BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL

AT NEW DELHI

Company Application (IB) No. 207 (PB) of 2021

In the matter of: -

Chitranjan Gupta & Others
…Applicants

Versus

M/s. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.

…Respondent

Compendium of Cases

Case Name & Citation Relevant excerpts Para Page

no. no.

1. Force Majure
Sunil Singh Vs.
Ministry of 2.1. vide its order dated 31.07.2012, imposed a ban on the
Environment &
Forests Paryavaran use of underground water for the construction
CWP-20032-2008 activities taking place in the region of Gurgaon and
adjoining areas. After the afore-mentioned order, the
entire construction work in Gurgaon region came to a
complete stand still. Further, the delay was also due
to ban on construction imposed by NGT every year
due to pollution. It is submitted that due to these
unforeseeable circumstances the force majeure
clauses of the Development Agreement and the
Apartment Buyer’s Agreement respectively, also came
into effect.

Navin Raheja vs. Shilpa 25. As per Clause 4.4 of Article- 25, 54,
Jain, 2020 SCC OnLine 55
NCLAT 46 4(‘ForceMajeure’),construction/continuation/completion
of the building/complex is subject to Force Majeure
Conditions which inter alia include delay on account of
non-availability of steel and/or cement or other building
materials or water supply or electric power or slow down,
strike, lock out or due to any dispute with the construction
agency employed by the Company, non-availability of
necessary infrastructure facilities being provided by the
Government for carrying development activities, pollution
clearances, court injunction, civil commotion or by
reason of war, enemy or terrorist action, earthquake, any
act of God and delay in grant of completion/occupation
certificate by the Government and/or any other public or
competent authority or if non delivery of possession is
beyond the control of the Company and in any of the
aforesaid events, the Company shall be entitled to a
reasonable extension of time for delivery of possession of
the said Apartment, depending upon the
contingency/prevailing circumstances at that time. The
Company as a result of such a contingency arising thereto
reserves, its right to alter or vary the terms and
conditions of allotment or if the circumstances beyond the
control of the Company so warrant the Company may
suspend the scheme.
54. The Adjudicating Authority before admitting an
application under Section 7 filed by allottee(s) will take
into consideration the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in “Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure
Limited &Anr. v. Union of India &Ors”(Supra), as
noticed in Paragraph 33 of this Judgment.
55. If the delay is not due to the ‘Corporate Debtor’ but
force majeure, as noticed above, it cannot be alleged that
the ‘Corporate Debtor’ defaulted in delivering the
possession.”

2. Protection of Corporate Debtor

 Swiss Ribbons Private 28. It can thus be seen that the primary focus of the legislation is to 28 16
Limited and Another ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting
versus Union of India the corporate debtor from its own management and from a corporate
and Others, (2019) 4 death by liquidation. The Code is thus a beneficial legislation which
SCC 17 puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being a mere recovery
legislation for creditors. The interests of the corporate debtor have,
therefore, been bifurcated and separated from that of its
promoters/those who are in management. Thus, the resolution process
is not adversarial to the corporate debtor but, in fact, protective of its
interests. The moratorium imposed by Section 14 is in the interest of
the corporate debtor itself, thereby preserving the assets of the
corporate debtor during the resolution process. The timelines within
which the resolution process is to take place again protects the
corporate debtor's assets from further dilution, and also protects all
its creditors and workers by seeing that the resolution process goes
through as fast as possible so that another management can, through
its entrepreneurial skills, resuscitate the corporate debtor to achieve
all these ends
58 503,504
Pioneer Urban Land
Infrastructure Limited 56. It can thus be seen that just as information utilities
vs. Union of India, 2019
SCC Online SC 1005 provide the kind of information as to default that banks
and financial institutions are provided under Sections 214
to 216 of the Code read with Regulations 25 and 27 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Information
Utilities) Regulations, 2017, allottees of real estate
projects can come armed with the same kind of
information, this time provided by the promoter or real
estate developer itself, on the basis of which, prima facie
at least, a “default” relating to amounts due and payable
to the allottee is made out in an application under Section
7 of the Code. We may mention here that once this prima
facie case is made out, the burden shifts on the
promoter/real estate developer to point out in their reply
and in the hearing before NCLT, that the allottee is
himself a defaulter and would, therefore, on a reading of
the agreement and the applicable RERA Rules and
Regulations, not be entitled to any relief including
payment of compensation and/or refund, entailing a
dismissal of the said application. At this stage also, it is
important to point out, in answer to the arguments made
by the petitioners, that under Section 65 of the Code, the
real estate developer can also point out that the
 insolvency resolution process under the Code has been
invoked fraudulently, with malicious intent, or for any
purpose other than the resolution of insolvency. This the
real estate developer may do by pointing out, for example,
that the allottee who has knocked at the doors of NCLT is
a speculative investor and not a person who is genuinely
interested in purchasing a flat/apartment. They can also
point out that in a real estate market which is falling, the
allottee does not, in fact, want to go ahead with its
obligation to take possession of the flat/apartment under
RERA, but wants to jump ship and really get back, by
way of this coercive measure, monies already paid by it.
Given the above, it is clear that it is very difficult to
accede to the petitioners' contention that a wholly one-
sided and futile hearing will take place before NCLT by
trigger-happy allottees who would be able to ignite the
process of removal of the management of the real estate
project and/or lead the corporate debtor to its death.”

