Issue 22-5

May 2022

JUDGES
• Petition for judicial clemency
In his Petition, respondent judge claimed that he desires to apply as a presiding judge in any of
the RTCs in Manila but was disqualified under Section 5(2)(c), Rule 4 of the 2016 Revised Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC Rules) on account of the aforementioned penalty imposed upon
him. He further averred that it is difficult for him to return to X, Sulu due to the threats on his life
and those of his family by the Abu Sayaff. Likewise, he alleged that he had learned his lessons
from the penalty imposed upon him in this case, as in fact, for a period of one year, he already
disposed of a total of 413 cases from the three courts where he was assigned as an
Acting/Assisting Judge.

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As he was previously penalized with a fine in the amount of P10,000, respondent judge
claims that, pursuant to the JBC Rules, he is disqualified from being nominated for appointment
to any judicial post, unless he would be accorded judicial clemency for this purpose.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency (Diaz), the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation[;]

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform[;]

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself[;]

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system
or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service[;]
and

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

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 Applying the Diaz guidelines, the Court finds merit in respondent judge’s petition.

As evinced by the records, respondent judge has sufficiently shown remorse and
reformation. He accepted his shortcomings as well as the penalty imposed upon him. He also
expressed sincere repentance for his past actions as the presiding judge of the RTC of AA, Sulu,
Branch XX, and committed himself to the expeditious disposition of cases.

Moreover, the Court received numerous letters of support from the following persons
attesting to respondent judge’s character reformation and recognizing his qualifications and
abilities as a judge, as well as his exemplary qualities as an individual[.] x x x

xxxx

At this juncture, it should be noted that the infraction committed by respondent judge,
for which he was meted the penalty of fine, occurred more than seven years ago. Since his
previous administrative case, he has disposed of a total of 1,151 cases when he was assigned as
the Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC of A City, Branch X, the RTC of B City, Branch Y, and the RTC
of C City, Branch Z. There is also no evidence on record to show that he had committed any similar
infraction of undue delay in rendering a decision or order, for which he was initially penalized by
the Court.

Further, the Court notes that respondent judge is only 49 years old; thus, it appears that
he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.

And finally, records disclose that respondent judge had already paid the fine in the
amount of P10,000, in compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated June 19, 2017. Moreover,
he filed the present petition for judicial clemency not only for the purpose of redeeming himself,
but particularly to allow him to be considered for positions in the judiciary. In this regard, he
expressed his desire for a “lateral transfer to any other Regional Trial Courts outside X, Sulu[.]

Thus, in view of the foregoing circumstances that square with the Diaz parameters, the
Court grants respondent judge judicial clemency as prayed for in his petition.

As a final word, it bears to stress that judicial clemency is not a privilege or a right that
can be availed of at any time. Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should
be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only
if there is a showing that it is merited, as in this case. [A.M. No. RTJ-17-2498, September 28,
2021] <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/26057/>

• Gross ignorance of the law or procedure, gross misconduct and undue delay in rendering an
order
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code) requires all judges to
exhibit impartiality, competence and integrity in the performance of judicial duties. A judge who
passes upon the innocence or guilt of the accused during a proceeding to determine probable
cause, and exhibits manifest bias towards the accused, is unfit to remain as a member of the
Judiciary.
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Respondent judge is guilty of

Issue 22-5|May 2022 Page 2 of 6

gross ignorance of the law.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. It is settled
that judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Unfamiliarity
with the rules is a sign of incompetence. When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the courts. Judges owe it to the public to be
knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules, they must know them by heart.

Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Such, however, is not the case for respondent judge. In
the case of Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang, this Court ruled:

Where the law is straightforward and the facts evident, the failure to know it or to act
as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of law. A judge is presumed to
have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme
Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects
the magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions.

In the present case, the CA and the OCA were one in finding that respondent judge
deviated from the normal course of procedure in handling the case. First, he ordered the victim
to testify on the witness stand during the clarificatory hearing on the motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and allowed her to be subjected to vigorous cross-examination.
He likewise called EEE to the witness stand to testify in his defense, where he raised defenses
that were never mentioned in his counter-affidavit. He further allowed EEE to present
unauthenticated private documents during the clarificatory hearing in support of his defenses of
alibi and denial without allowing the prosecution to controvert the same.

Well-settled is that the determination of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. In fact, probable cause is determined
in a summary manner. In concluding probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged, for it would be unfair to require
the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon
the filing of the information against the latter. Hence, the determination of probable cause does
not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense, or an admissibility or
veracity of testimonies presented. These are matters better ventilated during the trial proper of
the case. At such early stage of the proceedings, respondent judge was not yet tasked to review
in detail evidence submitted during preliminary investigation. As correctly ruled by the CA, since
the evidence presented at this stage is merely preliminary, trial judges must proceed in caution
in dismissing cases in the judicial determination of probable cause. A judge may dismiss the case
for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause—that is when the records show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.

That is not the case here.

This Court agrees with the CA that not only did respondent judge pass upon the innocence
or guilt to EEE without conducting a full-blown trial, but his resulting order dismissing the case
was patently and grossly erroneous in substance and inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
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 xxxx

Respondent judge giving due course to unauthenticated private documents submitted by

EEE to prove his defense of denial and alibi was likewise inconsistent with jurisprudence and
established rules and procedures. x x x

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From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent judge’s missteps are not minor errors, but
are of such nature that amount to gross ignorance of the law. When the inefficiency springs from
a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too
incompetent and underserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that
he deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority.
In both cases, the judge’s dismissal will be in order.

