UCGN Civil Law 2022

University of the Cordilleras
College of Law
Civil Law
#agbiagtiUClaw
Green Notes 2022 Civil Law
CIVIL LAW
Atty. Stephanie Rachel Castro

Faculty Adviser
Atty. Ronic Albert Treptor

Faculty Adviser
Committee Members:
Antonio Bruce
Azra Jameela Lacadin
Chin Chin Cagaoan
Ariston Jayme Jr.
Kristelle Ngina
Lois Gianne Oligane
Michelle Ao-asen
Paulyn Samonte
Paulyn Grace Saturno
Jarwell Vance Alingay
Denise Paola Garcia
Ara Tamara Klaire
Hermay Banario
Kenneth Michelle Flora
Runniel Ivan De Castro
Trisha Joi Esperanza
University of the Cordilleras

College of Law | 2022
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE laws which are to regulate their actions and

A. Effect and application of laws conduct as citizens. Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, publication in the Official Gazette, or in a
December 29, 1986 newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Doctrine: Publication is indispensable in every case, (Art. 2, NCC, as amended by E.O. 200)
but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or B. Human Relations
extended.
Albenson Enterprise Corp., et al. v. CA, G.R.
Q: Tañada sought a writ of mandamus from No. 88694. January 11, 1993
the Court in order to compel Tuvera to publish
in the Official Gazette various presidential Q: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, Corporation (Albenson) delivered to
proclamations, executive implementations, Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed) mild
and administrative orders. They did so steel plates. Albenson received a check in the
because of the right of the people to be amount of P2,575.00 as payment and drawn
informed on matters of public concern, a right against the account of E.L Woodworks. The
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 check was dishonored for the reason “account
Constitution. In addition, petitioners stress closed”. Albenson traced the origin of the
that Article 2 of the Civil Code requires the check and discovered that the president of
publication of laws as a requirement for their Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid steel
effectivity. Can Congress do away with plates, was one “Eugenio S. Baltao.”
publication of a law? Can Congress provide a Petitioners wrote private respondent
law to become effective even in the absence of demanding that he make good the amount of
publication? the check. However, private respondent wrote
back denying that he transacted with
A: No. The Court ruled that Art. 2 of the NCC Albenson. Baltao failed to mention that there
does not preclude the requirement of are 3 persons with the same name, one of them
publication in the Official Gazette even if the is his son, the actual issuer of the check.
law itself provides for the date of effectivity Albenson filed a complaint against Baltao for
since the clear object of the law is to give the violation of BP 22 which were eventually
general public adequate notice of the various dismissed. Because of the alleged unjust filing
University of the Cordilleras Page 1 of 129

of a criminal case against him, respondent Q: Restituto Tobias was employed by

Baltao filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Globe Mackay as purchasing agent
the petitioners. May the petitioner claim and administrative assistant. Globe Mackay
damages under Art. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil discovered fictitious purchases and other
Code or the principle of Abuse of Rights? fraudulent transactions for which it lost
several thousands of pesos. Hendry, the
A: No. Petitioners could not be said to have Executive Vice-President and General
violated the aforestated principle of abuse of Manager of Globe Mackay, confronted Tobias
rights. What prompted petitioners to file the stating that he was the number one suspect.
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 Tobias was ordered to take a one week forced
against private respondent was their failure to leave, not to communicate with the office, to
collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
bounced check which they honestly believed office keys. When Tobias returned to work, he
was issued to them by private Respondent. was instructed to submit specimen of his
Private respondent, however, did nothing to handwriting, signature, and initials for
clarify the case of mistaken identity at first examination. The Manila police cleared
hand. Instead, private respondent waited in Tobias. Not satisfied, Globe Mackay hired a
ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless private investigator. Hendry issued a
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious memorandum suspending Tobias from work.
by filing an action for damages. The Court will Meanwhile, the Manila Police Department
not countenance this devious scheme. There is submitted a second report reiterating the
no proof of a sinister design on the part of exculpation of Tobias. Notwithstanding the
petitioners to vex or humiliate private two police reports, petitioners filed a
respondent by instituting the criminal case complaint for estafa against Tobias. In the
against him. meantime, Tobias’ employment had been
terminated by petitioners. Unemployed,
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. CA, Tobias sought employment with the
176 SCRA 778 (1989) RETELCO. However, Hendry wrote a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
Doctrine: In the exercise of one’s right, the norms of by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Hence,
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the New Tobias filed a civil case for damages against
Civil Code must be observed. petitioners Globe Mackay. Are petitioners
liable for civil damages to respondent Tobias?

A: Yes. Article 19 provides that “every person University of the Philippines v. Philab
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the Industries, Inc. 482 Phil. 693 (2004)
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and Doctrine: Unjust enrichment claims do not lie
good faith”. As a remedy, Article 21 further simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
provides that “any person who willfully causes obligations of others, but instead it must be shown
loss or injury to another in a manner that is that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that
contrary to morals, good customs or public the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”. Q: The Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation
(FEMF) agreed to fund the purchase and
In the case at bar, the imputation of guilt fabrication of laboratory equipment and
without basis and the pattern of harassment furniture for the BIOTECH program at the UP
during the investigations of Tobias transgress Los Baños. Thereafter, BIOTECH arranged for
the standards of human conduct set forth in PHILAB to fabricate and deliver the
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has laboratory furniture to UP for the account of
already ruled that the right of the employer to the FEMF. After the completion of the delivery
dismiss an employee should not be confused and installation thereof, FEMF paid PHILAB
with the manner in which the right is exercised three times in installment basis to which the
and the effects flowing therefrom. If the latter issued official receipts to FEMF. A
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer balance remains unpaid afterwards.
is liable for damages to the employee. [Quisaba Subsequently, UP and FEMF executed a
v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. Memorandum of Agreement in which FEMF
No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See agreed to grant financial support and donate
also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. sums of money to UP for the construction of
L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under buildings, installation of laboratory and other
the circumstances of the instant case, the capitalization for the project. Prior to the full
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a payment of the laboratory equipment and
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, furniture, President Marcos was ousted from
giving the latter the right to recover damages office. PHILAB then filed a complaint praying
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the for the sum of money and damages against UP.
Civil Code. Is UP liable for the payment of the laboratory
furniture supplied by PHILAB under the
principle of unjust enrichment?

Q: Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III filed a petition

A: No. For the principle of unjust enrichment to for change of name to Abdulhamid Ballaho,
apply, the following requisites must concur: (i) which he has been using in all his records and
a person is unjustly benefited; and (ii) such is known to the community as such person. He
benefit is derived at the expense of or with alleged that he was born to Mario Alanis y
damages to another. Moreover, to substantiate Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-
a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must Raschid, and that the name on his birth
unequivocally prove that another party certificate was "Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III."
knowingly received something of value to However, he wished to remove his father's
which he was not entitled and that the state of surname "Alanis III," and instead use his
affairs are such that it would be unjust for the mother's maiden name "Ballaho," as it was
person to keep the benefit. what he has been using since childhood and
indicated in his school records. He likewise
UP legally acquired the laboratory furniture wished to change his first name from
under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid" for the same
to keep the laboratory furniture. The essential reasons. Do legitimate children have the right
requisites for the application of Article 22 of the to use their mothers' surnames as their
New Civil Code are not present in this case. surnames?
However, PHILAB had a remedy against the
FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact A: Yes. The State has the duty to actively modify
contract with the latter for the payment of its what is in its power to modify, to ensure that
claim. women are not discriminated. Section 14 states
that “The State recognizes the role of women in
II. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS nation-building and shall ensure the
A. Persons fundamental equality before the law of women
1. Civil personality and men.”
2. Use of surnames
Courts, like all other government departments
Alanis v. CA, G.R. No. 21645, November 11, and agencies, must ensure the fundamental
2020 equality of women and men before the law.
Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for
Doctrine: Equality of women and men before the law an interpretation that treats women and men
shall be ensured by the State. more equally, that is the correct interpretation.

The word "principally" as used in Art. 364 of the ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use
Civil Code is not equivalent to "exclusively" so of the word "may" in the provision readily
that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
legitimated child should choose to use the is under no compulsion to use the surname of
surname of its mother to which it is equally his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
entitled. permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children. (Grande v.
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014)
18, 2014
3. Entries in the Civil Registry and
Doctrine: Use of Surnames for Illegitimate Children Clerical Error Law (R.A. No. 9048, as
amended)
Q: A and B lived together as husband and wife 4. Absence
while A was still married. Their illicit affair a. Civil Code provisions
bore two sons. The children were not b. Presumptive death of
expressly recognized by A as his own in the absent spouse under the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Family Code
Registry. When their relationship turned sour, B. Marriage
B left for the United States with her two 1. Requisites of marriage
children. This prompted A to file a Petition for a. Solemnizing Officer:
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer
to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 (July
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of 19, 1996)
Minors. Can A compel the use of his surname
by his illegitimate children upon his Doctrine: Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
recognition of their filiation? outside his court’s jurisdiction there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
A: No. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the Article 3 of the Family Code which while it may not
right to decide if they want to use the surname affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
of their father or not. It is not the father (A) or officiating official to administrative liability.
the mother (B) who is granted by law the right
to dictate the surname of their illegitimate Q: Respondent MCTC Judge Domagtoy
children. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is allegedly solemnized the marriage of Floriano
free from ambiguity. And where there is no Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosari.

The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction Article 3 of the Family Code which while it may not
in the MCTC of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding officiating official to administrative liability.
at his residence in the municipality of Dapa
which is outside his jurisdiction. Is Judge Q: The marriage between Z and Y was
Domagtoy qualified to solemnize a marriage solemnized by Judge D in his residence in
outside his jurisdiction? J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
After their wedding, her husband abandoned
A: No. Judge Domagtoy was not clothed with her without any reason at all so she decided to
authority to solemnize a marriage in the go to Calbayog City's Local Civil Registrar to
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. inquire regarding her marriage contract but
Article 3 of the Family Code provides that one she found out that her marriage was not
of the formal requisites of marriage is the registered. She wrote Judge D to inquire but
“authority of the solemnizing officer” while Judge D informed her that all the copies of the
Article 7 states that marriage may be marriage contract were taken by her husband.
solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent Z filed an administrative complaint against
member of the judiciary within the court’s Judge who stands charge with Neglect of Duty
jurisdiction.” However, under Article 8, which and Abuse of Authority where the respondent
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue solemnized the marriage outside his
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer a copy and not registering the marriage
as provided in the preceding provision. contract with the office of the Local Registrar.
Hence, non-compliance with the requisites will Can a judge who is appointed to a specific
not invalidate the marriage but the party or jurisdiction officiate weddings beyond said
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be areas?
civilly, criminally and/or administratively
liable. A: No. Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions cannot officiate in weddings
Beso vs. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566, January 28, beyond said areas. Under Article 8 of the FC,
2000 there are only three instances wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside
Doctrine: Where a judge solemnizes a marriage his chamber: (1) when either or both contracting
outside his court’s jurisdiction there is a resultant parties is at the point of death; (2) when the
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in residence of either party is located in a remote

place; and (3) where both of the parties request They lived together as husband and wife on
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the strength of this marriage until her husband
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or passed away. However, since the marriage was
place designated by them in a sworn statement a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
to that effect. properties” left by Orobia was not recognized.
She was likewise deprived of receiving the
In the case at bar, Judge D is the presiding judge pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of
of the MTC Sta. Maria Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, the Philippine Navy.
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is
only limited to those municipalities under his In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent
jurisdiction. Additionally, neither Z or Y was at judge averred that he was requested by a
the point of death or in a remote place. Neither certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
was there a sworn written request made by the solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the February 2000. Having been assured that all
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers the documents to the marriage were complete,
or at a place other than his sala. (Beso vs. he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala
Daguman, 323 SCRA 566, January 28, 2000) at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Aranes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
2002 difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
Q: Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua,
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the to which request he acceded. Reviewing the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines records of the case, it appears that petitioner
Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February and Orobia filed their Application for
2000, respondent judge solemnized her Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. stamped in this Application that the marriage
Orobia without the requisite marriage license license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
his territorial jurisdiction. claimed it. Is the marriage is valid?

A: Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside that the two had been living together as
his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant husband and wife for seven years already
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in without the benefit of marriage, as manifested
Article 3, which while it may not affect the in their joint affidavit. Is the reason of the
validity of the marriage, may subject the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage
officiating official to administrative liability. valid?
A marriage which preceded the issuance of the A: No. Article 34 of the Family Code provides
marriage license is void, and that the “No license shall be necessary for the marriage
subsequent issuance of such license cannot of a man and a woman who have lived together
render valid or even add an iota of validity to as husband and wife for at least five years and
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, without any legal impediment to marry each
it is the marriage license that gives the other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a the Joint Affidavit of A and B stating that they
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
such authority when he solemnized the seven years. Just like separation, free and
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, voluntary cohabitation with another person for
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of at least five years does not severe the tie of a
the law. subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between
Borja-Manzano vs Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, two individuals who are legally capacitated to
March 8, 2001 marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not
Q: The Judge solemnized the marriage of A serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
and B who were both bound by a prior existing solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by
marriage. C the lawful wife of A charges the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the (Borja-Manzano vs Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8,
law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with 2001)
the Office of the Court Administrator on 12
May 1999. b. Effect of defect in the
marriage license:
According to the Judge, when he officiated the
marriage between A and B, he did not know Republic vs. CA, 236 257
that A was legally married. What he knew was

Doctrine: The absence of any of the essential or decision of the trial court was reversed. Is their
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab marriage valid?
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A: No. The New Civil Code provides that no
Q: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas marriage license shall be solemnized without a
were married in a civil ceremony without the marriage license first issued by the local civil
knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of
Cardenas personally attended the procuring of a valid marriage, absence of a license would
the documents required for the celebration of render the marriage void ab initio.
the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license. After the marriage, they did Moreno vs. Moreno, 246 SCRA 120, JULY 14,
not live together since their marriage was 1995
unknown to Castro’s parents. They only
decided to live together when Castro Q: Judge Bernabe solemnized the marriage of
discovered she was pregnant. The Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno
cohabitation lasted only for four months and despite having no marriage license. Judge
the couple parted ways. When Castro was Bernabe contends that both parties were
fixing her marital status before leaving for the informed of the effects of a marriage
U.S., she discovered that there was no performed without the required marriage
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to license and that he was given the assurance
the celebration of their marriage. She then that the marriage license was definitely
filed for a declaration of nullity of her forthcoming since the necessary documents
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage were complete. Judge Bernabe was charged for
license. As evidence, she presented a grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
certification stating that their marriage license law after solemnizing the marriage in the
could not be located. The trial court denied the absence of a marriage license. Is Judge
petition holding that the certification was Bernabe correct in solemnizing the marriage?
inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the A: No. We concur with the findings and
celebration of the marriage between the recommendation of the Office of the Court
parties. RTC ruled that the "inability of the Administrator. In its Memorandum dated
certifying official to locate the marriage January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court
license is not conclusive to show that there was Administrator stated:
no marriage license issued.” On appeal, the

Careful study of the records reveal that their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
indeed respondent Judge displayed his Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
ignorance of the law when he BR Chapel. They got married on the same day,
solemnized the marriage without a 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent
marriage license. As a judge, he is went through another marriage ceremony at
presumed to be aware of the existence of the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by likewise celebrated without the parties
E.O. 227), which provides that one of the securing a marriage license. The alleged
formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license, procured in Carmona,
marriage license. Absence of said Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is
requisite will make the marriage void a sham, as neither party was a resident of
from the beginning (Article 35 [3], the Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
Family Code of the Philippines). Judges apply for a license with the local civil registrar
are enjoined to show more than just a of the said place. Is the marriage between
cursory acquaintance of the law and Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Alcantara void
other established rules. due to lack of marriage license?
Alcantara vs. Alcantara 531 SCRA 446 A: No. In the cases decided by the Supreme
Court, it can be deduced that to be considered
Doctrine: Mere irregularities that do not affect the void on the ground of absence of a marriage
validity of the marriage do not render the marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
void, but the party or parties responsible for the marriage license must be apparent on the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and marriage contract, or at the very least,
administratively liable. supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was
Q: A petition for annulment of marriage was issued to the parties.
filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 In the case at bar, the marriage contract between
he and respondent, without securing the the petitioner and respondent reflects a
required marriage license, went to the Manila marriage license number. A certification to this
City Hall for the purpose of looking for a effect was also issued by the local civil registrar
person who could arrange a marriage for them. of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover
They met a person who, for a fee, arranged is precise in that it specifically identified the

parties to whom the marriage license was Q: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Bellones on September 26, 1974.
Almario, further validating the fact that a Subsequently, Teodulfa died on April 24,
license was in fact issued to the parties herein. 1985. On December 11, 1986, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any
Petitioner’s claim that neither he nor the marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite is Norma executed an affidavit stating that they
immaterial. Even then, we still hold that there is had lived together as husband and wife for at
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and least five years and were thus exempt from
respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage securing a marriage license. On February 19,
license in a city or municipality, not the 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. With the
residence of either of the contracting parties, assumption that the validity of the second
and issuance of a marriage license despite the marriage would affect their successional
absence of publication or prior to the rights, Pepito’s children from the first
completion of the 10-day period for publication marriage filed a petition for declaration of
are considered mere irregularities that do not nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
affect the validity of the marriage. An alleging that the said marriage was void for
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of lack of a marriage license. Is the marriage
marriage does not affect its validity but the between Pepito and Norma null and void ab
party or parties responsible for the irregularity initio due to the lack of Marriage License?
are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. A: Yes. The applicable law in this case is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
Ninal vs. Bayadog, Mar. 14, 2000, 328 SCRA time of their celebration. Under Article 76 of the
122 Civil Code, the requisite of a marriage license is
dispensed with the marriage of a man and a
Doctrine: Under Article 76 of the Civil Code, the woman who have lived together and
requisite of a marriage license is dispensed with the exclusively with each other as husband and
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
together and exclusively with each other as husband least five years before the marriage.
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. In this case, at the time of Pepito and Norma’s
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least

five years prior to their wedding day. From the Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
time of his marriage with Norma, only about marriage in question in accordance with
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming Article 34 of the Family Code. Can a couple
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in who have been cohabitating as husband and
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had wife for seven years enter into marriage
started living with each other that has already without judicial declaration of nullity of the
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their previous marriage?
five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Inasmuch as A: No. For provisions Article 34 of the Family
the same is not covered by the exception to the Code on legal ratification of marital
requirement of a marriage license, the marriage cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
between Pepito and Norma is void ab initio must concur: (1)The man and woman must
because of the absence of such element. have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage; (2)
Manzano v. Sanchez, AM No. MTJ-001329, The parties must have no legal impediment to
March 8, 2001 marry each other; (3) The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must be
Doctrine: Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows present at the time of marriage; (4) The parties
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal must execute an affidavit stating that they have
separation to live separately from each other, but in lived together for at least five years [and are
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. without legal impediment to marry each other];
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the and; (5) The solemnizing officer must execute a
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to sworn statement that he had ascertained the
remarry. qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Q: A complaint was filed against Judge Not all of these requirements are present in the
Herminia Borja-Manzano for with gross case at bar. The Court held that the Respondent
ignorance of the law as stated in a sworn Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. which would make the subsequent marriage
Judge Borja-Mazano solemnized a marriage null and void.
where the parties have legal impediments, The fact that Manzano and Payao had been
both having an existing valid marriage. living apart from their respective spouses for a

long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of Furthermore, he also solemnized marriages
the Family Code allows spouses who have with expired marriage license and provided
obtained a decree of legal separation to live couples who are to be married under Art. 34
separately from each other, but in such a case with the required affidavit of cohabitation
the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise even if one or both of them were minors
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the during cohabitation. What will be the status of
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to the marriages resulting from the gross
remarry. This holds true all the more when the negligence of Judge A?
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar. A: The absence of a marriage license will clearly
render marriage void ab initio. The Court does
Court Administrator v. Necessario, April 2, not accept the arguments that the ascertainment
2013 of the validity of the marriage license is beyond
the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer
Doctrine: Effect of defect in the marriage license especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly
Q: In the judicial audit of the Office of the observed by the OCA, the presumption of
Court Administrator (OCA), it was found that regularity accorded to a marriage license
Judge A was guilty of solemnizing marriages disappears the moment the marriage
even if the requirements submitted by the documents do not appear regular on its face.
couples were incomplete and of questionable “The presumption of regularity of official acts
character. Most of these documents showed may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
visible signs of tampering, erasures, irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” The
corrections or superimpositions of entries visible superimpositions on the marriage
related to the parties’ place of residence. He licenses should have alerted the solemnizing
also solemnized marriages where a contracting judges to the irregularity of the issuance. (Court
party is a foreigner who did not submit a Administrator v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-
certificate of legal capacity to marry from his 1691 April 2, 2013)
or her embassy and failed to make sure that
solemnization fee has been paid where the
OCA emphasizes that the payment of the
solemnization fee starts off the whole
marriage application process and even puts a
"stamp of regularity" on the process. Cosca vs. Palaypan, 237 SCRA 249

Republic v. Dayot, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA

Doctrine: The Family Code pertinently proves that 435
the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided Q: In November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
for therein. married at Pasay City Hall without a marriage
license but had an affidavit that they are at the
Q: Employees of the MTC of Tinambac, age of maturity, unmarried and they lived
Camarines Sur alleged that respondent Judge together as husband and wife for at least 5
solemnized 6 marriages even without the years. In 1990, Jose contracted another
requisite marriage license. As a consequence, marriage with Rufina Pascual. In 1993, Felisa
their marriage contracts did not reflect any filed an action for bigamy against Jose. On the
marriage license number. The respondent other hand, Jose filed a complaint for
Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and annulment and declaration of nullity of
did not indicate the date of solemnization, the marriage where he contended that his
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for marriage with Felisa was a sham and his
the marriage license to be submitted by the consent was secured through fraud. Jose and
parties which was usually several days after Felisa started living together in June of 1986. Is
the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage their marriage valid?
contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. What is the effect of the absence of a A: No. It was established that indeed, Jose and
marriage license? Felisa only began cohabiting in June 1986.
Hence, when they married in November 1986,
A: The Family Code pertinently provides that they had not cohabited for at least five years to
the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, warrant their exemption from obtaining a
a valid marriage license except in cases marriage license. Since the content of their
provided therein. Complementarily, it declares affidavit of cohabitation is a falsity, they were
that the absence of any of the essential or formal not exempt from obtaining a marriage license
requisites shall generally render the marriage before marrying each other. Their marriage is
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in thus void ab initio. An action to annul a void ab
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity initio marriage does not prescribe, thus, Joset
of the marriage, the party or parties responsible was not estopped from questioning the validity
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally of the marriage even if he filed the complaint
and administratively liable. only in 1993. (Republic v. Dayot, March 28, 2008,
550 SCRA 435)

The trial court ruled that the marriage between

Reinel Anthony B. De Castro vs. Annabelle Annabelle and Reinel is not valid because it
Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February was solemnized without a marriage license. Is
13, 2008 the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle
valid?
Q: Annabelle and Reinel applied for a
marriage license. However, when they went A: No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with
order to get married as soon as possible, they the marriage license requirement for a man and
executed an Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to a woman who have lived together and
show that they had been living together as exclusively with each other as husband and
husband and wife for the last five years, hence, wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
exempt from the marriage license least five years before the marriage. The aim of
requirement. They got married on the same this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
date before a judge. After the ceremony, humiliation, shame and embarrassment
however, they did not live together as concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
husband and wife.In November 1995, of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna publication of every applicants name for a
Tricia. In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for marriage license. In the instant case, there was
support against Reinel, claiming that he had no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact,
not given support to her and their child. there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent
In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married executed so they could push through with the
to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
void ab initio since the marriage was scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that marriage license requirement. Their failure to
they never cohabited with each other five obtain and present a marriage license renders
years before their marriage, hence they were their marriage void ab initio.
not exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. He also denied being the
father of Tricia.
Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257,1994

essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence

Q: On June 24, 1970, X and Y were married in a of a license would render the marriage void ab
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. initio. (Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257,1994)
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the 2. Exemption from license
knowledge of X's parents. Defendant Y requirement
personally attended to the processing of the 3. Marriages solemnized abroad
documents required for the celebration of the and foreign divorce
marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract Republic vs. Liberty D. Albios, 707 SCRA
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 584, October 16, 2013
was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Doctrine: Consent freely given
Manila.
Q: Liberty Albios is married to an American
Later on, they discovered that there was no citizen, Daniel Lee Fringer before MTC-
marriage license issued to Y prior to the Mandaluyong to enable her to acquire
celebration of their marriage. As proof, X American citizenship; that in consideration
presented a certification from the Civil thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Moreover, X $2,000.00. In 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
testified that she did not go to the civil petition for declaration of nullity of her
registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
order to apply for a license. Neither did she immediately after their marriage, they
sign any application therefore. She affixed her separated and never lived as husband and
signature only on the marriage contract on wife because they never really had any
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. Is the marriage intention of entering into a married state or
between X and Y valid? complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as
A: No. At the time the subject marriage was one made in jest and, therefore, null and void
solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing ab initio. Whether marriage, contracted for the
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The sole purpose of acquiring American
law provides that no marriage shall be citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void
solemnized without a marriage license first ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the

A: No. Consent was not lacking. Consent was presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
purpose of acquiring American citizenship Is difference in sex an essential requisite of
through marriage. There is no law that declares marriage?
a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law A: Yes. A person’s sex is an essential factor in
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
citizenship. Marriages entered into for other person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
convenience, companionship, money, status, provides:
and title, provided that they comply with all the ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
legal requisites, are equally valid. registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
Silverio vs. Republic 537 SCRA 373, October
19, 2007 Paragraph 2, Article 26 FC
a. Requisites for par. 2 Article 26
Doctrine: Is difference in sex an essential requisite FC to apply
of marriage?
Soledad L. Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces
Q: In the year 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Luna, Represented by Gregorio Z. Luna and
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, G.R. No. 171914,
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the July 23, 2014
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
Petitioner was born on April 4, 1962. His name Doctrine: Divorce between Filipinos is void and
was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Silverio" in his birth certificate. His sex was Philippine law.
registered as "male. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone Q: Atty. Juan Luces Luna is a practicing lawyer
treatment and breast augmentation. His who is married to Eugenia Zaballero-Luna.
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" Atty. Luna later on obtained a divorce decree
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he of his marriage with Eugenia from the Civil
underwent sex reassignment surgery in and Commercial Chamber of the First
Bangkok, Thailand. During the trial, Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
petitioner testified for himself. He also of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. On the

same date, he contracted another marriage, where they had two children. In 1982, the
this time with herein petitioner Soledad spouses were divorced in Nevada, US.
Lavadia. Is the divorce decree valid and Subsequently, Alice remarried to Theodore
binding in the Philippines? Van Dorn. In 1983, Richard filed a case asking
Alice to render an accounting of her business
A: No. At the time of solemnization of Atty. in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right
Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia, the Spanish to manage the conjugal property. Will the
Civil Code was in effect which adopted the divorce between Alice and Richard in Nevada
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine be binding in the Philippines?
laws relating to family rights and duties or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of A: Yes. Richard cannot have his cake and eat it,
persons were binding upon citizens of the too. When a foreigner obtains divorce abroad to
Philippines, although living abroad. end his or her marriage with a Filipino citizen,
Conformably with the nationality rule, the said divorce is recognized in the Philippines
divorce decree, even if voluntarily obtained provided they are valid according to their
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between national law. The divorce decree issued in
Atty. Luna and Eugenia. For as long as this Nevada released Richard from the marriage
public policy on marriage between Filipinos from the standards of American law, under
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus,
marriage between them can ever be given legal pursuant to his national law, Richard is no
or judicial recognition and enforcement in this longer the husband of Alice. He would have no
jurisdiction. standing to sue in the instant case and claim that
he is still the husband. Hence, Alice’s divorce
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Hon. Manuel v. with Richard is considered valid.
Romillo, Jr. and Richard Upton, G.R. No. L-
68470 October 8, 1985
Doctrine: Absolute divorce obtained by an alien

abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if valid Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona
under the national law of such an alien. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Q: Alice Reyes, a Filipino, and Richard Upton, Doctrine: There being no marriage from the
an American, married in Hong Kong in 1972. beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
Afterwards, they moved to the Philippines

declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to show that under German law said court was
stand on. locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
Q: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a said marriage was legally founded on and
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich authorized by the applicable law of that
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, or more
married before the Registrar of Births, than five months after the issuance of the
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
started auspiciously enough, and the couple of Manila alleging that, while still married to
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila said respondent, petitioner” had an affair with
where their only child, Isabella Pilapil a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. with yet another man named Jesus Chua
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual sometime in 1983". Is it necessary in the
recriminations between the spouses, followed commencement of a criminal action for
by a separation de facto between them. After adultery that the marital bonds between the
about three and a half years of marriage, such complainant and the accused be unsevered
connubial disharmony eventuated in private and existing at the time of the institution of the
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding action by the former against the latter?
against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He A: YES. Article 344 of the RPC specifically
claimed that there was failure of their provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
marriage and that they had been living apart concubinage the person who can legally file the
since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other complaint should be the offended spouse, and
hand, filed an action for legal separation, nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
support and separation of property before the abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, provision is made for the prosecution of the
on January 23, 1983 where the same is still crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
pending as Civil Case No.83-15866. The parents, grandparents or guardian of the
Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, offended party.
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a It is indispensable that the status and capacity
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of of the complainant to commence the action be
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the definitely established and, as already
child was granted to petitioner. The records demonstrated, such status or capacity must

indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
action. 227)
In the present case, the fact that private Q: Florante and Laura were married in 1937 in
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his the Philippines. Florante was later enlisted
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may for the US and became a US Citizen through
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as naturalization. Upon his visitation of his wife,
private respondent is concerned in view of the he discovered that she was pregnant and was
nationality principle in our civil law on the having an adulterous relationship with his
matter of status of persons. brother. The child was registered as legitimate
but the name of the father was left blank.
When said respondent initiated the divorce Florante went back to the US and filed a
proceeding, he obviously knew that there divorce, which later on became final. He
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows married Celia and they lived together for 25
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is years bringing 3 children. He made his last
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of will and testament stating that all his
introducing spurious heirs into the family, properties will be given to his second
which is said to be one of the reasons for the marriage. He filed a petition of probate that
particular formulation of our law on adultery, made or appointed Celia his special
since there would thenceforth be no spousal administrator of his estate. Before the
relationship to speak of. proceeding could be terminated, Florante
died. Laura filed a letter of administration over
Llorente vs. CA, 345 SCRA 593; November 23, Florante’s estate contending that: (1) that she
2000 was Florante’s surviving spouse, (2) that the
various property were acquired during their
Doctrine: Requisites for par. 2 Article 26 FC to marriage, (3) that Florante will disposed of all
apply: Article 26 par 2 of the Family Code: Where a his property in favor of Celia and her children,
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter the conjugal property. Is the divorce obtained
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse in the US by Florante from his first wife Laura
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino was valid?
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under

