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Bhutan’s border conundrum: Nowhere near the finish

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10 November 2022

 ADITYA GOWDARA SHIVAMURTHY

Despite the urgency shown by all three parties—Bhutan, India, and China—to end the
border disputes, divergent interests continue to pose a significant challenge
The Chinese Ambassador to India was on a three-day visit to Bhutan from 10 to
13 October, where he met King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Prime Minister
Lotay Tshering, and Foreign Minister, Tandi Dorji. This visit comes one year after
Bhutan and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a 3-step roadmap
to expedite boundary talks. The subtle yet significant development indicates that there is
an urgency to settle Bhutan’s border disputes amongst all the players—Bhutan, China,
and India. Yet the divergent interests of these three stakeholders will continue to pose a
significant challenge to any such solution.

Border dispute: An overview

Landlocked between India and China, Bhutan has maintained a special relationship with
India since the treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1949. With China, Bhutan has
maintained a neutral relationship, albeit without any diplomatic relations.
China claims certain territories from Bhutan; in the north, Pasamlung and Jakarlung
valleys, both of which are culturally vital for Bhutan; and in the west, Doklam, Dramana,
and Shakhatoe, Yak Chu and Charithang Chu, and Sinchulungpa and Langmarpo valleys
—these lands are pasture-rich and strategically located in the Bhutan-India-China
trijunction, lying precariously close to India’s Siliguri Corridor. In 2020, China made new
claims on Bhutan’s East in the Sakteng sanctuary.

The subtle yet significant development indicates that there is an urgency to

settle Bhutan’s border disputes amongst all the players—Bhutan, China,
and India.
Bhutan began its first border negotiations with China in 1984. In 1988, both parties drew
on fundamental principles to guide negotiations, and in 1998, they signed an agreement
to continue negotiations and maintain the status quo. To date, both countries have held 10
expert group meetings and 24 rounds of border negotiations. Considering its geographical
size and strategic stakes, Bhutan has been very defensive. In 2021, Bhutan and China
signed an MoU to expedite negotiations and solve the border disputes.

The  carrots and sticks approach

The Chinese Ambassador’s recent visit to Bhutan focused on maintaining friendly
exchanges, improving relations, expanding win-win cooperation, promoting China-
Bhutan border talks, and moving ahead with the three-step roadmap. This enthusiasm
from China indicates Beijing’s increasing keenness to further border negotiations and its
strategic and status interests in the region.

China has often used carrots and sticks to seek a settlement with Bhutan. China has
attempted to woo Bhutan, especially with offers of assistance and people-to-people
contacts. In April 2022, China also helped Bhutan by providing medical supplies to fight
COVID-19.

However, the use of sticks has intensified in recent years. Starting from the late ’90s,
China has encouraged its citizens to settle in the disputed areas and grazing lands. In the
following decades, Beijing has built roads, infrastructure, and even permanent
settlements within Bhutanese territories. Between 2020-2021, satellite images indicated
the construction of new villages in the North and the West. These villages
are reinforced with military or police outposts, settlements, well-connected roads and
bridges. The increasing intimidation indicates China’s urgency to compel Bhutan to end
the border disputes and to also gain a strategic advantage against India.

The Chinese Ambassador’s recent visit to Bhutan focused on maintaining

friendly exchanges, improving relations, expanding win-win cooperation,
promoting China-Bhutan border talks, and moving ahead with the three-
step roadmap.
This urgency is derived from multiple factors: Bhutan’s special relationship with India
and the former’s unresolved borders and the absence of diplomatic relations with China
continue to haunt Beijing’s aspirations of being an Asian power. Rivalry with India has
also consistently motivated Beijing to pressurie Bhutan and attempt to control the
disputed regions of Bhutan’s West. The Western region significantly empowers Beijing’s
offensive positioning against India vis-à-vis the Siliguri Corridor. In 1990, Beijing even
proposed to trade off Bhutan’s Northern disputed regions in return for the Western
disputed regions. Finally, Beijing’s increasing tensions with the United States and India
have created angst about tentative challenges from a non-friendly Bhutan, including that
of assistance to potential unrest in Tibet.

