S. Irudaya Rajan, Ginu Zacharia Oommen - Asianization of Migrant Workers in The Gulf Countries-Springer Singapore (2020)

S.
Irudaya Rajan
Ginu Zacharia Oommen Editors
Asianization
of Migrant
Workers in the
Gulf Countries
Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf
Countries
S. Irudaya Rajan • Ginu Zacharia Oommen
Editors
Asianization of Migrant
Workers in the Gulf
Countries
Editors
S. Irudaya Rajan Ginu Zacharia Oommen
Centre for Development Studies Kerala Public Service Commission
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India Trivandrum, Kerala, India
ISBN 978-981-32-9286-4 ISBN 978-981-32-9287-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface and Acknowledgement
The idea to bring out this book was conceived owing to the success of the
International Conference on Gulf Migration held at the Nehru Memorial Museum
and Library (NMML), Teen Murti Bhavan, New Delhi, in October 2014. Due to the
overwhelming response of participants and other scholars from around the world,
we decided to bring out this edited book as an essential volume on Gulf migration,
with contributions from participant scholars as well as other scholars invited to
write for this volume.
The conference was organized by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
(NMML), New Delhi, whilst Dr. Oommen was an NMML Fellow at the Centre for
Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, where Prof. Rajan is a Professor.
Our journey of collaboration on Gulf migration studies started with our introduc-
tion which was unbelievably facilitated by the eminent scholar Mr. S. Krishnakumar,
Associate Professor, Venkateswara College, New Delhi, and we are highly obliged
to him for his sincere efforts. To organize this conference, the wholehearted support
we received from the former Director of NMML Dr. Mahesh Rangarajan and staff
was invaluable, and we are very grateful. We are also indebted to our mentors Prof.
Prakash C. Jain and Dr. K. C. Zachariah for years of guidance in research in the
topic of Gulf migration.
We would also like to thank our organizations, the Centre for Development
Studies and the administrations and our colleagues for their support and encourage-
ment to pursue research on Gulf migration. Dr. Oommen is also highly indebted to
his former organization MIGRINTER, University of Poitiers, France. We also
express our gratitude to our research team, mainly Nikhil Panicker, Sreeja K. S. and
Anu S. Nair, for their sincere efforts in putting this work together.
v
vi Preface and Acknowledgement
It would be remiss if we do not acknowledge our families for their love and care
throughout the years. Dr. Rajan thanks his wife Hema and his three children Rahul,
Rohit and Mary Catherine, and Dr. Oommen thanks his wife Suvarna and his daugh-
ter Rebecca.
Last but not least, we thank Springer Nature for the timely publication of
this book.
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India S. Irudaya Rajan

Ginu Zacharia Oommen
Contents
1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook�� 1

S. Irudaya Rajan and Ginu Zacharia Oommen
2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council:
Past, Present and Future �� 19
George Naufal and Ismail Genc
3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies
in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries�� 37
Zahra R. Babar
4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry
Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf�� 55
M. H. Ilias
5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship
and Human Rights of Migrant Workers in the Gulf
Cooperation Council Countries�� 69
M. V. Bijulal
6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar�� 83
Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop,
Kaltham Al-Ghanim, Kien Le Trung, and Laura Harkness
7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour
Migration to the Gulf�� 103
Graeme Hugo
8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting
Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries�� 127
Neil G. Ruiz
vii
viii Contents
9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy:

Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic Discontent?�� 151
Zakir Hussain
10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble�� 177
Marie Percot
11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries:
An Investigation of Regional Disparities in Outflows of Workers,
Remittances and Poverty�� 189
G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq, and Nasir Iqbal
12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf:
Current Status and Future Outlook�� 219
Bilesha Weeraratne
13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested
Politics and Contradictory Policies�� 233
S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph
14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith
and Prosperity Amongst Syrian Christians in Kerala�� 247
15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula:
An Overview �� 267
Prakash C. Jain
16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf�� 281
About the Editors and Contributors
Editors
S. Irudaya Rajan, PhD, is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies,

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala (India). He has 35 years of research experience.

Professor Rajan has coordinated eight major migration surveys in Kerala since
1998 (with Prof. K. C. Zachariah), Goa Migration Survey 2008, Punjab Migration
Survey 2009 and Tamil Nadu Migration Survey 2015. He played an instrumental
role in conducting the Gujarat Migration Survey 2011 and in the process of initiat-
ing Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Bihar migration surveys. Professor Rajan has
published extensively in national and international journals on social, economic,
demographic, psychological and political implications of international migration.
He has undertaken projects on international migration with European Union;
International Labour Organization; World Bank; International Organization of
Migration; South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes (SANEI);
Rockefeller Foundation; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO); Migrant Forum in Asia; Department of Non-Resident
Indian Affairs, Government of Goa; Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs,
Government of Kerala; Commissionerate of Rehabilitation and Welfare of Non-
Resident Tamils, Government of Tamil Nadu; Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs,
Government of India; India Centre for Migration of the Ministry of External Affairs;
Canadian Institutes of Health Research; and International Development Research
Centre. He is the Editor of the annual series India Migration Report since 2010 and
also founding Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Migration and
Development.
Ginu Zacharia Oommen, PhD, is a member of the Kerala Public Service

