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American Perspectives
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Decentralization and Governance
by
Ladislau Dowbor
Brazil spends more than US$150 billion each year on social services
alone. A great deal could be done with this much money. According to the
World Bank, "The proportion of Brazilian GDP allocated to social services
seems higher than in other middle-income developing countries. Compared
to this group of countries, social welfare indicators in Brazil are surprisingly
low" (World Bank, 1988: ii). Our resources are insufficient, but, more
important, they are poorly used. It is an illusion that this is a characteristic
of the public sector alone; private expenditures are included in the numbers
cited above, and the World Bank study showed, for example, that over 75
percent of health expenditures were for curative care. What experienced
social planner would doubt that giving priority to preventive health care,
basic education, decentralization of the administration of social security, and
a few other measures could save 30 percent or more-tens of billions of
dollars-for broader investment? But we could go on to an essentially private
sector such as banking, where the costs, from salaries to computers and the
bankers' profits, of stocking, administering, and investing all of our funds
exceed US$80 billion a year, somewhere between 12 and 15 percent of the
Brazilian gross domestic product (GDP) and more than the value of total
agricultural production. To cover these costs, bankers charge interest, and the
companies that borrow money, for their part, include financial costs in their
price calculations and pass them on to the masses of consumers, who in
buying their products pay the financial costs of maintaining a gigantic
machine of financial intermediation.'
Again, 4 million private cars nudge each other along in the streets of Sao
Paulo, and anyone who is caught in a car on a rainy day can see our
administrative ineptitude: we are unable to move because we have too many
means of transportation. If each car is worth an average of US$5,000, US$20
billion are frozen in this fleet of cars. Obviously I am not calculating the costs
of accidents and hospital care, fuel and tires, or traffic management. The value
Ladislau Dowbor is a professor at the Catholic University of Sao Paulo. He was the secretary
for extraordinary affairs under Mayor Luiza Erundina of Sao Paulo and is the author of Social
Reproduction.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 98, Vol. 25 No. 1, January 1998 28-44
C) 1998 Latin American Perspectives
28
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 29
of the cars alone would pay for the construction of 500 kilometers of under-
ground train line in the city, solving all of these problems. But our invisible
hand is wise: in comparison with more than 10,000 kilometers of streets, Sao
Paulo has only 35 kilometers of underground. Building an underground on a
large scale would save an average of half an hour of transportation time, at
the very least, for each worker in the city. Half an hour a day for 5 million
workers would mean saving 2.5 million hours each day. Since average pro-
ductivity per man/hour in Brazil is about US$3, we would save US$7.5
million a day, or US$2.1 billion a year, enough to build the double of the
city's present underground system every year. But instead, more houses are
torn down on Faria Lima Avenue to make more space for cars, while an
underground is being built in Brasflia, where the streets are wide and there
are no traffic problems.
Decisions on infrastructure are mostly government ones, under the deci-
sive influence of building contractors. Brazil has accumulated an enormous
foreign debt of more than US$150 billion to develop a nuclear energy
program that produces no energy and makes no sense, a Transamazonian
Highway between nowhere and nothing, a railway for the steel industry that
reportedly has more tunnels and bridges than it does ordinary stretches, and
the Itaipui hydroelectric power station that incurred all of the extra costs for
being the biggest in the world. This dam alone cost US$18 billion, money
enough to buy land for all of the more than 10 million landless workers in
the country.
In agriculture, so important and underestimated, there are about 370
million hectares of good agricultural land, of which only about 60 million are
farmed, and the waste of land on this enormous scale has rather timidly been
called extensive cattle ranching (national average of 3 hectares per head); a
solid two-thirds of our potential in land is frozen as low-risk investment, and
its owners neither farm it nor allow others to do so. The elaborate systems
set up by traders to move agricultural products between different markets,
simply to pay the middlemen's toll, make products very expensive and reduce
the internal market. We thus have 200 million hectares of good agricultural
land without any use in a country that is trying to launch a national program
of voluntary food aid for its 32 million severely undernourished inhabitants.