A common plan for a common threat

On the other hand, recent developments also indicate an increasing urgency and
understanding between India and Bhutan on how to deal with China’s expansionism.
First, both countries are piggybacking on sector-wise negotiations. While Bhutan has
maintained this stance since the 1990s, India has openly shown interest in this tactic since
2020. As tensions with China peaked at Galwan, India reportedly asked Bhutan to solve
its territorial disputes with China so that all the stakeholders could focus on the complex
trilateral junctions. In July, the Bhutanese Foreign Minister clarified by asserting that the
2021 MoU only focuses on solving bilateral issues with China and wouldn’t impact the
trijunction areas of the Western borders.
Second, there seems to be mutual interest in using the 2012 agreement to limit China’s
expansionism. During the 2017 Doklam standoff, India had strongly condemned China
for not abiding by the 2012 agreement, which stated the trilateral junctions would include
negotiations with all the respective parties. However, Bhutan had made no such statement
during the standoff, despite criticising China for constructing roads within Bhutanese
territories. But the recent affirmation of solving the dispute trilaterally also suggests that
Bhutan is showing more interest in the agreement and is respecting Indian concerns and
toeing with its stance.

The challenges ahead:

Despite this urgency and understanding, there are several challenges:

The first challenge is to see if China would be keen on discussing the trijunction areas
with India—which means that Beijing has to shun its decades-old policy of treating the
Bhutan-China border dispute as a bilateral issue. This reapproach is even less likely
considering the strategic advantage of the Western disputed region and India’s
intensifying rivalry with Beijing.

The Bhutanese Foreign Minister clarified by asserting that the 2021 MoU

only focuses on solving bilateral issues with China and wouldn’t impact the
trijunction areas of the Western borders.
The second challenge is for Bhutan to mitigate India’s angst over increasing Chinese
expansion in the Western disputed regions. India has briefed and sensitised Bhutan of
China’s increasing inroads on multiple occasions. In July 2022, when satellite images of
Chinese constructions in Bhutan appeared, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
asserted that it was keeping a close eye on these security-related developments. That
month, India’s Chief of Army Staff discussed areas of further defence cooperation with
the Bhutanese king, who is the de-facto supremo of the country’s defence and security
issues, along with other key leaders, including the Chief of Army of Bhutan. In September
2022, the Bhutanese king also met with the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
to further the bilateral relationship. This increasing cooperation and anxiety also stem
from the fact that Bhutan lacks the material capability and presence to avert these
continuing intrusions and yet stays reluctant to seek more Indian assistance, fearing more
Chinese assertiveness.

The third challenge is that China’s solution to border disputes has often been inclusive of
establishing diplomatic relations with Bhutan. Such demands from Beijing will only
intensify as its tensions with the US and India increase. These developments will caution
India and the US and will also increase the stakes for Bhutan.

Bhutan has been keen on improving relations with China, but deep engagement or
establishing diplomatic relations has largely been dictated by other factors. Primarily,
Bhutan’s relations with both neighbours are dictated by the ‘Balance of Threat’
phenomenon. It shunned its isolationist policy and deepened relations with India as
China’s intimidation increased. As a result, Bhutan continues to be integrated with India’s
economy, security guarantee, and development assistance. On the other hand, China’s
violation of previous agreements, consistent intimidation, and the new territorial claims
has done little to counter this threat perception.

Bhutan has been keen on improving relations with China, but deep
engagement or establishing diplomatic relations has largely been dictated
by other factors.
Bhutan’s growth model of Gross National Happiness will also prevent any deeper
economic engagement with China since Beijing’s assistance is often economically and
environmentally unsustainable. This is likely to be the case unless the threat perception
from Beijing is mitigated. Although the recent visit of the Chinese ambassador indicated
some signs of perception management, a lot would be determined by China’s actions.
However, as Xi Jinping starts his third tenure and focuses on strengthening the Tibetan
borderlands, the threat perception is likely to prevail. Finally, to establish diplomatic
relations with China, Bhutan will also have to shun its policy of not
establishing diplomatic relations with any of the P-5 countries and staying away from their
great power politics.
Resolution to its border disputes will be an arduous task for Bhutan. There is an
indication that all the parties have shown interest and urgency in ending this dispute. Yet,
the momentum ahead will depend on how their interests and stakes are accommodated;
until then, a potential border settlement seems far too distant.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

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