Dao (2010) 9:323–337

DOI 10.1007/s11712-010-9176-z

Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic

Interpretation of the Laozi

Alex Feldt

Published online: 4 July 2010

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Within the literature, Daoist political philosophy has often been linked with
anarchism. While some extended arguments have been offered in favor of this
conclusion, I take this position to be tenuous and predicated on an assumption that
coercive authority cannot be applied through wuwei. Focusing on the Laozi as the
fundamental political text of classical Daoism, I lay out a general account of why one
ought to be skeptical of classifying it as anarchistic. Keeping this skepticism in mind and
recognizing the importance of wuwei in arguments for the anarchist conclusion, I provide
a non-anarchistic interpretation of wuwei as a political technique that is consistent with
the text of the Laozi. Having presented a plausible alternative to the anarchist
understanding of wuwei, I close my discussion with a brief sketch of a positive account
of the political theory of the Laozi.

Keywords Classical Daoism . Laozi . Political philosophy . wuwei . Anarchism

1 Preliminaries

Daoist political philosophy has often been linked with anarchist theories of the West.
As A.C. Graham notes, “[w]estern anarchists have claimed Laozi as one of themselves
ever since his book became known in the West in the 19th century” (Graham: 299),
to which John Clarke has added that “it has become almost common place to identify
the two” (Clarke 1999: 260).1 Unfortunately, this claim is often made in passing or with

1
For consistency, all quotations in the text using the Wade-Giles system of Romanization have been replaced
with Hanyu pinyin.
Alex Feldt (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 455 W. Lindsey, Room 605, Norman, OK 73019, USA
e-mail: alex.feldt@ou.edu
324 Alex Feldt

little critical engagement. Moreover, it appears that the only sustained arguments (at least
in the English language literature) come from a symposium in 1980 entitled “Is Political
Daoism an Anarchist Theory?”2 From this symposium emerged “a general consensus
that Daoist thought is supremely anarchistic,” which, while not a new conclusion at
the time, had “not hitherto been articulated in such cogent detail” (Cheng 1983: 4).
Since then, it is clear that this consensus in the literature has not changed, nor has it
received continued engagement. Though some might be skeptical of the anarchist
claim, there has yet to be a formalized refutation of it in the literature. This silence is
not surprising to some. In fact, John Rapp has commented that “it seems strange to
question whether philosophical Daoism is a doctrine of full-fledged anarchism similar
to Western anarchism,” since, according to him, the classical Daoist texts advocate
“for rulers to do nothing (wuwei)” and oppose most “techniques and forms of rule”
(Rapp 1998). Though others forward similar claims, the matter is not as simple as might
be suggested.
The arguments identifying Daoism with anarchist theory do it a disservice by
framing the discussion in a way that fails to provide a robust picture of the possibilities
for Daoist political theory. This neglect, I worry, also risks begging the question,
assuming anarchism while not entertaining other possible theories. These arguments
operate, implicitly or explicitly, with the following framework: (1) lay out a set of basic
conditions that an anarchist theory must meet; (2) show how Daoism meets those
conditions; and (3) discuss how Daoism can inform contemporary anarchist discourse.
Generally, the crux of the argument is that Daoism, particularly the Laozi, rejects all
forms of coercion and authority (often predicated on a specific understanding of wuwei),
and this rejection is taken to immediately identify Daoism as anarchist theory, given the
basic conditions provided for an anarchist theory. In taking this approach, rather than
attempting to independently flesh out a robust account of Daoist politics (or social
organization in the event there is no political order) and then comparing that to anarchist
theories, there is a worry that the anarchist conclusion is assumed from the beginning.
This worry is especially acute given the appearance that the anarchist conclusion rests
heavily on one’s understanding of wuwei, which often seems itself to rest on the anarchist
conclusion. I take this conclusion to be tenuous, and in what follows, I lay out an account
of why we ought to be skeptical of necessarily classifying Daoism as a whole as
anarchistic. Keeping this skepticism in mind, I will provide a non-anarchistic account of
wuwei and then close my discussion with a brief sketch of a positive account of the
political theory of the Laozi.
Before advancing the discussion, it is important to clarify the scope of Daoist thought
under consideration. The symposium mentioned above focused solely on classical Daoism,
as represented by the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, and I will not deviate from this. However,
like others, I take the Laozi to be the foundational text of socio-political relevance, while
the Zhuangzi is the foundational text of personal relevance (Ames 1998: 3; Ames 1994:
43). Consequently, the former enjoys priority in developing a general Daoist political

2
This symposium, sponsored by the International Society for Chinese Philosophy, took place at the Eastern
Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, which was held in Boston, MA. The presenters
were Fredric Bender, Roger Ames, and David Hall, with Julia Cheng and Benjamin Schwartz providing
comments. Following revisions, the papers were published in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (Vol. 10, no.
1), along with a fourth paper by John P. Clark that was commissioned to accompany the publication of the
three from the symposium.
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 325

theory, and my discussion focuses solely on it.3 I should also note that there are later
Daoists and neo-Daoists (particularly the Wei-Jin neo-Daoists), who fairly explicitly
advocate anarchism. While these neo-Daoists may well be genuinely anarchistic, given the
numerous and diverse interpretations of the Laozi, we cannot assume that any particular
reading of the text in later Daoist traditions is more authoritative than any other.
Furthermore, while I admit that one might be able to draw out a consistent anarchist
reading of the classical Daoist texts, I simply seek to show that there are other plausible
readings available and we ought to be highly skeptical of any definitive claim that classical
Daoism is necessarily anarchistic.

