AMERICA’S DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN?

by

JOSE ALCALA, B.A.

THESIS
Presented to the Graduate Faculty of
The University of Texas at San Antonio
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Walter Wilson, Ph.D., Chair
Stephen Amberg, Ph. D
Boyka Stefanova, Ph. D

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO

College of Liberal and Fine Arts
Department of Political Science and Geography
December 2021
 DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Everardo and Josefa. Thank you for providing me with
love and inspiration. To my dear friends, thank you for pushing me and inspiring me.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the faculty of the UTSA Department of Political Science and

Geography for giving me the opportunity to be in the political science master’s program. I would

like to thank Dr. Walter Wilson for his guidance and mentorship throughout the program and in

his role as my thesis chair. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Stephen Amberg and Dr.

Boyka Stefanova for serving on my thesis committee and for their guidance and advice.

December 2021

iii
 AMERICA’S DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN?

Jose Everardo Alcala Jr., M.A.

The University of Texas at San Antonio, 2021

Supervising Professor: Walter Wilson, Ph.D.

The United States has recently undergone a series of concerning events. From the stop

the steal movement, to the January 6 Capitol Insurrection, the danger of these events causes

concern for the health of democracy. The aim of this project is to analysis the health of American

through a qualitative comparison with notable cases of nations’ whose democracy failed. These

case studies will consist of early 20th century Argentina, Fujimorist Peru, 1940s Colombia,

Weimar Germany, interwar Austria, and antebellum America. Additionally, some light

quantitative discussion will be used to broaden the scope of the analysis. Ultimately, this inquiry

will conclude that despite outward appearances, American democracy is robust and not under

any immediate danger.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vi

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter One: Introduction ...............................................................................................................1

Chapter Two: Concerns About the State of American Democracy .................................................4

Chapter Three: Literature Review ...................................................................................................6

Chapter Four: Data and Methods ...................................................................................................17

Chapter Five: Modern America .....................................................................................................20

Chapter Six: Case Studies ..............................................................................................................22

Chapter Seven: Findings ................................................................................................................33

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................41

References ......................................................................................................................................43

Vita

v
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Legislative Productivity Comparison ....................................................................36

vi
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 116th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot ....................................9

Figure 2 116th Congress Senate Polarization Plot ................................................................10

Figure 3 95th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot ...................................11

Figure 4 95th Congress Senate Polarization Plot ..................................................................12

Figure 5 97th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot ....................................13

Figure 6 97th Congress Senate Polarization Plot ..................................................................14

vii
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Intro:

While democracy is one of the greatest achievements that humankind has produced, it is

also very fragile. As has been the case in nations that have tried to shed authoritarian or colonial

identities one must look at the current dysfunctional appearance of American democracy and

wonder whether we are following the same path of sliding into authoritarianism. The research

question for this project “is the United States on the path toward democratic breakdown?”

Democratic breakdown will be defined as an interruption or divergence of the political system’s

democratic features and practices. For clarity, an example is a situation like that of Peru in 1992

where President Fujimori dissolved Congress, reorganized the judiciary, and suspended the

constitution (Kenney 2014, 1). In the search to answer this question the focus of analysis will be

incidents and symptoms that precede a full breakdown of democracy as exemplified by the case

of early 1990s Peru where a drawn-out series of escalating events between hostile competing

sides (The President and the opposing congressional majority establishment parties) climaxed

into the end of democracy (10). In this discussion the theoretic outlook that will be used is Juan

Linz principle of dual legitimacy. This principle of dual legitimacy centers on the idea that

presidential system politics are a zero-sum game. Linz exemplifies the perils of zero-sum driven

partisan competition by pointing out how under a presidential system opposing parties can

control different branches of government and because they can both claim legitimacy this results

in fierce competition. (Linz 1990, 53). Although I agree with Linz over his theory of presidential

systems, his brief characterization of the centrism and stability of the American political system

needs a fresh look given that his example is from the 1970s and he spoke on this issue in the

1
1990s (53, 57). The dependent variable will be democratic breakdown which for this discussion

will be defined as the degradation of democratic features and practices. These democratic

features/practices consist of things such as political participation, access to the election process,

passage of “must do” legislation such as budgets, and legislative compromise. The independent

variables will be political violence/incivility, legislative productivity, and institutional capture.

Political violence/incivility in the United States will be measured and compared to the political

violence/incivility present in democracies on the verge of collapse. For our purposes political

violence and incivility will be defined as any action that violates the social norms or etiquette of

political participation between representative elites such as physical violence, confrontations, or

antagonistic rhetoric. Legislative productivity in the United States will also be looked at.

Legislative productivity will be defined as a modest passage of legislation which shows that

government is functioning and meeting its basic duties. Lastly, institutional capture in the United

States will be measured in this discussion. In other words, I will look to see if there are any signs

of the military, courts or institutions coming under the control of combative partisans as has been

the case in dying democracies. For further elaboration Levitsky and Ziblatt define institutional

capture as the takeover of judicial, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies by a would-be

dictator and their partisans (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 78). Institutional capture serves the

purpose of neutralizing or coopting any organization in the state that has the legal authority and

or resources to punish or prosecute the executive (78). These variables will be measured by

doing the following. Instances of political violence/incivility in the United States will be

analyzed and compared to political violence/incivility in selected case studies. With regards to

legislative productivity, the next step will be to investigate quantitative reports on partisanship

and Congressional productivity and compare the productivity of modern divided Congress’ to

2
that of the Fujimori regime circa 1990-1992. The last step will be to look at the events following

the 2020 presidential election and leading up to the January 6th, 2021, capitol insurrection and

compare details of institutional capture there to the Peruvian case.

3
 CHAPTER TWO: CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Since the 1960s, our political culture here in the United States has transformed into one

of tribalism, ideological purity, unwillingness to compromise, and seemingly more extreme

displays of party loyalty by our political elites (Theriault 2013, 5, 22, 23) (Mann and Ornstein

2012, 46, 47). Starting with the migration of the New Deal Coalition’s conservative elements to

the Republican Party and strengthened by events such as civil rights issues, the rise of the

evangelical right, abortion, welfare, and healthcare reform to name a few, party discipline among

elected officials have appeared to become an unbreakable dogma in this country (Hill and

Tausanovitch 2017, 109, 110), (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 11, 80). At its most extreme it can lead

to a disloyal opposition that can be deployed as a cyanide pill for even the most robust of

democratic systems. If the events of the January 6th Capitol Insurrection showed us anything, the

events leading to a democratic breakdown can happen here too.

