Case no.

56
Case no Luzon vs. Stevedoring
CASE NO. 56: LUZON STEVEDORING vs SSS, 34 SCRA 178
G.R. No. L-26175 July 31, 1970

FACTS:
Respondents Parohinog, Raymundo and Castillo questioned before the Social Security Commission the
reduction in their monthly pensions as a result of the mandatory integration of a private benefit plan with the
Social Security System plan as imposed by the Republic Act No. 1161, imposing compulsory social security
coverage.
Parohinog, Raymundo and Castillo are retired employees of the Luzon Stevedoring Corp. at the latter’s
branch office in Davao; Parohinog having retired on November 30, 1962, Raymundo on December 31, 1961
and Castillo on April 30, 1960.  Since their retirement Parohinog, Raymundo and Castillo received monthly
pensions from the petitioner in the amounts of P140.93, P120.14 and P49.50, respectively pursuant to the
LSC’s 1952 Plan for Pensions and Death Benefits, a private plan exclusively maintained by herein petitioner
(LSC) and to which none of the individual respondents nor any employee of the petitioner for that matter
contributes a single centavo.  In July 1963 the monthly pension of Parohinog, Raymundo and Castillo were
reduced by P22.99, P28.59 and P14.58 respectively petitioner having exercised the prerogatives it reserved for
it in the 1952 Plan for Pensions and Death Benefits.”  
Social Security Commission, in its resolution, granted the petition of the three retired employees directing
Luzon Stevedoring to pay the amount reduced in the pensions under its private plan from July 1963.
Luzon Stevedoring in its effort to do away with the resolution, questioned the authority of SSC to act on the
matter. They invoked the principle of separation of powers, the matter they say is primarily judicial, the
judiciary, not respondent Commission, is vested with jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON there is a violation in the principle of separation of powers.
(the matter is primarily judicial, the judiciary, not respondent Commission, is vested with jurisdiction)

RULING:
NONE. The doctrine of separation of powers has not been ignored or disregarded, for neither the lawmaking
nor the judging prerogative is actually entrusted to respondent Commission.  Its function remains the
enforcement and execution of the statute of its creation, impressed at times, and necessarily so, with either a
quasi-legislative or a quasi-judicial character.
To view the question more narrowly, there is no merit to petitioner’s assumption, that the performance of a
function, quasi-judicial in character, cannot be constitutionally vested in an administrative agency like
respondent Commission.
There is more truism and actually an interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down ‘with mathematical precision
and divide the branches into watertight compartments’ not only because ‘the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white’ but also because ‘even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.’ (Springer vs.
Government [1928], 277 US, 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.)” Thus in Arnault v. Pecson, in sustaining the power
of a court of first instance to allow a person detained for having been found in contempt of Congress to be
released for a period of not less than six hours as “a measure of necessity for an adequate preparation” for his
trial in a pending criminal case, it was stated in the opinion of Justice Tuazon, speaking for the Court, that
separation of powers “is not rigid and absolute but abstract and general, intended for practical purposes and
adapted to common sense.  There is no such thing as complete and definite designation by the Constitution of
all the particular powers that appertain to each of the several departments.  The constitutional structure is a
complicated system, and overlapping of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent
necessities of governmental coordination.”
However, the resolution of respondent Commission of January 11, 1966 was reversed, favoring Luzon
Stevedoring Corp, because as ascertained, the employees are not prejudiced by such reduction due to the
mandatory integration of the private plan.

Case no. 57
Garcia vs Macaraig

39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers

Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29,
1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From
July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to
the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running.  When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before
he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked
in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The
Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary,
without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted
in violation of his oath as a judge.  Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law.  And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not
been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping
the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does
not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench,
eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces
and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.

On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of
long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great
departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each
other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them,
have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional
scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position
where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior
approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is
best that this practice is discontinued.