Parvesh Magoo v. Iro 17. Thus, given the law laid down by this Hon’ble 17, 19
Grace Realtech Private,
Supreme Court in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and
2020 SCC Online
NCLAT 421 Infrastructure Limited Vs. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC
416 (para 36 of this Judgment) it is held that the
AdjudicatingAuthority has to see whether the delay is due
to the Corporate Debtor and in case the delay is not due
to the Corporate Debtor, but force majeure as noticed
above, it cannot be alleged that the Corporate Debtor
defaulted in delivering the possession...

...19.It is noticed that the despite the approval of building

plan on 23rd July 2013 project could not be started due to
the certain pre imposed conditions, including but not
limited to obtaining the grant of approval by Ministry of
Environment and Fire Safety approval, before the
commencement of construction. The Respondent obtained
the environmental approval on 12th December 2013 and
 the said approval reiterated the requirement of approval
by the Fire Department. Therefore, the Respondent
applied for the Fire safety Approval on 23rd October
2013, and before starting any construction, approval from
the Fire Department, in terms of Section 15 of the
Haryana Fire Safety Act, 2009 was material for the
fulfilment of the obligations of the Respondent and
commencement of construction. Accordingly, the date of
handover of possession is to be computed from the date of
grant of Fire Safety Approval, i.e. dated 27th November
2014. Before that, the letter for handing over possession
was already issued to the Appellant.”