2 What is Anarchism?

Heretofore, I have used the term “anarchism” without explaining what it means for a theory
to be anarchistic. Above, I rejected framing a discussion in terms of providing a set of
necessary conditions for anarchist theories and then showing how Daoism fits within them;
however, it is still essential to clarify what is meant by the term. This is particularly
important due to frequent misappropriations and stereotypes associated with it.4
Unfortunately, no single definition of anarchism can be given, and we must concede that
“those considered anarchists at best share certain family resemblances” (De George 1995:
30–31). Recognizing this, and acknowledging it is beyond the scope of this paper to
provide an exhaustive account of anarchism itself, I will merely stipulate a working
definition. With this definition, I aim merely to cast a net wide enough to include the
myriad contemporary anarchist theories, and complete enough to provide a useful point for
comparative analysis.5
First and foremost, anarchism is a modern ideology that arose following, and in direct
opposition to, the development of the modern state.6 Generally, it entails the claim that any
institution that fits the form of the modern state (or serves the functions of the modern state)
is illegitimate. Thus anarchism rejects the authority of the state, particularly its claim to
hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force and violence. As Richard Sylvan
remarks, “an anarchist theory is just any laterally structured theory which duly conforms to
the principle of rejecting political authority and coercion” (Sylvan 2007: 262). Accordingly,

3
As noted by an anonymous reviewer, this decision to focus solely on the Laozi leaves open the question of
what other considerations one would have to make to bring the anarchist claim into question, given that those
who argue for an anarchist reading of the Laozi turn to the Zhuangzi for additional support. While I agree that
this could be an interesting question, I take it to be beyond the scope of this focused discussion of the Laozi.
Additionally, since the use of the Zhuangzi appears to be merely supplemental to any claims about anarchism
in classical Daoism and the Laozi clearly enjoys primacy in developing a classical Daoist political theory, it
will be most fruitful to focus solely on it. If one can show the foundational political text as not being
anarchistic, doubt will be immediately cast on any claims about classical Daoism being anarchistic.
4
For a brief discussion of four of the more common misperceptions and stereotypes of anarchism, see
McLaughlin 2007: 4–14.
5
For more detailed accounts and analyses of anarchism, broadly construed, see McLaughlin 2007; Sylvan
2007: 257–281. For a collection of papers focused on different aspects of anarchism, see Pennock and
Chapman 1978.
6
Sylvan claims that the main intellectual work on anarchism began “only in the late eighteenth century with
the eruption of the French Revolution” (Sylvan 2007: 257; see also Miller 1984: 3–4). For a detailed history
of the origins of anarchism, see Chapter 5 of McLaughlin 2007. While the explications of the theory did not
arise until the late 18th century, many anarchist historians have still tried to claim connections going all the
way back to Laozi, see Marshall 1992.
326 Alex Feldt

anarchist theory can be seen as rejecting centralized government and political authority,
instead viewing social organization (or government) as some form of voluntary, non-
hierarchical association.
However, anarchism ought not simply be understood as the mere rejection of the state.
To avoid oversimplification, it is perhaps best to give the highly influential definition
offered by John Clark. For Clark, in order for any political theory to be anarchistic, it must
contain the following four features:
(1) a view of an ideal, noncoercive, nonauthoritarian society; (2) a criticism of
existing society and its institutions, based on this nonauthoritarian ideal; (3) a view of
human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress toward the ideal; and (4)
a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of noncoercive, nonauthoritar-
ian, and decentralist alternatives. (Clark 1978: 13)
While we see the criticism (and implied rejection) of centralized government and
political authority of the preceding paragraph in (2), we see additional background
components in (1) and (3) that importantly expand on why one ought reject political
authority. In (4) we see that the rejection of political authority and a centralized state carries
significant implications beyond merely deconstructing authority. These four criteria afford a
broader and more robust picture of what an anarchist theory should or may include. While
these, or other, definitional criteria are typically presented conjunctively, they can also be
understood disjunctively, yielding what we might call “weak” or “diluted” anarchism.7 For
example, a diluted form of anarchism could hold as an ideal a noncoercive, nonauthor-
itarian society, yet retain no hope for the ability of humankind to bring it into being, and
consequently reject the state as legitimate, yet tolerate it as a necessary evil. If Daoism is a
type of anarchism, I take it that it would have to be a diluted form, for the reasons I will lay
out below.
Finally, let me highlight one feature of anarchism more generally that I believe to be
significant for considering the political philosophy of the Laozi in particular. One way to
capture the underlying method of anarchist theory is to classify it as a form of skepticism
(McLaughlin 2007). In anarchism, skepticism of the state generally derives from arguments
predicated on a specific notion of the individual, viz. the traditional Western, atomistic
individualism most clearly apparent in liberalism. In this context, political authority and the
use of coercive force are rejected via arguments that there are no moral grounds for them.
The inherent integrity and autonomy of the individual is taken to preclude the type of
interference entailed by political authority and coercive force. This is not to say that the
interrelational aspects of communal life pass unrecognized by anarchist theories; rather,
anarchists simply incline to recognize those aspects along with the base concept of the
individual qua individual.8 While anarchist theories may employ subtly different grounding
concepts of the individual, despite such variations, an appeal to the individual qua
individual is generally employed to produce a skeptical analysis of the state.