Case no. 58
Bondoc vs HRET
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M.
PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991
GRIO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda won the said election. However, Bondoc contested
the result in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He won the protest and was
subsequently declared the winner by the HRET. Congressman Juanito Camasura, one member of the HRET
and a member of the LDP, confessed that he voted for Bondoc even though the latter was a member of the
Nacionalista Party which resulted to the former’s expulsion from the LDP. They further prayed that a new
election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will
be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s
chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
(SC). Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because
Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary
may not interfere.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating
the doctrine of the separation of powers.
RULING
Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the
legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is
being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by
the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the
electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same
election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative
to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a
lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
--
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP).
And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

Case no. 59
Defensor Santiago vs. COMELEC
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC 270 SCRA 106

FACTS
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Delfin also asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of
delegated powers. MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition
contending that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Sec. 2 Art. XVII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. Whether or not COMELEC Res. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a REVISION or an AMENDMENT of the
Constitution.

HELD
1. Sec. 2 Art. XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, w/o implementing legislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized/granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if the
Congress does not provide for its implementation.

2. The portion of COMELEC Res. 2300 is void. What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

3. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a REVISION, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A REVISION cannot be done by initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution - Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

R.A. No. 6735 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

COMELEC Res. 2300 - RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, AND INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ON NATIONAL AND LOCAL LAWS
 Case no. 60
Rubi vs. Provincial Board
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS:
Rubi together with her companions ( Mangyans; native people of Mindoro; non christians) were ordered
by the provincial governor to vacate their current place of comfort, and establish themselves in tigbao; still a
province of Mindoro. Nonetheless if they will not comply they will be punished through imprisonment.
So upon their resettlement in Tigbao one of the native people ( Dabalos) was pursued upon escaping. He was
held captive in calapan. So rubi filed a case, before the supreme court; that their freedom of liberty was being
violated.
SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMIN CODE:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order,
to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.

2. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:
1. NO. under the doctrine of necessity. The provincial governor shall determine whether to execute a law
or not. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. 
2. NO.  The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical
area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing
times.

Case no. 61
People vs. Vera
Facts:

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation
Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose
Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in
the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the
Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that
Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot
grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it
the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to apply the
probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
– hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to
the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the legislature did not provide
guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power to grant
pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the
executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC – ironic
because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its
application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as
the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past
without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the
validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal
protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a
probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said
province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the
probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon.
Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute
penalties.
 Case no. 62
Pelaez vs Auditor General
PALAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act
of Congress.”

Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.

Discussions:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits
him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

Case No.63
TUPAS VS OPLE 137 SCRA 108
FACTS: The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of
Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they
represent over a million workers all over the country.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which
states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).Each sector must have
four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These sectors can
submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor.
TUPAS however, instead of submitting nominations within the 20 days given, they addressed to respondent a
letter dated May 30, 1984, stating among other things that: ‘We are questioning before the Supreme Court the
constitutionality of Article III, Sections 4 to 6 of the 1984 Election Law (PD 697) and the legality of the current
efforts of the Minister of Labor and Employment to implement it in the absence of duly published rules on
accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives and questioned also the acts of
Blas F. Ople-Minister of Labor in accrediting certain nominations provided by the industrial labor groups.
Thus,Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious.
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then
is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who
could make the recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President.  The argument,
therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP. Such standard is set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in
carrying out the said provisions.
Further explanation:
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter coursed
through respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In
fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect
stated that they were not submitting any nomination and informing him that they were questioning the validity
of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one
to blame but themselves. And the law cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.
Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697:
“In recognizing the most representative and generally recognized organizations or aggroupments, the
Ministers of Agrarian Reform and Agriculture, the Minister of Labor and Employment, and the Ministers of
Local Government and of Education, Culture and Sports shall consider: a) The extent of membership and
activity of the organization or aggroupment which should be national; b) The responsiveness of the
organization or aggroupment to the legitimate aspirations of its sector; c) The militancy and consistency of the
organization or aggroupment in espousing the cause and promoting the welfare of the sector consistent with
that of the whole country; d) the observance by such organization or aggroupment of the rule of law; and e)
Other analogous factors.”