For passing upon the innocence or guilt of EEE without having him arrested, arraigned
and without conducting a full-blown trial, and for dismissing the case on grounds which are
patently and grossly erroneous in substance and inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence,
respondent judge is guilty of two counts of gross ignorance of the law. This is consistent with the
Court’s rulings in OCA v. Judge Villarosa and OCA v. Salvador (Salvador), where each procedural
and substantial misstep/error was considered a single count of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge is also guilty of

gross misconduct.

This Court agrees with the OCA’s findings that when respondent judge chose to simply ignore
and deviate from established procedural rules and jurisprudence, resulting to the dismissal of the
three cases for rape against EEE, he displayed partiality in favor of EEE, and cast doubt on the
integrity of his entire ruling. Even more telling is his continued persistence to conduct another
clarificatory hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, which exhibits his partiality
towards EEE. As the OCA correctly noted, the three informations for rape were supported by the
Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahabla of the victim, and the existence of probable cause was
affirmed by the CA in its decision x x x.

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As no further appeal was taken from the CA’s Resolution dated June 5, 2017, there is no
doubt that the CA’s decision had attained finality. Nothing is more settled in law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect. Yet, respondent judge erroneously disregarded the findings of the CA
and continued to insist that he retains the discretion to determine once again the existence of
probable cause. Respondent judge’s blatant disregard of the CA’s decision despite its finality
undoubtedly exhibits his partiality.

xxxx

Respondent judge’s insistence that he heard EEE answer differently from that which was
recorded by the court stenographer on a material matter, such as the date which the victim left
the house of EEE, raises suspicions as to his partiality. x x x [R]espondent judge’s tendency to
answer the questions of the prosecution on behalf of EEE is suspiciously akin to how a lawyer
would defend his client in court. Clearly, respondent judge failed to resolve the existence of
probable cause with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. x x x

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 This Court has repeatedly and consistently held that a judge must not only be impartial,
but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. Litigants are entitled to no less than that. Under Canon 3 of the New Code, impartiality
applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. An
act that violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross misconduct.

Respondent judge is likewise guilty of

undue delay in the resolution of the
determination of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest against EEE.

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This Court rules that respondent judge’s failure to timely resolve the issue of the existence of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest makes him administratively liable as well. Sec[tion] 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules provides that a judge is given 10 days from the filing of the complaint or
the information to personally evaluate the documents and resolve such issue. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, a judge is given the option to require the prosecutor to
present additional evidence and resolve the issue within 30 days from the filing of the complaint
or information. The periods provided are mandatory, and as such, he was expected to complete
his determination of probable cause within such periods.

However, in this case, it is uncontroverted that as a result of respondent judge’s

unwarranted deviations from established procedure, he failed to comply with the mandatory
period within which to resolve the issue of the existence of probable cause for issuing a warrant
of arrest. Respondent judge took 8 months and 3 days to issue the erroneous order that
ultimately dismissed the cases for lack of probable cause. Furthermore, as of the filing of the
present complaint in 2019, four years had passed since the informations for rape were filed
against EEE, and two years since the CA rendered its decision. Notwithstanding the significant
period that has elapsed, respondent judge has yet to issue a warrant of arrest against EEE nor
make any significant progress in the hearing of the cases.

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds respondent judge guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision or order, which is punishable under Sec[tion] 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules.

This Court finds respondent judge guilty of two counts of gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct and undue delay in rendering a decision. [A.M. No. RTJ-21-010 (Formerly OCA IPI
No. 19-4947-RTJ), November 23, 2021] <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/25602/>

• Gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice

Under Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, ‘[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.’ This is echoed in Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that
‘[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness.’

As explained by the Court in Dulang v. Judge Regencia, ‘[p]rompt disposition of cases is

attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess
those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants.
Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly.’

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 Here, records show that it took 12 months for respondent judge to rule on the motion for
reconsideration and around 10 months to issue his order submitting said pending incident,
including the Motion to Refer the Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, for resolution. This is
way beyond the reglementary period of 90 days, within which judges must resolve motions or
incidents pending before them. As such, as the OCA properly observed, respondent judge is
administratively liable for gross inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision or order,
which is considered as a less serious charge under Section 23 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and—during that time the OCA issued its recommendation—was punishable by either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than 1 month nor more than
3 months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. As such, the OCA
recommended a penalty of fine in the amount of P11,000.

This notwithstanding, the Court deems it proper to mitigate the penalty by lowering the
fine to P9,000, in view of humanitarian considerations. Among others, respondent judge has
asserted that his health condition (i.e., being a paraplegic), direly affected the performance of his
work. Further, as per existing case law, ‘humanitarian considerations’ may include remorse and
acknowledgment of guilt, which respondent judge has expressed in the case at bar. Thus, a fine
in the amount of P9,000 is reasonable to be imposed. [A.M. No. RTJ-20-2601 (Formerly OCA IPI
No. 16-4604-RTJ), February 28, 2022] <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/25925/>

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