Review of International Studies page 1 of 22 6 2012 British International Studies Association

doi:10.1017/S0260210512000046

Responsible reconstruction after war:

meeting local needs for building peace
CHRISTINE CUBITT

Abstract. Contemporary peacebuilding operations are often mandated to rebuild ‘collapsed’ or

weak states and provide unique opportunities for internationals to exert far reaching influence
in their reconstruction. The responsibility to help secure peaceful transformations and longer
term stability is profound. This article explores the issue of efficacy and propriety in recon-
struction programming and draws from field work in Sierra Leone – a rare example of ‘success’
for international partners in peacebuilding missions. The assertion is made that, despite the
euphoria over the mission in Sierra Leone, the peacebuilding operations were more about
the mechanics of statebuilding than the local politics of building peace, and that there was a
distinct disconnect between the policy rhetoric and the policy practice. The argument is put
that the pressing local concern of giving citizens a stake in government was not best served in
the reconstruction project because the wider and more influential objectives of the peacebuild-
ing mission were about meeting international goals not local aspirations. This reality has come
at the cost of exploiting a unique opportunity for creative thinking about the kind of state
structures which can better address the main challenges for sustainable peace facing post-war
states like Sierra Leone.

Christine Cubitt is the author of Local and global dynamics of peacebuilding: postconflict recon-
struction in Sierra Leone, published by Routledge, and the director of Reiga Research Group.
She has a PhD from Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. Her current research is on
the issue of post-conflict labour markets and local private sector employment. The author can
be contacted at: {christinecubitt@aol.com} or {christine.cubitt@reiga.org}.

Introduction

In his article ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Roland Paris argues that there is still no
realistic or preferable alternative to the orthodox model of international missions
which favour reconstructing states through liberalising programmes of reform.1 Given
the general consensus that the outcomes of contemporary peacebuilding operations
have been mixed and disappointing,2 these conclusions are of concern, especially as
Paris defends his position by arguing that many alternative peacebuilding strategies
suggested by critics of the ‘liberal peace’ are, in fact, most compatible with it.
Through an empirical study, this article sets out to challenge the thesis that liberalism
is the key to securing successful war to peace transitions, or indeed that genuine
attempts are being made to enforce it, and to explain the purpose behind peacebuild-
ing missions in the context of Sierra Leone.

1 Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, 36 (2010), pp. 337–65.
2 Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
1
2 Christine Cubitt

The current debate

Mixed outcomes from international missions – their failures, contradictions, and

many longer term challenges – have generated a rich body of critical literature on
the impact of peacebuilding operations on local communities. The general consensus
is that democratic reforms and export-oriented market economies have struggled to
deliver on key peacebuilding outcomes such as meaningful participation, and the
redistribution of wealth and power.3 In the absence of these outcomes, people have
developed their own strategies to cope with the debilitating circumstances of post-
war spaces; living life at the level of the ‘everyday’, local people have shaped peace
through cooperative activity and enterprising endeavours involving significant
degrees of agency often overlooked by external peacebuilders.4 Because of these realities,
many nuanced analyses have been produced which challenge the notion that liberal
democracy is a panacea for troubled societies emerging from conflict,5 including
Paris himself who provides us with the thesis of ‘institutions before liberalisation’
where democratisation and aggressive economic reforms can be delayed whilst strong
state structures are put in place to cope with the changes.6 The salient question here is
whether or not liberal state institutions have any relevance to the people who matter –
those who have lived through war.7 It is the case that international operations do not
bear out their claims of ‘local ownership’.8 This is because grass roots stakeholders
and non-elite members of local communities do not take a central role in the peace-
building process,9 but are consulted only an a predetermined template for reform,10
often mere observers of the process. This situation is deeply problematic on two
counts; first, because it perpetuates the perennial issue of exclusion of the local voting
populace and second, because outsiders do not know how to correctly identify peace
in complex war-torn environs. Political economies of peace therefore require a
‘paradigmatic shift’ in their negotiation in order to address this democratic deficit,

3 Berdal, Building Peace After War; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building
Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).
4 See Oliver Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’, Millennium Journal of International
Studies, 38 (2010), pp. 665–92.
5 Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding
(Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, 2009); Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk, From
War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6 Roland Paris, At War’s End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, Thomas
Carothers, Edward Mansfield, J. Snyder, and S. Berman, ‘The Debate on ‘‘Sequencing’’ ’, Journal of
Democracy, 8 (2007), pp. 4–22.
7 See David Roberts, ‘Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy’,
International Peacekeeping, 18:4 (2011), p. 416.
8 Jonathan Goodhand and Marc Sedra, ‘Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding
in Afghanistan’, Disasters, 34 (2010), pp. 78–102; Timothy Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?
Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes’, Peace and Change, 34 (2009),
pp. 3–26; Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London:
Vintage, 2003).
9 K. Papagianni, ‘Transitional Politics in Post-Conflict Countries: the Importance of Consultative and
Inclusive Political Processes’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3 (2009), pp. 47–63; Mike
Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy
of Peacebuilding (Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe,
‘Participatory Peacebuilding’, in T. Keating and A. Knight (eds), Building Sustainable Peace (Alberta
and Tokyo: University of Alberta Press and United Nations University Press, 2004).
10 See David Roberts, Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis (London and
New York: Routledge, 2011); and Christine Cubitt, Local and Global Dynamics of Peacebuilding: Post-
conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), p. 58.
 Responsible reconstruction after war 3

secure legitimacy and find out what the local needs are.11 Indeed, lack of legitimacy
supports the argument that foreign intervention for post-conflict reconstruction is
imperialism by other means,12 often too intrusive, diminishing the likelihood of
durable peace.13 The body of critical literature in this field promotes the assertion
that the current asymmetry of peacebuilding power needs rebalancing towards a
local approach.14 When peacebuilding does not achieve its objectives or substantiate
its claims, what tends to happen is resistance, adaptation, or distortion – described
elsewhere as ‘liberal-local’, ‘post-liberal’, or ‘hybrid’ forms of peace.15
Paris argues that the critics are really ‘liberals in disguise’16 because the alternatives
they suggest often complement ‘liberal peace’ theorising and can generally be accom-
modated within the existing framework for post-conflict reforms.17 He notes that, in
the absence of any radical new strategies among the critics which are not rooted in
liberalism, the suggested alternatives are not incompatible with, and indeed are often
complementary to, building market democracies.18 This means that scholars are not
working hard enough, or creatively enough, towards a more constructive critical
approach rooted in different orthodoxies which might identify distinct and viable
alternatives to the more aggressive forms of liberalism which Paris accepts often
destabilise societies in transition.19
Paris’s comments, and the focus in policy circles on the structures and processes
which can produce good governance in peacebuilding operations, reflect the common
perception that peacebuilding is, in fact, more to do with statebuilding. Peacebuild-
ing is sometimes used as a synonym for statebuilding.20 These connections have not
gone unnoticed in the policy discourse as conclusions have been drawn about the
11 Pugh, et al., Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding; Mark
Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge:
Polity, 2007); Roger Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace: the Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and
Peace Accords (Houndsmill, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
12 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto, 2006); A. Bendana,
‘From Peacebuilding to Statebuilding: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?’, Development, 48 (2005),
pp. 5–15.
13 Astri Suhrke, ‘The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan’, in
Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of
Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009); K. Krause and O. Jutersonke, ‘Peace, Security
and Development in Postconflict Environments’, Security Dialogue, 36:4 (2005), pp. 447–62.
14 David Roberts, ‘Beyond the Metropolis? Popular Peace and Postconflict Peacebuilding’, Review of
International Studies (2011). Available on CJO 2011 doi:10.1017/S0260210511000234.
15 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: the Interaction between Top Down and Bottom Up Peace’, Security
Dialogue, 41:4 (2010); David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance
(Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, England; New York: Routledge, 2010); Oliver Richmond, ‘Beyond
Liberal Peace? Responses to Backsliding’, in Newman, et al., New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding.
16 Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, p. 354.
17 For example, Michael Barnett’s ‘republican’ model for building peace – see Michael Barnett, ‘Building
a Republican Peace: Stabilising States after War’, International Security, 30:4 (2006), pp. 87–112;
Chandler’s critique of unaccountable and non-liberal behaviour of global actors – see Chandler, Empire
in Denial and Duffield’s or Richmond’s ideas about an ‘emancipatory’ approach to peacebuilding –
Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples; Oliver Richmond,
‘Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding’, International Journal, 62:3 (2007).
18 Williams defines market democracies as those states which encompass a liberal democratic polity and
market-oriented economy; see Paul Williams, ‘International Peacekeeping: The Challenges of State-
building and Regionalization’, International Affairs, 81:1 (2005), p. 168.
19 Roland Paris, At War’s End.
20 Roland Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the ‘‘Mission Civilisatrice’’ ’, Review of International
Studies, 28 (2002), pp. 637–56; M. Barnett and C. Zürcher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External
State-Building Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), The Contradictions
of State Building: Confronting the Dilemmas of Post-War Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2008).
4 Christine Cubitt

