religions
Article
The Methodological Implications of the Buddhist Model of
Study, Reflection, and Cultivation
Philippe Turenne 1,2
Citation: Turenne, Philippe. 2022.
The Methodological Implications of
the Buddhist Model of Study,
Reflection, and Cultivation. Religions
13: 1029. https://doi.org/10.3390/
rel13111029
Academic Editor: Marc-Henri
Deroche
Received: 9 May 2022
Accepted: 13 October 2022
Published: 27 October 2022
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Religions 2022, 13, 1029. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111029
1 Khyentse Vision Project, Kathmandu University, Dhulikhel 45200, Nepal; philippe.turenne@ryi.org
2 Centre for Buddhist Studies, Rangjung Yeshe Institute, Kathmandu 44600, Nepal
Abstract: This paper discusses aspects of the Buddhist concept of threefold wisdom and their
implications on methodology for Buddhist studies, especially the academic study of Buddhist
philosophy. The first part of the paper discusses aspects of threefold wisdom as presented in
Indian and Tibetan Buddhist sources, arguing that threefold wisdom is not simply a presentation of
mental cultivation and philosophical practice, but that it also proposes what can be called a practical
hermeneutic, that is, a method to maximize a reader’s understanding of Buddhist scriptures and
their full implication. Second, we consider how certain methods of studying Buddhist thought,
especially those that deal with philosophical engagement with Buddhist thought, should be adapted
to include the dimension of Buddhist philosophy that is exemplified by threefold wisdom. More
particularly, Buddhist philosophy’s perspective on what a successful reading method consists of,
which is exemplified by the practical hermeneutic described by threefold wisdom, should be included
as part of what scholars pay attention to when studying Buddhist philosophy. Thus, only will the
conditions for an open dialogue between Buddhism and other philosophical traditions be sufficiently
present for such a dialogue to take place in a fruitful way.
Keywords: Buddhist philosophy; Buddhist doctrine; Buddhist meditation
1. Introduction
While historical studies of Buddhist philosophy are still pursued, we see on the other
hand a continued popularity for philosophical methods that target engagement with Bud-
dhist ideas as the main goal of the study of Buddhist philosophy, whether for the purpose
of keeping Buddhist philosophical ideas alive by bringing them in conversation with
contemporary philosophy,1 facilitating conversation or dialogue between philosophical
traditions,2 or to reconstruct a reading of classical Buddhist authors in a charitable and
coherent manner. For example, see Westerhoff (2009, p. 8). Unfortunately, we have to admit
that the divide between historical and interpretative methods noted by Cabezón (1995,
pp. 231–68). still exists in Buddhist studies. While philosophers deepen their analysis of
specific philosophical issues, our overall understanding of Buddhist intellectual traditions
is still partial and could be improved not only by narrowing down on specific topics, but
also by deepening our knowledge of Buddhist intellectual cultures in general. In addition
to learning the specifics of various schools and thinkers of Buddhist philosophy, we could
learn more about topics such as the relation between Buddhism and the various fields of
knowledge,3 various models of the place of logic and rationality on the Buddhist path
and in Buddhist culture more generally, the relation between specific Buddhist views and
the cultural background in which they appeared, and the specific features of Buddhist
intellectual cultures from which specific philosophical traditions emerge.4 As some of the
heretofore ignored features of Buddhist intellectual cultures come to our knowledge, it
becomes necessary to draw the implications of newly acquired facts about the traditions
we are studying on the methods we use to study them, for our methods should be open to
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Religions 2022, 13, 1029 2 of 10