A: Yes. The fact that the Florante became an such foreign divorce will be recognized in the
American citizen long before and at the time of: Philippines.
(1) his divorce from Laura; (2) marriage to Celia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly Q: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as M. Villanueva before Lady Myros left for the
a rule, issues arising from these incidents are United States. After a few years, Cipriano
necessarily governed by foreign law. The discovered that his wife had been naturalized
divorce obtained by Florante from his first wife as an American citizen. He also learned that
Laura was valid and recognized in this his wife had obtained a divorce decree
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Citing the sometime in 2000 and then married a certain
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., it was held that Innocent Stanley and lived in California. He
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided then filed with the trial court a petition for
they are valid according to their national law. authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
The Court also held in Quita v. Court of Appeals Article 26 of the Family Code. May a Filipino
that once proven that respondent was no longer spouse also be considered divorced and be
a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce allowed to remarry?
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very A: Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in
well lose her right to inherit" from him. holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Likewise, in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, it was stated Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
that divorce and its legal effects may be citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who
recognized in the Philippines insofar as had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also
respondent is concerned in view of the to remarry under Philippine law.
nationality principle in our civil law on the The article should be interpreted to include
status of persons. (Llorente vs. CA, 345 SCRA cases involving parties who, at the time of the
593; November 23, 2000) celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later no one of them became
Republic v. Orbecido, 472SCRA 114, October naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a
5, 2005 divorce decree.
Doctrine: In a situation wherein both were Filipinos The instant case was one where at the time the
when they got married but one of them acquired marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
foreign citizenship and thereafter secured a divorce, Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and

subsequently obtained a divorce granting her it. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
an American citizen while residing in the US. defended in the name of the real party in
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed interest and must be based on a cause of action.
to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. void marriage may be filed solely by the
***However, since Orbecido was husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to
not able to prove as fact his wife’s file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
naturalization, he was still cannot be ascertained because of the absence of
barred from remarrying. the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. After all, she may have the personality to file
Felicitas Amor-Catalan, vs. Court of Appeals the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the
Q: Petitioner Felicitas married respondent foreign law may restrict remarriage even after
Orlando. Thereafter, they migrated to the the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note
United States of America and allegedly that it was the petitioner who alleged in her
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 complaint that they acquired American
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando citizenship and that respondent Orlando
divorced. Two months after the divorce, obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is a settled
Orlando married respondent Merope. rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
Contending that said marriage was bigamous of proving it and a mere allegation is not
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage evidence. (Felicitas Amor-Catalan, vs. Court of
with Eusebio, petitioner filed a petition for Appeals, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007)
declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages against Orlando and Merope. Does Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 472,
the petitioner has the personality to file a November 7, 2008
petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of Doctrine: Foreign divorce can be recognized in the
bigamy? Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact
and valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
A: No. The petitioner's personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage Q: Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of American citizen and born in Agoa, Guam,
the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing USA. She married Vicente Bayot at Greenhills,

Mandaluyong on April 20, 1979. On November were also properly adjudicated through their
27,1982, Rebecca gave birth to a daughter Agreement on 1996. Foreign divorce can be
named Alix at San Francisco, California. recognized in the Philippines provided that the
However, as the marriage turned sour, divorce decree is fact and valid under the
Rebecca initiated a divorce on 1996 in national law of the alien spouse. The reckoning
Dominican Republic. The latter ordered the point is the citizenship of parties at the time the
dissolution of marriage and remarriage after divorce was obtained and not the citizenship of
completing the legal requirements. However, the parties at the time of the celebration of
there must be a joint custody and marriage.
guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal
property, particularly the real properties Republic of the Philippines vs. Marelyn
located only in Manila that they acquired Tanedo Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
during their marriage be settled. 2018
However, Rebecca stated under oath on May Q: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously
28, 1996 that she is an American citizen and she married in the Philippines to a Japanese
is carrying a child not of Vicente. Rebecca national Yoshido Minoro. Recently, a case for
again filed another petition in Manila on divorce was filed by Manalo in Japan and after
March 2001 for absolute nullity of marriage on due proceedings, a divorce decree was
the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, rendered by the Japanese Court. Manalo then
monthly support for their daughter and that filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
Vicente is psychological incapacitated. marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of
Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss divorce rendered by a Japanese court. Is a
for lack of cause and action and filed a case of Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce
adultery and perjury against Rebecca. proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
Rebecca, on the contrary, charged Vicente with judgment against his or her alien spouse who
bigamy and concubinage. On the other note, is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
Rebecca became a recognized Filipino citizen remarry?
on 2000. Is the divorce filed by Rebecca valid?
A: Yes. The Court held that Article 26 of the
A: Yes, the divorce is VALID. Rebecca was Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is
bound by the national laws of USA where applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce was valid. Their property relations divorce against her Japanese husband because

the decree obtained makes the latter no longer remarry under Philippine law. Under Article
married to the former, capacitating him to 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of
Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling that the the foreign spouse? Was the divorce obtained
meaning of the law should be based on the by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the the Philippines?
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still A: Yes. Divorces obtained abroad by Filipino
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, citizens may now be validly recognized in the
is no longer married to her. For the appellate Philippines but only in cases of mixed
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner.
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar This is because Art. 26(2), FC makes no
to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. distinction as to who obtains the divorce. All
where the marriage between a foreigner and a that is required is that it is validly obtained
Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter. abroad. A Filipino who initiates the divorce
proceeding against a foreign spouse still ends
Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221209, April up in the same position as one whose foreign
24, 2018 spouse initiated proceedings: they both no
longer have spouses. There should be no
Q: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a distinction between the two cases in order to
Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo avoid the absurd situation where a Filipino
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due spouse is still married to the alien spouse even
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December though the latter is capacitated by his own laws
6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to to remarry and is no longer married to the
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Filipino.
Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be
allowed to reuse her maiden surname, 4. Void and voidable marriages
Manalo. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 a. Annulment under Article
of the Family Code, where a marriage between 36 (as recently articulated in
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R.
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly No. 196359, May 11, 2021;
obtained abroad by the alien spouse Totality of Evidence Rule)
incapacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to

marriage may testify on behaviors that they

have consistently observed from the
Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, supposedly incapacitated spouse.
2021
As to incurability, it must be incurable not in the
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity is not a medical medical, but in the legal sense; that is, incurable
illness that has to be medically nor clinically as to the partner. Psychological incapacity is so
identified. Hence, expert testimony is not required. enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner.
Q: Rosanna Tan-Andal sought to have her
marriage with Mario Andal be judicially As to gravity, it must be shown that the
annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious
incapacity. To prove her case, she presented a psychic cause. It is not necessary that it must be
psychologist, Dr. Fonso Garcia, who, after shown that the psychological incapacity is a
interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, serious or dangerous illness but that the “mild
and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
was psychologically incapacitated to perform occasional emotional outbursts” are excluded.
essential marital obligations. In her The psychological incapacity cannot be mere
assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be “refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill
suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial will”.
Personality Disorder. Does psychological
incapacity need to be medically or clinically Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27,
identified? 2021
A: No. The Supreme Court set a new guideline Doctrine: Article 40 of the Family Code applies
in determining the existence of psychological retroactively on marriages celebrated before the
incapacity and amended some of the outlies in Family Code insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
the Molina Doctrine. Under the new ruling, vested or acquired rights. Thus, a judicial declaration
psychological incapacity need not be medically of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted
or clinically proven. It is neither a mental before the effectivity of the Family Code but only for
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must purposes of remarriage.
be proven through expert testimony. Ordinary
witnesses who have been present in the life of Q: On September 5, 1983, Pulido married
the spouses before the latter contracted Arcon in a civil wedding at the Municipal Hall

of Rosario, Cavite. In 2007, Arcon found out initio marriages are inexistent from the very
that Pulido had an affair with Baleda and beginning.
married her on July 31, 1995. Arcon then filed
a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda. Anacleto Alden Meneses v. Jung Soon Linda
During the pendency of the case, a judicial Lee- Meneses, G.R. No. 200182, March 13,
declaration of absolute nullity of Pulido’s 2019
marriage with Arcon due to the absence of a
valid marriage license was issued with Doctrine: A marriage contracted by any party who,
finality. Considering that Pulido’s first at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
marriage was contracted before the effectivity incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
of the Family Code while his second marriage obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
was celebrated during the effectivity thereof, such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
can Article 40 of the Family Code be given a solemnization
retroactive application which requires Pulido
to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute Q: Anacleto and respondent Jung Soon Linda
nullity before he can contract another Lee-Meneses (Linda)] met during their college
marriage? Is a judicial declaration of nullity of years in the United States of America (USA).
marriage necessary to establish the invalidity They became involved romantically after
of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy fifteen (15) months of courtship. They decided
prosecution? to get married on August 9, 1981 at Sanctuario
de SanJose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
A: 1) Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code applies On June 3, 1983, Linda Monique L. Meneses,
retroactively on marriages celebrated before the their only child was born. During the first few
Family Code insofar as it does not prejudice or years of married life, they lived with
impair vested or acquired rights. Thus, a Anacleto's family in Houston, Texas, USA.
judicial declaration of nullity is required for Linda would always complain of not having
prior marriages contracted before the effectivity enough money as she wanted to live on their
of the Family Code but only for purposes of own, away from her parents-in-law. She
remarriage. would always nag Anacleto to look for a
2) No. A judicial declaration of nullity is only higher paying job so that she could get ahead
necessary for purposes of remarriage. It is not in life. Linda wanted a luxurious life and she
required to prove a void ab initio prior and only appreciated her husband when he bought
subsequent marriage in a bigamy case. Void ab her expensive gifts and took her out to fancy
expensive restaurants. The constant fighting

and nagging caused Anacleto humiliation; he incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
lost self-esteem and suffered an erectile required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
disorder. Linda even ridiculed Anacleto's history of the party antedating the marriage
inability to have an erection. She even accused although the overt manifestations may emerge
him of having an extra-marital relationship. only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
On September 8, 2006, Anacleto filed a or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage beyond the means of the party involved."
before the RTC. Anacleto presented the
testimony of Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez who The Court commiserates with Anacleto's plight.
testified that the root cause of Linda’s The denial of the present Petition maybe viewed
personality disorder can be traced back to her as a sentence to a lifetime trapped in a "loveless"
dysfunctional familial pattern and marriage characterized by failed expectations
psychological development. Dr. Lopez and lost hopes. Unfortunately, however,
concluded that Linda's psychological marriage recognized in this jurisdiction stands
incapacity is an integral part of her beyond love and personal emotions; it is a
personality, which has its juridical matter of law. Thus, in actions for declaration of
antecedence having existed even prior to the nullity of marriage, the Court is bound to
marriage. It is grave, permanent and incurable dispense justice not on the basis of its own
and which incapacitated her from performing determination on the existence of love or lack
her essential marital obligations. The RTC thereof, but on the basis of law and the evidence
ruled that the totality of the evidence on record. While the Court recognizes that there
presented does not show psychological may very well be grounds to nullify the
incapacity on the part of Linda. The CA marriage of Anacleto and Linda, the existence of
affirmed the said RTC decision. these grounds has not been sufficiently shown
Is a spouse who considers money and material by the evidence presented in this case.
needs as the essence of marriage
psychologically incapacitated to perform the Mallion v. Alcantara, October 31, 2006
essential marital obligations to warrant a
declaration of nullity of marriage under Doctrine: Failure to comply with the recording
Article 36 of the Family Code? requirements under Art. 52 (Art. 53)
A: No. To warrant a declaration of nullity on the Q: Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial
basis of Article 36, the incapacity "must be grave court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
or serious such that the party would be marriage to Editha Alcantara on the ground of

psychological incapacity. The trial court

denied the petition. Likewise, it was C. Legal Separation
dismissed in the Court of Appeals. After such
decision, petitioner filed another petition for Araneta v. Concepcion, G. R, No. L-9667 , July
declaration of nullity of marriage with the 31,1956
regional trial court alleging that his marriage
with respondent was null and void due to the Doctrine: Legal Separation
fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license.Respondent filed an answer Q: Alberto filed for legal separation against
with motion to dismiss on the ground of res his wife, Roberta, on the ground of adultery.
judicata and forum shopping. The trial court Roberta however filed an omnibus petition to
granted her petitiction of the husband secure custody of their three minor children, a
tenable? monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said
children, and the return of her passport.
A: No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Alberto opposed the petition, denying the
Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or misconduct imputed to him and alleging that
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a the wife had abandoned the children and
judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the committed adultery. The judge resolved the
second action upon the same claim, demand or omnibus petition granting custody of the
cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, children to the wife and a monthly allowance
it pertains to res judicata in its concept as of P2,300.00 for support for her and her
“conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of children. Alberto filed the petition for
auter action pendant which ordains that issues certiorari against said order and for
actually and directly resolved in a former suit mandamus to compel the judge to require the
cannot again be raised in any future case parties to submit evidence before deciding the
between the same parties involving a different omnibus petition. The judge refused the
cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and husband’s request for reason of the
impliedly concealed the validity of their prohibition contained in Article 103 of the
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed Civil Code, which reads as follows: “ART. 103.
to have waived any defects therein. The Court An action for legal separation shall in no case
finds then that the present action for declaration be tried before six months shall have elapsed
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of since the filing of the petition.” Is the Judge
marriage license is barred. The petition is correct in granting Roberta custody and
denied for lack of merit.

support pendente lite during the six-month Doctrine: Legal separation alone is not a ground for
cooling off period for legal separation? wife’s change of name. A woman’s married status is
not affected by a decree of legal separation, there
A: Yes. The determination of the custody and being no severance of the vinculum and under
alimony should be given effect and force Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue
provided it does not go to the extent of violating using the name and surname employed by her before
the policy of the cooling off period. That is, the separation.
evidence not affecting the cause of the
separation, like the actual custody of the Q: Elisea Laperal is a bona fide resident of
children, the means conducive to their welfare Baguio City who was married with Mr.
and convenience during the pendency of the Enrique R. Santamaria sometime in March
case, these should be allowed that the court may 1939. During their marriage, she naturally
determine which is best for their custody. It is uses Elisea L. Santamaria. However, Laperal
conceded that the period of six months fixed ceased to live with Enique and a decree of
therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently legal separation was later on issued to the
intended as a cooling off period to make spouses. She filed this petition to be
possible reconciliation between the spouses. But permitted to resume in using her maiden name
this practical expedient, necessary to carry out Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
legislative policy, does not have the effect of Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
overriding other provisions such as the violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was
determination of the custody of the children claiming that continuing to use her married
and alimony and support pendente lite name would give rise to confusion in her
according to the circumstances. (Article 105, finances and the eventual liquidation of the
Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that conjugal assets. Does the legal separation
these should be determined by the court permit the petitioner to resume using her
according to the circumstances. If these are maiden name?
ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual
facts, rank in justice may be caused. (Araneta v. A: No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads that
Concepcion, G. R, No. L-9667, July 31, 1956) when legal separation has been granted, the
wife shall continue using her name and
Laperal v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18008, surname employed before the legal separation.
October 30, 1962
In legal separation, the married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no

severance of the vinculum. The finding that A: YES. An action for legal separation which
petitioner’s continued use of her husband involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
surname may cause undue confusion in her separation of the spouses is purely personal.
finances was without basis. It must be The Civil Code of the Philippines (now
considered that the issuance of the decree of governed by the Family Code) recognizes this
legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
had automatically been dissolved and Article 108 (now Article 66 of FC) by providing
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind
conjugal assets. a decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being personal in character, it follows that the
Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, death of one party to the action causes the death
January 31, 1972 of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
Q: C filed a petition for legal separation
against E, alleging that she discovered her In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman. death of one of the parties to such action abates
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal the action, for the reason that death has settled
separation, and would order that Eufemio the question of separation beyond all
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal controversy and deprived the court of
partnership profits. But before the trial could jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties
be completed, C died in a vehicular accident. to the action and of the subject-matter of the
Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court action itself. (Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-
of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the 30977, January 31, 1972)
"petition for legal separation" mainly on the
ground that the death of C abated the action D. Rights and obligations between
for legal separation. Counsel for the deceased husband and wife
petitioner moved to substitute the deceased E. Property relations between husband
Carmen by her father, M. Counsel for Eufemio and wife
opposed the motion. Does the death of the 1. General provisions
plaintiff before final decree, in an action for 2. Donations by reason of
legal separation, abate the action? marriage

3. Absolute Community of alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding

Property took place were destroyed. Is the respondent
4. Conjugal Partnership of Gains illegitimate precluding her to become the
5. Separation of property and administrator of the deceased Francisco
administration of common Angeles’s Estate?
property by one spouse during
the marriage A: No, respondent is not illegitimate. Article 164
6. Regime of separation of of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on
property the matter: “Children conceived or born during
7. Property regime of unions the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” The
without marriage issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
F. Family home collaterally.
G. Paternity and filiation
1. Legitimate children 2. Proof of filiation
Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, Republic v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 203948,
September 2, 2005 January 22, 2020
Q: Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the Doctrine: Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
deceased while the respondent Aleli Maglaya Court an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication
is the child of the deceased Francisco Angeles or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third
in his first wife. Francisco died intestate and persons with respect to the adjudication of the
the respondent seeks administration of the property. However, there is no provision in the Rules
estate of the deceased but opposed by the of Court which states that the instrument cannot be
surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the used to prove that one is an heir due to the sheer fact
respondent is an illegitimate child of the that it was not registered before the Register of
deceased. Petitioner also averred that Deeds.
respondent could not be the daughter of
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Q: Petitioner Republic filed a complaint
Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the seeking to expropriate a parcel of land located
corresponding birth certificate was not signed in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City. The
by him. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per expropriation was necessary for the
certification of the appropriate offices, records implementation of the C-5 Northern Link
of marriages of the Civil Registrar where the Road Project. The title and registered owner of

the subject property, however, were not be substituted by respondent Leonor.

properly identified, although diligent efforts Petitioner Republic file a Motion of Partial
to search were exerted. After the trial court Reconsideration arguing that the substitution
directed that the complaint be published in of respondent Leonor was improper as the
the newspaper of general circulation, A filed a extrajudicial deed of partition, the evidence
motion for issuance of possession. The trial for allowing her to be substituted as the sole
court issued an order granting the motion. heir, was neither registered in the Register of
Meanwhile, a certain Atty. Cornado E. Deeds nor published in a newspaper of
Panlaque appeared before the RTC, praying general circulation pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 74
that one Elana A. Macabagdal be substituted of the Rules of Court. Did the CA erred in
as party defendant, alleging that she is the real finding that the RTC did not commit grave
party in interest, being the registered owner of abuse of discretion in allowing respondent
the subject property. Counsel also submitted a Leonor’s substitution as party defendant in
copy of land title registered in her name. the expropriation case?
On the day of the supposed hearing, neither A: No. The Court does not find merit in
Elena nor her counsel appeared. Instead, Atty. petitioner Republic’s assertion that the only
Ricardo C. Pilares, Jr. filed an Omnibus evidence of respondent Leonor in proving that
Motion for Substitution of Party of Answer she is the sole heir of Elena is the Deed of
and Hearing, averring that Elena already died Extrajudicial Settlement. Respondent Leonor
as shown in her death certificate. He also was able to present two witnesses as well as
prayed that the sole heir, one Leonor A. other pertinent pieces of documentary evidence
Macabagdal, represented by Eulogia establishing respondent’s Leonor’s identity and
Macabagdal-Pascual by virtue of a Special interest over the subject property. Moreover,
Power of Attorney, be substituted in Elena’s even assuming arguendo that the unregistered
place. Atty. Pilares presented witnesses and Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the only
marked on evidence copy of a Deed of piece of evidence provided by respondent
Extrajudicial Settlement and other pertinent Leonor to establish her interest over the subject
documents in support of Leonor’s claim as the property, the fact that the said Deed of
registered owner of the subject property and Extrajudicial Settlement was not registered
proof of their ownership. RTC, finding that before the Register of Deeds doesn't strip away
Elena A. Macabagdal really the owned the the document’s evidentiary value with respect
property, named her as party defendant. Due to respondent Leonor’s status and interest over
to her death, however, the RTC ordered her to the subject property. While the Republic is

correct insofar as saying that under Section 1, Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an unregistered the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that
affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial his deceased father left no debts and that his
settlement does not bind third persons with estate can be settled without securing letters of
respect to the adjudication of the property, the administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74
CA is also correct in its holding that there is no of the Rules of Court. He further argued that
provision in the Rules of Court which states that private respondents should have established
the instrument cannot be used to prove that one their status as illegitimate children during the
is an heir due to the sheer fact that it was not lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of
registered before the Register of Deeds. the Family Code. Are the private respondents
barred by prescription from proving their
filiation?
3. Illegitimate children A: No. Ruling on the same would be premature

considering that private respondents have yet
Guy v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 163707, to present evidence. Under the Family Code,
September 15, 2006 when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the
Q: Private respondents, Karen Oanes Wei, a civil register or a final judgment, or an
minor by and through her mother Remedios admission of filiation in a public document or a
Oanes, alleged that they are the duly private handwritten instrument signed by the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima parent concerned, the action for recognition
Wei, who died intestate leaving an estate may be brought by the child during his or her
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and lifetime. However, if the action is based upon
personal properties. His known heirs are his open and continuous possession of the status of
surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, an illegitimate child, or any other means
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only
surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
for the appointment of a regular administrator parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of
for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. the issue of prescription depends on the type of
They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, evidence to be adduced by private respondents
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the in proving their filiation. However, it would be
decedent, be appointed as Special impossible to determine the same in this case as
Administrator of the estate. In his there has been no reception of evidence yet.

While the original action filed by private they entered into a written agreement of
respondents was a petition for letters of separation whereby each renounced certain
administration, the trial court is not precluded rights as against the other and divided the
from receiving evidence on private conjugal property between them, the
respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to defendant undertaking in consideration of the
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise premises to pay the plaintiff within the first
of its recognized powers in handling the three days of each month the sum of P20 for
settlement of the estate, including the her support and maintenance. In the original
determination of the status of each heir. That the answer, Lerma set up as a special defense that
two causes of action, one to compel recognition Quintana had forfeited her right to support by
and the other to claim inheritance, may be committing adultery. This allegation was
joined in one complaint. stricken out by the court on motion, upon the
ground that under the provisions of article 152
4. Legitimated children of the Civil Code the commission of adultery
H. Adoption is not recognized as a ground upon which the
1. Domestic adoption (R.A. No. obligation to support ceases. Does Quintana
8552) have a right of action against Lerma for
a. Who may adopt support?
b. Who may be adopted
c. Rights of an adopted child A: Yes. Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides:
d. Instances and effects of "In default of express declarations in the
rescission marriage contract, the separation of the
2. Inter-country adoption (RA property of the consorts, during marriage, shall
8043) only take place by virtue of a judicial decree,
a. When allowed except in the case provided by article 50."
b. Who may adopt
c. Who may be adopted Under this article the agreement in suit is void.
I. Support The wife, however, has a right of action against
her husband for support under the provisions
Quinta v. Lerma, G.R. No. L-7426, February 5, of the Civil Code and, although the contract in
1913 question is void, her right of action does not for
that reason fail.
Q: Maria Quintana and Gelasio Lerma were
married in 1901 and that in February, 1905, J. Parental authority

K. Emancipation opposition claiming that the will is null and

L. Retroactivity of the Family Code void because Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a will. One of the witnesses
III. SUCCESSION for the petitioners testified that Paciencia is
A. General provisions “magulayan” or forgetful. Is the state of being
B. Testamentary succession forgetful tantamount to being of unsound
1. Wills mind so as to render a person unfit to execute
Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, April 7, a will?
2012
A: No. Article 799 of the New Civil Code
Doctrine: It is incumbent upon those who oppose provides that “to be of sound mind, it is not
the probate of a will to clearly establish that the necessary that the testator be in full possession
decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered
is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the by disease, injury or other cause.”
testator to distribute his estate in the manner In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable. pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is
no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise,
Q: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when that would show that Paciencia was of unsound
she made her last will and testament entitled mind at the time of the execution of the Will.
“Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Further, Article 800 provides, “The law
Paciencia Regala” (Will) in the Pampango presumes that every person is of sound mind, in
dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, the absence of proof to the contrary.”
executed in the house of retired Judge
Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was
to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia publicly known to be insane one month or less
expressed in the presence of the instrumental before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the
witnesses that the document is her last will burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
and testament. She thereafter affixed her mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners.
signature at the end of the said document on However and as earlier mentioned, no
page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, substantial evidence was presented by them to
2 and 4 thereof. In her will, she bequeathed all prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s
her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
his wife and their children. Petitioner filed an burden.

A: No. Although Araceli was a compulsory heir

in the direct descending line, she could not have
been preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As
contemplated in Art. 854, the presence of a will
Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R No. 208197, January is necessary. Secondly, before his death,
10, 2018 Perfecto had other properties. Araceli could not
have been totally excluded in the inheritance of
Doctrine: Article 854 of the Civil Code partly Perfecto even if she was not allegedly given any
provides: "[t]he preterition or omission of one, some, share in the disputed lots. If Araceli’s share in
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, the inheritance of Perfecto as claimed by her
whether living at the time of the execution of the will was indeed impaired, she could have instituted
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the an action for partition or a settlement of estate
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall proceedings instead of her complaint of free
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." patent and reconveyance.
Q: Araceli Mayuga, Benjamin and Armando 2. Institution of heirs (including

Atienza were legitimate heirs of Perfecto declaration of heirship as
Atienza who died on June 1978. Araceli decided in Treyes v. Larlar, G.R.
instituted a petition for cancellation and recall No. 232579. September 8, 2020)
of free patent application and reconveyance
against Antonio. Araceli represents that being Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579. September
one of the surviving compulsory heirs, she 8, 2020
was entitled to 1/3 of the disputed lot left by
Perfecto. Further, Araceli alleged that the Doctrine: Under the Civil Code, when the brothers
application of a free patent by Antonio is and sisters of a deceased married sister survive with
tainted with fraud because said application her widower, the latter shall be entitled by law to one-
was processed without her knowledge. half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters to
Perfecto left no will. He, however, executed a the other half. (Art. 1001, NCC) The Civil Code
Confirmation Affidavit prior to his death. likewise states that this successional right of the legal
Aside from the disputed lot, Perfecto also had heirs is vested in them from the very moment of the
other properties for residential and decedent's death. (Art. 777, NCC)
agricultural purposes. Can Araceli claim
preterition? Q: Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of
petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who

did not bear any children with petitioner situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. New titles had
Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left been issued in the name of petitioner Treyes
behind seven siblings, the private on the basis of the two Affidavits of Self-
respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Adjudication. The private respondents filed
Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne. At the time of her before the RTC a Complaint for annulment of
death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication,
properties, situated in various locations in the cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of
Philippines, which she owned together with ownership and possession, partition, and
petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties. damages against petitioner Treyes, the RD of
Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Marikina, the RD of the Province of Rizal, and
Affidavits of Self- Adjudication. The first the RD of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered Occidental. Petitioner filed his Motion to
by petitioner Treyes with the Register of Dismiss but denied by the RTC which was
Deeds (RD) of Marikina City, while the affirmed by CA. Are the rights of heirs
second Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was transmitted at the precise moment of death of
registered with the RD of San Carlos City, the decedent?
Negros Occidental. In these two Affidavits of
Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes A: Yes. That the private respondents do not
transferred the estate of Rosie unto himself, really seek in their Complaint the establishment
claiming that he was the sole heir of his of their rights as intestate heirs but, rather, the
deceased spouse, Rosie. As alleged by the enforcement of their rights already granted by
private respondents, they sent a letter to law as intestate heirs finds basis in Article 777 of
petitioner Treyes requesting for a conference the Civil Code, which states that the rights of
to discuss the settlement of the estate of their succession are transmitted from the moment of
deceased sister, Rosie. The private the death of the decedent.
respondents maintain that they never heard
from petitioner Treyes regarding their request. The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very
The private respondents then alleged that moment of the decedent's death – the
sometime during the latter part of 2012, they transmission by succession occurs at the precise
discovered to their shock and dismay that the moment of death and, therefore, the heir is
TCTs previously registered in the name of legally deemed to have acquired ownership of
their sister and petitioner Treyes had already his/her share in the inheritance at that very
beencancelled, except TCT No. M-43623 moment, "and not at the time of declaration of
situated in Tanay, Rizal and TCT No. T-627723 heirs, or partition, or distribution."