‘high degree of congruence’ between the objectives of peacebuilding and those of

statebuilding, the significant ‘overlaps’, and the need to build more ‘integrated’ opera-
tions.21 Even where there are no explicit overlaps between the two, it is argued that
‘complementarity is more likely to prevail than outright competition’.22 Within the
context of ‘state fragility and conflict’, policy discourse is now focussed on integrat-
ing peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives because weak and conflict prone states
cannot achieve the global ambitions codified in the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs),23 and what has emerged from the debate is that peacebuilding is statebuild-
ing for development, and therefore security.24 These interesting causal links mean
that previously failed or fragile sovereign entities are restructured after war to fit
into the international system of states, to fulfil their international as well as local
obligations – such as legislation on human rights or employment law – and to
enhance global security.25 Consideration of the root causes of conflict – and the
many and challenging ambitions of the local populace – appear to be somewhat
secondary in the process. Commentators have noted that this focus on state institu-
tions – which invariably fail to deliver significant development outcomes – overlooks
the reality in many peacebuilding contexts that authority structures with local legitimacy
often operate outside the state. Such parallel authorities create ‘hybrid polities’ and can
sometimes provide the sort of security and welfare support that central governments
fail to deliver.26
The arguments in this article do support the claim that contemporary peacebuilding
operations are more about the mechanics of statebuilding than the local politics of
building peace,27 and that there is a disconnect between policy rhetoric and policy
implementation.28 The article speaks to the concern that contemporary statebuilding
operations are not always compatible with national peacebuilding objectives,29 and
that the most pressing concerns of populations emerging from violent conflict are

21 DFID, Building the State and Securing The Peace (London: Department for International Development,
2009).
22 DIE, The Convergence of Peacebuilding and State Building: Addressing a Common Purpose from Different
Perspectives (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2009).
23 OECD, Dili Declaration: a New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010).
24 David Chandler, ‘The Security-Development Nexus and The Rise of ‘‘Anti-Foreign Policy’’ ’, Journal
of International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 362–86; IPA, ‘The Security-Development
Nexus: Research Findings and Policy Implications’, in The Security-Development Nexus Program
(New York: International Peace Academy, 2006); DFID, Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: a
Strategy for Security and Development (London: Department for International Development, 2005);
Krause and Jutersonke, ‘Peace, security and development in post-conflict environments’.
25 Jason Franks, ‘Beware of Liberal Peacebuilders Bearing Gifts: the Deviancy of Liberal Peace in Palestine
and Israel’, in Newman, et al. (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding; Edward Newman,
‘Liberal Peacebuilding Debates’, in Newman. et al. (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding;
Alex Bellamy, ‘The Next Stage in Peace Operations Theory’, International Peacekeeping, 11:1 (2004),
pp. 17–38.
26 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan, ‘Building Peace and Political Com-
munity in Hybrid Political Orders’, International Peacekeeping, 16 (2009), pp. 599–615.
27 Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: the Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Beatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN
Missions and Local People (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006).
28 Chandler, ‘The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise of ‘‘Anti-Foreign Policy’’ ’.
29 Tanja Chopra, ‘When Peacebuilding Contradicts Statebuilding: Notes from the Arid Lands of Kenya’,
International Peacekeeping, 16:4 (2009), pp. 531–45; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy:
Dilemmas of Peacebuilding; Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner; London: Eurospan [distributor], 2008).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 5

not best served by the current orthodoxy for reconstruction. This is because the
current orthodoxy holds nothing new for traumatised populations; no grand designs
for societal transformation or creative approaches to heal the political fractures of
the past and the institutions it supports are generally inconsequential to the lives of
the ‘everyday’. An empirical study, based on field work during post-conflict trans-
formation in Sierra Leone, provides the local evidence to develop a deeper under-
standing of the issues – in this case, specifically in the reform of the political and
economic spheres.

The claims of international peacebuilding (statebuilding) missions

Peacebuilding is distinct from peacemaking and peacekeeping because it is about long-

term security and development and can best be described as the activities involved in
building a positive peace which can last.30 The stated purpose of international peace-
building missions is first to understand and identify, in any given environment, the
sort of governing structures which can strengthen and solidify peace and avoid
any relapse into conflict and, second, to support the construction or reconstruc-
tion of those structures.31 The inference here is that the project should be local, but
invariably interventions are already predetermined on the hubris of external actors.32
Statebuilding as peacebuilding in divided societies and troubled locales centres on
designing structures which will allow future disputes to be settled peacefully. These
interventions involve strong emphasis on building state institutions and state capacity,
based on the rule of law,33 but the broader goal of modern integrated operations is to
transform societies through a multidimensional and multilevel engineering approach
which claims to address the causes of war as well as to stop the fighting.34 This
approach provides support to civil society and focuses on the protection of human
rights. It promotes democracy, the rule of law, and good governance for the efficient
collection of taxes and delivery of services. It encourages strong, transparent, and
accountable leadership and supports an independent and professional security sector.
This process has come to be known as the ‘liberal peace’ which has at its foundation
the claim that failed states, or weakened states, should be reconstructed to mirror
established Western democracies because there is merit in the thesis of the democratic
peace.35
Interventionist approaches therefore seek to establish a particular kind of state,
a liberal one, based on the rule of law, democracy, and a market economy. This is
30 UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) (New York: General
Assembly and Security Council, 2000); Kofi Annan, ‘Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in
Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 7:1 (2000), pp. 1–5.
31 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeep-
ing’, vol. II (1992).
32 Michael Pugh ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: a Critical Theory Perspective’, International
Journal of Peace Studies, 10:2 (2005); Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War:
Governing the World of Peoples.
33 UN, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, report of the Secretary-General’s high level
panel on threats, challenges and change (New York: UN Publications, 2004).
34 Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen From Below.
35 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795); David Barash (ed.), Approaches to
Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Vivienne
Jabri, War And The Transformation of Global Politics, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 127.
6 Christine Cubitt

what ‘stateness’ means in the new international order and ‘all states are compelled to
struggle to approach this ideal, or at least to pretend to be striving to establish it’.36
This is the master plan but, as Eriksen so astutely points out, it only forms the basis
for the design of formal institutions as many post-conflict states are far from corre-
sponding to it.37 A technical approach to statebuilding, guided by an administrative
view of the state, disregards its political and social character in the local context and,
creditable though it sounds, there is evidence to suggest that the current model for
statebuilding is not always appropriate for post-conflict environs or even embraced
by the local leadership, and local populations are mere spectators in the process.38
In which case we must ask the question, who is the statebuilding for?

Statebuilding as peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

The genesis of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and the eventual collapse of the state, was
extremely complex and nuanced and set against a background of historic structures
and their legacies. Similar to the experiences of many African populations, the new
and much longed for era of self-government was soon replaced by an aggressive and
predatory authoritarian regime.39 At independence (1961), Sierra Leone lacked leaders
with experience of statecraft beyond the systems of indirect rule left by the retreating
colonists yet the introduction of democracy held the assumption that elites had appro-
priate leadership qualifications, and that the country was a tangible and cohesive unit
with a populace which shared common interests, and where the citizenry was expressed
as a ‘collective self’.40 This was not case. The country’s ethnic demographics were
split into three quite clear divisions at independence; the Krio of Freetown, previously
favoured by the British but gradually losing their influence to the mostly southern
and eastern Mende dominated hinterland, and the northern Temne/Limba elite
who had historically opposed colonial rule and who were subsequently neglected in
their resource scarce northern territories.41 What remained was a conglomerate of
frustrated and ambitious local elites vying for control of state resources to enrich
themselves and their supporters as independence politics became a fight for power
between competing elites of all persuasions who knew from colonial experiences
that social mobility and wealth were only accessible through control of the state and
its resources.