be evaluated and redefined when they are no longer able to account for known facts about
what they study.
This publication does not focus on a particular school or concept of Buddhist phi-
losophy, but rather on a widely shared model of study and practice attested in various
forms of Buddhism, the model of wisdom defined as three-stage progression from study to
reflection and finally cultivation. Scholars of Buddhist doctrine (whether or not they use the
expression “Buddhist philosophy”) often mention the fact that Buddhist philosophy, since it
ultimately targets liberation from saṁsāra, has soteriological dimensions; what exactly that
entails for the way they read the same sources, though, is often left unsaid and unanalyzed.
In this paper I will argue that the model of threefold wisdom that is the topic of this special
issue has more to tell us than the theoretical recognition of liberation as the final goal of
philosophical practice: it offers a model for what we could call a practical hermeneutic, that
is, a model to be applied to make the most of what can be communicated across generations
interpreting the same Buddhist teachings. Because the threefold wisdom model provides
a detailed hermeneutic model, a cross-cultural or reconstructive model should consider
engagement with that model as part of the conditions for a fruitful conversation between
contemporary philosophy and Buddhism to take place.
After offering a summary of the threefold wisdom model and showing how it is a
model not only for spiritual cultivation, but for a practical hermeneutic, we will survey
individual features of study, reflection, and cultivation that, I argue, are methodologically
relevant, and should be part of any treatment of Buddhist thought presented as a cross-
cultural conversation or dialogue. A real dialogue with Buddhist intellectual culture
requires scholars to appreciate the specificities of a Buddhist model of reading and its
relation to the practice of mental cultivation on the path to liberation.

2. The Threefold Wisdom Model as a Practical Hermeneutic

In this section we will consider classical descriptions of the three-wisdom model that
help define a model for the use of textual study as part of the Buddhist path of spiritual
cultivation. We will see that the threefold wisdom can be seen as a method explaining
how to use study and reading as part of Buddhist spiritual cultivation. The method de-
scribed is based on what we can call a practical hermeneutic, that is, a reflection on how
the transmission of understanding can happen between a student and written or oral text,
often assumed to be Buddhist scripture, that is, for the authors we are considering here,
either words that are considered as the words of the Buddha or authoritative commen-
taries thereon. The classical locus for, and probably one of the earliest definitions of the
threefold wisdom model is found in chapter 6 of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and its
auto-commentary.5 First, let us note that, for Vasubandhu, the threefold wisdom is part
of a larger model of the path towards liberation. Cultivation (bhāvanā) and concentration
(samādhi) are only possible after prerequisites have been established, generally following the
Buddhist model of progression from morality (śı̄la) to concentration (samādhi) and wisdom
(prajnā). In that regard, first, it is worthwhile noting the Kośa’s mention that “[Cultivation]
is produced in the persons who are equipped with the two withdrawals”6 ; that is, the
study of scripture is recommended for those who have already achieved a certain level of
contentment and have few desires. In other words, one’s general emotional and cognitive
orientation towards the world is already established as a relevant factor in being able to
apply the threefold wisdom model to the understanding of scripture.
In chapter 6, verse 5 of his Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu makes it clear that the stages
of threefold wisdom function as a progression. He describes the process as, “Settled in
one’s conduct, equipped with [listening to] the teachings [śruta] and reflection [cintā], one
will be capable of devoting oneself to cultivation [bhāvanā] (Ibid 1893)”. It is therefore fair
to say that, for him, cultivation is the result and goal of study7 and reflection. Both classical
and modern sources typically refer to the third part of the threefold wisdom model as
bhāvanāmayı̄prajñā. Let us note, though, that the expression translated here as “cultivation”
is glossed by Vasubandhu as “samādhibhāvanā”, i.e., the cultivation of samādhi: “Having
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 3 of 10

reflected, they devote themselves to the cultivation of concentration (samādhibhāvanā) (Ibid

