1 s2.0 S0305750X20300383 Main

World Development 130 (2020) 104912
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
World Development
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
Ethno-Caste influences on migration rates and destinations

Nathalie E. Williams a,⇑, Prem Bhandari b, Linda Young-DeMarco b, Jeffrey Swindle b,
Christina Hughes a, Loritta Chan c, Arland Thornton b, Cathy Sun b
a
University of Washington, United States
b
University of Michigan, United States
c
University of Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: While studies commonly show differences in out-migration between ethnic groups, ethnicity most often
Accepted 5 February 2020 features no more than a side note in the emigration literature, and we have very little insight about why
Available online 28 February 2020 people from different ethnic groups migrate at different rates. Understanding ethnic differences in migra-
tion rates and destination choice has important implications for the present-day and future potential for
Keywords: either dampening or exacerbating ethnic discrimination and opportunity structures. Building on existing
Migration migration theory, we identify three possible mechanisms through which ethnicity might influence out-
Caste
migration rates and destination choice: human and economic capital, contemporary discrimination,
Ethnicity
Social networks
and historical legacies that are perpetuated through social networks. Our empirical investigation uses
Nepal longitudinal (panel) survey data from Nepal and we find that all three of these mechanisms likely influ-
South Asia ence out-migration and destinations of the five major ethno-caste groups. However, we show that histor-
ical legacy and human and economic capital emerge as the key drivers of ethnic differences in out-
migration here. We discuss what these results mean for migration studies as well as the potential for
the institution of migration to affect patterns of ethno-caste-based disadvantage in Nepal. The theoretical
basis and empirical evidence from our study also suggest ways to understand the reasoning for and con-
sequences of ethnic and racial differentials in migration patterns in other areas of the world.
Ó 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction reason for this might be the predominance in the literature of eco-
nomic resources and education as key predictors of out-migration.
In this study, we explore how socially determined categories of Given the strong and documented relationship in many countries
ethnicity are related to both the likelihood of out-migration and between ethnicity and economic resources/education (Barron,
destination choice. While ethnicity commonly appears in the 2008; Central Department of Sociology/Anthropology, 2014; Sen,
out-migration literature, it is most often a side note or a control 2000) and the likewise strong and documented relationship between
variable. We join Asad and Hwang (2019a) in noting that there is economic resources/education and out-migration (Bhandari, 2004;
very little research that seeks to understand why there are ethnic Bhandari & Ghimire, 2016; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Stark &
differences in out-migration rates throughout the world1. One Taylor, 1991; VanWey, 2005; Williams, 2009), it could logically be
assumed that any ethnic differences in migration rates and destina-
tion choice result from ethnic differences in economic resources and
⇑ Corresponding author at: Department of Sociology and Jackson School of education. Indeed, when Asad and Hwang (Asad & Hwang, 2019a,
International Studies, Box 353340, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195- 2019b) find lower rates of documented migration to the United
3340, USA.
States for people from communities in Mexico that are characterized
E-mail addresses: natw@uw.edu (N.E. Williams), prembh@umich.edu (P. Bhan-
dari), lyoungdm@umich.edu (L. Young-DeMarco), jswindle@umich.edu (J. Swindle), as ‘‘indigenous”, they attribute this largely to community level social
cmhughes@uw.edu (C. Hughes), loritta.chan@ed.ac.uk (L. Chan), arlandt@umich. and economic disadvantage. We follow their lead, but examine the
edu (A. Thornton), cathys@umich.edu (C. Sun). question at an individual level—are individuals from different ethnic
1
We refer here to the out-migration, or emigration, literature which focuses on groups more or less likely to migrate and more or less likely to
why, who and when people leave a place. In contrast, there is an extensive literature
migrate to specific destinations?
on ethnicity, race, and other social categories in the immigration literature, which
focuses on what happens to people after they leave and arrive at a destination. We Examining this question at an individual level creates additional
begin this article with this clarification and by carefully using the term ‘‘out- theoretical pathways to consider. We build on a long history of
migration”, but later relax to using the term ‘‘migration” for the sake of brevity.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104912
0305-750X/Ó 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 N.E. Williams et al. / World Development 130 (2020) 104912
social science showing that the social consequences of ethnicity Espinosa, 1997; Reed, Andrzejewski, & White, 2010; Ricketts,
are much broader than just economics and education. In taking a 2014; VanWey, 2005; Wright & Ellis, 2016), recent decades have
more comprehensive perspective, we address multiple mecha- shown that a variety of non-economic factors also have key impacts
nisms that might drive this relationship and how they might on migration. For example, studies have shown that social factors
sum up to create differences in migration rates and destination like networks, cumulative causation, and culture (Curran, Garip,
choices between ethnic groups. The mechanisms we focus on are Chung, & Tangchonlatip, 2005; Fussell & Massey, 2004; Garip,
educational and economic resources, contemporary discrimina- 2008, 2012; Garip & Asad, 2016; Kandel & Massey, 2002; Massey,
tion, and historical legacies of migration perpetuated through 1990a, 1990b; Massey et al., 1998; Osella & Osella, 2000; Williams
social networks. et al., forthcoming), as well as ideational factors like community sat-
Our study is based in Nepal, home to a variety of ethnic groups isfaction, intentions, aspirations, and fatalism (Bach & Smith, 1977;
that have long been and continue to be treated differently due to a Bjarnason & Thorlindsson, 2006; Carling & Collins, 2018;
Hindu-based caste system. While rates of out-migration are very Creighton, 2013; De Jong, 2000; De Jong et al., 1983; De Jong,
high in general, surveys show substantial variation by ethno- Richter, & Isarabhakdi, 1996; Deane, 1990; Fischer & Malmberg,
caste in out-migration and destination choice, making Nepal an 2001; Irwin, Blanchard, Tolbert, Nucci, & Lyson, 2004; Lee,
interesting case for the investigation of ethnicity and out- Oropesa, & Kanan, 1994; Marrow & Klekowski von Koppenfels,
migration. We use detailed longitudinal data from the Chitwan 2018; Schewel & Fransen, 2018; South & Crowder, 1997; Speare,
Valley Family Study (CVFS) (Axinn et al., 2019) and multinomial 1974; Speare, Goldstein, & Frey, 1975; Speare, Kobrin, & Kingkade,
logistic regression models to examine why some ethno-caste 1982; Stinner & Van Loon, 1992; Thissen, Fortuijn, Strijker, &
groups are more or less likely to migrate and why some are likely Haartsen, 2010; Thornton, Bhandari et al., 2019; Thornton,
to migrate to high or low earning potential destinations. Williams et al., 2019; Uhlenberg, 1973; van Dalen & Henkens,
Understanding the multiple mechanisms that might simultane- 2013) have substantial influences on migration and destination
ously influence ethnic differences in migration behavior is not just choice. Following this contemporary trend in migration studies to
an academic exercise; it can have important implications for think broadly about economic, social, and ideational influences, we
understanding present-day social hierarchies and the potential identify three key mechanisms that could create ethnic differences
for change (Howell, 2017; Karell, 2014). Migration is common in in migration and destination choice—human and economic capital,
many countries around the world, with an estimated 272 million contemporary discrimination, and historical legacy.
international migrants in 2019 (International Organization for
Migration, 2019) and a substantial majority of these migrants are 2.1. Human and economic capital
from poor countries where remittances are a key strategy for sus-
taining a basic standard of living. Social and political remittances We begin with two studies by Asad and Hwang (Asad & Hwang,
are also important consequences of migration with significant 2019a, 2019b) that examine how living in a Mexican community
impacts on origin communities. Numerous studies find that with a high proportion of ethnically indigenous people influences
returned migrants from disadvantaged ethnic groups have used migration to the United States. They find that indigenous commu-
the money and prestige from migration to renegotiate traditionally nity origin does not influence the likelihood of migration, but it
degrading occupations, change consumption practices, and does impact whether individuals migrate with documentation or
actively resist domination and discrimination (Adhikari & Hobley, not. Drawing on neo-classical, new economics, and social networks
2015; Carswell & De Neve, 2014; Gidwani & Sivaramakrishnan, theories of migration, they make a strong case that the social and
2003; Ilahiane, 2001; Kurien, 2002; Levitt, 1998; Osella & Osella, economic disadvantages of living in an indigenous community
2000; Sunam, 2014). Given the relatively clear case that migration impact the ability to obtain documentation for migration to the
influences the well-being of individuals and their families—paired U.S. for all who live there, regardless of their own ethnicity. While
with the high rates of migration today—it seems likely that migra- the Asad and Hwang studies theorize and measure indigeneity as a
tion would impact the status of ethnic groups at the broader level characteristic of a place, it is not a difficult logical leap to apply the
of society. However, in order to understand if that happens, we same reasoning to the individual. In that case, the expectation
empirically investigate whether disadvantaged ethnic groups have would be that Mexican individuals who are ethnically indigenous
higher or lower rates of migration, particularly to more profitable would be less likely to migrate to the United States because of eco-
destinations. This informs our discussion about the potential for nomic and social disadvantages. Two other studies have examined
migration to influence patterns of ethno-caste-based stratification the ethnicity-migration question on an individual-level. Based in
in Nepal. India and Nepal, Tsujita and Oda and Gurung (Gurung, 2012;
Tsujita & Oda, 2014) find ethno-caste differences in migration rates
2. Theoretical framework and, similar to Asad and Hwang, attribute this largely to the medi-
ation of education and economic capital. While they are not able to
Our primary purpose in this study is to understand the constella- test this causal assertion, the logic is again compelling.
tion of mechanisms that create ethnic differences in migration like- In many (if not most) countries, minority ethnic groups experi-
lihood and destination choice. For a thorough analysis and in line ence lower educational attainment, less wealth, and lower
with recent scholarship, we take a broad view of migration theory, incomes. We also know that education, wealth, and income are
considering the well-known economic factors as well as the more strong predictors of migration outcomes (Bhandari, 2004;
and less known non-economic factors that could mediate the rela- Caldwell, 1969; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Stark & Taylor,
tionship between ethnicity and migration. Economic factors are gen- 1991; VanWey, 2005; Williams, 2009). This suggests that system-
erally well known as they almost entirely dominated the earlier atic differences in education, wealth and income2 across ethnic
period of theorizing about migration (Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, groups will create systematic ethnic differences in the likelihood of
1962; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Stark & Levhari, 1982; Stark & Taylor,
2
1989; Stark & Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 1986, 1987; Todaro, 1969; It is likely that many different kinds of human, social, economic, political, cultural,
Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). Although these economically-based the- and natural capital might mediate the relationship between ethnicity and migration.
However, given the strong empirical record documenting the relationship between
ories explain much about migration around the world (Donato, education, wealth, income and migration, we focus on those types of capital in the
1993; Greenwood, 1985, 2016; Liang & White, 1997; Lundquist & remainder of this study. Hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, we refer to them as
Massey, 2005; Massey et al., 1993; Massey et al., 1994; Massey & human and economic capital.
N.E. Williams et al. / World Development 130 (2020) 104912 3
migration on an individual level. Further, given that some destina- historical legacy, whereby migration of particular people to partic-
tions require more financial input (for travel, resettlement, and/or ular places in the past perpetuates those migration and destination
employment contracts), and others have high educational require- choice patterns into the present-day.
ments for legal entry, we can expect human and economic capital Just as social networks and cumulative causation might
to mediate the relationship between ethnicity and destination choice increase migration for ethnic groups in which migration is com-
as well. mon, they might also function to depress migration for groups
where migration is uncommon or place attachment is high
2.2. Discrimination (Barcus & Brunn, 2009; Li & McKercher, 2016). Specifically, many
ethnic groups claim particular areas as their historic homeland. If
Also useful for our purposes are studies of the ‘‘Great Migration” an individual lives in their claimed homeland, we can expect they
of African Americans from the southeast to the northeast and will have higher place attachment and will be less likely to migrate
midwestern U.S. in the early to mid-twentieth century. While away. Alternately, if one lives outside their claimed historic home-
economic capital is generally believed to be part of the calculus, land, we might expect that social networks and normative pro-
many also conclude that discrimination (in the form of lynching scriptions on behavior will make them more likely to migrate to
and other racialized violence, political disenfranchisement, that homeland than other places. Thus, in the same way that social
behavioral restrictions, and inferior educational and employment networks make migration normative for some, they can also make
opportunities) were key factors that pushed African Americans to it unusual or transgressive for others.
migrate (Tolnay, 2003).
Classic migration theories also suggest that discrimination
3. Setting: Migration and caste in Nepal
might affect migration. The neo-classical economics theory of
migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Todaro & Maruszko,
The three mechanisms we discuss above are not mutually
1987) suggests that people are likely to migrate when they can
exclusive or competitive. Instead, it is possible that ethnic differ-
expect higher wages elsewhere. Extending this beyond economics,
ences in migration could be influenced simultaneously by the
we can take from this that when people expect better outcomes (in
mediation of human and economic capital, contemporary discrim-
terms of wages, but also in terms of other social benefits), they will
ination, and historical legacy. Thus, we might expect that empirical
be more likely to migrate. Furthermore, this also suggests that,
outcomes will display elements of each of these mechanisms. In
ceteris paribus, migrants will choose destinations with the best
seeking to identify whether each mechanism plays a role in ethnic
expected economic and social outcomes. Bringing discrimination
differences, it is essential to examine the particular context of a
into this discussion, we can predict that if an individual experi-
study in order to determine what would be evidence of discrimina-
ences discrimination in any aspect of life where they live, they
tion, human and economic capital, or historical legacy effects. We
might expect better outcomes elsewhere and thus be more likely
undertake this exercise next, with a description of the setting of
to migrate away than individuals who are more advantaged at
our study area in Nepal.
the origin.
2.3. Historical legacy 3.1. Migration
While contemporary pressures might encourage or discourage Nepal has a long history of out-migration and is now a major
migration and choices of particular destinations, the phenomenon migrant-sending country. International labor migration formally
of migration also has a distinct historical character due to the began in the early nineteenth century with the recruitment of
strong influence of social networks. A large body of research shows youths from the hill regions (particularly the Gurung and Magar
that if a person has more household or community members in ethnicities) into the British Army Gurkha Brigades (Rathaur,
their social network who have migrated, then they will be more 2001). Since then, migration to India has been regular, with the
likely to migrate themselves (Curran & Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; same hill ethnicities making up a substantial portion of Nepali
McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa, migrants to India.