Beginning with the partisan battles of the 1980s and continuing into the capitol

insurrection that happened on January 6th there is some initial cause for concern. Modern

American history is littered with instances of partisan battles that might cause one to question the

health and efficiency of our democracy. The list is too extensive to cover in its entirety, but a few

instances pop up that are cause for concern. In 1985 the results of a highly contests congressional

election in Indiana concluded with a victory for the Democrats and accusations of voter fraud,

corruption, and illegality by Republicans (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 67). The 1980s were riddled

by other instances like the threat of physical altercation between members, the blatant

manipulation of House rules by the Democratic Majority, and Newt Gingrich’s polemic against

4
his democratic colleagues on CSPAN (66, 67, 68). The Clinton presidency saw a continuation of

Republican obstructionism, two partisan driven government shutdowns in late 1995 and early

1996, blockage of President Clinton’s judicial nominees in the Senate and an abuse of special

counsel investigation authority against President Clinton (92, 93, 109, 110, 114, 116). The turn

of the 21st century under the Bush administration witnessed a more diluted partisan environment

in its early years with congressional Republicans working with individual Democrats on tax cuts,

the Patriot Act, and the airline security bill, and the invasion of Iraq to name a few (125, 126,

127, 129, 132). However partisan confrontation would resurface with battles over the homeland

security senate bill, the 2002 midterms, and obstruction of the President’s judicial nominees, and

the Medicare prescription drug plan bill (132, 133, 134, 136, 137). Partisan hostilities were taken

to new heights in the 2010s with Republican’s holding the debt ceiling hostage, the undermining

of presidential authority by GOP lawmakers, and the attacks on President Obama’s loyalties and

citizenship status by Republicans (Mann and Ornstein 2012, 3), (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 156,

158, 159, 165, 168). Putting all of this together, one can see a pattern of partisan conflict to some

degree or another within the last 41 years, some of it mild, some concerning. What is it about

democracy that allows for these conflicts?

5
 CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature Review:

In The Perils of Presidentialism Juan Linz describes dual legitimacy as a key weakness in

a presidential democracy. The reason this is so, is because of a competitive electoral system and

separation of powers which too often leads to extraconstitutional competition between the

executive and the legislature. If you get a united government where the executive and the

legislature are occupied by most of the same party/coalition then you have a strong mandate and

both branches work in harmony. However, when you get a President who is from one party and

legislature that is dominated by the opposing party you run into a situation in which both these

opposing sides can claim electoral legitimacy and compete against each other. As Linz stated in

this circumstance “who has the stronger claim to speak on behalf of the people: the president or

the legislative majority that opposes his policies?’ (Linz 1990, 53). This point establishes

partisan competition as a feature of a presidential democracy. Linz expands on this idea by

making an observation on institutional remedy for competition. It is that the conflict that arises

over the competition between the President and an opposing legislature has no effective

institutional remedy. Legal means that exist to resolve this conflict of competition like

impeachment or elections are too complicated and legalistic for an immediate resolution and as a

result you may get situations where an outside force like the military gets involved to

troubleshoot the situation (53).

Certainly, conflicts of competition don’t always end up with a coup and it takes more

than just competition to push democracy to the precipice. But what pushes competition to

6
become open antagonism? It is not following the unwritten rules of democracy. Levitsky and

Ziblatt point to the unwritten rules of democracies as key factors in the success and longevity of

American democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 101). These two rules are mutual toleration and

institutional forbearance. The development of political mutual toleration between Republicans

and Democrats after the Civil War is exhibited as part of the normalization of relations and

ending of hostilities between both parties (124). Mutual toleration is an acknowledgment and

respect for the legitimacy of your opponent (124). This mutual toleration can be seen in how the

elites of both parties cooperated in the early 20th century to pass 16th, 17th, and 19th amendments.

This cooperation exemplifies both parties and former enemies acknowledging each other and

collaborating which is a far cry from the open antagonism they held for each other during the

Reconstruction era (122, 124). The second rule, institutional forbearance is seen when the

branches of government exercise power with restraint and don’t infringe upon the other’s

prerogatives (125). An example of this would be the executive respecting and enforcing a

Supreme Court ruling or the federal and state governments respecting each other’s jurisdictions.

A historical episode that adds strength to the claims made by Linz, Levitsky, and Ziblatt is the

rise and fall of Yrigoyen administration in Argentina. For as much as Argentina thrived under a

bipartisan accord, conflict began when the Conservative Party was turned into a minority in an

electoral upset (P. Smith 1987, 12). With this newfound power President Yrigoyen of the Radical

Party began interfering in provincial governments held by the Conservative Party. President

Yrigoyen in his bid to centralize the state’s power forsook institutional forbearance as he

overreached with his authority into provincial affairs which upset many the Conservative Party

elites (15). Likewise, Conservative Party politicians ignored mutual toleration as they allied with

the military to overthrow the Yrigoyen regime (19). In this instance one can see the pitfalls of a

7
presidential system in how opposing factions rise to challenge each other. Taken along with

ignoring the unwritten rules of democracy and one ends up with the breakdown of a

governmental system like Argentina.

As for the basics of dual legitimacy I can expand on this idea further with rational choice

theory. In his book Why Parties? John Aldrich explains that the American legislative system

evolved to encourage strict partisan voting. In his 2.1 table Aldrich shows that individual

legislators voting individually and guided by reason will vote in a way that benefits them but in

the long run every legislators’ payoffs will be minimized (Aldrich 2011, 28). This is fixed by

what Aldrich calls the long but narrow coalition. The long but narrow coalition is a coalition in

which legislators agree to form an enduring coalition to pass any bill that benefits them and

defeats all opposition sponsored bills thus maximizing their pay offs (33). This coalition in turn

can turn into political parties since overall, this model is successful than individual voting or a

temporary vote trading bloc (70).

Aldrich’s theory can be seen in a recent state of party polarization. Through DW

Nominate scores as shown below we can see a modern snapshot of the division between

Republicans and Democrats in both houses of the recent and divided 116th Congress. When it

comes to the 116th Congress the results are attention grabbing. Figure 1 shows that in the House

of Representatives as shown below, the most liberal Republican’s partisan score stands at 0.165

and the most conservative Democrat’s partisan score stands at -0.065 (Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith

Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 2021).

8
Figure 1: 116th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot. Adapted from: DW

Nominate House of Representatives Plot. Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard

Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet (2021). Voteview:

Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

9
In the 116th Congress’ Senate as shown in figure 2 the most liberal Republican’s partisan score

stands at 0.115. The most conservative Democrat stands at -0.058 (Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith

Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 2021).

Figure 2: 116th Congress Senate Polarization Plot. Adapted from: Lewis, Jeffrey B.,

Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet

(2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

In the 116th Congress the partisan divide is significant with the most conservative Democrats

gravitating closer to the center the most liberal Republicans stationed solidly in the conservative

sector of the chart. In the 95th Congress which was significantly more bipartisan you can see a lot

more overlap. In the 95th Congress’ House of Representatives as shown in figure 3, the most

liberal Republican scored a -0.139 while the most conservative Democrat scored 0.884 (Lewis,

Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet

2021).

10
Figure 3: 95th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot. Adapted from:

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and

Luke Sonnet (2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database.

https://voteview.com/

11
In the Senate of the 95th Congress as shown in figure 4 the most liberal Republican Senator

scored a -0.1 while the most conservative Democrat scored a 0.128 (Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith

Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 2021).