A: Yes. The Court reexamined the iron curtain

Hence, the Court has held that the "title or rights rule, finding that Article 992 “should be
to a deceased person's property are construed to account for other circumstances of
immediately passed to his or her heirs upon birth and family dynamics. Peace within
death. The heirs' rights become vested without families cannot be encouraged by callously
need for them to be declared 'heirs.'" depriving some of its members of their
inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the
3. Substitution of heirs cause of antagonism and alienation that could
4. Conditional testamentary have been otherwise avoided.” Departing from
dispositions and those with a regressive conjectures about family life in favor
term of the best interests of the child, the Court
5. Legitime abandoned the presumption that “nonmarital
6. Disinheritance children are products of illicit relationships or
7. Legacies and devises that they are automatically placed in a hostile
C. Legal and intestate succession environment perpetrated by the marital
1. General provisions; family.” Grandparents and other direct
relationship and right of ascendants are outside the scope of “relatives”
representation under Article 992. “Both marital and nonmarital
children, whether born from a marital or
Aquino v. Aquino, December 7, 2021, G.R. nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their
Nos. 208912 and 209018 parents and other ascendants.” Thus, a
nonmarital child’s right of representation
Doctrine: Illegitimate Children exercising right of should be governed by Article 982 of the Civil
representation Code, which does not differentiate based on the
birth status of grandchildren and other direct
Q: Elsa claims to be the nonmarital child of descendants. (Aquino v. Aquino, December 7,
Juanito, who died before she was born. After 2021, G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018 EN BANC
her alleged paternal grandfather died, she Decision)
asserted her right to represent her deceased
father—a marital child—in inheriting from 2. Order of intestate succession
her grandfather’s estate. Being an illegitimate D. Provisions common to testate and
child, does Elsa have the right to intestate succession
representation? 1. Right of accretion

2. Capacity to succeed by will or filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold

by intestacy for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. had
3. Acceptance and repudiation of already died and JDS Construction was no
inheritance longer at its registered address, with its
4. Partition and distribution of whereabouts unknown. In its defense,
the estate Stronghold maintains that Asahi’s money
claims against it and JDS have been
IV. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
A. Obligations Is the death of Santos a valid defense of
1. General provisions Stronghold?
2. Nature and effect
A: No. As a general rule, the death of either the
Stronghold Insurance Company Inc. v. creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
republic - Asahi Glass Corp., G.R. No. 147561, obligation.
June 22, 2006
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs,
Doctrine: A surety company’s liability under the except when the transmission is prevented by
performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
the principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish nature of the obligation. Only obligations that
the obligation and the solidary nature of that are personal or are identified with the persons
liability. themselves are extinguished by death. In the
present case, whatever monetary liabilities or
Q: Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) obligations Santos had under his contracts with
entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., respondent were not transmissible by their
the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
the construction of roadways and a drainage
system in Asahi’s compound that was Hence, his death did not result in the
supposed to be completed within 240 days. extinguishment of those obligations or
However, due to the slow pace of the liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.
construction, Asahi extrajudicially rescinded Death is not a defense that he or his estate can
the contract. Because of the rescission, Asahi set up to wipe out the obligations under the
incurred losses and filed a claim against the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold
bond by Stronghold Insurance and JDS, but as surety cannot use his death to escape its
the letter went unheeded. Asahi eventually

monetary obligation under its performance to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that
bond. one has committed no negligence or misconduct
that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam v. Jorge G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
In connection to Article 1173 of the Civil Code
Q: Lulu pawned several pieces of jewelry to further provides: The fault or negligence of the
Robert to secure a loan. Then two armed men obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
entered Robert's pawnshop and took away which is required by the nature of the obligation
whatever cash and jewelry in the pawnshop and corresponds with the circumstances of the
vault. Robert sent a letter to inform Lulu of the persons, of time and of the place. When
loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
in the pawnshop on the same day. Lulu wrote Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
back and requested Robert to prepare the If the law or contract does not state the diligence
pawned jewelry for withdrawal but Robert which is to be observed in the performance, that
failed to return the Jewelry. Is Robert liable for which is expected of a good father of a family
the loss of the pawned jewelry? shall be required. (Sicam v. Jorge G.R. No. 159617,
August 8, 2007)
A: Yes. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, 3. Kinds
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the Sagun v. ANZ Global Services and
assumption of risk, no person shall be Operations (Manila) Inc., G.R. No. 220399,
responsible for those events which could not be August 22, 2016
foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. Fortuitous events by definition are Q: Petitioner was employed at Hongkong and
extraordinary events not foreseeable or Shanghai Banking Corporation Electronic
avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the Data Processing (Philippines), Inc. (HSBC-
event should not have been foreseen or EDPI) when he applied online for the position
anticipated, but it must be one impossible to of Payments and Cash Processing, Lead at
foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to respondent ANZ Global Services and
foresee the happening is not impossibility to Operations (Manila), Inc. (ANZ),After passing
foresee the same. Robert failed to show that he the interview and online examination, ANZ,
was free from any negligence to the loss of the offered petitioner the position of Customer
pawned jewelry. In order for a fortuitous event Service Officer, Payments and Cash

Resolution, which the latter accepted on June

8, 2011.In the letter of confirmation of the offer A: The court ruled in the affirmative. An
which constituted petitioner's employment employment contract, like any other contract, is
agreement with ANZ, the acknowledged copy perfected at the moment the parties come to
thereof was transmitted to ANZ Accordingly, agree upon its terms and conditions, and In this
on June 11, 2011, petitioner tendered his relation, the contracting parties may establish
resignation together with his other pre- such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions
employment documentary requirements. was as they may deem convenient, provided they
handed a letter of retraction signed by ANZ's are not contrary to thereafter, concur in the
Human Resources Business Partner, Paula essential elements thereof: law, morals, good
Alcaraz (Alcaraz), informing him that the job customs, public order or public policy.
offer had been withdrawn on the ground that
the company found material inconsistencies in Smith, Bell & Co. v. CA, 267 SCRA 530 (1997)
his declared information and documents
provided after conducting a background check Q: XYZ Co. doing business under the style of
with his previous employer, particularly at Ching Chang Chong, Importer, bought and
Siemens. Asserting that his employment imported to the Philippines from the firm
contract had already been perfected upon his Shin Chan Tsu.,Ltd. of Taipei , Taiwan , 50
acceptance of the offer on June 8, 2011, and as metric tons of Dicalcium Phosphate , These
such, was already deemed an employee of were contained in 1,250 bags and shipped
ANZ who can only be dismissed for cause, from the Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan for the
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal Port of Manila. On July 27, 1982, this
dismissal with money claims against ANZ, shipment was insured by the defendant
Cruzada, and Alcaraz (respondents) before the Shingaling Insurance Co and stamped XYZ
NLRC, National Capital Region, relationship Co. as “claim agent” `against all risks’. Upon
with petitioner. They contended that their arrival, the shipped goods were not complete
offer was conditional and the effectivity of (of the 1,250 bags of the imported material, 600
petitioner's employment contract was subject were damaged by tearing at the sides of the
to a term his job application and interview that container bags and the contents partly empty.
prompted them to withdraw the offer or Also, the contents of the damaged bags were
period. Is an employment contract, like any found to be 18, 546. 0 kg short).
other contract, is perfected at the moment the
parties come to agree upon its terms and On October 16, the plaintiff filed with XYZ Co.
conditions? a formal statement of claim with proof of loss

and a demand for settlement of the claims are proven and undisputed, and if the
corresponding value of the losses. But XYZ Co. claim is disputed or is disapproved by the
denied liability. They said that a claim agent is principal, like in the instant case, the agent does
not personally liable under a policy in which not assume any personal liability. The recourse
it has not even taken part of. Is the settling of the insured is to press his claim against the
agent personally and / or solidarily liable upon principal. [Smith, Bell & Co. v. CA, 267 SCRA 530
a marine insurance policy issued by its (1997)]
disclosed foreign principal?
PH Credit Corporation v. CA, 370 SCRA 155
A: No. An adjustment and settlement agent is (2001)
no different from any other agent from the point Q: PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific
of view of his responsibility ( sic ), for he also Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H. Van
acts in a representative capacity. Whenever he Sebille and Federico C. Lim, for a sum of
adjusts or settles a claim, he does it on behalf of money before the Regional Trial Court. After
his principal, and his action is binding not upon service of summons upon the defendants, they
himself but upon his principal. failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period, hence they were
An insurance adjuster is ordinarily a special declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was then
agent for the person or company for whom he allowed to present its evidence ex-parte.
acts, and his authority is prima facie coextensive Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
with the business entrusted to him. plaintiff PH Credit Corporation and against
An adjuster does not discharge functions of a defendants Pacific Lloyd Corporation,
quasi - judicial nature, but represents his Thomas H. Van Sebille, Carlos M. Farrales,
employer, to whom he owes faithful service, and Federico C. Lim, ordering the latter to pay
and for his acts, in the employer's interest, the the former: 1. The sum of P118, 814.49 with
employer is responsible so long as the acts are interest of 18% per annum; 2. Surcharge of 16%
done while the agent is acting within the scope per annum; 3. Penalty Charge of 2% per
of his employment. month; 4. Attorney's fees; 5. Cost of suit.
After the aforesaid decision has become final
It, therefore, clearly appears that the scope and and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued
extent of the functions of an adjustment and and consequently implemented by the
settlement agent do not include personal assigned Deputy Sheriff. Personal and real
liability. His functions are merely to settle and properties of defendant Carlos M. Farrales
adjust claims in behalf of his principal if those were levied and sold at public auction wherein

PH Credit Corp. was the highest bidder. The whole obligation. Is the obligation a joint
personal properties were sold on August 2, obligation?
1984 at P18,900.00 while the real properties
were sold on June 21, 1989 for P1,294,726.00. A: A solidary obligation is one in which each of
On July 27, 1990, a motion for the issuance of a the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and
writ of possession was filed and on October each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
12, 1990, the same was granted. The writ of satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or
possession itself was issued on October 26, all of the debtors. On the other hand, a joint
1990. Said order and writ of possession are obligation is one in which each debtor is liable
now the subject of this petition. It appears that only for a proportionate part of the debt, and the
on January 31, 1991, respondent Judge issued creditor is entitled to demand only a
an order considering the assailed Order dated proportionate part of the credit from each
October 12, 1990 as well as the writ of debtor. The well-entrenched rule is that solidary
possession issued on October 26, 1990 as of no obligations cannot be inferred lightly. They
force and effect. The purpose of the petition is must be positively and clearly expressed. A
precisely to have the aforesaid order and writ liability is solidary "only when the obligation
of possession declared null and void, but the expressly states, when the law so provides or
same had already been declared of no force when the nature of the obligation so requires."
and effect' by the respondent Judge. It is a In the dispositive portion of the January 31, 1984
well-settled rule that courts will not determine Decision of the trial court, the word solidary
a moot question... or abstract proposition nor neither appears nor can it be inferred therefrom.
express an opinion in a case in which no The fallo merely stated that the following
practical relief can be granted. The Court of respondents were liable: Pacific Lloyd
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling Corporation, Thomas H. Van Sebille, Carlos M.
declaring null and void (a) the auction sale of Farrales and Federico C. Lim. Under the
Respondent Ferrales' real property and (b) the circumstances, the liability is joint, as provided
Writ of Possession issued in consequence by the Civil Code. We should stress that the
thereof. It held that, pursuant to the January respondent's obligation is based on the
31, 1984 Decision of the trial court, the... judgment rendered by the trial court. The
liability of Farrales was merely joint and not dispositive portion or the fallo is its decisive
solidary. Consequently, there was no legal resolution and is thus the subject of execution.
basis for levying and selling Farrales' real and The other parts of the decision may be resorted
personal properties in order to satisfy the to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for
the disposition. Where there is a conflict

between the dispositive part and the opinion of May the petitioner, PNB, be compelled to
the court contained in the text or body of the release the mortgage?
decision, the former must prevail over the latter
on the theory that the dispositive portion is the A: Yes. There are two phases involved in the
final order, while the opinion is merely a transactions between respondents PEPI and
statement ordering nothing. Hence the Dee; the first phase is the contract to sell, which
execution must conform with that which is eventually becomes the second phase, the
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion absolute sale, after Dee's full payment of the
of the decision. purchase price. In a contract of sale, the party’s
obligations are plain and simple. The law
4. Extinguishment obliges the vendor to transfer the ownership of
Philippine National Bank v. Dee, G.R. No. and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale.
182128, February 19, 2014 On the other hand, the principal obligation of a
Doctrine: Obligations of Parties in a contract vendee is to pay the full purchase price at the
of sale agreed time. The obligation of PEPI, as owners
and vendors of Lot 12, Block 21-A, Village East
Q: In July 1994, respondent Dee bought from Executive Homes, is to transfer the ownership
respondent Prime East Properties Inc. (Pepi) a of and to deliver Lot 12, Block 21-A to Dee, who,
residential lot in Binangonan, Rizal. in turn, shall pay, and has in fact paid, the full
Subsequently, PEPI assigned its rights over a purchase price of the property. The order of
213,093-sq m property to respondent Armed cancellation/release of the mortgage is simply a
Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and consequence of Dee’s full payment of the
Separation Benefits System, Inc. (AFP-RSBS), purchase price.
which included the property purchased by
Dee. Thereafter, on September 10, 1996, PEPI Sps. Bonrostro v. Sps. Luna, G.R. No. 172346,
obtained a P205,000,000.00 loan from July 24, 2013
petitioner Philippine National Bank Doctrine: “To have the effect of payment and
(petitioner), secured by a mortgage over the consequent extinguishment of the
several properties, including Dee’s property. obligation to pay, the law requires the
In July 1998, a deed of sale was executed by the companion acts of tender of payment and
respondents in Dee’s favor after full payment consignation."
of the purchase price. Consequently, Dee
sought from the petitioner the delivery of the Q: Constancia Luna as seller, entered into a
owners duplicate title but the latter refused. Contract to Sell with petitioner Lourdes

Bonrostro concerning a house and lot. Under realized payment if he had accepted the tender,
the terms and conditions, if Lourdes, the followed by a prompt attempt of the debtor to
vendee, fails to pay the amount of P630,000 on deposit the means of payment in court by way
the stipulated time, the contract to sell shall be of consignation, the accrual of interest on the
deemed cancelled and rescinded. obligation will be suspended from the date of
Immediately after the execution of the such tender. Here, the subject letter merely
contract, the spouses Bonrostro took states Lourdes’ willingness and readiness to
possession of the property. However, except pay but it was not accompanied by payment.
for the P200,000 down payment, Lourdes Hence, spouses Bonrostro are liable for interest
Bonrostro failed to pay the other stipulated on the installments due from the date of default
subsequent amortization payments. Hence, until fully paid.
spouses Luna filed a complaint for rescission
of contract and damages against the spouses Sps. Poon v. Prime Bank Savings, G.R. No.
Bonrostro. Is the contract to sell extinguished 183794, June 13, 2016
by rescission due to failure to pay the purchase Doctrine: Legal remedy of rescission is not
price in accordance with the terms of the limited to situations under art. 1381 and 1382.
contract? The Civil Code uses two different contexts. The
first refers to breach of contract under Art. 1191,
A: No. The Court believes that the defendants’ also known as the remedy of “resolution”;
delay in the payment of the two installments is the second is rescission by reason of lesion or
not so substantial as to warrant rescission of the economic prejudice under Art. 1381. The first
contract. Although, the defendant failed to pay is a principal action based on breach of a party,
the two installments in due time, she was able while the second is a subsidiary action.
to communicate with the plaintiffs through
letters requesting for an extension of two Q: During the 10-year contract of lease
months within which to pay the installments. between Spouses Poon as the lessor and Prime
However, plaintiff did not bother to get or pick- Savings Bank as the lessee (P60,000 monthly
up the money without any valid reason. It with advance payment of P6million), the
would be very prejudicial on the part of the Banko Sentral placed Prime Savings Bank
defendant if the contract to sell be rescinded under receivership of the PDIC and ordered its
considering that she made a down payment of litigation due to its fraudulent acts. Prime
₱200,000.00 Savings Bank vacated the premises and PDIC
When a tender of payment is made in such a demanded the return of unused advance
form that the creditor could have immediately rentals of PhP3,480,000. Spouses Poon refused.

Prime Savings Bank then commenced an abuse of Poon’s right under the contract on
action for rescission of contract and recovery the theory that they tenaciously enforced their
of sum of money. Spouses Poon invoked a right to forfeit the advanced rentals which was
provision in their contract which states that in bad faith since they knew that the bank was
should the leased premises be closed, deserted already insolvent. The forfeiture clause in the
or vacated by the lessee, the lessor shall have Contract is penal in nature. The forfeiture clause
the right to terminate the lease. The lessor therein was intended to prevent respondent
shall thereupon have the right to enter into a from defaulting on the latter's obligation to
new contract with another party. All advanced finish the term of the lease.
rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the lessor.
Can Prime Savings Bank be released from its Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, G.R. No. L-
contractual obligations to Poon on the ground 22825, February 14, 1925
of a fortuitous event? Can there be rescission Doctrine: Extinguishment of Obligation
in relation to the forfeiture of the advance
rentals? Q: On February 1, 1919, plaintiffs and
defendant Salvador Serra entered into a
A: 1) No. The closure of Prime Savings Bank contract of partnership marked Exhibit A, for
was neither a fortuitous nor an unforeseen the construction and exploitation of a railroad
event. In Tagaytay Realty vs. Gacutan the line from the "San Isidro" and "Palma" centrals
requisites for the application of Art. 1267 are: 1. to the place known as "Nandong." The original
The event could not have been foreseen at the capital stipulated was P150,000. It was
time of the execution of the contract; 2. It makes covenanted that the parties should pay this
performance of the contract extremely difficult amount in equal parts and the plaintiffs were
but not impossible; 3. It must not be due to the entrusted with the administration of the
act of any of the parties; 4. The contract is for a partnership. The agreed capital of P150,000,
future prestation. however, did not prove sufficient, as the
In this case, the first and third requisites are expenses up to May 15, 1920, had reached the
lacking. Since the lease was for 10 years, the amount of P226,092.92, as per statement
parties should have considered the possibility presented by the administrator and O.K.'d by
of closure of business. Further, the cause of the the defendant. On January 29, 1920, Salvador
breach of obligation was not independent of the Serra entered into a contract of sale with
will of the debtor. Venancio Concepcion, Phil. C. Whitaker, and
2) Yes. In the case at bar, the Prime Savings Eusebio R. de Luzuriaga, whereby he sold to
Bank’s right of action rests on the alleged the latter the estate and central known as

"Palma" with its running business, as well as planted at the time, together with all the
all the improvements, machineries and improvements made by Messrs. Phil. C.
buildings, real and personal properties, rights, Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion. Since the
choses in action and interests, including the defendant Salvador Serra failed to pay one-
sugar plantation of the harvest year of 1920 to half of the amount expended by the plaintiffs
1921, covering all the property of the vendor. upon the construction of the railroad line, that
Before the delivery to the purchasers of the is, P113,046.46, as well as Phil. C. Whitaker and
hacienda thus sold, Eusebio R. de Luzuriaga Venancio Concepcion, the plaintiffs instituted
renounced all his rights under the contract of the present action. Defendant Salvador Serra
January 29, 1920, in favor of Messrs. Venancio set up three special defenses: (1) The novation
Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker. The of the contract by the substitution of the
purchasers guaranteed the unpaid balance of debtor with the conformity of the creditors; (2)
the purchase price by a first and special the confusion of the rights of the creditor and
mortgage in favor of the vendor upon the debtor; and (3) the extinguishment of the
hacienda and the central with all the contract of partnership, Exhibit A. Is the
improvements, buildings, machineries, and contention of the defendant Salvador Serra
appurtenances then existing on the said tenable?
hacienda. Afterwards, on January 8, 1921,
Venancio Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker A: No. Defendant Salvador Serra's contention
bought from the plaintiffs the one-half of the that any person, who has contracted a valid
railroad line pertaining to the latter. So it obligation with a partnership, is exempt from
results that the "Hacienda Palma," with the complying with his obligation by the mere fact
entire railroad, the subject-matter of the of the dissolution of the partnership, is
contract of partnership between plaintiffs and untenable. The dissolution of a partnership
defendant, became the property of Whitaker must not be understood in the absolute and
and Concepcion. Phil. C. Whitaker and strict sense so that at the termination of the
Venancio Concepcion having failed to pay to object for which it was created the partnership
the defendant a part of the purchase price, that is extinguished, pending the winding up of
is, P750,000, the vendor, the herein defendant, some incidents and obligations of the
foreclosed the mortgage upon the said partnership, but in such case, the partnership
hacienda, which was adjudicated to him at the will be reputed as existing until the juridical
public sale held by the sheriff for the amount relations arising out of the contract are
of P500,000, and the defendant put in dissolved.
possession thereof, including what was

The dissolution of a firm does not relieve any of guarantee completion by Company B of its
its members from liability for existing scope of work in the Project. In turn, Company
obligations, although it does save them from B executed two Indemnity Agreements
new obligations to which they have not promising to compensate CCCIC for any
expressly or impliedly assented, and any of damages the insurance company might incur
them may be discharged from old obligations from issuing the Surety and Performance
by novation of other form of release. It is often Bonds. The Project commenced, however,
said that a partnership continues, even after Company B ceased performing its work in the
dissolution, for the purpose of winding up its Project after suffering financial problems.
affairs. (30 Cyc., page 659.) After discussions, Company A and Company
B then executed a new Agreement wherein
CCC Insurance Corp. v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., Company A recognized the "Completed
G.R. No. 156162, June 22, 2015 Portion of Work" of Company B and agreed to
Doctrine: Extinguishment of Obligation take over the unfinished portion of work of
Company B, referred to as "Transferred
Q: Company A and Company B executed a Portion of Work." They further agreed that
Consortium Agreement for the purpose of "any profit or benefit arising from the
contracting with the Philippine Government performance by Company A of the
for the construction of a fishing port network Transferred Portion of Work shall accrue to
in Pangasinan. According to their Consortium the latter. Company A informed CCCIC about
Agreement, Company A and Company B the cessation of operations of Company B, and
undertook to perform and accomplish their the failure of Company B to perform its
respective and specific portions of work in the obligations in the Project and repay the
intended contract with the Philippine advance payment made by Company A.
Government. The Project was awarded to the Consequently, Kawasaki formally demanded
Company A-Company B Consortium. that CCCIC, as surety, to pay Company A the
For the release of Company B’s share in the amounts covered by the Surety and
advance payment made by the Republic, Performance Bonds. However, CCCIC denied
Company B secured from CC Insurance any liability on its Surety and Performance
Corporation (CCIC) the following bonds in Bonds claiming that was released from its
favor of Company A: (a) Surety Bond to obligations as surety under the Surety and
counter-guarantee the amount of advance Performance Bonds because of the novation of
payment Company B would receive from the Consortium Agreement by the subsequent
Company A; and (b) Performance Bond to Agreement between Company A and

Company B without the consent of CCCIC. Is acquiesced to the payment but did not give her
CCCIC accurate in its claim? consent to enter into a new contract.
A: No. It is well-settled that novation is never Q: Leonida Quinto was convicted of the crime
presumed - novatio non praesumitur. As the estafa, the case started when Quinto asked and
party alleging novation, the onus of showing received in trust from one Aurelia Cariaga
clearly and unequivocally that novation had pieces of jewelry worth P36,000.00 for some
indeed taken place rests on CCCIC. The prospective buyer. They made an agreement
extinguishment of the old obligation by the new that after 5 days if Quinto had not sold the
one is a necessary element of novation which jewelry, it would be returned to the owner.
may be effected either expressly or impliedly. After 5 days Quinto failed to deliver back the
The term "expressly" means that the contracting jewelry and asked for an extension that results
parties incontrovertibly disclose that their in almost six months. Quinto claimed that the
object in executing the new contract is to solo ring was sold by certain Mrs. Camacho,
extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no the buyer paid in check on half amount only
specific form is required for an implied and the remaining half was paid by
novation, and all that is prescribed by law installments directly to Cariaga. Quinto also
would be an incompatibility between the two transacted with Mrs. Camacho the marques
contracts. While there is really no hard and fast and the ring, Mrs. Camacho then failed to pay
rule to determine what might constitute to be a the full amount. Quinto brought Cariaga to
sufficient change that can bring about novation, Mrs. Camacho and both of them agreed that
the touchstone for contrariety, however, would the payment will be in installments. Was there
be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the a novation when the private complainant
old and the new obligations. CCCIC failed to consented to receive payment on installments
discharge the burden of proving novation of the directly to the buyer?
Consortium Agreement by the Agreement.
(CCC Insurance Corp. v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., G.R. A: No. Novation is never presumed, and the
No. 156162, June 22, 2015) animus novandi, whether totally or partially,
must appear by express agreement of the
Quinto v. People, G.R. No. L- 126712, April 14, parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
1999 unequivocal to be mistaken.
Doctrine: There is no substitution of debtors There are 2 ways which could indicate the
since the private complainant merely presence of novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation by another

which substitutes the same. These are: a. When Ormoc Sugar Cane Planters Assn. Inc. v.
novation has been explicitly stated and declared Courts of Appeals, G.R. No. 156660, August 24,
in unequivocal terms. b. When the old and the 2009
new obligations are incompatible on every
point. The test of incompatibility is whether or Q: Petitioners are associations organized by
not the two obligations can stand together, each and whose members are individual sugar
one having its independent existence. If they planters (Planters). Respondents Hideco Sugar
cannot, they are incompatible and the latter Milling Co., Inc. (Hideco) and Ormoc Sugar
obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes Milling Co, Inc. (OSCO) are sugar centrals.
that breed incompatibility must be essential in Petitioners claimed that respondents violated
nature and not merely accidental. The the Milling Contract when they gave to
incompatibility must take place in any of the independent planters who do not belong to
essential elements of the obligation, such as its any association the 1% share, instead of
object, cause or principal conditions thereof; reverting said share to the centrals. Petitioners
otherwise, the change would be merely contended that respondents unduly accorded
modificatory in nature and insufficient to the independent Planters more benefits.
extinguish the original obligation. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on
The changes alluded to by the petitioner ground of lack of cause of action because
consists only in the manner of payment. There petitioners had no milling contract with
was really no substitution of debtors since the respondents. Respondents and these 80
private complainant merely acquiesced to the Planters were the signatories of the milling
payment but did not give her consent to enter contracts. Thus, it was the individual Planters,
into a new contract. and not petitioners, who had legal standing to
The fact alone that the creditor receives invoke the arbitration clause in the milling
guaranty or accepts payments from a third contracts. Petitioners, not being privy to the
party who has agreed to assume the obligation milling contracts, had no legal standing
does not constitute an extinctive novation whatsoever to demand or sue for arbitration.
absent an agreement that the first debtor shall Can the petitioners sue and demand for
be released from responsibility. arbitration independently of the Planters
because the milling contract is a contract pour
B. Contracts autrui under Article 1311 of the Civil Code?
1. General provisions
A: No. If a contract should contain some
stipulation in favor of a third person, he may

demand its fulfillment provided he line. On June 30, 1997, plaintiff filed a
communicated his acceptance to the obligor complaint for specific performance and
before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit damages before the Regional Trial Court of
or interest of a person is not sufficient. The Manila alleging that defendant PPA’s
contracting parties must have clearly and unjustified refusal to comply with its
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third undertaking, unnecessarily leading to the
person. To summarize, the requisites of a delay in the implementation of the award
stipulation pour autrui or a stipulation in favor under the August 26, 1993 Notice of Award,
of a third person are the following: (1) there has put on hold plaintiff’s men and resources
must be a stipulation in favor of a third person; earmarked for the project, aside from
(2) the stipulation must be a part, not the whole, effectively tying its hands in undertaking
of the contract; (3) the contracting parties must other projects for fear that plaintiff’s
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor incapacity to undertake work might be spread
upon a third person, not a mere incidental thinly and it might not be able to function
benefit or interest; (4) the third person must efficiently if the PPA project and other
have communicated his acceptance to the projects should require simultaneous
obligor before its revocation; and (5) neither of attention.
the contracting parties bears the legal Petitioner contends that the existence of
representation or authorization of the third "Notice of Award of Contract and Contractor’s
party. These requisites are not present in this Conforme thereto," resulting from its
case. negotiation with respondent, proves that a
Sarrgasso Construction & Development contract has already been perfected, and that
Corporation / Pick & Shovel Inc.,/ Atlantic the other documents enumerated under the
Erectors, Inc. (Joint Venture) v. Philippine amended Rules and Regulations
Ports Authority, G.R. No. 170630, July 5, 2010 implementing P.D. 1594 are mere physical
representations of the parties’ meeting of the
Q: On August 26, 1993, a Notice of Award minds; that the "Approval of Award by
signed by PPA General Manager Rogelio Approving Authority" is only a "supporting
Dayan was sent to plaintiff for the phase I document," and not an evidence of perfection
Reclamation Contract in the amount of of contract, and which merely "facilitates the
P30,794,230.89 and instructing it to "enter approval of the contract;" that PPA is bound by
into and execute the contract agreement with the acts of its general manager in issuing the
this Office" and to furnish the documents Notice of Award under the doctrine of
representing performance security and credit apparent authority; and that the doctrine of

estoppel, being an equitable doctrine, cannot created the apparent authority. In this case, not
be invoked to perpetuate an injustice against a single act of respondent, acting through its
petitioner. Was there a perfected contract Board of Directors, was cited as having clothed
between the parties for the reclamation its general manager with apparent authority to
project? In turn, depends on whether or not execute the contract with it.
the general manager of PPA is vested with
authority to enter into a contract for and on 2. Essential requisites
behalf of PP? Republic v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27905,
December 28 1970
A: Apparent authority, or what is sometimes Q: Fredie entered into an amicable settlement
referred to as the "holding out" theory, or with the Central Bank of the Philippines
doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, wherein both of them agreed to the dismissal
not as the result of the reality of a contractual of their respective amended petition and
relationship, but rather because of the actions of counterclaim. A Trade Assistance Agreement
a principal or an employer in somehow (TAA) was also entered into between Fredie
misleading the public into believing that the and the National Marketing Corporation
relationship or the authority exists. The (NAMARCO). To implement this agreement,
existence of apparent authority may be Fredie filed a petition to set aside the amicable
ascertained through (1) the general manner settlement. He argued otherwise by stating
in which the corporation holds out an officer that the entire transaction involves the TAA. Is
or agent as having the power to act or, in other the TAA the cause of the amicable settlement?
words, the apparent authority to act in general,
with which it clothes him; or (2) the A: No. TAA is only a motive of Fredie. Article
acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, 1351 of the civil Code Article 1351 of provides
with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, that" [t]he particular motives of the parties in
whether within or beyond the scope of his entering into a contract are different from the
ordinary powers. It requires presentation of cause thereof." Cause is the essential reason for
evidence of similar act(s) executed either in its the contract, while motive is the particular
favor or in favor of other parties. Easily reason of a contracting party which does not
discernible from the foregoing is that apparent affect the other party and which does not
authority is determined only by the acts of the preclude the existence of a different
principal and not by the acts of the agent. The consideration. (Cf. Gonzales, Et. Al. v. Trinidad,
principal is, therefore, not responsible where Et Al., 67 Phil., 682.). (Republic v. Cloribel, G.R.
the agent’s own conduct and statements have No. L-27905, December 28 1970)

