Cayetano vs.

Leonides 129 SCRA 522

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate
of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix' death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident
of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute
the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his
children and forced heirs as, on its face patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and
testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September
13, 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not a compulsory heir may be validly excluded by a will executed by a foreign testator?

HELD: YES
RATIO: Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2)."However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found."
Art. 1039."Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the
parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would
run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:"It is
therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
a. Who may succeed?

Art. 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed by will or ab intestato.

The provisions relating to incapacity by will are equally applicable to intestate succession. (744, 914)

 the second paragraph above merely enunciates a general rule because Article 1027 and 1028 clearly are exceptions which do not
apply to intestate succession but only that of testamentary dispositions.
 Kinds of Incapacity: a) absolute or per se and b) relative or per accidens

Art. 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper.

A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions
prescribed in article 41. (n)

* Those not existing at the time of death is incapacitated to succeed except on conditional wills where succession only opens upon the
happening of the condition.
Art. 1026. A testamentary disposition may be made to the State, provinces, municipal corporations, private corporations, organizations, or
associations for religious, scientific, cultural, educational, or charitable purposes.

All other corporations or entities may succeed under a will, unless there is a provision to the contrary in their charter or the laws of their creation,
and always subject to the same. (746a)

Art. 1029. Should the testator dispose of the whole or part of his property for prayers and pious works for the benefit of his soul, in general terms
and without specifying its application, the executor, with the court's approval shall deliver one-half thereof or its proceeds to the church or
denomination to which the testator may belong, to be used for such prayers and pious works, and the other half to the State, for the purposes
mentioned in Article 1013. (747a)

Art. 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in general, without designation of particular persons or of any community, shall be
deemed limited to the poor living in the domicile of the testator at the time of his death, unless it should clearly appear that his intention was
otherwise.

The designation of the persons who are to be considered as poor and the distribution of the property shall be made by the person appointed by the
testator for the purpose; in default of such person, by the executor, and should there be no executor, by the justice of the peace, the mayor, and the
municipal treasurer, who shall decide by a majority of votes all questions that may arise. In all these cases, the approval of the Court of First
Instance shall be necessary.

The preceding paragraph shall apply when the testator has disposed of his property in favor of the poor of a definite locality.

Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-
four hectares. That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative
who would study for the priesthood.
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933
which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testator's
nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a
devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administratrix, Florencia Rigor), who should
deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The
probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the
delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they
be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the
testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Judge De Aquino granted the second motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a
grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers
in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest
male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would
violate "the rule against perpetuities". It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the same
should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was
different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333
"The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a will". It is "the first greatest rule, the
sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will"
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative
who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood,
or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose
of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of
time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he
was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it
be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the
controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined.
Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at
anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative
at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not
have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who
would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with
certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would
be his nephew or grandnephews (the sons of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the
Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiastica" would include indefinitely
anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will. He must have known that such a broad provision
would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying
for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of the late
(Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise
inoperative.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists" ("el legado . . . por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto, se refundir en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y
derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the
will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
b. Who are incapable of succeeding?
Art. 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him
during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter, community, organization, or
institution to which such priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of the guardianship have been
approved, even if the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian
when the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid;

(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse,
parents, or children; in relation to Art. 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child,
a devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or
child of such person, or any one claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void, unless there are three other
competent witnesses to such will. However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or legacy had not
been made or given. (n)

(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a)
Art. 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
Art. 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a disqualified person, even though made under the guise of an onerous contract, or made
through an intermediary, shall be void. (755)
Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation
has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a
month, unless the authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is no
obligation to make an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or from revoking one already made, or who supplants,
conceals, or alters the latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a)
Art. 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if, having
known of them subsequently, he should condone them in writing. (757a)
c. Effect of alienations by the excluded heir
Art. 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and acts of administration performed by the excluded heir, before the judicial order of
exclusion, are valid as to the third persons who acted in good faith; but the co-heirs shall have a right to recover damages from the
disqualified heir.
d. Rights of the excluded Heir
Art. 1035. If the person excluded from the inheritance by reason of incapacity should be a child or descendant of the decedent and should
have children or descendants, the latter shall acquire his right to the legitime.
The person so excluded shall not enjoy the usufruct and administration of the property thus inherited by his children
Art. 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded from the succession has a right to demand indemnity or any expenses incurred in the
preservation of the hereditary property, and to enforce such credits as he may have against the estate.
Art. 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate of the deceased appears and files a claim thereto with the court within five years from the
date the property was delivered to the State, such person shall be entitled to the possession of the same, or if sold the municipality or city
shall be accountable to him for such part of the proceeds as may not have been lawfully spent.
e. Liabilities of the excluded heir
Art. 1038. Any person incapable of succession, who, disregarding the prohibition stated in the preceding articles, entered into the possession
of the hereditary property, shall be obliged to return it together it its accessions.
He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may have received, or could have received through the exercise of due diligence.
f. Prescription of Action
Art. 1040. The action for a declaration of incapacity and for the recovery of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall be brought within five
years from the time the disqualified person took possession thereof. It may be brought by any one who may have an interest in the
succession.