Candidates De Guzman v. COMELEC G.R. No.

180048 June 19, 2009

Issue: Whether Labo is disqualified to run for public office? Held: Labo is disqualified pursuant to the earlier case of Labo v. COMELEC (176 SCRA 1, 1989). His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Labo failed to present evidence which will proved that he reacquired Philippine citizenship. Petitioners claim that he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to P.D. No. 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270 is not enough. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship. However, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. A contrary view would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. Lonzanida v. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Dela Cruz filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211 alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the USA. Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic on 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. During the May 14, 2007 elections, Dela Cruz won as vicemayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying petitioner. COMELEC argued that although petitioner re-acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of R.A. No. 9225, this does not automatically mean that he has eligibility to run for public office. Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9225 requires him to renounce him citizenship with another country to be eligible. Later, in the election protest case, the trial court declared petitioner as the winner. Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225? Held: Petitioner is disqualified from running for a public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after the taking of his oath of allegiance in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. However, it must be emphasized that the same Act imposes additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Labo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992

Facts: Petitioner was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections and that the office of the Mayor is vacant. After the revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, the COMELEC declared Alvez as the winner. Petitioner was ordered to vacate the office of the Mayor and Alvez served the remaining portion of the mayoral term. Petitioner again filed his certificate of candidacy for the Mayoralty post in the 1998 elections. His opponent, Eufemio Muli, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner from running for mayor of San Antonio on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. Petitioner was proclaimed winner. Thereafter, the First Division of the COMELEC issued the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. The COMELEC counted petitioners assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in 1995 although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the said resolution. Petitioner maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. Issue: Whether petitioner has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and is therefore disqualified? Held: Petitioner served only for two consecutive terms and is therefore qualified to run for Mayor again. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 of the LGC provide that no elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the the official concerned was elected. This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It is not enough that an individual has

Facts: Labo and Ortega both filed their certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baguio City for the May 1992 elections. Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. COMELEC, in a resolution, denied and cancelled Labos certificate of candidacy. Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification" filed by Labo, COMELEC declared that the resolution declaring Labo as disqualified shall become final and executor only after five (5) days from promulgation. Labo may still be voted upon as candidate subject to the final outcome of the case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court.

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served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. The two requisites are absent in the case at bar. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Villaber v. COMELEC G.R. No. 148326 November 15, 2001

moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. In addition, the Court cannot go along with the contention of the petitioner that since the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted and only payment of fine can be imposed, the offense ceased to be an offense involving moral turpitude. In those cases, the Court made no pronouncement that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. Caasi v. COMELEC G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

Facts: Both petitioner and respondent Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify petitioner and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, petitioner was convicted by the RTC of Manila in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC Decision (convicting petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22). Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 106709. Said petition was dismissed and became final and executor. Petitioner countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. COMELEC declared the disqualification of the petitioner. Issue: Whether violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude so as to disqualify petitioner? Held: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude hence petitioner is disqualified to run for any elective post. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. Petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone. To constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22, three elements must be present. One of these elements is that The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. The presence of this element manifests

Facts: In the 1988 local elections, private respondent (Merito Miguel) won as the municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pampanga. Respondents rival candidates filed petitions to disqualify the former on the ground that he is a permanent resident of the United States as evidenced of him being a green card holder. Respondent admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 and the congressional elections on May 18,1987. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by the respondent does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Issue(s): Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US? Whether respondent has waived his status as a permanent resident of the US prior to the 1988 local elections? Held: Respondent is disqualified to run for any elective office. The green card in the possession of the respondent is sufficient proof to prove that he is a permanent resident of the US. In his Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, respondent answered that he intends to stay in the US permanently. Moreover, the green card that was issued to respondent clearly indicates that his status in the US is a resident alien. Hence, respondents immigration to the US some years prior to the 1988 elections constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. As a resident alien in the US, respondent owes temporary and local allegiance to the US in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Furthermore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" in accordance with Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Marquez v. COMELEC G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

Facts: Private respondent (Eduardo Rodriguez) was elected and proclaimed Governor-elect of the province of Quezon on 1992. Petitioner, a defeated candidate, sought for the disqualification of respondent under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code which states that fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad shall be disqualified to run for any elective position. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against the latter before the COMELEC on the ground that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal

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charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, California, USA. Petitioner also claimed that said court already issued warrant of arrest against respondent but has yet to be served on respondent on account of his "flight" from that country. COMELEC denied the petition. Issue: Whether respondent who is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office? Held: The case was remanded to the COMELEC due to COMELECs failure to ascertain whether respondent was indeed a fugitive from justice as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC. However, it is important to note that fugitive from justice has been defined by the Oversight Committee, which formulated the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC, as a person who has been convicted by final judgment.

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