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Tema 2 (3-5)
Tema 2 (3-5)
Nowadays, the regulation of the sources of law is situated in the field of the theory of
the Constitution. A conceived by the jurist Kelsen, the Constitution is the regulatory
norm of the process of creation of norms by the superior organs of the state.
The very configuration of the Constitution as a supreme judicial norm presupposes that
it becomes not only an authentic source of law, but also in the delimiting norm of the
system of sources. Before the entry into force of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the
sources of law were regulated by the Civil Code whose art 1.1 stated that: “The sources
of the Spanish legal order are the law, custom and general principles of law”.
This regulation of the Civil Code has not been repealed but must be interpreted
according to the Constitution, concretely in its article 149.1 8a, where reference is made
to the sources.
The concept is not unanimous in doctrine. Thus, the expression sources of law can have
various meanings:
Sociological sense understood as the set of factor that effectively lead to the
creation of norms, which implies a sociological conception of the same . The
very configuration of the Constitution as a supreme judicial norm presupposes that it becomes not
only an authentic source of law, but also in the delimiting norm of the system of sources. Before the
entry into force of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the sources of law were regulated by the Civil
Code whose art 1.1 stated that: “The sources of the Spanish legal order are the law, custom and
general principles of law”.
Legal sense that determines a triple distinction. The sources of law would be:
o That group of subjects or acts to which the legal system attributes the
power to create norms. These are called “sources of production”
o The rules that qualify the facts, what would be denominated like
“sources on the production”
o The forms through which the legal norm is expressed. This would be
the sense established in art. 1.1 od the Civil Code.
In a material sense, the term “source of law” refers to the organs from which the rules
that make up the legal system emanate.
In a formal sense, would be the historical factor that influence the creation of law.
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ORGANISATION OF SOURCES OF LAW
In a legal sense, source of the law is each social force with power to create norms. Each
legal system has its own system of sources although there is a certain homogenization in
two aspects:
In the States with influence of the Roman-Germanic-Continental Law, the written law
or not written law prevails. This predominance of the written source is the result of the
French Revolution, which imposes itself as a guarantee of citizens in the nineteenth
century constitutionalism, despite the effort of Savigny´s historical school to maintain
the “spirit of the people or Volkgeist.
Irrespective of whether the law is expressed in written forms or not as established by the
Common Law Anglo-Saxon tradition. In certain supranational areas there has been a
certain unification in listing the sources of law (understood as law, custom and the
general principles).
We can distinguish three different normative types:
1. WRITTEN SOURCES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, which constitutes the budget of validity
and effectiveness of hierarchical lower standards and in general of the
whole system (principle of constitutionality). Here the protestas
normandi has the constituent power exclusively.
THE LAW IN ITS DOUBLE MANIFESTATION: as “organic law”
and ordinary laws” (principle of legality). The Norman protests are
exercised by Parliament.
REGULATORY ISSUES: It is exercised by the Government and the
rank of this rules is always inferior to the law (regulatory principle).
2. UNWRITTEN SOURCES
THE CUSTOM: understood as “constant and continuous social use”
or “social belief that is obligatory”, there is no law applicable to the
case.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: considered as “non-
fundamental evaluation criteria such as good faith”.
3. INDIRECT SOURCES
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: written agreements between
subjects of International Law and those who are governed by it. They
can be adopted either between two or more States, between States
and International Organizations, or between several International
Organizations.
JURISPRUDENCE: is the doctrine or set of judgments emanating
from the courts and, in particular the Supreme Court in interpret and
apply the law, custom and general principles of law. It is necessary to
clarify that in this case, with the expression jurisprudence we d not
refer to the specific jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, that we
can define like authentic source of the Right.
LESSON 4. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION AS A SOURCE OF LAW
CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION
Before the entry into force of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the sources of law were
regulated by the Civil Code whose art. 1.1. stated that: “The sources of the Spanish legal
order are the law, custom and general principles of law”.
This regulation of the Civil Code has not been repealed but must be interpreted
according to the Constitution and particularly in its article 149.1 8a where reference is
made to the sources.
At the present time, classifications are also carried out, considering much more specific
data such as the form of territorial organization, the form of Head of State or the
existing relationship between powers. Thus:
Constitutions unitary, federal regional or autonomous.
Presidential, parliamentary, and directorial constitutions.
Constitutions monarchical or republican.
CONSTITUTION OF 1978
Imposed or popular because it obeys to the democratic principle (art. 1.2 SC), without
considering that the Crown participates in the constituent power.
Written and in a single document, in front of the Francoist system, based on the
successive publication of different texts of “fundamental” rank.
Our constitution seems rigid, reaching levels of amount intangibility with respect to the
material areas protected by the reform procedure established in art. 168 SC.