7
It is important to note that “[t]here are limits, however, to how far definitional dilution should be allowed to
proceed: a theory such as Nozick’s libertarianism, postulating a minimal coercive centralized state, exceeds
acceptable bounds of dilution” (Sylvan 2007: 258).
8
While the individualism mentioned here is present in most anarchist theories (particularly that of Max
Stirner), there are other collectivist strains (especially Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin) that do run
counter to the full-fledged individualism of liberalism. However, even in these more collectivist theories
there does seem to be a use of the concept of a person that is much more in the vein of liberalism than
Daoism (Clarke 2000: 106 & 225n29; Ames 1983: 31–32).
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 327

3 Prima Facie Problems with Classifying Daoism as Anarchism

Given the origins of anarchism, it is important to recognize that claiming the political
philosophy of the Laozi as a form of anarchism requires placing a Chinese world-view into
a Western framework that postdates it by over two thousand years and is understood vis-à-
vis a particular Western concept (i.e., the modern state). This alone should raise initial
skepticism about the anarchist conclusion regarding the Laozi. However, this is not the only
reason for initial skepticism. Daoism’s own historical past must be considered. While my
focus here is on the text of the Laozi, it nonetheless seems appropriate to observe that, as
Clarke notes, “Daoists have frequently been participants in the processes of government,
have given advice to emperors, and have constituted a significant factor in political
argument in China for over two thousand years” (Clarke 1999: 258).9 Additionally, the
active engagement with politics by Daoists in the Han dynasty led to the development of
the politically oriented Huang-Lao Daoism (Guo: 80–84). These historical phenomena
would be difficult to explain if Daoism were from the beginning necessarily anarchistic.
Beyond Daoism’s historical past, there are three theoretical reasons for skepticism: (1) the
fact that the Laozi is clearly a political treatise addressed to the ruler and providing him with
a philosophy of governance; (2) the Chinese conception of personhood, which creates a
problem for traditional anarchist arguments that utilize a notion of the atomistic individual;
and, (3) the fact that the skepticism of the Laozi is aimed at a different target than that of
anarchism. I will now address each of these in turn.

3.1 The Laozi as a Political Treatise

It is widely accepted that the Laozi ought to be understood as a political treatise, espousing
a particular form of governance through wuwei. Examining the Laozi, there are at least 40
chapters of a political nature.10 As D.C. Lau notes in introducing his translation:
The term “sage (sheng ren)” occurs more than twenty times in the Laozi and, with
only a few exceptions, refers always to a ruler who understands the dao. Besides “the
sage,” there are other terms as well that refer to rulers, like “the lord of men” and
“lords and princes”. This shows that the Laozi is, through and through, a work on the
art of government. (Lau 1963: xxviii–xxix)
Beyond merely referencing the ruler, the text is, more importantly, directly addressed to
him. This is clear not only from the text’s content, but also from stylistic features identified
by Hans-Georg Moeller:
When the word “I” appears in the text … [i]t is the “I” of the prospective ruler who
studies the teaching of the Daodejing. This “I” functions similar to the “I” as it was
used some time ago, for instance, in “educational” materials for children ... It is an “I”
that asks the reader or listener to identify him/herself with, and not the “I” of the
speaker or of the author. (Moeller 2004: 7)
Additionally, wuwei is employed in the text explicitly as a political technique in at least
6 of its 12 appearances in the Laozi, as well as 18 of its 56 appearances in the Zhuangzi

9
In making this claim, Clarke cites Seidel 1989–1990: 273–278 and Verellen 1995: 326–327.
10
Laozi 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28–32, 35–37, 45, 47–49, 51, 53, 54, 57–62, 64–69, 72, 74, 75,
77, 78, and 80. This list is based on a comparison of passages cited by others in discussing the political
philosophy of Daoism, as well as my own reflections.
328 Alex Feldt

(Creel 1970: 54–55).11 Were the text not political in nature, these facets of the text would be
difficult to understand. Consequently, I take them to prove decisive in claiming the Laozi as
a political treatise.
When we examine the nature of the text’s political claims, the existence of a legitimate,
centralized political order is quickly apparent. In Chapter 17, in a ranking of types of rulers,
we see a full acceptance of the state:12
The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects.
Next comes the ruler they love and praise;
Next comes one they fear;
Next comes one with whom they take liberties.
When there is not enough faith, there is lack of good faith.
Hesitant, he does not utter words lightly.
When his task is accomplished and his work done
The people all say, “It happened to us naturally.”
At no point in this passage is there a rejection of government or the state, and this
absence is telling. There could have easily been a claim made that the best ruler is the one
who does not exist. Instead, the text merely advocates a government that is not overly
intrusive or authoritative, resulting in the people’s “forgetting” they are being governed.13
This theme of minimal interference in governing the state pervades the text, most explicitly
in Chapters 29, 57, and 60. Chapters 29 and 57 both provide claims that the empire ought to
be ruled without frequent actions; the former claiming that whoever tries to alter the empire
will lose it and the latter claiming that the ruler ought not to be meddlesome. Chapter 60
notes that “[g]overning a large state is like boiling a small fish,” suggesting it requires as
little handling as possible.
Rather than making these frequent arguments for minimal government interference, the
text could have simply argued that the government or ruler is illegitimate or ought not to
exist. However, no such claim is offered. The text consistently assumes the legitimacy of a
political order governed by a single ruler: “While the notion of ‘giving up the throne’
occurs frequently in the Daoist literature, there is never any talk of ‘doing away’ with the
throne” (Ames 1983: 36).14 Furthermore, ancient Chinese philosophical texts unvaryingly
assume an autocratic framework, most likely due to their historical context. The Laozi
notably does not depart from this assumption, seeming to take autocracy as legitimate and
given while navigating the scope and most efficacious use of monarchical power within it.