Figure 4: 95th Congress Senate Polarization Plot. DW Nominate Senate Plot. Adapted

from: Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin,

and Luke Sonnet (2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database.

https://voteview.com/

12
In the 97th Congress’ House of Representatives you see similar partisan overlap. As indicated in

figure 5, the most liberal Republican scored -0.018 while the most conservative Democrat scored

0.884 (Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and

Luke Sonnet 2021).

Figure 5: 97th Congress House of Representatives Polarization Plot. Adapted from:

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and

Luke Sonnet (2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database.

https://voteview.com/

13
In the 97th Congress Senate as shown in figure 6 the most liberal Republican scored -0.033 while

the most conservative democrat scored -0.056 (Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard

Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 2021).

Figure 6: 97th Congress Senate Polarization Plot. Adapted from: Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith

Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet

(2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

The lack of ideological overlap in the 116th Congress and the presence of overlap in the Congress

preceding the solidification of current ideological sorting appears to indicate that both chambers

of Congress are sorted into teams that are in competition with one another.

There are plenty of examples that document this “team” and partisan dynamic when a

lack of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance are present. John Owens recounts how the

14
seeds of modern partisan warfare started to come into being once during Newt Gingrich’s

speakership. During his speakership Gingrich centralized control of the Republican party and the

standing committees and isolated or eliminated Democratic held committees and Democrat

committee members (Owens 1997, 250, 251). Stretching as far back as the 1980s there is a rise

of insurgency style confrontational politics as made popular by the Gingrich led Congressional

Conservative Opportunity Society (Theriault 2013, 21). Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein have

documented numerous instances of Linz’s and Aldrich’s descriptions playing out. For example,

in the 1980s you had the then up and coming Representative Newt Gingrich using a combination

of CSPAN access to the House of Representative’s voting floor and strategic amendment

proposals to attack the Democrat majority which played into his agenda for the GOP to take back

the House someday (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 66). Another famous case pointed out by Mann

and Ornstein is the 2011 debt ceiling crisis in which Republican members of Congress threatened

a government shutdown if President Obama did not meet the demands of the “Young Gun” GOP

leadership (Mann and Ornstein 2012, 11). You see the same sort of tactics deployed when

Democrats have been in the opposition. As Senator John Cornyn pointed to, the Bush

administration had a difficult time confirming qualified and well-respected judges who had their

nominations blocked for political reasons (Cornyn 2003, 182). The same can be said for Attorney

General Garland’s Supreme Court nomination, which was also opposed for partisan reasons

(Elying 2018, paragraph 6). While everything that I just mentioned might at first glance seem par

for the course in any democratic system, the events of January 6th of 2021 give a different weight

to this trend and demonstrate how the battle of partisan competition has influenced the shift from

the acceptance of the legitimacy of the opposition to denial and denouncement. Starting from the

end of the 2020 elections and popping off with the capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021, you

15
had several prominent Republican legislators denying the legitimacy of Joe Biden election.

Senator Ted Cruz and a group of GOP senators objected to recognizing Joe Biden’s election

victory (Samuels and Patrick 2021, paragraph 3). Senator Josh Hawley raised his fist at the

rioters in solidarity (A. Smith 2021, paragraph 4). But most notably, President Donald Trump

claimed to that same group of people before the riot that the election was stolen and that they had

to fight like hell and to march on the capitol (Naylor 2021, paragraphs 1, 2, and 4). Even though

the capitol insurrection did not lead to a one wonders how close have come to a democratic break

down.

16
 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS

Data and Methods

To reiterate my research question is “is the United States on the path toward democratic

breakdown?” My dependent variable throughout my observation is breakdown of democracy

which is defined as an interruption or divergence of a political system’s democratic features and

practices. The independent variables are political violence/incivility, legislative productivity, and

institutional capture. The primary method of analysis for this project are comparative interpretive

case studies. Through these case studies the following measurements will be applied. For

starters, political violence/incivility in the United States will be gauged by analyzing the

frequency of confrontational political incidents. The period of analysis for these incidents will be

from the 1980s to the present day. These modern incidents will be compared to the political

violence/incivility present in the case studies.

Another measurement for this project will be rate of legislative productivity of divided

Congress’. This will be carried out by looking at a quantitative report compiled by Pew Research

Center’s Drew Desilver that recorded the legislative productivity of modern Congresses

(Desilver 2021, paragraph 6). Congresses that will be considered will be the recent 116th

Congress, the united 95th Congress and a control group of the moderately successful 97th

Congress. I’ve selected the 95th Congress because it is the most productive Congress on record.

The 95th Congress has also been selected because during its lifespan both chambers were held by

17
one party (the Democrats). Concurrently I am examining the 116h Congress because it is our

most recent divided Congress. Although it isn’t the least productive Congress on Desilver’s

report, it has a low output and is the most recent divided Congress. So, it can be expected that

this Congress better reflects the current legislative environment. Both of these Congress’

represent our legislature at its most productive and least productive. They also represent our

legislature in periods of low polarization and high polarization. Therefore, they will be used as

snapshots of congressional productivity under a united and a divided Congress. The moderately

successful and divided 97th Congress will be used as a control group since its legislative output is

almost identical to the median of all congressional output on record. The productivity levels from

these Congresses and the overall productivity averages of united and divided Congresses will

then be and compared to legislative productivity of Peru in the two years of the Fujimori

government that preceded the coup.

The last measurement for this project is institutional capture in the United States. I will be

analyzing and comparing the events preceding the January 6 Capitol Insurrection and comparing

those events to institutional capture in the case studies to see if there are signs of institutional

capture in modern America. The time period before the January 6 Capitol Insurrection will be

looked at due to the insurrection’s uniqueness as the sole and most recent in recent American

history. These independent variables have been chosen because they appear to be present in

every single lead up to democratic breakdown. For example, the tale of the Myanmar coup of

2021 is characterized by a long pattern of political violence that started in 1988, continued until

2015, and resurfaced in 2021 (Thein-Lemelson 2021, 3, 4). Political violence as can be seen in

the Myanmar coup is weaponized, to intimidate, submit, and remove political rivals and appears

18
to be a staple of a democracy’s death throes. Legislative productivity or the lack there of (ie

gridlock) is also a prominent feature of democratic breakdowns. As can be seen in the legislative

battles between President Alberto Fujimori and the Peruvian Congress and, unrestrained

competition can spiral out of control into obstructionism that causes one side to permanently

sideline the other. Lastly, institutional capture also appears frequently as a warning sign of an

impending breakdown of democracy. Levitsky and Ziblatt bring up institutional capture as a key

objective that any aspiring strongman needs to achieve to bring down a democratic system

(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018,78). This is demonstrated in the way that Juan Peron allied himself

with military elements to remove President Ramon Castillo, build up a power base, and remain

in the presidency (Potash 2002, 77, 78). The purpose of these measurements will be to test the

independent variables and gauge the health of America democracy when compared to cases of

democratic breakdown that have displayed symptoms of systemic fracture in the lead up to

democratic breakdown. My hypothesis is that an overtly partisan and competitive environment

breeds the conditions necessary for a breakdown of democracy.