Case No. 64
US vs Ang Tang Ho
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies

FACTS: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done
on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail
to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use.
The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Case No.65
Tio vs. Videogram
TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD151 SCRA
208Principle: Requirements as to title of bills
FACTS: The petition assails the constitutionality of PD No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the Videogram industry. Following its
promulgation is the annual tax of 5% and 30% on gross receipts payable to the local government. The
petitioner’s grounds is that the imposition of tax is a rider and is harsh and confiscatory, oppressive and/or
unlawful restraint of trade. It is also alleged that the imposition of taxes is invalid since the title of the bill said
only for the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, not for the imposition of taxes. This violates the One-
Subject-One-Title Rule
ISSUES:
The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter of
the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

HELD:
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to,
and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the
same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly
tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating
the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has
authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed
and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the
Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit
such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the
direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

Case No.66
Free Telephone Workers Union

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. MINISTER OF LABOR

FACTS: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union)
and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction
over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it
averred that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by
granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to
the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on
free collective bargaining.

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

HELD:  No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take
on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the
law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that
the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state
should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law,
that is yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor
dispute in issue.

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The
law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.”

Case No. 67
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
VS.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondents.

Facts:
The case was about the petition of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation to the Supreme Court to
annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior
notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17,
1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes, E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative
bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing are
not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is
erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if
not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. 
The Supreme Court said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make
such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case
at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order
pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other,

Case no 68.
People vs Rosenthal
PEOPLE vs ROSENTHAL

68 Phil 328

FACTS:

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible
assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and
5 of Act No. 2581 otherwise known as the Blue Sky Law.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with
the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of
twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied,
either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation
is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he
shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such
person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such
person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named
in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his
judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of
the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can
guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making
his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2581 furnish a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision to
follow regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit.

RULING:

Yes. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefore “has complied with the provisions of this Act” and this requirement, construed in
relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular
Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.

Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and purpose
of Act No. 2581 - to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines,
and other like fraudulent exploitations”, - we incline to hold that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient
standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term “public interest” is not without a settled meaning.

RATIO:

Delegation to Administrative Agencies.

Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Sufficient standard is provided. “Necessary or advisable in the public interest" is a necessary standard.

Case No. 69
US vs Barrias
United States v Aniceto Barrias
GR No. 4349 September 24, 1908

FACTS:
The defendant, Aniceto Barrias, was charged with the violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No
397 of the Insular Collector of Customs which was published in the Official Gazette of the Philippines and
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. The defendant did not dispute the truth of the allegation but
he claimed that it was not a sufficient ground to justify legal action. He used bamboo poles in moving the raft
along Pasig River which according to Circular No. 397 Par 70 that no heavily casco, lighter, or other similar
craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power; and Par 80 states that for any violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the person offending
shall be liable to a fine of not less than 5 pesos and not more than 500 pesos. Aniceto Barrias question the
validity of Par 70 on two grounds. According to his counsel, the paragraph was unauthorized by sec 19 or Act
No 355 and that the act of the Philippine commission to authorize the collector to promulgate such law are
void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs has the power to promulgate laws.

HELD:
Under sections 1, 2 and 3 of Act No 1136, the Collector of Customs was authorized to license craft
engaged in lighterage or other exclusive harbour business. According now to Sec 5 of the same act, the
Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to promptly
make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein
licensed. An act from a legislative body delegates power to the Collector of Customs to promulgate laws. The
court finds that Act No 1136 is valid and is sufficient to sustain the prosecution. The judgement of the Court of
First Instance was revoked and the appellant is convicted of misdemeanour and punished by a fine of 25
dollars with costs.

Case No 70
Villegas vs. Hiu Chong
Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong Case Digest Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong 86 SCRA 270 No.L-29646
Facts:

The controverter Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to
be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within
the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu
Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction
and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution?

Held:

While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification
in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor
in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold
or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Case no.71
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. Vs. COMELEC
AQUILINO PIMENTEL VS COMELEC
GR No. 161658; November 3, 2008
(OUTLINE: Section 3, Article VI – Qualifications of a Senator)

FACTS
 On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the
May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Specifically Section 36(g) of RA 9165 provides that
“all candidates for public office both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test”.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 election filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the election.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.6486 is unconstitutional?

RULING
Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification
on candidates for senator. A candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.

Case no 72
Rogelio Bagabuyo Vs COMELEC
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government – Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino
Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence
two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration
of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts.
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de
Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily
means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.

Case no 73
Barangay Association for National And Transparency (BANAT) vs. COMELEC
BANAT V. COMELEC
, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009Facts:
FACTS:
>Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.

>BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full
number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
 
>The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC formula.

>Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment through Action, Cooperation and Harmony towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula.
COMELEC denied the consideration.

>Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC
in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or merely a ceiling

.2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

RULING:
1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.

2. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

3. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes “is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats

Presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectorial or group interests in the House of Representatives."

4. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure
shall be observed: 1. the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectorial wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectorial party," R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly

Case no 74
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC
Atong paglaum, inc., represented by its president, mr. Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
GR NO. 203766 APRIL 2, 2013
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of republic act no. 7941 and comelec resolution no’s. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13th
may 2013 party-list elections. PBB does not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 13
petitioners were excluded in the printing ballot for the party-list elections. COMELEC scheduled summary
evidenciary hearing to determine whether the groups and organizations have continually complied with the
requirements of RA 7941 and ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR party v. Comelec. 39 petitioners were
held by the comelec to be disqualified but were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the ballots for the party-list elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abused of discretion on disqualifying the participants.
RULING:
The comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion. However, since the court adopts in this decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, we
remand to the comelec all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections. Hence, the 1987 constitution, section 5(1) and (2),
article VI cannot be undisputed: the party-list system is not for the sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties. RA 7941 does not require national or regional parties or organizations to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented sectors”. To require national or regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to exclude and deprive, by judicial fiat, ideology
based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. RA 7941 does not require that national and
regional party must represent “marginalized and underrepresented sector”. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principle and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizen.
ADJUDICATION: Petition is Granted.

Case no 75
Dayao vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013
 
ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
LPGMA (LPG Marketer’s Association) is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry
players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010
elections and was approved by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC
for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not
marginalized or underrepresented citizens. In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or
underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of
those mentioned in Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to
oppose the petition for registration. The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground
for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for the registration which has long
been approved with finality. Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were denied.
 
Issues:
1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators,
officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.

Ruling of the Court:

There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of
COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed.1) An opposition
to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for cancellation. Section 6,
R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz: Sec. 6.
Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list
group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group
concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.2) In Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the Court explained that the "laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections" referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which declares the underlying policy
for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the House of
Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be
disqualified. The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and
their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that "those
who are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified. All told, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the
ordinary course of procedure, the herein complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC. However, on
August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which subjected to summary evidentiary hearings
all existing and registered party-list groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941and the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated,
among others, that the registration of all non-compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a
factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC and was deemed to have complied with all requirements
for registration.

Csae no 76
Lico vs. COMELEC
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, et.al, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE
SELFSTYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T. RIMAS, Respondents.
SERENO, C.J.: FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November 2009 under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law). On 30 November
2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for
the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner
Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups. Based on the procedure provided in BANAT
Party-List v. COMELEC, Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico
subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, and thereafter assumed office. On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National
Convention, during which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and Bylaws. In effect, the amendments
cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central
Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the
Rimas Group. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft
and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual
basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Interim Central
Committee, which subsequently denied the same in a Resolution dated 29 December 2011. On 21 January
2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in Parañaque City (the Parañaque convention), at
which a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were constituted. Members of the Rimas Group won
the election and occupied all the corresponding seats. On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to
represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico. The said Petition, which was
subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating
Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as
Ating Koop's representative in the House
COMELEC Ruling In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, the COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group.
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second Division's Resolution, which
the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013. In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held
that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the
COMELEC has jurisdiction to expel a party-list representative from the house of Congress when such member
was expelled in his own party.
SC RULING. NO. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it
relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction
over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning partylist group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath;
and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case. What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the
COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling
that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the
qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be
represented. The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that
do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of
the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the
validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored
on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list
nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party -list group is a
continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are
continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of
assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure. Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize
that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a
writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its
authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31
January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12 -039 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating
Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party -list Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the
legitimate Party -list Group. A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set
of officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to
the split of Ating Koop. SO ORDERED.
 Case no 77
Dr. Hans Christian M. Seneris vs COMELEC
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES A. ROBLES
G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
In 1999, Melquiades Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, a party-list group duly
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-
year term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with
Robles as its president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises,
including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of
BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation
of its Desire to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past two elections, the
manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres, on the other hand, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to
Certificates. In it, Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having
assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Señeres also claim that the
nominations made by Robles (nominations pertaining as to who should represent BUHAY in Congress) were,
for lack of authority, void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president. Furthermore, Señeres
asserted that Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the
latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled
corporation. Robles, so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity which civil service
members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a
winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats and it also declared
Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not Robles should be disqualified as president of BUHAY and whether or not COMELEC
acted without or with grave abuse in issuing two resolutions declaring Robles as a duly authorized
representative of BUHAY.