1893).”. In chapter 4 of his auto-commentary, Vasubandhu also explains the phrase “The
wholesome which is concentrated or the wholesome which is concentration in its intrinsic
nature is bhāvanā . . . ” as “That which is concentration (samādhi) in its intrinsic nature and
that which coexists with what is concentration in its intrinsic nature (Ibid 2012).”
Another highly relevant source on the threefold model, especially with regard to the
Tibetan Buddhist tradition, is Kamalaśı̄la’s first Bhāvanākrama. Here, Kamalaśı̄la adds to
the prerequisites for cultivation the development of great compassion. He then brings
the distinction between the provisional and definitive meanings of scripture (neyārtha and
nı̄tārtha) as the proper subject of the wisdom of reflection, which results into the disappear-
ance of doubt and, following that, “perfect wisdom” (samyagjñāna). The progression of the
threefold wisdom is described by Kamalaśı̄la as follows:
There, first of all, the wisdom of hearing should be generated. For through it one enters
into the meaning of the scriptures. Thereafter one penetrates their provisional and definitive
meanings by the wisdom of thinking. After that, having ascertained the meaning that is
real (bhūtam artham, i.e., non-origination, emptiness) by means of that (wisdom of thinking),
one should cultivate it, not that which is unreal (abhūtam, i.e., neyārtha). Otherwise, on
account of meditating upon the false and the (consequent) non-disappearance of doubt,
there could be no production of perfect knowledge. Additionally, then meditation would
be pointless, just like that of the non-Buddhists (Translation in Adam 2002, p. 128).
Summarizing the application of the threefold wisdom model to Mahāyāna doctrine,
he adds,
Therefore, when the wisdom consisting in thinking has investigated by way
of both logic and scriptures, the very reality which is the natural condition of
things should be cultivated. Additionally, the natural condition of things is
ascertained, on the basis of scripture and reasoning, to be in the ultimate sense
only non-origination. (Adam 2002, p. 128)
As will be made clear below, it is important to note that the wisdom of reflection uses
both scripture (āgama) and reason (yukti). Thus, scripture is important not only as the object
of the wisdom of study, but of the wisdom of reflection as well. Regarding the wisdom of
cultivation, Kamalaśı̄la says, “Thus having ascertained the real meaning by means of the
wisdom of thinking, one should give rise to the wisdom of meditation in order to directly
perceive it (Adam 2002, p. 134).” Bhāvanā, thus, leads into a clearer perception of reality,
not mediated by conceptions (the Sanskrit phrase used is “pratyaks.ı̄karan.āya”). The final
result of the process is the removal of both afflictive and cognitive obscurations, the latter’s
root described as mistaken notions such as existence:
. . . on the basis of the removal of all conceptualizations of existence and so forth
by this practice of yoga, there is the removal of the mistaken transposition of all
existence, which is the nature of ignorance and the root of the afflictive obscura-
tions. Thus, on account of being cut off at the root the afflictive obscuration is
completely removed. (Adam 2002, pp. 145–46)
Kamalaśı̄la’s treatment of the threefold wisdom model is interesting in many ways, for
it details his understanding of the relation between conceptual and non-conceptual methods
of training, supplementing his analogy of two sticks which, when rubbed against each other,
end up burned (Adam 2002, p. 207), with more details about removing doubt and hence
wrong conceptualizations as the root of removing cognitive and afflictive obscurations.
In brief, classical presentations of the threefold wisdom model by Vasubandhu and
Kamalaśı̄la stress the importance of concentration for cultivation, the importance of scrip-
ture as well as logic as part of reflection, and the fact that the direct experience of reality
that happens during cultivation (and therefore concentration) is where study and reflection
are supposed to lead.
The model thus described can be understood as what I would call a practical hermeneu-
tic. We do not find, in these sources, an explicit abstract discussion of the question of
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 4 of 10

prejudice, bias, and how the reader’s predisposition determines understanding as much
as the author’s words. What we do find, though, is the description of a method to ensure
that the reader is able to produce the best possible understanding of scripture, leading
to the right result. Study and reflection help one get close to what a scriptural statement
means, but the full circle of interpretation is only complete when a direct experience of
what scripture conveys is produced in the context of cultivation, that is, as the object of
concentration (samādhi). The hermeneutical model described does not offer much of a
theoretical and critical reflection on interpretation in general, but a clear method to ensure
that genuine understanding is established with confidence. If the reader does not have the
prerequisites, does not base their reflection and concentration on adequate scriptural state-
ments, or misunderstands them with regard to their reality and their status as provisional
or definitive, then understanding is not complete, and the reader has failed to receive the
full message intended to be conveyed. If wisdom is to penetrate reality, all these elements
are required. Without the direct cultivation of reality as conveyed in scripture, the act of
interpretation is not complete.
In the next section we will discuss the methodological implications of these points
for scholars who wish either to obtain a full picture of the place of intellectual practices in
Buddhist cultivation or to establish a solid basis for dialogue on the views discussed by
Buddhist philosophy.