19
 CHAPTER FIVE: MODERN AMERICA

Modern America

America’s current political environment has displayed several instances that have given

cause for concern. Going back to the 1980s you begin to see the maturation of new party

loyalties that came into being during the realignment of the 1960s. Though the establishment of

both parties tolerated each other’s claim to legitimacy and at times worked on bipartisan

legislation, on the Republican side Representative Newt Gingrich began forming strategies for

political confrontation and reached out to and recruited other likeminded conservatives for the

purpose of recapturing the majority in the House of Representatives. Political incivility at this

early stage of the modern period (1980s-2000s) can be characterized by repeated partisan battles

such as Gingrich and his COS’s CSPAN polemics against their Democrat colleagues, the ethics

investigation into Speaker Wright, and New Gingrich’s concentration of power in the House and

his abolition/containment of Democrat leaning committees (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 66, 75, 76)

(Owens 1995, 250, 251). In the 1990s this trend of politically motivated confrontation continues

as the Whitewater and Monica Lewinsky scandals were used by Republicans to rob Bill Clinton

and the Democrats of their goodwill and political momentum needed to carry out their legislative

agenda. In the 2010s we see a growth of political tribalism. Notably there was the Republican led

government standoff with President Obama over the debt ceiling (Mann and Ornstein 2016, 11)

which threatened to plunge the government into turmoil over partisan interests. Secondly, there

was also the undermining of President Obama’s authority by Republicans at home and abroad.

Mitch McConnell went on the record to tell state governments to ignore President Obama’s

regulatory order limiting greenhouse emissions (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 168) Then there was

20
a letter by Republican Senators to the Iranian government which undermined President Obama’s

authority to negotiate the Iran Nuclear deal, and which effectively undermined his authority in

the eyes of an adversary (165). There is also the birther movement and other related conspiracy

theories. These narratives which questioned President Obama’s citizenship status, patriotism, and

legitimacy as president were repeated and endorsed by several prominent GOP legislators and

party figures (156, 158, 159). However, the most serious instance in this trend of incivility was

the January 6th, 2021, Capitol Insurrection. Though it was perpetrated by average citizens, their

actions were condoned or supported by Republican officials and political elites including but not

limited to President Trump, Senator Ted Cruz, and Senator Josh Hawley (Samuels and Patrick

2021, paragraph 3), (A. Smith 2021, paragraph 4), (Naylor 2021, paragraphs 1, 2, and 4). This

behavior demonstrates a progressive rejection of the opposing party which appears to get more

confrontational as time goes on. As concerning as this pattern and the insurrection might be one

must ask how does it compare to cases where democratic breakdown came into fruition?

21
 CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES

Germany

Weimar Germany’s is a peculiar situation. From its foundation the Republic’s party

system was populated by an authoritarian camp that housed Nationalists and Monarchists. This

camp was opposed to democracy. They also opposed the existence of the Weimar Republic and

the “Weimar Coalition” of Social Democrats, Liberals, and Catholics who despite their social,

political, and economic policy differences, were kept together by an opposition to the

authoritarians and a commitment to maintaining the Republic alive (Lepsius 1994, 36). Not long

after the Republic’s birth in 1920 a third competing bloc, the Communist Party which opposed

the Republic as well was founded. Throughout the 1920’s the Communists would gain electoral

strength and steal votes from its main competitor, the Social Democrats thus weakening the pro-

democracy coalition (36, 40). These three camps and the three groups within the Weimar

Coalition were plagued by a lack of political tolerance and a strict adherence to ideology. This

strict partisanship made cooperation amongst the political parties difficult with regards to the

democrats and impossible with regards to the authoritarians and the communists (42, 43, 44).

The effective electoral paralysis of the pro-Republic parties combined with the consistent

dissolution of parliament by President Hindenburg, and crippling economic situation caused by

the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression gave the Nazi party political momentum as

they grew in popularity and they siphoned votes away from the Weimar Coalition and amassed

enough votes from the authoritarian and ambivalent camps to capture the chancellorship in 1932

(48, 51, 52, 54, 57, 61). With the Reichstag fire of 1933 and the following assumption of

emergency powers and suspension of the constitution, the Weimar Republic and democracy in

Germany was laid to rest (73).

22
 Weimar Germany’s situation is unique as noted by its description as a Republic without

Republicans (35). This is to say that the Republic’s political system contained authoritarian and

communist elements within it that from the beginning were opposed to the Republic’s existence

which created a deeply polarized political environment. One way this opposition manifest itself

is political violence. Political violence was prominent as street brawling, mainly between the

Communists and the Nazis and other far right groups was rampant in that era (57, 68).

Notoriously, in 1919 during the aftermath of the fall of the German Empire, Communist party

leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered by right-wing army officers and

with the approval of the ruling Social Democratic Party (Gietinger and Balhorn 2020, paragraph

1). There was also the Beer Hall Putsch in 1924 which although failed also exemplifies an

extreme manifestation of political intolerance that was indicative of the volatility of Weimar

democracy as it had to contend with the hostile authoritarian and communist camps. These

expressions of breakdown communicate the presence of a pattern of political violence in this

case. This political violence which displays a lack of mutual toleration isn’t the only factor that

shows that the unwritten rules of democracy were broken. As noted in a 1929 parliamentarian

crisis, members of parliament who were members of the Weimar coalition parties resigned due

to disagreements with the agenda carried out by the Weimar coalition (Lepsius 1994, 4). In

fighting such as this was not uncommon as pro-democracy coalitions were consistently unstable

and had a difficult time producing effective legislation due to their social, political, and

ideological differences. This instability would set the stage for institutional capture. In response

to parliamentarian instability President Paul von Hindenberg would continuously dissolve

parliament in order to circumvent democratic rule and rule by decree (48). This had the effect of

23
weakening parliament and concentrating power in the hands of the executive branch After his

1933 election as chancellor Hitler as used a weakened parliament to rubber stamp new

emergency powers in the wake of the Reichstag fire in order to strengthen his political power

(73). These illustrate institutional capture as both men sidelined and then coopted one of the key

decision makers in the political system for the purpose of centralizing executive power and

neutralizing a potential threat.

Austria

Throughout the interwar period Austrian democracy like Germany faced threats to its

existence from the inside. Within the three major voting blocks, the Socialists, the Conservatives,

and the Nationalist there were the moderate wings that desired to keep the Republic afloat and

the extremists that wanted to meet their own goals at the expense of democracy (Simon 1994, 80,

81). The fascist movement in Italy and the ascendancy of the National Socialists in Germany in

the 1920s added pressure to the moderate elements in the three camps. This was especially the

case Italian fascism which to citizens with conservative inclinations appeared to promote a “law

and order image, as opposed to the revolutionary chaos of socialism (94). This fermented

polarization as some Austrian Conservatives and Nationalists accepted Mussolini as an

ideological sponsor which caused Socialists to group conservatism together with fascism (94).