11
Creel cites the following passages in the Laozi as appearances of the term wuwei, and I have indicated
those employing it as a political technique with an asterisk: 2, 3*, 10*, 37*, 38, 43* (twice), 48 (twice), 57*,
63, and 64. In referring to wuwei as a political technique, I am simply stating that it is employed in these
passages as a method of governance, regardless of whether or not it is a dispositional extension of the ruler. I
take it that even if wuwei ought to be understood as the extension of a ruler’s inner disposition, it will have
no bearing on the overall force of my argument. All that I require is that wuwei is understood as having a
political role within the text.
12
All quotations from the Laozi are given using D.C. Lau’s translation of the text.
13
Roger Ames and David Hall take this passage as an example of anarchism in the Laozi. As they note in
their commentary: “The most efficacious regime is one in which those who rule carry out their administrative
responsibilities so lightly and unobtrusively that the people are able to go about their business confidently
without detecting any kind of manipulation” (Ames and Hall 2003: 102). However, the mere lack of
detection or recognition of coercion does not imply that there is no coercion or coercive authority present.
14
Additionally, all the passages Ames cites come from the Zhuangzi, while there are no passages in the
Laozi that appear to imply “giving up the throne” (see Hsiao 1979: 308–309).
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 329

While the above does not decisively reject the anarchist conclusion, it ought to arouse
our skepticism. The Laozi does not merely appear to accept the existence of a legitimate
state; it accepts a state that is hierarchical and autocratic in nature. Hence the Laozi accepts
the very thing rejected by anarchists: a centralized political authority. At the least, it seems
that the burden of proof now rests heavily on those claiming the Laozi as anarchistic. One
possible avenue for the anarchist here is to argue that while the Laozi accepts the state, it is
a conception of the state stripped of anything resembling coercion and political authority.
This seems to be a common route (Ames and Hall 2003: 102–103; Ames 1983: 31–42;
Bender 1983: 8–15; Clark 1983: 80–85). However, this argument rests on a specific
anarchist interpretation of wuwei, which I will argue below is open to question. Even if the
political philosophy of the Laozi is shown to be anarchistic, given the above, we would
have no choice but to consider it diluted anarchism.

3.2 Problem of the Ancient Chinese Concept of the Person

A second conceptual problem facing the anarchist reading of the Laozi arises out of a lack
of tension between the individual and collective. Roger Ames notes this effectively:
“Common to both individualist and social anarchists alike, however, is a perceived tension
between individual liberty and the collective will. In Daoism and in Chinese political
thought generally, this tension does not exist” (Ames 1983: 32). This lack of tension results
from the Daoist, and more generally Chinese, conception of the person. Rather than
conceiving the self as autonomous and discrete, Daoists understand the self as
interdependent and contextualized. As Karyn Lai notes, this understanding of interdepen-
dence with others as constitutive of the self, means that “[n]otions of development, self-
fulfillment, and meaningful action are embedded in the conceptual framework of
interdependence” (Lai 2006: 47). Personhood derives from one’s existence within a
specific context, defining the “individual” relative to the relations of that context, be they
interpersonal, to the natural world, or to the cosmos. Thus, for the Daoist there is no
individual qua individual (or rights bearing individual), only an individual qua member of a
contextualized web of relations. Consequently, there is no individual (in the Western,
atomistic sense) on which to predicate the skeptical arguments of the anarchist against the
state. The individual the anarchist defends from state interference is absent and thus the
tension between ruling authority and the autonomy of the ruled either does not arise, or
does so in a form unfamiliar and unanticipated by Western anarchism. In the early Chinese
context, the ruler and ruled become coextensive, each mutually defining and determining
the other. There is no inevitable opposition between the two.
This conception of the self as interdependent can yield an organicist conception of the
state, which can be utilized to argue for the anarchist conclusion (Ames 1983: 32–42; Clark
1983: 65–80). However, this does not necessarily generate a noncoercive relationship
between ruler and ruled (contra Ames 1983: 32–42). That the ruler and ruled are
understood as mutually determining and defining is not inconsistent with coercion. Mutual
determination may well include coercion. Coercion can only be understood through a two-
place relation. In its simplest form, it is the power of one entity to force some specific
action from another entity. Additionally, this two-place relation allows us to understand
each entity through the other: we understand one who is coerced as being defined by the
one coercing, and vice versa. Given this, it is conceptually unproblematic to view the ruler
(the one with the ability to coerce) and the ruled (one who is coerced) as mutually
determining one another. Moreover, I would argue that some measure of coercion is a
necessary aspect of the ruler/ruled relation. By definition “ruler” conceptually requires the
330 Alex Feldt

existence of at least one person who is ruled, and the only way that individual can be ruled
is if the ruler has the ability to force her to act when necessary. This ability to force another
to act entails the presence of coercive power. Without the ability to coerce and force action
when needed, there can be no ruler/ruled relation. This is not to say that the ruler will
always be actively engaged in forcing the ruled to act, nor does it prohibit the ruled from
acting voluntarily (thus not requiring the ruler to act). It simply means that mechanisms
must be in place to allow the ruler to exercise his or her power. Once we grant that the
Laozi accepts the existence of a legitimate ruler of the state and the Daoist conception of the
person as interdependent, the text must allow for some coercive institutional element.
Otherwise, there is no way to make sense of the mutually determining relationship between
the ruler and the people. This allowance, and perhaps necessary existence, of coercion again
creates tension between the political philosophy of the Laozi and the anarchist.