Tata Steel BSL Ltd. v. 18. A proper appreciation of the above quoted provisions 18
Varsha, reported at 2019
of the IBC would show that the IBC has been enacted in
SCC OnLine Bom 541
order to bring about a legislation to revive a corporate
debtor and to put it back on its feet and that the IBC is
not merely a recovery legislation for creditors. In that
sense, the emphasis of the IBC is on creating a situation
where a corporate debtor does not spiral into financial
destruction, and at the same time resolution of the
difficulties of a corporate debtor is achieved while
taking care of the interests of creditors. In this
balancing act sought to be achieved by the IBC, the
scheme that emerges from the provisions is that a
creditor, including operational creditor like respondent
No. 1, is required to approach the resolution professional
with details of its claim, including information about
pending litigation regarding the same. These aspects are
required to be taken into consideration by the resolution
professional when it recommends resolution plan of a
resolution applicant like the petitioner herein, in tune
with the object of the IBC.”
 3. applicability of the principles of limitation over Insolvency proceedings
Asset Reconstruction “7. A perusal of the above would show that considering that the Limitation 7
Company (India) Act applies only to courts, unless made statutorily applicable to tribunals,
Limited v. Bishal the Committee was of the view that such Act should be made to apply to the
Jaiswal, 2021 SCC IBC as well, observing that though the IBC is not a debt recovery law, the
Online 321 trigger being “default in payment of debt” would render the exclusion of the
law of limitation “counter-intuitive”. Thus, it was made clear that an
application to the IBC should not amount to resurrection of time-barred
debts which, in any other forum, would have been dismissed on the ground
of limitation
Laxmi Pat Surana v. . Ordinarily, upon declaration of the loan account/debt as NPA that date 42
Union of India 2021 can be reckoned as the date of default to enable the financial creditor to
SCC Online SC 267 initiate action under Section 7 of the Code. However, Section 7 comes into
play when the corporate debtor commits “default”. Section 7, consciously
uses the expression “default” - not the date of notifying the loan account of
the corporate person as NPA. Further, the expression “default” has been
defined in Section 3(12) to mean non-payment of “debt” when whole or any
part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is
not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. In cases
where the corporate person had offered guarantee in respect of loan
transaction, the right of the financial creditor to initiate action against such
entity being a corporate debtor (corporate guarantor), would get triggered
the moment the principal borrower commits default due to non-payment of
debt. Thus, when the principal borrower and/or the (corporate) guarantor
admit and acknowledge their liability after declaration of NPA but before
the expiration of three years therefrom including the fresh period of
limitation due to (successive) acknowledgments, it is not possible to
extricate them from the renewed limitation accruing due to the effect of
Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Section 18 of the Limitation Act gets
attracted the moment acknowledgment in writing signed by the party
against whom such right to initiate resolution process under Section 7 of the
Code enures. Section 18 of the Limitation Act would come into play every
time when the principal borrower and/or the corporate guarantor
(corporate debtor), as the case may be, acknowledge their liability to pay
the debt. Such acknowledgment, however, must be before the expiration of
the prescribed period of limitation including the fresh period of limitation
due to acknowledgment of the debt, from time to time, for institution of the
proceedings under Section 7 of the Code. Further, the acknowledgment
must be of a liability in respect of which the financial creditor can initiate
action under Section 7 of the Code.
Babulal 32. When Section 238-A of the Code is read with the above 32 49, 50
VardharjiGurjar v.
noted consistent decisions of this Court in Innoventive
Veer Gurjar
Aluminium Industries [Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. Icici Bank, (2018) 1
Industries Private
SCC 407 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356] , B.K. Educational
Limited (II), (2020)
15 SCC 1 Services [B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Paras Gupta &
Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ)
528] , Swiss Ribbons [Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2019) 4 SCC 17] , K. Sashidhar [K. Sashidhar v. Indian
Overseas Bank, (2019) 12 SCC 150 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ)
222] , Jignesh Shah [Jignesh Shah v. Union of India, (2019) 10
 SCC 750 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 48] , Vashdeo R.
Bhojwani [Vashdeo R. Bhojwani v. Abhyudaya Coop. Bank
Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 158 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 308] , Gaurav
Hargovindbhai Dave [Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave v. Asset
Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd., (2019) 10 SCC 572 : (2020) 1
SCC (Civ) 1] and Sagar Sharma [Sagar Sharma v. Phoenix
ARC (P) Ltd., (2019) 10 SCC 353 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 175]
respectively, the following basics undoubtedly come to the fore:
(a) that the Code is a beneficial legislation intended to put the
corporate debtor back on its feet and is not a mere money
recovery legislation;
(b) that CIRP is not intended to be adversarial to the corporate
debtor but is aimed at protecting the interests of the corporate
debtor;
(c) that intention of the Code is not to give a new lease of life to
debts which are time-barred;
(d) that the period of limitation for an application seeking
initiation of CIRP under Section 7 of the Code is governed by
Article 137 of the Limitation Act and is, therefore, three years
from the date when right to apply accrues;
(e) that the trigger for initiation of CIRP by a financial creditor
is default on the part of the corporate debtor, that is to say, that
the right to apply under the Code accrues on the date when
default occurs;
(f) that default referred to in the Code is that of actual non-
payment by the corporate debtor when a debt has become due
and payable; and
(g) that if default had occurred over three years prior to the
date of filing of the application, the application would be time-
barred save and except in those cases where, on facts, the delay
in filing may be condoned; and
(h) an application under Section 7 of the Code is not for enforcement of
mortgage liability and Article 62 of the Limitation Act does not apply to this
application.
NandkishoreHarikis 7. The contention of the Corporate Debtor that the Petition is
han Attal v. Marvel 7
hit by Law of Limitation has to be accepted in view of the fact
Landmarks Pvt. Ltd.,
2019 SCC Online that the date of the default mentioned in the petition is
NCLT 11200it
01.04.2014, but this petition was filed on 03.07.2019, which is
 more than three years after the date of default. It is beneficial to
refer the judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on
limitation in Insolvency & Bankruptcy Petitions, viz B.K.
Education Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and
Associates ((2019) 11 SCC 633), Vashdeo R
Bhujwani v. Abhyudaya Cooperative Bank Ltd., (2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1159) and Sagar Sharma v. Phoenix ARC
Limited ((2019) 10 SCC 353), wherein it was held that Article
137 of the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings wherein
three years is the limitation period. Hence, the Petition is liable
to be dismissed as hit by limitation.”