contracts of sales, by receiving the

3. Reformation of instruments consideration offered in each transaction. RTC
4. Interpretation of contracts handed down its decision declaring the deeds
5. Rescissible contracts of sale of the properties null and void; The
6. Voidable contracts defendant is to return the lots in question
7. Unenforceable contracts including all improvements thereon to the
8. Void or inexistent contracts plaintiff and the plaintiff is ordered to
Francisco v. Herrera, G.R. No. 139982. simultaneously return to the defendant the
November, 21, 2002 purchase price of the lots sold and to pay the
Q: Eligio Herrera, Sr., the father of respondent, cost of the suit. The counterclaim of the
was the owner of two parcels of land. defendant is denied for lack of merit. CA
Petitioner bought from said landowner the affirmed the decision of RTC. Are the assailed
two lands paid in installments. Contending contracts of sale void or merely voidable and
that the contract price was grossly inadequate, hence capable of being ratified?
the children of Eligio, Sr. and respondent
Pastor Herrera, tried to negotiate with A: No. Both the RTC and the CA found that
petitioner to increase the purchase price. Eligio, Sr. was already mentally incapacitated
When petitioner refused, herein respondent when he entered into the contracts of sale. A
then filed a complaint for annulment of sale void or inexistent contract is one which has no
with the RTC claiming ownership over the force and effect from the very beginning. Hence,
second parcel and co-ownership of the it is as if it has never been entered into and
surviving heirs of Francisca A over the first cannot be validated either by the passage of
parcel of land. Finally, respondent also alleged time or by ratification. Article 1318 of the Civil
that the sale of the two lots was null and void Code states that no contract exists unless there
on the ground that at the time of sale, Eligio, is a concurrence of consent of the parties, object
Sr. was already incapacitated to give consent certain as subject matter, and cause of the
to a contract because he was already afflicted obligation established. Article 1327 provides
with senile dementia, characterized by that insane or demented persons cannot give
deteriorating mental and physical condition consent to a contract. But, if an insane or
including loss of memory. In his answer, demented person does enter into a contract, the
petitioner as defendant below alleged that legal effect is that the contract is voidable or
respondent was stopped from assailing the annullable as specifically provided in Article
sale of the lots. Petitioner contended that 1390. In the present case, it was established that
respondent had effectively ratified both the vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement

with petitioner, but that the former’s capacity to 31, 2002) shall be covered by assignment of
consent was vitiated by senile dementia. Hence, certain FPI assets sufficient to cover the
we must rule that the assailed contracts are not obligations even at today's depressed metal
void or inexistent per se; rather, these are prices.
contracts that are valid and binding unless The right to the work process owned by FPI
annulled through a proper action filed in court shall be made available to G. Holdings under
seasonably. the following options:
Option A
G. Holdings, Inc., v. Cagayan Electric Power As soon as metal prices and major costs justify,
and Light Company, Inc., G.R. N9o. 226213, FPI shall at its capital and expense operate the
September 27, 2018 plant including the assets transferred to G.
Q: GHI filed a case against Sheriff Baron, Holdings. Revenue shall be shared with G.
CEPALCO and FPI for Nullification of Holdings at the rate of 20% of EBITDA
Sheriffs Levy on Execution and Auction Sale, (Earnings Before Interest [,]Taxes,
Recovery of Possession of Properties and Depreciation and Amortization.)
Damages before the RTC-CDO. GHI claimed A minimum of P10.0 million annually shall be
that the levied ferro-alloy smelting facility, shared by G. Holdings. The [c]ost of
properties and equipment are owned by it as maintenance and upkeep of assets shall be
evidenced by a Deed of Assignment executed covered by FPI.
by FPI in consideration of P50,366,926.71. FPI, Option B
as the assignor, in consideration of obligations [G.] Holdings shall be the entity to operate the
amounting to P50,366,926.71, assigned, plant and business with its capital and
transferred, ceded and conveyed absolutely in expense.
favor of GHI, as the assignee, "all of the As owner of the rights to the work process, FPI
[assignor's properties, equipment and shall be entitled to a share of 10% in the
facilities, located in Phividec Industrial Estate, EBITDA with a minimum of P7.5 million per
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental and more. Prior to year.
the Deed of Assignment, FPI sent to GFII a This arrangement shall be for a minimum of 8
wherein the manner by which the obligation years after which G. Holdings can acquire the
of FPI amounting to P50,366,926.71 would be rights for an amount equal to P36.0 M.
addressed per their earlier discussions was All financial requirements shall be
confirmed, to wit: shouldered by G. Holdings x x x.
The obligation of FPI to G. Holdings The option shall be decided by G. Holdings
amounting to P50,366,926.71 (as of December within a three[-]year period beyond which the

choice shall be made by FPI within a 3[-] year representations or admissions or by his silence
period. The cycle will be repeated if the plant when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
has not operated for six years from through culpable negligence, induces another to
assignment.27 believe certain facts to exist and the other
The letter bears the conformity of GHI. In the rightfully relies and acts on such beliefs so that
case at bar, what type of a contract executed by he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted
FPI is the deed of Assignment? to deny the existence of such facts.
A: The Deed of Assignment is declared Q: Spouses Victoriano and Debbie Chung

inexistent for being absolutely simulated or contracted with respondent Ulanday
fictitious. The lack of intention on the part of FPI Construction, Inc. to construct within a 150-
to divest its ownership and control of "all of [its] day period the concrete structural shell of their
properties, equipment and facilities, located in two-storey residential house. It was stipulated
Phividec Industrial Estate, Tagoloan, Misamis in their contract, among others, that
Oriental" — in spite of the wordings in the Deed respondent Ulanday Construction cannot
of Assignment that FPI "assigned, transferred, change or alter the plans, specifications, and
ceded and conveyed [them] x x x absolutely in works without the petitioners’ prior written
favor of [GHI]" — is evident from the letter approval. During the construction, the
dated February 28, 2003 which reveals the true respondent effected 19 change orders without
intention of FPI and GHI. the petitioners’ prior written approval. The
FPI's intention was not to transfer absolutely the petitioner, however, paid change order No. 1
assigned assets to GHI in payment of FPI's and partially paid change order Nos. 16 and 17.
obligations to GHI amounting to P50,366,926.71. Applying estopped in pais, did the petitioners
FPI did not really intend to divest itself of its impliedly consent and ratify the change orders
title and control of the assigned properties. FPI's by payment of several change order billings
real intention was to place them beyond the and their inaction or non-objection to the
reach of its creditor. construction of the projects covered by the
change orders?
B. Natural obligations
C. Estoppel A: No. The petitioners’ payment of Change
Spouses Chung v. Ulanday Construction, Inc. Order Nos. 1, 16, and 17 and their non-objection
G.R. No. 156038, October 11, 2010 to the other change orders effected by the
Doctrine: Estoppel in pais, or equitable respondent cannot give rise to estoppel in pais
estoppel, arises when one, by his acts,

that would render the petitioners liable for the Q: During the pendency of appeal for a civil
payment of all change orders. case between Businessman Jose C. Go and
Estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel, arises BSP, Go, Ever Crest and Mega Heights entered
when one, by his acts, representations or into a compromise agreement to have their
admissions or by his silence when he ought to properties with their improvements be made
speak out, intentionally or through culpable subject to the writ of attachment in order "to
negligence, induces another to believe certain secure the faithful payment of the outstanding
facts to exist and the other rightfully relies and obligation of P2Billion, until such obligation
acts on such beliefs so that he will be prejudiced shall have been fully paid by defendants to
if the former is permitted to deny the existence plaintiff," and expressly assured Bangko
of such facts. Sentral in the same compromise agreement
In this case, the requirement for the petitioners’ that "all the corporate approvals for the
written consent to any change or alteration in execution of this Compromise agreement by
the specifications, plans and works is explicit in Ever Crest Golf Club Resort, Inc., and Mega
Article 1724 of the Civil Code and is deemed Heights, Inc., consisting of stockholders
written in the contract between the parties. The resolution and Board of Directors approval
contract also expressly provides that a mere act have already been obtained at the time of the
of tolerance does not constitute approval. Thus, execution of this Agreement." Said
the petitioners did not, by accepting and paying compromise agreement was approved by the
for Change Order Nos. 1, 16, and 17, do away RTC. Go, however, did not comply with its
with the contractual term on change orders nor provisions. Hence, Bangko Sentral move for
with the application of Article 1724. The the execution of the compromise agreement.
payments for Change Order Nos. 1, 16, and 17 The RTC issued the writ of execution against
are, at best, acts of tolerance on the petitioners’ Ever Crest. Can Go claim that such issuance of
part that could not modify the contract. the order of execution was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion because the execution was
Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. directed against the properties of Ever Crest
202262, July 8, 2015 despite Ever Crest being neither a defendant
Doctrine: Under estoppel by deed, a party to a in the cases between Bangko Sentral and Go,
deed and his privies are precluded from denying nor a signatory to the compromise agreement?
any material fact stated in the deed as against
the other party and his privies. A: No. Go and the others are estopped by deed
by virtue of the execution of the compromise
agreement. Under estoppel by deed, a party to

a deed and his privies are precluded from declarations be cancelled; and that the subject
denying any material fact stated in the deed as properties be reconveyed to her.
against the other party and his privies. They The RTC ruled that it found no express trust
were the ones who had offered the properties of created between Roberto and Margarita by
Ever Crest to Bangko Sentral, and who had also virtue merely of the said document as there
assured that all the legalities and formalities for was no evidence of another document
that purpose had been obtained. They should showing Roberto's undertaking to return the
not be allowed to escape or to evade their subject properties. On appeal, the CA
responsibilities under the compromise dismissed petitioner's claim that Roberto was
agreement just to prevent the levy on execution merely a trustee of the subject properties as
of Ever Crest’s properties. there was no evidence on record supportive of
the allegation that Roberto merely borrowed
D. Trusts the properties from Margarita upon his
Estate of Margarita Cabancungan v. Marilou promise to return the same on his arrival from
Laigo, G.R. No. 175, August 15, 2011 the United States. Further, it hypothesized that
Doctrine: Trusts granting the existence of an implied trust, still
Margarita’s action thereunder had already
Q: In 1968, Margarita Cabancungan executed been circumscribed by laches. Is the plaintiff’s
an Affidavit of Transfer merely to contention tenable?
accommodate the request of her son Roberto to
have the three properties in his name and A: Yes. A trust is the legal relationship between
thereby produce proof of ownership of certain one person having an equitable ownership of
real properties in the Philippines to support property and another person owning the legal
his U.S. visa application. When Roberto came title to such property, the equitable ownership
back to the Philippines, he sold the properties of the former entitling him to the performance
to Spouses Campos and to his adopted of certain duties and the exercise of certain
children Marilou and Pedro. Margarita only powers by the latter. Trusts are either express or
came to know of the sale during the wake of implied. Express or direct trusts are created by
Roberto. She imputed bad faith to Pedro, the direct and positive acts of the parties, by
Marilou and the Spouses Campos as buyers of some writing or deed, or will, or by oral
the lots, as they supposedly knew all along declaration in words evincing an intention to
that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the create a trust. Implied trusts - also called "trusts
properties. Hence, she principally prayed that by operation of law," "indirect trusts" and
the sales be annulled; that Roberto's tax "involuntary trusts" - arise by legal implication

based on the presumed intention of the parties Doctrine: Trusts

or on equitable principles independent of the
particular intention of the parties. Q: Mata Inc is a private corporation engaged in
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding providing goods and services to Star Kist
that there was no evidence on record showing Foods, Inc. As part of their agreement, Mata
that an implied trust relation arose between makes advances for the crew’s expenses,
Margarita and Roberto, we find that petitioner which Star Kist reimburses by telegraphic
before the trial court, had actually adduced transfer through banks. On Feb 21, 1976,
evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to SEPAC of Los Angeles, which had an
transfer to Roberto only the legal title to the arrangement with PNB, transmitted a cable
properties in question, with attendant message to PNB to pay $14,000 to Mata’s
expectation that Roberto would return the same account with Insular Bank of Asia and
to her on accomplishment of that specific America. PNB noticed an error, informed
purpose for which the transaction was entered SEPAC Bank, who replied with the correction
into. The evidence of course is not that the $14,000 is actually only for $1,400. On
documentary, but rather testimonial. the basis of this message, a cable check worth
As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, $1,400 was issued to Mata, from Star Kist.
Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive However, 14 days after, PNB issued another
trust, is merely a depositary of legal title having check to Star Kist in the amount of $14,000.
no duties as to the management, control or Almost 7 years later, PNB requested Mata for
disposition of the property except to make a a refund of the erroneous $14,000 check.
conveyance when called upon by the cestui que Thereafter, it filed a civil case for collection
trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with and refund of $14,000 arguing that based on
respondents are a wrongful conversion of the constructive trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil
trust property and a breach of the trust. Code, it has the right to recover the amount
This scenario is characteristic of a constructive erroneously credited to Mata. May PNB still
trust imposed by Article 1456 of the Civil Code, claim the US$14,000 it erroneously paid Mata
which impresses upon a person obtaining Inc. under a constructive trust?
property through mistake or fraud the status of
an implied trustee for the benefit of the person A: No. The basis of obligation is governed by
from whom the property comes. Art. 1456 on constructive trust. However, the
action to recover damages has already
Philippine National Bank vs. Courts of prescribed due to laches. It is a well-settled rule
Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1995 now that an action to enforce an implied trust,

whether resulting or constructive, may be which led to the issuance of a Transfer

barred not only by prescription but also by Certificate of Title (TCT) in the names of Luis
laches. Although only seven (7) years lapsed and Eulalio. Prior to the issuance of the TCT,
after PNB erroneously credited Mata Inc with Eulalio supposedly sold his and Flora’s share
the said amount and that under Article 1144, of the lot to Luis without Flora’s consent as
petitioner is well within the 10-year prescriptive covered by another Escritura de Venta (second
period for the enforcement of a constructive or sale). The second sale was registered and
implied trust, PNB’s claim cannot prosper since another TCT was issued in the names of Luis
it is already barred by laches. While and Eulalio, which was later cancelled for
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, another TCT issued solely in the name Luis,
laches deals with the effect of unreasonable married to Juana. In a Deed of Absolute Sale
delay. It is unbelievable for a bank, and a (third sale), Luis allegedly sold the property to
government bank at that, which regularly Spouses Epifanio and Veronica Bautista (Sps.
publishes its balanced financial statements Bautista) leading to the registration of a TCT
annually or more frequently, by the quarter, to in their name. Thereafter, the Sps. Bautista
notice its error only seven years later. took possession of the property and built
(Philippine National Bank vs. Courts of improvements on the same. Years later, Sps.
Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1995) Bautista donated the subject property to their
E. Quasi-Contracts four children to which TCTs were issued in
V. SALES their names. Sps. Cueno filed a complaint in
A. Nature and form 2008 for recovery of the subject property on the
1. Essential requisites ground that they were allegedly deprived of
Sps. Cueno v. Sps. Bautista, et.al., G.R. No. their share through fraud. On the other hand,
246445, March 2, 2021 Sps. Bautista claimed that they acquired the
Q: Lot No. 2836 was owned by the two sons of subject property in good faith and for value
Ramon Bonifacio who sold part of their from the registered owner, Luis, as evidenced
interest to the City of Zamboanga and became by the third sale. The Regional Trial Court
co-owners of the retained lot (subject (RTC) granted the complaint and declared the
property). Flora Bonifacio Cueno (Flora) is the second sale between Eulalio and Luis void.
daughter of Luis and is married to Eulalio Although the fraud and/or forger was not
Cueno (Eulalio). In 1961, Spouses Eulalio and proven, the RTC invalidated the sale for lack
Flora Cueno (Sps. Cueno) bought the pro of the spousal consent of Flora. On appeal, the
indiviso share of Isidro in the subject property Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of
as reflected in an Escritura de Venta (first sale), the RTC and held that the Sps. Bautista had a

better right over the subject properties. Was Prudential Bank(now BPI) v. Rapanot and
the second sale void for lack of spousal HLURB, G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017
consent pursuant to Article 166 of the Civil Q: A complains against GD Corporation for
Code? damages. A paid GD reservation fee for a unit
at the condominium. Prudential Bank, on the
A: NO. Article 166 of the Civil Code indicates other hand, extended a loan to GD to be
that “the husband cannot alienate or encumber utilized as additional working capital. GD
any real property of the conjugal partnership executed a Mortgage Agreement in favor of the
without the wife’s consent” and in relation bank constituting a real estate mortgage
thereto, Article 173 of the Civil Code provides covering several units still registered under
that “the wife may, during the marriage and them. This included A’s reserved unit. Later,
within ten years from the transaction GD and A entered a Contract to Sell covering
questioned ask the courts for the annulment of the unit he recently purchased. He completed
any contract of the husband entered into the payment in full and was issued the Deed
without her consent.” of Absolute Sale. A made several verbal
Based on various jurisprudence, two conflicting demands on the unit. Prompted by these
views in the interpretation of the above- demands, GD sent a letter to the Bank
mentioned provisions emerged: (a) The first requesting substitution of collateral for the
view treats such contracts as void: (i) on the purpose of replacing the said unit with
basis of lack of consent of an indispensable another of the same area. However, the bank
party; and/or (ii) because such transactions denied due to GD's unpaid accounts. A
contravene mandatory provisions of law; and requested several demands of formal delivery
(b) The second view holds that the absence of through his counsel of his unit but neither
such consent indicated under Article 166 does Prudential nor GD complied. Bank answered
not render the entire transaction void but only when A raised this to HLURB however,
merely voidable in accordance with Article 173 they only responded thru email with the
of the Civil Code. content "refuse to respond". So, HLURB made
2. Perfection null and void the mortgage of A's unit. They
3. Contract of sale v. contract to sell also directed the Registry of Deeds of
B. Capacity to buy or sell Mandaluyong to cancel the mortgage. Bank
C. Effects of the contract when the thing sold filed motions of reconsideration and contend
has been lost that they were not given due process to
D. Obligations of vendor answer. Can the Bank be considered a
E. Obligations of vendee mortgagee in good faith?

Q: Private respondent Elias Colarina bought

A: No. The doctrine of "mortgagee in good on instalment from Petitioner Magna
faith" is based on the rule that all persons Financial Services Group, Inc., one (1) unit
dealing with property covered by a certificate of Suzuki Multicab. To secure payment thereof,
title, as mortgagees, are not required to go Colarina executed an integrated promissory
beyond what appears on the face of the title. A note and deed of chattel mortgage over the
person who deliberately ignores a significant motor vehicle. Colarina failed to pay the
fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise complete monthly amortization and despite
reasonable person cannot be deemed a repeated demands from Magna, the former
mortgagee in good faith. The nature of the failed to make the necessary payment. Magna
Bank's business precludes it from feigning then instituted a complaint for foreclosure of
ignorance of the need to confirm that such chattel mortgage with replevin before the
requirements are complied with prior to the MTCC of Legaspi City. In its complaint,
release of the loan in favor of Golden Dragon, in Magna prayed for both 1.) the payment of the
view of the exacting standard of diligence it is principal sum with penalty charges plus
required to exert in the conduct of its affairs. In liquidated damages, and 2.) for Colarina to
granting the loan, petitioner bank should not surrender possession of the Multicab.
have been content merely with a clean title, The MTCC granted the prayer for the issuance
considering the presence of circumstances a writ replevin and upon service of a copy of
indicating the need for a thorough investigation the same to respondent by the sheriff, the
of the existence of buyers like the respondent. respondent voluntarily surrendered
Having been wanting care and prudence, the possession of the motor vehicle to said sheriff.
latter cannot be deemed to be an innocent The MTCC then rendered its decision in favor
mortgagee. Petitioner cannot claim to be a of Magna, ordering Colarina to pay, among
mortgagee in good faith. (Prudential Bank(now others, the principal amount plus penalty
BPI) v. Rapanot and HLURB, G.R. No. 191636, charges. The MTCC also declared that should
January 16, 2017) Colarina default in paying the money
judgment, the subject motor vehicle shall be
F. Breach of contract sold at a public auction to satisfy said
1. Remedies judgment. Colarina appealed to the RTC of
2. Recto Law and Maceda Law Legaspi City. During the pendency of his
Levy Hermanos v. Gervacio, 1939 appeal before the RTC, Colarina died and was
Doctrine: Recto Law substituted in the case by his heirs. The RTC
rendered its judgment affirming in toto the

decision of the MTCC. Colarina’s heirs filed a amortizations which is a remedy that is
Petition for Review before the Court of provided under Article 1484 of the Civil Code,
Appeal, which reversed and set aside the allowing an unpaid vendee to exact fulfillment
decision of both the MTCC and the RTC. of the obligation. At the same time, petitioner
Applying Article 1484 of the Civil Code of the prayed that Colarina be ordered to surrender
Philippines, the CA ordered the foreclosure of possession of the vehicle so that it may
the chattel mortgage over the subject vehicle ultimately be sold at public auction, which
without any right on the part of Magna to seek remedy is contained under Article 1484. Such a
the payment of unpaid balance of the purchase scheme is not only irregular but is a flagrant
price. According to the appellate court, the circumvention of the prohibition of the law. By
MTC and the RTC erred in ordering the praying for the foreclosure of the chattel, Magna
defendant to pay the unpaid balance of the Financial Services Group, Inc. renounced
purchase price of the subject vehicle whatever claim it may have under the
irrespective of the fact that the complaint filed promissory note. Article 1484, paragraph 3,
by petitioner was for the foreclosure of its provides that if the vendor has availed himself
chattel mortgage. of the right to foreclose the chattel mortgage,
The judgment of the lower court in effect “he shall have no further action against the
allowed Mana to retain the possession and purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the
ownership of the subject vehicle and at the purchase price. Any agreement to the contrary
same time claim against the defendant for the shall be void.” In other words, in all
unpaid balance of its purchase price. Whether proceedings for the foreclosure of chattel
petitioner availed of avail itself of the first and mortgages executed on chattels which have
third remedies under Article 1484; and was been sold on the installment plan, the
there an actual foreclosure of the subject motor mortgagee is limited to the property included in
vehicle? the mortgage. In sum, since the petitioner has
undeniably elected a remedy of foreclosure
A: 1) The Supreme Court says YES. It is under Article 1484(3) of the Civil Code, it is
unmistakable that petitioner preferred to avail bound by its election and thus may not be
itself of the first and third remedies under allowed to change what it has opted for nor to
Article 1484, at the same time suing for replevin. ask for more. On this point, the Court of
For this reason, the Court of Appeals justifiably Appeals correctly set aside the trial court’s
set aside the decision of the RTC. Perusing the decision and instead rendered a judgment of
Complaint, the petitioner, under its prayer foreclosure as prayed for by the petitioner.
number 1, sought for the payment of the unpaid

2) The Supreme Court says NO. In the case at her their respective pro indiviso shares in the
bar, there is no dispute that the subject vehicle subject lot for P50,000.00. After the execution
is already in the possession of the petitioner, of the DAS, Nena immediately took
Magna Financial Services Group, Inc. However, possession of the subject lot. Instead of paying
actual foreclosure has not been pursued, cash, she executed a Promissory Note (PN) in
commenced or concluded by it. Where the favor of petitioners whereby she obligated
mortgagee elects a remedy of foreclosure, the herself to pay P50,000.00 without interest.
law requires the actual foreclosure of the Despite non-payment of the purchase price
mortgaged chattel. As held in the case Manila and the absence of Alden's signature on the
Motor Co. v. Fernandez, it is actual sale of the DAS, Nena was able to cause the registration
mortgaged chattel in accordance with Sec. 14 of of the document with the Register of Deeds of
Act No. 1508 that would bar the creditor (who Capiz, and a new title was issued to her. Did
chooses to foreclose) from recovering any Nena constitute breach of contract in the
unpaid balance. And it is deemed that there has contract of sale?
been foreclosure of the mortgage when all the
proceedings of the foreclosure, including the A: Yes. Pursuant to Article 1458 of the Civil
sale of the property at public auction, have been Code, a contract of sale is a reciprocal obligation
accomplished. to give; and the prestation or obligation of the
seller or vendor is "to transfer the ownership of
Vito v. Moises-Palma, G.R. No. 224466, March and to deliver a determinate thing" while the
27, 2019 prestation or obligation of the buyer or vendee
Doctrine: Breach of Contract is "to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent." The full payment of the purchase
Q: Vicente, the original owner of a lot located price is the buyer's prestation.
in Mambusao, Capiz (subject lot) borrowed The non-payment of the purchase price by the
P30,000.00 from Rosy and as security, executed buyer after the seller has delivered the object of
a real estate mortgage over the subject the sale to the buyer constitutes a breach of the
property. Since Rosy had no money, the funds buyer's prestation in a contract of sale. The
came from Nena, Rosy’s daughter. Upon buyer has contravened the very tenor of the
Vicente’s death, the subject lot was contract.
transmitted to his heirs, On June 28, 1995, With respect to the sale of immovable
Nena was able to have all petitioners, except properties, the remedies of the vendor are
Alden, sign a Deed of Adjudication and Sale provided in the following Civil Code
(DAS) wherein petitioners purportedly sold to provisions:

ART. 1591. Should the vendor have reasonable the execution of the contracts; that the price for
grounds to fear the loss of immovable property the land was insufficient as it was sold only
sold and its price, he may immediately sue for for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of
the rescission of the sale: the lot should be P1,000.00 per square meter,
Should such ground not exist, the provisions of Gertrudes acquired from the then Department
Article 1191 shall be observed. of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
ART. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, a parcel of land with an area of one hundred
even though it may have been stipulated that (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Niño,
upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer
upon the rescission of the contract shall of right Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed
take place, the vendee may pay, even after the of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow.
expiration of the period, as long as no demand Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners,
for rescission of the contract has been made the spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in
upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest,
After the demand, the court may not grant him payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan
a new term. (Vito v. Moises-Palma, G.R. No. was secured by a mortgage over the property
224466, March 27, 2019) covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes,
however, failed to pay the loan on the due
G. Extinguishment date. Gertrudes executed two contracts in
1. In general favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is
2. Pacto de retro sale denominated as "Kasunduan" which the
Cruz v. Leis, G.R. No. 125233, March 9, 2000; parties concede is a pacto de retro sale,
327 SCRA 570 granting Gertrudes one year within which to
Q: Private respondents, the heirs of spouses repurchase the property. For failure of
Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro, filed an Gertrudes to repurchase the property,
action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ownership thereof was consolidated in the
of Pasig seeking the nullification of the name of Alexander Cruz. Gertrudes Isidro
contracts of sale over a lot executed by died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private
Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner respondents, received demands to vacate the
Alexander Cruz, as well as the title premises from petitioners, the new owners of
subsequently issued in the name of the latter. the property. May a co-owner acquire
Private respondents claimed that the contracts exclusive ownership over the property held in
were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was common?
illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of

A: Yes. It bears stressing that notwithstanding Molina filed an action for reformation of
Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of instrument and/or annulment of document
Property of the consolidation of ownership of and title with reconveyance and damages
the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the Cavite, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale
owners of the subject property since neither does not express the true will of the parties.
Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the The RTC ruled in favor of Molina and ordered
same within the one-year period stipulated in the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de Margarito and Nerisa appealed to the Court of
retro sale is that title and ownership of the Appeals which reversed the RTC‘s decision
property sold are immediately vested in the and dismissed the complaint of Molina. Did
vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory the parties intend the Deed of Absolute Sale
condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro in favor of Flores and Herrera to be an absolute
within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the sale or an equitable mortgage?
vendor a retro to perform said resolutory
condition vests upon the vendee by operation of A: For the presumption of an equitable
law absolute title and ownership over the mortgage to arise under Art. 1602, two (2)
property sold. As title is already vested in the requisites must concur: (a) that the parties
vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title entered into a contract denominated as a
under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not contract of sale, and (b) that their intention was
impair such title or ownership for the method to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage.
prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose In the case at bar, the second requisite is
of registering the consolidated title. conspicuously absent. That the alleged loan was
received by Molina in installments of P1,000.00
3. Equitable mortgage per month for ten months or a total of P10,000.00
Molina v. CA, 2003 in fact indicates that the transaction was not one
Q: More than four years after petitioner Pedro of a loan but of sale on installment.
Molina (Molina) executed the Deed of Sale Molina argues that assuming arguendo that a
conveying his share of the property to his contract of sale was entered into, it was not
sister Felisa, Molina executed another Deed of consummated as the entire purchase price was
Absolute Sale in lieu of the first deed covering not paid. Assuming that to be so albeit, by the
the same share in favor of Felisa‘s son Deed in question Molina acknowledged receipt
respondent Margarito Flores and his wife of the P8,000.00 purchase price, it does not by
Nerisa Herrera. itself bar the transfer of the ownership or

possession of the property, much less dissolve Q: Petitioners Eufemia Evangelista, Manuela
the contract of sale. The contract remains but the Evangelista, and Francisca Evangelista
payment of the price is a resolutory condition, borrowed a sum of money from their father
and the remedy of the seller is to exact and, together with their personal monies, used
fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to such amount to purchase real properties. After
rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the having bought real propertie, petitioners had
Civil Code. such real properties rented or leased to various
That Molina, prior to the execution of the tenants leaving them a total net income of
impugned Deed, signed receipts under which P26,061.81 from March 1945 to 1948. In
he acknowledged receiving sums of money as September 24, 1945, respondent Collector of
payment for his property, which receipts were Internal Revenue demanded payment of
worded in the vernacular and could not have income tax on corporation, real estate dealer’s
been mistaken or misunderstood for anything fixed tax and corporation residence tax.
else other than as evidence of the sale of his Petitioners instituted the case in the Court of
property, seals the case against him. It confirms Tax Appeals, with a prayer that they be
this Court‘s earlier observation that the absolved from payment of the taxes in
transaction indicated was one of sale on question. Are petitioners subject to the tax on
installment. Corporations provided for in Section 24 of
H. Assignment of credits Commonwealth Act No. 466?
VI. LEASE
A. General provisions A: Yes. Article 1767 of the Civil Code of the
B. Rights and obligations of the lessor Philippines provides:
C. Rights and obligations of the lessee By the contract of partnership two or more
VII. PARTNERSHIP persons bind themselves to contribute money,
A. General provisions properly, or industry to a common fund, with
Evangelista v. Collector of Internal Revenue, the intention of dividing the profits among
G.R. No. L-9996, October 15, 1987 themselves.
Doctrine: Article 1767 of the Civil Code of the Pursuant to the article, the essential elements of
Philippines provides: By the contract of a partnership are two, namely: (a) an agreement
partnership two or more persons bind to contribute money, property or industry to a
themselves to contribute money, properly, or common fund; and (b) intent to divide the
industry to a common fund, with the intention profits among the contracting parties.
of dividing the profits among themselves. The first element is undoubtedly present in the
case at bar, for, admittedly, petitioners have

agreed to, and did, contribute money and IX. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
property to a common fund. A. Loan
As to the second element, upon consideration of Radiowealth Finance Co. Palieo, G.R. No.
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 83432 May 20, 1991
case, we are fully satisfied that their purpose Doctrine: Under Act No. 3344, registration of
was to engage in real estate transactions for instruments affecting unregistered lands is
monetary gain and then divide the same among “without prejudice to a third party with a
themselves. First, said common fund was not better right”.
something they found already in existence.
Second, they invested the same, not merely in Q: Spouses Castro sold to Palileo a parcel of
one transaction, but in a series of transactions. unregistered coconut land. The sale is
Third, he aforesaid lots were not devoted to evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute
residential purposes, or to other personal uses, Sale. The deed was not registered in the
of petitioners. Fourth, the affairs relative to said Registry of Property for unregistered lands.
properties have been handled as if the same Since the execution of the deed of sale, Palileo
belonged to a corporation or business and exercised acts of ownership over the land
enterprise operated for profit. Fifth, the through his mother as overseer. Palileo has
foregoing conditions have existed for more than continuously paid the real estate taxes on said
ten (10) years, or, to be exact, over fifteen (15) land from 1971 until the present.
years. Lastly, Petitioners have not testified or Consequently, RTC issued a writ of execution
introduced any evidence, either on their against the Spouse Castro in favor of
purpose in creating the set up already adverted Radiowealth Finance Company. Provincial
to, or on the causes for its continued existence. Sheriff levied upon and finally sold at public
They did not even try to offer an explanation auction the subject land that Castro had earlier
therefor. sold to Palileo. A certificate of sale was
executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance
B. Obligations of the partners Company. After the redemption period has
C. Dissolution and winding up expired, a deed of final sale was also executed.
D. Limited partnership Both the certificate of sale and the deed of
VIII. AGENCY final sale were registered in the Register of
A. Nature, form and kinds Deeds. Who is the rightful owner of the
B. Obligations of the agent unregistered coconut land?
C. Obligations of the principal
D. Modes of extinguishment