3.3 Differing Focal Points of Skepticism

The final conceptual reason for being wary of the anarchist conclusion is that the skepticism
found in the Laozi takes a very different target than the skepticism of anarchism. As noted
above, anarchism can be understood as a type of skepticism directed solely toward political
authority. While there is a pervasive skepticism throughout the Laozi, it appears focused
solely on social norms and culture. Specifically, it particularly targets Confucian social
norms (e.g. benevolence and righteousness):
When the great way falls into disuse
There are benevolence and rectitude;
When cleverness emerges
There is great hypocrisy;
When the six relations are at variance
There are filial children;
When the state is benighted
There are loyal ministers. (Laozi 18)
Exterminate the sage, discard the wise,
And the people will benefit a hundredfold;
Exterminate benevolence, discard rectitude,
And the people will again be filial;
Exterminate ingenuity, discard profit,
And there will be no more thieves and bandits.
These three, being false adornments, are not enough
And the people must have something to which they can attach themselves:
Exhibit the unadorned and embrace the uncarved block,
Have little thought of self and as few desires as possible. (Laozi 19)
In both of these chapters, representative examples of the wider skepticism of the text, we
see a complete rejection of the existing Confucian social norms, yet we do not see this
skepticism expanded to include other targets.15 Here, there is once again a clear opportunity

15
One might claim that the target is expanded beyond Confucian social norms in the opening line of Chapter
19 calling for the extermination of the sage, which as noted above is typically used in the Laozi to reference
the Daoist ruler or emperor. However, given the focus of the rest of the passage on either artificial or
Confucian social norms, one ought to take the use of “the sage” here to reference the Confucian sage, rather
than the Daoist ruler.
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 331

for the text to say something anarchistic, yet it notably passes it over. Just as the text is
silent when given a chance to deny the need for a ruler (as noted above), it is also silent on
this occasion when presented with an opportunity to expand its skepticism to the authority
of the state.
Given that the text confines its skepticism to Confucian moral targets, the only place the
skepticism of the Laozi might enter into the political realm is a rejection of the Confucian
virtuous ruler. This is seen in Chapter 17 (cited above) where a ranking of the best types of
ruler is provided. Here the Confucian ruler is the one whom the people “love and praise.”
While the Laozi does not claim the Confucian ruler to be the worst, it still clearly shows the
Confucian ruler to be less desirable than the Daoist ruler. Yet, in this, there is no rejection or
skepticism of the ruler or political authority generally, only a skepticism and disagreement
about the worth of certain types of rulers. Consequently, it would appear that the skepticism
of the Laozi never takes on the same target as anarchism.

4 Understanding Wuwei as a Political Technique

If the skepticism of the anarchist reading of the Laozi above is to be overcome, the anarchist
would require a way of explaining how the state exists legitimately devoid of coercive,
authoritarian force. Here, the anarchist is likely to turn to the concept of wuwei, which as
mentioned above, is employed as a technique of government in half of its appearances in
the Laozi. Given the acceptance of the state in the Laozi, it should not be surprising that
arguments for the anarchist conclusion are predicated on a noncoercive and nonauthori-
tarian conception of wuwei as the principal technique of rulership. In fact, without this
specific interpretation of wuwei, it seems highly implausible that one could make a case for
the Laozi as being anarchistic. Thus, it is essential to examine what this concept entails vis-
à-vis governance and whether this undermines political authority yielding anarchism.

4.1 Problem of Translation

Perhaps the largest problem for understanding wuwei in a political context is the difficulty
in formulating a satisfying account of what wuwei generally entails. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the numerous efforts by scholars to establish an adequate translation of the
term. In their translation of the Laozi, Roger Ames and David Hall translate it as
“noncoercion” (Ames and Hall 2003); however, in his study of ancient Chinese political
thought, Ames keeps it untranslated, sometimes providing English alternatives in
parentheses, including “noncoercive activity,” “nonaction,” “doing nothing,” and “acting
naturally” (Ames 1994). D.C. Lau’s translation of the Laozi utilizes “nonaction” (Lau
1963). Edward Slingerland’s book length study of wuwei opts for a final metaphorical
rendering of “effortless action” (Slingerland 2003), while in a recent book Lai uses multiple
renderings, including “non-coercing action,” “non-conditioning,” “non-imposing,” and
“non-action” (Lai 2006). Finally, Benjamin Schwartz takes it “as meaning nonaction or,
more importantly, as the kind of unpremeditated, nondeliberative, noncalculating,
nonpurposive action” (Schwartz 1985: 75).
It is quickly apparent that not all of these translations carry the same meaning and
implications in English. This is increasingly evident when they are put in a political
context: to govern through non-action is effectively to do nothing, while to govern through
non-coercive action is to do something via voluntary associations, or something of that
nature. There is also a worry about the choice of “noncoercion” as a translation for wuwei,
332 Alex Feldt

since that choice appears to hinge on the anarchist conclusion, which itself calls on the
translation choice for support. Thus, the differing notions of wuwei yield quite different
modes of political activity. GUO Xuezhi offers one possible mode: “In the doctrine of the
Daodejing, however, nonaction (wuwei) is to govern without active interference…. Laozi
holds that there is a certain rule based on natural law that functions beyond any conscious
effort of political actors” (Guo 2002: 75). Other interpretations move this passivity more
toward full anarchism or collectivism (Ames 1983; Ames 1994; Clark 1983; Rapp 1998).
How then ought we understand wuwei in the political arena?
Given the myriad interpretations available, it is important to explicate a plausible reading
of wuwei that is not only intelligible, but also consistent with its use in ancient Chinese
literature. Any satisfactory conception must not only provide a clear understanding of
wuwei itself, but must also make sense of its paradoxical nature:
This term [wuwei], which goes back to Confucius, is often translated by such
innocuous phrases as “non-action” to avoid giving the impression that Daoists
recommend idleness, but it seems better to keep the paradoxical force of the Chinese
expression. Wei is ordinary human action, deliberated for a purpose, in contrast with
spontaneous processes of nature which are “so of themselves.” (Graham 1989: 232)
Thus, we must find an understanding of wuwei that can make sense of this, in a crude
sense, “acting, but not acting.”