This is a strictly private sector.2
As for human resources, Brazil has a total population of about 160 million,
of whom about 100 million are of working age. Of these 100 million, about
70 million constitute the economically active population: they have jobs or
are looking for work; a little more than 60 million actually work. The numbers
show an enormous underutilization of human resources in strictly quantita-
tive terms, without mentioning the fact that half of our labor force has a
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30 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
MANAGING CHANGE
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 31
INTERNATIONALIZATION
URBANIZATION
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32 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
POLARIZATION
The polarization of rich and poor is increasing and accelerating. Data from
the World Bank's World Development Report for 1992 show that, in 1990,
total population was 5.3 billion for a world GDP of US$22 trillion, or
US$4,200 per person: the planet produces more than enough for a decent life
for all. However, US$16 trillion or 72 percent of GDP is retained by the 800
million inhabitants of the countries of the North, who represent 15 percent
of the world's population. The practical effect is that our planet has 3 billion
people with an average annual income of US$350 each, less than half the
Brazilian minimum wage. The citizen of the North has an average of 60 times
more resources than the planet's 3 billion poor, and this gap, already cata-
strophic, is deepening. In 1990, for example, the per capita income of the
poor increased by 2.4 percent, or US$8, while that of the rich increased by
1.6 percent, or US$338. The wealthy population increases by 4 million a year,
while the poor increase by 59 million (World Bank, 1992: 196). If we consider
capital formation, a 20 percent investment rate in a country with US$1,000
per capita means US$200 per person per year in new equipment, enough to
buy a wheelbarrow or two, while in Switzerland, for example, with its
US$36,000 per capita, the same investment rate means US$7,200 in new
equipment and improved technologies per person, 36 times as much, al-
though it is the poor country that should invest more if we are eventually to
achieve a more balanced world economy. No spontaneous market mecha-
nisms will invert this trend, and the measures will have to be much more
positive than the ones considered at the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit.
These statistics must be faced dispassionately. The impact on education,
for example, is immediate. World expenditures on education in 1988 were
US$1,024 billion, about 5.5 percent of the world's product. Developed
countries spent US$898 billion of this while underdeveloped countries
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 33
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34 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
TABLE 1
1880 10 8 15 11 6 10
1929 31 10 19 19 8 24
1960 32 28 35 18 31 32
1985 47 37 52 33 65 48
With the natural force of a cliche, the view has become widespread that
the institutional side of modernization can be summed up as privatization.
The World Bank itself, which can scarcely be suspected of "statism," warns
that privatization is not a panacea. There is a strong trend toward increasing
state participation, especially in recent years, in spite of all the discourse to
the contrary. In the United States, Labor Department figures for the 1960-
1994 period show that the public sector has continued to grow despite all the
Reagan and Bush rhetoric, although growth is concentrated in local and state
government. In general terms, it can be said that government today adminis-
ters about half of the social product. This is important because substantial
segments of society have begun to think in terms of a "small and efficient
state," in fact justifying a chaotic process of privatization and shelving the
essential issue of how and whom the state serves. The state will not melt
away. What we have to work with in confronting the processes of change
described above is a large state-albeit trimmed for sheer administrative
efficiency-that will work on the basis of a new state/society relationship.5
If developed societies have modernized in fact (if not in their discourse) by
strengthening the state-and the above figures leave no room for doubt about
this-the main avenue of action is not cutting out parts of government but
making it work better and with new goals. More democratic institutional
solutions must be sought (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In terms of the overall
efficiency of society's administration of resources, a director of the Ecole
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 35
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36 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 37
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38 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
STYLES OF GOVERNMENT
people should guide both the state and the market, which need to work in
tandem, with people sufficiently empowered to exert a more effective influence
over both.... Markets need to be reformed to offer everyone access to the
benefits they can bring. Governance needs to be decentralized to allow greater
access to decision making. And the community organizations need to be
allowed to exert growing influence on national and international issues.
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 39
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40 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
government offices (when the capital was moved to Brasflia), industry (which
nowadays seeks smaller towns), and reduced port activity and now faces an
enormous demographic mushroom with a shrinking economic base. Well
before the social explosion that has made any solution difficult, the city
should have made long-term investments and mobilized society to become a
great tourist capital, paving the way for long-term economic development.
Local authorities must consciously contribute to the organization of their
economic space.
