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Cemex Case Study 1 Part 1
Cemex Case Study 1 Part 1
[DRAFT]
By Dr. David Webb
The February Investor Day was an important date in the 2014 calendar, particularly for
Juan Romero1. Romero had recently taken over as President of CEMEX’s Mexican business
following an internal restructuring. The day offered a chance to emphasise the strength of
this important part of the group.
CEMEX had expanded dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s from its original home in
Hidalgo and Monterrey in Northern Mexico to become a global giant with direct
operations in over 50 countries. However, the Mexican business still contributed over
20% of the group’s overall sales and almost 40% of operating EBITDA. 2
With the Group pushing to regain its investment grade credit rating after the ill-timed
Rinker acquisition in 2007 and the global financial crisis, his presentation was an
important opportunity to convince analysts and shareholders of the firm’s prospects in its
home market. The previous year, 2013, had seen a large fall in sales and in headcount, as
CEMEX Mexico looked to “right size” its operations and focus on value over volume.
Romero had joined CEMEX in 1989 following his graduation in law, economics and
business. After senior roles in Mexico, he had run both CEMEX’s South American and
European regions. He was seen as a possible future CEMEX Group CEO3 when Lorenzo
Zambrano, who had led CEMEX for decades, finally retired.
Looking across the Mexican business, Romero believed there were positive signs for
investors. Despite a recent slow down in housing construction, national investment in
highways and other infrastructure projects were expected to increase significantly over
the coming years. Private and commercial construction was also expected to rise. 4
In line with the Group’s priorities, CEMEX Mexico’s strategic focus was on better serving
customers – offering solutions where possible rather than just product. In country
strategic themes put emphasis on “value before volume”, sales force effectiveness and on
improving its distribution network.
About 1.6 tons of raw materials are needed to produce 1 ton of cement and its
manufacture requires heavy machinery and a large amount of heat. Super heated crushed
limestone is loaded into a rotating kiln and heated to 1450°C to produce clinker. This is
then finely milled into cement powder.
1
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13 2014
2
CEMEX 2013 Annual Report
3
Reuters May 13 2014 “CEMEX leadership unclear after sudden death of CEO”
4
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13 2014
Given the bulk of cement and its raw materials, transportation is costly and hence cement
plants are located near quarries or major ports to minimise costs. It also means that the
logistics of distribution are important. The industry is highly capital intensive given the
cost of machinery and distribution facilities.
Combining 10-15% cement with quantities of gravel, sand and water produces concrete
and this sets in to a rock-like mass after about 45 minutes. Consequently it is either mixed
at the construction site or delivered in rotating drum trucks (“ready mix”). Logistics and
timing are therefore critical. The production and distribution of concrete is an industry in
itself, with “ready mix” firms a significant customer of cement producers. Many major
cement manufacturers have forward integrated into concrete production and following its
acquisition of the UK’s RMC, CEMEX has become the global leader in ready mix.
Cement is delivered in bulk to ready mix companies, fabricators and major construction
sites. Smaller constructors and ‘self-constructors’ buy cement in bags via building
materials wholesalers and retail stores.
The industry consolidated massively over the 1990s and 2000s with dedicated cement
companies acquiring and building regional capacity. With transportation costs high firms
would seek to dominate regions and to vertically integrate (e.g. into raw material
extraction, ready mix concrete and retail). With over-capacity and the entry of global
giants, Lafarge and Holcim, competition is intense. Holcim’s Apasco was number two in
the market behind CEMEX, and Lafarge was looking to grow by forming a joint venture
with Elementia, a Mexican company. Lafarge had placed its Cementos Fortaleza subsidiary
into this venture.6
CEMEX in Mexico
CEMEX owns 15 cement plants with a total potential capacity of 29.3 million tons per
year. They are spread across Mexico, although 2 are temporarily closed given market
conditions.7 It also owns 49 quarries, and 85 distribution centres (including 7 marine
terminals). The distribution centres are supplied through the firm’s own fleet of trucks
and railcars - in addition trucks. In addition rail facilities are also leased. They own 286
concrete ready mix plants (although 77 are idle) located in 80 cities, as well as 2,320
ready mix concrete delivery trucks. 8 In cement and concrete the firm claims to “cover the
territory like no one else”.9
5
Oxford Business Group (2015) The Report: Mexico 2015
6
Reuters January 8 2013 France’s Lafarge in Mexican cement venture with Elementia
7
CEMEX 2013 20F Report
8
ibid
9
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13, 2014
In 2013 cement represented 52% of CEMEX’s net sales in Mexico, ready mix concrete
24% and aggregates 5%. Exports of cement and clinker were to the USA, the Caribbean
and South America.10
Capital expenditure in 2013 for Mexico was US$86m down from US$98m in 2012. It was
expected to be around US$80m in 2014. 11
The company’s employee head count was 12,200, falling from 14,600 in 2011 as the firm
globally made cost savings.12 CEMEX as a group have a strong emphasis on staff training,
as well as health and safety in what can be a dangerous industry – there were 10 fatalities
in CEMEX’s Mexican operations in 2013. CEMEX attracts high calibre staff – as a global
leader the company was an attractive employer in Mexico and claimed to have the best
people in the industry.