4.2 A Possible Political Rendering of Wuwei

In order to make sense of wuwei in a political context, it is helpful to look at its other
appearances and uses in ancient Chinese literature. Here I draw on the work of H.G. Creel
and his essay on the origins of the Daoist employment of wuwei.16 Creel is quick to point
out that wuwei cannot be understood as merely “doing nothing”:
In terms of common sense, this advice may well seem absurd. No government, in any
time or place has been able to follow a policy of doing nothing for very long and stay
in power. If this were possible, the last place in which it would have been possible
was the China of the Zhan’guo [Warring States] period, in which Daoism
developed…. A policy of inaction, in any simple sense, would have been literally
suicidal. (Creel 1970: 55)
This is a useful point of departure for our examination, as it emphasizes an important
concern for the early Daoists: the efficacy of government. The Laozi is prominently
concerned with maintaining the state and, as a result, focuses on the most efficacious
manner for doing so. We see this focus in Chapter 3, which articulates the best method for
maintaining peace in the state:
Not to honour men of worth will keep the people from contention; not to value goods
which are hard to come by will keep them from theft; not to display what is desirable
will keep them from being unsettled of mind. Therefore in governing the people, the

16
Creel is predominately concerned with presenting an argument tracing the origins and use of wuwei. I am
merely drawing on his work to bring out a plausible interpretation of wuwei that I will argue can be seen as
consistent with the text of the Laozi as it exists today, regardless of its origins. Should discoveries of new
texts show Creel’s historical genealogy to be incorrect, it ought not impact the possibility of understanding
wuwei in a particular sense, insofar as that sense is consistent with its employment in the Laozi.
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 333

sage empties their minds but fills their bellies, weakens their wills but strengthens
their bones. He always keeps them innocent of knowledge and free from desire, and
ensures that the clever never dare to act. Do that which consists in taking no action
[wuwei], and order will prevail.
This aim ought to be kept in mind as we proceed with the discussion. Wuwei must, in the
end, be an effective way of governance.
Here, we turn to Creel’s examination of the appearances of wuwei in the extant texts that
predate the Laozi, as well as the earliest portions of the Zhuangzi. Creel finds no uses of
wuwei in the Yijing, Shujing, Chunqiu, or the Guoyu. The only extant texts in which he
finds wuwei employed are the Shijing (on four occasions) and the Lunyu (on one occasion)
(Creel: 56–61). Of these five, Creel takes only the Lunyu (15.4) appearance as significant,
nonetheless noting that it does not explain the Daoist (and even later Confucian)
employment of the term:
[the appearance in the Lunyu] epitomizes Confucius’ view that the ruler should be
one who sets a proper example and selects virtuous and able officials, who “reigns
but does not rule.” But this Confucian use of the term does not explain, nor does it
even seem adequately to foreshadow, the meaning of wu-wei in Daoist literature. Yet,
in the latter half of the fourth century B.C. and the first half of the third there
developed, with no apparent antecedents, the Daoist wu-wei with all of its abstruse
peculiarities. And this Daoist wu-wei became so influential that we find it, and not the
wu-wei of Confucius, in the Confucian book Xunzi. (Creel 1970: 61)
With no clear uses of the term that seem even apparently associated with the Laozi’s
usage, there appears to be no recourse for understanding the initial employment of wuwei in
the Laozi beyond the text itself.
However, Creel claims there is help available in a no longer extant text. He points to
fragments available to us that purportedly were part of the Shenzi, attributed to SHEN
Buhai, the prime minister of the state of Han in the 4th century B.C.E. (Creel 1970: 61–
62).17 In these fragments, “wuwei” appears six times, each with clear political
implications. Wuwei is described as an advantageous technique in which the ruler
appoints ministers to carry out the actual functions of his administration, while he is freed
to supervise the overall course of things without losing perspective (Creel 1970: 65). It is
important to note however, that the usage here does not imply that the ruler should give
up his authority nor do they claim he never ought to act. They instead emphasize a ruler
with absolute control, who when necessary will alter his administration in the minimal
ways necessary to maintain proper functioning. Thus, we get a notion of wuwei that
makes sense of the ruler as personally passive, while still actively governing through
ministers, and non-authoritarian in allowing ministers to govern day-to-day, while still