3. The Methodological Implications of Threefold Wisdom

Threefold wisdom can thus be understood as the description of the process by which
one ensures that the best possible understanding of Buddhist scripture is achieved. It
seems to include an awareness of the fact that rational analysis and concordance with
scripture can convince one of the validity and truth of a statement, but a full understanding
of the same statement is not achieved until one has cultivated it as a lived reality, that is,
after having applied a reading method and connecting it with cultivation exercises. The
simple fact that the Buddhist tradition has a quite clearly defined model of how we can and
should learn from scripture is significant for the interpretive models we use in the academic
study of Buddhism, especially if the method privileged to study Buddhist thought is that
of philosophical engagement through conversation or dialogue, an awareness of how
differently Buddhists understand the process of interpretation to work will be necessary
for a fruitful conversation to take place. This section highlights specific elements of that
model and their implications on method.
(a). Separating listening and reflection
Little detail is given by Vasubandhu and Kamalaśı̄la on the wisdom of study itself
other than to say that it is the basis for reflection and then cultivation. To help us distinguish
between the Buddhist model and the contemporary philosophical approach8 with which it
is often brought in dialogue, it is worthwhile noting that the fact that study and reflection
are described as separate steps is itself significant for a comparative methodology of
Buddhist and contemporary models of textual interpretation.
The separation of study and reflection is evidence that, according to the Buddhist
model described above, it would be a mistake to engage in critical reflection before a
proper study of a text has been conducted. The objective of critical reflection is the properly
established meaning of the text we are studying; the process of identifying that is distinct
from the evaluation of its truth through scripture and logic.
Contemporary academic conversations tend to see these two parts of the process
of interpretation as inconsistent methods. One can either engage (philosophically or
theoretically) with the ideas in a reinterpretation of the text based on current context9 or set
aside one’s own evaluation of the same ideas by attempting to get as close as possible to the
original circumstances of the creation of the same text. While proponents of philosophical
engagement reject the purely historical method as based on the illusion of objectivity,
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 5 of 10

historians criticize proponents of a philosophical reading as having no way to show that

they are doing anything but projecting their own ideas on to the material.
The Buddhist model of the threefold wisdom is different in several ways. First, it goes
beyond the apparent dichotomy between an objective reading free from evaluation and
an engagement based primarily on evaluation. Both these approaches are required and
properly applied, that is, in succession, they lead to the full understanding that is lived in
cultivation. The approach based on critical, philosophical engagement is thus, from the
Buddhist perspective, incomplete and inadequate not only because it does not include
cultivation, but because it fails to take the wisdom that comes from study seriously. Being
able to suspend judgment and evaluation is a prerequisite to a proper study of scriptural
statements.
Proponents of philosophical engagement as the only way to engage with Buddhist
texts should therefore be aware that the view according to which understanding proceeds
through evaluation of the validity of ideas goes against the gradual process described
in Buddhist sources. They should also be happy to hear that an approach that suspends
judgment altogether is, from the Buddhist point of view, also incomplete: it would amount
to using only the wisdom that comes from study, and not continuing on to the other
two stages of interpretation. The Buddhist model thus offers the double benefit of, on
the one hand, making our best effort at understanding a text on its own terms while, on
the other, retaining the possibility of engaging with the ideas conveyed using available
epistemological tools to establish their validity. Any model of reading Buddhist scriptures
that limits itself to either one of these two approaches is thus, from the point of view of
threefold wisdom, incomplete.
Finally, separating the wisdom of study from that of reflection paints a reader that lets,
at least provisionally, the text establish its own interpretive environment. Through explicit
statements of the purpose of a text, who it is composed for, and what attitude one should
take in reading it, it advocates a skill in study that consists essentially in orienting one’s
disposition, as a reader, with the text. That does not imply that the process ends there and
that there is no evaluation going on: indeed, a rigorous evaluation of statements found in
scripture is conducted using criteria such as logical and scriptural consistency. Nor does it
open one to the faults of assuming the possibility of objectivity: an objective reading that
sets aside one’s criteria for truth and validity is itself only provisional and is a crucial yet
only partial feature of the ideal picture of the Buddhist art of reading.
Thus, the Buddhist threefold wisdom provides an interesting and unique take on
the question of interpretation and the role of philosophical evaluation and engagement,
seemingly avoiding a false dichotomy between descriptive and philosophically engaged
methods. Engaging philosophically with its textual tradition while skipping the phase of
listening is likely to undermine the establishment of ideal conditions for a fruitful dialogue
to take place.
(b). The importance of scripture for the wisdom of reflection
The wisdom of reflection gives us the most obvious common point between con-
temporary philosophical and Buddhist approaches to reading Buddhist texts, especially
when approached more specifically through emphasizing reflection using reason. Logical
coherence is an obvious point of contact between Buddhism and contemporary academic
and philosophical approaches, hence probably why most philosophical studies of Buddhist
thought highly emphasize the polemical dimensions of doctrinal writing. Logical argu-
ments, insofar as they tend to be readily isolated from specific contexts, lend themselves to
generate confidence that we understand what they are about.
Just what the role of reflection using scripture is in the process of developing threefold
wisdom, though, has not been fully appreciated by studies of Buddhist philosophy. How
does reflection using scripture differ from the wisdom of study? How exactly does one
apply scripture as a way to reflect on the validity and the interpretive status (i.e., as
provisional or definitive) of statements? While I think this issue requires further research,
basing ourselves on the example of Kamalaśı̄la, the process seems to describe a cross-
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 6 of 10

referencing with other established scriptural statements. Kamalaśı̄la stresses, for example,
that contradictions should not be found within scriptural statements (Adam 2002, p. 125);
seemingly incompatible statements should be reconciled by being interpreted using the
distinction between provisional and definitive statements. While rational analysis is used
to critically evaluate statements and views, scripture is kept in play to complement logic.
The text one is interpreting is judged not only against logic, but also against other scriptures.
The rationality used as part of the wisdom of reflection is synthetic as well as critical.
One possible consequence of this point for methodology is to stress efforts at checking
one’s philosophical readings against other texts: other scriptures, possibly other works
stemming from a same tradition. More importantly, it shows the importance given to
scripture in the process of interpretation, not only as the basis for study, but as part of the
process of reflection.
A large part of philosophical readings of Buddhist sources deals with rational elements,
completely ignoring aspects of Buddhist thought related to scriptural interpretation. This
can only lead to an extremely partial understanding of the discussions taking place in
Buddhist philosophical literature. Some of the debates on emptiness, for example, can
be explained as having to do with the principles of interpretation much more than with
purely logical arguments.10 More attention to the scriptural, exegetical and hermeneutical
discussions that surround Buddhist doctrinal conversations could certainly improve the
mutual understanding of the various methods that face each other in cross-cultural readings
of Buddhist sources.
Moreover, Vasubandhu and Kamalaśı̄la both convey an important point: reflection
on the validity of ideas is not the end of the process of interpretation. It is an important
yet only preliminary stage of the process of making the meaning of what one studies inte-
grated in one’s life by removing doubt about its meaning and validity.11 Any interpretive
approach that deliberately ignores this fact will limit the space for dialogue, that is, the
range of questions that are considered relevant to the discussion, so as to make a vast
portion of Buddhist discussions of texts and their application in mental cultivation fall
outside the space set for dialogue. Setting aside from the start issues of scripture and
scriptural interpretation, unsurprisingly, can feel alienating to live conversation partners
and, correspondingly, lead to selective and highly directed readings of the literature. A
more open and impartial attitude towards the works we study is impeded by the decision
not to pay attention to the scriptural dimensions of these discussions.
(c). Methodological implications of cultivation
The importance given to cultivation as part of the practice of reading scripture is often
referred to by scholars, but its implications, especially with regard to method, have not
been fully fleshed out. Discussions of reading, exegesis, and hermeneutics are usually
based on Western notions of hermeneutics, assuming that the debates about hermeneu-
tics we are familiar with exhaust the possibilities of what thinking about interpretation
entails, and that Buddhist intellectual culture does not have its own understanding of how
interpretation works and should be done. As a result, the way we engage with Buddhist
text—philosophically or otherwise—is determined by our understanding of hermeneu-
tics, making no effort to include a specifically Buddhist understanding of how the “art of
reading” should be performed. Here, we will consider two aspects of the Buddhist art of
interpretation described by the threefold wisdom model and their implications on method
for scholars who study Buddhist culture.
First, as we have seen above, for Vasubandhu, Kamalaśı̄la, and followers of that
tradition, reading culminates in the direct cultivation of the direct experience of the reality
described in the scripture studied. That emphasis on the practical dimension of reading—
the stage where the ideas studied and analyzed are put into practice—distinguishes that
understanding of reading from what we often assume reading to be about in contemporary
discussions of hermeneutics. When applied to Buddhism, those discussions stress the
model of the hermeneutic circle: the determination of meaning is performed by the reader
in relation to the text, but there is never a way to obtain a view of what the text says outside
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 7 of 10