By 1927, Austrian democracy began to break. In January of that year a street scuffle between

groups of Fascists and Socialists ended up with the Fascists shooting at the Socialists and

injuring and killing some of them (96). This in turn resulted in retaliation by the Socialists when

those guilty were failed to be convicted. A socialist mob set fire to the Palace of Justice and a

Conservative newspaper (96). This back and forth was not a one off. Partisan violence appears to

24
be riddled throughout this tense period. For instance, September 13 of 1931 the fascist

paramilitary organization, Heimwehr threatened an armed uprising and when the government

was slow to respond, the Socialists threatened their own call to arms against the Heimwehr (98).

Other incidents included sporadic attacks by Austrian Nazis in the Spring and Summer of 1933

on supporters of the Conservative government (113). An incident not too long after that led to

the de facto dissolution of parliament (133). This dissolution of parliament was used as a pretext

by the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss as he precluded the parliament from meeting

again and seized dictatorial power there by ending democracy in Austria.

Austria follows its German counterpart as from its inception it had moderate democrats

that wanted to keep the Republic alive and extremists from the Conservatives, Nationalists, and

Socialists that wanted to achieve their aims at the expense of democracy (80, 81). Austria in this

period was riddled with political violence as distrust and contempt grew within the ranks of the

three large voting blocks. Political violence between opposing partisans is present throughout the

period seeing as street fighting, shootings, arson, assaults happened frequently (96, 98, 113).

Something that should also be noted is that institutional capture is present due to Chancellor

Dollfuss dissolving parliament and expanding the powers of the executive (113).

25
 Argentina

Argentina from 1916-1930 tells a similar story of competition turned into hostility. With

the electoral reforms of the early 20th century, Argentina’s ruling Conservative landowners in a

calculated political move, decided to enter in a power sharing agreement with the opposing

Radical party which consisted of the expanding middle class, the nouveaux riches, and

disaffected aristocrats (P. Smith 1987, 10). The idea was to keep the reins of power in control by

this elite with their new Radical partners, who seemed to be more interested in partaking in

governing than in tearing the system down. Up until the end of the 1920s there was a

“controlled” democracy under this agreement. This changed with the expansion of the electorate

and a surge of Radical election victories which pushed out the Conservatives from power (12).

The Conservative partisan reaction in Congress was to subject cabinet members to frequent

interpellations and obstruct the administration’s legislative agenda (12). Despite a brief reprieve

and pattern of cooperation from 1926-1929 by 1930 polarization was at an all-time high (13).

This polarization was intensified by the centralization of power by Radical President Yrigoyen in

the form of patronage and intervention in the provinces which the President used to eliminate

pockets of Conservative strength (15). Yriogen like Fujimori in Peru went against the established

order (in this case, attacking the Conservative power base, resulted in the death of the old

bipartisan accord). After this breakdown of the old power sharing accord, the Conservatives

began conspiring with the disaffected military to overthrow President Yrigoyen. The Manifesto

of the Fourty-Four which was published by members of Congress condemned President

Yrigoyen as a despot and stressed the need to save Argentina (18). This was followed by similar

declarations made by the military and other former UCR legislators (19). This would be followed

26
a month later with the September 6th, 1930, overthrow of the Yrigoyen administration and the

establishment of a military dictatorship.

Argentina’s case of democratic breakdown has some differences from our current

political environment. With the fall of the power sharing agreement between the Conservatives

and the Radicals what followed was a blatant violation of federalism by the Radical-led federal

government as it interfered with Conservative led provincial governments (15). Instances such as

this are key for the Argentine breakdown as it became a justification by Conservatives to band

together with the military and overthrow President Yrigoyen (19). From this chain of events, we

witness a display of institutional capture as one of the most powerful institutions in the country

was weaponized to bring down an elected administration. It must be noted as well that legislative

gridlock was also a persistent problem as Conservative representatives resorted to obstructionist

tactics in the wake of their break with the Radicals (12). Both problems crippled Argentine

democracy and paved the way for a military dictatorship.

Colombia

Colombia’s democratic breakdown had a similar origin story to Argentina’s and had a

similar downfall. Up until the 1940s the Conservative Party and Liberal Party had a power

sharing agreement. Under this “Convivencia” Liberals were included in the Conservative led

government and these elites were encouraged to keep this agreement going due to the economic

benefits that the nation was experiencing at the time (Wilde 1987, 34). This was not to last.

Beginning in 1942 the partisan rivalry of the previous century remanifested. Prominent

27
Conservative Party figure and opposition leader Laureano Gomez in defiance of the Liberal

Party-led government endorsed a revolution against said government and endorsed the bombing

of the Palace of Justice (37). Only two years later, Conservative Party politicians were implicated

in the Pasto Coup of 1944 which aimed to overthrow the same Liberal government (50). From

the Liberal side noted agitator and populist Jorge Eliecer Gaitan gathered popular electoral

support by calling into question the Convivencia (38). The assassination of Gaitan in 1948, the

capital riot known as el Bogotazo and the sectarian violence known as “La Violencia” between

Conservatives and Liberals was followed by a final rupture between the Conservative

government of President Ospina and the Liberals. Now finding themselves as the opposition, the

Liberal members of Congress proceeded by launching attempts to limit the power of the

President by limiting the appointment power and reorganizing the police (39). Other notable

displays of this escalation were violent stand offs between congressional Liberals and

Conservatives, the murder of Liberal deputy Gustavo Jimenez in a gun fight that broke out on the

chamber floor, and the encouragement of the sectarian violence by party elites of both sides (39,

48). All of this ended with the official demise of the convicencia and the dissolvement of

democracy by President Ospina and the Conservatives (55).

While Argentina had a relatively bloodless coup, the situation in Colombia was more

vicious and drawn out. With the fall of the power sharing agreement between the Conservatives

and the Liberals hostilities began to take shape. An early sign of political incivility was the

endorsement of revolution against the government by prominent conservative Laureano Gomez

(37). This along with the violence shown in “el bogotazo”, the partisan fueled carnage of “la

violencia”, and the murders Liberal party figures Gaitan and Jimenez show that political violence

28
was a persistent issue in Colombia. Additionally, institutional capture is also present given

President Ospina’s dissolvement of Congress and assumption of dictatorial powers.

Peru

When it comes to Peru, Charles Kenney illustrates the heated rivalry in the early 1990s

between President Alberto Fujimori and the Peruvian Congress. Alberto Fujimori entered Peru’s

political scene as a political outsider and won the Presidency in an upset. He defeated the

candidate of the center right FREDEMO alliance (Kenney 2004, 39). Once Fujimori got into

office, he drove a wedge in the established order as he frequently undermined and opposed the

two-party dominated system that was previously run by the center left APRA and the center right

AP party. These parties and their allies in the majority in Congress that opposed Fujimori were

the old establishment parties that had dominated Peruvian politics since the early 20th century.