A: Palileo has the superior right over the land. neighboring subdivision; that in the process,
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments respondent CMS Construction, with the
affecting unregistered lands is “without knowledge and consent of respondent MWSS
prejudice to a third party with a better right”. but without petitioner's knowledge and
The aforequoted phrase means that the mere consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give the latter's new and separate water service
him any right over the land if the vendor was connection on Visayas Avenue; that on May
not the current owner of the land having 28, 1992, petitioner's members were waterless,
previously sold the same to somebody else even which lasted for three (3) days, and that
if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Applying this petitioner's polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes
principle, the execution sale of the unregistered and radius elbow, valued at around P30,000.00,
land in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company were stolen by respondent CMS
is of no effect because the land no longer Construction's workers; that when petitioner's
belonged to the Spouses Castro as of the time of officers discovered the illegal cutting of the
the said execution sale. Article 1544 of the Civil water connection on May 30, 1992, they
Code cannot be invoked to benefit the immediately complained to the respondents
purchaser at the execution sale though the latter and demanded for the restoration of their
was a buyer in good faith and even if this water line; that respondent CMS Construction
second sale was registered. only made a temporary reconnection with the
use of a 2-inch rubber hose to the new water
B. Deposit line it constructed at Sanville Subdivision;
C. Guaranty and Suretyship and that despite petitioner's verbal and
D. Quasi-Contracts written demands, respondents have failed to
X. TORTS AND DAMAGES restore petitioner's water line connection in its
A. Torts original state and to return the missing PVC
1. Elements pipes and radius elbow. Does performance of
Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners a duty may result in damages even if the act is
Association Inc., v. CMS Construction and not illicit?
Development Corp., G.R. No. 209359
Q: Sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS A: Yes. "Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was
Construction made diggings and excavations, intended to expand the concept of torts by
and started to lay water pipes along Fisheries granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
Street and Morning Star Drive in Sanville number of moral wrongs which is impossible
Subdivision, Quezon City, petitioner's for human foresight to provide[,] specifically in

statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in without the latter's consent and notification
one's acts can make him liable for damages for thereby causing prejudice or injury to the
injury caused thereby, with more reason should petitioner's members because of the unexpected
abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence water loss for three (3) days. Respondents'
of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good actions were done in total disregard of the
faith is an honest intention to abstain from standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil
taking any unconscientious advantage of Code which entitles petitioner to damages.
another, even though the forms or technicalities Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. Adriano
of the law, together with an absence of all Savillo, G.R. No. 149547, July 4, 2008
information or belief of fact which would render Doctrine: Elements of Torts
the transaction unconscientious. Q: Facundo purchased a ticket from PAL with
"While Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] may the following itinerary: Manila-Singapore-
have been intended as a mere declaration of Jakarta-Singapore-Manila. PAL would take
principle, the 'cardinal law on human conduct' them from Manila to Singapore, while
expressed in said article has given rise to certain Singapore Airlines would take them from
rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his Singapore to Jakarta. When they arrived in
rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or Singapore, Singapore Airlines rejected the
performs his duties in a manner that is not in tickets of Facundo because they were not
keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens endorsed by PAL. Due to being stranded at the
himself to liability. airport, Facundo was subjected to panic and
The elements of an abuse of rights under Article humiliation. They were also forced to
19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which purchase a separate set of tickets to go to
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of Jakarta. 3 years later, Facundo filed a
prejudicing or injuring another." complaint for damages against PAL but PAL
The Court further held that the respondents filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Article
admitted in their respective Comments that the 29 of the Warsaw Convention governed the
inconvenience of the temporary stoppage of case, as it provides that any claim for damages
water supply in petitioner's area was highly in connection with the international
inevitable in the process of changing petitioner's transportation of persons is subject to the
water pipe size crossing the bridge up to prescription period of 2 years. Is Facundo’s
Visayas Avenue where the tapping source is action for damages barred by prescription
connected. Notwithstanding, respondents applying the rules on Warsaw Convention?
proceeded with the cutting off and
disconnection of petitioner's water connection

A: No. The present case involves a special she ascertained that the host celebrant did not
species of injury resulting from the failure of invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told
PAL and/or Singapore Airlines to transport the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food
private respondent from Singapore to Jakarta - and leave the party. Reyes however made a
the profound distress, fear, anxiety and scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a
humiliation that private respondent policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the
experienced when, despite PAL's earlier party. According to Reyes, he was invited by
assurance that Singapore Airlines confirmed his Dr. Violeta Filart but the latter denied the
passage, he was prevented from boarding the claim. Was Ruby Lim acted abusively in
plane and he faced the daunting possibility that asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party.
he would be stranded in Singapore Airport
because the PAL office was already closed. A: No. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit
These claims are covered by the Civil Code injuria*, by coming to the party uninvited,
provisions on tort, and not within the purview Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned
of the Warsaw Convention. Hence, the away, and thus being embarrassed.
applicable prescription period is that provided The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted.
under Article 1146 of the Civil Code: Art. 1146. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself
The following actions must be instituted within denied inviting Reyes into the party and that
four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even
plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict. present any supporting evidence to support any
Thus, private respondent's claims have not yet of his claims. Since he brought injury upon
prescribed. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be
Adriano Savillo, G.R. No. 149547, July 4, 2008) held liable for damages.
*The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to
NikkoHotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, g.R. No. which a person assents is not esteemed in law
154259, February 28, 2005 as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to
Q: An exclusive party was being held at the the consent to injury which precludes the
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for a prominent recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
Japanese national. The person in charge at the and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
party was Ruby Lim who was also the if he is not negligent in doing so.
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during
the party, she noticed Robert Reyes was not on Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. CA,
the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to 176 SCRA 778 (1989)
find out who invited Reyes to the party. When

Q: Tobias was employed by Mackay as Tobias was never hired by the said employer
purchasing agent and administrative assistant which caused him to file an action for damages
to the engineering operations manager. In for malicious prosecution and abusive acts of
1972, Mackay discovered fictitious purchases the petitioners. Are Mackay and Hendry liable
and other fraudulent transactions which for damages?
caused significant loss to the company. Tobias
claimed that he discovered it and reported the A: Yes. When a right is exercised in a manner
incident to his immediate superiors, Mackay which does not conform with the norms
and Hendry. Soon after making the report, enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
Tobias was considered as the primary suspect another, a legal wrong is committed for which
by Hendry and he was instructed to take a the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
forced leave. Two separate investigations by while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the police were conducted which confirmed the government of human relations and for the
Tobias’ non-participation in the incident. maintenance of social order, it does not provide
Despite the said conclusions made by the a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
police, the petitioners filed six (6) complaints for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
against Tobias for estafa which were would be proper.
subsequently dismissed. During the course of Article 20, which pertains to damage arising
the filing of criminal charges, Tobias’ from a violation of law, provides that: Every
employment was terminated which prompted person who contrary to law, willfully or
him to file a case for illegal dismissal with the negligently causes damage to another, shall
labor arbiter. The labor arbiter upheld the indemnify the latter for the same.
validity of the dismissal but upon appeal to However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim
the NLRC, it was reversed. The petitioners that they did not violate any provision of law
appealed to the Secretary of Labor which since they were merely exercising their legal
upheld the decision of the labor arbiter. The right to dismiss private respondent. This does
respondent then raised the matter to the Office not, however, leave private respondent with no
of the President but during the pendency of relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
the proceedings, the parties entered into a provides that:
compromise agreement. Tobias then applied Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
for other employment but Hendry wrote a to another in a manner that is contrary to
letter to the prospective employer, without the morals, good customs or public policy shall
latter’s request, that Tobias’ employment was compensate the latter for the damage.
terminated due to dishonesty. As a result,

The question of whether or not the principle of Q: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other her gall bladder. She was told to undergo an
applicable provision of law, depends on the operation and after some tests and exams, she
circumstances of each case.The petitioners have was indicated fit for surgery. Dr. Orlino
indeed abused the right that they invoke, Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda
causing damage to private respondent and for should undergo a “cholecystectomy”
which the latter must now be indemnified. An operation. Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked
employer who harbors suspicions that an Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.
employee has committed dishonesty might be Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda
justified in taking the appropriate action such as (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda
ordering an investigation and directing the to the operating room and saw Dr. Gutierrez,
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the the other defendant, who was to administer
resolve to uncover the truth would also be anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived around
expected from such employer. But the high- 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the
handed treatment accorded Tobias by operation continued and Herminda then saw
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to her saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali
continue when the private respondent returned yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish
to work. The imputation of guilt without basis discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the
and the pattern of harassment during the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an order for
investigations of Tobias transgress the someone to call Dr. Calderon, another
standards of human conduct set forth in Article anesthesiologist. The patient was placed in a
19 of the Civil Code. (Globe Mackay Cable and trendelenburg position for decrease of blood
Radio Corp. v. CA, 176 SCRA 778 (1989)) supply in her brain. At 3:00 PM, the patient
was taken to the ICU. Four months after, the
2. Culpa aquiliana v. culpa contractual v. patient was released from the hospital.
culpa criminal However, the patient has been in a comatose
3. Vicarious liability condition.
4. Res ipsa loquitur Hence, the petition filed a civil case for
Ramos v. CA (1999) damages against herein private respondents
Doctrine: res ipsa loquitu alleging negligence in the management and
care of Erlinda Ramos. Petitioners contended
that the faulty management of her airway

casused the lack of oxygen in the patient’s Considering that a sound and unaffected
brain. On the respondent’s part, they member of the body (the brain) is injured or
contended that the brain damage was Erlinda's destroyed while the patient is unconscious and
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. Will under the immediate and exclusive control of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply in this the physicians, we hold that a practical
case? administration of justice dictates the application
of res ipsa loquitur.
A: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where
the thing which caused the injury complained 5. Last clear chance
of is shown to be under the management of the Picart v. Smith
defendant or his servants and the accident is Q: Sergio was riding on his horse over Jones
such as in ordinary course of things does not Bridge when Brad’s automobile approached
happen if those who have its management or him from the opposite direction. Brad blew his
control use proper care, it affords reasonable horn to give warning of his approach. He
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the continued his course and after he had taken
defendant, that the accident arose from or was the bridge he gave two more successive blasts,
caused by the defendant's want of care. as it appeared to him that the man on
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is horseback before him was not observing the
applicable, the court is permitted to find a rule of the road.
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury Sergio saw the automobile coming and heard
to the patient, without the aid of expert the warning signals. However, being
testimony, where the court from its fund of perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or
common knowledge can determine the proper the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
standard of care. pony closely up against the railing on the right
Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for side of the bridge instead of going to the left.
surgery. However, during the administration of As the automobile approached, Brad guided it
anesthesia and prior to the performance of toward his left, that being the proper side of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable the road for the machine. In so doing the
damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing defendant assumed that the horseman would
surgery, she went out of the operating room move to the other side. Unfortunately, Sergio
already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. and Brad got into a collision resulting in the
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda death of the horse and Sergio received
sustained, is an injury which does not normally contusions which caused temporary
occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. unconsciousness and required medical

attention for several days. Is Brad in Philippine National Railways, et al. v. Vizcara,
maneuvering his car in the manner above et al., G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012
described guilty of negligence? Q: On May 14, 2004, at about three o'clock in
the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara was driving a
A: Yes. The control of the situation had then passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his deliver onion crops, with his companions,
duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop namely, Cresencio Vizcara, Crispin Natividad,
or, seeing that there were no other persons on Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador
the bridge, to take the other side and pass Antonio and Joel Vizcara. While crossing the
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the National Railways (PNR) train, then being
defendant ran straight on until he was almost operated by respondent Japhet Estranas,
upon the horse. suddenly turned up and rammed the
A prudent man, placed in the position of the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to
defendant, would in our opinion, have the instantaneous death of Reynaldo,
recognized that the course which he was Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would hand, Dominador and Joel sustained serious
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and physical injuries. At the time of the accident,
the rider as a reasonable consequence of that there was no level crossing installed at the
course. Under these circumstances the law railroad crossing. Additionally, the "Stop,
imposed on the defendant the duty to guard Look and Listen" signage was poorly
against the threatened harm. maintained. The "Stop" signage was already
Consequently, “last clear chance” rule is faded while the "Listen" signage was partly
applicable. In other words, when a traveler has blocked by another signboard. Does the
reached a point where he cannot extricate doctrine of last clear chance find application in
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert this instant case?
the injury, his negligence in reaching that
position becomes the condition and not the A: No. The doctrine of last clear chance is not
proximate cause of the injury and will not applicable. The doctrine of last clear chance
preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. provides that where both parties are negligent
Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.) (Picart v. Smith, Jr. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918) in point of time than that of the other, or where
it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the

incident, the one who had the last clear hence Iran must be held liable. Is Engada
opportunity to avoid the impending harm but correct?
failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. The proximate A: No. Engada's negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision was PNR’s negligence in cause of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he
ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike did not see to it first that the opposite lane was
may safely cross the railroad track. The free of oncoming traffic and was available for a
unsuspecting driver and passengers of the safe passage. After seeing the Tamaraw jeepney
jeepney did not have any participation in the ahead, he did not slow down. What has been
occurrence of the unfortunate incident which shown is the presence of an emergency and the
befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any proper application of the emergency rule.
overt act manifesting disregard for their own Endaga’s act of swerving to the Tamaraw’s lane
safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as
the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time
clear chance cannot be applied. Thus, the and opportunity to ponder the situation at all.
supreme court ruled in favor of Vizcara. Iran cannot be held liable.
Rogelio Engada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. Bustamante v. CA, 193 SCRA 603, 1991
140698, June 30, 2003 Q: A cargo truck and a passenger bus were
Q: Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota approaching each other, coming from the
Tamaraw jeepney with Shiela Seyan as opposite directions of the highway. While the
passenger. Rogelio Engada, herein petitioner, truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin,
driving an Isuzu pick-up truck came from the the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the
opposing direction, swerved to its left vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the
encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw. To truck was heading towards his lane. Not
avoid the pick-up, Iran swerved to his left, but minding this circumstance due to his belief
the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the that the driver of the truck was merely joking,
pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. Seyan Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in
was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on order to give more power and speed to the bus,
a ricefield resulting in physical injuries. which was ascending the inclined part of the
Engada invokes the doctrine of last clear road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota
chance. Between him and Iran, the latter had hand tractor being pushed by a person along
the last clear chance to avoid the collision, the shoulder of the highway. While the bus
was in the process of overtaking or passing the

hand tractor and the truck was approaching Doctrine: The doctrine of "the last clear" chance
the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each shall be applied in a suit between the owners
other at each other's left side. After the impact, and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
the truck skidded towards the other side of the
road and landed on a nearby residential lot, Q: A jeepney, driven by Manalo and owned by
hitting a coconut tree and felling it." The heirs the Mangune spouses, made a sudden U-turn
of the deceased passengers filed a case against and encroached on the western lane of the
the owners and drivers of the colliding highway. Consequently, a Philippine Rabbit
vehicles. The Court of Appeals absolved from bus collided with the said jeepney causing the
liability the owner and driver of the cargo death of three jeepney passengers. The heirs
truck, contending that the bus driver had the of the deceased passengers filed a complaint
last clear chance of avoiding the collision. Is for recovery of civil damages impleading the
the CA correct? Mangune spouses, Manalo, Philippine Rabbit
and Tomas, the driver of the bus. Can the
A: No. The CA incorrectly applied the doctrine doctrine of “the last clear chance” be applied
of “last clear chance” since the case at bar is not in this case?
a suit between the owners and drivers of the A: No. The doctrine of "the last clear" chance
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs shall be applied in a suit between the owners
of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does
and drivers of the colliding vehicles. In the not arise where a passenger demands
recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the court contractual obligations. It would be inequitable
ruled that the principle of "last clear chance" to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney
applies "in a suit between the owners and and its owners on the ground that the other
drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. BPI v. CA, 216 SCRA 51, 1992
Therefore, the respondent court erred in Doctrine: Last clear chance. The person who has
absolving the owner and driver of the cargo the last fair chance to avoid the impending
truck from liability. harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. IAC,
August 30, 1990 Q: A woman (Susan Lopez San Juan) who
identified herself as Eligia G. Fernando who

had a money market placement with BPI was A: No. The doctrine of last clear chance is not
able to pre-terminate the investment thru a applicable in the present case.
phone call and requested that two checks be Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's
released to be delivered to Fernando’s office, reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to
but later was changed to be picked up instead clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC had
by Rosemarie Rosario who was also San Juan. no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's
San Juan was able to get hold of the checks and employees on the pretermination of Eligia
deposited to CBC head office to a current G.Fernando's money market placement.
account she opened a day ago by just Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC.
presenting her tax account identification card Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia
and an initial deposit of ₱10,000. Two days G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G.
after the deposit of the BPI checks, a series of Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could
withdrawals follow in huge amounts thru not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud.
issuance of checks. It was only when the real Hence, unlike in the Picart case herein the
Eligia G. Fernando came to BPI to roll over the defendant, had he use reasonable care and
investment that they learned of the caution, would have recognized the risk he was
misrepresentation made by the impostor San taking and would have foreseen harm to the
Juan. BPI then returned the checks to CBC horse and the plaintiff but did not, respondent
asking the said bank to return the amount CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. In
alleging that CBC was negligent when it fact the records fail to show that respondent
allowed San Juan to open a current account CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of the
and allow the withdrawals of huge amounts fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the
two days after opening of the said account. A employees of BPI.
ping-pong started when CBC, inturn, returned Again, applying the doctrine of proximate
the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time", cause, petitioner BPI's contention that CBC
and the stoppage of this ping-pong, prompted alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of
the filing of this case. BPI insists that the one (1) day between the issuance and delivery
doctrine of last clear chance enunciated in the of the checks bearing the impostor's name as
case of Picart v. Smith (37Phil. 809 [1918]) payee and the impostor's negotiating the said
should have been applied considering the forged checks by opening an account and
circumstances of the case. Is the contention of depositing the same with respondent CBC is not
BPI tenable? controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected
that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia
G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's

employees, the impostor would complete her Gardo but the house of the spouses Martinez
deception by encashing the forged checks. is built on the property. Pending the spouses’
There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the appeal, Atty. A secured a demolition order and
proximate cause of the payment of the forged started demolishing the house of the spouses.
checks by an impostor was due to the But 2 days later, the Supreme Court issued a
negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule the demolition order. Two weeks later, the
that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of Supreme Court ruled that the mortgage
P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two (2) between Atty. A and Gardo is void, hence,
forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC Atty. A has no right over the property. But by
could have prevented any loss. this time, the house of the spouses was already
demolished because it appears that despite the
6. Damnum absque injuria TRO, Atty. A continued demolishing the
Amonoy v. Spouses Guiterrez, G.R. No. house. The spouses then sued Atty. A for
140420, February 15, 2001 damages but Atty. A contended that he
Doctrine: Damnum absque injuria incurred no liability because he was merely
Q: Atty. A represented Gardo in a partition exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to
case. Atty. A and Gardo agreed to make use of the demolition order) hence what happened
whatever property he acquires as a security for was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury
the payment of attorney’s fees. However, without damage). Is Atty. A correct?
Gardo died prior to the property being
adjudicated where Gardo, through his heirs, A: No. Damnum absque injuria finds no
got his just share from the property in dispute. application to this case. The demolition of the
Since Gardo was unable to pay Atty. A, Atty. house by Atty. A, despite his receipt of the TRO,
A sought to foreclose the property. The heirs was not only an abuse but also an unlawful
of Gardo, spouses Jose and Angela Martinez, exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged
then sued Atty. A questioning the validity of right, he wantonly violated this Courts Order
his mortgage agreement with Gardo. The and wittingly caused the destruction of
spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the respondents’ house. Obviously, Atty. A cannot
Court of Appeals but they appealed to the invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Atty. A was able premised on the valid exercise of a right.
to foreclose the property where he was the Anything less or beyond such exercise will not
highest bidder in the public sale in view of the give rise to the legal protection that the principle
foreclosure. He was able to buy the property of accords. And when damage or prejudice to

another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot to be caused by tetanus toxin which was
be obscured, much less abated. (Amonoy v. infected from the healing wound in the right
Spouses Guiterrez, G.R. No. 140420, February 15, palm of his hand. The following day, on
2001) November 15, 1980, Javier died. Is the wound
inflicted by Urbano to Javier may be
B. Proximate cause considered as the proximate cause of the
Filimeno Urbano v. IAC, G.R. No. 72964, latter’s death?
January 7, 1988
Q: Urbano went to his ricefield and found his A: No, the wound inflicted by Urbano cannot be
storage of palay was flooded with water considered as the proximate cause of Javier’s
coming from the irrigation canal which had death. Proximate cause as “that cause which, in
overflowed. He saw Javier and Efre cutting natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
grass and asked them who was responsible for any efficient intervening cause, produces the
the opening of the irrigation canal. Javier injury, and without which the result would not
admitted that he opened the canal so Urbano have occurred.” In this case, the death of the
got angry and demanded Javier to pay his victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
soaked palay. Because of anguish, Urbano consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him
unsheathed his bolo and hacked Marcelo, by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
hitting him on the right palm of his hand. criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
Upon intervention, Urbano and Javier had an caused the victim’s death must convince a
amicable settlement. Urbano agreed to rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
shoulder all the expenses for the medication of Urbano is not liable for the death of Javier,
the wound of Javier, as well as to pay also however he is only liable for the physical
whatever loss of income Javier may have injuries inflicted to Javier through the wound on
suffered. Javier, on the other hand, signed a the right palm of his hand. The Court took into
statement of his forgiveness towards Urbano account the average incubation period of
and on that condition, he withdrew the tetanus toxin, and medical evidence indicated
complaint that he filed against Urbano. that patients affected with tetanus experience its
After several weeks of treatments and symptoms within 14 days. If, indeed, Javier had
medication, the doctor pronounced that the incurred tetanus poisoning out of the wound
wound was already healed. However, on inflicted by Urbano, he would not have
November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the experienced the symptoms on the 23rd day after
hospital when he had sudden lockjaw and the hacking incident.
convulsions. The doctor found the condition

The medical findings lead to a distinct Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
possibility that the infection of the wound by countered the claim by imputing the accident
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later to respondent’s own negligence in driving at
or between the times Javier was wounded to the high speed without curfew pass and
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial
distinct and foreign to the crime. However, the court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
act of Javier working in his farm where the soil of private respondent.
is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient Is the collision was brought by respondent’s
supervening cause which relieves Urbano of own negligence?
any liability for the death of Javier. There is a
likelihood that the wound was but the remote A: No. Dionisio is guilty of contributory
cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to negligent but the legal and proximate cause of
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may the collision was brought about by the way the
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death truck was parked.
with which the petitioner had nothing to do. The legal and proximate cause of the accident
(Filimeno Urbano v. IAC, G.R. No. 72964, January and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
7, 1988) negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked in other words, the negligence of
Phoenix Construction v. IACC, G.R. No. 65295, petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's
March 10, 1987 car with the dump truck was a natural and
Q: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on negligence. The defendant cannot be relieved
his way home from cocktails and dinner from liability by the fact that the risk or a
meeting with his boss. He was proceeding substantial and important part of the risk, to
down General Lacuna Street when he saw a which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff
Ford dump truck parked askew, partly has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable
blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no intervening forces are within the scope original
lights or early warning reflector devices. The risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence.
truck was driven earlier by Armando The courts are quite generally agreed that
Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner intervening causes which fall fairly in this
company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to category will not supersede the defendant's
the left, but it was too late. He suffered some responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks
physical injuries and nervous breakdown. the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in
Dionision filed an action for damages against a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the

risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the wiping out the fundamental law that a man
plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the must. respond for the foreseeable consequences
car is negligently driven; and one who parks an of his own negligent act or omission. Thus, the
automobile on the highway without lights at Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied
night is not relieved of responsibility when because the court thinks that it is not applicable
another negligently drives into it. We hold that in our jurisdiction.
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and C. Negligence
proximate cause" of the injury remained the Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company and
truck driver's "lack of due care" and that Intergames, INC., G.R. No. 164749, March 15,
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover 2017
damages though such damages are subject to Q: To promote the sales of "Pepsi", PepsiCo
mitigation by the courts. The Last Clear Chance jointly with Intergames, organized an
doctrine of the Common Law was imported into endurance running contest billed as the "1st
our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still Pepsi Junior Marathon". The organizers
a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the
has found its way into the Civil Code of the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
Philippines. The doctrine was applied by through public roads and streets, to end at the
Common Law because they had a rule that Quezon Memorial Circle. Ronnel participated
contributory negligence prevented any in the contest. Allegedly, PepsiCo failed to
recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the provide adequate safety and precautionary
Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil measures, and to exercise the diligence
Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine required of them by the nature of their
of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in undertaking, they failed to insulate and
this case stated that it does not believe so that protect the participants of the marathon from
the general concept of Last Clear Chance has the vehicular and other dangers along the
been utilized in our jurisdiction. marathon route. Unfortunately, Ronnel was
Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an bumped by a jeepney that was then running
exercise in chronology or physics but what is along the route of the marathon on Don
important is the negligent act or omission of Mariano Marcos Avenue, and in spite of
each party and the character and gravity of the medical treatment given to him, Ronnel died.
risks created by such act or omission for the rest Are the organizer Intergames and sponsor
of the community. To say that Phoenix should PepsiCo guilty of negligence?
be absolved from liability would come close to

A: Only Intergames was negligent. The

sponsorship of Cosmos was limited to financing 1. Standard of care
the race. Gan v. CA, G.R. No. L-44264, September 19,
Negligence is the failure to observe that degree 1988
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the Q: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused
circumstances justly demand, whereby another Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay
person suffers injury. The safety and Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two
precautionary measures undertaken by vehicles parked on one side of the road, one
Intergames were short of the diligence following the other. As the car driven by Gan
demanded by the circumstances of persons, approached the place where the two vehicles
time and place under consideration. Hence, were parked, there was a vehicle coming from
Intergames as the organizer was guilty of the opposite direction, followed by another
negligence. In staging the event, Intergames had which tried to overtake the one in front of it
no employees of its own to man the race, and thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven
relied only on the "cooperating agencies" and by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan
volunteers who had worked with it in previous swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit
races. It held no briefings of any kind on the an old man who was about to cross the street,
actual duties to be performed by each group of pinning him against the rear of one of the
volunteers. It did not instruct the volunteers on parked vehicles. The force of the impact
how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of the caused the parked vehicle to move forward
race. Since the marathon would be run hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it.
alongside moving vehicular traffic, at the very The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the
least, Intergames ought to have seen to the two parked vehicles suffered damages. The
constant and closer coordination among the pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at
personnel manning the route to prevent the the hospital. Is Gan guilty for Homicide
foreseen risks from befalling the participants. through simple imprudence?
Intergames further conceded that the marathon
could have been staged on a blocked-off route A: No. Under the emergency rule, one who
where runners could run against the flow of suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
vehicular traffic. Intergames had the option to is required to act without time to consider the
hold the race in a route where such risks could best means that may be adopted to avoid the
be minimized, if not eliminated. (Abrogar v. impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
Cosmos Bottling Company and Intergames, INC., he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017) reflection may appear to have been a better

method, unless the emergency in which he finds A: No. The mere fact that they suffered losses
himself is brought about by his own negligence. does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
The SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the To warrant the recovery of damages, there must
crime of simple imprudence resulting in be both a right of action for a legal wrong
Homicide. inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
2. Presumptions without damage, or damage without wrong,
D. Damages does not constitute a cause of action, since
1. General provisions damages are merely part of the remedy allowed
The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Yu, for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. The
G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016 loss Yu and Yuhico experienced, assuming to be
Doctrine: To warrant the recovery of damages, true, was brought upon them by themselves for
there must be both a right of action for a legal deliberately and consciously violating the rules
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage and regulations of the Club. Considering that
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. they were validly suspended, there is no reason
for the Club to compensate them.
Q: Yu and Yuhico were set to play golf at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club with one People v. Oandasan, G.R. No. 194695, June 14,
more member of the club. Unfortunately, the 2016
other member canceled at the last minute. The Doctrine: Damages in cases of crimes and
Club’s policy prohibits less than three people quasi-delicts. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
from teeing off on weekends and public defendant shall be liable for all damages which
holidays before 1pm. Despite the refusal of are the natural and probable consequences of
the Club to let the two of them play golf, Yu the act or omission complained of. It is not
and Yuhico played anyway. Consequently, the necessary that such damages have been foreseen
Club’s Board of Directors resolved to suspend or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
both members. Yu and Yuhico alleged that defendant.
they became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers
and that some of his friends in the business Q: Ferdinand Cutaran testified that on July 29,
refused to have dealings with them as a result 2003 between 8:00 to 9:00 in the evening, he
of their suspension. Can Yu and Yuhico be and his companions Jose Ifurung, Arthur
granted moral and exemplary damages, Cutaran and victim Danny Montegrico were
attorney’s fees and costs of suit? having a drinking spree outside the
bunkhouse of Navarro Construction.