17
Ames, in a footnote in his Art of Rulership, rejects this turn to the Shenzi as it is premised on “an
assumption that the SHEN Buhai fragments are genuine and, moreover, on a tentative and highly subjective
attempt to arrange pre-Ch’in texts in a chronological order…. Given the combination of scant data and
tenuous chronology, no attempt to determine the historical origin of wu-wei can amount to much more than
strained speculation” (Ames 1994: 216n1). However, even if no definitive ordering can be made,
understanding other uses of wuwei from a similar time period can still help offer a way of understanding
it that might prove beneficial in grasping its use in the Laozi. All that is necessary for my argument is that the
interpretation of wuwei offered is consistent with the Laozi, regardless of its historical origins (see note 16
above).
334 Alex Feldt

being authoritarian by maintaining ultimate control over the state at large. The ruler,
through wuwei, is able to remain distant and vigilant over all things, making sure they
accord with the dao, yet when action is required act to set the conditions (via policy
changes) to allow continued accordance with the dao.
This type of ministerial bureaucracy not only fits with the historical context in which
early Daoist thought emerged, but it is also fully consistent with the passages of the Laozi
employing wuwei in a political context. Chapter 30, for example, explicitly mentions the
use of ministers in governance. With this view, we can now make sense of the use of wuwei
in the closing stanza of Chapter 3 without resorting to a paradoxical stance or the
aforementioned suicidal policy of nonaction: “Do that which consists in taking no action,
and order will prevail.” If we merely take the passage as stating that in a bureaucratic
structure proper governance is possible, it becomes an unassuming statement. Moreover,
this conception of wuwei fits with the claim in Chapter 17 that the best ruler is one whose
existence is merely known to the people. If wuwei is the preferred technique of governance
and its employment would place the ruler far removed from the people (to the point they
take him as passive and the local ministers as active), it makes sense to hold up as the ideal
the ruler who is merely known to the people.
It is important to note that instituting this autocratic and bureaucratic conception of
wuwei does not question the legitimacy of a centralized coercive political authority, nor
does the above undermine such authority. While the ruler does not maintain an active hand
in daily governance, he never absolves himself of the power to institute policy and
structural changes necessary to facilitate society’s accordance with the dao on a broader
level. If the ruler were to give up his political authority, then he would never be able to
institute any changes, and consequently would never be able to help bring the people into
accordance with the dao, which appears to be one of the goals of governance in the Laozi.
One objection that might be raised against this account of wuwei is that in the instances
the ruler acts, he violates the notion that wuwei entails non-purposive action in accordance
with the dao. However, this might not be all that troublesome once one considers the
opening portions of Chapter 49: “The sage has no mind of his own. He takes as his own the
mind of the people.” This prescription for a ruler’s deference to those other than himself is
also apparent in Chapter 7. When the ruler, through due diligence, is forced to intervene and
act, he does so not with his own desires as an end, but instead takes as his desire that of the
people and the dao itself. Thus, the ruler is not acting in the purposive, desire based way
that is condemned throughout the Laozi. He is not acting from social norms or artificial
values. Rather, he simply acts in a manner that allows things to accord more with the dao.
Consequently, his action through wuwei can be understood as being impersonally non-
purposive (in the Daoist sense).
In closing this section, it is helpful to summarize the importance of wuwei. Most
arguments for the anarchist reading of the Laozi utilize an interpretation of wuwei as
either “nonaction” so as to render the government superfluous, or “noncoercive action” so
as to remove the coercive and authoritarian elements of the state anarchism rejects (Ames
1983; Ames 1994; Bender 1983; Clark 1983; Rapp 1998). However, given the
plausibility of the above rendering of wuwei and its consistency with the text, the matter,
at best, cannot be as straightforward as imagined, and, at worst, cannot succeed at all.
Either way, it is clear that much more attention needs to be given to the political
conception of wuwei in the Laozi. While such an examination cannot be continued here, it
is sufficient for my purposes that we have shown the anarchist reading of wuwei to be
problematic. So long as there are plausible, rival readings of wuwei, the anarchist reading
must remain in doubt.
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 335

5 Sketching a Positive Account of the Political Order of the Laozi

If the above arguments and account of wuwei are plausible, then we ought to be able to
provide a positive, nonanarchistic account of the political order espoused by the Laozi.
While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a complete and detailed account,
in closing my discussion, I will provide a brief sketch of what form this might take. Given
the above, the political structure presented in the Laozi would necessarily be autocratic,
with a centralized government ruled by the Daoist sage and administered by numerous
ministers. The ruler or autocrat would operate through wuwei, allowing the ministers and
others to have direct control of government functions, while always maintaining ultimate
control and authority. Thus, the ruler would enjoy supreme political authority.
Furthermore, the state will attempt to operate in a manner that allows as much freedom
as possible for the people. This is clear from numerous references in the Laozi to the fact
that the people are best served when the government is not meddlesome and there is not an
excess of laws. We see this in Chapter 57:
Govern the state by being straightforward; wage war by being crafty; but win the
empire by not being meddlesome.
How do I know that it is like that? By means of this.
The more taboos there are in the empire
The poorer the people;
The more sharpened tools the people have
The more benighted the state;
The more skills the people have
The further novelties multiply;
The better known the laws and edicts
The more thieves and robbers there are.
Hence the sage says,
I take no action and the people are transformed of themselves;
I prefer stillness and the people are rectified of themselves;
I am not meddlesome and the people prosper of themselves;
I am free from desire and the people of themselves become simple like the
uncarved block.

This idea of a nonintrusive state is also clear in the first half of Chapter 75, which adds
an explicit criticism of taxation:
The people are hungry:
It is because those in authority eat up too much in taxes
That the people are hungry.
The people are difficult to govern:
It is because those in authority are too fond of action
That the people are difficult to govern.
Putting this emphasis on personal freedom, with the political structure of the preceding
paragraph, we see a bureaucratic centralized state, governed by a single ruler, with minimal
or no taxation, minimal laws, and maximal freedoms.
While it might be the case that no Western analogue can properly capture the political
structure of the Laozi, it seems useful to offer an alternative Western analogue to rival the
336 Alex Feldt