They took exception to Fujimori’s attempts to circumvent the legislature’s prerogatives, as he

was an outsider with no connection to the establishment. Fujimori first used an executive decree

to alter tax and economic policy that had previously been handled by Congress. Fujimori would

once again challenge Congress by granting general amnesties which only Congress could legally

do (128, 132). Legislative gridlock plagued the relationship between the executive and Congress

as illustrated by the late 1990-early 1991 budget law dispute which included a blockage of

presidential nominations, obstruction of an executive budget proposal, and escalation by

President Fujimori’s part in the form of using presidential decree authority to overwrite budget

amendments favored by members of Congress (144, 142, 143). Eventually the conflict between

the executive and the legislature came to a head when Congress censured the Minister of

29
Agriculture Enrique Rossl Link and forced his resignation despite the President’s protests and

the subsequent denouncement of Congress by the President (181, 183). Hostilities were furthered

enhanced by several legislators and prominent party members of the opposition repeatedly

expressing either their desire to impeach the President and replace him with the establishment

friendly Vice President Maximo San Roman or delegitimizing President Fujimori’s rule by

equating him to an authoritarian (147, 153, 169, 184). Eventually, this cycle of confrontation

reaches its conclusion as President Fujimori with the support of the Peruvian Army closed

Congress and seized dictatorial power.

Peru from 1990-1992 is a good example of a democratic breakdown. The Peruvian cases’

build up to breakdown was marred by legislative gridlock. The blockage of legislation by

establishment politicians against President Fujimori’s Change 90 Party, congressional gridlock

as well as delegitimizing rhetoric were the main expressions of political intolerance in the build

up to the coup of 1992. The blocking of important legislation ranging from budget laws to

security concerns, to government initiatives tied the Fujimori administration hands. This inability

to enact an agenda was only exacerbated by the continued attempts to censure government

ministers. Institutional capture was also present as President Fujimori aligned himself with the

military. He used the support of the military to force the dissolvement of Congress and seize

power there by eliminating his most fierce opponents.

30
 Antebellum America

Considering that this discussion centers on the United States, it feels only natural that we

look at the events preceding the Civil War. The era between the 1830s and 1860 was a hotbed of

polarization, sectarianism, and political intolerance. The issues of slavery and the balance of

power between the North and the South remained the core issues throughout this period. Dr.

Joanne B. Freeman documented 50 notable cases of political incivility and physical

confrontation in the United States throughout this period. These incidents as will be

demonstrated later played a significant part in the breakdown of relations between the two

relevant groups of adversaries, Northerners and Southerners and Whigs/Republicans and

Democrats. The violence of this age is illustrated by the need of members of Congress to take

knives and guns with them to the Capitol every morning as fights and assaults were not

uncommon (Freeman 2018, xxii). This reality further emphasizes the tensions that were

simmering at the time. The poster child for political intolerance in this era is of course the

Caning of Charles Sumner (188) which further intensified the festering partisan and sectarian

animosity between members of Congress. Further incidents like the murder of Congressman

Cilley by a congressional colleague, the altercation between Congressmen Dawson and Giddings

and Bleeding Kansas added fuel to the buildup of partisan and sectarian hostilities (68, 99,188,

202). The election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and the subsequent secession by the South

cemented a conflict that was decades in the making.

Antebellum America was a wholly different society than the one we live in today.

Slavery existed, the technology that we take for granted did not exist yet, and violence appeared

to be common and expected. This last point is key. From the 1830s to 1860 Dr. Freeman

31
documented fifty separate instances of legislative violence and political incivility. The most

infamous of these is of course the canning of Charles Sumner (188) which exemplifies the casual

and accepted violence of the era. But this isn’t the only one, or the most violent. An early

example of partisan fighting can be seen in the Graves-Cilley duel where a Whig Congressman

killed a Democrat colleague (99). There is also the 1832 physical assault on opposition Senator

Samuel Smith by Henry Clay (34) which shows how early in our Republic’s history these

displays of violence manifested. Whereas today the resort to violence in anything but self-

defense is frowned upon, back then it was expected in certain circles. Members of Congress were

broken up into two categories. Fighting men and non-combatants (71). For Southern and

southern born Westerners, a slight or political dispute could only be responded to with a fight of

some sort since honor was at stake. While in the North duels and fights were frowned upon early

on some Northerners in this early stage were forced to fight back as did the three Northern Whig

congressmen (xxiii). As time progressed, during the 1850s and with animosity over the question

of slavery coming to a boiling point it became expected of Northern of Members of Congress to

fight as can be seen in their actions of defiance and self-defense (211). Therefore, it is undeniable

that political violence had a profound presence in Antebellum America.

32
 CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS

Political Violence/Incivility

When it comes to political violence in the cases that have been presented there is an additional

level of animosity and intolerance that pushes things over the edge. In Antebellum America or

the Weimar Republic for example this is manifested as the prominence of violence that is

employed as a political tool. A culture of violence plays apart in the prominence of political

violence. This cultural difference cannot be understated. From the frequency of violent

altercations and the open engagement of violence between both sides during the 1850s (think

Bleeding Kansas along with numerous Congressional altercations) it can be inferred that the

violent political environment served as a special ingredient to help push the country towards a

democratic breakdown. Whereas today there is the perception of open disdain by one side

towards the other, the prevalence of violence is not nearly as present today. From 1980 to 2021 I

have only found a handful of instances of political or legislative violence in the United States.

These instances include then Congressman Greg Gianforte body slamming a Guardian reporter,

Matt Rinaldi’s confrontation with Democrat colleagues of the Texas State House of

Representatives, Congressman Don Young pulling a knife on Congressman John Boehner and

the January 6th Insurrection (Abaldi 2017, paragraphs 2 and 3; Stevenson 2017, paragraph 7;

Freeman 2018, xx).These incidents pale in comparison with the violence and repetition of the

political violence of the Antebellum period and are few and far between. Out of all of these our

most recent instance has so far been isolated, and the others are sprinkled throughout the 2000s

and 2010s. The same can be said for the political violence displayed in the Colombian case. Take

the example of Conservative opposition leader Laureano Gomez and his endorsement of

33
domestic terrorism. This action demonstrates a key difference with the modern American. As of

now we have yet to have a prominent party leader encourage domestic terrorism with the aim of

overthrowing political opponents. Even with the Capitol Insurrection the most severe

demonstrations that saw was GOP figures using vague terms such as “fight, kicking ass, or a

simple raising of the fist”. It never crossed over into the territory of openly wishing and

commanding a terror attack on the government. You can actually find something more akin to

Gomez’ endorsement of politically motivated domestic terrorism in the Antebellum South where

Governor Gist of South Carolina openly declared that he would use militias to invade

Washington DC if things didn’t go the way the South wanted them to (Freeman 2018, 258).