& Spittel, 2001; Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Todaro & In 1985, the Nepali government began encouraging migration
Maruszko, 1987). Further, as social networks perpetuate more to non-Indian destinations by licensing non-governmental institu-
migration, the behavior becomes normative, leading to what is tions to export Nepalese workers abroad. The result was an explo-
now called ‘‘cumulative causation” and a ‘‘culture of migration” sion of international migration outside of India by all ethnic
(Durand & Massey, 2004; Kandel & Massey, 2002). Social networks groups. Recent estimates suggest that there may be as many as
can also influence destination choice, whereby one is more likely to three million Nepalis, or about 10 percent of the total population,
migrate to the same destination as those in their social network in 131 countries at any time (Government of Nepal, 2014; World
(Williams et al., forthcoming). In the case of ethnic groups, if a per- Bank, 2009). Of course, not all destinations are equal in terms of
son’s social network is comprised heavily of others in their same possible remuneration, living standards, accessibility, educational
social group (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Mollica, requirements, and influences of social networks. Destinations
Gray, & Treviño, 2003) and if members of their own ethnic group within Nepal and India are relatively accessible, require lower tra-
have migrated, they might be more likely to choose the same des- vel costs, and have relatively similar cultural conventions. Travel to
tinations as others in their ethnic group. India does not require a visa or passport and there are no restric-
Many ethnic groups have different histories of migration and tions on employment. Most jobs require menial labor, and wages
destination choice, stemming from events or processes of differen- are generally low. Data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study
tial treatment in the far distant or recent past. As social networks (CVFS) show an average monthly wage of 181 USD for Chitwan
grow within specific historically entrenched migration streams migrants in India and 192 USD for other places in Nepal.
and as they are perpetuated by the process of cumulative causa- Middle East destinations are farther away, require higher initial
tion, this can link distant events or differential treatment to the investment (for travel costs and securing employment contracts
present day, even if the conditions that caused the original migra- through labor recruiting agencies), and are culturally dissimilar
tion are no longer present (Hatlebakk, 2016). In other words, the to Nepal. Common jobs include unskilled labor in construction,
well-known social networks effect is essentially a narrative of trucking, and service, and working conditions are extremely
difficult with long work hours in very high temperatures. However, groups, it is the Tharu who are indigenous to the Chitwan area.
wages there are much higher, with an average monthly wage of Indeed, Chitwan and other parts of the Nepali terai are called by
349 USD. some ‘‘Tharuwan”, meaning ‘‘Tharu homeland”. Just as with the
Countries in Europe, North America, and East and Southeast Newars and Kathmandu, Chitwan and the surrounding terai areas
Asia are the most desirable destinations in terms of higher wages serve a central role in Tharu identity formation. Tharus and other
(average 1180 USD per month) and better working and living con- terai indigenous groups are also closely attached to their land
ditions (Seddon, Adhikari, & Gurung, 2002). However, access to and farming lifestyles.
these places is difficult due to the distances involved, travel costs, Dalit is the term for the caste groups that occupy the lowest
and restrictive immigration policies. rank in the Hindu caste hierarchy, were previously known as
‘‘untouchables”, and are heavily disadvantaged in almost all
3.2. Ethno-Caste in Nepal: Historic migration patterns and aspects of life (Bennet et al., 2008). Because they are considered
discrimination impure, religious customs dictate a bevy of restrictions on their
interactions with people in higher caste groups. Peoples of higher
Ethnicity and caste affect almost every aspect of life in Nepal. caste are not supposed to eat or share cooked food or water
The population is comprised of 126 ethnic groups of Indo-Aryan touched by Dalits. Dalits are often not extended the traditional
and Tibeto-Burmese origins (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), respectful greeting ‘‘Namaste” and are not supposed to enter the
2012). In 1854, the civil code institutionalized caste for every eth- homes of higher caste people. Thus, in addition to the tangible ben-
nic group (some of which previously had not had caste) and placed efits of society (access to housing, employment, education, health,
each in a hierarchy of inclusion and exclusion based on the Hindu etc.), they are also generally excluded from social relations and
caste system, similar to that in India. Although discriminatory civic participation. Although Dalits are just as skilled as other caste
practices based on caste were legally abolished in 1962, caste- groups, this social exclusion makes it very difficult for those who
based discrimination is still rampant today (Bennet, Dahal, & migrate within Nepal to negotiate employment and housing. How-
Govindasamy, 2008). ever, a published study (Pariyar & Lovett, 2016) and our ethno-
Brahmin and Chhetri peoples, generally termed ‘‘high caste graphic experience show that some Dalit migrants to India avoid
Hindu”, hail from all regions of Nepal and have enjoyed the best caste-based discrimination there by changing their family names
access to various economic, social, and political resources to hide their caste.
(Bennet et al., 2008; Bista, 1991; Dahal, 2003). In addition to being In summary, ethno-caste groups in Nepal differ in terms of geo-
involved in government and politics, they have also long served as graphic origination (claimed homeland), historic migration
ambassadors and in other high-level positions in the foreign ser- patterns, economic and educational disadvantage, and discrimina-
vice. Thus, while most Nepalis were precluded from leaving the tion. In terms of disadvantage and discrimination, they can gener-
country for centuries, there is a history of some Brahmin and Chhe- ally be arranged the following order of progressive disadvantage:
tri people (along with their household staff of the same caste) trav- 1) Brahmin/Chhetri, 2) Newar/Hill Janajati, 3) Terai Janajati, and
eling to many countries around the world, especially wealthier and 4) Dalit. In terms of geography, the ethno-caste groups can gener-
more politically powerful countries where the Nepali foreign ser- ally be arranged by historic/claimed homeland as follows: Newar-
vice was located. Kathmandu Valley, Terai Janajati-Chitwan and other terai,
The Newar ethnic group is lower in the caste hierarchy than the Brahmin-Chhetri/Hill Janajati/Dalit-all Nepal. In terms of historic
high caste Hindu people. But given their claimed origin in the Kath- migration patterns, the general patterns are Brahmin-Chhetri-
mandu Valley—the seat of the Nepali government—Newars have international, especially wealthy geopolitical powers, Hill
long enjoyed substantial advantages, opportunities, and involve- Janajati-India, Newar/Dalit/Terai Janajati-nowhere.
ment in business, trade, and politics (Bennet et al., 2008; DFID, &
World Bank, 2006). Kathmandu Valley not only has influenced
the employment advantages of Newars but is also a central figure 4. Data
in their ethnic identity and serves as a homeland to be proud of and
a place to ‘‘return” to (Gellner, 1986), with important implications Our data comes from the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS)
for migration. (Axinn et al., 2019), collected in the western Chitwan District,
Hill Janajati people (including Gurung, Magar, Rai, Limbu, and which lies in the south-central part of Nepal. Chitwan was histor-
others) historically come from the middle hills and mountainous ically inhabited by the indigenous Tharu people of the Terai Jana-
regions across Nepal. They are considered lower in the caste hier- jati ethno-caste. However, in the 1950s, the Nepali government
archy than the Brahmin/Chhetri people and enjoy fewer advan- cleared the forest and encouraged in-migration of people from
tages than those of the Newars. In terms of migration, it is the the mountains and hills by offering land grants. Present-day Chit-
Hill ethnicities (specifically Gurungs and Magars) that comprised wan is now home to the Tharu people as well as many other ethno-
approximately 99 percent of the British Gurkha regiments since caste groups who moved into the region within the last few gener-
the 18000 s ( Pariyar, 2016) and thus have a long history of migra- ations. Outside the city of Narayanghat, which is situated in the
tion to India. northern corner of our study area, most residents live in small vil-
Terai Janajati comprise several different ethnic groups (Tharu, lages and sustain themselves with a combination of agriculture
Darai, Kumal, Bote, and others) that are indigenous to the lowland and animal husbandry.
terai area of Nepal that borders India. Similar to indigenous groups The CVFS encompasses a population-based representative sam-
in other parts of the world, Terai Janajati people are thought to be ple of all individuals aged 12–59 who were living in the western
somewhat ethnically different than the other ethno-caste groups. Chitwan Valley in 2008. Our study period is 2008–2012. A baseline
They are also more residentially segregated and tend to live in vil- survey was conducted in 2008 with all residents in sample neigh-
lages that are exclusively of their own group. While they are in the borhoods aged 15–59. Those aged 12–14 in 2008 completed a
middle of the Hindu-based caste system, occupying ranks similar baseline survey when they turned 15. The response rate was 97
to the Hill Janajati people, they are nonetheless generally heavily percent.
disadvantaged in social, economic, health, and political spheres. Baseline respondents residing in Nepal (either in Chitwan or
In the Chitwan study area, most of the Terai Janajati people come elsewhere in Nepal) were re-interviewed thrice yearly through
from the Tharu ethnic group (Guneratne, 2002). Of all ethnic 2012, with 93 percent of this group interviewed in all waves. All
respondents who moved outside Nepal between 2008 and 2011 upper middle or high-income countries, whereas Nepal is catego-
were re-interviewed before and after their moves. Migrants were rized as a low-income country.
asked extra questions about their migration experience, including Our choice of analyzing the first time a person migrates out of
the timing and destination. Chitwan during the study period is important. It would be possible
The CVFS also conducted thrice yearly household-level inter- to analyze any migrations during the study period (to include sec-
views that provide continuous demographic information about ond, third, or higher migration spells). However, with subsequent
each respondent. In particular, these household interviews provide migration spells, the relationship between migration and our pre-
a history, with monthly precision, of all moves. Thus, we have data dictor variables (like work experience and household resources)
from household interviews for an average of 49 months of demo- becomes increasingly endogenous. It would also be possible to
graphic events for our study sample (with the exact number of analyze the first migration ever, by excluding from the analysis
months depending on the exact dates of the interviews). Because all respondents who had ever migrated before the study period
very few households moved in their entirety, were lost to follow- began. While this would greatly reduce our sample size, it is also
up, or refused, we have these reports for 98 percent of our original problematic for a different reason. Similar to many other places,
sample. migration in Nepal over the life course tends to follow a stepwise
With reports of migration from both respondents and house- pattern (Paul, 2011) whereby many people first migrate shorter
hold interviews, the CVFS provides two migration reports for distances (within Nepal or India) and later to farther destinations
almost all respondents. A comparison of the two reports reveals as they gain experience. Accordingly, including only people with
a high degree of consistency, with 98 percent of respondents no migration experience could produce misleading results, partic-
reporting the same migration outcome for themselves as their ularly for the farther destinations. Thus, our strategy is to examine
household members reported for them. Even when the compar- first migration during the study period as a middle ground that
isons are limited to only respondents who migrated during the tempers the different limitations of these other strategies.
study period, the individual and household reports provided the
same first destination status for 91 percent of the migrants. These 4.2. Explanatory measure
comparisons provide substantial confidence in the quality of the
migration information reported by household informants. For our Our measure of ethno-caste is as reported by respondents and
analyses, we use the information about migration obtained from grouped into five categories: (a) Brahmin-Chhetri, (b) Dalit, (c) Hill
the migrants themselves when that information is available (94 Janajati, (d) Newar, and (e) Terai Janajati. As the Brahmin-Chhetri
percent of the sample). When it is not, we use reports of the house- group are the most advantaged ethno-caste group, we use it as
hold interviews. Thus, we have nearly complete migration infor- our reference category in all models.
mation for 97 percent of the original respondents.
The full sample of CVFS respondents eligible for our study is 4.2.1. Human and economic capital
4936 people. However, the tables we present in this article do One of the main mechanisms that we propose links ethno-caste
not include respondents for whom household resources informa- to migration is human and economic capital. We can directly
tion (described below) is not available; thus, the final analytic sam- investigate this with several measures that are strongly suggested
ple that we use is 4406 people. Models that include the full by the existing migration literature and that we can measure well
possible sample of 4936 people, with indicators for missing house- with this study. For human capital, we include a time-varying mea-
hold resources information, produce results that are substantively sure of education, categorized to match the primary credentialing
equivalent to those presented here. points in the Nepali school system (0, 1–5, 6–8, 9–10, and
11 plus years), and a time-varying measure of non-family work
experience (never worked, wage only, any salary). For economic
capital we used a variable that is a composite of land ownership,
4.1. Outcome measures livestock ownership, housing quality, and income. Each of these
indicators provide partial measures of economic status and
We use two measures of migration: (i) any migration outside together provide a more comprehensive record. For each of these
Chitwan (dichotomous), which is measured as any first time (after four measures, we logged the indicators to correct for skewness,
2008) departure from Chitwan lasting six months or more, and (ii) calculated a z-score for each of the logged variables, and then
destination-specific migration, which categorizes migrations into added the z-scores. We also use a variable for relative household
different destinations, including: no migration, migration in Nepal resources. This was done by comparing the household resources
(but outside Chitwan), to India, to the Persian Gulf, and to wealthy of the respondent’s household with the resources of the house-
Western3 and Asian countries, which we call ‘‘WWA”. holds in their neighborhood. For this measure, respondents were
The main international destinations that we identified as being divided into thirds: the lower third of relative household wealth,
in the Persian Gulf are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the middle third, and the upper third. Our economic resources vari-
and the United Arab Emirates. Seven percent of the migrants in this ables are non-time varying and measured in 2006.
Persian Gulf category went to other countries: Afghanistan, Iraq,
Israel, and Lebanon. The primary destinations in the WWA cate- 4.2.2. Controls
gory were Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, We control many other factors that have been shown in this and
Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, with these seven countries other study areas to have important influences on migration. Indi-
accounting for 86 percent of all migrants in this category. The vidual level controls include: gender, age (a time-varying measure
remaining 14 percent were divided evenly among Belgium, Belize, categorized into nine groups – 14–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39,
Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Maldives, Poland, Portu- 40 plus), marital status (a time varying measure – ever married and
gal, and Spain. Although these countries represent a wide range of never married), and individual migration experience before the
geographical locations and cultures, they are all quite culturally baseline interview (no migration, domestic migration only, any
dissimilar from Nepal and all are classified by the World Bank as international migration). Household level controls include the total
number of household members (a time varying measure) and a
3
By Western countries, we mean European countries or countries dominated by time varying measure of household level migration (percent
European diaspora and culture, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. migrants logged). Finally, the community level controls include
community level migration experience (time varying, percent Table 1