Suddenly, appellant Mariano Oandasan who Montegrico, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00;

appeared from back of adump truck, aimed moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary
and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran ran damages of ₱75,000.00; and temperate damages
away after seeing the Oandasan shoot of ₱50,000.00; (2 To the heirs of Edgardo
Mentegrico. He did not witness the shooting Tamanu, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral
of the other two victims Edgar Tamanu and damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of
Mario Paleg. When he returned to the crime ₱75,000.00; and temperate damages of
scene, he saw the bodies of Montegrico, ₱50,000.00; and (3) To Mario Paleg, civil
Tamanu and Paleg lying on the ground. As a indemnity of ₱50,000.00; moral damages of
result of the shooting incident, Danilo ₱50,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00;
Montegrico and Edgardo Tamanu died; while and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00.
Mario Paleg survived. Mariano Oandasan was For death caused by a crime or quasi-delict,
convicted by the RTC of murder for killing Article 2206 of the Civil Code enumerates the
Montegrico and to pay his heirs of ₱150,000.00; damages that may be recovered from the
homicide for killing Tamanu and to pay his accused or defendant, to wit:
heirs of ₱50,000.00, and frustrated homicide Article 2206. The amount of damages for death
for injuring Paleg. The CA affirmed the RTC caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
decision with modification in that appellant is three thousand pesos, even though there may
ordered to pay the heirs of Edgardo Tamanu have been mitigating circumstances. In
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity addition: 1) The defendant shall be liable for
and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and Mario the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
Paleg, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of
Does the order of the CA as to the amounts of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
damages proper? assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical
A: No. The Court held that Mariano Oandasan disability not caused by the defendant, had no
is guilty of two counts of murder in Criminal earning capacity at the time of his death; 2) If the
Case No. 11-9259 and Criminal Case No. 11- deceased was obliged to give support according
9260 for the killing of Edgardo Tamanu and to the provisions of article 291, the recipient
Danilo Montegrico, respectively; and of who is not an heir called to the decedent's
frustrated murder for the frustrated killing of inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
Mario Paleg. The Court also held that Mariano succession, may demand support from the
Oandasan should pay the following person causing the death, for a period not
indemnification: (1) To the heirs of Danilo exceeding five years, the exact duration to be

fixed by the court; 3) The spouse, legitimate and Joselito filed a complaint for damages that
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the pursuant to the contract of carriage between
deceased may demand moral damages for him and Philippine Rabbit. Joselito’s claims
mental anguish by reason of the death of the are as follows: P500k for moral damages, P60k
deceased. for actual damages, and P25k for attorney’s
In fixing the civil indemnity, the Legislature fees. Is Philippine Rabbit accountable for all
thereby set a minimum. The Civil Code, in of Joselito’s claims?
Article 2206, took the same approach by
specifying the amount to be at least ₱3,000.00, A: No. Clearly, moral damages are not
which was directly manifesting the legislative recoverable in this case. Moral damages, as a
intent of enabling the courts to increase the general rule, are not recoverable in actions for
amount whenever the circumstances would damages predicated on breach of contract. As
warrant. an exception, such damages are recoverable [in
an action for breach of contract: (1) in cases in
Q: Define damages. which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in
A: Damages maybe defined as the pecuniary relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for (2) in cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
an injury sustained, or, as otherwise expressed, or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220. It is
the pecuniary consequences that the law obvious that this case does not come under the
imposes for the breach of some duty or the first of the abovementioned exceptions since
violation of some right. As such, damages refer Joselito did not die in the mishap but merely
to the amount in money awarded by the court suffered an injury. In this case, the fraud or bad
as a remedy for the injured. faith that must be convincingly proved by
petitioners should be one which was committed
2. Kinds of damages by Philippine Rabbit in breaching its contract of
Estrada v. Phil. Rabbit Bus Line, Inc., G.R. No. carriage with Joselito. There is no showing here
203902, July 19, 2017 that Philippine Rabbit induced Joselito to enter
Doctrine: Kinds of damages into a contract of carriage with the former
Q: Joselito was aboard a Philippine Rabbit Bus through insidious machination.
(PRB) travelling from Urdaneta to La Union Philippine Rabbit may be accountable for actual
when it collided with an Isuzu truck. The damages, however, as a rule, documentary
incident resulted to Joselito’s arm being evidence should be presented to substantiate
injured and was later amputated. the claim for damages for loss of earning

capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss the airport check-in opened on the day of their
[or impairment] of earning capacity may be scheduled flight, Wilfredo was informed by a
awarded despite the absence of documentary staff from Cathay Pacific that Wilfredo’s
evidence when (1) the deceased [or the injured] family did not have confirmed reservations,
was self-employed and earning less than the and only Sixta’s flight booking was
minimum wage under current labor laws, in confirmed. Although they were allowed to
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the board the flight to Hong Kong, not all of them
fact that in the deceased's line of work no were allowed to board the flight to Manila as
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the it was fully booked. Only Wilfredo’s mother-
deceased was employed as a daily worker in-law, Sixta, was allowed to proceed to
earning less than the minimum wage under Manila from Hong Kong. On the following
current labor laws. Furthermore, actual day, the Reyeses were finally allowed to board
damages by way of medical expenses must be the next flight bound for Manila. Upon
supported by official receipts to show the exact arriving in the Philippines, Wilfredo went to
cost of his medication and to prove that he Sampaguita Travel to report the incident. He
indeed went through medication and was informed by Sampaguita Travel that it
rehabilitation. In the absence of the same, such was actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled
claim must be negated. (Estrada v. Phil. Rabbit their bookings. Was there a breach of contract
Bus Line, Inc., G.R. No. 203902, July 19, 2017) by Cathay Pacific with the Wilfredo s family?
Cathay Pacific Airways v. Reyes, G.R. no. A: Yes. Cathay Pacific breached its contract of
185591, June 26, 2013 carriage with the Reyeses when it disallowed
Q: Wilfredo made a travel reservation with them to board the plane in Hong Kong going to
Sampaguita Travel for his family’s trip to Manila on the date reflected on their tickets.
Adelaide, Australia. Upon confirmation of Thus, Cathay Pacific opened itself to claims for
their flight schedule, Wilfredo paid for the compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary
airfare and was issued 4 Cathay Pacific damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. In
roundtrip airline tickets for Manila-Hong contrast, the contractual relation between
Kong-Adelaide-Hong Kong-Manila. One Sampaguita Travel and respondents is a
week before they were scheduled to fly back contract for services. The object of the contract
home, Wilfredo re-confirmed his family’s is arranging and facilitating the latter’s booking
return flight with the Cathay Pacific office in and ticketing. It was even Sampaguita Travel
Adelaide and were advised that the which issued the tickets. Since the contract
reservation was still okay as scheduled. When between the parties is an ordinary one for

services, the standard of care required of the filed for the reformation of instruments and
respondent is that of a good father of a family prayed for injunction, TRO and damages
under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This before the RTC. However, the court did not
connotes reasonable care consistent with that issue a writ, so the bank proceeded with the
which an ordinarily prudent person would extra judicial foreclosure of the properties,
have observed when confronted with a similar where it emerged as the highest bidder at the
situation. The test to determine whether public auction. The title was consolidated in
negligence attended the performance of an favor of the bank after failure of the
obligation is: did the defendant in doing the petitioners to redeem the property within one
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care year. Petitioners filed a petition for indirect
and caution which an ordinarily prudent contempt with damages against the
person would have used in the same situation? respondents, alleging that the bank had pre-
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. There was empted judicial authority by foreclosing the
indeed failure on the part of Sampaguita Travel mortgages and selling the properties at a
to exercise due diligence in performing its public auction during the pendency of the
obligations under the contract of services. It was reformation of instruments case. While these
established by Cathay Pacific, through the cases were pending, Rural Bank filed an ex-
generation of the PNRs, that Sampaguita Travel parte petition for issuance of writ of
failed to input the correct ticket number for possession over the subject property. Because
Wilfredo's ticket. Cathay Pacific even asserted of this, the petitioners filed their third petition
that Sampaguita Travel made two fictitious for indirect contempt. The RTC eventually
bookings for Juanita and Michael. The dismissed the petitioners’ complaint for
negligence of Sampaguita Travel renders it also reformation of instruments and petition for
liable for damages. indirect contempt, and ordered the Clerk of
Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Court to issue a writ of possession in favor of
Inc. G.R. No. 201436, july 11, 2016 the respondents. The court further ordered the
Q: Petitioners executed a real estate mortgage payment of damages to respondents in the
over a parcel of land and a chattel mortgage aggregate amounts of P700,000 as moral
over a rice mill machinery and a diesel engine damages, P350,000 as exemplary damages,
as security to a loan from respondent Rural P101,500 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of
Bank of San Jose. When petitioners failed to litigation. Is the award of exemplary damages
pay their outstanding obligation of proper?
P125,700.00, the bank informed them that it
would foreclose the mortgages. Petitioners

A: No. Exemplary or corrective damages are wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro
imposed by way of example or correction for City, on August 25, 1973. Upon investigation,
the public good, in addition to moral, Luis Tan (Luis), William Tan, Joaquin Tan,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory Vicente Tan, Alfonso Tan and Eusebio Tan
damages. The award of exemplary damages is (the Tan brothers), and Ang Tiat Chuan
allowed by law as a warning to the public and (Chuan), together with eight others, were
as a deterrent against the repetition of socially charged with murder before Military
deleterious actions. The requirements for an Commission No. 1.5 In a Decision dated June
award of exemplary damages to be proper are 10, 1976, the Military Commission found Luis,
as follows: (1) They may be imposed by way of Chuan, and four of their co-accused, namely,
example or correction only in addition, among Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Ocasiones,
others, to compensatory damages, and cannot Leopoldo Nicolas, and Marciano Benemerito,
be recovered as a matter of right, their guilty of murder. On the other hand, the other
determination depending upon the amount of brothers of Luis were acquitted of the charges
compensatory damages that may be awarded to and were released on June 11, 1976.6 The said
the claimant. (2) The claimant must first judgment, however, simply concluded the
establish his right to moral, temperate, criminal prosecution of those already haled to
liquidated, or compensatory damages and; (3) court but it did not entomb the indignant
The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad feelings instigated by the death of Florentino.
faith; and the award would be allowed only if Thus, on February 11, 1983, Rosita B. Lim
the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, (Rosita), wife of the deceased Florentino,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. together with her then minor children
In the light of the appellate court’s finding that Jennifer, Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed
the respondents are not entitled to moral Lim Ket Kai (collectively, the petitioners),
damages, the award of exemplary damages, commenced a civil action for damages in the
too, must be deleted for lack of legal basis. RTC of Manila, against all those charged with
(Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc. the slaying of Florentino. RTC ruled in favor
G.R. No. 201436, July 11, 2016) of petitioners ordering the surviving
Defendants and the heirs and successors-in-
3. In case of death interest of the deceased Defendants, who have
Lim v. Tan, G.R. No. 177250, November 28, been substituted in their place as Defendants,
2016 to pay to the petitioners, jointly and severally,
Q: This case spawned from the death of actual and compensatory, moral, exemplary
Florentino Lim (Florentino), a scion of the and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. CA

modified amount of the damages stated and In imposing the proper amount of damages, the
replaced actual and compensatory damages principal consideration is the penalty provided
with civil indemnity and temperate damages. by law or imposable for the offense because of
Is it proper to award compensatory, moral, its heinousness and not the public penalty
exemplary and attorney’s fees and litigation actually imposed on the offender. Essentially,
expenses? despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be
imposed because of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
A: Yes. In the case at bar, the challenge 9346,14 the imposable penalty as provided by
essentially posed is the propriety of the law for the crime, such as those found in R.A.
awarded damages, attorney's fees and litigation No. 7569,15 must be used as the basis for
expenses. To resolve said issue, an examination awarding damages and not the actual penalty
of factual circumstances would be necessary, a imposed. Here, the Court sustains the award of
task that is clearly outside the province of a civil indemnity but increases its amount to
petition for review on certiorari. Nevertheless, P100,000.00 in accordance with recent
this case has been dragged down for ages and jurisprudence. "In our jurisdiction, civil
the Court would like to put the whole matter to indemnity is awarded to the offended party as
rest; hence, a review is justified by the need to a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
make a definitive finding on this factual issue in to the victim for the damage or infraction that
light of the differing amounts of damages and was done to the latter by the accused, which in
attorney's fees awarded by the courts below. a sense only covers the civil aspect. Thus, in a
After a careful examination of the present case, crime where a person dies, in addition to the
the Court sustains the awarded damages, penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
appellate court, but modifies the amount of the victim a sum of money as restitution."
civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
Florentino. "[I]t is jurisprudentially settled that temperate damages, which are more than
when death occurs due to a crime, the following nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto may be recovered when the court finds that
for the death of the victim; (2) actual or some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and proved with certainty.” Her, there is no doubt
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper that pecuniary expenses were incurred in the
case." funeral and burial of Florentino and the award
of temperate damages shall answer for the same

in the amount of P350,000.00, in consideration the deceased’s line of work no documentary

to the social status and reputation of the victim. evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less
People v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 200842, June 16, than the minimum wage under current labor
2016 laws.10 Notably, this case does not fall under
Q: On April 2, 2003, at around 10 PM, Ryan any of the exceptions. The deceased victim
Fuentes, the manager of Del Monte, Phils. in could not be considered as a self-employed
Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the earning less than the minimum wage; neither
company staff house onboard his Isuzu could he be considered employed as a daily
pickup after attending a despedida. While he wage worker. However, we are inclined to
was about to enter the gate of the staff house, award lost earnings considering that the
he was gunned down by a person riding in deceased, as testified by his widow, was the
tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay
duty, Renz Culcol, who was then opening the City and was receiving a monthly salary of
gate, identified one of the assailants as herein ₱95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when
appellant, Peter Rayos. During arraignment gunned down by appellant. This testimony was
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime of not objected to by appellant or questioned
murder. However, Appellant was found guilty during cross-examination or on appeal. Clearly,
as charged in the RTC and CA. Are the the existence of factual basis of the award has
damages for loss of earning capacity which is been satisfactorily established. (People v.
a civil liability should be proved beyond Wahiman, G.R. No. 20042, June 16, 2016)
reasonable doubt?
A: Yes. Regarding the award for lost earnings,

the general rule is that there must be
documentary proof to support indemnity for
loss of earning capacity. Admittedly, there are
exceptions to this rule, viz.:
By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the
deceased is self-employed earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, and
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in

XI. PROPERTY Likewise, the other parcels which are not

located along the riverbank, or bordering the
TOPIC: Classification of Property shoreline of Manila Bay, cannot be registered,
since the source of the accretion from these
Republic vs Asuncion areas cannot be established with certainty; and
GR No. 200772; February 17, 2021 in accordance with Article 4 of the 1866 Law on
Waters, 113 the Constitution, and earlier
Doctrine: If an alluvion, despite being carried by the findings, these must be presumed to be part of
flow of a river, is deposited along the seashore as the the public domain, either as foreshore lands or
river merges into the sea, such alluvion cannot be unclassified lands.
considered an accretion under the Civil Code.
Q: Spouses Felipe and Paciencia Asuncion were OWNERSHIP

the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Bulacan located on the banks of the Wawang TOPIC: Possession/Ownership
Dadap River. In 1976, Paciencia and her
children filed an application for original Ricarido* Golez v. Mariano Abais
registration of title over nine parcels of land in G.R. No. 191376; January 08, 2020
the area, claiming simple ownership by
inheritance, accretion, and possession under Doctrine: Title to land acquired pursuant to this
color of title for at least 30 years. The Republic Decree or the Land Reform Program of the
opposed on the ground that the lands are Government shall not be transferable except by
unclassified forest lands within the public hereditary succession or to the Government in
domain that have existed before 1927, but the accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the
Asuncions insisted that the lands are alienable Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws
and disposable. and regulations.
Is the property considered under unclassified Q: The petitioner filed an ejectment case against
public land? the respondent over the subject land. She
claimed that she was the eldest daughter of the
A: Yes. Being located along the riverbank, these dead beneficiary of said land and that she was
are the only areas which can be safely presumed the qualified beneficiary of it. The respondent
to have been formed through the accretion was the husband of petitioner’s late younger
received by the banks of the mother property. sister. He countered that his possession of the

disputed land is by virtue of being a tenant as a sanction "prejudice to the refiling of the same
decided by the RTC and the DARAB; and that claim."
he had been in continuous cultivation of the
land for more than 30 years. Q: Respondents first filed a complaint for
annulment and declaration of nullity of the
Who is the owner of the property? deed of sale and TCT over the disputed
property which was dismissed. Subsequently,
A: Presentacion is the qualified sole owner- petitioners filed a complaint against
cultivator under PD 27. respondents for quieting of title and issuance of
a new TCT for which was granted by the court
Mariano does not dispute that Presentacion was
in their favor. Despite the issuance of TCT to the
the oldest surviving heir of Ireneo at the time of
petitioners, possession over the disputed
the latter's death. He also does not assail that
property remained with herein
Presentacion possessed the qualifications
respondents. Thus, petitioners seek to revive
necessary to succeed Ireneo as new owner-
the judgment of dismissal of the trial court.
cultivator under MC 19.
Hence, the question on the validity of the deed
Thus, in the absence of any extra-judicial of sale and the Torrens title issued had already
settlement assigning in Vicenta's (Mariano's been settled in their favor making them as
wife) favor the priority right to become sole rightful owners and possessors of the disputed
owner and cultivator of the disputed lots, her property.
husband Mariano's claim of possession is left
with no leg to stand on. Are the petitioners correct?
A: NO. The dismissal order did not and could

TOPIC: Rights of ownership / Possession not enforce any rights of ownership or
possession whatsoever in favor of petitioners
Atty. Felino M. Ganal v. Andres Alpuerto because it merely barred the refiling of the same
G.R. No. 205194; February 12, 2020 claim by respondents against petitioners. In
effect, adjudication on the merits applies to
Doctrine: Dismissal with prejudice means that there respondents only insofar as to bar any action by
is an adjudication on the merits as well as a final the latter against petitioners arising from the
disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain an same questioned deed of sale and Torrens title.
action on the same claim or cause. An "adjudication Thus, concomitant to the foregoing established
on the merits" for non prosequitur cases imposes as principles, petitioners' argument that

possession was awarded in their favor as a

consequence of the dismissal order is
misplaced. TOPIC: Builder in Good Faith or Bad Faith
PRDC vs Hillview,
LAND OWNER, OWNER OF
BUILDER, OR MATERIALS G.R. No. 222482, June 02, 2020
PLANTER (LO) (OM)
Doctrine: Bad faith contemplates a state of mind
GOOD FAITH GOOD FAITH affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
LO must pay the OM has the limited
OM for the right of removal (he To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential
materials used may remove what that a person asserts title to the land on which he
is built as long as it builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of
will not cause
owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his
damage to the thing
built) title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
BAD FAITH GOOD FAITH
Q: PRDC is the registered and absolute owner
LO is in bad faith if OM has the right of
of parcels of land and in physical possession of
he knows that he removal (even if it
does not own the will cause damage), these as early as 1996. It religiously paid the
materials, and he Demand for the realty taxes thereon. In 2007, they discovered
still makes use of it value of the that their neighbor, Hillview, had encroached
materials, Entitled
for damages
on their property and built condominium units
in it.
GOOD FAITH BAD FAITH

Can Hillview use good faith as a defense?
LO is entitled to OM loses his right
consequential to the materials A: No. Hillview is a Builder in Bad Faith.
damages if the
materials are of an Hillview was actually informed by their
inferior quality engineer of the intrusion, but nevertheless
BAD FAITH BAD FAITH proceeded with the development. The Supreme
Court, thus, takes with a grain of salt Hillview's
LO is considered to OM is considered contention that it merely relied on the surveys
be in Good Faith to be in good faith
prepared by the engineer given the latter's

testimony that he discovered the use of the registration of title over nine parcels of land in
wrong boundary line as early as the time when the area, claiming simple ownership by
the property was being sold by the Tirols to inheritance, accretion, and possession under
Hillview. The use of this wrong boundary line color of title for at least 30 years. The Republic
despite the resultant encroachment was opposed on the ground that the lands are
nevertheless maintained by Hillview. unclassified forest lands within the public
domain that have existed before 1927, but the
Significantly as well, Hillview is not an ordinary
Asuncions insisted that the lands are alienable
landowner, but a property developer. Hillview
and disposable.
is undeniably engaged in large-scale property
development projects where it is expected to The Asuncions claimed that the accretion is the
exercise a higher degree of diligence. More so in product of the alluvial action of the Wawang
this case where there was no noticeable mark or Dapdap river on the mother property. Also, a
boundary which delineated the adjoining previous CIF ruling awarded a number of these
properties. As a large property developer, parcels of land to the Asuncion on the ground
Hillview ought to have, and which it could have of accretion and open and continuous
easily dispensed, verified the definite possession since 1933.
boundaries of the property it sought to improve. On the other hand, the Republic claimed that
the accretion happened on the seashore and that
the lands are public domain, though they failed
TOPIC: Natural Accession (Accretion) to submit evidence.
Republic vs Asuncion, Can the Asuncions lay claim to all the

GR No. 200772, February 17, 2021 disputed lands considering the Republic’s
argument regarding the place of the deposit of
Doctrine: If an alluvion, despite being carried by the
the material?
flow of a river, is deposited along the seashore as the
river merges into the sea, such alluvion cannot be
A: NO. The Asuncions claimed alluvial
considered an accretion under the Civil Code.
accretion, and so they must prove this fact.
Alluvial accretions are governed by paragraph
Q: Spouses Felipe and Paciencia Asuncion were
(3), Article 457 of the Civil Code, which vests
the registered owners of a parcel of land in
ownership of the accretion gradually received
Bulacan located on the banks of the Wawang
by lands adjoining the banks of rivers in the
Dadap River. In 1976, Paciencia and her
owners of such lands. If an alluvion, despite
children filed an application for original

being carried by the flow of a river, is deposited intervention. This was granted by the RTC and
along the seashore as the river merges into the granted respondent GSIS’ application for a writ
sea, such alluvion cannot be considered an of possession as against NSJBI but only as to
accretion under the Civil Code. unsold condominium units and lots that are not
in possession of third-party buyers.
CO-OWNERSHIP Is the RTC correct?
TOPIC: Rights of a Subdivision and Condominium A: YES, writs of possession issued upon the
Buyers application of mortgagee banks or financial
institutions should exclude units or lots actually
Sps. Wilfredo and Dominica Rosario v. occupied by individual buyers.
Government Service Insurance System,
Condominium and subdivision lot buyers are
G.R. No. 200991, March 18, 2021
protected by PD No. 957 or the Subdivision and
Doctrine: The possessor cannot be summarily Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree, an
dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex- instrument of social justice meant to protect
parte possessory writ, since to do so would be small lot and condominium unit buyers as
tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation against gigantic financial institutions who
of the basic tenets of due process. developers normally deal with.
Herein respondent should not be allowed to

Q: New San Jose Builders Inc. (NSJBI) and the
summarily divest petitioners of their possession
GSIS entered into a Loan Agreement. Among
of Unit 205. The protection afforded to a
others, they agreed that NSJBI shall not alienate,
subdivision lot buyer under PD No. 957 should
sell, or dispose of the mortgaged properties
not be defeated, particularly by someone who is
without the prior consent of the respondent.
not a mortgagee in good faith. In this case,
However, it appears that a unit of the
respondent knew that the mortgaged properties
mortgaged property was sold by NSJBI to the
form part of a condominium project, which are
petitioners.
within the purview of PD No. 957.
NSJBI defaulted in its payment of the loan;

hence, the ownership over the property was
TOPIC: Ownership by co-owners over a definite
executed in favor of the GSIS. The petitioners
portion of the inheritance
and its buyers filed their pleadings-in-

Reynaldo Reyes, as heir of Vitaliano Reyes indiviso share in the co-owned property even
vs. Sps. Wilfredo and Melita Garcia, without the consent of the other co-heirs.
G.R. No. 225159, March 21, 2022 However, as a mere part owner, he cannot
alienate the shares of the other co-owners. Nemo
Q: Julian and Marcela are the owners of an
dat quod non habet. No one can give what he does
unregistered parcel of land. Upon their death,
not have.
their heirs executed a "Partihan At Bilihan Nang
Kalahating Bahagi ng Lupang Tirahan Sa Labas Hence, Isidoro's sale of the remaining half of the
ng Hukuman," and sold half of the subject subject property will only affect his own share
property to one of the heirs, Anastacio. While but not those of the other co-owners who did
Isidoro, an heir, sold his rights as co-owner of not consent to the sale. The spouses Garcia will
the property to the Sps. Garcia. No document only get Isidoro's undivided share in the subject
was presented to show that the heirs of Julian property.
and Marcela agreed to divide the remaining half
of the subject property , among themselves; or
that one or some of them waived their rights TOPIC: Co-ownership
over the remaining property. There is a
Spouses Benny and Normita Rol vs. Isabel
preponderance of evidence showing that the
Urdas Racho,
subject property is still co-owned by the heirs of
G.R. No 246096, January 13, 2021
Julian and Marcela.
Doctrine: A sale of a definite portion of a co-owned
Can a co-owner alienate an inchoate portion of property requires the consent of all the co-owners.
the subject property which belongs to him or Without such unanimous consent, a co-owner can
her. only convey his undivided, aliquot interest over a co-
owned property; he/she has no right to divide, and
A: Yes, To demand a partition or division of the thereafter, convey definite portions thereof.
common property is in accord with Article 494
of the Civil Code, that no co-owner shall be If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner
obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that cannot sell a definite portion of the land without
each co-owner may demand at any time consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could
partition of the thing owned in common insofar only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned
as his or her share is concerned. property. If he is the owner of an undivided half of a

tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an
Isidoro, as one of the heirs of Julian and undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot
Marcela, has the right to alienate his pro

into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by The EJSS dated September 13, 1993 is null and
metes and bounds void, considering that it was executed without
the knowledge and consent of Isabel, a co-heir
Q: On August 6, 1963, Loreto Urdas died of Fausto, Chita, and Maria, to the estate of their
without an issue, thus, leaving his siblings as deceased brother, Loreto.
heirs to his property. Isabel instituted the
The Court had consistently ruled that a deed of
complaint when she found out that the property
extrajudicial partition executed to the total
was subdivided into two parts without her
exclusion of any of the legal heirs, who had no
consent. Despite Loreto’s death in 1963, the
knowledge of and consent to the execution of
petitioners made it appear that Loreto sold to
the same, is fraudulent, vicious, and a total
them the subdivided lots through a Deed of
nullity. As such, it produced no effect
Absolute Sale of Portion of Registered Land
whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone.
dated September 1, 2006 and Deed of Sale of a
Portion of Land dated June 19, 2012, Accordingly, Lot No. 1559 should revert back to
respectively. In light of the execution of said Loreto's estate, and only the parties' respective
deeds, new titles covering the subdivided lots inchoate interests should be recognized in this
were issued in petitioners' names. case.
The petitioners claim that in 1993, they bought

one-half of the property from Fausto’s wife
POSSESSION
Leoncia. Thus, on September 13, 1993, Fausto,
Chita, Maria, and Allan executed an Extra
TOPIC: FORCIBLE ENTRY: Prior Physical
Judicial Settlement with Sale (EJSS) whereby the
Possession
property was subdivided equally into two and
was adjudicated to Fausto, Chita, and Maria,
Gorgonio P. Palajos v. Jose Manolo E. Abad
who then sold the same to petitioners; and the
G.R. No. 205832; March 7, 2022
other half was adjudicated to Allan.
Doctrine: Possession can be acquired not only by

Is the conveyance to petitioners of the
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing
property valid?
is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
A: No, the conveyance of the property to the
such right.
petitioners is invalid.