Other examples of the Colombian case study such as murder of a Liberal party member in

Congress, the partisan charged sectarian violence known as El Bogotazo and La Violencia, and

the encouragement of said violence by politicians and party leaders of both sides also put the

severity of action and delegitimization into perspective and make it evident that political

violence was a hallmark of the time. Even though desire for political violence is harbored in

fringe circles, for the most part current political figures aren’t engaging in the same behavior as

back then. We have also yet to see the murder of a politician by a rival of an opposing party. On

this note democracy appears to be more stable and safer than it was in the Antebellum period or

1940s Colombia.

34
 Legislative Productivity

When comparing legislative productivity in a broken-down democracy to the legislative

productivity in ours the results are hopeful. Peru before the 1992 coup was riddled with crippling

obstructionism. Notably the establishment party members of Congress successfully obstructed

the President and his party’s legislative proposals and censured government ministers there by

ensuring that the government would remain crippled and paralyzed. When looking at modern day

America the numbers that I will show tell us that we are overall in a better position. Despite an

outward projection of partisan warfare and distaste for compromise modern divided Congresses

have managed to produce consistent and moderate to favorable results. I have reviewed an

analysis on legislative productivity and the results are moderate. In table Desilver notes the

entirety of laws passed each session by Congress since 1973 (Desilver 2021, paragraphs 5 and

10).

35
 Table 1. Legislative Productivity Comparison. Adapted from Drew Desilver. “Nothing
lame about this lame duck: 116th Congress had busiest post-election session in recent history”
(Pew Research Center). Pewresearch.org.

36
 The total amount of laws passed during the united and extremely successful 95th

Congress stands at 803 laws. For the recent and divided 116th Congress the number of laws

passed drops to 334. The control group, the 97th Congress passed a total of 529 laws. The

difference between the 95th and the 116th Congresses is considerable as it shows that the ultra-

productive 95th managed to pass 459 more laws overall than the 116th did. When comparing our

control group 97th Congress to the 95th the difference in output stands at 274. When comparing

the 97th Congress to the 116th Congress the difference stands at 185. What these numbers show

is that the drop between the 116th Congress and our control group is 35 percent. In comparison

the drop between the 116th Congress and the 93rd Congress is 57 percent. In other words, when

comparing the productivity of our most recent divided Congress to the most successful Congress

the results are astonishing. And when comparing the 116th Congress to our control group the

results are significant. While this may seem concerning in the divided 104-106 congresses of the

Bush administration the average of successful legislation passed is 448 bills per year. In divided

congresses under the Bush administration the average is 422 bills per year. In divided congresses

under the Obama administration the average is 303 bills per year. Lastly, under the 116th

congress, the sole divided congress under the Trump administration, the amount of bills passed

was 334. Taking together these results across the four administrations the overall average of

legislation passed per year by a divided government stands at 381 pieces of legislation per year.

When looking at the overall average of legislation passed by unified congresses the average

stands at 546 bills per year. The difference in overall average output between divided congresses

and united congress is 30 percent. While the difference in productivity between divided and

unified congresses is apparent with unified congresses clearly being more productive the

differences in overall don’t appear signal that divided governments face an overwhelming

37
handicap overall. Additionally, we must keep in mind that the rising use of omnibus bill

packages that stuff in several bills in to one large bill could also account for some of the decline

in bills passed per year. We can also look at the yearly budget debt ceiling raises, and military

and national security legislation as proof of some productivity being achieved during periods of

divided government along with the modest difference in overall output. When we contrast this

with the fact that during 1990-1992 period the Peruvian government was unable to address grave

and existential concerns that should have brought about multi-partisanship like their economic

crisis or the conflict with shining path it is clear that our modest legislative productivity gives us

a functioning government which wouldn’t be present in a democracy on the verge of collapse.

38
 Institutional Capture

With regards to institutional stability, democracy is endangered when a President or

political operator captures “the referees” (the institutions and agencies that are meant to interpret

the law, execute the law, and check executive) (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018,78). An obvious fit for

this description of referees are courts and important regulatory and executive agencies like the

IRS or FBI. However, for our purposes the military will also be included in our definition as

militaries are often deployed to ensure the success of coups. A textbook example of a successful

round of regulatory capture can be seen in both the Peruvian case and Argentine case. President

Fujimori successfully came to an agreement with the military in the prelude to his coup. This

action gave him the force to be able to overthrow the democratic order. The same goes for

Conservative party elites in Argentina and their alliance with the military to oust President

Yrigoyen. In our case this was not so. Starting with the military, in the aftermath of the 2020

presidential election and in the lead up to the January 6th insurrection, the Joint Chiefs’ chairman

General Miley took a stance of political neutrality and sole loyalty to the constitution and stated

that this was the military’s stance (Browne and Starr 2020, paragraph 3). Any chances of a

military backed coup were immediately shot down by this statement. Secondly, the courts

demonstrated a clear independence from the Trump administration. Fifty lawsuits filed by

President Trump’s legal team with the intent of claiming voter fraud were dismissed by federal

and state judges, some of which are Trump appointees (Reuters Staff 2021, paragraph 3). The

Supreme Court who has a conservative majority, and whom three of its justices are Trump

appointees refused to get involved in Trump’s claims of widespread voter fraud (Gresko 2021,

paragraph 1). Another point to make is that unlike the German or Austrian cases there hasn’t

been attempt by an American president to dissolve or neutralize Congress in order to assume

39
dictatorial power. These instances demonstrate an institutional independence and robustness that

is simply not present in unhealthy democracies. Due to these results on these criteria, it appears

that our democracy isn’t in any immediate danger in this category. On the contrary, the

successful deflections of corruption by our institutions demonstrate that our democracy stands

healthy despite the partisan warfare that loudly plays out in news networks and social media.

40
 CONCLUSION

Given the information that I presented I conclude that there are no indications that we are

experiencing a democratic breakdown in the United States now. In the case studies of this

inquiry political violence, institutional capture and crippling gridlock are consistent factors that

manifest in the build up to the breakdown of democracy. In the United States institutional

capture is negligible, gridlock isn’t as bad as it appears at first glance, and there have been only a

few minor and one serious case of political violence in the past few decades with all these

instances being isolated as noted in the chapters above. Although we are not in danger for the

moment, that does not mean that we are completely in the clear. There is still the issue of

political elites in the Republican party by in large not denouncing or distancing themselves from

the stop the steal movement and the January 6 Capitol Insurrection. This continued stance of

antagonism toward the Biden presidency and the continued status quo may leave the door open

for further collaboration on destabilizing events in the future. Although the courts remain

independent as I discussed earlier it doesn’t mean that they will always remain so. An

implication is that the continued presence of a faction hostile to their political opponents and the

democratic system can at some point pack our courts with partisan judges that are willing to

cosign on the legitimacy of a coup or turn a blind eye to the annulment of an election’s results.

The same can be said for the military and the appointment of military commanders allied to a

demagogue. If the military is ever led by a partisan such as Michael Flynn, they may direct the

military either actively or passively in a coup attempt. Our democracy also hinges on the military

remaining apolitical.