of our perspective as a reader (See, e.g., Garfield 2002, pp. 229–50). As Andrew Tuck has
shown, attempts at objectivity can often be shown to be as likely to lead readers to project
our assumptions on the text as more openly “engaged” approaches (Tuck 1990).
An emphasis on cultivation allows a different perspective. When reading following
the model of threefold wisdom, the back and forth between the reader and the text is
not a closed circle because it also reaches out into practical application. The addition of
cultivation, especially when conceived, following Vasubandhu, as samādhibhāvanā, brings
an additional way to test our reading against the text. Adding cultivation to the act
of reading brings an element to reading that is different from study and reflection, an
element that is eminently practical and as close as a direct experience as is available to us.
Concentration, insofar as it includes non-discursive practices, enriches the experience of
interpretation with elements that are not limited to the realm of words and ideas. Tested
against descriptions of concentration found in the text, it adds a richer, lived dimension to
the act of reading.12
An important distinction should be made here. The point is not that non-Buddhist
philosophical traditions, even the professionalized academic approaches to philosophy,
have no practical application. Philosophical reflections have consequences on many aspects
of our lives. The important difference is rather in the underlying belief that the reality—
often conceived in metaphysical terms—and which is the main and final object of study
and reflection is considered to be something that can be attained or realized not simply
through words but through some other form of experience. That experience is itself to be
further refined against study and reflection in a dynamic process, but the very possibility,
even if only theoretical, that one can see reality for oneself adds an important dimension to
interpretation: you can check it for yourself, so to speak.
Vasubandhu describes the wisdom of cultivation using the analogy of the person
crossing a river:
One can compare three kinds of persons who are crossing a river: (1) those who do
not know how to swim do not abandon their swimming device [plava] for one moment;
(2) those who know how to swim a little sometime hold onto it, sometimes let go of it;
(3) those who know how to swim cross without support (Vasubandhu 2012, p. 1893).
If we take the threefold wisdom model to describe the process of reading, debating the
meaning and validity of textual assertions without direct cultivation is like debating the
nature of swimming without having practiced it. More importantly, it gives a different take
on the problem of interpretation. It hints at the level of confidence a reader can gain as to the
accuracy of his/her interpretation of a text by applying the practice itself. The experience
of cultivation is as certain and straightforward as we can get. We can debate whether
our understanding of the feeling of hot, cold, sweet, or seeing red or blue is the same as
anybody else’s experience of the same things, and maybe ultimately they are not the same,
but our confidence that our understanding of what hot is is as good as understanding
can get.
Such a view of textual interpretation gives a different perspective on our ability to
understand textual statements; while on the one hand being aware that understanding
needs to be set up by adequate preparation, “listening” with an open mind to what the
text is saying, and applying analysis to determine the exact meaning of the text, it aims
at an understanding that is pragmatically adequate, that is, to be validated in experience
unmediated by concepts. In that light, arguments against the possibility of a perfect
understanding of the author’s “intention” appear irrelevant; the point is not to get the
exact same experience as the author, for such a thing would only be possible after an equal
level of mental and spiritual development has been reached, but to reach an experience
that confirms our understanding by practical standards. Now, of course, such a model
of interpretation presupposes that one accepts the possibility of such an unmediated
experience, and contemporary readers, whether they are philosophers from a tradition
that does not emphasize or acknowledge that possibility or Buddhists who disagree with
the importance given by some to an unmediated experience, may disagree with such an
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 8 of 10

assumption. The fact remains that Vasubandhu and Kamalaśı̄la do seem to accept that
presupposition, and that it makes a model for understanding through study and reading
valid to the extent to which it is needed. If contemporary philosophers disagree with that
assumption, it would be a good idea for them to have a conversation on why that is the
case.13 However, ignoring it and assuming that the Buddhist model of interpretation shares
their assumptions about experience and hermeneutics can only undermine the quality of
the common basis for dialogue they use to support their own method.
The question of the role of experience is now familiar to scholars and students of
Buddhist studies, and I want to emphasize that I do not wish to bring back the idea that
the only important thing in Buddhism is experience, especially in the context where some
Buddhists, and some Buddhist scholars, still promote the idea that all that matters about
Buddhism is some form of non-conceptual experience that arises during meditation. Cf.
Sharf (1995); Gyatso (1999). I rather wish to emphasize that study, reading, and reflection are
part of a continuum of cultivation that includes both discursive and more practical, hands-
on dimensions. For example, in the mind training (blo sbyong) system of cultivation, we find
a lot of teachings emphasizing that self-cherishing is at the root of saṁsāric experience, and
that one can only benefit from reducing all self-centered dispositions and behavior. That
cultivation involves reading, but also imagination and some rationally derived arguments
and contemplations. They also include the cultivation of certain mental qualities such as
friendliness and compassion, coupled with some discussions of ultimate bodhicitta that
depict the latter as being free of conceptual constructions.14 That system of practice is not
simply about the latter, non-conceptual experience, but it is there, at least theoretically in
the beginning, and attaining familiarity with it is recognized as something real at least
in the life stories of the great adepts of the past. So, while we cannot reduce that whole
tradition to the experience of ultimate bodhicitta, it does acknowledge it in part. It also
includes the idea of post-meditation (rjes thob), that is, what happens when you try to carry
on the attitudes developed into your daily life. What I am proposing here is that we pay
more attention to those elements as part of our philosophical study of those traditions, at
least insofar as they are relevant contextual elements without which the interpretation of
the analytic, discursive dimensions of the reflection is difficult.
The point is not to reduce Buddhism to experience, but to recognize that the unmedi-
ated experience of the reality (or realities) described in scripture and studied philosophically
is, for Buddhist philosophical traditions, at least theoretically possible. The degree to which
an unmediated experience of reality is possible, and the conditions that are required for
that to be possible, are understood differently by different people. Those ideas form the
basis of much Tibetan debate, for example. As far as I know, though, inasmuch as one
recognizes the possibility of attaining the state of buddha, or awakening, the fact that the
buddha’s gnosis is also real is also accepted. Correspondingly, most practices, whether they
are called vipaśyanā, meditation on rig pa, the completion stage (rdzogs rim), is understood as
cultivating a perception of reality the is mediated as little as possible by wrongly imposed
views and latent cognitive and emotional tendencies. For authors such as Mipham, topics
of philosophical debates are described in highly “experiential” or subjective categories
such as the absence of constructions (niśprapañca/spros pa dang bral ba) or unity/coalescence
(zung ‘jug) Wangchuk (2012, p. 15). Without going into how representative these ideas are
of Tibetan philosophy, or their place in contemporary philosophical debates, I hope the
reader will at least agree with me that such ideas give a clear indication that, for authors
like Mipham, the rational analysis of ideas like emptiness is done while keeping in mind
the wish to make a full realization of reality the final, more or less remote, yet undoubtedly
real goal of philosophical practice.
In short, we could say that, in the context of the study of Buddhist philosophical
argument, an attitude opposite yet similar to what Buddhist modernism has created
about experience has appeared: while the secularists and modernists focus on experience,
philosophers tend to eliminate it from the discussion. Revalorizing the importance of the
Religions 2022, 13, 1029 9 of 10

context for philosophical discussion, especially the practical context, can only help gather
more conditions for a fruitful discussion to take place.

4. Conclusions
If taken as describing a method of reading leading to understanding scriptural state-
ments so as to lead to an unmediated experience of the realities pointed out in scripture,
the threefold wisdom model offers its own take on the question of interpretation, a model
that, by focusing on a practical notion of understanding, circumvents issues related to the
impossibility of objectivity and recovering authorial intent. Methodological implications of
such a model include the expectation of striving for understanding prior to evaluation, to
the recognition of the importance of the role of scripture in the act of interpretation, and to
the necessity of cultivation, that is, of a practical application to our experience of the object
of study for understanding to be complete. As a result of this analysis, I propose that any
method that claims dialogue or conversation based on a commonality of purpose should
include a conversation about these topics as well as specific philosophical issues, lest the
basis assumed for dialogue be established from the unique point of view of academia rather
than being a genuinely shared basis. Buddhist presentations of threefold wisdom thus offer
us an interesting topic for philosophical conversation, a fact about Buddhist intellectual
life that is good for us to keep in mind as we read Buddhist literature, and an area that
should be addressed by future discussions of comparative or cross-cultural philosophical
study. Further study should probably consider to what extent the model of understanding
described in Buddhist literature are actually carried out in living traditions,15 and the
variations found in various Buddhist traditions. It would also be useful to the present
discussion to see how similar questions were addressed in other religious traditions. It
is to be hoped, though, that in the meantime modern assumptions about reading and
understanding are not projected on to Buddhist traditions, but that a properly Buddhist
understanding of study and reading and their place in cultivation will be appreciated for
its unique character and importance.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes
1 For a discussion of “productive encounters” as the work of cross-cultural philosophy, see for Garfield (2002, p. 244).
2 Such a method is described for example in Garfield (2015, p. 3).
3 Recent contributions bring much needed information on the intellectual background of Buddhist traditions. For example, the
relation between linguistic philosophy and Buddhism is described in, Bronkhorst (2019).
4 An example of such a study is offered in Gold (2007).
5 For a wider discussion of hermeneutics in Buddhism, see Lopez (1988).
6 Translation in Vasubandhu (2012, pp. 1894–95).
7 While the term śruta (“listening”) carries the connotation of orality, it can be applied to written text as well as oral text, so that
listening can stretch into study more generally to include the potential use of written support as part of study.
8 While a detailed definition of contemporary academic philosophy is too big a topic for the current essay, and since I certainly
do not want to imply that contemporary philosophy, even when practiced in purely academic settings, cannot be applied to
one’s life, the difference between the two types of philosophical practice I want to emphasize here rests on the notion that the
possibility of connecting correct views of reality to a lived experience of that reality, distinct from deluded experience, as part of
Buddhist mental cultivation. See below, Section 3 for more on that point.
9 This method corresponds to what Kapstein calls the “problems and solutions approach.” See the introduction of Kapstein (2001).
It also corresponds to Garfield’s “cross-cultural philosophy”, cited above.
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10 An example of this in the thought of the Tibetan author Śākya mchog ldan is given in Philippe Turenne, “Interpretations of Unity:
Hermeneutics in ŚĀKYA MCHOG LDAN’s Interpretation of the Five Treatises of Maitreya.” (Montreal, McGill University, 2012).
11 Kamalaśı̄la describes the disappearance of doubt as the result of reflection. See Adam (2002, p. 128).
12 A similar point of comparison is to be found in Hadot’s description of philosophy as spiritual exercise. See Hadot (1995, 2003). For
applications of that discussion to Buddhism, see Fiordalis (2018), Eltschinger (2008, pp. 285–544) and Deroche (2021, pp. 19–32).
13 We should note that, as a significant part of comparative or cross-cultural studies of Buddhist philosophy pursues the overt
goal of convincing Western philosophers of the importance of studying Buddhist philosophy, and as an open discussion of the
spiritual dimensions of Buddhist thought may be seen as going against that purpose, philosophers interested in engagement with
Buddhist thought may be tempted to set aside such dimensions.
14 Many instances of teachings belonging to that system can be found Jinpa (2006).
15 A good example of such a study is offered in Liberman (2007).

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