36 Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, ‘The Liberal Peace is Neither: Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and the Reproduc-
tion of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Peacekeeping, 16:5 (2009),
pp. 652–66.
37 Ibid.
38 Boege, et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders’.
39 TRC, Witness to Truth, (Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004); A. Adebajo, ‘Sierra
Leone: a Feast for the Sobels’, in A. Adebajo (ed.), Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner, 2002); Tunde Zack-Williams, ‘Sierra
Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98’, Third World Quarterly, 20:1 (1999), pp. 143–62;
Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Portsmouth,
NH: Heinemann, 1996).
40 See Crawford Young, ‘The Colonial State and its Political Legacy’, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi
Chazan (eds) Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1988), pp. 25–66.
41 Alexander Peter Kup, Sierra Leone: a Concise History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Christopher
Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); R Lewis, Sierra Leone: a
Modern Portrait, Corona Library Series (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 7

After a short era of multi-party politics, the All People’s Congress (APC) came to
power and secured a long and unbroken period of government (1968–1992) by evolv-
ing a de facto single party system and co-opting or intimidating the opposition.42 The
country’s rebellious youth population were accommodated by politicians – not as
a legitimate lobbying group among civil society – but as political thugs reliant on
patrimony.43 The centralised government ‘sustained itself through corruption, nepotism
and the plundering of state assets’ to the exclusion of the majority of citizens outside
the private networks of governing elites.44 This marginalisation of the masses and
the cynical manipulation of state power had a profound impact on the lives and live-
lihoods of ordinary Sierra Leoneans whose poverty deepened as they became further
disconnected from the levers of power and democracy was denied them.
Gross mismanagement of the state was to have the most severe consequences
come the global economic downturn of the 1970s and 80s; international companies
withdrew their operations and all associated livelihoods for locals, and the arrival of
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) took a heavy toll on jobs. Price fluctuations on
the international markets meant a steep decline for the country’s mineral economy
which dominated trade and was the main source of foreign exchange. The national
economy could not withstand such shocks as it had already been withered by the
incompetence and greed of politicians, so a shadow economy emerged to feed estab-
lished patrimonial networks. This involved the illegal mining and export of the
country’s diamonds by elites and their (mostly foreign) business cronies – a practice
that allowed domestic revenue collection to plunge to 18 per cent of levels in 1977–
8.45 Between 1980 and 1987 state spending on health and education declined by
60 per cent with large disparities between the rural areas and the capital city.46
SAPs increased the pressure on an already weakened state to reform and expose its
fragile economy to global markets. Many jobs disappeared swelling the numbers
of unemployed and disenfranchising large sections of the community still further,
especially the country’s youth who experienced vast asymmetry of power with central
and traditional authority.47
All the while, citizens were locked out of the political process. There was no plat-
form for their voice, no access to the levers of power and no justice for their genuine
grievances about deepening poverty and abuse of human rights. Dissenting voices
including unions, agricultural cooperatives, businesses, professional organisations,
and the judiciary were either brought into the patrimonial system or intimidated to
such an extent that they migrated, easing any pressure on government to reform.48
The nation building project, instead of being a united effort towards self-governance,
turned into a destructive bid for power among competing elites which had previously

42 Aminatta Forna, The Devil that Danced on the Water (London: Harper Collins, 2002).
43 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (London,
C. Hurst & Co., 2005).
44 TRC, Witness to Truth, executive summary, para. 14.
45 William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), cited in David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James
Curry, 2005), p. 23.
46 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (London: Lynne Reinner, 1998).
47 This group was to provide a strong body of recruits for the rebellion which followed and which, after
initial ‘revolutionary’ traits, soon descended into anarchy, criminality, and collapse of the state.
48 Adebajo, ‘Sierra Leone: a Feast for the Sobels’; Yusuf Bangura, ‘The Political and Cultural Dynamics
of the Sierra Leone War: a Critique of Paul Richards’, in Ibrahim Abdullah (ed.), Between Democracy
and Terror (Senegal: CODESRIA, 2004).
8 Christine Cubitt

been favoured, or sidelined, by the British, whilst deteriorating global conditions

eventually brought the national economy to its knees. Bad governance, endemic
corruption, and mass abuse of human rights plagued the nation building project,
and a profound failure of leadership eventually stripped the country of its dignity
and was the precursor for war.49
One of the main priorities after war, therefore, was political reform. Failures of
leadership in the past meant that an effective democratic process was required to
produce responsive and representative government accountable to the people and
committed to a more egalitarian distribution of the nation’s wealth. To secure longer
term peacebuilding ambitions and move away from the tensions of the past, citizens
needed impartial and accountable politicians to build confidence that the promises
of democracy would not be compromised this time, and that their interests would
be served through genuine representations. The country needed good governing
structures, effective and transparent political processes that would give citizens a
role in decision-making. It needed a strong and independent judiciary that could
counter-balance any executive excess and protect the rights of civilians, especially
the most vulnerable and the victims of the war. Success of the reforms would require
a strong and independent civil society, or broader citizen representations, which
could monitor government activities and drive through the reforms which were essen-
tial for addressing key peacebuilding challenges. In sum, the problematic relationship
between the government and the governed – which had so bedevilled the indepen-
dence years – needed radical and creative reform to produce a more responsive state
and a more engaged citizenry after the fighting ended. Good and relevant institutional
design was therefore central to the consolidation of peace;50 could the implementation
of liberalising and democratic reform help in this regard?

A new political process: liberalising the body politic

All the accoutrements of liberal statebuilding were marshalled for the reconstruction
project. They included rebuilding the security apparatus in a ‘liberal’ way to disconnect
it from the levers of power and bring it under civilian control – a most successful
enterprise and imperative prerequisite for all the local priorities noted above. Security
sector reform (SSR) involved a major undertaking to retrain and re-equip the Sierra
Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) by the British Ministry of Defence in collaboration
with the International Military Assistance Training Scheme (IMAT).51 Successful
securitisation of the country and SSR allowed people to return home and for free,
fair, and peaceful democratic elections to take place and removed one of the most
serious threats to human security which had been present since colonial times. In
particular, the mass abuse of civilians by government troops during the war had left
communities deeply fearful of the security services. The removal of this threat in the

49 TRC, Witness to Truth, vol. 2, C.2:66, p. 68.

50 Andrew Reynolds, The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); K. Belmont, Scott Mainwaring, and Andrew
Reynolds, ‘Introduction’, in A. Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design,
Conflict Management, and Democracy.
51 Jeremy Ginifer, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools (London: Department for International
Development, 2004).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 9

post-war years cannot be underestimated as a profound contribution to the wellbeing

of Sierra Leoneans and their ability to exercise political freedom.
Reform of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) allowed a series of multi-
party elections to take place52 – presidential and legislature in 2002 and 2007, and
local elections in 2004 and 2008. In the 2007 poll, an historic and peaceful change-
over of power took place when the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) made way
for the successful APC. For the first post-war elections in 2002, political parties
formed around the usual regional groupings as well as interest groups such as women
and youth, and the warring factions,53 but by 2007 political party participation had
shrunk to three main players,54 and voting patterns suggested that the country had
settled back into habits of old where regional and ethnic ties dictated party allegiance.
Research and commentary emanating from the field evidenced that ethnicity was
re-emerging as a political fracture, manipulated by political elites using youth in
political violence. In the absence of a state which could provide jobs or welfare,
some youth, mostly former combatants, chose to use old patrimony networks,
headed by politicians, to supplement their income.55 In this respect, the ‘hybrid
polity’ was having a most corrosive effect on social cohesion and provided a most
undesirable alternative to state provision for excluded groups. Ethnicity was predicted
to emerge as a potential threat for future stability,56 and it was asserted that the system
of multiparty politics would feed into this malaise.57
There were positive developments as new press and media freedoms allowed
peaceful forms of political expression to emerge. These included politically charged
songs which were popular during campaigning particularly amongst the formerly
marginalised youth expressing long held frustrations about their government.58 After
a 32 year absence, decentralisation allowed local voting to take place. Devolution of
power from central government was an important component of the reform agenda
to correct the highly centralised system of government inherited from previous