41
 We shouldn’t discount the possibility of political violence either. Though it has been

confined to threatening tweets and past remarks endorsing violence against Democrats by some

GOP Representatives, political violence may resurface if hostile elites continue to get elected and

push the envelope on how far they are willing to take their disdain. If this turns out to be the case

there will always remain a possibility that violence may reappear in some fashion, either directly

or through proxies and endorsements. The final implication is with regards to legislative

productivity. As was seen with the early Fujimori government, an inability to meet basic

legislative goals like budget bills or responding crisis might be an indicator of a deteriorating

political situation. A seemingly permanent inability to meet these basic needs might indicate a

nonexistent working relationship and open hostility between the political parties. We must

remain vigilant on these points and continue to monitor the health of our democracy and events

and situations come and go.

42
 REFERENCES

Abadi, Mark. 2017. “Here’s the mugshot of Greg Gianforte, the Congressman who assaulted a

reporter the day before his election”. Business Insider. (11, Oct. 2017).

https://www.businessinsider.com/greg-gianforte-mugshot-2017-10

Aldrich, John. 2011. “Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in

America”. 27-70. Chicago Il. University of Chicago Press. (2011).

Browne, Ryan and Barbara Starr. 2020. “Top US general stands firm amid Pentagon turmoil”.

CNN. (12, Nov. 2020). https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/12/politics/mark-milley-pentagon-

turmoil/index.html

Cornyn, John. 2003. “Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process And The Need For Filibuster

Reform”. Proquest. Vol 27. 181-230. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. (2003).

Desilver, Drew. 2021. “Nothing lame about this lame duck: 116th Congress had busiest post-

election session in recent history”. Pew Research Center. (21, Jan. 2021).

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/21/nothing-lame-about-this-lame-duck-116th-

congress-had-busiest-post-election-session-in-recent-history/

43
Elving, Ron. 2018. “What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It Matters Now”.

National Public Radio. (29, June. 2018). https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-

happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now

Freeman, Joanne B. 2018. “The Field of Blood: Violence In Congress And The Road To Civil

War”. 34-258. New York City NY. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (11, Jan. 2018).

Gietinger, Klaus, Loren Balhorn trans. 2020 “The Man Who Murdered Rosa Luxemburg”.

Jacobin. (15, Jan. 2020.) https://jacobinmag.com/2020/01/rosa-luxemburg-murder-waldemar-

pabst-germany

Gresko, Jessica. 2021.“Supreme Court rejects Trump election challenge cases”. Associated

Press. (22, Feb 2021). https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-pennsylvania-

elections-us-supreme-court-5cc6aee8c328c7bb1d423244b979bcec

Hill, Seth and Chris Tausanovitch. 2017.“Southern realignment, party sorting, and the

polarization of American primary electorates, 1958-2012”. Public Choice. (16, Oct. 2017).

https://link-springer-com.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/s11127-017-0478-0.pdf

Kenney, Charles D. 2004. “Fujimori’s Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin

America”. 1-184. Notre Dame ID. University of Notre Dame Press. (2004).

44
Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt., “How Democracies Die”. Broadway Books. (2018).

Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism”. 51-69. Journal of Democracy, Vol 1,

Number 1. Baltimore MD. Johns Hopkins University Press. (1990).

Linz, Juan J, Alfred Stepan, Pablo Farneti, M. Rainer Lepsius, Walter B. Simon, Risto Alapuro,

Erik Allardt. 1994. “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe”. 4-133. Baltimore MD.

The John Hopkins University Press. (1994).

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke

Sonnet (2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

Linz, Juan, Alfred Stepan, Peter H. Smith, Alexander W. Wilde, Daniel H. Levine, Guillermo

O’Donnell, and Julio Cotler. 1987. “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America” 1-

55. Baltimore MD. The John Hopkins University Press. (1987).

Mann, Thomas E., and Norm Ornstein. 2006. “The Broken Branch”. 66-168. Oxford UK. Oxford

University Press. (2006).

Mann, Thomas E., and Norm Ornstein. 2012. “Its Even Worse Than It Looks”. 3-47. New York

City NY. New York Basic Books. (2012).

45
Naylor, Brian. 2021. “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial”. NPR.

(10, Feb. 2021). https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-

part-of-impeachment-trial

Owens, John E. 1997. “The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives:

Central Leadership—Committee Relations in the 104 Congress”. British Journal of Political

Science Vol. 27. No. 2. Cambridge University Press. (Apr. 1997). https://www-jstor-

org.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/stable/pdf/194139.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6e1b48eff88f36365339d91

38bd4775f

Reuters Staff. 2021 “Fact check: Courts have dismissed multiple lawsuits of alleged electoral

fraud presented by Trump campaign”. Reuters. (15, Feb. 2021).

https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-courts-election/fact-check-courts-have-dismissed-

multiple-lawsuits-of-alleged-electoral-fraud-presented-by-trump-campaign-idUSKBN2AF1G1

Samuels, Alex and Patrick Svitek. 2021. “After riot at the U.S. Capitol, Ted Cruz gets fierce

blowback for his role in sowing doubts about Joe Biden’s victory”. The Texas Tribune. (7, Jan.

2021). https://www.texastribune.org/2021/01/07/ted-cruz-riot-capitol/

Smith, Allan. 2021.“Sen. Josh Hawley becomes a pariah on Capitol Hill”. NBC News. (9, Jan.

2021). https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/sen-josh-hawley-becomes-public-enemy-no-

1-capitol-hill-n1253470

46
Stevenson, Peter W. 2017. “A Texas Republican is accused of threatening to ‘put a bullet in one

of my colleagues’ heads’”. The Washington Post. (30, May. 2017).

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/29/a-texas-republican-called-ice-on-

protesters-then-lawmakers-started-to-scuffle/

Tausanovitch, Alex and Sam Berger. 2019.“The Impact of the Filibuster on Federal Policy

Making”. Center for American Progress. (5, Dec. 2019).

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/12/05/478199/impact-

filibuster-federal-policymaking/

Theriault, Sean M. 2013. “The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress”.

5-23. OUP USA. (23, May. 2013).

Thien-Lemelson, Seinenu M. 2021. “’Politicide and the Myanmar Coup’”. Anthropology Today.

Vol.37 (2). (Apr. 2021) https://rai-onlinelibrary-wiley-

com.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/1467-8322.12639

Torre, Juan Carlos, Robert A. Potash, et. al. “Los años peronistas (1943-1955)”. 77-78. Editorial

Sudamerica. (01, Jan. 2002).

https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utsa/detail.action?docID=3158449&pq-origsite=primo

47
 VITA

Jose Alcala is from Laredo, TX. He studied Political Science and earned a Bachelor’s

degree in Political Science from Texas A&M International University. His area of study centers

on Congress. Jose’s policy areas of interest include, healthcare reform, education, immigration

reform, and foreign policy to name a few. His future plans include working as a legislative

staffer and eventually running for political office.

48
 ProQuest Number: 28865562

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality
and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest.

Distributed by ProQuest LLC ( 2021 ).

Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted.

This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license
or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata
associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement
or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17,

United States Code and other applicable copyright laws.

Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization

of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA