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Ruth Campos
To cite this article: Ruth Campos (2017): If you want to get ahead, get a good master.
Annette Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / Si quieres avanzar, ten una buena
maestra. Annette Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo, Infancia y Aprendizaje, DOI:
10.1080/02103702.2017.1401318
Article views: 8
Download by: [RMIT University Library] Date: 09 December 2017, At: 06:33
Infancia y Aprendizaje / Journal for the Study of Education and Development, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/02103702.2017.1401318
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) offered us the best advice regarding science:
‘If you want to get ahead, get a theory’. Theories allow us to define a domain of
interest and the way in which to address it. As in the three-mountain task from
Piaget and Inhelder (1956), the perspective adopted will establish what portion of
reality we will pay attention to and how it will be observed. Theory is both goal
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and map; it determines the route from the starting point to the arrival and enables
understanding of and predicting of the sequence of steps along the way.
Together with theories, another mechanism that makes learning possible is the
assumption of an internal personal model, or ‘internalized imitation’, in which
models relating to the other’s way of doing are incorporated as guides for one’s
own behaviour (Rivière, 1997). Imitation is the resource by which human inter-
subjective abilities are transformed into effective development, and this elaborate
form of imitation, in which we are not even aware that we imitate and which goes
far beyond emulating behaviour, is a privileged means of development. On the
path to growth, the internal models of those who we desire to be like will be our
reference, our compass.
In this article, an explanatory model of psychological functioning based on a
particular way of looking at things, which places development at the centre, will
be discussed. This perspective comes as a contrast to a static neuropsychological
approach (i.e., that does not consider development), according to which the
cognitive system and the brain are organized into innate modules that have the
same potential for dissociation from birth as during the rest of the individual’s life.
This static model presupposes a relationship of transparency among phenotypic
outcomes and etiological factors, with the expectation that the same dissociations
observed in the adult stage are already evident at the time in which skills emerge
in development, and assumes a linear relationship among behavioural results in
early and later stages (Ellis & Young, 1988; Temple, 1997).
The commitment to take development into consideration is even more impor-
tant when we refer to different developmental trajectories, because this atypical
scenario confronts us with some fundamental questions, among others, about the
possible variability in the usual sequence of development to reach the same result,
or about the possibility of dissociating the consistency of certain development
principles with respect to the consistency of the environment to which most
individuals are exposed. These questions, in turn, generate new ones, related to
the proposed cognitive subject model; to the innate and/or modular character of
processes; to a universal character of its sequence of development; to its specifi-
city of domain, of group and also of species; to the role played by the environ-
ment, and the plasticity in an atypical development.
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 3
A developmental perspective
Piaget defined four factors responsible for mental development: the biological
factor, the physical experience, the social experience and an internal mechanism
for construction. The first three are produced during development, but the fourth
is the process of development itself, which cannot be restricted to the innate or to
an established plan (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). With Piaget, Karmiloff-Smith
learned that the process of development is key in understanding the resulting
cognitive system’s structure and functioning, which is a product of the interrela-
tionship between organism and environment. The fundamental argument from this
perspective is, therefore, that to understand psychological functioning it is neces-
sary to look at its process of ontogenesis (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998a, 2009, 2015).
The neuroconstructivist model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998a) contemplates a pro-
gressive modularization process in which the modules are the result of the process
of development and are not its starting point. Development is supported by
constraints as starting points, initially domain relevant, which will only become
domain-specific at the end of this development process due to specific interactions
with the environment (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992a). The specificity of the function is
acquired through the experience of interaction with the environment. Initial
perceptual biases would guide the infant to certain aspects of the environment,
and the repeated processing of stimuli would be responsible for further specificity
of the system. This idea has its roots in Piaget’s constructivism: the child’s
environment is constructed, and the microcircuit of his/her brain is also shaped,
through his/her physical and mental actions on the world. The fundamental notion
of the model is therefore emergentism: initial constraints of the computational
properties in the brain are the basis of specialization that emerges as a result of
development (Elman, Bates, Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1996).
