DEMOCRITUS

Dem. was an ancient Greek philosopher, who is associated with atomism. Atomism itself is one
of the doctrines in ancient philosophy, that addresses the problem of the nature of reality. In the
ancient context there were many of them, and perhaps, Dem. wasn’t the first, for he was
preceded by Leucippus and Epicurus. And their views as far as the nature of reality is concerned,
is quite similar. In looking at Dem. our concern is to estimate his take on the nature of nature,
and to adjudicate to what extent his scheme resolves that problem. In our thesis therefore, we
explore the commitment of atomism under the rubrics of Dem.
Democritus, one amongst the atomists, posits that the universe is made up of atoms, that atoms
are the basic constituents of reality. Besides, the world is composed of material bodies, of whose
basic unit are atoms. In between the atoms, he posits further, that there is void, space, so that the
atoms can move and collide freely, for they are not static, rather, they are dynamic, and if
dynamic, there must be collision amongst them, and the different shades of collisions of the
different sizes and shapes of atoms, gives the generation of different kinds of entities, for all
things came to be as a result of the conglomeration of atoms. For the the basic constituent of
reality are atoms and atoms are moving in space. Hence every material body and indeed
everything, can be explained in terms of the behavior of movement of atoms. For him, atoms are
eternal, indestructible, indivisible, and uncreated. These were the very features of Parmenides’
One, which for him, was the only reality. Given this, the question of the origin of atoms, is
inconsequential. With his scheme, you don’t need a creator, for all of the constituents of the
material bodies, were never created, they have always been there, and they will always be there
for they are eternal, and then of course, there is no room for the One. For Democritus, the
scheme of Parmenides, that change is an illusion, is counter-intuitive, for from observation, there
is change.
Change in Dem’s philosophy of nature.
For him, change is as a result of the different collision between the atoms. Change becomes the
movement of atoms in space. Hence, he cannot make the sought of differentiation, which
Aristotle makes, as to essential and accidental change. From the standpoint of atomism, the
question of change in any of the senses is inconsequential. Put in a more detailed fashion,
Democritus argued that motion is first of all directionless amongst atoms, they do not have
weight in any absolute sense, there is no final natural resting place for them and their motion is
eternal.
The Implications of the Materialism of Dem’s Concept.
In his work; On the Nature of things, Democritus would posit that “nothing can ever be created
by divine power out of nothing”, further that both gods and men are a conglomeration of atoms.
This doctrine, has monumental consequences. Firstly, it is a pure materialistic understanding,
since everything is explained in terms of matter, everything obeys the law of the movement of
atoms. Since everything is made out of material bodies, which are conglomeration of atoms.
Secondly, in man, you can’t talk of mind independent of matter, for matter is basic, hence, even
if you want to accept the reality of mind, you must do that as a modification of matter, meaning
effectively that mind is dependent on matter, of which even if you were to talk of the constituent
of the mind, it is made up of matter. Pushed further, this position reveals that there is nothing that
is immaterial or spiritual. For even the soul is a material entity. And death or perishing of a thing,
is only disintegration of the atoms that make up a material thing. If this is true, it means there is a
problem for human responsibility. Hence, no room for epistemology, no space for ethics, no
freedom of actions, man must concur to the mechanistic and deterministic movement of atoms of
which he is a part. Thirdly, if the universe itself is a conglomeration of atoms which in
themselves, have no inherent purpose beyond themselves, everything in the universe happens by
chance, hence nothing has purpose, and the universe itself has no purpose, hence, it is made for
man. Besides, if we are talking of causal influence, it has to be explained in terms of erratic
collision of atoms. The position is an attack on superstition, theology, transcendence, for it
rationalizes reality in terms of movement of atoms. There is no recognition of hierarchy, you
can’t talk of causes, for all these are resolved in a mechanical mode of explanation.