Commission, Trivandrum. Prior to this, he was a visiting professor at the Fondation

Maison des Sciences de l’homme (FMSH), Paris. Oommen has held numerous fel-
lowships and has been Visiting Faculty at MIGRINTER (the Centre for International
Migration), University of Poitiers, France; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library,
ix
x About the Editors and Contributors
New Delhi; Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin; Gulf Studies Programme, JNU;
Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi; Centre for South Asia–West China
Cooperation, Sichuan University, China and India Centre for Migration, New Delhi.
Oommen was also a Hermes Postdoctoral Fellow at MIGRINTER, University de
Poitiers France and Visiting Graduate Fellow at the Rothberg International School,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Besides, Oommen was also offered two
other prestigious fellowships: the Swedish Institute Guest Postdoctoral Fellowship
at Uppsala University, Sweden, and the Visiting Senior Fellowship at MACIMIDE,
University of Maastricht University, the Netherlands, both of which he declined
since it coincided with other fellowships.
His major publications include Ethnicity, Marginality and Identity: The Jews of
Cochin in Israel (Manak, 2011), South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History,
Policies, Development (Routledge, 2015). Oommen has conducted extensive field
research in Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, France and Kerala.
Contributors
Kaltham Al-Ghanim is Professor of Sociology, Qatar University.
G. M. Arif is a demographer and currently he is the Joint Director at the Pakistan

Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. He has been member of
various government commissions and study groups on poverty reduction and
migration.
Zahra R. Babar is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International

and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
in Qatar.
M. V. Bijulal is Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations and

Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.
Abdoulaye Diop is Associate Research Professor and Head of the Research

Department at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar
University (QU).
Shujaat Farooq is working in Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP),

Pakistan, as Director of Monitoring and Evaluation.
Andrew Gardner is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Puget Sound

in Tacoma, Washington. He is the author of numerous articles, book chapters, books
and essays.
About the Editors and Contributors xi
Ismail Genc is Professor of Economics and the Head of the Economics Department

at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Prof. Genc received
his PhD in Economics from the Texas A&M University.
Laura Harkness is Freelance Researcher and she was a research associate at

Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar.
Graeme Hugo was ARC Australian Professorial Fellow and Director of the
Australian Population and Migration Research Centre, University of Adelaide.
Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru

House, New Delhi.
M. H. Ilias is Professor at the India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia,

New Delhi.
Nasir Iqbal is Director of Research at the Benazir Income Support Programme

(BISP), Pakistan. Previously, Iqbal was Assistant Professor of Economics at Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics (PIDE).
Prakash C. Jain is UGC Emeritus Fellow following his superannuation as

Professor of West Asian Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi.
Jolin Joseph is Doctoral Scholar at York University, Canada.
Kien Le Trung is Associate Professor at the Social and Economic Survey Research
Institute (SESRI), Qatar University.
George Naufal is Senior Research Associate at PPRI and a Research Fellow at the

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) at Bonn. He was also an Assistant/Associate
Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah in the United Arab
Emirates.
Marie Percot is an anthropologist and is associated with the Laboratoire d’

Anthropologie Urbaine/Institut Interdisciplinaire d’Anthropologie du Contemporain
(EHESS), Paris, France.
Silvia Pessoa is Associate Teaching Professor of English at Carnegie Mellon

University, Qatar. Her areas of expertise are immigration studies and academic
writing development.
xii About the Editors and Contributors
Neil G. Ruiz is a Senior Policy Analyst and Associate Fellow at the Brookings
Institution Metropolitan Policy Program. His research focuses on regional and state
economic development, innovation, international migration, high-skilled immigra-
tion as well as global economic issues.
Bilesha Weeraratne is currently a Research Fellow, attached to the Labour,

Employment and Human Resources Development Unit at the Institute of Policy
Studies, Sri Lanka. She is also serving as an International Consultant to the Asian
Development Bank, Philippines.
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Immigration number – all females (NB: 1960 value

is equated to 100)�� 22
Fig. 2.2 Immigration number – all males (NB: 1960 value
Fig. 2.3 Immigration number – all (NB: 1960 value
Fig. 2.4 Share of population as foreigners.�� 26
Fig. 2.5 Nationals and non-nationals sex ratio.�� 26
Fig. 2.6 Age distribution by nationality: GCC countries.�� 27
Fig. 2.7 Distribution of employed population by nationality.�� 28
Fig. 2.8 Share out of total foreign population in Kuwait (2012).�� 28
Fig. 2.9 Unemployment rate in Kuwait (2012).�� 29
Fig. 2.10 Labour force participation rate in Kuwait (2012).�� 29
Fig. 6.1 Duration of low-income migrants’ stay in Qatar, 2012�� 88
Fig. 6.2 Living quarters for low-income labor migrants in qatar�� 94
Fig. 6.3 Monthly basic salary and migration costs, by nationality�� 95
Fig. 7.1 Indonesia: Migrant Stocks by Country of Destination.�� 105
Fig. 7.2 Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed
by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979–2013.�� 107
Fig. 7.3 Saudi Arabia: Arrivals and departures of non-Saudis
with Indonesian country of citizenship, 2000–2011�� 108
Fig. 7.4 Indonesia: growth of remittances, 1983–2013.�� 111
Fig. 7.5 Indonesia: age–sex structure of the population,
2010 (shaded) and 2030�� 117
Fig. 7.6 Example of a brokerage network for official
migrants to Saudi Arabia.�� 121
Fig. 8.1 Overseas workers welfare administration within
the Philippine government. �� 134
xiii
xiv List of Figures
Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006.�� 135