5. Orders of HRERA are in REM

Vidya Droila&Ors. v. 48. A judgment in rem determines the status of a person or
Durga Trading
thing as distinct from the particular interest in it of a party to
Corporation, reported
at (2021) 2 SCC 1 the litigation; and such a judgment is conclusive evidence for
and against all persons whether parties, privies or strangers of
the matter actually decided. Such a judgment “settles the
destiny of the res itself” and binds all persons claiming an
interest in the property inconsistent with the judgment even
though pronounced in their absence.

Deccan Paper Mills 25. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn., 25, 26

Co. Ltd. v. Regency
Wadhwa Nagpur) describes an in rem proceeding as follows:
Mahavir Properties,
reported at (2020) SCC “In rem. adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or
Online SC 655
determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of
persons generally with respect to that thing.-Also termed
(archaically) impersonal. (Black 7th Edn., 1999)
“An action in rem is one in which the judgment of the Court
determines the title to property and the rights of the parties,
not merely as between themselves, but also as against all
persons at any time dealing with them or with the property
upon which the Court had adjudicated.” R.H.
GRAVESON, Conflict of Laws 98 (7th ed. 1974).
Against the king; against the property, not against a person.
This term is derived from the Roman law, but is not used in
English law in precisely the same sense as in that law. Indeed,
 Bracton, limits proceedings in rem to actions to obtain
possession of res by which he understood real actions;
(Bigelow on Estoppel 42, 43.)
A proceeding in rem is a proceeding instituted against a thing,
and not against a person.
A proceeding in rem, in a strict sense, is one taken directly
against property, and has for its object the disposition of the
property, without reference to the title of individual claimants
but in a larger and more general sense the term ‘proceeding in
rem’ is applied to actions between parties where the direct
object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of
some interest therein.
A judgment in rem is generally said to be a judgment
declaratory of the status of some subject matter, whether this
be a person, or a thing. Thus the probate of a will fixes the
status of the document as a will; so a decree establishing or
dissolving a marriage is a judgment in rem, because it fixes the
status of the person. A judgment or forfeiture against specified
articles of goods for violation of the revenue laws is a
judgment in rem. In such case the judgment is conclusive
against all the world, and, if the expression ‘strictly in rem’
may be applied to any class of cases, it should be confined to
such as these. Chief Justice Marshall says:‘I have always
understood that where a process is to be served on the thing
itself, and where the mere possession of the thing itself, by the
service of a process and making proclamation, authorizes the
Court to decide upon it without notice to any individual
whatever, it is a proceeding in rem, to which all the world are
parties. The claimant if a party, whether he speaks or is silent,
whether he asserts his claim or abandons it. But usage has
distinguished as proceedings in rem a class of cases in which,
while the seizure of the thing will be in aid of jurisdiction, yet it
is essential that some form of notice be given to the particular
person or persons. The proceeding thus assumes a phase of
actions in personam, and a judgment will not be binding upon
any one who was not before the Court.
An act or proceeding is in rem when it is done or directed with
 reference to no specific person and consequently against or
with reference to all whom it might concern, or ‘all the world’.
Lawsuits brought against property as compared with those
against a person; the Court's jurisdiction does not depend on
notice to the property owner.”

26. In R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul

Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22, this Court set out the Roman law
concept of jus in rem as follows:
“Roman lawyers recognised a right either as a jus in rem or
a jus in personam. According to its literal meaning “jus in
rem” is a right in respect of a thing, a “jus in personam” is a
right against or in respect of a person. In modern legal
terminology a right in rem, postulates a duty to recognise the
right imposed upon all persons generally, a right in personam
postulates a duty imposed upon a determinate person or class
of persons. A right in rem is therefore protected against the
world at large; a right in personam against determinate
individuals or persons. An action to enforce a jus in
personam was originally regarded as an action in
personam and an action to enforce a jus in rem was regarded
as an action in rem. But in course of time, actions in rem and
actions in personam acquired different content. When in an
action the rights and interest of the parties themselves in the
subject-matter are sought to be determined, the action is in
personam. The effect of such an action is therefore merely to
bind the parties thereto. Where the intervention of the Court is
sought for the adjudication of a right or title to property, not
merely as between the parties but against all persons
generally, the action is in rem. Such an action is one brought
in the Admiralty Division of the High Court possessing
Admiralty jurisdiction by service of process against a ship or
cargo within jurisdiction. There is another sense in which an
action in rem is understood. A proceeding in relation to
personal status is also treated as a proceeding in rem, for the
judgment of the proper court within the jurisdiction of which
the parties are domiciled is by comity of nations admitted to

vindicate a jus in rem, i.e., a right such as ownership available
653, “It (judgment in rem) has been defined as a judgment of a
evidence for and against all persons whether parties, privies or
6. Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against a real estate
Flat Buyers
Association Winter
Hills v. Umang
RealtechPvt. Ltd.
through IRP &Ors.,
Company Appeal (AT)
(Insolvency) No. 926
of 2019
recognition by other courts. As observed by Cheshire in his
“Private International Law”, Sixth Edition at page 109, “In
Roman law an action in rem was one brought in order to
against all persons, but the only action in rem known to
English law is that which lies in an Admiralty court against a
particular res, namely, a ship or some other res, such as
cargo, associated with the ship.” Dealing with judgments in
rem and judgments in personam. Cheshire observed at page
court of competent jurisdiction determining the status of a
person or thing (as distinct from the particular interest in it of
a party to the litigation); and such a judgment is conclusive
strangers of the matter actually decided. …… A judgment in
rem settles the destiny of the res itself ‘and binds all persons
claiming an interest in the property inconsistent with the
judgment even though pronounced in their absence’; a
judgment in personam, although it may concern a res, merely
determines the rights of the litigants inter se to the res.”
In Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against a real
estate, if allottees (Financial Creditors) or Financial
Institutions/Banks (Other Financial Creditors) or Operational
Creditors of one project initiated Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor (real estate
company), it is confined to the particular project, it cannot
affect any other project(s) of the same real estate company
(Corporate Debtor) in other places where separate plan(s) are
approved by different authorities, land and its owner may be
different and mainly the allottees (financial creditors),
financial institutions (financial creditors, operational
creditors are different for such separate project. Therefore, all
the asset of the company (Corporate Debtor) are not to be
maximized. The asset of the company (Corporate Debtor –
 real estate) of that particular project is to be maximized for
balancing the creditors such as allottees, financial institutions
and operational creditors of that particular project. Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process should be project basis, as per
approved plan by the Competent Authority. Any other allottees
(financial creditors) or financial institutions/ banks (other
financial creditors) or operational creditors of other project
cannot file a claim before the Interim Resolution Professional
of other project and such claim cannot be entertained.
So, we hold that Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
against a real estate company (Corporate Debtor) is limited to
a project as per approved plan by the Competent Authority
and not other projects which are separate at other places for
which separate plans approved. For example – in this case the
Winter Hill – 77 Gurgaon Project of the ‘Corporate Debtor’
has been place of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. If
the same real estate company (Corporate Debtor herein) has
any other project in another town such as Delhi or Kerala or
Mumbai, they cannot be clubbed together nor the asset of the
Corporate Debtor (Company) for such other projects can be
maximised.”