migrants logged) and the distance to the main urban area of Descriptive statistics at the time of baseline interview (N = 4424).
Narayanghat (in miles). Measures Percent distribution or SD Min-

mean Max
Outcome measures – any
5. Analytic strategy migration
Non-migrants 83.6
Any migrants 16.4
We first present bivariate results, comparing ethno-caste to Migration destinations
migration rates and destinations. This presentation of the gross Non-migrants 83.6
effects of caste on migration is key to understanding our broader Migrants outside Chitwan in 8.6
concern in this article of how ethno-caste variation in migration Nepal
India 2.3
might influence social change in Nepal.
Persian Gulf 3.5
Next, we seek to understand whether the reasons for these dif- Wealthy Western and Asian 2.0
ferences are due to human and economic capital, contemporary Caste/ethnicity
discrimination, or historical legacy. To accomplish this, we esti- Brahmin-Chhetri 44.5
mated multivariate logistic regression equations to model the Newar 6.6
Hill Janajati 15.5
monthly hazard of out-migration. Table 3 tests the dichotomous
Dalit 11.0
outcome of migration to any destination versus no migration. We Terai Janajati 22.4
progressively add controls for education, work experience, and Individual characteristics
land ownership, enabling us to examine how these human and Gender (1 = female) 60.8
Male 39.2
economic capitals mediate the relationship between ethno-caste
Age: 14–19 27.6
and migration. The models in Table 3 use discrete-time event his- 20–24 11.6
tory models with person-months as the unit of analysis. 25–29 10.6
In Table 4 we test destination outcomes. When we consider 30–34 9.7
destinations, we must acknowledge that migration decision- 35–39 9.5
40+ 30.8
making could be a one- or two-step process and must be modeled
Ever married 65.1
accordingly. A one-step decision process is where people decide to Personal migration
migrate and decide on a destination all at once, e.g. ‘‘I want to experience
migrate to Australia”. A two-step decision process is where people None 62.8
Domestic migration only 23.2
decide to migrate and then subsequently decide where to migrate,
Any international migration 14.0
e.g. ‘‘I want to migrate. Where should I go? I think I’ll choose Work experience
Australia”. There is not substantial evidence whether migration None 46.0
decisions are largely made through one- or two-steps, and our Wage work only 34.9
fieldwork suggests that both happen in Nepal. As such, we analyze Any salary work 19.1
Education
both for a thorough understanding of the relationship between
None 25.6
ethno-caste and migration. Table 4 presents results from models 1–5 years 15.5
that include the full analytic sample (as in Table 3), but include a 6–8 years 26.6
five category outcome (no migration, within Nepal, to India, to the 9–10 years 14.5
11+ years 17.8
Persian Gulf, to WWA), with no migration as the reference outcome.
Household characteristics
This essentially models a one-step migration decision making pro- # of household members 3.4 1.4 1–10
cess. We also present Table 5, which is equivalent to Table 4 except Household resources 0.45 2.48 9.30–
that the reference outcome is migration to WWA. Again, this models 8.56
a one-step decision-making process. The results in Table 5 are sub- Relative household resources
Lower third 24.4
stantively equivalent to those in Table 4, but with a different refer-
Middle third 37.3
ence outcome (no migration in Table 4 and WWA in Table 5), we can Upper third 38.2
glean slightly different information that is helpful to sorting out % household migrated 39.3 30.6 0–100
the complex relationship between ethno-caste and migration. Neighborhood characteristics
Distance to Narayanghat 8.6 3.93 0.02–
We also model a two-step migration decision-making process.
(miles) 17.7
Table 3, which tests migration versus no migration is the first step. % neighbors migrated 40.9 10.8 0–85.2
Table A1 in our supplementary materials includes migrants only
and separates destination outcomes (Nepal, India, Persian Gulf,
WWA), and addresses the second step in a two-step process.
Notably, the results of the one-step process (Tables 4 and 5) are the historical legacy explanation. Specifically, we will interpret as
substantively equivalent to those for the two-step process (Tables historical legacy cases where we find higher likelihoods of
3 and A1). Brahmin-Chhetri people going to WWA destinations, Newars to
In both cases (one- or two-step decision-making process), we within Nepal (as Kathmandu is considered their traditional home-
are interested in understanding the mediating influences of human land), Hill Janajati to India, and Terai Janajati not migrating (as
and economic capital, contemporary discrimination, and historical Chitwan is considered their traditional homeland). Alternately,
legacies. We directly test for mediation of human and economic we will interpret as discrimination any cases where an ethno-
capital by progressively controlling for these factors in Tables caste group, especially the disadvantaged groups of Dalit and Terai
3–5. However, we cannot use this strategy to directly test for dis- Janajati, are more likely to migrate to a destination outside South
crimination and historical legacies. Instead, we do this by carefully Asia (destinations where Hindu-based caste discrimination is not
examining the results in our models that fully control for human practiced). For our purposes, it is useful that our hypotheses for
and economic capital (Models 4, 6, and 8). In cases where a discrimination-influenced migration predict different destinations
particular ethno-caste group is more likely to migrate to a destina- for each ethno-caste group than our hypotheses for historical-
tion where they have a history of migrating, we attribute that to influenced migration.
Table 2
Distribution of migrants by destination and caste/ethnicity.
Caste/ethnicity Percent migrated Percent of migrants, by destination