It does not appear either as an original constitution but, on the contrary, our Magna
Carta assumes influences of both international law (art. 10 DSC), patriotic
constitutionalism, as well as those derived from foreign constitutionalism. Of particular
mote are the contributions of constitutional law from Germany. From Italy we import
the transformer character that the “Basso clause” established in art. 3 of the Italian
Constitutions, which is collected-with nuances- in 9.2 CE, together with the conception
og the regional state. The northern monarchies also influence the configuration of the
functions of the Monarch, while in France the concept of organic law is accepted,
although in a different way, since in the neighbouring country they enjoy a hierarchical
rank superior to that of the ordinary law.
On its extension, it may be said that it is, after the three hundred and eighty-four articles
of the Cadiz of 1812, the most extensive Spanish constitutional text of the entire history
of constitutionalism. It may also be said that there are certain aspects that are not
regulated (the system of sources, for example) and that others have come to “de-
constitutionalize). Thus, despite its extension, our Constitution appears as unfinished, as
incomplete, as open.
There is no doubt that it is a normative constitution (art. 9.1 SC). In front of what
happened with the text of our Second Republic, it is a constitution that may not enjoy
the same professorial character than the previous one, but that it is much more linked to
the reality it intends to regulate.
Ideological and utilitarian? Every constitution contains specific ideologies, which does
not mean that this ideology entails a dependence, determines of the legal mechanisms
that appear as mere instruments to achieve the exclusivity of the ideology. In our
democratic system, in addition, due to the second paragraph of art. 9 SC, we find a
transformational potentiality of the system that makes the ideology underlying the
constitutional background. This system can be taken to more leftist areas, within the
limits of a representative democratic system where the market economy prevails (art. 38
SC).
As for the territorial structure of the State, the Spanish system advocates a system that
overcomes the old confrontation between the unitary and federal states. There is a new
attempt to solve an atavic problem, such as the territorial one, by configuring an
autonomous State (art. 1.2, 2 and Title VIII SC), which advocates a third genre that
assumes at the same time the unity of the State and its realization within a political
decentralization, and not merely administrative, which now exceeds the competence
level of some federal States.
Taking into account if the Head of State is provided by choice or according to the
hereditary principle, our Constitution advocates a Monarchy that denominates
parliamentary and which qualifies as “political form”, according to the doctrine, to
honor the important role of the current Monarch in the political transition.
And as it would not fit otherwise, appears in our Maximo Text a system of relationship
between the powers, a parliamentary system. This system is the only one in which the
Crown can survive, being at the same time the most convenient after the Francoist
power concentration which did not wish to fall into an assembly system.
With regard to its position in the normative hierarchical scale, it seems logical the
proclaim the supremacy of the Constitution over the law of constitutional reform itself,
raiding the issue of possible constitutional control over the laws of constitutional
reform.
The technique of constitutional reform may involve a progressive transformation of the
constitutional text as least to prevent modifications in the opposite direction. However,
this is not its main function because it seems designed to adapt the constitution text to
those transformations that are occurring in reality.
The reform of the Spanish Constitution:
1. The first use of constitutional reform mechanism occurred in 1992, as a
result of ratification process of the Treaty on European Union, in order to
allow passive suffrage in local elections to any person belonging to a
Member State of the Union.
2. The second reform of our constitution took place 2011, in a surprising and
urgent way, because in one month all the formalities of the reform were
completed. This reform had as object the constitutionalization of the
principles of budgetary stability and budgetary balance, and was imposed by
certain European authorities, which forced to introduce into the
constitutional texts the rules of budgetary stability approved by the EU.
Other sources
REGULATORY AUTHORITY: the generality of the doctrine distinguishes between
the so-called executive regulations, which are those that occur in the execution of a law,
to which they are linked, and independent regulations, which occur without there being
a previous law to execute.
It also speaks, according to the subject matter, of normative or legal regulations, which
are those that create a new right or modify it, affecting the rights and duties of citizens;
as well as administrative or organizational regulations, configured as a power of self-
disposal of its respective holder.
JURISPRUDENCE: the art. 1.6 of the Civil Code does not configure jurisprudence as
a source of law, but only attributes a function that complements the legal system.
When the Civil Code alludes to jurisprudence, it refers to that of the Supreme Court,
which, by virtue of the system of cassation, is obliged to elaborate a doctrine on
interpretation and application of the law that is imposed on all judges and tribunals, and
that conditions their subsequent decisions.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM: the role of custom is to fill gaps within the
corresponding legal systems, to adapt existing regulations to the social reality of the
moment and to guide the application of both precepts.
The doctrine considers that we are before a constitutional custom when basically two
elements are given, on the one hand the constant and uniform repetition of an act, and
on the other hand it requires that this repetitive action is inspired by a conviction of
compulsion.
The consideration of custom as a source of law finds its legal basis in inter-private
relations, and hences its regulation in the Civil Code.
The custom is delayed in the scope of the sources of the right, although the increasing
complexity and dynamism of the constitutional law do not lose its condition, since there
are certain areas such as the case of parliamentary law, where still the custom, in this
case praeter legem, may have a certain scope of application.