Ejusdem generis can literally be translated to ‘of the same kind.

’ Having words derive their

meaning from a class sharing the same characteristics as them is goal of the construction of
statutes. Where a general word follows a listing of items of the same class, the general word
must be understood within the confines of that particular class. The meaning of the general
word is narrowed down to the nature of the genus in question.

A practical example of the application of this rule is the case of Stockford 1898 (2) CH 687.
A statute had the following enumeration, “any cathedral, collegiate, chapel or school.” In this
statute, there is a distinct genus of words which precedes the general word, ‘schools.’ This
class of words restricts the understanding of the general word to mean schools of a religious
nature, nullifying the possible interpretation of the statute suggesting that these are schools of
any other nature.

An example, where the application of the Ejusdem generis maxim would not apply, is the
case of S v Makandigona 1981 (4) SA 439. The Prevention of Corruption Acts made
reference to, “any receipt, account or other document.” It was argued that the general word
could be interpreted as “documents relating to money.” However, courts dismissed this
meaning as there was no clear genus in the enumeration. While they did admit an ‘account’ is
associated with money, a ‘receipt’ on the hand can be the acknowledgment of something else
other than money. Hence, the ejusdem generis rule could not be applied.

Additionally, the Expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim can literally be translated to
“the express mention of one or more things is the exclusion of another in the same class that
is not mentioned.” This maxim applies where the things mentioned belong to a particular
class but may not necessarily share the same characteristics. The intention of the legislature is
to be understood in the sense that the exclusion of the other items in that particular genus
means that those items or objects not mentioned are not meant to be covered.

The case of Lead Smelting Co vs Richardson, illustrates the practicability of this maxim. In
this case, the Poor Relief Act of 1601 imposed a poor rate on the occupiers of “lands, houses,
tithes and coal mines.” The courts came to the interpretation that the express mention of ‘coal
mines’ meant that the word ‘lands’ was not inclusive of the mines. The argument that mines
and other coal mines were included under lands was rejected
The contemporanea expositio maxim, which is derived from the full expression “expositio est
optima et fortissima in lege,” refers to the meaning of a provision as understood at the time it
was originally enacted or shortly after the enactment. According to Cross, this could also
refer to the interpretation a statute received from the courts, legal writers and others during
the period of its enactment or the statements or statutory instruments issued by the
government within the same period their enabling Act is issued. If for some reason confusion
arises concerning the meaning of words in a Statute, the current courts will be required to
gain the initial understanding of the words of the provisions by looking back at the meaning
given by the courts at the time of enactment. Although the courts usually will not disturb the
meaning initially applied by the preceding judiciary system.