Within Nepal India Persian Gulf WWA Total
Brahmin-Chhetri 16.9 57 9 17 17 100
Newar 19.2 70 12 9 9 100
Hill Janajati 19.1 47 24 21 8 100
Dalit 18.0 39 19 35 7 100
Terai Janajati 11.5 46 16 29 9 100
Total number moved 722 376 103 131 155 722
6. Results shown in Model 4, neither economic resources nor relative eco-

nomic resources had statistically significant associations with
Table 1 provides univariate descriptive statistics of each vari- migration.
able appearing in our models. Of the full sample, 16.4 percent Despite the substantial association of human capital with
undertook a migration to any destination during our study period. migration, their addition to the equations produces only slight
8.6 percent of respondents had a domestic migration, 2.3 percent changes in the estimated relationship between ethno-caste and
migrated to India, 3.5 percent to the Persian Gulf, and 2.0 percent migration. Looking at Terai Janajati results, those that are strongest
to WWA (Table 1). in Model 1, we find that the odds ratio increases to 0.78 (from 0.69)
Table 2 shows bivariate distributions for the total sample and once education is controlled, but then decreases again to 0.75
by ethno-caste. Looking at the first column, titled ‘‘Percent when work experience and economic resources are controlled.
migrated”, we can already see variance in migration rates between We find a similar pattern with other ethno-caste groups, where
ethno-castes. The highest rate was the Hill Janajati and Newar peo- only a small amount of the ethno-caste association is mediated
ple, 19.2 percent and 19.1 percent (respectively) of whom migrated by education, work experience, and land ownership, with the sug-
during the study period, and the lowest rate is found with the Terai gestion that the strongest mediating factor is education. These
Janajati, at 11.5 percent. Recall that it is the Hill Janajati who have results suggest that contrary to conjectures in the existing litera-
the history of migrating to India to serve in the Gurkha regiments, ture (Gurung, 2012; Tsujita & Oda, 2014), the ethno-caste differ-
it is the Newar people who have strong place attachments with ences in migration that we find in Chitwan are not, to any great
Kathmandu, and it is the Terai Janajati who claim Chitwan as their extent, the result of differentials in education, work experience,
ancestral homeland with strong place attachments to our study and land ownership.
area. In the middle of the distribution, we find Dalit people (who Our results in fully controlled Model 4 still show one substantial
are the most disadvantaged ethno-caste group) with a migration caste difference in migration. Specifically, the odds ratio for Terai
rate of 18.0 percent and Brahmin-Chhetri people (the most advan- Janajati is 0.75, meaning that they are much less likely to migrate
taged group) at 16.9 percent. Already we can see hints that some of compared to Brahmin-Chhetri people. At the same time, we find no
our suggested mechanisms are appearing in empirical results, but reportable difference between migration rates of Brahmin-Chhetri
we will examine the multivariate results before making conclusive and Dalit people. Again, the association of ethno-caste with migra-
assessments (Table 2). tion appears to only be present for the Terai Janajati people, impli-
Turning to destinations (the remainder of Table 2), while most cating that it is likely a historical effect due to living in their
migrations occurred within Nepal, destinations outside of Nepal historical homeland in Chitwan and very low rates of migration
vary considerably by ethno-caste. Newars who migrated were less in the past (Table 4).
likely than others to migrate outside of Nepal; 70 percent of New-
ars who migrated had a destination within Nepal, compared to a 6.1. Destinations
low of 39 percent of Dalit migrants whose destination was within
Nepal. Hill Janajati and Dalit migrants were more likely than others While we find a direct effect of ethno-caste on any migration for
to go to India, and Dalits and Terai Janajati migrated to countries of only one group (Terai Janajati people), we find some more interest-
the Persian Gulf more often than the other groups. Notably, ing differences in our models that separate destinations (some of
Brahmin-Chhetri migrants were the most likely to go to WWA which are much more profitable than others), shown in Tables 4
countries and the least likely to go to India. and 5.
Table 3 provides multivariate estimates of the association of Model 5 shows results where human and economic capital are
ethno-caste with the rate of migration to any destination. Model not controlled. Here we see that ethno-caste plays a substantial
1 indicates that when controlling for basic demographic and social role on destination choice. Dalit people are almost twice as likely
characteristics, the odds ratios, at 0.99, for Dalit people (who expe- (odds ratios of 1.73 and 1.94) as Brahmin-Chhetri people to
rience the most contemporary discrimination) are essentially the migrate to India and the Persian Gulf (compared to not migrating
same as for Brahmin-Chhetris (who experience the least). It is only at all). We also find a substantial positive effect for Hill Janajati
with the Terai Janajati people (with a historic homeland in Chitwan people going to India. With an odds ratio of 2.94 that is statistically
and little history of migration) that we find a statistically signifi- significant, Hill Janajati are almost three times more likely to go to
cant association, which, with an odds ratio of 0.69 is substantial India, compared to Brahmin-Chhetri people. At the same time, we
(Table 3). find no statistically significant effect of Hill Janajati people going to
In Models 2–4, we show the estimated influences of human and the Persian Gulf or Terai Janajati people going to any destination
economic capital (education, work experience, and economic (Table 5).
resources) on migration out of Chitwan. As shown in Model 2, edu- Notably, we find large ethno-caste differences for migration to
cational attainment has a strong, positive, and statistically signifi- WWA countries, with all caste groups substantially less likely to
cant effect on migration. Model 3 indicates that any salary work is move to this destination compared to Brahmin-Chhetri people.
associated with higher migration likelihoods, with marginal statis- Odds ratios for Newar, Hill Janajati, Dalit, and Terai Janajati are
tical significance, compared to no non-family work experience. As 0.51, 0.53, 0.38, and 0.28, respectively, indicating that these people
Table 3
Logistic regression estimates of the likelihood of migration (to any destination).
Measures Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Caste/ethnicity
Brahmin-Chhetri Ref Ref Ref Ref
Newar 1.14 1.19 1.20 1.20
(0.86) (1.15) (1.22) (1.23)
Hill Janajati 1.05 1.15 1.15 1.14
(0.42) (1.22) (1.23) (1.25)
Dalit 0.99 1.09 1.05 1.05
(0.5) (0.65) (0.38) (0.35)
Terai Janajati 0.69** 0.78* 0.75* 0.75*
(3.02) (1.96) (2.23) (2.27)
Individual characteristics
Gender (1 = female) 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.46***
(10.11) (9.40) (8.62) (8.59)
Age: 14–19 Ref Ref Ref Ref
20–24 1.97*** 1.80*** 1.74*** 1.74***
(6.53) (5.26) (4.93) (4.95)
25–29 0.97 0.91 0.86 0.86
(0.17) (0.58) (0.88) (0.90)
30–34 0.61** 0.60** 0.56** 0.57**
(2.76) (2.73) (3.07) (2.96)
35–39 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(4.84) (4.54) (4.81) (4.79)
40+ 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(11.0) (9.52) (9.76) (9.64)
Ever married 0.72** 0.76* 0.76* 0.75*
(2.60) (2.14) (2.20) (2.23)
Personal migration experience: None Ref Ref Ref Ref
Domestic only 1.54*** 1.58*** 1.57*** 1.56***
(3.68) (3.89) (3.80) (3.76)
Any international 2.67*** 2.71*** 2.59*** 2.56***
(7.77) (7.77) (7.04) (7.02)
Education: no school Ref Ref Ref
1–5 years 1.87** 1.83** 1.86**
(3.17) (3.04) (3.11)
6–8 years 1.61* 1.58* 1.60*
(2.43) (2.34) (2.37)
9–10 years 1.91** 1.90** 1.90**
(3.23) (3.19) (3.18)
11+ years 2.16*** 2.14*** 2.14***
(3.90) (3.82) (3.77)
Work experience: None Ref Ref
Wage work only 1.16 1.16
(1.54) (1.49)
Any salary work 1.23+ 1.22+
(1.79) (1.74)
# household members 0.93* 0.92** 0.92** 0.92**
(2.42) (2.62) (2.66) (2.66)
Log % household migrated 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04
(0.84) (0.75) (0.86) (0.90)
Household resources 0.99
(0.27)
Relative household resources: Ref
Lower third
Middle third 1.02
(0.16)
Upper third 1.04
(0.26)
Neighborhood characteristics
Distance to Narayanghat 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02
(1.27) (1.34) (1.36) (1.50)
Log % neighbors migrated 1.05 1.03 1.05 1.09
(0.35) (0.21) (0.33) (0.62)
# person periods 193,233 193,233 193,233 193,233
# moves 722 722 722 722
Fit statistics
AIC 8821.16 8809.24 8808.87 8814.32
2 Log L 8783.16 8763.24 8758.87 8760.32
Odds ratios (OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
One-tailed tests for caste/ethnicity, two-tailed tests for controls.
Table 4
Multinomial logistic regression estimates of destination choice. All respondents included (4406 people). Reference outcome is No Migration.
Model 5 Model 6
Measures Within Nepal India Persian WWA Within Nepal India Persian WWA
Gulf Gulf
Caste/ethnicity
Brahmin-Chhetri Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Newar 1.38+ (1.57) 1.92+ 0.60 (1.04) 0.51+ (1.37) 1.42* (1.68) 1.57 (0.99) 0.53 (1.23) 0.58 (1.09)
(1.45)
Hill Janajati 0.99 (0.08) 2.94*** 1.36 (1.20) 0.53* (1.82) 0.99 (0.08) 2.06** 1.15 (0.51) 0.75 (0.79)
(3.91) (2.45)
Dalit 0.74+ (1.47) 1.73* (1.67) 1.94** 0.38* (2.16) 0.72+ (1.47) 1.04 (0.10) 1.44 (1.24) 0.71 (0.71)
(2.54)
Terai Janajati 0.43*** (4.64) 0.63+ (1.37) 0.48** 0.28*** 0.41*** (4.61) 0.41** 0.34*** 0.51* (1.67)
(2.72) (3.35) (2.49) (3.64)
Gender (1=female) 1.08 (0.57) 0.33*** 0.70*** 0.17*** 1.18 (1.26) 0.30*** 0.07*** 0.19***
(4.56) (10.2) (6.62) (4.56) (9.10) (5.65)
Age: 14–19 Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
20–24 0.92 (0.52) 0.80 (0.82) 3.24*** 3.40** 0.98 (0.13) 1.09 (0.29) 3.64*** 3.02**
(3.82) (3.03) (3.96) (2.63)
25–29 0.44*** (3.39) 0.29** 3.62*** 1.62 (0.96) 0.42*** (3.41) 0.35* (2.12) 3.76** 1.40 (0.64)
(2.59) (3.33) (3.27)
30–34 0.24*** (5.06) 0.10*** 1.70 (1.24) 0.75 (0.52) 0.22*** (5.20) 0.12*** 1.57 (1.00) 0.69 (0.65)
(4.01) (3.64)
35–39 0.12*** (6.13) 0.06*** 0.94 (0.14) 0.43 (1.37) 0.11*** (6.13) 0.08*** 0.84 (0.36) 0.42 (1.33)
