HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA vs HON.

FELIX DOMINGO

TOPIC: Public Trial

FACTS
In the case at bar, the petitioner Judge commenced all criminal actions against
the respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and Petitioner Lorenzana.
A total of 14 trials fell on a Saturday and were held in the chamber of Judge
Garcia. Based on the allegations in the petition, during the 14 days of trials, the counsel
of the accused acted not only in defense of the latter but also as prosecutor of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. Despite the said irregularity, Carbonel insisted
to proceed on trial, and the said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses
presented by the adverse party. In addition, the said respondents show no objection to
the alleged irregularity in the proceedings of the case in their memorandum but are
confined merely on the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases.
Thru their counsel, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with the application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging
jurisdictional defects. Subsequently, the respondent Judge Domingo issued a restraining
order causing the postponement of the promulgation of judgment. After the
proceedings, the former issued an order declaring that the right to a free and impartial
trial, and the right to a public trial had been impaired. Judge Domingo ordered the city
court, Judge Garcia, to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the
decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases in question until further
orders of the Court.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court. In their answer, the respondent
Judge and other respondents asserted that there was a failure to respect the right to a
public trial of the accused.

Issue
Whether or not the trial conducted in the chambers of the Judge suffice to vitiate the
proceedings as violative of the right to a public trial.

Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative.
 The Supreme Court explained that the Constitution guarantees an accused the
right to a public trial in which the very purpose is to prevent any danger of conducting it
illegally and unjustly.
In a public trial, anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom shall be allowed irrespective of
his relationship with the parties. This right is embraced in procedural due
process. It provides the accused further protection against irregularities in
tainted trials. Nevertheless, there is a well-recognized exception that
warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be
characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
In the case at bar, there is no evidence showing that the public was excluded.
Although the size of the room allotted by the Judge reduced the number of those who
could witness the trial, it is not indicative of any transgression of the right to a public
trial. According to Justice Black in In re Oliver, as cited by the Supreme Court, the
requisite of the right to a public trial observe if the accused could have his friends,
relatives, and counsel present, irrespective of the offense charged against him.
In addition, it shows on the record that the accused offered no objection to at
least 14 hearings held in the chambers of the city court Judge. As the Supreme Court
held in one case penned by Justice Moran, the same is considered a waiver of the right.
The main concern of the respondent Judge, in the case at bar, was to assure the
reality public trial. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as
well as criminal, and the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered
to all make for a less tense atmosphere. In this way, the attendance of the general
public is much more evident. Furthermore, the occupants of such courts are not
chosen primarily for their legal acumen but taken from that portion of the
bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life it is not to be
rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and
comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the
persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of
being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because,
as did happen in the case at bar, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a
city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place. The
Court granted the writ of certiorari and nullified, set aside, and declared
bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix
Domingo.