Fig. 8.3 Philippine government emigration institutional
organizational chart�� 149
Fig. 9.1 History of Saudization in private sector (in per cent).�� 161
Fig. 9.2 Total and youth unemployment in Saudi Arabia,
2006–2010. �� 162
Fig. 9.3 Work permits issued to foreign workers to different
enterprises, 2001.�� 164
Fig. 9.4 Projected national labour force, 2010–2050.�� 166
Fig. 12.1 Skills of migrant workers 1994–2015.�� 221
Fig. 12.2 Gender distribution of migrants. �� 222
Fig. 12.3 Migrant Departure by Age and Gender: 2015.�� 223
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of various expatriate groups

at different time intervals (%)�� 21
Table 2.2 Difference between male and female expatriate
populations in the GCC�� 24
Table 2.3 Occupation by nationality and gender – Kuwait 2012�� 30
Table 6.1 Averages for key variables, by ethnicity�� 97
Table 6.2 Averages for key variables for South Asian migrants,
by religion�� 97
Table 7.1 Indonesia: estimated stocks of overseas contract
workers around 2013�� 105
Table 7.2 Estimates of stock of Indonesian female domestic
overseas contract workers, 2011–2013�� 109
Table 7.3 Main Asian labour exporting countries: workers’
remittances relative to exports and imports
in US$ million, 1980–2012�� 112
Table 7.4 Indonesia: Comparison of key economic
and demographic indicators, early
1990s and 2010–2013�� 113
Table 7.5 Indonesia: labour force and unemployment�� 114
Table 7.6 Indonesia: demographic variables, 1970 and 2010�� 116
Table 7.7 Indonesia: growth and projected growth
of population aged 15–34�� 116
Table 8.1 Number of OWWA welfare cases, January
to September 1994�� 131
Table 8.2 Post-1995 Philippine emigrant institutions�� 140
Table 8.3 Philippine legislation and policies dealing
with emigration�� 141
Table 8.4 Recruitment and placement by recruitment
intermediary, 1986�� 143
xv
xvi List of Tables
Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987

(in Philippine pesos)�� 144
Table 8.6 Philippine remittance industry revenue estimate, 2004�� 146
Table 9.1 Share of foreign workers in total Saudi labour force
(in thousands)�� 153
Table 9.2 Categories of business units under Nitaqat�� 154
Table 9.3 Nitaqat zones�� 155
Table 9.4 Schematization of the Nitaqat provisions for business
units under different categories�� 156
Table 9.5 Percentage of Saudization under
different Nitaqat zones�� 158
Table 9.6 Saudization bands across the select business
lines (in per cent)�� 159
Table 9.7 Average monthly wage to Saudis and non-Saudis
in private sector in Saudi Arabia (in Saudi Riyal)�� 164
Table 9.8 Salary gap between Saudis and non-Saudis
in select profession (in per cent)�� 164
Table 9.9 Reasons for Saudi unemployment�� 165
Table 9.10 Share of Saudis in different business units�� 168
Table 9.11 Share of Saudis employed in different
industries (July 2011)�� 168
Table 11.1 Migration to the Gulf and domestic labour market�� 192
Table 11.2 Workers’ remittances and GDP growth in Pakistan�� 194
Table 11.3 Comparison of two methods in district classification
into very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration
categories�� 198
Table 11.4 District classification into low-,
medium- and high-migration categories�� 200
Table 11.5 Distribution of inflows of remittances (%)
by migration status�� 201
Table 11.6 Share of self-employed (non-agriculture sector)
in total employed labour force by migration status�� 202
Table 11.7 Migration, poverty and deprivation�� 203
Table 11.8 Proportion of households (%) deprived
in education dimension of multidimensional
poverty by migration status�� 205
Table 11.9 Proportion of households (%) deprived in health
dimension of multidimensional poverty�� 205
Table 11.10 Proportion of households (%) deprived in standard
of living dimension of multidimensional poverty
by migration status�� 206
List of Tables xvii
Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators,

weight and definitions (dimensions are
equally weighted)�� 211
Table 11.12 Classification of districts into high-, medium-,
low- and very-low-migration categories-based
remittance share and incidence-of-migration methods�� 212
Table 12.1 Departures by skills and gender—2015�� 222
Table 12.2 Distribution of departures to GCC countries 2011–2015�� 224
Table 12.3 Skills composition by destination: 2015�� 225
Table 12.4 Composition of remittances: 2015�� 226
Table 12.5 Gender distribution of departures and complaints
origins—2015�� 226
Table 15.1 Trading and entrepreneurial ethnic groups
among overseas Indian communities�� 268
Chapter 1
Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook
Asia’s historical contacts with the Gulf region date back to ancient times. Many
historians have documented the existence of Indian settlements and merchant guilds
in Aden and other prominent Gulf ports prior to the discovery of oil in the region
(Secombe and Lawless 1986). In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the indus-
trialization process, pearl trading, Haj and the requirement of skilled workers in the
ports had prompted the flow of Indian migrants to the Persian Gulf region. These
included ordinary artisans, masons, technicians, clerks and administrative personnel
during the colonial times, largely to support the British colonial apparatus in the
region (Kumar 2016). The colonial rulers used ‘Indian subjects’ as treasured
resources to sustain and operate critical ventures like communication, education,
health, bureaucracy, postal services and so on. Later, in the 1930s major Western oil
companies like Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) and Aramco Gulf Operations Company
Limited and Petroleum Development Qatar (PDQ) employed a substantial number
of labourers from the subcontinent and a recruiting office was established in Surat
(Kumar 2016). Thus, by late 1950s, Indian and Pakistani migrant workers consti-
tuted the largest workforce in many Gulf countries particularly in Kuwait and
Bahrain.
The discovery of oil in the 1970s and the economic rise of the Gulf Co-operation
Countries (GCC) inspired a huge influx of migrant workers from Asia, in particular
South Asia (Abraham and Rajan 2012; Rajan 2017a, b; Chowdhury and Rajan
2018). Therefore, the contemporary large-scale migration to GCC countries from
India is not an isolated event connected to oil boom of the 1970s, as it dates back to
the colonial policies and historic trade linkages.
S. I. Rajan (*)
Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India
e-mail: rajan@cds.ac.in
G. Z. Oommen
Kerala Public Service Commission, Trivandrum, Kerala, India
e-mail: ginuzach@gmail.com
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 1

S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf
Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_1
2 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen
At present, out of roughly 15 million expatriates in the Gulf region, Asians con-
stitute around 12 million (Rajan 2018, 2019; Jain and Oommen 2016). The histori-
cal linkages, religious and cultural proximity, poverty, unemployment, political
instability and insurgency in the Asian countries are some of the factors that have
led to this large influx. The majority of expatriate workers in GCC countries are
largely from South Asian and Southeast Asian countries.
In GCC countries, massive developmental activities had forced the oil-rich mon-
archies to instate an ‘open door’ demographic policy encouraging large-scale migra-
tion from outside the region (Hussain 2011, 2014, 2016). The neighbouring Arab
countries had failed to provide skilled workforce to the region to sustain this process
of development. Although, in the beginning, the workforce came largely from
neighbouring Arab countries like Egypt, Yemen and Sudan, by 1980s, the GCC
countries shifted the preference of workforce towards Asian countries, particularly
from the South Asian region, mainly to avoid the spread of radical and socialistic
political ideologies in the Gulf region. Though, the composition of migrant workers
has been changing in GCC, a consistent and a significant shift from Arab to Asian
workers had started since late 1970s, mainly to safeguard the political interests of
the oil rich monarchies.
The Asian workforce became a preferred choice due to certain characteristics,
specifically docility, political neutrality, flexibility, willingness to work at manage-
able wages and readiness to work hard (Kapiszewski 2006). In addition, Asians
have not been looked upon as a threat to the political establishment of the GCC
countries and the involvement of Asian governments in the recruiting process helps
in attracting a monitored and filtered workforce. Thus, by the mid-1980s, Asian
workforce in GCC had further expanded, beyond India and Pakistan, and countries
like Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka also joined in the labour
market (Rajan 2016).
The flow of migrant workers from Asia, particularly South Asia, had given a stiff
competition to the workers from West Asia (Kapiszewski 2006). Hence,
‘Asianization’ of migrant labour in the Gulf is the outcome of the ‘preference and
choice’ of the receiving governments due to various economic–political consider-
ations and these dynamics paved the way for the emergence of an Asia–Gulf
Migratory Corridor in region. In an earlier work, Naufal and Genc (2014) observed
that there is a structural break in remittances around the 1990s, where the largest
portion of remittances there leaves the region, presumably heading to Asia. Asian
female labour migrant population growth rate surpasses that of Arabs earlier than
the 1990s. The extraordinary and unmatched movement of the people, remittances
flow, developmental initiatives, voluminous trade, energy security, diplomatic and
strategic overtures are the overt and outstanding results of the embryonic ‘Asia–
Gulf Migratory Corridor’ in the region (Naufal et al. 2016).
The Asian region, especially India, receives the largest amount of remittances
and those from the GCC constitute the major external financial flow for these devel-
oping nations. The Asian migrant communities have made a remarkable contribu-
tion to the socio-economic and the cultural development of GCC countries and have
become the dominant workforce in economy of the region. The strategic and
1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 3
e conomic implications of Asianization on migration and remittance flows are quite

important for both sending and receiving countries. Remittances from GCC coun-
tries play a significant role in the foreign exchange reserves of the host country,
alleviation of poverty and socio-economic development of recipient countries.
Remittances from GCC countries have been a major source of influence on the
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the Asian countries, as is evi-
dent from the fact that it constituted one-fifth of the total flow to the region in 2008
(Oommen 2016). However, due to the economic crisis there was a slowdown of
remittance flow to the Asian region in 2009, but it resumed to normal by 2011
(Rajan 2012). On the impact of migration in Pakistan, Arif (2009) noted that, ‘The
social contribution of migration is even more encouraging in terms of improving
children’s education, enhancing housing condition, eliminating child labour,
empowering women of the migrant household’. The path-breaking prosperity of the
‘Gulf Pockets’ in the Asian countries can be highly contributed to the strength and
dynamisms of the emergent ‘Asia–Gulf Migratory Corridor’.
The flow of remittances to developing countries reduced in 2008 because of eco-
nomic crisis, and it affected recipient countries adversely. By 2010, GCC countries
had regained some of the economic growth, which had a direct impact on the remit-
tance flow. The economic fluctuation did not affect the flow of migrants, but a shift
in domestic economic policies of the Gulf countries are expected to affect the quan-
tum and nature of migration patterns. The recent nationalization policies and the
exodus of large number of migrant workers from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not
make any impact on the flow of remittances (Rajan 2016). The Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs (2012) data gives a clear picture of the enormous amount of remit-
tances flown to India during the last decade, with a quantum jump from $14.8 bil-
lion in 2002–03 to $53.9 billion in 2009–10. India continues to be the top recipient
of remittances with $80 billion in 2018 (Ratha et al. 2018). In 2008, India, China,
Bangladesh and the Philippines were among the top 10 remittance recipient coun-
tries (Kelegama et al. 2011). Migration and remittances, particularly from the Gulf
region contribute significantly in the overall developmental process of South Asia
and Southeast Asian countries.
The large flow of remittances has prompted the South and Southeast Asian coun-
tries (Arasaratnam 1970) to formulate policies to attract migrant workers and chan-
nelize maximum amount of remittances through the formal channels, mainly
through banks, cheques and telegraph and post office transfers rather than informal
channels. The informal flow of remittances through hawala/hundi is a major con-
cern for the recipient countries. To block the inroads of informal remittance links,
Asian countries have opened branches of major banks in GCC region, and also
provide various schemes to deposit money in these branches of native banks. The
Asian countries have formulated many financial schemes to attract the remittances
such as Non-Resident Indian Account (NRI Account) in India, Non-Resident
Foreign Currency in Bangladesh, Foreign Employment Bond in Nepal and Share
Investment External Rupee Account in Sri Lanka (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012).
The job market in Gulf countries is not egalitarian in nature, and the wage dif-
ferential is quite high between expatriates and the natives. However, the migration
policies of all Asian countries, except India, promote migration. Interestingly, the
global economic crisis, job cuts, anti-immigrant efforts of the GCC governments
and socio-spatial isolation of the expatriates have neither reduced the steady flow of
migrants from the Asian region nor has it created a ‘reverse migration’ back to the
sending countries (Rajan 2012).
However, the decision of the Saudi Arabian government in late 2014 to strictly
implement nationalization of workforce was an unexpected setback in the free flow
of migration to the Gulf region (Zachariah et al. 2014). Various domestic factors like
high unemployment among natives, economic burdens due to the Gulf Wars,
increase of the female participation in the labour market and Arab Spring have
forced many of the GCC countries to introduce restrictive policies towards migra-
tion, implementation of ‘Nitaqat Law’ and active enrolment of natives in the private
sector. Education, health, construction, manufacturing and care industry are highly
dependent on the Asian workers, thus, the recent attempts made by GCC countries
to implement the Nitaqat Law may not be successful due to the reluctance of the
nationals to participate in blue collar and private sector jobs.
Presently, a substantial number of migrant workers from Asia in GCC countries
are in the construction sector (Rajan and Narayana 2012). Majority of the Asian
migrants in GCC countries are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, mostly illiterate,
single and male (Ozaki 2012). Since 1990s, the IT boom and the technological
advancement have altered the skill composition of the migrants as well as the
demand of the host countries particularly in the case of Indian expatriates (Srivastava
and Sasikumar 2003).
The majority of the Pakistani workers in GCC region are unskilled, followed by
semi-skilled, skilled and highly qualified professionals (Arif 2009). The statistics on
Bangladeshi immigrants show that majority of the migrants are from poor and
downtrodden sections. Rita Afsar (2009) study on Bangladeshi migrants pointed
that hunger and desperation, unemployment and debt traps are the main factors
prompting them to migrate to oil-rich monarchies. According to job classifications,
skilled categories include nurses, teachers and technicians; semi-skilled categories
include masons, drivers, carpenters and welders; and unskilled categories include
construction labourers, cleaners and domestic workers. The average age of migrant
workers is nearly 32 years, and vast majority of the migrants are male (Bohra and
Massey 2009). A study conducted by Williams et al. (2010) shows that the vast
majority of the Nepali migrants (90%) are working as labourers in GCC region and
only 2% are engaged in professional jobs.
The Asian migration to GCC countries is predominantly a male phenomenon.
The relatively limited participation of women as a migrating workforce is attributed