(4.58) (4.15)
40+ 0.08*** (9.50) 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** (8.38) 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.09***
(7.57) (5.25) (4.49) (6.91) (5.24) (3.71)
Ever married 0.46*** (4.16) 0.82 (0.61) 1.26 (0.82) 1.63 (1.47) 0.43*** (4.46) 0.61 (1.43) 0.99 (0.04) 1.79+
(1.72)
Personal migration experience: Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
None
Domestic only 2.94*** (6.04) 0.89 (0.21) 1.55 (1.43) 2.68** 2.81*** (5.72) 0.79 (0.41) 1.27 (0.76) 2.93***
(3.18) (3.34)
Any international 2.56*** (3.55) 15.0*** 4.55*** 4.94*** 2.04* (2.56) 14.3*** 3.23*** 6.59***
(7.28) (5.67) (4.52) (6.20) (3.95) (4.86)
Education: no school Ref Ref Ref Ref
1–5 years 1.40 (1.15) 1.77 (0.94) 1.34 (0.67) 1.59 (0.54)
6–8 years 1.23 (0.71) 1.74 (0.93) 1.34 (0.67) 2.61 (1.20)
9–10 years 1.32 (0.93) 1.15 (0.17) 0.82 (0.41) 2.21 (0.96)
11 + years 0.96 (0.16) 0.49 (1.10) 0.56 (1.24) 3.49 (1.57)
Work experience: None Ref Ref Ref Ref
Wage work only 1.15 (0.97) 1.72* (2.08) 1.71* (2.05) 0.45* (1.98)
Any salary work 1.87** (3.10) 1.06 (0.15) 2.08** 0.62 (1.42)
(2.59)
# household members 0.99 (0.14) 1.00 (0.02) 1.24** 1.06 (0.63) 0.98 (0.36) 1.01 (0.09) 1.25** 1.01 (0.07)
(3.15) (3.17)
Log % household migrated 1.01 (0.13) 1.00 (0.0) 0.92 (0.97) 1.53** 1.00 (0.02) 1.02 (0.16) 0.94 (0.75) 1.41* (2.55)
(3.20)
Household resources 1.05 (1.32) 0.96 (0.61) 1.04 (0.73) 1.11 (1.38)
Relative household resources Ref Ref Ref Ref
Lower third
Middle third 0.88 (0.75) 1.05 (0.16) 1.03 (0.10) 0.83 (0.48)
Upper third 0.82 (0.91) 1.32 (0.72) 0.85 (0.48) 1.03 (0.06)
Distance to Narayanghat 0.98 (1.30) 1.10** 1.06* (2.38) 0.93* (2.35) 0.98 (1.35) 1.09** 1.06* (2.38) 0.93* (2.29)
(3.24) (2.98)
Log % neighbors migrated 0.37*** (5.14) 0.33** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.37*** (5.14) 0.34** 0.26*** 0.28***
(3.04) (4.60) (4.29) (2.82) (4.54) (3.58)
# moves 376 103 155 88 376 103 155 88
Fit statistics
AIC: 4615.91 AIC: 4601.18
2 Log L: 4471.91 2 Log L: 4385.18
Odds ratios (OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
were about half to one quarter as likely to move to WWA countries In Model 6 of Table 4, we introduce into the analysis education,
as their Brahmin-Chhetri counterparts. The effects are statistically work experience, and land ownership. Comparing coefficients in
significant in all cases (with marginal significance for Newar Model 6 with Model 5, we see that the introduction of these human
people). The large magnitude of the odds ratios warrants and economic capital measures has only modest effects on the
attention and we address this pattern further in our discussion of coefficients for destination choices of Newars compared to
Model 6. Brahmin-Chhetris. By contrast, the coefficient for Hill Janajati to
Table 5
Multinomial logistic regression estimates of destination choice. All respondents included (4406 people). Reference outcome is WWA.
Model 5 Model 6
Measures No Move Within India Persian Gulf No Move Within India Persian Gulf
Nepal Nepal
Caste/ethnicity
Brahmin-Chhetri Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Newar 1.96+(1.37) 2.71*(1.94) 3.76*(2.06) 1.16(0.22) 1.73(1.09) 2.47*(1.71) 2.73+(1.52) 0.92(0.11)
Hill Janajati 1.87*(1.82) 1.85*(1.66) 5.51*** 2.56*(2.28) 1.33(0.79) 1.31(0.70) 2.74*(2.23) 1.53(0.98)
(3.99)
Dalit 2.64*(2.16) 1.95+(1.39) 4.58**(2.82) 5.12*** 1.40(0.71) 1.02(0.03) 1.45(0.64) 2.01+(1.30)
(3.30)
Terai Janajati 3.55*** 1.53(1.04) 2.24+(1.64) 1.71(1.21) 1.96*(1.67) 0.80(0.51) 0.80(0.42) 0.67(0.83)
(3.35)
Gender (1=female) 5.91*** 6.35***(6.42) 1.96+(1.90) 0.40*(2.47) 5.23*** 6.19***(5.82) 1.57(1.16) 0.37**(2.63)
(6.62) (5.65)
Age: 14–19 Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
20–24 0.29**(3.03) 0.27**(3.11) 0.24**(3.05) 0.95(0.10) 0.33**(2.63) 0.32**(2.57) 0.36*(2.02) 1.21(0.36)
25–29 0.62(0.96) 0.27*(2.43) 0.18*(2.56) 2.23(1.32) 0.72(0.64) 0.30*(2.14) 0.25*(1.98) 2.69(1.55)
30–34 1.33(0.52) 0.31+(1.94) 0.14*(2.57) 2.26(1.22) 1.45(0.65) 0.31+(1.86) 0.18*(2.16) 2.27(1.17)
35–39 2.34(1.37) 0.27+(1.88) 0.15*(2.28) 2.20(1.06) 2.36(1.33) 0.25+(1.91) 0.18*(1.98) 1.99(0.88)
40+ 14.5*** 1.08(0.12) 0.15*(2.28) 1.08(0.10) 10.6*** 0.76(0.39) 0.13*(2.33) 0.68(0.48)
(4.49) (3.71)
Ever married 0.61(1.47) 0.28***(3.46) 0.50(1.54) 0.77(0.64) 0.56+(1.72) 0.24***(3.84) 0.34*(2.30) 0.55(1.41)
Personal migration experience: None Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Domestic only 0.37**(3.18) 1.10(0.27) 0.33+(1.76) 0.58(1.33) 0.34*** 0.96(0.12) 0.27*(2.04) 0.43+(1.93)
(3.34)
Any international 0.20*** 0.52(1.56) 3.03**(2.63) 0.92(0.20) 0.15*** 0.31*(2.57) 2.17(1.39) 0.49(1.55)
(4.52) (4.86)
Education: no school Ref Ref Ref Ref
1–5 years 0.63(0.54) 0.88(0.15) 1.11(0.10) 0.84(0.18)
6–8 years 0.38(1.20) 0.47(0.90) 0.67(0.41) 0.51(0.74)
9–10 years 0.45(0.96) 0.60(0.60) 0.50(0.67) 0.37(1.05)
11 + years 0.29(1.57) 0.27(1.54) 0.14+(1.93) 0.16*(2.02)
Work experience: None Ref Ref Ref Ref
Wage work only 2.24*(1.98) 2.58*(2.24) 3.86**(2.84) 3.82**(2.85)
Any salary work 1.61(1.42) 3.00**(2.93) 1.71(1.07) 3.35**(2.90)
# of household members 0.94(0.63) 0.94(0.64) 0.94(0.46) 1.16(1.41) 0.99(0.07) 0.98(0.24) 1.00(0.01) 1.24+(1.89)
Log % household migrated 0.65**(3.20) 0.66**(2.94) 0.65*(2.50) 0.60*** 0.71*(2.55) 0.71*(2.38) 0.72+(1.88) 0.66**(2.64)
(3.35)
Household resources 0.90(1.38) 0.94(0.69) 0.86(1.48) 0.94(0.70)
Relative household resources: Lower Ref Ref Ref Ref
third
Middle third 1.20(0.48) 1.06(0.14) 1.27(0.49) 1.24(0.47)
Upper third 0.97(0.06) 0.80(0.46) 1.28(0.42) 0.83(0.38)
Distance to Narayanghat 1.08*(2.35) 1.05(1.55) 1.19*** 1.14*** 1.08*(2.29) 1.05(1.50) 1.18*** 1.15***
(4.04) (3.48) (3.79) (3.40)
Log % neighbors migrated 3.46*** 1.28(0.68) 1.15(0.29) 0.90(0.25) 3.56*** 1.32(0.74) 1.21(0.38) 0.93(0.16)
(3.65) (3.58)
# non-moves/moves 3684 376 103 155 3684 376 103 155
Fit statistics AIC: 4615.91 AIC: 4601.18
2 Log L: 4471.91 2 Log L: 4385.18
Odds
ratios (OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.
Significance: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
India is reduced from 2.94 to 2.06, suggesting that about half of the Interestingly, the introduction of the socioeconomic attribute
Hill Janajati association with migration to India is the result of dif- variables substantially reduces the magnitude of the positive coef-
ferent socioeconomic attributes. Despite that decrease, Model 6 ficient of Dalits to both India and the Persian Gulf. Although the
indicates that Hill Janajati people are still about twice as likely to odds ratio for Dalits moving to the Persian Gulf is still notably pos-
move to India compared to Brahmin-Chhetris. This could be due itive (1.44), it is not statistically significant. This indicates that
to contemporary discrimination or historical legacy. Note that much of the overall association between Dalit ethnicity and desti-
the Hill people experience moderate discrimination (much less nations is a product of socioeconomic attributes, similar to what
than Dalit people) and that they have a long (and proud) history Tsujita and Oda and Gurung (Gurung, 2012; Tsujita & Oda, 2014)
of large migration streams to India for work in the British and suggest.
Indian Army Gurkha Brigades. Thus, while we cannot be definitive We noted earlier that all of the ethno-caste groups had lower
in attributing causation, the context is highly suggestive that the rates to the WWA countries than did the Brahmin-Chhetris. In
remaining positive result for Hill Janajati moving to India (in Model Model 6, we see that even with the socioeconomic controls, most
6) is due to the historical explanation. of these odds ratios remain strong, between 0.51 and 0.75. Notice,
however, that the magnitudes of the odds ratios are generally literature. The one important ethno-caste relationship to emerge
somewhat weaker in Model 6 than in Model 5 and it is only for is the significantly lower likelihood of Terai-Janajati people to
Terai Janajati that we find statistical significance. migrate and we attribute this to the legacy of very low migration
Migration to WWA destinations is important for this study, due amongst this group of people who still live in their historic
to the fact that these countries offer much higher remuneration homeland.
and social prestige for migrants. We also hypothesized that Alternately, it is with destination choice that we find evidence
Brahmin-Chhetri people would be more likely to migrate there that supports all three of our proposed mechanisms. Here we find
due to historical legacy. We find some evidence in this regard in that the mediation of human and economic capital has an impor-
Table 4. To examine this destination more closely, we turn to tant influence on destination choice, especially for Dalits who are
Table 5, where our models use WWA as the reference outcome. the most disadvantaged group. It is also with Dalits that we find
In Table 5, we see the same general patterns. Most odds ratios results that suggest contemporary discrimination might be influ-
are smaller when socioeconomic factors are controlled (Model 8) encing destination choice.
compared to when they are not (Model 7). The fully controlled For the other ethno-caste groups (Brahmin-Chhetri, Newar, Hill
model in Table 4 (Model 6) shows that Terai Janajati people were Janajati, and Terai Janajati), our results show that destination
less likely to go to any destination as opposed to not migrating choice is partially mediated by socioeconomic factors. Notably,
and the fully controlled Model 8 in Table 5 also shows that Terai we do not find evidence that contemporary discrimination influ-
Janajati people were about twice as likely to not migrate as to go ences destination choice, but this is not entirely surprising because
to WWA destinations (OR 1.96). Compared to Brahmin-Chhetris, these groups occupy the top and middle of the caste hierarchy in
Newar people were more than twice as likely to migrate within Nepal. The striking results we find for these groups is historical
Nepal (OR 2.47) or to India (OR 2.73) as they were to go to legacy likely has the strongest influence on their destinations. In
WWA. Hill Janajati were more than twice as likely to go to India some cases, ethno-caste groups (like Hill Janajati and Brahmin-
(OR 2.74) and Dalit people were more than twice as likely to go Chhetri) are more likely to migrate to the same destinations where