52 It should be noted that reform of the NEC was quite problematic and that it took two attempts by
international partners to ensure its independence. Irregularities were unearthed after the 2002 and
2004 polls resulting in the sacking of all but two members of staff and a thorough ‘clean up’ for the
2007 elections. See Europa, Election Observation Report: Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections, 14 May 2002 (European Union, 2002); M. G. Sesay and Charlie Hughes, Go Beyond First
Aid: Democracy Assistance and the Challenges of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone (The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005).
53 For example the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)
formed themselves into political parties for the post-conflict elections – RUF Party (RUFP) and the
Peace and Liberation Party (PLP). Neither party survived to contest the 2007 elections
54 The All Peoples’ Congress (APC), the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) and the newly formed Peoples’
Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC)
55 Mats Utas, ‘The Rewards of Political Violence: Remobilising Ex-combatants in Postwar Sierra Leone’,
Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
56 Maya Christensen and Mats Utas, ‘Mercenaries of Democracy: the ‘Politricks’ of Remobilised Com-
batants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 107:429 (2008), pp. 515–39; Lisa
Denney, ‘Sierra Leone: Wave of Violence or Wake Up Call?’, Afriko (18 June 2009), available at:
{http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/18449.html} accessed 27 October 2011.
57 Cubitt, Local and Global Dynamics of Peacebuilding: Postconflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone.
58 Tunde Zack-Williams and Osman Gbla, ‘The Conduct of the Elections: Challenges of Peacebuilding
and Democratisation’, in Tunde Zack-Williams (ed.), The Search for Sustainable Democracy, Develop-
ment and Peace: the Sierra Leone 2007 Elections (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008); Zubairu
Wai, ‘The Role of Youths and the Sierra Leone Diaspora in Democratic Awakening’, in Tunde Zack-
Williams (ed.), The Search for Sustainable Democracy, Development and Peace: the Sierra Leone 2007
Elections.
10 Christine Cubitt

regimes.59 This project was well supported by international partners who hoped to
bring accountability and participation to the ‘local’ and improve the impact of
aid.60 Through decentralisation, space for participation grew considerably but local
political culture remained a challenge. Tensions were recorded between the local
councils and central government as a new political class was being established in
competition with traditional authorities and roles and responsibilities were being
contested.61 Restoration of the chieftaincy system was part of the bid to give owner-
ship to the grass roots but was most contentious because of the problematic relation-
ship between traditional authority and the youth in the history of the war,62 and new
opportunities for chiefs to co-opt local councillors raised concerns that corruption
had been decentralised along with devolution.63 The behaviour of political elites
was showing no signs of reform despite the structural changes going on around them.
At first glance post-war democratisation – in this case based on a multiparty system
of government and an elected president – appeared to have gained real traction but
in the outcome it was a shallow exercise on several counts. Although reform of the
national electoral commission had allowed a series of successful elections to take
place, all other accountability mechanisms – parliament, judiciary, etc. – remained
dysfunctional. Being able to choose your candidate was somewhat irrelevant when
there were no mechanisms to hold them accountable between elections, a situation
that meant one unresponsive government could quite easily be replaced by another.64
The parliament received very little support from either government or donors and
remained weak and dysfunctional, and MPs struggled to understand their function
or their powers. This had serious implications for law making, the approval of state
budgets or the appointment of senior officials and was a situation exacerbated by the
change of government in 2007 as new and inexperienced parliamentarians took over.
As the government changed the whole bureaucracy was replaced from southern
SLPP aligned Mende to northern APC aligned Temne virtually overnight; experienced
staff of the previous regime who had benefitted from international support and training
were replaced with less experienced workers. Ethno-politics wasted precious human

59 Statement delivered by his Excellency the President at Kenema, Bo, Makeni and Pork Loko from
26–30 January 2003 and available from Sierra Leone Web at: {http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/
kabbah-012603.html} accessed 5 February 2009.
60 DfID, Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone (London: Department for International
Development, 2008); EU, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period
2008–2013 [edited by Europa] (Freetown: European Community, 2007); Sonnia-Magba Bu-buakei
Jabbi and Salia Kpaka, Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey: Sierra Leone [edited by Tiri]
(Freetown and London: National Accountability Group, 2007).
61 DfID, Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone; EU, Country Strategy Paper and
National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013; Paul Jackson, ‘Chiefs Money and Politicians:
Rebuilding Local Government in Post-War Sierra Leone’, Public Administration and Development, 25
(2005), pp. 49–58.
62 Paul Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra
Leone’, African Affairs, 106:422 (2007), pp. 95–111; Richard Fanthorpe, ‘On the Limits of the Liberal
Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone’, Africa Affairs, 105:418 (2005),
pp. 27–49.
63 Sonnia-Magba Bu-buakei Jabbi and Salia Kpaka, Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey:
Sierra Leone; J. Hanlon, ‘Is The International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions
for War in Sierra Leone?’, The Round Table: the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 381
(2005).
64 See Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Critical
Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (2004) (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2002).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 11

capital.65 Essential resources were denied parliamentarians; secretarial staff, com-

puterised technology, and well stocked libraries, appropriate buildings or meeting
rooms, and the relevant knowledge and expertise among staff.66 Consequently, as an
institution of representation, parliament was unable to fulfil its primary function – the
monitoring of the executive and representation of the electorate.67 This malaise was
widely recognised, and the international community was urged to support MPs by
building knowledge on simple basics, including theory on the separation of powers,
integrity in office, and the rule of law.68
Parliamentarians themselves had a case to answer. Their commitment to serve the
interests of the electorate and not themselves simply could not be relied upon. ‘MPs
are bribed and given different incentives to act or not.’69 Remuneration was so low
that most could not afford to travel to their own constituencies to meet citizens or
to even ‘exercise a will of their own’.70 Some were hostile to the needs of their con-
stituents as they consolidated the long established practice of self-remuneration
whilst working within the state apparatus.71 A proposed capacity building project
for Parliamentary Committees was cancelled by donors because there was insufficient
support from key stakeholders within parliament itself – across all party lines.72
There were also concerns that political elites were co-opting unemployed youths
as their ‘political thugs’ during election campaigning in 2007; a reality which was
causing concern for the 2012 polls as marginalised youth – many being former com-
batants still aligned to old command structures – exploited opportunities offered to
them by politicians.73
The justice sector was similarly weak in terms of reform and functionality. ‘With
a judiciary operating under two jurisprudential philosophies and exercising power
according to the whims of an overreaching executive, the backbone of a Sierra Leone
democracy appeared too weak to succeed.’74 Justice sector reform was described as
an unmitigated failure,75 the judicial branch being the main impediment for change.
Although the salaries of judges and magistrates were bankrolled by the international
community, the quality of judicial delivery remained poor and vulnerable to ‘cooption’,
and the failure to separate the powers of the executive and judiciary had obvious
consequences. The Anti-Corruption Commission’s pitiful performance was impacted
by the general lack of reform across the justice sector and the close relationship

65 Anonymous interviews, Freetown (May 2009).

66 Interview with the leader of the opposition Peoples’ Movement for Democratic Change, Freetown
(March 2007).
67 Interview with the leader of the opposition All Peoples’ Congress, Freetown (March 2007).
68 All Africa, article by Pel Koroma entitled Conduct Workshop for Parliamentarians, dated 3 January
2007. Available at: {http://allafrica.com/stories/200712031626.html} accessed 27 September 2011.
69 Anonymous interview, Freetown (March 2007).
70 Ibid.
71 Various anonymous interviews, Freetown (March 2007).
72 DfID, Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States (London: Department
for International Development, 2010).
73 Maya Christensen and Mats Utas, ‘Mercenaries of Democracy: the ‘‘Politricks’’ of Remobilised Com-
batants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra Leone’; Mats Utas, ‘The Rewards of Political Violence:
Remobilising Ex-combatants in Postwar Sierra Leone’.
74 A. K. Bangura and S. K. Ganji, ‘Sierra Leone’s Judiciary: Colonial Traditions and Post-Colonial
Legality’, Patriotic Vanguard (2009).
75 S. Gloppen, R. Gargarella and E. Skaar (eds), Democratization and the Judiciary: the Accountability
Function of Courts in New Democracies (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
12 Christine Cubitt