RULING:
No, Robles is not disqualified as the president of BUHAY. His being the chairman of LRTA and the president of
BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible. There is no law prohibiting that the LRTA chair cannot be a
president of a party-list group. Further, Robles is not guilty of electioneering. Robles’ act of nominating BUHAY
representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The crime electioneering is clearly defined under Section 79
(b) of the Omnibus Election Code but Robles did not commit any act defined thereunder.
Regarding the issue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY already expired when he made the nominations
hence the nominations are void, the Supreme Court ruled that the nominations are valid. This is because of the
“Hold-Over” doctrine under corporation law. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over
after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. The holdover
doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would
otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to
outsiders.
 Case no 78
Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
FACTS:

The petitioner, is a national organization which represents the LGBT. It filed a petition for accreditation
as a party-list organization to public respondent. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as
it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. However, due to moral grounds, they denied the said petition. Petitioner claimed that
the assailed resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.

Whether or not the Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

HELD:

Our constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” What our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Thus, moral disapproval is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated, not by our own laws nor by any international laws to
which we adhere. So ordered.

Case no 79
Philippine Guardian and Brotherhood ,INC, vs COMELEC
Philippine Guardian and Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190529

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELECen banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed
its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of
its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied
PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

HELD: The petition for review is GRANTED and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009
which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as
a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections

POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or sectoral party

The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections;or(b)fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies,as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot
be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in
two preceding elections should now be understood to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should
be understood and applied.

PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to
address.The Court cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the
Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed exists,
then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.

On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to
seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
is absolute lack of notice and hearing. PGBI was not denied due process.In any case, given the result of this
Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.
 Case no 80
Victorino Aldaba vs. COMELEC
Aldaba vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078
January 25, 2010

This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act no. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement
for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

Facts:
On May 1, 2009, RA 9591 was approved into law, amending Malolos City Charter, for creating a
separate legislative district for the city. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill No. 3693 and Senate
Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City in 2007 was 223,069.
HB No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010
based on the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Aldaba and company, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed for the prohibition
of RA 9591 for being unconstitutional because it failed to meet the minimum population requirement of at least
250,000 for a city to become a legislative district, as provided under Section 5 (3), Article 6 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and section 3 of the Ordinance appended.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9591, “An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”, is
unconstitutional?

Ruling:
Yes, RA 9591 is unconstitutional. Our Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, it
must have a population of at least 250,000. The certification issued by Regional Director Miranda, based on
demographic projections, is void because only the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) can
issue/declare the said projections, as provided under Section 6 (b) of EO No. 135: “For census years,
certification on population size will be based on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal
years, the certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or estimates declared
official by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB)”. It was also computed that the population of
Malolos will only grow to 249,333 as of Aug. 1, 2010 using the growth rate.
More importantly, it violates the Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, Malolos must first attain the 250,000 population, and after that in the immediately following
election, the city shall have a district representative.
 Case no 81
Benigno Aquino III vs COMELEC
Gr no 189793 April 7,2010

FACTS:

Aquino III(senator) and Jesse Robredo (mayor of Naga from the former district two of Camarines Sur)
alleged the constitutionality of Republic Act no. 9716, entitled “ an act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First and Second Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From such reapportionment”. The first and second district were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. The act was alleged as a well-milled legislation.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by the Republic Act no 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district.
That the first district did not met the minimum population because it was less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioner rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the 250,000 minimum population
standard.