largely to the prevalence of patriarchy in the sending countries. According to the
Asian Development Bank report, women migrants constitute nearly 15% of the total
migrant workers from South Asia (Ozaki 2012, Tinker 1974; Winckler 2010; Sohan
2011). Not surprisingly, study on the Asian women migrant workers has received
less attention both in the academic world and at the policy level. Migration of
Women from South Asia to the Gulf (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012), Indian Nurses
in Persian Gulf (Percot 2006; Percot and Rajan 2007) and Sri Lankan Migration to
the Gulf: Female Bread Winners (Gamburd 2010) are some of the notable academic
works in this regard. In the context of international labour migration, majority of the
women workers are from South Asia–Southeast Asia, and the majority are engaged
in low skilled and semi-skilled jobs (Baldwin-Edwards 2011).
The oil boom of the 1960s in the Gulf countries lowered the participation of the
nationals in the workforce and brought a new form of ‘royal sheikh culture’ which
heightened the demand for maids and domestic workers. Asian women are mostly
employed as teachers, paramedics, nurses, assistants, in manufacturing, entertain-
ment and care industry as maids and domestic workers (Ozaki 2012; see also
Varghese and Rajan 2011; Kodoth 2015). Gamburd (2010) noted that the ‘army of
housemaids’ represents the feminization of migration in South Asia. Initially,
women workers migrated from India, Pakistan, Philippines and Bangladesh, but by
the year 2000, Sri Lankan women migrants had emerged as the largest group in the
GCC region. Factors that prompted Asian women to migrate were mainly poverty,
hunger, debt traps, oppressive social system, marital discords, alcoholism of the
spouse, aspiration for the betterment of life and so on (Gamburd 2010). Women
migrant workers are often victims of patriarchy in both sending and receiving coun-
tries (Kabeer 2007). Sexual abuse, harassment at workplace and long working hours
without proper payment are quite rampant in GCC countries (Rajan and Joseph
2013, 2015, 2016, 2017). However, the precarious issues related to women migrants
have received less attention and more women-friendly policies need to be formu-
lated by both sending and receiving countries in the future to safeguard the unprec-
edented movement of the migrant workers in the ‘Asia-Gulf Migratory Corridor’.
It is interesting to note that policymaking centres in Asia have been focusing
more on maximizing benefits out of this trend of international migration through the
process of remittances than treading any confrontationist path with the generally
repressive Gulf regimes (Panicker 2013). But this preoccupation has sometimes
come at the cost of ignoring the pitiable conditions under which the labourers work
in alien territories, bearing the wrath of a whole host of prejudice and discrimination
meted out against them. However, the working conditions and protection of labour
rights are relatively low in GCC countries. Irregular payment, withholding of wages,
inconsistency between the promised and real wages, deduction of salary, non-
payment of salary for long duration, denial of medical insurance and long working
hours in hostile climatic conditions are quite rampant in the region. The spurious
recruitment process, visa trading, harsh working conditions, autocratic nature of
Kafala system and the high visa cost undermine the stability and economic struc-
tures of the migrant sending families. ‘The vast pool of cheap labour from India,
Pakistan and other parts of Asia has been pivotal to the Gulf’s economic boom in
recent years. But labour abuse is frequent. Recruiters often require workers to sign
one contract in their home country, then instruct them to sign a new one at a far
lower wage once they arrive in the Gulf’ (Surk and Abbotarch 2009). Therefore,
both sending and receiving countries have to deliberate upon the plight of migrants
more seriously and formulate policies which would safeguard rights of migrant
workers.
The exploitation of the recruiting agencies and the helplessness of sending gov-
ernments to curtail the powerful recruitment private lobby are being raised on vari-
ous high-level meetings on migrant workers (Rajan et al. 2011). At the same time,
there are numerous instances of harassment committed by the employers on hapless
migrant workers, like confiscating the passport, physical abuse, non-payment of
wages and medical insurance and so on. Hundreds of migrant workers are living in
pitiable conditions in labour camps without basic amenities, civic rights, insurance,
proper working conditions, decent living conditions and sexual exploitation
(Wickramasekara 2011; Zachariah et al. 2004). The circular migration to the Gulf,
which has crossed over more than three decades, continues to be characterized by a
serious deficit in migrant rights. The large commercialization of the recruitment
industry has made migration in the region not only too costly, but also quite risky.
The 2008 ILO Regional Symposium at Dhaka has highlighted the problem experi-
enced by women migrant workers in general, and argued for a gender sensitive
management policy. The initiatives with respect to the ASEAN Declaration on the
promotion and protection of the rights of migrant workers are presented as an
instance. Ironically, none of the Asian countries has so far signed the ILO conven-
tions on migrant workers and only Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have signed the UN
Convention on Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families (ICRMW), 1990 (Wickramasekara 2011).
Though there is a worldwide demand for labour force from the Asian countries,
the risks involved in the process are very high and alarming. The major challenges
before the migrant community are debt, racism and xenophobia, high migration
costs, corruption, deceit, fraudulent recruiting agencies, sexual and physical harass-
ment, hazardous working conditions and non-payment of wages, poor medical
facilities, absence of grievance redressal mechanism and basic labour rights. In this
context it is highly imperative that both sending and receiving countries have to
formulate policies and legislations to ensure equitable and vigorous working atmo-
sphere. Due to the heavy outflow migration, few Asian countries like India, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh and Philippines have formed separate ministries/departments to
administer the overseas labour migration and diaspora. However, loopholes in the