between the office of the attorney general and the executive.76 Funding from the
main donor was withdrawn in 2007 due to failures of the Commission to make any
progress in reducing corruption, improve its capacity or make progress on high level
convictions.77 Over a five year period it was estimated that the Commission was
effective for only six to nine months, and that there was no real understanding of
the investigative doctrine or the desire among higher level staff to improve pro-
fessional conduct.78 After a change of government some progress was recorded in
terms of the efficacy and functionality of the Anti-Corruption Commission, yet levels
of perceived corruption remained high.79
Deficiencies in the judicial system included ‘extortion and bribe-taking by officials;
insufficient numbers of judges, magistrates, and prosecuting attorneys; absenteeism by
court personnel; and inadequate remuneration for judiciary personnel’.80 Extortion
and bribe taking by court officials meant that justice was too expensive for most
ordinary citizens and lack of representation for those accused meant that a fair trial
remained elusive. Failures in judicial reform not only marginalised the general populace
from the protection of the law, it also allowed unscrupulous elites to go about their
business with impunity. In their manifestos for the 2007 elections, no political party
had plans for judicial reform despite the fact that (with the exception of one) none
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations for reform had
been carried out.81 This was a major concern because lack of accountability in the
reconstruction, or real commitment to an efficient justice sector, set a precedent for
the future.
Official documentation on Poverty Reduction Strategies and debt relief between
the government of Sierra Leone and its international partners revealed many references
to the importance of civil society for democratic consolidation, and its central role
as a public oversight mechanism.82 The rhetoric was not matched with practical
support, however, and funding generally came as small accountable grants to well
established and known local actors who were used to working with international
partners; in some cases the same personnel worked for different civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs).83 After the war, the number of CSOs in Sierra Leone reached epidemic
proportions – over 500 by 2007 – as people took advantage of the potential oppor-
tunities civil society could offer.84 CSOs became the new entrepreneurs of post-war
reconstruction often working donors by ‘skewing’ their projects in line with inter-
national agendas on issues which were not necessarily grass roots driven, lacking

76 EU, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013; See also
Sierra Leone Web (26 October 2002), available at: {http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews1002.html}
accessed 28 August 2010.
77 DfID, Annual Review of DfID Support to the Anti-Corruption Commission Phase 2 in Sierra Leone
(London: Department for International Development, 2007).
78 Interview with principal investigating officer of the ACC, Freetown (March 2007).
79 See Human Rights Watch ,Sierra Leone Country Report 2010, available at: {http://www.hrw.org/en/
world-report-2010/sierra-leone} accessed 30 August 2010.
80 Ibid.
81 See The Monitor, official newsletter of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, Vol. 25 (July
2007), available at: {www.slcmp.org} accessed 21 January 2009.
82 DfID, Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone; EU, Country Strategy Paper and National
Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013.
83 Various anonymous interviews, Freetown (March 2007).
84 TIRI, Integrity in Reconstruction: Executive Summary Sierra Leone (London: TIRI, 2007).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 13

local legitimacy.85 Most support went to urban-based organisations, predominantly

English speaking and elite led.86 Far from being watchdogs, it was feared that CSOs
themselves had become part of the state apparatus (or even global apparatus) by
latching on to preferred agendas; some were even recipients of state patrimony.87
What had been constructed after war was rather an ‘illiberal’ version of civil society.
It was the case that Sierra Leone already had a functioning and strong civil society
which had contributed a great deal to the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts
in the country.88 There was no need to reconstruct what was already functioning
well, but the search for wider and more autonomous representations of the broader
citizenry – such as labourers’ or farming cooperatives, transport workers’ or market
women’s associations – where representations could bring meaning to the notion
of participation and inclusivity, was not prioritised in the peacebuilding mission.
Known actors were favoured, and easily recognisable forms of association were
prioritised by interventionists looking for partners on human rights, democracy and
gender, for example. This ‘malleability’ of the civic sphere sidelined any ambitious
attempts – by local or global agents for change – for a programme of societal trans-
formation.89
Human rights were low priority on both local and global agendas. The setting up
of a Human Rights Commission was promised no later than 90 days after the signing
of the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 but was eventually set up in 2006 and opera-
tionalised in 2007.90 Although public awareness on human rights was mainstreamed
in donor programming, there were little funds available in this area.91 Peoples’
experiences living day to day lives were hardly different from those of the pre-war
as poverty remained widespread, and the needs of the vulnerable were ignored. For
women, things had deteriorated; around 67 per cent of women were victims of
domestic violence in 2008, but they experienced persistent barriers to justice.92 The
incidence of rape was judged to be higher in peacetime than it had been during the
war and crimes against women often involved former combatants.93 Most of the
perpetrators got away with their crimes – just 13 out of 896 alleged attackers received
a conviction in 2007.94 The general absence of reparations for war victims reflected
the attitude of political elites and also the attitude of the international community

85 Cubitt, Local and Global Dynamics of Peacebuilding; see also Roberto Belloni, ‘Civil Society in War to
Democracy Transitions’, in Jarstad and Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.
86 Brian Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? (London: Chatham House, 2007); see also Julie
Hearn and Mark Robinson, ‘Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa’, in Peter Burnell,
Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000),
pp. 241–62.
87 ICG, Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform? (International Crisis Group, 2008).
88 For example the Women’s Forum, Civil Society Movement and Council of Churches.
89 See David Chandler, ‘Race, Culture and Civil Society: Peacebuilding Discourse and the Understanding
of Difference’, Security Dialogue, 41 (2010), pp. 369–90.
90 See UNDP, {http://www.sl.undp.org/4_media/Newsroom/humanright_commission.htm} accessed 27
October 2011.
91 Brian Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse?
92 Pamela Dale, ‘Barriers to Justice in Sierra Leone’, in Justice For the Poor (The World Bank, 2007).
93 IRIN, ‘Sierra Leone: Sexual Violence Defies New Law’, IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (30
July 2009), available at: {http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85511} accessed 3 February
2011; IRIN, ‘Sierra Leone: Sex Crimes Continue in Peacetime’, IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis
(20 June 2008), available at: {http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=78853} accessed 3 February
2011.
94 IRIN, ‘Sierra Leone: Sex Crimes Continue in Peacetime’.
14 Christine Cubitt

to the important issue of reconciliation and human rights. The Lomé Accord prom-
ised a Special Fund for War Victims which was made law in Article 7(6) of the TRC
Act 2000. The TRC recommended that the Special Fund be created three months af-
ter the submission of its final report in 2004, but it was not until 2009 that the first
payment of US $246,000 was made by the GoSL, following which the United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund donated US $3 million. These donations left the Fund short by
approximately US $10 million if it was to reach all those eligible for reparations.95
Amputees were ostracised and stigmatised by their communities and this made the
long wait for reparations more distressing, the victims of war being deeply resentful
of former combatants who were getting better treatment than themselves through the
DDR.96 The country remained at, or near, the bottom of the Human Development
Index and over half the populace continue to live in the deepest poverty – on less
than US $1.25 each day.97
In sum, the absence of effective key mechanisms of accountability meant that the
ambition to bring meaningful democracy and human rights to Sierra Leone was futile
even though free and fair elections were remarkably efficient in changing government
and a great success, in terms of procedure, for the country and its partners. Although
space for participation grew considerably, it was stifled by the general weakness of
civilian representations, a dysfunctional judiciary and inutile parliament, and a ‘bad
attitude’ among politicians. What remained was a shallow and unconsolidated
democracy, a form of ‘feckless pluralism’ characterised by a ‘class of political elites . . .
plural and competitive . . . [but] profoundly cut off from the citizenry’.98 This was
exactly the issue that had to be addressed to alleviate local concerns that nothing
would change in terms of local power structures when the peace mission came to
an end. The process was procedural and built around a template not compatible
with local conditions and local practices; the central tenets of democracy were not
embraced by local elites who appeared to struggle with the very concept. This hollowed
out the political sphere as electoral democracy locked the political process in a ‘twilight
zone of tentative commitment, illiberal practices and shallow institutionalism’, and
reform remained ‘tentative, partial and incomplete’.99 The result was ‘just enough
reform’ to secure aid flows for the country’s recovery.100
Given the lack of accountability mechanisms, it is not possible to consolidate
democracy in Sierra Leone and to try to argue otherwise is misleading, yet the failure