Issue:

Whether or not a population of 250,000 in an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

RULING:

No, there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.” The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “ each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other
conclusion than the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

The subject of interpretation by this court in mariano v comelec. Thus, section 461 of the Local Government
Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. States:

Requisites for creation.- (a) a province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of finance, of not less than Twenty Million Pesos based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisite:

(i) A contiguous territory of at least two thousand square kilometres, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: or
(ii) A population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
*notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income requirement.
 Case no 82
Antonio Bengson III vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro Cruz

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An
Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who
was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
 Case no 83
Velasco vs. Belmonte
DIGEST
VELASCO VS. BELMONT
FACTS:
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC
First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency
requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC
actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions.
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's
[Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is"devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation."31But she hastens to point out that(i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the
proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x"as he was
not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and(ii)Velasco is estopped from asserting the
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.

ISSUE:
RESIDENCE
Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include the
name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public
respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register the name
of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
 Case no 84
Tagolino vs Hret and Lucy Torres
TAGOLINO V HRET AND LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ (MARCH 19, 2013)

FACTS:
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate
for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she
could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell
on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office. Opposing candidate Juntilla
asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said
office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.5 On May 5, 2010,
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post.
HELD:
NO PROPER SUBSTITUTION.
A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of
candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public
office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under
Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of
disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC,
and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount
in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261,
paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section
68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he
or she had already been elected.35
 It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not,
however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is,
however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the
above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78
of the OEC36 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the
elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have
also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. XXX
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate
for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party
may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the
said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be
substituted.43

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to
his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. 49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the
use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was
adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further
perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which
means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason
to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
 Case no 85
Ocampo vs. House Electoral Tribunal and Mario Crespo
PABLO V. OCAMPO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B.
CRESPO a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ
GR No. 158466
June 15, 2004

FACTS:
On May 23, 2001, Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a “Mark Jimenez”, was proclaimed by the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to be the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
However, the petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo, filed an electoral protest citing the following anomalies: (1) the
votes were misread (2) election returns were falsified (3) election returns were substituted (4) use of spurred,
marked, and fake ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written by one person or two persons.

However, Mark Jimenez was disqualified due to the residency requirement and was, later on, found
guilty as well of vote-buying. The petitioner then filed a motion that he be declared the elected winner of the
May 14, 2010 election for the position of Congressman of the 6th District of Mania, having garnered the second
highest number of votes.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be declared winner on the grounds that he received the highest number of
votes.

HELD: Petition is denied because the disqualification of a winning candidate for whatever reason, does not
qualify a second place candidate to claim such right. Considering that nature of the position which does not
allow a substitute; unlike those of mayor and vice mayor where the mayor can be replaced by vice mayor in the
event of death, disablement or disqualification, we cannot proclaim any second placers to the post as this
“would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy as enshrined within our
Constitution”. It is only the electorate who can ascertain their choice of representative, thus, the only recourse
would be holding another election.

Case no 86
Rep. Danilo Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus Vicente

FERNANDEZ VS. HRET

G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of
Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Private respondent Jesus L.
Vicente (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and Petition for Disqualification" before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna and later
forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Private respondent sought the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence. Dismissed for lack of merit.
 Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on June 27,
2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that the petitioner lacked the required one-year residency
requirement provided under Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private
respondent argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the
period of his residence in the legislative district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and two
months; and (3) his eligibility for the office where he was seeking to be elected. The HRET rule in favor of the
private respondent, petitioner ran to the SC for assistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a Member
of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be
overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstance of this case. SC found nothing wrong if the
petitioner sometimes transacted business or received visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta.
Rosa residence, as there is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from
owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the address they
had indicated as their place of residence in their COC. It also stated that there is nothing in the Constitution or
our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and
buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other
district. SC found that petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona
fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.

Case no 87
Deles vs. Commission on Appointments
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES vs COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Facts: Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by the former President Corazon Aquino as sectoral
representative for women along with Al Ignatius G. Lopez for youth Bartolome Arteche for peasant and Rey
Magno Teves for urban poor. They were appointed when the Congress was in session. Afterwards, their
appointment to take an oath was scheduled but the Commission on Appointment (COA) filed a case against
Deles et al saying that for their appointment to be valid it should first be confirmed by COA.

Issue:

Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of Sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?Resolution:

Yes, there are four groups that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
 According to the ruling of the case, the first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

Teresita Deles et al are included in the first group.