governance of migratory process have been publicly acknowledged by the erstwhile
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, as it noted that ‘the system that government
had put in place to regulate and streamline the emigration process itself has resulted
in corruption and in the formation of a nexus between government and officials and
recruiting agencies leading to increasing exploitation of poor’ (Rajan et al. 2011).
Except India and Nepal, all the other major migrant sending Asian countries have
vibrant and comprehensive policy to deal with emigration and migrant workers
(Datta 2005).
Interestingly, Sri Lanka and Philippines have the most outstanding policies to
monitor and safeguard the right of overseas migrant workers (Wickramasekara
2011). The legislations such as ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995,’ Sri Lanka’s ‘National Labour Migration Policy,’ Pakistan’s ‘National
Emigration Policy: Promoting Regular Emigration and Protecting Emigrants’ and
the ‘Overseas Employment Policy’ of Bangladesh are some of the outstanding
migration policies enacted by the Asian countries to safeguard the overseas migrant
workers. Ironically, India with a substantial overseas migrant population is yet to
formulate a transparent and coherent migrant policy till date. Wickramasekara
(2011) noted that ‘therefore origin countries in Asia are generally confronted with
the dilemma between “promotion” and “protection”. Thus, the delicate balance
between the promotion of foreign employment and the protection of national work-
ers abroad is a continuous challenge.’ Though many origin countries have supported
out-migration through institutional mechanisms, it did not result in protecting the
rights and dignity of migrant workers.
The strategic and economic implications of Asianization of migrant workers in
GCC countries, particularly its impact in terms of migration and remittances are
undoubtedly an important aspect in the context of the emerging Gulf–Asia strategic
relations. The unprecedented and massive exodus of migrant workers to the oil-rich
monarchies is surely a blessing in disguise for many of the Asian countries as remit-
tances constitute the largest external financial flow. The Asia–Gulf migration corri-
dor will emerge in the foreseeable future as a vital component in the Asia–Gulf
strategic relations. For the past two decades, Asia has emerged as the largest trading
partner of GCC countries accounting for more than 57% of its total trade (Tamimi
2013). GCC countries are the key global suppliers of hydrocarbons and they con-
tribute around 42% and 24% of the world total oil and gas reserves respectively.
The GCC countries, as part of their ‘Look East’ policy, are looking for non-
western economies to invest their surplus funds and they are also keen on diversify-
ing their petroleum-based economies. GCC exports more oil products to Asia than
to Europe and both India and China are the largest buyers of GCC’s oil products.
Gulf–Asia relations are multifaceted and multidimensional with strong emphasis on
trade, human resources, agribusiness, economy, education and defence. Trade in
crude oil forms the backbone of Gulf–Asia relations which is bound to continue in
the future too.
The cross-regional investments and engagements between both the regions par-
ticularly in the field of maritime security are yielding great results. The construction
sector is one of the crucial areas in which both India and China’s private players
have been engaged successfully (Calabrese 2009). The Gulf–Asian economic rela-
tions are multilayered, inclusive and diverse and have immense potential to expand
(Calabrese 2009). The ruling establishment in GCC countries is very keen to diver-
sify and invest their sovereign funds in both India and China, the emerging econo-
mies of Asia. The liberalization and uncomplicated investment policies have been
formulated by both India and China in past two decades to tap the Foreign Direct
Investment from GCC countries.
The Gulf is an inseparable part of Asia’s foreign policy that serves mutual inter-
ests, confronts terrorism and extremism, as well as taps the investment potential.
GCC–Asia relations have come a long way and diversified to accommodate new
areas.
The apolitical and passive approach of the Asian workers in the political sphere
of the Gulf society and their hard-working attitude are highly attributed to the unin-
terrupted flow of migrant workers to GCC states. The social networking and the
informal links have added additional impetus to the Asia-Gulf migratory process,
and flow of workers to the Gulf would continue to flourish in future. Though Gulf
migration is both transitory and circulatory in nature the ongoing demand for expa-
triate workers from the GCC states has contributed to the existence of both second-
and third-generation migrants in the region. However, the flow of migration from
Asia still revolves around certain geographical locations, communities, families and
it is yet to permeate horizontally in the sending societies.
However, the lack of a unified voice and the non-sensitive attitudes of sending
countries have intensified the socio-economic uncertainties of migrant workers.
Though remittances from GCC countries constitute the major portion of the exter-
nal financial flows for recipient countries, the migrant workers have not been devel-
oped as core component in the strategic discerning of sending governments. The
bilateral agreements of labour rights and minimum wages are quite inadequate to
safeguard the social insecurity and gross human rights violations in the host setting.
Therefore, both sending and receiving countries should approach the multifaceted
concerns of Asian migrants more holistically and sensitively. In addition, issues
concerning women workers should be dealt with utmost care and policies should be
formulated without curtailing the basic rights and mobility of migrant workers, par-
ticularly women migrant workers.
This book intends to explore the multifaceted nuances of the ‘Asia-Gulf migra-
tory corridor’ and also would try to unearth the future prospects and strategic impli-
cations. The book examines remittance behaviour, changing gender roles of
immigrants, the social-spatial mobility, migrant policies, human rights, sense of
belonging and the identity, perception and the interaction between nationals and
non-nationals and so on.
George Naufal and Ismail Genc explore three periods of Gulf migration and the