95 Daniel Kelly, ‘Haitian Amputees: Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone’, The New England Journal
of Medicine (2010), available at: {http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpv1002391} accessed
7 February 2011; ICTJ, Report and Proposals for the Implementation of Reparations in Sierra Leone
(International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2009), available at: {http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/
SierraLeone/ICTJ_SL_ReparationsRpt_Dec2009.pdf } accessed 7 February 2011.
96 M. Ovadiya and G. Zampaglione, Escaping Stigma and Neglect: People with Disabilities in Sierra
Leone (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009); Mohamed Gibril Sesay and Mohamed Suma, DDR
and Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2009); see
also INFOSUD Human Rights Tribunal, ‘Sierra Leone’s war amputees angrily await reparations’ (23
December 2008), avaiaable at: {http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/Sierra-Leone-s-War-Amputees,3956}
accessed 3 February 2011.
97 UN Human Development Index (2009).
98 Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’.
99 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, John Hopkins University
Press, 1999), p. 20; Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy,
and Market Reform in Africa (London, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 14.
100 Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 15

to consolidate may not have been altogether unintentional as a true functioning

democracy might challenge the liberal internationalism going on outside. The negotia-
tions between global and local elites disconnected the populace from decisions about
their future and marginalised them still further from the levers of power. Macroeco-
nomic reform trumped all other priorities; a non-negotiable condition which relocated
the political economy of peace external to the country and which constrained any
government response to the demands of its citizenry. This reality excluded citizens
from meaningful political engagement as deals for reconstruction were brokered
outside their sphere of influence; it represented a democratic deficit which the country
could ill afford when expectations for change were so high after war.101

Economic reform: the ‘hidden hand’ in peacebuilding

In the aftermath of war, Sierra Leone was almost totally dependent on multilateral
and bilateral institutions and arrangements for the reconstruction of its state apparatus,
humanitarian support, and infrastructure renewal. The challenges facing the country
were enormous,102 and compounded by severely limited human, technical and financial
capacity, and the legacy of economic mismanagement.103 Authorship of the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) cemented the new relationship between the govern-
ment and its partners, and determined the way the new economy was to work.104
Proponents of PRSPs – unlike their predecessors SAPs and the ESAF105 – claim
they represent a ‘locally owned’ and innovative process for determining national
development policy because they involve consultations with local stakeholders, albeit
on predefined templates for reform.106 The consultations are believed to help secure
‘democratic, equitable and sustainable development’,107 which is measured against
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).108 The commitments made by national
governments when authoring the PRSPs, and the implementation of the liberalising
reforms, are essential for post-war recovery because the broad sphere of influence of
the International financial Institutions (IFIs) – especially the International Monetary
Fund – determines the future of developing nations. Without its approval govern-
ments struggle to attract private investment or other resource flows, but these realities
are not widely known by the general populace; ‘civic education’ and ‘sensitisation’
programming on democracy and human rights does not detail the economic nuance

101 Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011).
102 GoSL, The National Recovery Strategy Sierra Leone 2002–2003 (Freetown: GoSL, 2002).
103 TRC, Witness to Truth, vol. 2, C.2: 67.
104 See Rex Brynen, A Very Political Reconstruction: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and
Gaza (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2000).
105 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility – introduced in 1987 by the IMF on similar principles
to SAPs but involving larger budgets and closer monitoring of domestic economic management for
countries which were eligible under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and which
had received concessional loans and grants. It was replaced by the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
in 1999.
106 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (1st edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Diana
Cammack, ‘The Logic of African Neo-patrimonialism: What Role for Donors?’, Development Policy
Review, 25 (2007), pp. 599–614.
107 Joseph Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes.
108 Ibid.; Fantu Cheru and Colin I. Bradford, The Millennium Development Goals: Raising the Resources
to Tackle World Poverty (London: Zed Books, 2005).
16 Christine Cubitt

of liberal interventions and, in this respect, democratisation in reconstruction has

its limitations – the demands of a powerful external constituency trump those of the
local electorate.
What these conditionalities mean in practice is the promotion of liberalising
reform in the economic domain which requires a reduced role for government, an
improved environment for private investment, and the privatisation of public enter-
prises. It involves trade liberalisation and the promotion of exports; the reduction
or elimination of price controls and subsidies; the removal of trade barriers; the con-
traction of government wage bill, good fiscal management, and open and transparent
processes. This recipe for success is grounded in the notion that the reforms will
produce economic growth, that growth will create jobs and reduce poverty, and all
this will help with peacebuilding.109 Central to the deal is that countries achieve
high and sustained growth in order to service their debt.110
The debt burden in Sierra Leone was an obstruction to the country’s recovery,
and commitment to drastic and penetrating economic reform was essential to allow
the country relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country’s Initiative (HIPCI). The
HIPCI legitimises debt relief for the poorest nations and involves the restructuring of
national economies to meet several agreed performance criteria. The process is linked
to authorship of PRSPs which commit governments to pursuing the MDGs whether
or not they have the capacity, wherewithal or resources to do so.111 The three perfor-
mance criteria upon which resource flows (and debt relief ) are linked include sustained
growth in GDP (between 6–7 per cent), low inflation (below 5 per cent) and good levels
of international reserves. In Sierra Leone, growth was to be supported through the
regeneration of rutile mining, the recovery of agricultural production, the expansion
of industry, services and construction, and growth in the fishing and mining sectors.112
New trade policies would reduce state protectionism and be enhanced by liberal
trading and exchange mechanisms, and also privatisation. These commitments were
successful in securing US $21 million in emergency funds during 1999–2001 and con-
sistent flows thereafter. By 2006, the government’s economic performance was such
that it received eligibility for debt relief at the HIPCI completion point. The country
continues to receive good flows from its international partners gaining approval for a
further disbursement from the IMF of US $6.83 m in 2010 and between 2009 and
2011 a commitment from DfID for budget support of over BP £25 m.113
The reforms, supported by technical and financial resources from the international
community, were hugely successful in stabilising and regenerating the Sierra Leone
economy; an impressive feat after 11 years of civil war and an even longer period
of economic mismanagement and decline. The previously dysfunctional revenue
authority was transformed into an efficient mechanism for revenue generation and
109 IMF/IDA, Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Decision Point Document
(International Monetary Fund and International Development Association, 2002).
110 Ibid.
111 See Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, ‘Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peace-
building in Afghanistan’; Goodhand and Sedra question the extent to which MDGs are relevant or
operationalisable in a country like Afghanistan that has never had a service delivery state and is emerg-
ing from a long conflict.
112 GoSL, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Freetown: Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone, 2001).
113 IMF Sierra Leone Country Page, available at: {http://www.imf.org/external/country/SLE/index.htm}
accessed 10 May 2011; DfID Sierra Leone country Page, available at: {http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-
we-work/Africa-West–Central/Sierra-Leone/} accessed 10 May 2011.
 Responsible reconstruction after war 17

export trade increased. Between 2000 and 2007 annual growth averaged around
8 per cent of GDP, although this had slowed somewhat during 2008–9 (5.5 per cent
and 3.2 per cent respectively) due in part to the global recession and the fall of
diamond prices, settling at around 5 per cent in 2010. The vast majority of economic
activity involved informal markets and formal job creation remained elusive;114 over
80 per cent of post-war economic activity took place in informal, family, or farm
businesses.115 This is relevant because informal activities are ‘under the radar’ of
revenue authorities and any potential income through taxation is denied the national
treasury helping maintain the weakness of the state. This also means citizens have
fewer legitimate claims on government than international lenders and donors. Con-
strained flows to the treasury also perpetuate dependency on external support, stunt
capacity building across all sectors and preclude autonomous decision-making free
from external constraints. The second performance criteria, controlling inflation,
proved to be problematic, especially after 2003 when the consumer price index
averaged 12 per cent; this was due to rising prices on the global markets, especially
for fuel and rice, which had a severe impact on the many hundreds of thousands who
remained out of work. By 2010, inflation stood at 18.4 per cent. Progress accumulat-
ing international reserves went well, however, with the country reaching a figure
equivalent to around five months of imports by 2009.116
Lack of transparency and accountability in the management of public finances
continued unabated and plagued the nation’s recovery.117 Legislation was passed
to improve financial management and reduce corruption but actual corruption and
perceptions of corruption remained high.118 Accounting mechanisms in the national
revenue authority were inserted at the very final stages of the revenue process by
which time ‘much had already disappeared’.119 In 2007 the World Bank judged the
country to be one of the ‘worst regulatory environments in the world’ to do business –
ranked 148 out of 183 on its ‘ease of doing business’ index – creating challenges for
private sector development.120 It was expensive to register a business; legislation was
confusing, building permits problematic, and the taxation system discriminated
against non-nationals or small companies. Pervasive corruption increased invisible
costs and corporate risks to potential investors.121 Poor infrastructure meant that
both foreign and local investment was severely constrained, and the weak regulatory
environment and financial sector made matters worse. Private sector investment
in agriculture was limited by traditional land laws, administered under an archaic
system controlled by local chiefs and which precluded private investment in land or
property.122 Ordinary people failed to benefit fully from development in rural areas,