anarchist reading. My own sense is that the best way to understand Daoist political thought
is to see it as an early Chinese anticipation of the minimal, “nightwatchman” state of
Nozickean libertarianism. Under Nozick’s conception, the state is “limited to the functions
of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of
contracts” (Nozick 1974: 26). As such, the only justified governmental institutions are a
military (to protect against foreign aggression), judicial system, and police. While there are
great discrepancies between the political philosophy of the Laozi and Nozickean
libertarianism generally, the role of the state appears quite similar. For both, the state
simply provides the basic infrastructure for communal living via protection from both
internal and external forces. And, in both, political authority is exercised on the
“watchman” model, in which, to employ the Laozi’s own suggestive language, authority
resides at a distance, easily “forgotten” when unneeded but available when required. It is
worth noting that it is possible that the scope of a political order consistent with the Laozi
could far exceed the scope of the legitimate functions of Nozick’s state, since the only
requirement for the legitimacy of government actions according to the Laozi is that they are
achieved through wuwei.18 However, given the passages cited directly above it seems likely
that the political order presented in the Laozi would be closer to the scope of Nozick’s state
than not. Clearly, there is ample room for continued expansion, but with this we have a
strong foundation from which to develop a detailed non-anarchistic, positive account of
political order consistent with the Laozi.

6 Final Remarks

Throughout my discussion, the goal has merely been to show that the Laozi, and thus
classical Daoism as a whole, is not necessarily anarchistic. To that end, I have provided
numerous reasons for being skeptical of the anarchist conclusion, while offering a possible
account of wuwei that supports a positive account of the political order espoused in the
Laozi. Not only do I take the above argument to be as plausible as the anarchist reading of
the Laozi, I take it to be just as consistent with the text. Consequently, there is compelling
reason to reconsider the anarchist reading of classical Daoism, since we ought to be
skeptical of the claim that its foundational political text is anarchistic. While I do not
consider my argument to definitively reject the anarchist reading in favor of my own, it
does at least show the need and room for further engagement on the point. It might simply
be the case that the Laozi opens itself up to multiple interpretations, insofar as the
anarchistic and non-anarchistic readings are both consistent with the text. However, given
the above discussion and the clear fact that classical Daoism endorses the existence of a
ruler and a state, it seems that even if one is inclined to the anarchist position, it must be a
form of diluted anarchism. Either way, there is good reason to reject the consensus in the
literature, presented in the introduction, that classical Daoism as a whole is “supremely
anarchistic.”

18
Here, I am indebted to Dr. HUANG Yong for noting that a key difference between Nozickean libertarianism
(and most Western political ideologies for that matter) and the political philosophy of the Laozi is that
Western ideologies are not wuwei and are instead focused on the legitimate scope of youwei. While this point
could prove interesting in any sustained comparative discussion of a full account of the political philosophy
of the Laozi with Western analogues, I will not undertake that here. Even if this distinction moves the
political philosophy of the Laozi farther afield from Nozickean libertarianism, it still would not move it to the
anarchist camp, and thus does not cause any worry for the primary focus of my discussion in this paper.
Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi 337

Acknowledgments I am greatly indebted to Dr. Amy Olberding for her invaluable comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I would also like to express my thanks to Dr. HUANG Yong and two anonymous reviewers
for their helpful and insightful comments.

References

Ames, Roger T. 1983. “Is Political Taoism Anarchism?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10.1: 27–47.
_____. 1994. The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
_____. 1998. “Introduction.” In Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. Edited by Roger T. Ames. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press.
Ames, Roger T., and David Hall, trans. 2003. Daodejing – “Making this Life Significant”: A Philosophical
Translation. New York: Ballantine Books.
Bender, Fredric. 1983. “Taoism and Western Anarchism.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10.1: 5–26.
Cheng, Chung-Ying. 1983. “Introduction.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10.1: 1–4.
Clark, John, P. 1978. “What is Anarchism?” In Pennock and Chapman 1978.
_____. 1983. “On Taoism and Politics.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10.1: 65–88.
Clarke, John J. 1999. “Taoist Politics: An Other Way?” In Border Crossings: Towards a Comparative
Political Theory. Edited by Fred Dallmayr, 253–276. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
_____. 2000. The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought. London: Routledge.
Creel, Herrlee G. 1970. What Is Taoism?: And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
De George, Richard T. 1995. “Anarchism.” In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Edited by Ted
Honderich, 30–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Graham, A.C. 1989. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. Chicago, IL: Open
Court.
Guo, Xuezhi. 2002. The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Hsiao, Kung-Chuan. 1979. A History of Chinese Political Thought, Vol. 1. Translated by F.W. Mote.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lai, Karyn. 2006. Learning from Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualized Self.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Lau, D.C., trans. 1963. Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching. New York: Penguin.
Marshall, Peter. 1992. Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. New York: Harper Collins.
McLaughlin, Paul. 2007. Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Miller, David. 1984. Anarchism. London: Dent.
Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2004. Daoism Explained: From the Dream of the Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory.
Chicago, IL: Open Court.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Pennock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. 1978. Anarchism: Nomos XIX. New York: New York
University Press.
Rapp, John A. 1998. “Daoism and Anarchism Reconsidered.” Anarchist Studies 6.2: 123–151.
Schwartz, Benjamin I. 1985. The World and Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Seidel, Anna. 1989–1990. “Chronicle of Taoist Studies 1950–1980.” Cahier d’Extrême Asie 5: 273–278.
Slingerland, Edward. 2003. Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early
China. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sylvan, Richard. 2007. “Anarchism.” In A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition,
Vol. 1. Edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, 257–281. Oxford: Blackwell.
Verellen, Franciscus. 1995. “Taoism.” Journal of Asian Studies 54.2: 322–346.