CEMEX had, over the last 25 years, significantly invested in technology and logistics to
overcome these challenges and realise operational improvements. As CEO from 1985
Zambrano had championed the use of information technology and operational data across
the business. With the Mexican phone system unreliable and insufficient to network the
company’s operations, CEMEX invested in its own satellite communications system called
CEMEXNET.13 This, combined with a suite of bespoke production, and decision-making IT
applications had allowed the firm to drive best practice and standards throughout
production and effectively manage order fulfilment. The transparency of all operations
allowed the optimisation of production across CEMEX’s plants and flexibility in
responding to fluctuations in demand and unexpected issues. The investments
transformed the company’s approach to logistics and its supply chain and it believed that,
as a result, it was well ahead of its international and especially local rivals.
10
CEMEX 2013 20F Report
11
CEMEX 2014 20F Report
12
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13, 2014
13
Hoyt, D (2005) CEMEX: Transforming a Basic Industry Company, Stanford Graduate School of Business
(Ref GS-33)
14
Bardsley, D. (2019) Down Mexico Way: Economics, Politics and Family Business, Camden FB, 18 th
February
years shifted further and put greater focus on meeting customer needs – emphasising
product innovation and deepening relationships with distributors and end users. 15
Given its size and construction material know-how it had increasingly looked to provide
design, coordination and technical support to infrastructure and other large construction
projects (e.g. timed delivery of concrete and on-site plants). It also offered legal and
financial support.16
Given this distribution channel’s importance, CEMEX had developed a network for
independent retailers called Construrama. With the firm’s larger retailers being invited to
join this national chain, by 2014 the network comprised 782 independent companies
operating 1110 stores across Mexico.18
The Construrama network provided a national brand with countrywide and regional
advertising and standardisation in store design, logos and point of sale technology.
15
Hoyt, D (2005) CEMEX: Transforming a Basic Industry Company, Stanford Graduate School of Business
(Ref GS-33)
16
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13, 2014
17
ibid
18
CEMEX 2014 20F Report
CEMEX provided assistance and training across many business practices including staff
training, marketing, inventory control and customer DIY guides. Brand awareness of
Construrama was more than 90% across Mexico – substantially higher than other
construction materials chains.19
Typically members increased the range of products stocked (perhaps moving from 50 to
500 products), increased customer’s diversity and gained growth. While members were
required to stock CEMEX’s cement, they could offer products from other suppliers.
Although many took advantage of CEMEX’s effective logistics system to access products
beyond of cement. These improvements were good for CEMEX too – in some Construrama
stores sales of CEMEX branded cement more than tripled 20
In the CEMEX Investor Day presentation, Romero would be detailing developments in the
Construrama offering – “Construrama 2.0” as the set of initiatives was called. Four areas
were being highlighted21:
In light of market developments and the actions CEMEX was taking, Romero believed the
Mexican business was on track to meet its targets. The business, in his view, covered the
country like no one else, had the best products and solutions, a superior distribution
network and the best people in the industry. However, with international and domestic
competition growing and an uncertain economic recovery, only time would tell whether
CEMEX Mexico could maintain its advantages over others.
19
Hoyt, D (2005) CEMEX: Transforming a Basic Industry Company, Stanford Graduate School of Business
(Ref GS-33)
20
ibid
21
CEMEX Day Presentation February 13, 2014
Appendix: Slides from Juan Romero’s CEMEX Day Presentation