114 World Bank, AFDB/IDA/IFC Joint Country Assistance Strategy 2009–2012 (African Development
Bank, 2010).
115 GoSL, Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire Survey: (CWIQ 2007) (Freetown: Statistics Sierra Leone,
2007).
116 All data from IMF country statistics. Available at: {www.imf.org}.
117 World Bank, AFDB/IDA/IFC Joint Country Assistance Strategy 2009–2012.
118 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2009).
119 ICG, ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States’, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 87 (Dakar
and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004).
120 World Bank Doing Business Data Sets, available at: {http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/}
accessed 31 August 2010.
121 DDI, Standards and Guidelines for Sierra Leone’s Artisanal Diamond Mining Sector (Diamond Develop-
ment Initiative International, 2008).
122 Ibid.
18 Christine Cubitt

and many communities – especially those in mining areas – continued to live in the
deepest of poverty amidst debilitating conditions.123
By 2010, growing confidence in the banking sector and global market changes
attracted new private investment to the country but the nature of the investment
remained a challenge for recovery because it continued to expose local people to
future uncertainties on the global markets, and because it tapped into historic
exploitative power relations which remained embedded in the countryside.124
The project for privatisation was also disappointing. The government promised
to target state-owned enterprises with a view to enhancing the efficiency of government
operations and increasing revenues,125 but retained its ‘critical mass’ of inefficient and
unaccountable parastatals with huge debts.126 The assumption that private investment
could be drawn into failing national authorities was rather missing the point of local
conditions and the challenges the country faced for development. Privatising the
National Power Authority, for example, would involve investing ‘millions of dollars
to get the infrastructure right. . .’. It was not just a question of producing power for
someone to buy. Large amounts of wastage along the collection and distribution
lines would produce expensive private power which local people simply could not
afford.127 Added to this, international companies cited corruption in all branches of
government as an obstacle to investment in state owned enterprises.
Economic growth was unrelated to significant job creation so ‘illiberal’ or artificial
methods became the post-conflict norm. Job creation initiatives remain generally
funded by development agencies – the generation of 1,200 jobs or training oppor-
tunities through a World Food Programme ‘food for work’ agreement,128 or the
World Bank injection of a US $4 million grant into the Sierra Leone economy creat-
ing around 16,000 temporary employment opportunities through 360 cash-for-work
projects which was aimed at avoiding riots during the global food crisis of 2008.129
Even the few jobs that were created in the private sector – the mining of bauxite
and rutile for example – were financed by a @25 million grant from the EU.130 This
was not a ‘liberal peace’ or even a ‘post-liberal peace’ because the local environment

123 Paul Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra
Leone’; Philippe Le Billon, Resources for Peace? Managing Revenues from Extractive Industries in Post-
Conflict Environments, ed. Political Economy Research Institute (Centre on International Cooperation,
2008); Roy Maconachie and Tony Binns, ‘Farming Miners or Mining Farmers? Diamond Mining and
Rural Development in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone’, Journal of Rural Studies, 23 (2007), pp. 367–80.
124 The most significant recent investment is the US $400 million agri-business deal to produce bio-fuels
from sugarcane. There is currently a high demand for this commodity on the global markets. The
government claims this project will create 4,000 new jobs through direct employment, contracting and
out-grower agreements. The deal involves leasing 10,000 hectares of farmland over a period of 50 years
in the underdeveloped north of the country. The final product – ethanol – will be for export to Europe
and also for ‘local consumption’; see also Christine Cubitt, ‘Employment in Sierra Leone: What
Happened to Post-Conflict Job Creation?’, African Security Review, 20:1 (2011); and Richard Fanthorpe
and Roy Maconachie, ‘Beyond the ‘‘Crisis of Youth’’? Mining, Farming and Civil Society in Post-War
Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 109 (2010), pp. 252–72.
125 GoSL, Letter of Intent (IMF, 2006).
126 Sonnia-Magba Bi-Buakei Jabbi and Salia Kpaka, Report of the Need Assessment Survey on Public
Finance and Budget Transparency in Sierra Leone.
127 Interview with former Finance Minister, Mr John Benjamin (11 December 2008).
128 UNDP, Peacebuilding Fund Supported Projects: Summary of Progress (Freetown: United Nations
Development Programme, 2008).
129 Robert Zoellick, The World Bank is Committed to Helping Africa out of the Economic Crisis (World
Bank, 2010).
130 IMF, Sierra Leone: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Annual Progress Report (Washington, 2007).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 19

was simply not suitable or ready for liberalising reform and the patchy implementa-
tion of reforms – liberal or otherwise – were failing the local populace. So who was
the reconstruction for?
In terms of international objectives the statebuilding project in Sierra Leone was
most successful. Stabilisation of the national economy, growth in exports, and improved
revenue flows were stated objectives which were met. These successes could have
been beneficial for the populace but the proclaimed benefits of such reform – job
creation, community development, and a reduction in poverty – failed to materialise
in any significant way. The reforms were successful enough to persuade the IFIs
to release essential resource flows because debt repayments were assured but, in the
outcome, there was little evidence to show that flows from the IFIs compensated
ordinary citizens for the little direct benefit they were enjoying from their country’s
economic recovery. Democratic elections and institutional reform were also key
objectives, as was integration of the Sierra Leone economy into the international
system and these ambitions were indeed realised. The emphasis in the reconstruction
appeared to be on the ability of the state to fulfil its key international responsibilities
first and its responsibilities to the local citizenry second. It is conceivable that this
was the primary expectation from reconstruction and perhaps this is the point of
international missions. If so, they proved successful for international statebuilders
but failed the local populace dramatically.

Analysing liberal statebuilding and its relevance for local peace

The evidence from Sierra Leone reveals that ‘peacebuilding as statebuilding’ was
centred on securitisation, legitimising government, and restructuring the country’s
economy to improve its ability to service debt and deliver the MDGs whose
objectives – most creditable in their aims – were not necessarily the most pressing
concern for longer term peacebuilding locally. The most pressing concern was build-
ing a new relationship between state and citizen, between politicians and the electorate,
built on trust and mutual respect. The nature of political and economic reform con-
trived to keep the populace out, however, as democracy failed to consolidate and
macroeconomic deals were brokered from outside.
The complicated, demanding, and intrusive nature of interventions put huge
strain on a weak government with minimal capacity to deliver anything at all. The
special circumstances and vulnerabilities of post-conflict Sierra Leone meant that
any genuine liberalising reform was patchy and unlikely to gain real traction in terms
of stated aims of liberal peacebuilders – jobs and a reduction in poverty – let alone
priorities of the local populace: a stake in government, responsive leadership, protec-
tion of rights, and an equitable share of the nation’s resources. Assuming that liberal
peacebuilding is a tangible concept – and the evidence here suggests that it is not –
both external and local policymakers appeared uncommitted to making it work, and
local conditions were hostile both in terms of prevailing political culture and lack
of government capacity, and also in terms of local infrastructure and critically weak
domestic markets.
Trying to conflate local democracy with interventionist politics is, in fact, contra-
dictory, and dangerous when the expectations of the populace are artificially raised.
Interventionist politics play into the hands of local elites because having to be
accountable to an external constituency rather lets them off the hook locally, but
20 Christine Cubitt

