Professional Documents
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1 Political Law - Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
1 Political Law - Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
SOURCE
NOTE
The author is not related or connected to any of the Justices of the Supreme Court
(past or present). Unauthorized distribution or reproduction of the materials without
the author’s consent is punishable by law.
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CASE DOCTRINES
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.
It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can only be
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that is, that degree of proof that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Hence, where the court entertains a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, it is not only the right of the accused
to be freed; it is the court's constitutional duty to acquit them.
A MOA or contract between the water district entity and the deep well operator/user
is not required under the law and the Rules. However, when a MOA is voluntarily
agreed upon and executed, the obligation to pay production assessment fees on the
part of the deep well operator/user and the right of the water district entity to
collect the fees arise from contract. The parties are, therefore, legally bound to
comply with their respective prestations.
While mere omission from or misdeclaration in one's SALN per se do not constitute
Dishonesty, an omission or misdeclaration qualifies as such offense when it is
attended with malicious intent to conceal the truth, as Dishonesty implies a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud.
“Public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them.
For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the
plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand,
official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the plaintiff is
left in the darkness of uncertainty.”
While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious
rights, the Court fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be
served by the denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption [from all his
Sabbath (from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday) classes, exams, and other non-
religious activities]. Neither is there any showing that petitioner Valmores' absence
from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others.
before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be
supported by documentary evidence. The amount of just compensation could only be
attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the
condemned property. A commissioners' report of land prices which is not based on
any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the
court.
[Under R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National And Local
Elections)], the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear,
carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the definition of
"firearms," among others. These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC,
which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on
election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
No vacancy having legally been created by the illegal dismissal, no appointment may
be validly made to that position and the new appointee has no right whatsoever to
that office. She should be returned to where she came from or be given another
equivalent item. No person, no matter how qualified and eligible for a certain position,
may be appointed to an office which is not yet vacant. The incumbent must have
been lawfully removed or his appointment validly terminated, since an appointment
to an office which is not vacant is null and void ab initio.
[S]ince respondent Basada is merely performing a civic duty and is not actually
engaged in outside employment or any private business or profession, the
requirement of obtaining authority from the head of office to engage in outside
employment obviously does not apply to him.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system,
or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a
public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated,
property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title
nullifies that title.
[T]he Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own
personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by
other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory
qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the
Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes
another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its
own choice.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides that [n]o
lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of
Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary
of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources).
[T]here are TWO documents that must be presented to prove that the land subject
of the application for registration is alienable and disposable: (1) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records, and (2) a certificate of land classification status
issued by the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
The Court, no matter how vast its powers are, cannot trample on the previously
discussed right of schools to enhance their curricula and the primary right of parents
to rear their children, which includes the right to determine which schools are best
suited for their children's needs. Even before the passage of the K to 12 Law, private
educational institutions had already been allowed to enhance the prescribed
curriculum, considering the State's recognition of the complementary roles of public
and private institutions in the educational system.
The fact that they acquired the same by sale and their transferor by succession is not
incontrovertible proof that it is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of
such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption
arising from the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or
dominion must be overcome.
The rule (fruit of the poisonous tree) is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties' alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least,
only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
"[I]f the opposition or the adverse claim of any person covers only a portion of the
lot and said portion is not properly delimited on the plan attached to the application,
x x x conflicting claims of ownership or possession, or overlapping of boundaries, the
court may require the parties to submit a subdivision plan duly approved by the
Director of Lands."
Under Executive Order No. 229, DAR shall exercise "quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)] and the Department of Agriculture
(DA)." In such cases, "[a]ll doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the
law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian
matters."
While it is true that the act of affixing a public officer's signature on a document in
the ordinary course of business does not automatically mean that he/she becomes a
participant in an illegal or anomalous transaction, however, when the very face of the
document reflects a possible irregularity, then there arises an additional reason for
the public officer to examine the document in more detail and exercise a greater
degree of diligence before signing the document.