7. THE PROPOSED IRP SHOULD NOT BE APPOINTED AS AN IRP IN THE PRESENT CASE
IDBI Bank Limited v. 23. The other questions whether Mr. Vijaykumar V Iyer is 23, 24
Lanco Infratech
competent to act as an Interim Resolution Professional for the
Limited, 2017 SCC
Online NCLT 15292 applicant company. The Respondents by reply dated
04.08.2017 submitted that Mr. Vijay Kumar V. Iyer has been
appointed as Interim Resolution Professional for two more
companies viz. Binani Cement Limited (Bank of
Baroda v. Binani Cement Limited, CP(IB) No. 359/KB/2017,
Order dated 25th July 2017) and Bhushan Steel Limited
(State Bank of India v. Bhushan Steel Limited CP No.(IB) No.
201(PB)/2017, Order dated 26.07.2017). Therefore, not only
does this vitiate Form 2 filed by him but the Respondent
Company has serious concerns on the availability of the
interim resolution professional to effectively perform his
functions, verify numerous claims, prepare information
 memorandum, run LITL as a going concern etc. especially in
context of the Respondent Company, whose debt structure and
operations are very complicated and complex. In this regard,
attention of this Hon'ble Tribunal is drawn to Paragraph 22 of
the Code of Conduct for Insolvency Professionals as provided
in the First Schedule of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board
of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016, which
reads as under:—
“22. An insolvency professional must refrain from
accepting too many assignments, if he is unlikely to be able
to devote adequate time to each of his assignments”.
24. We have also verified from the website and confirmed that
the said IRP has been very recently appointed as IRP to the
aforesaid two large companies only in the last week of July,
2017. Therefore, we agreed with the submissions of the
respondents considering his previous three assignments to
large companies and the current corporate debtor itself is a
large company we are of the prima facie view that the
proposed IRP would not find sufficient time to act as IRP for
the respondent Company. Most of the activities prescribed in
the IBC code are time bound. Therefore, we had suggested to
change the aforesaid IRP, accordingly the Financial Creditor
viz. IDBI proposed another IRP viz. Shri SavanGodiawala an
insolvency professional registered with Insolvency
Professional of ICAI having registration No. is IBBI.IPA-
001/IP-P00239/2017-2018/10468. The newly proposed IRP
has also confirmed that no disciplinary proceedings pending
against him, he does not currently serve as an IRP for any
company and he is eligible to be appointed as IRP to the
Corporate Debtor. We are satisfied with the above disclosures
made by the IRP viz. SavanGodiawala and accordingly we
appointed him as an IRP for the Corporate Debtor.”

of Anil Goel v. LML 4... 4

Ltd., CP No. (IB)
...He is also appointed the Liquidator in another two matters, i.e. Rotomac
55/ALD/2007 with CA
Global Pvt. Ltd. (CA. No. 74/2018) & Rotomac Export Pvt. Ltd. (CA. No.
No. 73/2018
75/2018). In the case in hand, the Resolution Profession Process was to be
 completed within the extended period of CIRP, by dated 25.02.2018. But
the Resolution Professional failed to submit the progress report/the
resolution plan within the statutory period i.e. 270 days. The Resolution
Professional has filed this application on 19.03.2018, after the issuance of
notice by order of this Tribunal dated 13.03.2018 for submission of
progress report/Resolution Plan against him. The RP was also directed to
remain present in the Court in person on 19.03.2018. The above act of the
RP shows that he was not careful in following the timeline prescribed
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code