to the Persian Gulf (OR 2.01, although this is marginally statisti- they have a long history of migration. In another case, it is the his-
cally significant). toric homeland and lack of migration history and culture of migra-
Considering Tables 4 and 5 together, we find that when socio- tion that appears to discourage out-migration to any destination
economic factors are controlled one destination stands out for each for the Terai Janajati. In other words, the differential treatment
ethno-caste group. Compared to all others, Brahmin-Chhetri peo- and discrimination of ethnic groups in the past remains powerful
ple are more likely to go to WWA destinations than any other in present-day migration patterns, perpetuated by social networks
place. Newar people are more likely to migrate within Nepal, Hill and cumulative causation. Indeed, so powerful is the past that it
Janajati to India, Dalits to the Persian Gulf, and Terai Janajati are appears to overwhelm much of the possible effect of contemporary
about equally unlikely to migrate to any destination. These desti- discrimination on contemporary out-migration.
nations largely match our predictions of where people would This study also allows us to comment on the potential for the
migrate if the historical legacies pathway is influential. The lone institution of migration to influence social change. Specifically,
exception is Dalits, whose migration to the Persian Gulf is indica- can ethno-caste differences in migration cause change in the
tive of escaping contemporary discrimination. dynamics of caste-based discrimination? A relatively strong litera-
ture from many countries already shows that there are multiple
7. Conclusion benefits (economic and social) from migration, for returned
migrants, their households, and their communities in general
We investigated the relationship between ethnicity, out- (Acosta, Calderón, Fajnzylber, & López, 2006; Adams, 2011;
migration, and destination choice using detailed panel data from Massey & Parrado, 1988). In Nepal alone, studies show that remit-
rural Nepal. Our analyses were guided by previous literature that tances have dramatically reduced poverty (KC., 2003; Lokshin,
suggests that human and economic capital might mediate the Bontch-Osmolovski, & Glinskaya, 2007; Sharma & Gurung, 2009;
effect of ethnicity on out-migration. In addition, we drew on exist- World Bank, 2005).
ing theories of emigration to hypothesize that the expectation of These benefits of migration to individuals and households only
caste-based discrimination will lead people from the more disad- influence broader social change if migration is available to those
vantaged castes to not migrate within Nepal, and instead be more from caste groups that experience discrimination. We find that
likely to choose international destinations where they will not Dalits, the most disadvantaged ethno-caste group, migrated at
experience caste-based discrimination. We also addressed the pos- slightly higher rates than the most advantaged group, the
sibility that ethno-caste differences in migration could be based on Brahmin-Chhetris. Further, they were much more likely to migrate
an entirely different mechanism, that of historical patterns perpet- to India and the Persian Gulf, which are better remunerated than
uated into the present day by social networks. within Nepal. Thus, there is potential for migration to reduce eco-
Our bivariate results, by not controlling for any other factors, nomic inequality and dampen existing caste-based hierarchies,
show actual patterns of ethno-caste migration differences. From creating more opportunities for those who were previously disad-
these, we see that the high-caste Brahmin-Chhetri are more likely vantaged. The obvious contingency to this conclusion is our finding
to migrate to the premier destinations of wealthy Western and that the highest status group (Brahmin-Chhetri) were more likely
Asian countries. But Dalits and the indigenous Terai Janajati peo- than any other group to migrate to the premier destinations in
ple, both disadvantaged castes, are more likely to migrate to India wealthy Western and Asian countries. Thus, migration might be
and the Persian Gulf, destinations where remuneration is higher creating space to dampen caste-based hierarchies, but historical
than for migrants who move within Nepal. legacies that limit Dalits from migrating to premier destinations
With multivariate models intended to better isolate the mech- also might limit the potential for changing the caste hierarchies
anisms that influence these patterns, our results for migration to (see Howell, 2017).
any destination show little evidence that contemporary discrimi- Of course, this study represents the period 2008–2012. Since
nation influences the ethno-caste differences in migration. Instead, then and looking into the future, we expect that different patterns
we find that human and economic capital is a likely mechanism, have and will emerge. Just as Paul (2011) describes for the Philip-
but its role is relatively small and notably less influential than pines, we believe that intentional stepwise migration is common in
the overwhelming influence that is suggested by previous Nepal, whereby people first migrate to a closer destination, to
accumulate social and economic capital, which they use to migrate Declaration of Competing Interest
to a farther preferred destination. If this is indeed the case, then we
might expect to find more Dalits moving to wealthy Western and The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
Asian destinations since our study period and in the future, after cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
they or their family members accumulate resources in the Persian to influence the work reported in this paper.
Gulf (where they were located during our study period). This could
then influence even more renegotiation of caste-based hierarchies
Acknowledgements
in Nepal.
Even with our new evidence that allows us to surmise how
This work was supported by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver
migration might impact caste-based discrimination in the future,
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
more investigation is still necessary. Specifically, in addition to
(NICHD) [grant numbers R01HD078397, R24HD041028,
being better remunerated, premier migration destinations also
P2CHD041028, R24HD042828]. We also thank the Institute for
provide the possibility of longer-term stays and even permanent
Social and Environmental Research-Nepal for collecting the Chit-
relocation, compared to Nepal, India, and the Persian Gulf. Thus,
wan Valley Family Study data and respondents for sharing their
migrants to the wealthier destinations, who are heavily comprised
time and experiences.
of the advantaged Brahmin-Chhetri people, are probably less likely
to return to Nepal, and it is this return that ultimately creates the
greatest potential for changes in patterns of caste-based discrimi- Appendix
nation in Nepal. Drawing on Portes (Portes, 2010), we note that
to fully understand the potential for migration to influence social
change in Nepal (or any other sending country), it will be necessary Appendix A. Supplementary data
to examine ethno-caste selection in length of stay and return
migration. The theoretical development and methods we use here Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
should contribute to these endeavors. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104912.
Table A1
Multinomial logistic regression estimates of destination choice. Only migrants included (722 people). Reference outcome is migration within Nepal.
Model 9 Model 10
Measures India Persian Gulf WWA India Persian Gulf WWA
Caste/ethnicity
Brahmin-Chhetri Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Newar 1.15 0.46+ 0.40* 0.84 0.46+ 0.40+
(0.28) (1.35) (1.70) (0.35) (1.30) (1.56)
Hill Janajati 2.71*** 1.44 0.54+ 1.80* 1.10 0.70
(3.13) (1.12) (1.58) (1.69) (.26) (0.83)
Dalit 2.19* 2.04* 0.40* 1.39 1.45 0.56
(2.01) (2.01) (1.82) (0.79) (0.94) (1.05)
Terai Janajati 1.25 1.00 0.66 0.60 0.66 0.99
(0.58) (0.01) (0.92) (0.77) (1.04) (0.02)
Gender (1=female) 0.33*** 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.28*** 0.06*** 0.10***
(3.96) (8.621) (6.39) (4.29) (8.14) (5.97)
Age: 14-19 Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
20-24 0.94 4.10*** 3.83** 1.34 5.34*** 3.63**
(0.21) (4.08) (3.12) (0.86) (4.44) (2.82)
25-29 0.92 10.80*** 4.19** 1.27 13.58*** 3.96*
(0.16) (5.08) (2.64) (0.46) (5.23) (2.37)
30-34 0.42 5.79** 2.46 0.58 7.01*** 2.71
(1.37) (3.23) (1.44) (0.83) (3.42) (1.51)
35-39 0.44 6.46** 2.40 0.68 8.44** 2.62
(1.14) (2.90) (1.14) (0.50) (3.16) (1.17)
40+ 0.15** 0.87 0.83 0.22* 1.03 1.16
(2.80) (0.23) (0.29) (2.05) (0.04) (0.20)
Ever married 1.87+ 3.02** 4.76*** 1.59 2.59** 5.17***
(1.79) (3.19) (4.07) (1.28) (2.69) (4.04)
Personal migration experience
Personal migration experience: None Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Domestic only 0.27* 0.46* 0.75 0.26* 0.35** 0.87
(2.32) (2.09) (0.82) (2.29) (2.65) (0.38)
Any international 5.28*** 1.59 1.65 7.89*** 1.26 3.26*
(3.78) (1.17) (1.09) (3.70) (0.50) (2.20)
Education: no school Ref Ref Ref
1-5 years 2.44 2.10 1.40
(1.20) (1.21) (0.36)
6-8 years 2.13 1.34 1.83
(1.04) (0.48) (0.68)
9-10 years 1.28 0.61 1.12
(0.33) (0.76) (0.12)
Table A1 (continued)
Model 9 Model 10
Measures India Persian Gulf WWA India Persian Gulf WWA
11+ years 0.85 0.59 2.31
(0.20) (0.82) (0.94)
Work experience: None Ref Ref Ref
Wage work only 1.30 1.32 0.41*
(0.88) (0.88) (1.98)
Any salary work 0.46 1.15 0.26**
(1.57) (0.36) (3.00)
# household members 1.01 1.22* 1.01 1.06 1.26* 1.00
(0.13) (2.09) (0.06) (0.50) (2.36) (0.03)
Log % household migrated 1.04 0.93 1.54** 1.10 1.00 1.43*
(0.30) (0.62) (2.82) (0.69) (0.00) (2.18)
Household resources 0.88 1.02 1.06
(1.53) (0.30) (0.58)
Relative household resources: Ref Ref Ref
Lower third
Middle third 1.18 0.90 0.98
(0.49) (0.31) (0.05)
Upper third 1.64 0.74 1.49
(1.11) (0.68) (0.74)
Distance to Narayanghat 1.10** 1.06+ 0.92* 1.08* 1.06+ 0.92*
(2.58) (1.71) (2.15) (2.26) (1.68) (2.15)
Log % neighbors migrated 0.94 0.47+ 0.33 0.99 0.41+ 0.68
(0.12) (1.70) (0.68) (0.01) (1.93) (0.78)
# moves 103 155 88 103 155 88
Fit statistics
AIC: 1466.87 AIC: 1457.95
2 Log L: 1358.87 -2 Log L: 1295.95
Odds ratios(OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