While it is true that the issuance of the CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership Award)
does not put the ownership of petitioner beyond attack and scrutiny, respondents
should have done it in a separate action for that purpose. As held in a plethora of
cases, the issue of the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued,
can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The validity of
the CLOA cannot be attacked collaterally.
[A] case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public
utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied
the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior
acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will
not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such
property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and
injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable
estoppel. The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case
without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just
compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the
public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and
determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67
(Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the
value of the subject land.
[T]he Court reiterates that it is aware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort
to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass
civilians. Hence, the Court reaffirms the long-standing rule that the presumption that
regular duty was performed by the police officers could not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of the innocence of the accused.
[E]ven if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the
police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked
[petitioner] for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak
of.
In finding that Durban failed to strictly observe the prescribed working hours, the
Court also takes into consideration his advanced age, his years of service, and the
fact that this is his first offense. In determining the penalty to be imposed, the Court
considers the facts of the case and factors which may serve as mitigating
circumstances, such as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's
acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent's
advanced age, among others. Thus, the Court deems it appropriate to admonish
Durban.
[I]t would be a patent violation of the Constitution to uphold the importance of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty over the presumption of
innocence, especially in this case where there are more than enough reasons to
disregard the former.
[B]y sacrificing the sacred and indelible right to presumption of innocence for the
sheer sake of convenience and expediency, the very maintenance of peace and order
sought after is rendered wholly nugatory. By thrashing basic constitutional rights as
a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal drugs, instead of protecting the general
welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words, by
disregarding the Constitution, the war on illegal drugs becomes a self-defeating and
self-destructive enterprise.
The Court believes that the menace of illegal drugs must be curtailed with
resoluteness and determination. Our Constitution declares that the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings
of democracy.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
The sacred and indelible right to presumption of innocence enshrined under our
Constitution, fortified further under statutory law, should not be sacrificed on the
altar of expediency. Otherwise, by choosing convenience over the rule of law, the
nation loses its very soul. This desecration of the rule of law is impermissible.
[T]he mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and
not private property. If land owned by the State is considered patrimonial property,
then such land assumes the nature of private property.
An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for
the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for
the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend
largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated
in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the judge fails
to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses
in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of
discretion is committed.
The requirement that a matter must be acted upon by the en banc of a body or
tribunal has been interpreted to mean that it reaches a decision as a collegial body,
and not necessarily, as an entire body.
"[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a '[p]ublic office
is a public trust [and] [public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.'"
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is nor merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary
objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the
tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the
State and in favor of the individual.
[T]he duty of budget preparation and its enactment are primarily lodged with the
local chief executive and the sanggunian, respectively.
[I]t is unfair to penalize public officials based on overly stretched and strained
interpretations of rules which were not that readily capable of being understood at
the time such functionaries acted in good faith. If there is any ambiguity, which is
actually clarified years later, then it should only be applied prospectively.
[L]ocal chief executives and local legislative bodies are necessarily given enough
elbow room to navigate and respond to the different community-based needs and
challenges that vary per constituency. The crucial flexibility of these offices, designed
no less by RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), is defeated when each decision
that they make on behalf of their constituency pursuant to their corporate powers
are constantly threatened by prospects of criminal backlash after the fact.
Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
To amount to grave misconduct the elements of corruption, flagrant disregard of an
established rule, or willful intent to violate the law must be proved by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
In a previous case, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and
corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the
offenders punished. However, this objective can only be accomplished if the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, which must closely be scrutinized under the lens of the
spirit that animates R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), passes the
test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated
to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the
accused.
To give life to the right against double jeopardy, the Court has, in numerous
occasions, adhered to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, which provides that "a
judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation."
The Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence
has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a
conviction.
It is well-settled that administrative, civi[l] or even criminal liability, as the case may
be, may attach to persons responsible for unlawful expenditures, as a wrongful act
or omission of a public officer. It is in recognition of these possible results that the
Court is keenly mindful of the importance of approaching the question of personal
liability of officers and payees to return the disallowed amounts through the lens of
these different types of liability.