Q: Respondents filed a case for forcible entry the subject property which they acquired from
against Palajos. They claimed that they are the their parents in 1999. Although they did not
registered owners of the subject property immediately put the same to active use, but
acquired from their parents in 1999; took actual viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical
possession of it in 2001; and constructed a fence acts, Manolo had been occupying the land since
around it. Later on, they discovered that the 1999.
petitioners constructed their houses thereon by
With regard to the issue of prior physical
means of force. Respondents then demanded
possession, sometime in September or October
that they vacate the property but the petitioners
2001, Manolo and his siblings took actual
refused to leave. One of the petitioners, Palajos,
possession of the subject property and
claimed that Lot No. 5 of the subject property
constructed a concrete perimeter fence around
was executed in his favor. He presented a 1988
it.
Deed of Absolute Sale to support this claim that
he had prior physical possession over said lot.
Palajos contended that Manolo had no prior
TOPIC: Acquisition of Possession
physical possession of the property and that the
action was filed beyond the one-year
Barber vs. Chua,
prescriptive period.
GR No. 205630, January 12, 2021
Is he correct? Doctrine: A lawful owner has the right to fully enjoy

possession over his entire property, not only over the
A: No, he is not correct because Manolo and his land's surface but also over the structures built
siblings have prior physical possession over the thereon, including everything underneath and the
subject property by juridical acts. airspace above it up to a reasonable height. As such,
a landowner is has the right to eject those who
In Mangaster v. Ungay, the Court ruled that:
unlawfully encroach and build upon not only on the
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
lot itself, but as well as on the structures existing on
These are acts to which the law gives the force
his property.
of acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and
Q: Diana built a portion of the second floor of
registration of public instruments, inscription of
her house on the top of the firewall of her
possessory information titles and the like.
neighbor, Rolando. Thus, Rolando filed a
Here, Manolo and his siblings were able to complaint for ejectment of extended structures
establish that they are the registered owners of that partly occupied the portion of said firewall.

Doctrine: In the unlawful detainer case, the main

Diana now argues that the complaint did not issue to be resolved by the Court is who has the better
raise the issue of material or physical possession right of possession over the property regardless of the
of a property but the removal of certain aspect of ownership of the property. On the other
structures that encroached upon Rolando’s hand, it is in the action to recover possession based
property. The complaint referred to on ownership or accion reivindicatoria that the
encroachment, not of a land or building, but of matter of ownership will be threshed out.
a firewall, which they claim cannot be a subject
of an ejectment case. As such, the case is one for Q: Michael is the lawful owner of a certain
specific performance. parcel of land occupied by Fe. When Fe refused
to vacate the said property despite Michael’s
Is Diana’s argument correct? demand, the latter filed a complaint for
recovery of possession based on ownership.
A: NO. That Rolando’s complaint did not refer
Fe now seeks to dismiss Michael’s complaint on
to dispossession of a parcel of land or a building
the ground of forum shopping as Michael
does not mean that the remedy of ejectment is
previously filed a complaint for unlawful
unavailable. A lawful owner has the right to
detainer involving the same property.
fully enjoy possession over his entire property,
not only over the land's surface but also over the
Is Michael guilty of forum shopping?
structures built thereon, including everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a
A: NO. In the unlawful detainer case, the main
reasonable height. As such, a landowner is has
issue to be resolved by the Court is who has the
the right to eject those who unlawfully encroach
better right of possession over the property
and build upon not only on the lot itself, but as
regardless of the aspect of ownership of the
well as on the structures existing on his
property. On the other hand, it is in the action
property. (Barber v. Chua; GR No. 205630;
to recover possession based on ownership or
January 12, 2021)
accion reivindicatoria that the matter of
ownership will be threshed out. Indeed, accion
reivindicatoria is an action for the recovery of
TOPIC: Unlawful detainer - Possession
ownership which includes the recovery of
possession. The rationale of the rule regarding
Sps. Tobias vs. Gonzales,
the difference of unlawful detainer to accion
GR No. 232176; February 17, 2021
reivindicatoria is that the former involves only

the issue of material possession or possession de redeem the subject property within the one-year
facto, while the latter involves the question of redemption period. Accordingly, a title was
ownership. issued in China Bank’s name and it filed before
the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
TOPIC: Exception to General Rule on Issuance of
Is the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor
Writ of Possession
of China Bank proper?
Sy vs. China Banking Corporation, A: No. The Supreme Court is convinced that the
G.R. No. 213736, June 17, 2020 exception found in Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court shall apply in this case.
Doctrine: It is a general rule that the court possesses
no discretion to deny an application for Writ of Foregoing considered, the court's obligation to
Possession if the judgment debtor failed to redeem the issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of
foreclosed property within the legal redemption the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure
period. However, an exception to this is found in sale ceases to be ministerial in those exceptional
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court where “a cases where a third party is claiming the
property adversely to that of the judgment
third party is actually holding the property
debtor/ mortgagor, and where such third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.”
is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings
wherefrom the ex parte writ of possession was
Q: A mother simulated a Deed of Absolute Sale
applied for. Understandably, the third party
for his son, Priscil, so he could mortgage it to
adversely possessing the foreclosed property
DBP. The property was foreclosed and Priscilo cannot be dispossessed by a mere ex parte
executed an SPA authorizing his sister, Elena, to possessory writ in favor of the purchaser,
redeem it in favor of their younger brothers who because to do so would be tantamount to a
are the actual occupants of the property. summary ejectment of the third party in
However, after redeeming the property, Elena violation of the latter's right to due process.
Besides, the purchaser's possessory right in an
forged the signature of Priscilo and executed a
extra-judicial foreclosure of real property is
Deed of Waiver and Relinquishment of Rights recognized only as against the judgment debtor
and in favor of her own children. Thereafter, and his successor-in-interest, but not as against
Elena's children also mortgaged the property to persons whose right of possession is adverse to
China Bank, but were also not able to pay, thus the latter.
the property was foreclosed. China Bank was
declared the highest bidder in the conducted
TOPIC: Recovery of Possession
public auction and the mortgagors failed to

land, which is the subject of the implementation

CRC 1447 vs. Calbatea et al., of the CARP. Such a case falls squarely within
G.R. No. 237102, March 4, 2020 the jurisdictional ambit of the DARAB.
Doctrine: If the issues between the parties are

intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the
USUFRUCT
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute
must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.
TOPIC: Right to reimbursement over improvements
Q: An estate became the subject of a Notice of made by a lessee on a leased property
Coverage pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under R.A. Anita C. Buce v. Spouses George Galeon and
No. 6657, hence the original owners applied for Erlinda Tiongco Galeon,
the conversion of the property from agricultural G.R. No. 222785, March 02, 2020
to industrial. This was granted by the court, and Doctrine: The right to reimbursement arises only if
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the lessen opts to appropriate the improvements
issued an order of conversion subject to the introduced by the lessee.
condition that the development of the area shall
be completed within five years from the Q: Respondents filed a complaint for recovery
issuance of said order, which the original of possession over the subject property against
owners failed to do so. While applying for an the petitioners. The petitioner was the lessee of
extension to comply with the conditions, the the respondents’ father and uncle. When the
estate was bought from the original owners by petitioner failed to pay their rent to the
CRC 1447. Thereafter CRC 1447 filed a respondents, the latter asked for the turn-over
Complaint for Recovery of Possession before of the possession of the subject property and
the RTC against Calbatea et al. who claimed to payment of the rentals against her. The
be actual occupants and potential agrarian petitioner demanded that she should be
reform beneficiaries of the subject landholding. reimbursed for the building she constructed on
said property.
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the
complaint for recovery of possession in this
Should the respondents be compelled to
case?
reimburse the petitioner?
A: No. The subject of petitioner's Complaint
undoubtedly involves the use of agricultural

A: NO. They cannot be compelled to pay one- prescription and extinction of their loan
half of its value. However, respondents cannot obligation.
retain possession of the improvement, without
Petitioner essentially argues that the real
reimbursing the petitioner. In case they refuse
parties-in-interest in the present action are the
to pay the same, petitioner has the right to
REGISTERED OWNERS of the lands
remove the building without causing any more
mortgaged and thus, since they were not
impairment upon the property leased than is
impleaded in the case, any judgment resulting
necessary. Thus, respondents cannot demand
from such case should be considered as null and
the possession of the improvements on the
void.
subject land without properly reimbursing
petitioner. Does the Respondent have the right to bring
the action?
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP A: Yes. Petitioner's argument itself holds no

water.
TOPIC: Prescription
Under Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
agents are allowed to bring actions for the
PNB-Republic Bank (Maybank Philippines,
principals in their own name without joining
Incorporated), vs. Remedios Sian-Limsiaco,
their principals, provided that the contract does
G.R. No. 196323, February 08, 2021
not involve things belonging to the principal. As
Q: Respondents obtained several crop loans applied in this case, while it may seem that the
from Petitioner Maybank. Several Real Estate mortgage contracts "involve" real property of
Mortgages were executed to cover such loans. the principals, such contracts are actually not of
The Respondent was given special authority to that nature.
encumber the mortgagors-principals' titles with To clarify, the mortgage contract itself does not
the mortgage contracts. involve real property, but merely the right to
foreclose upon such real property should the
Maybank never demanded payment of the
necessary legal pre-conditions are met, such as
above sugar crop loans nor filed a case to collect
a breach in the principal contract to which the
or foreclose the mortgage. After a lapse of 17
mortgage is merely an accessory of.
years, the Respondents filed a Petition to cancel
the liens annotated on the titles of the Therefore, since neither the subject mortgage
mortgaged properties on grounds of contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights,

there was no need to join them and hence, prescription has ripened their de facto
respondent validly instituted the action in her possession of Lot 1087 into legal possession and
own name but still in her capacity as an agent of ownership.
the mortgagors-principals.
It was ruled that the Respondents are absolute
owners through succession of Lot No. 1087 on
the basis that the Petitioners could not have
TOPIC: Ownership through acquisitive
acquired Lot 1087 through prescription because
prescription.
it was covered by a Torrens title.
Heirs of Yadao et al. v. Heirs of Caletina et al., Did petitioners acquire ownership of the
G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022 subject lot through acquisitive prescription?
Q: Respondents filed a complaint or ownership A: YES. Petitioners are declared as the rightful
and recovery of possession against the owners of the subject land.
Petitioners. Respondents averred that they are
the grandchildren and surviving heirs of Juan, The ownership and possession of registered
the registered owner of a parcel of land in land cannot be obtained or acquired by
Cagayan. Sometime in 1991, petitioners prescription no matter the length of time of
occupied the subject land and refused to leave one's physical occupation and exercise of
despite their opposition and vigorous juridical rights of possession over the land.
prohibition. Hence, since ownership cannot be gained
through this means, it follows that the
Petitioners allege that they bought the subject registered owner is not automatically
lot from the Respondents for value and in good dispossessed of the registered land and
faith from the surviving heirs of Juan covered foreclosed from getting it back through the
by a contract and a Deed of Sale. They further passage of time as the registered owner may
alleged that they had been in public and resort to appropriate remedies to recover the
continuous possession thereof and had been in property. Appropriateness, however, requires
possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. that the rule on extinctive prescription as
explained below has not set in. HOWEVER,
On the other hand, as petitioners stressed,
Extinctive prescription refers to the rule that
respondents brought the matter to court only on
bars even the registered owner from availing
June 22, 1993 or more than thirty (30) years after
remedies to vindicate their right over the subject
they had taken possession thereof on September
lot.
28, 1962. By petitioners' conclusion, acquisitive

Petitioners' present occupation and possession La Union, having inherited the property from
of is not unlawful, void, or based on non- their predecessor-in-interest who had openly,
existent claim. They have long planted publicly, continuously and peacefully
themselves on Lot 1087 under the series of sales possessed the same without interruption for
by the heirs of the registered owner ~ without more than 30 years in the concept of an owner.
any objection from any of them until 1993 when They further allege that the Heirs of Gaetos
the relevant parties are long dead, truthful surreptitiously and without their knowledge
memory has faded and compromised, and and consent caused the property to be surveyed
crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. for the purpose of claiming ownership. The acts
For this reason, respondent's action to recover of the Heirs of Gaetos disturbed and put a cloud
the lot is definitely not imprescriptible. It will be on their ownership, possession and title over
both inefficient and unfair to the truth-seeking the property. The Heirs of Gaetos on the other
and grievance-redressing functions of the hand contend that their family owned the
courts to insist that prescription has not set in. property by virtue of succession from a
To stress, respondents are now barred from common ancestor several years before World
assailing the sale of Lot 1087 and petitioners' War II. The Quejados provided testimonies and
possession of this lot by reason of extinctive documentary evidence like mortgages and their
prescription. cancellation and Tax Declarations under the
name of their predecessor-in-interests to
support their claim of ownership. On the other
QUIETING OF TITLE hand, the Heirs of Gaetos provided testimonies
and presented the San Juan, La Union Cadastre
TOPIC: Quieting of Title Cad 739-D showing that the property was
already partitioned among the six children of
Viloria vs. Heirs of Pablo Gaetos Gaetos as evidenced by current tax declarations
G.R. No. 206240 May 12, 2021 to support their claim of ownership. The trial
court decided in favor of the Heirs of Gaetos
Doctrine: In an action for quieting of title, the because the evidence presented by the Quejados
plaintiff has the burden to show by preponderance of did not convincingly establish that they
evidence that they have a legal and equitable title to possessed the property publicly, exclusively
or interest in the real property subject of the action. and peacefully in the concept of owners and
that the Quejados did not have the requisite title
Q: The Quejados allege that they are the owner to pursue an action for quieting title. The Court
of a 10,000-square meter lot located in San Juan,

of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial having equitable title as well. The tax
court. declarations under the names of their
predecessor-in-interests, documentation
Do the Quejados have either legal or alluding to mortgages, and the testimonial
beneficial title to institute the action to quiet evidence they have presented did not
title against the Heirs of Gaetos? convincingly establish their equitable title over
the subject property. The tax declarations and
A: No, the Quejados have no legal or beneficial receipts are not conclusive evidence of
title to institute the action to quiet title against ownership or of the right to possess land when
the Heirs of Gaetos. not supported by other evidence. Mere
The Court reiterated the case of Spouses Basa v. allegation of open, continuous, and exclusive
Loy where it states that in order for an action for possession of the property in dispute without
quieting title may prosper, it is essential that the substantiation does not meet the requirements
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or of the law. Evidently, petitioners failed to
interest in, the property which is the subject- establish the first requirement of having legal or
matter of the action. Legal title denotes equitable title over the property in dispute. In
registered ownership, while equitable title view of their lack of title, legal or equitable,
means beneficial ownership. In the absence of there is no cloud to be prevented or removed
such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is and there is no case of quieting of title to speak
no cloud to be prevented or removed. For an of.
action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an TOPIC: Quieting of Title
equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, Casino, Sr. v. Development Bank of the
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be Philippines,
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in GR Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
Doctrine: As a rule, in an action for quieting of title,
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
the plaintiff or complainant must demonstrate a legal
In this case, the Quejados did not have a legal or equitable title to, or an interest in the subject
title to the subject property. There were no property. He must likewise show that the deed, claim,
certificates of title in their respective names. encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a
Also, they failed to substantiate their claim of cloud on his title is in fact invalid or inoperative

despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal TOPIC: Reconveyance of Real Property
efficacy.
Dacquel vs. Spouses Sotelo
Q: Baldomero filed a complaint against DBP for G.R. No. 203946, August 4, 2021
annulment of real estate mortgage and
Doctrine: If a mortgagee in equity desires to obtain
foreclosure proceedings with the RTC Br. 8,
title to a mortgaged property, the mortgagee’s proper
which complaint was ultimately dismissed.
remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in
Accordingly, a writ of possession over the
equity and buy it at a foreclosure sale.
subject parcel of land was issued by the RTC Br.
8 in favor of DBP.
Q: A parcel of land located in Malabon City is
This prompted Baldomero to file a complaint owned by the Spouses Sotelo under TCT No.
for quieting of title with the RTC Br. 10., 738. In 1994, the spouses started the
alleging, among others, that he is the true, construction of a 7-storey building on said land.
lawful, and absolute owner of the said parcel of In order to finance the construction, the spouses
land. borrowed from Dacquel ₱ 140,000 and the
parcel of land was used as a security. The
It appears that Baldomero characterizes the writ
construction was completed in 1997. A Deed of
of possession issued by the RTC Br. 8 as a cloud
Sale was allegedly executed thus the property
upon his alleged title.
was transferred in the name of Dacquel. It was
agreed that the debt was to be paid in double
Will Baldomero’s complaint prosper?
the amount (₱ 280,000) through the collection of
rentals from the building. However, when
A: NO. The writ of possession that was issued
Dacquel already collected the amount of ₱
as a result of the proceedings in RTC Br. 8
280,000, he refused to return the parcel of land
cannot be regarded as a cloud upon his alleged
to the spouses.
title, as the said writ and/or the proceedings
were not shown to be "in fact invalid,
May Dacquel’s title to the subject property
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable." It is the
nullified and reconveyed to the Spouses
claimant or plaintiff who has the burden of
Sotelo?
proof as a general principle of due process.
A: Yes, title may be nullified and the subject

property may be reconveyed to the Spouses
OTHER CASES:
Sotelo.

and Dacquel is one of equitable mortgage. Since

The Court first identified whether the Deed of it is established that their contract is one of
Sale executed between the Spouses Sotelo and equitable mortgage, Dacquel is now prohibited
Dacquel constitutes an equitable mortgage. by pactum commissorium under Article 2088 of
Article 1602 enumerates the instances when a the Civil Code which states that the creditor
contract is presumed to be an equitable cannot appropriate the thing given by way of
mortgage. Included in the enumeration are the pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any
price of the sale with a right to repurchase is stipulation to the contrary is null and void. It is
unusually inadequate and that the vendors of stressed the mortgagor’s default does not
the subject property remained in possession of operate to automatically vest on the mortgagee
the same. In this case, there was gross the ownership of the encumbered property.
inadequacy in the purchase price since the land Such an arrangement is void. If a mortgagee in
was only sold for ₱ 140,000 when the debt it was equity wants to obtain title to a mortgaged
allegedly supposed to pay amounted to ₱ 1 property, the mortgagee’s proper remedy is to
Million pesos. From there, we could already cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity
infer that there was gross inadequacy in the and buy it at a foreclosure sale. Consequently,
purchase price of the land. Next is that the the transfer of the property under Dacquel’s
vendors remained the owner of the subject name without availing the remedy of
property. The spouses remained in possession foreclosure is void thus the title of the subject
of such property because Dacquel never property must be reverted to the Spouses
demanded an accounting of the expenses when Sotelo.
the building was made, the spouses were the
ones who entered into a contract of lease with
the tenants and they were the ones who TOPIC: Unlawful Detainer
collected rentals from three of the tenants. Also,
the building permit and the utility bills were Florita Viray vs. Heirs of Viray
named under Ernesto Sotelo and he was the one G.R. No. 252325; March 18, 2021
who managed the building after its
Q: Milagros alleged that she is the lawful owner
construction. From these actions, it can be seen
of a stall space in a commercial
that it is the spouses who are the real owners of
building registered in her name. She leased the
the property and the building and that Dacquel
property to her daughter-in-law, the wife of her
is only a creditor who lent them some funds for
son, Julito, under conditions that she pays the
the project. Thus, it is clearly established that
the contract entered into by the spouses Sotelo

daily rent of P400.00 and that it will be used for In the given case, Milagros filed a complaint for
selling dressed chickens only. unlawful detainer in 2014, she failed to establish
that the possession of the subject property by
However, Julito's wife violated their terms
Julito's wife was tolerated all the way from the
when she deferred rent payments and used the
very beginning. In the absence of proof of
facility as a storage unit for the dressed
tolerated possession up to the filing of the
chickens. Milagros filed a case against them to
complaint for unlawful detainer, the
vacate the premises and restore possession
jurisdictional element of an illegal detainer case
under her name. Julito's wife allege that the lot
is not satisfied. (Florita Viray vs. Heirs of Viray GR
is co-owned by Milagros and her children as
No.252325 March 18, 2021)
heirs to the estate of Jose Viray, Milagros' late
husband; thus she is not legally bound to pay
rental since the property is partly owned by her
TOPIC: Immutability of Judgment
husband; hence, she could not be ejected
therefrom.
HH & Co. Agricultural Corporation v Perlas
G.R. No. 217095; February 17, 2020
Is the case against her tenable?
Doctrine: Immutability of Judgment - A final
A: No, the case against her is untenable. judgment is immutable and unalterable. It cannot be
disturbed or modified by any court even if the
For an unlawful detainer action to prosper, the
purpose of the alteration is to rectify perceived errors
plaintiff must allege and establish the following
of fact or law. This is to avoid delay in the
key jurisdictional facts: (I) initially, possession
administration of justice and of putting an end to
of property by the defendant was by contract
with, or by tolerance of, the plaintiff; (2) judicial controversies which cannot drag
perpetually.
eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of
Q: HH & Co. executed an extrajudicial
the termination of the latter's right of
foreclosure on a real estate mortgage covering a
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and lot in Cadiz City and was the highest bidder
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; during the public auction sale and a certificate
and (4) within one year from the last demand on of sale was issued in its favor. HH & Co. failed
the defendant to vacate the property, the to execute the formalities for consolidation of
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. title because of a preliminary injunction issued
for declaration of nullity of mortgage and

foreclosure sale involving said property. HH & an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
Co. filed an application for Writ of Possession regardless of whether the modification is attempted
and was subsequently granted. An Entry of to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
Final Judgment was issued to them on April 27, court of the land, as what remains to be done is the
2009. However, Perlas and siblings filed a purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the
motion to Quash such Writ of Possession and to judgment.
nullify the mortgage because they were
claiming that such property belongs to the Q: Domingo alleged that she bought a parcel of
estate of their mother. The RTC and CA ruled in land from Samonte by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
favor of Perlas and his siblings and ordered to However, after the sale, Samonte refused to
recall the Writ of possession issued to HH & Co. vacate the property and even rented out
portions of the land to other tenants. Samonte
Was the recalling of the Writ of Possession on other hand said that there was no sale
issued valid? executed between Samonte and Domingo and
that what he signed was believed by him to be a
A: No, the recalling of the issued Writ of contract of mortgage in relation to his loan from
Possession is not valid because it has already Domingo amounting to ₱59,000.00. Samonte
become final and executory. Also, it already has instituted a case for annulment of deed of sale
an entry of final judgment. Based on the and damages and another case which is
Immutability of Judgment doctrine, a final unlawful detainer with the RTC. The RTC and
judgment is immutable and unalterable. It the CA rendered judgment declaring the Deed
cannot be disturbed or modified by any court of Sale null and void and the decision became
even if the purpose of the alteration is to rectify final and executory on September 15, 2017.
perceived errors of fact or law. While on August 17, 2017, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and ruled that Domingo has
proven her right of ownership over the property
TOPIC: Immutability of Judgment and ordered Samonte and the other tenants to
evacuate the property.
Samonte v Domingo
G.R. No. 237720; February 5, 2020 Does Domingo have the right to possess the
subject property, considering that the Deed of
Doctrine: Once a judgment has become final and Sale she relied upon in filing her complaint
executory, it may no longer be modified in any was declared null and void in a separate case?
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct

A: No, Domingo no longer has any right to

possess the subject property since the Deed of
Sale where she based her claim was already
declared null and void and such decision has
already attained finality during the pendency of
this case. The issue has already been settled and
can no longer be disturbed in this case. It is a
general rule that judgments by a court of
competent jurisdiction, which have attained
finality, are not subject to reversal, modification
or alteration and are, thus immutable.

XII. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS EIB then sent a letter asking the petitioners to
settle their outstanding obligation. They failed
ANTICHRESIS to settle their obligation despite the given
extension. Now, EIB demanded that said
PLEDGE alleged outstanding balances be paid. Again,
they failed. Thus, EIB petitioned for the extra-
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE judicial foreclosure of the petitioners’ Makati
Property because they defaulted on the
TOPIC: Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Mortgaged payment of their obligations under the 1999
Property RCML despite repeated demands. The
petitioner filed a complaint for the nullification
Sps. Rolando and Cynthia Rodriguez v. of the extra-judicial foreclosure since they were
Export and Industry Bank, Inc (EIB), based on the alleged non-payment of
G.R. No. 214520, June 14, 2021 obligations that had already been cancelled.
Spouses Rodriguez argues that they were not in
Doctrine: If demand was made and duly received by
default at the time the mortgage in dispute was
the respondents and the latter still did not pay, then
extra-judicially foreclosed.
they were already in default and foreclosure was
proper. However, if demand was not made, then the
Is the extra-judicial foreclosure valid?
loans had not yet become due and demandable. This
meant that respondents had not defaulted in their
A: No, the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
payments and the foreclosure by petitioner was
Makati property was premature.
premature. Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor
is in default in the payment of his obligation. There are three elements that must be
established before a creditor may proceed with
Q: The respondent, formerly known as Urban the extra-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage,
Bank, granted the petitioners credit thus:
accommodations. Later on, the petitioners
"First, there must have been the failure to
executed an additional mortgage agreement
pay the loan obtained from the
covering their Makati property which was their
mortgagee-creditor; second, the loan
family home. In 2000, a merger between Urban
obligation must be secured by a real
Bank and EIB was issued so all assets and
estate mortgage; and third, the
liabilities of Urban Bank were transferred to
mortgagee-creditor has the right to
EIB.

foreclose the real estate mortgage either When PASSI defaulted in its payments, SBDI
judicially or extrajudicially." sent a demand letter to PASSI. PASSI however,
still failed to settle its outstanding obligation.
Subsumed in the first and third elements is the
Thus, SBDI went after the performance bond
requirement that the mortgagor-debtor be in
and sought payment from WGC for the full
default. In the absence of a contractual
amount of its surety contract.
stipulation to the contrary, the mortgagor-
debtor can only be deemed in default when the
May SBDI collect from WGC?
latter fails to pay despite a valid demand made
Would your answer in (a) be the same if the
by the mortgagee-creditor.
credit limit was inordinately increased to P8.5
The prior written demands served by EIB upon million without the knowledge of WGC?
Spouses Rodriguez pertained to obligations
which had been explicitly extinguished under A: (a) Yes. WGC is a surety. Even though the
the 1999 RCML. These demands could not have contract of a surety is secondary only to a valid
had the effect of placing Spouses Rodriguez in principal obligation, the surety becomes liable
default of the obligation arising from the 1999 for the debt or duty of another although it
RCML. possesses no direct or personal interest over the
obligations nor receives any benefit therefrom.
In fact, since the surety is a solidary debtor, it is
CHATTEL MORTGAGE not necessary that the original debtor first failed
to pay before the surety could be made liable; it
TOPIC: Suretyship is enough that a demand for payment is made
by the creditor for the surety's liability to attach.
Subic Bay Distribution, Inc v. Western
(b) Yes. While it is true that a surety is released
Guaranty Corp
from its obligation when there is a material
GR No. 220613; November 11, 2021
alteration of the principal contract in connection
with the bond given, such rule does not apply
Q: SBDI entered into a Distributor Agreement
in the given problem. The alteration here is not
with PASSI where the latter would purchase
material. Not all changes in the principal
petroleum products from the former to be paid
contract would work to absolve a surety from
within 15 days, provided that the credit limit
liability. This liability is not extinguished when
did not exceed P5 million. Pursuant to the
the modifications in the principal contract do
agreement, PASSI secured a performance bond
not substantially or materially alter the
from WGC.

principal's obligations. Verily, the touchstone went to the Registry of Deeds to verify the new
for contrariety would be an irreconcilable title given to him by Fe but he found out that
incompatibility between the old and new such title was fake. Manuel then filed a case
obligations. against respondent for the annulment of the
SPA, the REM and to surrender the original
owner's duplicate copy. He claimed that the
TOPIC: Mortgagee in Good Faith brothers So did not execute any SPA in favor of
Anita.
Spouses Danilo I. Yabut and Nelda Yabut v.
Michelle C. Nachbau Is the respondent a mortgagee in good faith?
G.R. No. 243470, January 12, 2021
A: No, the respondent is not a mortgagee in
Doctrine: One who transacts with another who is good faith since she failed to investigate the true
not the registered owner of the property, is expected nature of the property despite knowledge of
to examine not only the certificate of title but all circumstances that cause suspicion.
factual circumstances necessary to determine if there
The "mortgagee in good faith" rule is based on
are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in the
the principle that persons dealing with a
capacity to transfer the land.
property covered by a torrens certificate of title
are not required to go beyond what appears on
Q: The brothers So sold a piece of land to the
the title, in the absence of any sign that might
Spouses Yabut, represented by their son
arouse suspicion. This doctrine, however, does
Manuel. To transfer the title of property to his
not apply when the mortgagee does not directly
parents’ name, Manuel paid Fe Manuba to
deal with the registered owner, such as in this
facilitate such transfer. Fe then delivered the
case. It is incumbent upon the mortgagee to
purported new title to him. Sometime later, a
exercise greater care and higher degree of
group of people went to the property and asked
prudence in dealing with the mortgagor.
Manuel for an ocular inspection over it. Manuel
then learned that the subject property was First, respondent was merely dealing with an
mortgaged. It appears that the brother So attorney-in-fact. Despite the presence of an
allegedly executed an SPA authorizing Anita alleged SPA from the registered owners,
(one of the brothers’ wife) to mortgage the respondent should have inquired with the
subject property. Anita then mortgaged the said registered owners as to the extent of the
property to secure the loan the brothers So authority of the attorney-in-fact, especially
obtained from the respondent. Manuel then when the property is co-owned by two

persons. Second, respondent did not personally Spouses Ocampo. As a result, the TCT was
investigate the identity of the property. cancelled and a new TCT No. was issued in the
name of Spouses Ocampo. Later on, the Spouses
As borne by the records, respondent failed to Ocampo executed a Real Estate Mortgage,
exercise the due diligence in dealing with an through Carlos Talay, in favor of Bonnie Lao
attorney-in-fact whose authority was derived with the land as security, in exchange for a loan.
The Spouses Ocampo failed to pay the loan thus
from a spurious SPA.
the mortgage was foreclosed.
Is Bonnie Lao a mortgagee in good faith?

TOPIC: Mortgagee in Good Faith
A: Yes, Bonnie Lao is a mortgagee in good faith.