Significance: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
References Caldwell, J. C. (1969). African rural-urban migration: The movement to Ghana’s towns.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Carling, J., & Collins, F. (2018). Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration. Journal of
Acosta, P., Calderón, C., Fajnzylber, P., & López, H. (2006). Remittances and
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(6), 909–926. Retrieved from doi:10.1080/
Development in Latin America. The World Economy, 29(7), 957–987. https://
1369183X.2017.1384134.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00831.x. Retrieved from https://
G. Carswell G. De Neve (2014). T-shirts and tumblers:Caste, dependency and work
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00831.x.
under neoliberalisation in south India. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 48(1),
Adams, R. H. (2011). Evaluating the Economic Impact of International Remittances
103-131. Retrieved from doi:10.1177/0069966713502423
On Developing Countries Using Household Surveys: A Literature Review. The
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) National Population and Housing Census 2011 –
Journal of Development Studies, 47(6), 809–828. Retrieved from: Doi: 10.1080/
National Report Retrieved from Kathmandu, Nepal 2012.
00220388.2011.563299.
Central Department of Sociology/Anthropology Nepal Multidimensional Social
Adhikari, J., & Hobley, M. (2015). Everyone is leaving. Who will Sow Our Fields?”
Inclusion Index Retrieved from Kathmandu, Nepal 2014.
The Livelihood Effects on Women of Male Migration from Khotang and Udaypur
Creighton, M. J. (2013). The role of aspirations in domestic and international
Districts, Nepal, to Gulf Countries and Malaysia. Himalaya, the Journal of the
migration. The Social Science Journal, 50(1), 79–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 35(1), 11–23.
j.soscij.2012.07.006.
Asad, A. L., & Hwang, J. (2019a). Indigenous Places and the Making of
Curran, S. R., Garip, F., Chung, C. Y., & Tangchonlatip, K. (2005). Gendered Migrant
Undocumented Status in Mexico-US Migration. International Migration Review,
Social Capital: Evidence from Thailand Retrieved from. Social Forces, 84(1),
53(4), 1032–1077.
225–255. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2005.0094. doi:10.1353/sof.2005.0094.
Asad, A. L., & Hwang, J. (2019b). Migration to the United States from Indigenous
Curran, S. R., & Rivero-Fuentes, E. (2003). Engendering migrant networks: The case
Communities in Mexico. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and
of Mexican migration. Demography, 40(2), 289–307. https://doi.org/
Social Science, 684(1), 120–145. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/
10.1353/dem.2003.0011. doi:10.1353/dem.2003.0011.
0002716219848342.
Dahal, D. R. (2003). Social composition of the population of caste/ethnicity and
Axinn, W. G., Thornton, A., Barber, J. S., Ghimire, D. J., Fricke, T. E., Matthews, S., .. . .
religion. Retrieved from Kathmandu, Nepal.
Treleaven, E. (2019). Chitwan Valley Family Study: Changing Social Contexts
De Jong, G. F. (2000). Expectations, gender, and norms in migration decision-
and Family Formation, Nepal, 1995-2017.
making. Population Studies, 54(3), 307–319. Retrieved from doi: 10.1080/
Bach, R. L., & Smith, J. (1977). Community Satisfaction, Expectations of Moving, and
713779089.
Migration. Demography, 14(2), 147–167.
De Jong, G. F., Abad, R. G., Arnold, F., Cariño, B. V., Fawcett, J. T., & Gardner, R. W.
Barcus, H. R., & Brunn, S. D. (2009). Towards a Typology of Mobility and Place
(1983). International and Internal Migration Decision Making: A Value-
Attachment in Rural America. Journal of Appalachian Studies, 15(1/2), 26–48.
Expectancy Based Analytical Framework of Intentions to Move from a Rural
Barron, M. (2008). Exclusion and Discrimination as Sources of Inter-Ethnic
Philippine Province. International Migration Review, 17(3), 470–484. https://doi.
Inequality in Peru. Economia, 61(31), 51–80.
org/10.1177/019791838301700305.
Bennet, L., Dahal, D. R., & Govindasamy, P. (2008). Caste, ethnic and regional identity
De Jong, G. F., Richter, K., & Isarabhakdi, P. (1996). Gender, Values, and Intentions to
in Nepal: further analysis of the 2006 Demographic and Health Surveys.
Move in Rural Thailand. International Migration Review, 30(3), 748–770. https://
Retrieved from Calverton, Maryland, USA.
doi.org/10.1177/019791839603000305.
Bhandari, P. (2004). Relative Deprivation and Migration in an Agricultural Setting of
Deane, G. D. (1990). Mobility and Adjustments: Paths to the Resolution of
Nepal. Population and Environment, 25(5), 475–499.
Residential Stress. Demography, 27(1), 65–79.
Bhandari, P., & Ghimire, D. J. (2016). Rural Agricultural Change and Individual Out
DFID, & World Bank. (2006). Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion
Migratioin. Rural Sociology, 81(4), 572–600.
in Nepal, Summary Version. Retrieved from Kathmandu, Nepal.
Bista, D. B. (1991). Fatalism and development. Calcutta, India: Orient Longman.
Donato, K. M. (1993). Current Trends and Patterns of Female Migration: Evidence
Bjarnason, T., & Thorlindsson, T. (2006). Should I stay or should I go? Migration
from Mexico. International Migration, 27(4), 748–771. Retrieved from doi:
expectations among youth in Icelandic fishing and farming communities.
10.1177/019791839302700402.
Journal of Rural Studies, 22(3), 290–300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
Durand, J., & Massey, D. S. (Eds.). (2004). Crossing the Border: Research from the
jrurstud.2005.09.004. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
Mexican Migration Project. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
article/pii/S0743016705000860.
Fischer, P. A., & Malmberg, G. (2001). Settled People Don’t Move: On Life Course and Massey, D. S. (1990a). The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration. The ANNALS
(Im-) Mobility in Sweden. International Journal of Population Geography, 7(5), of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 510(1), 60–72. https://doi.
357–371. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijpg.230. org/10.1177/0002716290510001005.
Fussell, E., & Massey, D. S. (2004). The Limits to Cumulative Causation: International Massey, D. S. (1990b). Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative
Migration from Mexican Urban Areas. Demography, 41(1), 151–171. Causation of Migration. Population Index, 56(1), 3–26.
Garip, F. (2008). Social Capital and Migration: How Do Similar Resources Lead to Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993).
Divergent Outcomes? Demography, 45(3), 591–617. Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and
Garip, F. (2012). Discovering Diverse Mechanisms of Migration: The Mexico–US Development Review, 19(3), 431–466.
Stream 1970–2000. Population and Development Review, 38(3), 393–433. Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1994).
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00510.x. An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case.
Garip, F., & Asad, A. L. (2016). Network Effects in Mexico–U.S. Migration: Population and Development Review, 20(4), 699–751. https://doi.org/10.2307/
Disentangling the Underlying Social Mechanisms. American Behavioral 2137660.
Scientist, 60(10), 1168–1193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764216643131. Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1998).
Gellner, D. N. (1986). Language, caste, religion and territory: Newar identity ancient Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the
and modern. European Journal of Sociology, 27(1), 102–148. https://doi.org/ Millenium. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10.1017/S0003975600004549. Massey, D. S., & Espinosa, K. E. (1997). What’s Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A
Gidwani, V., & Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2003). Circular Migration and the Spaces of Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 102(4),
Cultural Assertion. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93(1), 939–999. https://doi.org/10.1086/231037.
186–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8306.93112. Massey, D. S., & Parrado, E. A. (1988). International Migration and Business
Government of Nepal (2014). Labour Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Formation in Mexico. Social Sciences Quarterly, 79(1), 1–20.
Nepal: 2013/2014. Retrieved from Kathmandu, Nepal: McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migration
Greenwood, M. J. (1985). Human Migration: Theory, Models, and Empirical Studies. and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development
Journal of Regional Science, 25(4), 521–544. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- Economics, 84(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.11.003.
9787.1985.tb00321.x. McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily
Greenwood, M. J. (2016). Perspectives on Migration Theory – Economics In M. J. in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27(1), 415–444. https://doi.org/
White (Ed.), International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution 10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415.
(pp. 31–40). New York, NY: Springer. Mollica, K. A., Gray, B., & Treviño, L. K. (2003). Racial Homophily and Its Persistence
Guneratne, A. (2002). Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in in Newcomers’ Social Networks. Organization Science, 14(2), 123–136. https://
Nepal. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.2.123.14994.
Gurung, Y. B. (2012). Migration from Rural Nepal: A Social Exclusion Osella, F., & Osella, C. (2000). Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala. Journal of
Framework. Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and the Royal Anthropological Institute, 6(1), 117–133. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
Himalayan Studies, 31(1). 9655.t01-1-00007.
Hatlebakk, M. (2016). Inter-generational Determinants of Migration Decisions: The Palloni, A., Massey, Douglas S., Ceballos, M., Espinosa, K., & Spittel, M. (2001). Social
Case of International Labour Migration from Nepal. Oxford Development Studies, Capital and International Migration: A Test Using Information on Family.
44(1), 93–112. Retrieved from doi: 10.1080/13600818.2015.1056132. Networks. American Journal of Sociology, 106(5), 1262–1298. https://doi.org/
Howell, A. (2017). Impacts of Migration and Remittances on Ethnic Income 10.1086/320817.
Inequality in Rural China. World Development, 94, 200–211. https://doi.org/ Pariyar, B., & Lovett, J. C. (2016). Dalit Identity in Urban Pokhara, Nepal. Geoforum,
10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.01.005. Retrieved from http:// 75, 134–147.
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X17300074. Pariyar, M. (2016). Overseas Caste among Military Migrants: The Migration and
Ilahiane, H. (2001). The Social Mobility of the Haratine and the Re-Working of Settlement of Nepalese Gurkhas in Britain (PhD). Sydney, Australia: Macquarie
Bourdieu’s Habitus on the Saharan Frontier, Morocco. American Anthropologist, University.