this does not solve the challenge of giving people a stake in government. Local
citizens do not feature in the global politics going on around them and local elites
seem to benefit most whether or not they are committed to good governance. This
lack of real ownership is a challenge facing peaceful recovery because people expect
results and they expect democracy to work. External intervention had a major
impact on the post-war political process, yet local politics remain deeply problematic,
citizens locked out of the process and resentful at persistent abuse of power by govern-
ing elite. A legitimate body politic requires more than the coercive power of external
benefactors; it requires proper mechanisms to address the demands of the society
it serves.131 Free, fair, and peaceful elections allow people some choice and are a
welcome departure from politics of the past when citizens were mere pawns in elite
contests for state resources. But in the outcome, citizens remain pawns.
What is important for external actors in their statebuilding endeavours, but
which is often ‘hidden’ from the electorate, is government commitment to restructure
the national economy for export-led growth, yet exporting the country’s wealth does
not fit well with ambitions to reenergise local markets, produce sustainable jobs for
the populace and share the benefits of economic recovery locally. Export orientation
earns dollars to repay loans. More inward looking processes do not. This is the
priority in statebuilding missions yet the framework for support – codified in the
PRSPs and complementary HIPCI – puts in place historically problematic economic
structures which hijack the local political economy of development, of peace and of
security.132 Change has not come in the political economy of the everyday.133 The
electorate is once again locked out and post-war institutional design remains wedded
to failed models from the past.134
Why would external statebuilders wish to alter institutions or challenge a govern-
ment which has put its economic house in order and is servicing its debt? Why should
local priorities for peace influence structures of governance when key international
objectives are being met? This is where the power resides, and any redirection of
precious state resources in response to local demands may just threaten the capacity
of government to sustain its debt repayments. So is it possible to persuade interven-
tionists that structural change might serve their own interests as well as those of the
local populace; that it might be in everyone’s interests to remove some of the impedi-
ments for locals to achieve their own objectives?135
The answer may lie in one of the key objectives of statebuilding beyond securiti-
sation and debt repayment – the delivery of development. Achieving the MDGs and
reducing poverty is central in policy circles because it is believed that development
remains closely linked to the security of not only local communities but also Western
ways of life, and the international order itself.136 The widening of security threats to
131 David Chandler, ‘Back to the Future? The Limits of neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy’,
Review of International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 475–94.
132 Cubitt, ‘Employment in Sierra Leone: What Happened to Post-Conflict Job Creation?’
133 See Roberts, ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding, liberal irrelevance and the locus of legitimacy’.
134 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.
135 Roberts, ‘Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy’, p. 422.
136 Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples; DfID,
Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: a Strategy for Security and Development (London: Depart-
ment for International Development, 2005); Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World: Euro-
pean Security Strategy (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2003); DAC, DAC Guidelines on
Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1997).
 Responsible reconstruction after war 21

include those of human development is viewed as unproblematic in the policy literature

and indeed quite progressive in that it reflects important international advances in
humanitarianism after the Cold War. Development has thus become a ‘technology
of security’,137 and the failure to achieve the MDGs in weak states like Sierra Leone
might help focus minds on alternative frameworks for delivery.
It is at this point that we see the scope for reconceptualising reconstruction for
peace, and also for development, to address local challenges. The evidence presented
here suggests that the global preoccupation with development as a central com-
ponent of counterinsurgency, and the fixation on ‘liberal peacebuilding’, is somewhat
delusory and misses the point. The notion that security and development are natural
partners is therefore challenged in this context because it is not simply development
that Sierra Leone needs for continued stability, it is a sense of a unified nation,
shared entitlement, and good leadership. Given these priorities are somewhat side-
lined in statebuilding activities, but the need for development as a technology of
security is not, why impose such an ineffective model in the reconstruction? The
country is unlikely to achieve any of the MDGs. Is it conceivable that a different
model for reconstruction may have the potential to address both development and
peacebuilding challenges? Could a different model which reshapes the political space
achieve better development outcomes and, at the same time, address the historic
political fractures which remain the central challenge for durable peace in the country
today?
Once state structures are in place changes are costly and complex and risk desta-
bilising the security environment. A faulty model is difficult to correct even if there
is a will to do so. Which is perhaps why Paris finds little radical or transformative
argument in the general critique of liberal peacebuilding. This reality emphasises the
point of getting the structures right from the start, and the responsibility of interven-
tionists to think more creatively. It is also the responsibility of critics and proponents
to move away from their obsession with the theoretical and philosophical labelling of
events; liberal, illiberal, social, developmental and so on, and focus on what works –
most probably a messy and unidentifiable fusion of inter-related processes and mutually
re-enforcing structures. The perverse preoccupation with identifying a particular
trend is always contestable because local realities never precisely fit the models con-
structed by Western social science.138
In the case of Sierra Leone, the point is to think more creatively: to identify a
more ‘popular peace’ and new political spaces which can support local needs and
local ambitions as well as those of international partners.139 This might include
more deliberative or discursive forms of democracy or different structures of authority
nuanced to local norms, values and expectations. Power and control might be
exercised more independently away from the centre within a framework which puts
justice, representation, and accountability as non-negotiable priorities for the populace.
Donors might consult end users on the realities of aid outcomes before rewarding

137 Gary King and Christopher J. Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly, 116
(2001), pp. 585–610; Andre Mack, The Human Security Report Project: Background Paper, ed. Human
Security Centre (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2002); CHS, Human Security Now (New
York: Commission for Human Security, 2003); HSC, The Human Security Report 2005; War and Peace
in the 21st Century edited by Human Security Centre (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005).
138 Patrick Chabal, Africa: the Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London: Zed; Pietermaritzburg, 2009).
139 See Roberts, ‘Beyond the Metropolis? Popular Peace and Postconflict Peacebuilding’.
22 Christine Cubitt

elites with more resources, thus locating power at the ‘everyday’. Change might
involve removing ‘tunnel vision’ on economic restructuring so that local markets –
not global markets – benefit first from recovery enabling increased grass roots
engagement with the benefits of export, trade within the region, and trade in local
markets. This would produce local jobs based on local demand and local entrepre-
neurship, not global jobs based on unreliable global trends. Targeted investment in
infrastructure, in public and private enterprises, using national wealth for national
projects (not the repayment of debt) in a committed and unambiguous way would
create decent work and strengthen the local economy. Consequential job creation
would improve human development, put people central in the reconstruction; give
rewarding opportunities and sense of worth, and a genuine stake in government.

Conclusion
Evidence from Sierra Leone does suggest that liberal institutionalism is irrelevant
for the majority populace. The current fixation with analysing reconstruction peace
missions in terms of ‘liberal’ or not is distracting us from the realities of policy imple-
mentation. We need to understand the motives behind liberal interventions and their
objectives before we can construct something more relevant for the locale by cherry
picking the processes that work and ignoring their theoretical connotations. This
might mean considering different models of democracy and more locally focused
models for economic restructuring. The challenge is to identify the structures that
work better, and to identify local actors more dedicated to change.
Fragile and vulnerable post-war societies present unique opportunities for inter-
national partners to think creatively about the kind of local structures that can
address local needs while at the same time protecting the security interests of the
global system of states, but the current orthodoxy presents too narrow an approach
which must always fail in this task. It is the responsibility of international partners to
embrace opportunities with transformative potential locally and move away from
prescriptive solutions which dictate disappointing outcomes in the field. Through
a study of some of the challenges facing Sierra Leone in its recovery, and the
challenges of its partners in building a stable state, this article helps to deepen our
understandings of so-called peacebuilding missions. The fragmented reforms achieved
so far have not brought about delivery of the most essential prerequisites for longer-
lasting peace which give the general populace real investment in their government.
No meaningful change has come for the governed; and no breakthrough in institu-
tional design which might create the difference that is needed. Local actors and local
conditions play their part in resisting transformation, but global agents also appear
resistant – confining their commitment to ‘just enough’ ‘liberal peace’. It is at this
point we must remind ourselves that ‘the sole agenda around which everyone should
unite in post-conflict situations can only be one that serves the interests of the people
we pretend to be there to help, and them alone’,140 and that the epistemology of
peace cannot reside wholly in Western scholarship or policy circles.141

140 Lakhdar Brahimi, State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries (Vienna, Austria: United Nations,
2007), p. 3.
141 Kristoffer Liden, Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Introduction: Beyond Northern Episte-
mologies of Peace: Liberal Peacebuilding Reconstructed’, International Peacekeeping, 16:5 (2009),
pp. 587–98.