3. Organization of social players. It is naive to believe that town councils
can effectively represent complex interests in the midst of the transformation
of the municipality's main social and economic activities. Local administra-
tions should create forums to generate consensus on key problems of local
development. The forums should include representatives of business, unions,
community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, research centers,
and the various levels of government present in the municipality in order to
ensure that management is more participatory. Successful examples of local
government show more than anything a great capacity for "social engineer-
ing," in the setting up of flexible systems of partnership at various levels.
4. Innovation. At this fin-de-siecle, with its profound technological
changes-innovations in computer technology that allow government to
modernize and become transparent, computer and telephone technology that
can give instant access to information about how the city is being managed,
digitalized satellite photographs to monitor the situation of the environment,
new technologies for recycling solid waste and biodegrading sewage, new
approaches to management that are more horizontal and flexible-the
authorities should abandon their fear of innovating and even introduce
experimental solutions to let society decide whether particular innovations
hit the mark.
5. Critical lines of action. Besides sectoral routines that ensure delivery
of basic services, it is important that local authorities define critical lines of
action that catalyze action by a society to defend its middle- and long-term
interests. This catalytic action can be seen in Santos, where cleaning up the
beaches and ocean has stimulated the modernization of tourism and the local
economy; in Penaipolis, with the formation of a health consortium by several
municipalities; and in Curitiba, where the environmental program has led the
main social players in the city to join ranks behind urban modernization as a
whole.
6. Identification of underutilized resources. If we have 370 million hec-
tares of agricultural land but cultivate about 60 million, we are underutilizing
land for permanent crops and livestock. A systematic effort to identify natural
and human resources and capital that could be better used at the local level
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 41
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42 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
CONCLUSION
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Dowbor / DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 43
NOTES
1. See the excellent cover story in the newsweekly Veja, August 11, 1993, "Caixa alta na
terra da infla,co," as well as the special section of the Folha de Sao Paulo, August 26, 1993,
entitled "O sistema financeiro mergulha nos lucros." "Bradesco 50 Anos" states that the banking
group "closed last year [1992] with a profit of US$289 million, 77.6 percent more than the
previous year, and had a market share of 16 percent to 18 percent." Up to 1994, a key element
of the banking system's profitability was inflation. Since the July 1994 monetary reform, the
interest rate, which net of inflation was close to 30 percent in 1995, has become the new factor
of high costs of financial intermediation for society.
2. See Anudrio Estatistico do Brasil de 1992 (IBGE, 1992: 143) for data on land potential;
for data on the agricultural use of land, see IBGE (1989: 259). The 50,000 largest agricultural
establishments in the country, which control 44 percent of the land, use an average of 5 percent
of this area, while small farmers cultivate 65 percent of their land. The 61 mega-latifundias of
more than 100,000 hectares farm about 0.14 percent of their land.
3. See on this point Friedmann (1986); see also studies by Samir Amin of this turn-of-the-
century contradiction between the globalization of the economy and the persistent national
character of the instruments of regulation.
4. This first regular evaluation by UNESCO of the situation of education in the world pays
tribute to what developing countries have been able to do with scarce resources: "International
studies carried out by the International Association of School Evaluation (IEA) have shown that
students in developed countries do not perform very much better-in fact, in some cases not at
all better-in comparable tests of reading comprehension, arithmetic and science, for example,
than students from relatively poor countries where expenditures per student are much lower."
5. A bigger state does mean that the state is taking over the private sector. The private sector
is particularly efficient in productive areas, and these are shrinking, while community services
such as health, education, and others, which are generally poorly managed by the private sector,
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44 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
are becoming more important in the economy as a whole. Moreover, as we shall see, more state
does not nececessarily mean more central state.
6. Adam Smith had already stated that business will be politically stronger than workers
because its representatives are fewer and therefore easier to organize.
7. An excellent study of these trends is found in Gerlach (1992). Analyzing intercorporate
networks in Japan and the United States, Gerlach concludes that the environment in which a
modem company functions has changed from the "anonymous world of the invisible hand" to
"specific areas of planning and coordination."
8. Brazilian business does not, in general, have a tradition of partnership and is quite resistant
to modem ways of working based on what the UN Center for Transnational Corporations calls
"collaborative arrangements." However, a strongly modernizing tendency is emerging, repre-
sented by the Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais, one of the leading and more
progressive employers' associations, among others, and new directions are being taken.
REFERENCES
Dowbor, Ladislau
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