Parmenides’ One and Dem. correction
The context in which Dem.’s atomism developed, was in the context of the problem of one and
many, as found in the ancient epoch of philosophy. The problem is the problem of change, it is
the problem of appearance and reality, for it assumes various configurations in the ancient
context, beginning with the postulations of the Milesian thinkers under the rubrics of the issue of
the primary stuff. It then progresses and attains a critical moment in Parmenides. With him, the
problem of being is properly formulated in terms of the problem of the One. What the one has to
be in order to be the one. Whether the one can admit of the many, and if the one admits of many,
how is the many related to the one. Now, in order to understand the claims of Dem. we need to
understand the problems that bedevil Parmenides’ concept of the one. And the battle will be
finally fought at the altar of Metaphysics. For Parmenides, for the one to be one, the one cannot
admit of change, change is illusory, change is not part of reality, for the One is uncreated, the one
is indivisible, indestructible, and eternal. Effectively implying that the one does not come into
being, hence, the question of coming into being for the one is inconsequential. And since it is
eternal, it doesn’t change, hence, the question of change too, is inconsequential. He doesn’t deny
that there are many, but he says, what you think is many, is actually not many, for the only thing
that is real is the One. Hence on this scheme the problem of change is serious. He provides a
solution to the problem, but his solution is the negation of the reality of change at the altar of the
many, for he cancels out the reality of the many and upholds the One as the only thing that is
real.
Now for Dem. that position is counter-intuitive. It is not an adequate account of the nature of
reality, for it doesn’t account for the reality of change, he doesn’t do justice to it. For rather than
accounting for it, he has only negated the reality. This was what he and the like atomists, were
reacting to. Hence, where Parmenides denies change, Dem. affirms and emphasizes it, he says,
there can’t be One, without the many, thus, he makes the One, an appendage of the many. But
the issue will be how the many can be accounted for. That led to the background of his concept
of nature. For according to him, the same features which Parmenides attributed to the One, Dem.
will attribute to the Many. For you can’t use Parmenides’ scheme to explain the reality of change
which is perceptible. Hence, he denies that the many are illusory, he maintains that the many are
real, they are the substance of reality, and that the One is appearance, it is illusory.
THE MECHANICAL UNIVERSE AND OUR EVALUATION.
Dem. conception, presupposes some assumptions, for which no philosophical argumentations are
offered. First, he posits that atoms are ceaselessly moving in motion. No problem, he has posited
that they are eternal, hence no question of causes, but beyond this, the presupposition that they
are ceaselessly moving is philosophically weak. For as to the question of their motion, what, is
the principle? What is it that informs their movement. On this, Dem. is weak. But beyond this,
Aristotle, is critical of that presupposition of the eternity of atoms. He doesn’t accept that, for
until you have explained something in terms of causes, you haven’t explained that thing.
Aristotle, though, doesn’t reject matter, but he posits further, that there is a form, that guarantees
the origin of the matter, hence for him, you can’t find matter without form. On this note, I would
not agree with Dem. that atoms are eternal, there must be a reason for their existence, and
beyond their existence, there must be an explanation for the principle of their movement, which
Dem. doesn’t offer.
Sequel to this, the mechanical conception of the universe, is no doubt a synthesis between
Democritus’ atomism, Pythagorean mathematics, Copernicus’ revolution and Newtonian
physics, which argues conclusively that the real world is a world of particles in motion that has
very little in the way of human capabilities and qualities. The universe, in materialistic terms, is
explained in terms of physics and physical operation, for it is a universe that runs on its own
deterministic laws and mathematical principles. If Dem. has argued that all beings in the universe
have as their basic constituents, atoms which are constantly moving in space, which of course are
mechanistic and deterministic. How can he then come around to admonish us to be morally
responsible, having placed man under deterministic laws. This admonition of his, directly
contradicts his materialistic thesis. But beyond his admonition, the tension between human
freedom and deterministic laws, is one that has divided philosophers. Man cannot be equated
with the behavior of atoms. Man is a unity of body and mind. A mind that is independent of
body, beyond this, he possesses a soul that is substantial, a soul whose existence is not dependent
on the material body, and indeed, a soul that is the essence of the material body. Hence, we can
account for human freedom, of which our account, necessary contradicts Dem. absolute
atomism, and on this note therefore, I wouldn’t agree with Dem.