From this hypothesis of emerging modularity, Karmiloff-Smith’s proposal can
be understood as modularist, although it distances itself from other positions in its
4 R. Campos
any innate predispositions to the human infant? Yet they would not hesitate to do
so with respect to the ant’ (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992a, p. 17). The answer to this
paradox is discovered in her book, and in all her work: systems in development
must be both restricted and flexible, and ontogenetic development consists pre-
cisely in the dynamic balance between these two extremes (Karmiloff-Smith,
1992a, 2015). The advantage of an ant’s cognitive system is its efficiency; the
advantage of ours, the possibility of adaptation to change. Systems under devel-
opment are adaptive systems because they change in response to their environ-
ments, they act and they learn from that interaction, and their flexibility allows
them to be more robust than fixed systems (D’Souza, D’Souza, & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2017; Smith & Gasser, 2005). The long and slow process of human
development gives time for the infant’s cognitive system to calibrate and adjust
the internal operations to the characteristics of the external world (Johnson, Jones,
& Gliga, 2015). These features will be more or less universal or more or less
specific to the environment, and the infant will also need more or less time to
attune to them. A clear example of this possibility of adaptation to the environ-
ment is the differential development of the linguistic (and general cognitive)
system of monolingual and bilingual infants (Bosch & Sebastián-Gallés, 2001).
Development will allow the infant to adjust to the environment through a gradual
process of attunement to the stimuli of his/her experience.
The main developmental mechanism will therefore be that of specialization;
the neuroconstructivist model has also received the name of interactive speciali-
zation approach (see Johnson, Halit, Grice, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002).
Progressive specialization explains how the repeated processing of input converts
the initially general intention representations into domain-specific, allowing a
faster and effective operation (Elman et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992a). The ‘specialized’ system gains automaticity at the expense of
losing flexibility, to the extent that the modular systems (actually, ‘modularized’)
involve inflexible ‘encapsulated’ functioning, in other words, non-permeable to
the influence of other systems. Specialization is therefore emerging in develop-
ment; an infant’s cognitive system is initially very flexible, but little by little
becomes specialized in the processing of relevant stimuli within their experience
(Johnson, 2011).
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 5
Johnson, 2014; Palomo, 2012; Zwaigenbaum, Bryson, & Garon, 2013). The solu-
tion to the puzzle involves finding the precursors to this cognitive profile, and the
most parsimonious hypothesis would seem to be to look for early signs related to
deficits characteristic of the clinical condition, the reason why research over early
development in autism (through prospective studies with at-risk infants) has been
principally centred on analysing the early processing of social stimuli (Chevallier,
Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Dawson, 2008). However, in opposition
to these hypotheses, which share the argument that the first signs already manifest
in the social domain and in the structures of the social brain (social-first hypoth-
eses), recent evidence suggests that those first signs, or earliest precursors of those
specific difficulties in the social domain, are more general, and involve an atypical
functioning in the processing of information independent of the social nature (or
not) of the stimulus, for example in mechanisms such as attentional disengagement
(Elsabbagh, Fernandes, et al., 2013), the processing of temporal synchrony
(Bahrick, 2010; Guiraud et al., 2012), visual (Gliga et al., 2015) or auditory
processing (Guiraud et al., 2011) or others. Specific deficits linked to the cognitive
phenotype characteristic of autism would thus be a clinically recognizable result of
an atypical specialization of function and structure (Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2016).
The process of specialization in people with neurodevelopmental disorders
presents an atypical pattern, which may be due to a later or earlier timing
(Karmiloff-Smith, 2015). In the first case, the risk is that a cognitive and neural
specialization could occur that would cause difficulties in the processing of some
types of stimuli (D’Souza & Karmiloff-Smith, 2011). In the second, a specializa-
tion occurring too early would compromise the system’s flexibility and, therefore,
its chances of attuning to new stimuli (Thomas, Davis, Karmiloff-Smith,
Knowland, & Charman, 2016; Thomas, Knowland, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2011).
The result of the specialization and of the consequent reduction in plasticity is
that the adaptation of the phenotype to the characteristics of the physical and
social environment are maximized. For that reason, phenotypes corresponding to
neurodevelopmental disorders are manifestations of the adaptations of an atypical
system to the experience of the environment, also necessarily atypical (Johnson
et al., 2015). This process of adaptation, in turn, will be the result of the dynamics
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 7
set of negative images that constitute specific double dissociations among them (i.e.,
a group presents a high level of functioning in one domain and a low level in another,
while another group has the opposite pattern), they are viewed as landscapes of ways
of functioning, similar or not in the course and pace of development. The neurocon-
structivist perspective thus shifts the focus of interest from double dissociations to
associations among syndromes, and places the different conditions of development
on a continuum in relation to different functions (Doherty & Scerif, 2017; Karmiloff-
Smith, Scerif, & Ansari, 2003). Two very different resulting phenotypes could have
begun with only slightly different parameters, but the effects of that subtle difference
could have progressively increased in development. A minuscule alteration at the
beginning of development can have an enormous impact on some domains (the
‘selectively altered’ modules for static neuropsychology) but only a subtle effect on
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specificity of the system, whose end point would imply specificity of domains
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992a). The infant specializes in the processing of those
stimuli — of those stimulating domains, from the point of view of the already
specialized system — that are relevant to his/her experience. Early experience is
fundamentally interactive, and in this social sense, so that the process of specia-
lization will be produced in a context that is basically one of interaction with
others. In this gradual specialization the infant will construct specific neurocog-
nitive constraints to the native characteristics of the environment, of the culture, in
which he/she develops (i.e., of his/her experience). It is in this sense that we
previously referred to perceptual narrowing phenomena being produced over
stimulating domains linked to the social aspect, as is the case of language or the
processing of faces. The evidence that we collected over the differences in the
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difficulties (Hobson, 2002; Rutter et al., 1999; Yagmurlu, Berument, & Celimli,
2005). Other times the adult is present, but has difficulties in implementing those
mechanisms favouring interaction. Some mental health conditions, such as depres-
sion or the diagnosis of a borderline personality disorder, compromise the ability
of caregivers to develop attachment, sensitivity and adjustment to the infant
(Hobson, 2002).
If the infant has a different development, the dyad will also be affected. The
behaviour associated with certain developmental disorders has an obvious influ-
ence on the social environment: caregivers behave differently depending on the
personality and cognitive functioning of the child (Hodapp, 1997). Even the fact
that the family knows the diagnosis of their child can change the form of the
relationship. In an example of the influence of information over the functioning
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profile associated with a diagnosis, it was found that the mothers of children with
Williams syndrome (a genetic developmental disorder which often involves
visuospatial construction difficulties) tended to help their children in solving
puzzles more than mothers of children with a different diagnosis, regardless of
their children’s actual functioning level (Hodapp, 2004).
Karmiloff-Smith and her team specifically studied the interaction patterns in
adult-infant dyads, with infants with different developmental conditions (Soukup,
D’Souza, D’Souza, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2016). When the infant had a diagnosis of
a developmental disorder (Williams syndrome or Down syndrome), the dyads
shared less reciprocity and engagement behaviours, the parents’ responses were
more directive and less sensitive, the infants paid less attention to the adult, and
there was less mutual activity. There are several possible explanations for these
differences, which are not only not exclusive, but in many cases could also be
understood as interdependent. The first is that the adults, as the parents of any
infant, are adjusting to the needs of their children. Children with a different
development sometimes show less active behaviours in their relationship with
the other person as well as with the physical world, and could benefit from more
directive interaction patterns, in which the adult takes the initiative in interaction
and in the use of objects. The parents of children with developmental disorders
additionally endure very high stress levels, which could also influence the beha-
viours that they display in interaction (Baxter, Cummins, & Yiolitis, 2000).
When the mother-infant interaction is analysed in families in which the infant
has an older sibling with autism, the mothers display more directive and less
sensitive behaviours towards the demands of her child that, however, are not
related to the detection of developmental difficulties in that infant (Wan et al.,
2012, 2013). One might think that her functioning is not only influenced by the
infant’s responses, but that it could also be due to her own history of learning
derived from the previous relationship with the child who was diagnosed with
autism spectrum disorder.
The environment of a person with a different development, therefore, will be
different from that of a person with a typical development. But it is also likely that
the influence of the environment over their development is also different. In an
example of the influence of the adult’s language on the child, it has been found
16 R. Campos
that the linguistic input’s predictor role (assessed in terms of syntactic complexity
as well as in relation to the displaced use of language) over the children’s
linguistic development is strongest when the development is different (i.e., in
children with a very early brain injury; see Demir, Rowe, Heller, Goldin-Meadow,
& Levine, 2015; Rowe, Levine, Fisher, & Goldin-Meadow, 2009).
The aim must then be to build development optimizer contexts which max-
imize the adaptation between the environment’s demands and the functioning of
children’s cognitive systems.
strategies and also a profound change with regard to the design of support for
child development.
One of the fundamental challenges that this model for research implies is the
need to attend to the developmental dynamics at multiple levels, incorporating the
notions of atypical initial constraints as well as adaptation and compensation
constraints, from the fundamental premise that the developmental context is
essentially interactive. Instead of trying to identify modules damaged on a cogni-
tive level, the research must move towards looking for subtler effects beyond the
obvious alterations (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998a). An in-depth analysis must be
carried out of the different processes by which apparently normal behaviours on
the surface can be produced from different processes, for which it is necessary to
design tasks that enable differentiation between the observable behaviour and the
underlying cognitive processes. It is a matter of identifying the lowest level of
alteration and to study its developmental effects in higher cognitive levels. To do
this, it is necessary to also understand how minuscule variations in the initial stage
may give rise to domain-specific differences in the final stages (Karmiloff-Smith,
1998a, 2006, 2015).
But all these efforts in relation to the study of the different developmental
trajectories would not make any sense if their purpose was only to trace their
sequence, even though knowledge of the trajectories allow us to explain and
predict later functioning. At the end of this path, the objective must be to optimize
each child’s developmental possibilities, no matter what their initial constraints
and potentialities may be. The neuroconstructivist theory will allow us to move
forward, and each one of the explained principles marks a clear roadmap in
relation to the assessment and design of support for children in a situation or at
risk of presenting an atypical development.
Given that the resulting functioning will not be able to be explained if its
genesis is not addressed, it will be essential to trace each person’s development
trajectory as soon as possible, and to pay attention to the information from as
many explanation levels as possible. In the planning of support, the first step will
be to perform a thorough assessment in which information is collected about the
sequence of the child’s development in various aspects (i.e., cognitive, biological)
and within all contexts (i.e., family, school).
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 17
argument here is that those strengths, defined at a given time and according to
measures only referring to behaviour, may not be as strong if the processes that
sustain the behaviours are examined.
As an example of several of these arguments we could refer to the evidence
over development in two particular domains in people with Williams syndrome.
Adults with Williams syndrome show many difficulties in numeric processing
(Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002), as opposed to a relatively good behavioural
performance in face-processing tasks. However, this performance draws on an
atypical strategy of componential analysis (Grice et al., 2001; Karmiloff-Smith
et al., 2004). In the genesis of two domains as diverse as numeric and face
processing, a common precursor could be found: the deficit of children with
Williams syndrome in the planning of saccadic movements would affect the
development of numeric processing — complicating the visual examination of
numerical quantities — as well as face processing, hampering a global analysis
(Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Van Herwegen, Ansari, Xu, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2008).
Continuing with this idea, if the aim is to work on the processes that do not
directly correspond to behaviours, and given that time is a fundamental dimension
in development, then it would not be necessary to wait until there is an observable
behavioural deficit to begin intervention. In addition to intervening in those
domains that present difficulties, it would be advisable to get ahead of those
that still do not, with the aim of minimizing the risks of them occurring. It is clear
from this idea that it is not only not necessary to wait for the diagnosis in order to
organize support, but that it would not even be necessary to detect a deficit
behaviour in a particular domain. Knowing the developmental trajectory of the
different processes will enable the development of effective interventions to
prevent, as much as possible, the appearance of difficulties.
The diagnosis, then, will help when it comes time to set priority objectives for
assessment, but in no case should the fundamental criterion be to organize
interventions, which should always be determined from the needs of each child
and his/her family. It will, however, be essential to urge professionals to screen for
developmental risk factors as soon as possible. To this end, in addition to the need
for effective assessment tools, it will be important to listen to and respond to
families’ suspicions regarding their children’s development.
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 19
Laurent, 2003) the conclusion of a certain tension between the need for more
structured and oriented approaches to learning, and the trend towards more
natural and incidental approaches that seek to directly impact the family rela-
tionship rather than just, or primarily, the child, may arise. A possible solution
could go from defining the minimal degree of structure that each child and each
family requires, in every stage of development, to building more natural inter-
action contexts from there that promote relationships and experiences favouring
development (Guralnick, 2011b).
Cultural diversity in terms of beliefs and values over issues related to child
rearing in general, the family and family roles, and also over disability and its
origin, will assume for itself a factor that impacts the interactions of adults with
infants. It is therefore necessary to take into account this diversity when plan-
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Annette, scientist, sage and poet, passionate in all things, generous with all…
has been and continues to be, for so many, the best master. She made us grow, and
gifted us a way of looking, which we learned through her bright eyes, full of
enthusiasm.
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22 R. Campos
cómo el procesamiento repetido de las entradas del input convierte las represen-
taciones inicialmente de propósito general en específicas de dominio, permitiendo
un funcionamiento más rápido y eficaz (Elman et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011;
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992a). El sistema ‘especializado’ gana en automaticidad a
costa de perder flexibilidad, en la medida en que los sistemas modulares (en
realidad, ‘modularizados’) implican un funcionamiento inflexible y ‘encapsulado’,
es decir, no permeable a la influencia de otros sistemas. La especialización es por
tanto emergente en el desarrollo; el sistema cognitivo del bebé es inicialmente
muy flexible, pero poco a poco va especializándose en el procesamiento de los
estímulos relevantes en su experiencia (Johnson, 2011).
El proceso de especialización se produce a lo largo de todo el desarrollo en
distintos dominios. Por ejemplo, los niños se especializan en la realización de
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sistema no será suficiente estudiar sus elementos por separado, sino que resultará
ineludible tratar de abarcar la complejidad que supone atender a las interrelaciones
de todos sus componentes en los distintos niveles (D’Souza et al., 2017). Una
dificultad añadida en este propósito es la falta de correspondencia unívoca entre
los distintos niveles de explicación.
por otro, están asumiendo que los procesos cognitivos en la base de esas puntua-
ciones se han desarrollado también normalmente (Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas,
2003). Los patrones de comportamiento observados en la edad adulta son el
resultado de interacciones atípicas entre los procesos cognitivos a lo largo del
desarrollo. Además de analizar el origen ontogenético del funcionamiento poster-
ior en distintos dominios, es necesario valorar las interacciones y compensaciones
potenciales entre los procesos que, como acabamos de ver, también pueden alterar
el curso del desarrollo (Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005).
Por otra parte, la hipótesis de continuidad modular implica una continuidad
lineal, de forma que se asume que los resultados fenotípicos del perfil adulto
también caracterizan los estados iniciales. La metáfora de la mariposa nos
recuerda que no resulta evidente, desde el estado adulto, inferir el de larva
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paso previo esencial para la RR. Sin embargo, a partir de los datos sobre
redescripción en situaciones de estado estable (a pesar de que las respuestas
repetidas sean erróneas), sugiere que el requisito para la redescripción será la
mera presencia de este estado estable. Es suficiente entonces con que el sistema
comience a captar las regularidades en los datos de entrada, que realice un
procesamiento repetido de estas regularidades. Este procesamiento repetido, con
una cierta función de organización, de imposición de estructuras a la percepción
de estas regularidades (Pozo, 2003), va a constituirse por tanto en requisito
imprescindible para la redescripción posterior, y también para la especialización
del sistema.
Quizá sea en el déficit en el procesamiento de entradas específicas y repetidas
donde puedan situarse algunas de las dificultades del sistema, en algunas de las
situaciones de desarrollo atípico, para inducir los procesos de especialización y
explicitación clave del desarrollo. Las dificultades en el procesamiento podían
derivarse de la atipicidad en las restricciones que impone el organismo (de dentro
a fuera) o el ambiente (de fuera a dentro), aunque, desde esta perspectiva, no
resulta evidente ni la distinción conceptual ni la utilidad de esta distinción en la
explicación del desarrollo.
de interacción con el adulto serán determinantes para el desarrollo del bebé. Por
un lado, porque las propiedades de la experiencia interactiva supondrán el con-
texto necesario para la construcción de las funciones que definen el desarrollo
humano (Rivière, 1999/2003b). Pero además, porque las características concretas
de la interacción impactarán directamente en el proceso de especialización
(Karmiloff-Smith, Aschersleben, de Schonen, Elsabbagh, Hohenberger, &
Serres, 2010).
El desarrollo humano requiere de un contexto especial: un entorno afectiva-
mente mediado, que provea al bebé de interacciones sociales particulares, muy
tempranas en la ontogenia, y cuyos patrones son sabiamente puestos en marcha
por los miembros adultos de la especie (Rivière, 1986/2003). El recién nacido
posee ciertos mecanismos de sintonización con el otro y de orientación para la
relación, que implican la preferencia por los cuadros perceptivos ofrecidos por las
personas y la tendencia a dar respuestas relativamente armónicas a los estímulos
que estas presentan (Rivière, 1999/2003b). Del mismo modo, las figuras de
crianza también poseen una predisposición para mantener con el bebé una
relación optimizadora del desarrollo: organizan su experiencia desplegando
también mecanismos de sintonización y armonización (Kaye, 1982).
La imitación constituye un patrón particular de sintonización, que establece un
ciclo en el que el bebé actúa, el adulto imita, el bebé actúa … y poco a poco van
intercambiando roles (Carpenter, Uebel, & Tomasello, 2013). De este modo la
imitación es un mecanismo muy potente para la interacción diádica: ofrece
oportunidades para el aprendizaje y permite transformar el comportamiento del
bebé en patrones convencionalmente compartidos. El adulto va a interpretar las
imitaciones del bebé como una invitación para responder de manera contingente
(Wörmann, Holodynski, Kärtner, & Keller, 2012) y, en un juego de ida y vuelta,
los bebés cuyas madres despliegan más conductas de imitación serán más capaces
de percibir las contingencias en la interacción (Legerstee & Varghese, 2001;
Soussignan, Nadel, Canet, & Gerardin 2006). Los cuidadores van a ir seleccio-
nando en su imitación los patrones de comportamiento que tienen sentido, las
conductas que más se asemejan a las convenciones que establece la cultura
compartida. De este modo, desde el inicio, la imitación va a constituirse en la
estrategia para transformar la intersubjetividad en desarrollo (Rivière, 1997). Más
A. Karmiloff-Smith: the developmental perspective / A. Karmiloff-Smith: la mirada desde el desarrollo 35
partida (Hannon, 2010; Longhi, 2009; Trehub, 2003). Los contornos entonativos
producidos por el niño desencadenan la interpretación por parte de los padres y
otros adultos de sus intenciones comunicativas (Crystal, 1986). Desde muy pronto
el adulto va a emplear también una ‘distorsión favorecedora’ en la percepción de
las conductas del bebé, de manera que realiza una atribución excesiva de inten-
cionalidad primero, y de competencia simbólica después, que resulta una herra-
mienta fundamental para apoyar el desarrollo de las funciones tipo 3 (Rivière,
1986/2003).
Desde el modelo neuroconstructivista quizá resulte todavía más relevante la
evidencia de que estas variables relacionadas con la interacción temprana tienen
implicaciones específicas sobre el proceso de especialización. Los bebés que
participan en interacciones con madres que muestran conductas más contingentes
se especializan a las características perceptivas de su lengua materna (i.e., en la
discriminación de fonemas nativos vs. no nativos) varios meses antes que los
bebés cuyas madres muestran una contingencia moderada en la interacción
(Elsabbagh, Hohenberger, et al., 2013; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2010). No se
trata de un resultado general sobre el impacto del patrón de interacción diádica
en cualquier aspecto del desarrollo, puesto que, sin embargo, son los bebés cuyas
madres presentan comportamientos más controladores (un perfil de conducta
menos sensible y más intrusivo) los que obtienen mejor rendimiento en una
tarea sobre la comprensión de acciones dirigidas a una meta (Karmiloff-Smith
et al., 2010).
Las características de la interacción temprana resultan fundamentales para el
desarrollo neurocognitivo del bebé. Afortunadamente, los contextos en los que se
desarrolla una abrumadora mayoría de niños reúnen estas características espe-
ciales, y los bebés siempre cuentan con varios adultos psicólogos naturales
optimizadores de desarrollo. Sin embargo, cuando alguno de los elementos
implicados falla, las consecuencias de la alteración en los procesos interactivos
pueden ser demoledoras. Una situación en que estas consecuencias son muy
evidentes la constituyen aquellos casos en los que los bebés tienen un contacto
social muy limitado durante la primera etapa de su desarrollo, por ejemplo debido
a haber estado institucionalizados, y más adelante muestran dificultades muy
importantes de contacto social (Hobson, 2002; Rutter et al., 1999; Yagmurlu,
36 R. Campos
Berument, & Celimli 2005). Otras veces el adulto está, pero tiene dificultades para
poner en marcha esos mecanismos favorecedores de la interacción. Algunas
condiciones de salud mental, como la depresión o el diagnóstico de trastorno
límite de personalidad, comprometen la capacidad de los cuidadores para desa-
rrollar conductas de enganche, sensibilidad y ajuste con el bebé (Hobson, 2002).
Si el bebé presenta un desarrollo diferente, también la diada se va a ver
afectada. El comportamiento asociado a determinados trastornos del desarrollo
tiene una influencia ostensible en el ambiente social: los cuidadores se comportan
de manera distinta en función de las características de personalidad y de funcio-
namiento cognitivo del niño (Hodapp, 1997). Incluso el hecho de que la familia
conozca el diagnóstico de su hijo puede modificar el modo de relación. En un
ejemplo sobre la influencia de la información sobre el perfil de funcionamiento
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intervenir en los dominios con un mejor rendimiento porque es posible que, bajo
alguno de esos puntos fuertes en un nivel conductual, subyazcan procesos atípicos
y por tanto no tan eficaces ante otras demandas cognitivas. Por lo tanto, desde esta
mirada, será pertinente realizar una evaluación sobre el nivel de funcionamiento,
pero también sobre los modos en que se llega a ese resultado, para organizar
intervenciones que apoyen también el desarrollo de los modos. Esta sugerencia es
complementaria con la idea de que, en el diseño de intervenciones para personas
con discapacidades del desarrollo, deben emplearse los puntos fuertes para apoyar
los débiles, aunque la justificación es diferente. El argumento aquí es que esos
puntos fuertes, definidos en un momento concreto y en función de medidas
referidas únicamente a conductas, pueden no serlo tanto si se atiende a los
procesos que sostienen las conductas.
Como ejemplo de varios de estos argumentos podría referirse la evidencia
sobre el desarrollo en dos dominios particulares en personas con síndrome de
Williams. En la edad adulta presentan muchas dificultades en el procesamiento
numérico (Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002), frente a un rendimiento conductual
relativamente bueno en tareas de procesamiento de rostros que, sin embargo, se
sostiene en una estrategia atípica de análisis componencial (Grice et al., 2001;
Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). En la génesis de dos dominios tan distintos como el
procesamiento numérico y de rostros podría encontrarse un precursor común: el
déficit de los niños con síndrome de Williams en la planificación de movimientos
sacádicos afectaría tanto al desarrollo del procesamiento de números — compli-
cando el examen visual de cantidades numéricas — como al del procesamiento de
rostros — dificultando un análisis global (Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Van Herwegen,
Ansari, Xu, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2008).
Siguiendo con esta idea, si el objetivo es trabajar en los procesos que no se
corresponden directamente con las conductas, y puesto que el tiempo es una
dimensión fundamental en el desarrollo, entonces no sería necesario esperar a
que exista un déficit conductual observable para comenzar la intervención.
Además de intervenir en aquellos dominios que presenten dificultades,
convendrá adelantarse a los que no lo hagan todavía, con el objetivo de minimizar
los riesgos de que se produzcan. Desde esta idea resulta evidente que no solo no
es necesario esperar al diagnóstico para la organización de los apoyos, sino que ni
40 R. Campos
todos … ha sido y sigue siendo para tantos la mejor maestra. Nos hizo crecer, y nos
regaló una forma de mirar, que aprendimos de sus ojos brillantes, llenos de entusiasmo.
Acknowledgements / Agradecimientos
This work has been carried out within the framework of project PSI 2015-66509/P, funded
by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) and the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF). We would like to thank Dr. Mercedes Belinchón for her
attentive reading of the manuscript and her invaluable suggestions. / Este trabajo se ha
realizado en el marco del proyecto PSI 2015-66509/P, subvencionado por el Ministerio de
Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional
(FEDER). Agradecemos a la Dra. Mercedes Belinchón su atenta lectura del manuscrito
y sus inestimables sugerencias.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. / Los autores no han referido
ningún potencial conflicto de interés en relación con este artículo.
ORCID
Ruth Campos http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0209-6002
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