Spouses Miles vs. Lao
G.R. No. 209544, November 22, 2017 A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on
the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the
Doctrine: A mortgagee has a right to rely in good
property given as security, and in the absence of
faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the
any sign that might arouse suspicion, the
property given as security, and in the absence of any
mortgagee has no obligation to undertake
sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has
further investigation. Thus, the mortgagors’
no obligation to undertake further investigation.
right of ownership under the subject property is
This doctrine presupposes however, that the
not in question. However, the doctrine
mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
presupposes that the mortgagor, who is not the
property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens
rightful owner of the property, has already
title over the property in his name and that, after
succeeded in obtaining Torrens title over the
obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging
property in his name and that, after obtaining
the property to another who relies on what appears
the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the
on the title.
property to another who relies on what appears
on the title.
Q: Spouses Miles was the owner of a parcel of
land in Makati City. Before going to the United In this case, Bonnie has every right to rely on the
States, the spouses entrusted the duplicate of TCT presented to her since the property was
the TCT to their niece Rodora Jimenez so that already registered under the name of the
she may sell the land to interested buyers. There Spouses Ocampo. Also, there is nothing in the
was no written (SPA) given to Rodora. records, and neither did petitioners point to
Allegedly, Rodora conspired with the Spouses anything in the title which would arouse
Ocampo to falsify a Deed of Donation where the suspicions as to the spouses Ocampo's defective
Spouses Miles are donating said land to the title to the subject property.

In this case, Lao dealing with the mortgagors A: Yes, the CA is correct in imposing 12%
through a middleman does not equate to bad interest per year because the 10% interest per
faith. Lao’s decision to use a middleman in her month stipulated by the parties is
transactions with the mortgagors could be unconscionable. Here, the petitioners and
characterized as risky or reckless, however, the respondents entered into a loan obligation and
same does not establish a corrupt motive on the clearly stipulated for the payment of monetary
part of respondent, nor an intention to take interest. However, the stipulated interest of 10%
advantage of another person. Indeed, bad faith per month was found to be unconscionable, and
does not simply connote bad judgment or thus, the courts a quo struck down the same and
negligence. pegged a new monetary interest of 12% per
annum, which was the prevailing legal rate of
interest for loans and forbearances of money.
TOPIC: Unconscionable Stipulated Interest Rate
Isla vs. Estorga TOPIC: Real Estate Mortgage

G.R. No. 233974 July 2, 2018
Doctrine: Anent monetary interest, the parties are Britania. v. Gepty

free to stipulate their preferred rate. However, the GR No. 246995; January 22, 2020
courts are allowed to equitably temper interest rates
Doctrine: A judgment creditor or purchaser at an
that are found to be excessive, iniquitous,
execution sale acquires only whatever rights the
unconscionable, and/or exorbitant. In such, the legal
judgment obligor may have over the property at the
rate of interest prevailing at the time the agreement
time of levy.
was entered into is applied by the Court.
Q: Petitioners obtained a loan from the Q: Blas loaned Melba an amount which was
respondent subject to 10% interest per month. secured by a 120-square meter property. The
To secure the loan, a real estate mortgage was property, however, was actually the property of
executed. Petitioners failed to pay the loan; Florencia and was properly registered in her
hence, the respondent filed a petition for name.
judicial foreclosure. Upon appeal, the CA
ordered petitioners to pay the loan subject to Can Blas move for the judicial foreclosure of
12% interest per year until full payment. Melba’s property if the latter failed to pay her
debt?
Is the court correct?

A: NO. Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bills of lading. In addition, the Court finds the
on the examination of the judgment obligor CA's imposition of 12% interest per
when the judgment is unsatisfied speaks of the annum from date of last extrajudicial demand
on May 4, 2005 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per
judgment obligor’s property and income only;
annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this
not those belonging to third persons. Thus, if
Decision in place.
the judgment obligor has no right, title or
interest over the levied property, there is Acceptance
nothing for him or Gregoria transfer.
Catapang v. Lipa Bank,
G.R. No. 240645, January 27, 2020
TOPIC: Interest
Doctrine: When a contract is in a language not
Sps. Dennis and Cherrylyn "Cherry" Garcia, understood by one of the parties, and mistake or
Doing Business Under the Name and Style of fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract has
Ecolamp Multi-Resources v. Northern the burden of proving that the terms of the contract
Islands, Co., Inc., were fully explained to the contracting party.
G.R. No. 226495, February 05, 2020
Q: Spouses Catapang obtained a loan from Lipa
Q: Ecolamp ordered 3D home appliances from Bank and used as security for the loan their
the respondent; but they failed to pay its order property located in Rosario, Batangas covered
despite demand. Petitioner denied receipt of by TCT No. T-50140. The spouses failed to pay
goods from respondent because there was no the obligation hence, Lipa Bank foreclosed the
sales invoice issued to them. Upon appeal, the mortgage. The spouses also failed to exercise
CA ordered the petitioner to pay the value of their right of redemption thus, the property was
the ordered goods plus 12% interest per annum named after Lipa Bank under TCT No. 102308
from date of last extrajudicial demand and and the spouses were allowed to stay in the
6% per annum. . property. Not long after, the property was sold
to Redentor for ₱1.5M with a down payment of
Is the CA correct in imposing such interests? ₱ 400,000.00. Due to inadequate funds, Redentor
only paid ₱ 200,000.00 and obtained a loan from
A: YES. Deliveries to Ecolamp having been Lipa Bank worth ₱ 270,000.00 to pay the whole
established by preponderance of evidence, the down payment. The property of Catapang and
Court finds that the CA did not err in ordering Casiana was used as a security for the loan of
petitioner Spouses Garcia to pay respondent Redentor. Allegedly, Casiana was convinced by
Northern the value of the 3D appliances in the Lipa Bank to sign a Prosmissory Note and to
amount of P6,478,700.00 as shown by the execute a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
various delivery cargo receipts the details of property. Redentor and Casiana claim that they
which correspond to the details found in the did not receive any proceeds from the loan of ₱

270,000.00 and that the Promissory Note and the Mortgage. Since there is no consent, there no
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was procured perfected contract. Therefore, the Promissory
through fraud. Note and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is not
valid and binding and is declared to be null and
Are the Promissory Note and Deed of Real void.
Estate Mortgage entered into between Casiana
and Lipa Bank valid and binding contracts?
A: No, the Promissory Note and Deed of Real

Estate Mortgage are not valid and binding as
contracts. A contract is binding when there is
consent between the contracting parties; the
object is certain and the cause of the obligation
is established. Absence of one of the elements
does not create a perfected contract. Consent is
the acceptance by one of the offer made by the
other and that such acceptance must be
absolute. In this case, consent was not obtained
by the parties. It was found that Casiana did not
understand the English language hence she did
not understand the Promissory Note and Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage when it was presented
to her for signing since both documents were
written in the English language. One must be
mindful that Article 1332 of the Civil Code
protects parties to a contract who is at a
disadvantage due to his illiteracy, ignorance,
mental weakness or other handicap. It states
that the person enforcing the contract has the
burden of proving that the terms of the contract
were fully explained to the contracting party.
Since Casiana does not understand the English
language and that Lipa Bank failed to prove that
they have explained to Casiana each document
before signing, then it is clear that Casiana has
no consent to such signing of the documents
presented to her. There was no acceptance by
Casiana of the offer made by Lipa Bank under
the Promissory Note and Deed of Real Estate

XIII. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Are the respondents correct?
TORRENS SYSTEM A: NO, they are not correct.
TOPIC: Torrens Title The subject property was registered in the name
of petitioners' predecessor, Adolfo G. Barcelo,
Susana Barcelo v. Dominador Riparip having been issued Katibayan ng Orihinal na
G.R. No. 250159, April 26, 2021 Titulo Blg. P-1805, and declared the same for
taxation purposes.
Doctrine: Well-entrenched is the rule that a person
who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled Petitioners had been tilling and cultivating the
to the possession thereof. same by planting vegetables and mango trees.
When petitioners discovered the stealthy
Q: Adolfo Barcelo, husband of the petitioner, intrusion of respondents over the subject
owned a property covered by Katibayan ng property, they immediately filed a complaint
Orihinal na Titulo Blg P-1805. Upon his death, his with the barangay and subsequently filed a
family (petitioners) succeeded him. They complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
discovered that the respondent Dominador
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of
Riparip encroached a part of the said property.
petitioners' predecessor, pursuant to a free
Later, the petitioners learned that together with
patent application, evidences ownership and
the other respondents, Dominador occupied the
from it, a right to the possession of the property
remaining parts of the property. The petitioners
follows.
then filed a complaint against the respondents.
The respondents countered that their
grandfather originally possessed the subject
TOPIC: Registration of land under the Torrens Title
property and cultivated it in 1980. When their
grandfather died, they inherited it. They also
Jesus E. Ulay v. Maranguyod Bustamante
claimed that Adolfo and his wife obtain a
GR No. 231721; March 18, 2021
certificate of title by forging some documents
and claiming that they are in the possession of Doctrine: A certificate of title is merely an evidence
the property in their application for Free Patent of ownership or title over the particular property
from the DENR. Because of this, they sought for described therein. It cannot be used to protect a
the dismissal of the action. usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a
shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it

permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. A deed of Extrajudicial Partition (DEP) is a
Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not binding contract that is enforceable against the
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be parties thereto, as well as their successors-in-
co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, interest. The Court found that the DEP prevails
or that it may be held in trust for another person by over the erroneous subdivision plan, which
the registered owner (Naval v. Court of Appeals; consequently rendered the Deed of Exchange a
G.R. No. 167412; February 22, 2006). surplusage. Proceeding from the validity of the
DEP, the Court held that the Deed of Exchange
Q: After Eugenio's death, his wife Juana and is but a redundancy, since it could no more
their five children divided his lot through a restore to the Gregoria Heirs and Juana's heirs
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (DEP). Years possessions that they never lost.
later, a survey of the lot was conducted and an
Furthermore, the fact that a person was able to
approved subdivision plan was issued.
secure a title in his name does not operate to
However, in the subdivision plan, the shares of
vest ownership upon him of the subject land
Juana and one of her daughters, Gregoriere
since registration of a piece of land under the
interchanged. Despite the error and even after
Torrens System does not create or vest title and
the issuance of their corresponding Original
it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Certificates of Title in accordance with the
subdivision plan, Juana and Gregoria took
possession of their shares in accordance with
Moldex Realty, Inc v. Sps. Ernesto and Elsie
the DEP. Meanwhile, Juana cohabitated with
Yu
Arturo Remillano and had another 2 children
GR No. 246826; July 28, 2021
with him.
Doctrine: A boundary dispute would essentially
In an attempt to correct the matter, the heirs of seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of
Gregoria Bustamante and the Remillanos Spouses Yu or that of Moldex, but any alteration or
eventually executed a Deed of Exchange of their modification either way should be initiated only by
lots. direct proceedings and not merely as an issue
incidentally raised by the parties herein.
Is such Deed of Exchange valid and necessary?
Q: The Spouses Yu are the owners of a parcel of
A: No. Such the Deed of Exchange is invalid land adjacent to a land owned by Moldex
and unnecessary. Realty. The spouses alleged that Moldex
encroached over their property through the

latter’s construction of a perimeter fence. boundary dispute would essentially seek to

Despite demands to vacate and to cease alter or modify either the Torrens title of
construction of the perimeter fence, Moldex Spouses Yu or that of Moldex, but any alteration
refused and failed to comply. Thus, the spouses or modification either way should be initiated
filed a case for prohibitory injunction with only by direct proceedings and not merely as an
temporary restraining order, removal of the issue incidentally raised by the parties herein.
perimeter fence, and damages. To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in
an action for injunction would violate Section 48
During trial, the RTC issued an order directing
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property
a Geodetic Engineer from the DENR to conduct
Registration Decree, which prohibits collateral
a survey on the Yu property. In compliance
attacks on Torrens titles.
thereto, Engr. Arellano of the DENR conducted
ocular inspections and relocation surveys of the
Yu property. Engr. Arellano concluded that
TOPIC: Principle of indefeasibility and
there are discrepancies between the technical
incontrovertibility of a title under the Torrens
description of the Yu property as stated in the system
Torrens Title and the property’s actual location.
Heirs of Sulit etc. vs. Sps. Alfonso etc.
Thus a conflict arose: if the technical G.R. No. 230599, January 20, 2021
descriptions as stated in the Torrens Title were
given credence, it is undisputed that there is an Q: Spouses Sulit conveyed their 4,086-sq.m.
encroachment on the part of Moldex Realty. The property in favor of their two children: Efren
same is not true if Engr. Arellano’s findings and Zenaida for a consideration of P3,000.00
were followed instead. under a Deed of Absolute Sale for the purpose
of convenience in registration and with a
If you were the judge, how will you resolve the condition for its return in case the sellers needed
case? financial assistance.. Two months later a
counter Deed of Sale was executed by Sps. Efren
A: If I were the judge, I will use the technical Sulit and Sps. Alfonso who reconveyed the
descriptions as stated in the Torrens Title as the subject property to their parents, Sps. Sulit.
basis for rendering my decision. The Despite the foregoing, Spouses Efren Sulit and
controversy involved herein is essentially a Spouses Alfonso caused the subdivision of the
boundary dispute between Moldex and subject property and sold portions thereof.
Spouses Yu which the latter sought to settle
through an action for prohibitory injunction. A

The court held that the conveyance of the scrutinizing the certificate of title and
subject property in favor of innocent purchasers examining all factual circumstances in order to
for value and in good faith. determine the seller's title and capacity to
transfer any interest in the property.
Is the court correct?
A: NO. it is well-settled that even if the REGALIAN DOCTRINE

procurement of a certificate of title was tainted
with fraud and misrepresentation, a title may be TOPIC: Regalian Doctrine
the source of a completely legal and valid title
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Republic v. Espinosa
G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017
This doctrine emphasizes that a person who
deals with registered property in good faith Q: On October 26, 1955, a cadastral decree was
could acquire good title even from a forger or a issued to Valentina Espinosa covering a 2.888-
fraud and be absolutely protected by a Torrens hectare land located in Negros Occidental. By
title. As a rule, a prospective buyer is not virtue of the decree, the land was named under
required by law to inquire further than what Espinosa through an Original Certificate of Title
appears on the face of the prospective seller's and was later on sold to Caliston through a
Torrens certificate of title on file with the Transfer of Certificate of Title.
Register of Deeds when dealing with registered Subsequently, the State claimed that the
land. property is an inalienable public land for it fell
within a timberland area as indicated per Land
While the subject property was registered to
Classification Map certified by the Director of
Spouses Efren Sulit and Spouses Alfonso, there
Forestry. The spouses Escarda also intervened
were circumstances herein which would have alleging that they have been occupying the
impelled a reasonably cautious man to make an property since 1976 and believes that the
inquiry into the status of the title of the property property belongs to the State. They also prayed
in litigation. Unfortunately, the Court cannot the ejectment case filed against them by
ascribe good faith to persons who have not Caliston be ordered desist.
shown any diligence in protecting their rights.
Caliston countered that the property is not
The rest house or nipa hut is evidence of Sps.
timberland. She argued that her title was issued
Sulit exercise of possession over the subject
earlier in 1962 while the map shows that it was
property which obliges any buyer thereof to
only classified in 1986. She also claimed that the
observe a higher degree of diligence by spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or

personality to intervene because only the State The case at bar is one of reversion and not one
may initiate an action for reversion. She also of land registration. Therefore, the burden of
alleged that she was merely tolerating the proving whether the property was classified as
spouses occupancy of the land until their refusal timberland or forest land at the time it was
to vacate. decreed to Espinosa is on the part of the State.
The Regalian Doctrine is well-enshrined not

Is the case of the State tenable?
only in the present Constitution, but also in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has
A: No, the State failed to prove that the property
always recognized and upheld the Regalian
was classified as forest land at the time of the
doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's
grant of the cadastral decree to Espinosa.
property regime. Nevertheless, in applying this
Cadastral proceedings are governed by the
doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that
usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence
in every claim or right by the Government
and therefore a cadastral decree and a certificate
against one of its citizens, the paramount
of title are issued only after the applicant proves
considerations of fairness and due process must
all the requisite jurisdictional facts that they are
be observed. Respondent in this case failed to
entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are
show that the subject lot is part of timberland or
heard, and that evidence is considered. As such,
forest reserve it adverted to
the cadastral decree is a judgment that
adjudicates ownership after proving these
jurisdictional facts.
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
In the case at bar, it is of no doubt that Espinosa
was granted a cadastral decree and was TOPIC: Possession and Property Registration
subsequently issued an Original Certificate of
Title, the predecessor title of Caliston’s
Rep. Of the Phil. vs. Banal na Pag-aaral
Certificate of Title. It implies that during the
GR NO. 193305, January 27, 2021
time of application of Espinosa for Registration
of Title, he has proved that the property is an Q: Amadeo Cadastre claimed ownership
alienable and disposable property in the and actual possession of the subject lot on the
cadastral proceedings. ground of its continuous, exclusive and
Reversion is the remedy where the State seeks notorious possession and occupation in the
to revert land back to the mass of the public concept of an owner long before World War II,
domain. Such remedy is proper when public reckoned from the possession of its
land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to predecessors-in-interest, the Heirs of
private individuals or corporations. Hermogenes Bayot (vendors), who executed an

Extrajudicial Partition of Estate with Deed of Clearly, the subject lot is an alienable and
Absolute Sale. disposable land of the public domain. The
foregoing documents sufficiently show that the
On the other hand, to support its claim of
government executed a positive act of
possession in the concept of an owner prior to
declaration that the subject lot is alienable and
June 12, 1945, it presented documentary and
disposable land of the public domain as of
testimonial evidence that: (a) the subject lot was
March 15, 1982, which enjoy the presumption of
previously owned by Hermogenes Bayot
regularity in the absence of contradictory
(Hermogenes); (b) no other person had laid any
evidence
claim of ownership on the subject lot; (c)
Hermogenes had been in possession of the 2. Has Cadastre established possession and
subject lot since the early 1940s until his death; occupation of the subject lot of the nature and
(d) Hermogenes held tax declarations in his duration required by law?
name; (e) upon Hermogenes' death, was
A: Yes, For purposes of land registration under
succeeded by his children, herein vendors, who
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, proof of specific acts
sold the subject lot to respondent; and (f)
of ownership must be presented to substantiate
respondent is in possession of the subject lot
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive and
which is now covered by TD No. 97 13023.
notorious possession and occupation of the land
1. Has Cadastre sufficiently established that subject of the application. Actual possession
the subject lot is alienable and disposable? consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually
A: Yes, Verily, the applicant has the burden of
exercise over his own property.
overcoming the presumption that the State
owns the land applied for, and proving that the Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible,
land has already been classified as alienable and apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b)
disposable as of the time of the filing of the continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and
application. not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
Cadastre presented: (a) the CENRO
dominion over the land and an appropriation of
Certification "verified to fall within the
it to his own use and benefit; and (d) notorious
Alienable or Disposable Land established under
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
Project No. 5 per Land Classification Map No.
known and talked of by the public or the people
3013 (LC-3013) as approved and certified as
in the neighborhood.
such on March 15, 1982 under FAO No. 4-1656;"
and (b) a certified copy of FAO No. 4-1656.

Melanio Ambat (Melanio). Melanio, who was blown hearing wherein petitioner must prove the fact
born in 1927, categorically claimed: (a) to have of loss or theft through preponderant evidence.
known of Hermogenes' ownership of the
subject lot when he was about 15 years old, or Q: Rogelio filed with the RTC a Petition for the
around 1941 before the Japanese-American war Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of a
broke out, since they are barrio mates, their certificate of title registered in his name. He
house being merely 15 meters away from each executed an Affidavit of Loss and accordingly,
other; (b) that the subject lot used to be an a Certification was issued by the Register of
agricultural land, as he in fact used to till and Deeds certifying that a copy of said certificate of
farm a portion thereof; and (c) that no other title registered under his name is intact.
person had laid any claim of ownership on the
subject lot. From the foregoing facts, is Dominador
entitled to a replacement duplicate certificate?
In sum, the Court finds that respondent has met
the requirements for registration of the subject
A: No. The applicable law in case of loss of the
lot under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529.
owner's duplicate certificate of title is Section
109 of P.D. No. 1529, which has two distinct
requirements: the first paragraph refers to the
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
notice requirement, i.e., submission of an
Affidavit of Loss to the Register of Deeds while
TOPIC: Certificate of Title
the second paragraph pertains to the procedure
for the replacement, i.e., filing a petition for the
Republic of the Philippines v. Rogelio
issuance of a new duplicate certificate. The
Ciruelas
second paragraph contemplates the conduct of
GR No. 239505; February 17, 2021
a full-blown hearing wherein petitioner must
Doctrine: The applicable law in case of loss of the prove the fact of loss or theft through
owner's duplicate certificate of title is Section 109 of preponderant evidence. As applied to the
P.D. No. 1529, which has two distinct requirements: instant case, mere compliance with the notice
the first paragraph refers to the notice requirement, requirement and the filing of a petition with the
i.e., submission of an Affidavit of Loss to the Register appropriate RTC does not automatically entitle
of Deeds while the second paragraph pertains to the the registered owner to a replacement duplicate
procedure for the replacement, i.e., filing a petition certificate. Rogelio must still establish by
for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate. The preponderance of evidence that the owner's
second paragraph contemplates the conduct of a full- duplicate was lost.

Decision declaring the plaintiffs as owners of the lots

and ordering the defendant to refrain from
TOPIC: Certificate of Title committing acts of dispossession.
Mutilan v. Mutilan Q: The RTC, in a case between the Spouses

GR No. 216109; February 5, 2020 Poblete and Banco Filipino, rendered a decision
against the latter, declaring that the mortgage of
Doctrine: The certificate of title is the best evidence the subject land to Banco Filipino was void and
of ownership of a property. that the spouses are entitled to said lots. The
decision lapsed into finality and a writ of
Q: What is the best evidence of ownership of a execution was accordingly issued ordering
property? Banco Filipino to refrain from committing acts
of dispossession against the spouses.
A: The certificate of title is the best evidence of
Later, the spouses moved for the issuance of an
ownership of a property. If a property covered
alias writ of execution alleging that the original
by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
writ is incomplete since it did not order Banco
conclusiveness of such title should be given due
Filipino to surrender and transfer the
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
certificates of title in their names, which motion
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
was denied by the RTC explaining that an order
should be considered as the owner of the
of execution cannot vary the terms of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified
judgment.
or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when possession of the property
Is the denial by the RTC of the motion correct?
itself is in the persons named in the title.
A: NO. The Order to surrender and transfer the

certificates of title is deemed implied from the
TOPIC: Certificate of Title
Decision declaring the spouses as owners of the
lots and ordering Banco Filipino to refrain from
Sps. Poblete v. Banco Filipino Savings and
committing acts of dispossession. The fact that
Mortgage Bank
it was not mentioned in the dispositive portion
GR No. 228620; June 15, 2020
is of no moment. Further, Banco Filipino has no
right over the properties. It should not be
Doctrine: The Order to surrender and transfer the
permitted to retain the titles over the lots on the
certificates of title is deemed implied from the

basis of a void transaction. Otherwise, it would subject property since time immemorial; A.
unjustly deprive the spouses of their right as Lontok committed fraud and misrepresentation
owners to register the lots in their names and in her free patent application when she claimed
subject them to threats of dispossession. that she had complied with all the cultivation
and residence requirement of the free patent
law, when in fact she was not in possession of
OTHER CASES: the subject property; and A. Lontok's
TOPIC: CANCELLATION of FREE PATENT on misrepresentation constitutes sufficient ground
the ground of FRAUD and for the cancellation of the patent and the
MISREPRESENTATION corresponding title issued to her under the
mandate of Section 91 of the Public Land Act.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sps. Virgilio
and Anna Ramirez Lontok Is the Republic authorized to file such action?
G.R. No. 198832; January 13, 2021
A: Yes. To recall, the Republic initiated this
Doctrine: Although the State may no longer have a complaint upon a finding of fraud in the
cause of action for reversion, it may still validly application of a free patent. The authority to file
initiate a complaint for nullification of patents and an action in the event of fraud in the application
titles in order to maintain the integrity of the land of free patents is based on Sec. 91 of the Public
registration process Land Act.
Sec. 91 expressly provides for the automatic

Q: Anna Lontok was granted Free Patent by the
cancellation of the applications filed on the
DENR over a piece of land. She sold a portion of
ground of fraud and misrepresentation. The
it to the respondent corporation. In 1994, the
State maintained sufficient interests in terms of
heirs of Sps. Juanito Amando and Rizalina
the maintenance of the integrity of the
Bartolome (protestants) filed a complaint
land registration process to have standing in
against the issuance of free patent to the
these cases.
respondents claiming that their father owned
the subject property. The Republic then filed a
complaint for the annulment of Patent and
TOPIC: Buyers in good faith
Cancellation of Title against the respondent
spouses stating that the protestants together
Arakor Construction and Development
with their predecessors-in-interest have been in
Corporation v. Teresita Sta. Maria
continuous and adverse possession of the

GR No. 215006; January 11, 2021 Is Arakor a buyer in good faith?

Third Division
A: No. The standard to determine the good
Doctrine: The buyers of conjugal property must faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had
observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) title to and possession of the land but whose
the diligence in verifying the validity of the title capacity to sell was restricted, in that the
covering the property; and (b) the diligence in consent of the other spouse was required before
inquiring into the authority of the transacting the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove
spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other good faith in such a situation, the buyers must
spouse. show that they inquired not only into the title of
the seller but also into the seller's capacity to
Q: Spouses Fernando and Felicidad owned sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must
certain parcels of land. Felicidad died intestate observe two kinds of requisite diligence,
and was survived by Fernando and their 8 namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the
children. Felicidad’s heirs inventoried her validity of the title covering the property; and
properties but they did not initiate its partition; (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority
thus, the parcels of land remained in the name of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
of the spouses. property in behalf of the other spouse.
Years later, Fernando passed away. After his Here, Arakor cannot claim to be an innocent
death, Atty. Legaspi, the president of Arakor purchaser for value since Atty. Legaspi did not
Construction and Development Corporation, diligently ascertain the genuineness of the
informed the heirs that their parents had signatures of the owners-spouses, especially
already sold the contested parcels of land to that of Felicidad's. He merely relied on
Arakor as evidenced by two undated Deeds of Fernando's representations that Felicidad's
Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Felicidad signature was genuine. Atty. Legaspi, being a
during her lifetime and during her marriage lawyer, should have been more circumspect to
with Fernando. The said Deeds of Absolute determine if the spouses had the capacity to sell
Sale, however, were forged. and if they voluntarily and validly signed the
deeds of sale. Atty. Legaspi could have
In attempting to establish that Arakor is a buyer
requested or even demanded to personally talk
in good faith, Atty. Legaspi said that he merely
to Felicidad in order to affirm if she consented
relied on Fernando’s representations that
to the disposition of the properties.
Felicidad's signature was genuine.

TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Courts Over Cases The Regional Trial Court’s petition is an action
Involving Presidential Decree No. 902-A. for the annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It states that the Securities
Imperial v. Armes and Exchange Commission declared as void the
G.R. No. 178842; January 30, 2017 sale between Napal and Cruz without hearing
the pleadings of Cruz. Also, the Securities and
Q: Napal failed to convey the property land to
Exchange Commission has no power to order
Imperial as stated under their MOA to organize
transfer of title over the subject property.
a domestic corporation named NIDSLAND that
Annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies
is engaged in real estate.
limits its application to regional trial courts and
However, Napal sold the land to Cruz municipal trial courts.
evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale.
In the present case, there is no law at the time
Imperial filed a derivative suit before the
pertinent to this case, which allows the filing of
Securities and Exchange Commission. Imperial
a petition for annulment of judgment before the
also filed a notice of lis pendens for the SEC case
regional trial courts and the Court to Appeals to
with the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City.
set aside a void judgment of the Securities and
The Securities and Exchange Commission ruled Exchange Commission on the basis of lack of
in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND. Since jurisdiction.
Napal did not appeal the decision, it became
final and executory. TOPIC: FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
Napal filed a Petition for Annulment of Heirs of Domingo Reyes v. The Director of
Judgement with the Court of Appeals. Cruz Lands and Director of Forestry
joining as a party-petitioner. G.R. No. 223602; June 08, 2020
Does the SEC have jurisdiction over the case? Doctrine: Judgments or orders become final and
executory by operation of law, and not by judicial
A: The Regional Trial Court petition lacks declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact
jurisdiction and the decision of the Securities upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if
and Exchange Commission was issued with no appeal is perfected or no motion for
grave abuse of discretion. Rule 47 of the Rules reconsideration or new trial is filed.
of Court provides that an action for the
annulment of judgment may be filed before the Q: Domingo Reyes applied for land registration
Court of Appeals to annul a void judgment of of parcels of lands but this was opposed by the
regional trial courts even after it has become respondent because said lands were within the
forest classification. The trial court adjudicated
final and executory.
four parcels of lands to the petitioners. The

Green Notes 2022 Lorem ipsum Civil Law
SolGen representing the respondents asked for

extension of time to file an appeal over the
court’s decision. This was opposed by the
petitioners claiming that the decision has
become final and executor.
Are the petitioners correct?
A: NO. The OSG prayed that the appeal taken

be treated as a petition for review and
consequently requested for the transmittal of
the entire records from the RTC to the CA. After
a lapse of 16 years or on May 22, 2012, the RTC
resolved both the motion for execution filed by
petitioners and the Manifestation and Motion
filed by the Solicitor General. In its fallo, the
Resolution explicitly stated that the appeal was
considered as a petition for review and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records
of the case to the CA for disposition. Evidently,
the Solicitor General's appeal was given due
course. Hence, in view of the pendency of the
Solicitor General's petition for review, the Order
has not become final and executory.


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University of the Cordilleras

Atty. Stephanie Rachel Castro

Atty. Ronic Albert Treptor

University of the Cordilleras

I. PRELIMINARY TITLE laws which are to regulate their actions and

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of a criminal case against him, respondent Q: Restituto Tobias was employed by

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Q: Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III filed a petition

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Republic v. Dayot, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA

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The trial court ruled that the marriage between

Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257,1994

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essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence

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Doctrine: Absolute divorce obtained by an alien

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marriage may testify on behaviors that they

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psychological incapacity. The trial court

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3. Absolute Community of alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding

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the subject property, however, were not be substituted by respondent Leonor.

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3. Illegitimate children A: No. Ruling on the same would be premature

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K. Emancipation opposition claiming that the will is null and

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A: No. Although Araceli was a compulsory heir

Q: Araceli Mayuga, Benjamin and Armando 2. Institution of heirs (including

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A: Yes. The Court reexamined the iron curtain

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2. Capacity to succeed by will or filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold

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Resolution, which the latter accepted on June

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