103(2), 380–394. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2001.103.2.380. Paul, A. M. (2011). Stepwise International Migration: A Multistage Migration
International Organization for Migration. (2019). World Migration Report 2020. Pattern for the Aspiring Migrant. American Journal of Sociology, 116(6),
Retrieved from Geneva, Switzerland: Retrieved on December 18, 2019 https:// 1842–1886. https://doi.org/10.1086/659641.
publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf. Portes, A. (2010). Migration and Social Change: Some Conceptual Reflections.
Irwin, M., Blanchard, T., Tolbert, C., Nucci, A., & Lyson, T. (2004). Why People Stay: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(10), 1537–1563. https://doi.org/
The Impact of Community Context on Nonmigration in the USA. [Pourquoi 10.1080/1369183X.2010.489370.
certains ne migrent pas:]. Population, 59(5), 567–592. https://doi.org/10.3917/ Rathaur, K. R. S. (2001). British Gurkha Recruitment: A Historical Perspective. Voice
popu.405.0653. of History, 16(2), 19–24.
Kandel, W., & Massey, D. S. (2002). The Culture of Mexican Migration: A Theoretical Reed, H. E., Andrzejewski, C. S., & White, M. J. (2010). Men’s and women’s migration
and Empirical Analysis*. Social Forces, 80(3), 981–1004. Retrieved from doi: in coastal Ghana: An event history analysis. Demographic research, 22, 10.4054/
10.1353/sof.2002.0009. DemRes.2010.4022.4025. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
Karell, D. (2014). Ethnicity, Citizenship, and the Migration-Development Nexus: The pubmed/24298203 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3843947/.
Case of Moroccan Migrants in Spain’s North African Exclaves. The Journal of doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2010.22.25.
Development Studies, 50(8), 1090–1103. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Ricketts, E. (2014). U.S. Investment and Immigration from the Caribbean*. Social
00220388.2014.895814. Problems, 34(4), 374–387. Retrieved from doi: 10.2307/800814.
KC., B. K. (2003). Migration, Poverty and Development in Nepal. Paper presented at Schewel, K., & Fransen, S. (2018). Formal Education and Migration Aspirations in
the Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting on Migration and Development, Economic Ethiopia. Population and Development Review, 44(3), 555–587. https://doi.org/
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand. 10.1111/padr.12159. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
Kurien, P. A. (2002). Kaleidoscopic ethnicity: International migration and the 30333673 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6175090/.
reconstruction of community identities in India. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Seddon, D., Adhikari, J., & Gurung, G. (2002). Foreign Labor Migration and the
University Press. Remittance Economy of Nepal. Critical Asian Studies, 34(1), 19–40.
Lee, B. A., Oropesa, R. S., & Kanan, J. W. (1994). Neighborhood Context and Sen, A. (2000). Social Exclusion: Concept, application, and scrutiny Retrieved from
Residential Mobility. Demography, 31(2), 249–270. Retrieved from doi: 10.2307/ Manila, Philippines:
2061885. Sharma, J., & Gurung, G. (2009). Impact of Global Economic Slowdown on
Levitt, P. (1998). Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Remittance Inflows and Poverty Reduction in Nepal. Retrieved from
Diffusion. International Migration Review, 32(4), 926–948. https://doi.org/ Mandikhatar, Kathmandu, Nepal:
10.1177/019791839803200404. Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. Journal of
Li, T. E., & McKercher, B. (2016). Effects of place attachment on home return travel: Political Economy, 70(5, Part 2), 80-93. Retrieved from https://www.journals.
A spatial perspective. Tourism Geographies, 18(4), 359–376. https://doi.org/ uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/258726. doi: 10.1086/258726.
10.1080/14616688.2016.1196238. South, S. J., & Crowder, K. D. (1997). Escaping Distressed Neighborhoods: Individual,
Liang, Z., & White, M. J. (1997). Market Transition, Government Policies, and Community, and Metropolitan Influences. American Journal of Sociology, 102(4),
Interprovincial Migration in China: 1983–1988. Economic Development and 1040–1084. https://doi.org/10.1086/231039.
Cultural Change, 45(2), 321–339. Speare, A. (1974). Residential Satisfaction as an Intervening Variable in Residential
Lokshin, M., Bontch-Osmolovski, M., & Glinskaya, E. (2007). Work-Related Migration Mobility. Demography, 11(2), 173–188.
and Poverty Reduction in Nepal. D.C.: Retrieved from Washington. Speare, A., Goldstein, S., & Frey, W. H. (1975). Residential Mobility, Migration, and
Lundquist, J. H., & Massey, D. S. (2005). Politics or Economics? International Metropolitan Change. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Migration during the Nicaraguan Contra, War. Journal of Latin American Studies, Speare, A., Kobrin, F., & Kingkade, W. (1982). The Influence of Socioeconomic Bonds
37(1), 29–53. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X04008594. Retrieved from and Satisfaction on Interstate Migration. Social Forces, 61(2), 551–574. https://
https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/politics-or-economics-international- doi.org/10.1093/sf/61.2.551.
migration-during-the-nicaraguan-contra-war/ Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The New Economics of Labor Migration. The
8D4C1819DE91C67F509AE7E7D8D44C81. American Economic Review, 75(2), 173-178. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.
Marrow, H. B., & Klekowski von Koppenfels, A. (2018). Modeling American org/stable/1805591.
Migration Aspirations: How Capital, Race, and National Identity Shape Stark, O., & Levhari, D. (1982). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. Economic
Americans’ Ideas about Living Abroad. International Migration Review, 0(0), Development and Cultural Change, 31(1), 191-196. Retrieved from https://
0197918318806852. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/0197918318806852. www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/451312. doi:10.1086/451312.
Stark, O., & Taylor, J. E. (1989). Relative Deprivation and International Migration. Todaro, M. P., & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform:
Demography, 26(1), 1–14. A Conceptual Framework. Population and Development Review, 13(1), 101-114.
Stark, O., & Taylor, J. E. (1991). Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The Role of Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/1972122. doi:10.2307/1972122
Relative Deprivation. The Economic Journal, 101, 1163–1178. Tolnay, S. E. (2003). The African American ‘‘Great Migration” and Beyond. Annual
Stinner, W. F., & Van Loon, M. (1992). Community size preference status, Review of Sociology, 29(1), 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.
community satisfaction and migration intentions. Population and Environment, 010202.100009.
14(2), 177–195. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358044. Tsujita, Y., & Oda, H. (2014). Caste, Land and Migration: Analysis of a Village Survey
Sunam, R. (2014). Marginalised Dalits in International Labour Migration: in an Underdeveloped State in India. In Y. Tsujita (Ed.), Inclusive Growth and
Reconfiguring Economic and Social Relations in Nepal Retrieved from. Journal Development in India: Challenges for Underdeveloped Regions and the
of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(12), 2030–2048. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Underclass (pp. 96–116). London Palgrave Macmillan UK.
1369183X.2014.948393. Uhlenberg, P. (1973). Noneconomic Determinants of Nonmigration: Sociological
Taylor, J. E. (1986). Differential Migration, Networks, Information, and Risk. In O. Considerations for Migration Theory. Rural Sociology, 38(3), 276–311.
Stark (Ed.), Research in Human Capital and Development (Vol. 4, pp. Pp. 141- van Dalen, H. P., & Henkens, K. (2013). Explaining emigration intentions and
171). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. behaviour in the Netherlands, 2005–10. Population Studies, 67(2), 225–241.
Taylor, J. E. (1987). Undocumented Mexico—U.S. Migration and the Returns to https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2012.725135.
Households in Rural Mexico. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69(3), VanWey, L. K. (2005). Land Ownership as a Determinant of International and
626–638. https://doi.org/10.2307/1241697. Internal Migration in Mexico and Internal Migration in Thailand. International
Thissen, F., Fortuijn, J. D., Strijker, D., & Haartsen, T. (2010). Migration intentions of Migration Review, 39(1), 141–172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2005.
rural youth in the Westhoek, Flanders, Belgium and the Veenkoloniën, The tb00258.x.
Netherlands. Journal of Rural Studies, 26(4), 428–436. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. Williams, N. E. (2009). Education, gender, and migration in the context of social
jrurstud.2010.05.001. change. Social Science Research, 38(4), 883–896.
Thornton, A., Bhandari, P., Swindle, J., Williams, N., Young-DeMarco, L., Sun, C., & Williams, N. E., Hughes, C., Bhandari, P., Thornton, A., Young-DeMarco, L., Sun, C., &
Hughes, C. (2019). Fatalistic Beliefs and Migration Behaviors: A Study of Swindle, J. (forthcoming). When Does Social Capital Matter for Migration? A Study
Ideational Demography in Nepal. Population Research and Policy Review. of Networks, Brokers, and Migrants in Nepal. International Migration Review.
Retrieved from doi: 10.1007/s11113-019-09551-0. World Bank. (2005). Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of
Thornton, A., Williams, N. E., Bhandari, P., Young-DeMarco, L., Sun, C., Swindle, J., & Remittances and Migration. Retrieved from Washington DC:
Xie, Y. (2019). Influences of Material Aspirations on Migration. Demography, 56 World Bank. (2009). Impact of Global Financial Crisis on South Asia. Retrieved from
(1), 75–102. Washington D.C.:
Todaro, M. P. (1969). A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Wright, R., & Ellis, M. (2016). Perspectives on Migration Theory – Geography. In M. J.
Developed Countries. The American Economic Review, 59(1), 138-148. White (Ed.), International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution
Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/1811100. (pp. 12–30). New York: Springer.

1 s2.0 S0305750X20300383 Main

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 s2.0 S0305750X20300383 Main

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

World Development 130 (2020) 104912

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Ethno-Caste influences on migration rates and destinations

2.3. Historical legacy 3.1. Migration

community level migration experience (time varying, percent Table 1

Narayanghat (in miles). Measures Percent distribution or SD Min-

Caste/ethnicity Percent migrated Percent of migrants, by destination

6. Results shown in Model 4, neither economic resources nor relative eco-

Measures Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Odds ratios (OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

Odds ratios (OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

Odds ratios(OR) shown. Z-statistics in parentheses.

You might also like