reasons for the emergence of Gulf countries as a lucrative destination for labour
migration. The authors also focus on the contemporary labour market in Gulf region
and highlight the opportunities and challenges for the future. Naufal and Genc argue
that the large oil wealth, unavailability of labour in the local population, high labour
compensation and the political stability are some of the major reasons for the large
inflow of migrants to the GCC countries. The authors observe shifting of the labour
market in favour of Asian countries by the 1990s and also the large flow of remit-
tances towards South Asia and Southeast Asia. The large influx of expatriates has
highly altered the demographic composition of Gulf region and the ruling establish-
ment is quite concerned about this alteration. The initiatives by the local govern-
ments in Gulf region to create local human capital or the local workforce have not
produced substantial results. Hence the authors predict that the uninterrupted flow
of foreign migrant workers is likely to continue regardless of the anti-immigrant
measures in the Gulf region.
The uncontrolled and voluminous influx of migrant workers has created continu-
ous formulation of labour migrant policies in the Gulf countries. Zahra Babar pro-
vides a detailed sketch of the migrant policies and legislations devised by the oil
monarchies and its implications. She argues that migration policies of the host
countries have invariably deprived the basic human rights of migrant workers. In the
GCC, the policymaking and management of migration has evolved within each
state’s national context, based on their national interests and needs. The Kafala and
labour contracts have always been biased against the migrant’s rights and places the
employer in an advantageous position. In spite of various migrant policies, she
observes that the recruiting agencies have a key role in managing the lives of hap-
less migrant working class in the Gulf region. The author pointed that the ruling
establishments are aware of the shortfalls of the Kafala system and have been sys-
tematically trying to devise mechanisms to rectify the loopholes, but it has not
yielded anticipated results. Though the host countries have failed to formulate any
equitable or reasonable policies, the participation of Gulf countries in Abu Dhabi
dialogue and Colombo process underlines the acknowledgment of the migrant phe-
nomenon by the ruling establishments. Finally, Zahra also highlights the valuable
interventions of ILO and UN and other international agencies in recognizing and
protecting the rights of migrant workers.
Ilias Hussein’s article provides non-citizenry aspects of popular politics which
was reflected in the general strikes among the South Asian migrant workers in Dubai
in 2006. Hussein argues that the popular politics of migrant workers move around
the notion of rights rather than around political power. This paper highlights the idea
of popular politics among the migrant workers in the Gulf countries through a set of
informal expressions. Popular politics among the expatriate workers is an outcome
of a particular political context, which is informal in nature and does not take an
institutional form. Hussein noted that these informal actions are within the context
of ‘imagined politics’ that offers an escape from the political realities in the host
country. Moreover, Hussein strongly asserts that the local population in the GCC
countries perceives the existence of South Asians as a threat to their cultural heri-
tage and identity. The socio-political dynamics of Kerala is directly transmitted
among the expatriate workers in the Gulf as well and the popularity of new social
movements among the migrant workers show the intrinsic connection between the
developments in home and host societies. Hussein concludes that the development
of popular politics in the Gulf revolves mainly around this sense of alienation.
Bijulal’s article reflects on the implication of non-hegemonic form of human
rights interventions to address human rights violations faced by low-skilled, under-
paid expatriate Indian workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
Bijulal argues that a rights-denying, growth-seeking development approach has
emerged in governing the world of work. While authentic informal documentation
of migrant workers elsewhere have led to changes in the policy framework, in the
GCC countries, where the human rights violations have not been considered actively
under the legal and political system, the conditions are extreme. Bijulal asserts that
the expatriate/guest worker classification attached to the migrant workforce leads to
a discriminatory legal status in terms of access and the right to judicial redressal.
Theoretically, the requirement is to evolve a transnational rights approach in under-
standing and to resolve the problems and violations involved. Bijulal points that the
migrant workers in the Gulf converses a condition of statelessness, similar to bond-
age and distressed labour. The migrant sending countries should evolve an intergov-
ernmental mechanism to manage the large flow and life of migrant workers and also
to protect the dignity and rights of migrant workers.
Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al Ghanim, Kiene le
Trung and Laura Harkness attempt to explore the multifaceted migratory experi-
ences of low-income workers in Qatar based on an extensive and in-depth survey.
The authors argue that the low-income labour force in Qatar remains a temporary
and transnationally cyclical labour force. The data revealed that the low-income
migrants in Qatar had little or no previous work experience outside their home
country and wished to return to their home countries after the completion of the
contract. Contradictory to the established notions, none of the migrant workers is
keen to settle for a long duration of time in the Gulf region (see also Bedi et al.
2016). The recruiting process has become highly commoditized, which makes the
migration process quite costly, debt-trapped and complicated. The survey shows
that vast majority of the workers failed to sign an authentic work contract prior to
departure and relies on verbal assurances. The authors finally reiterate that the mis-
information, deception and unrealistic expectations continue to play an unfathom-
able role in the migratory process. The data reveal that the rough nature of the
Kafala system and incessant passport confiscation continue to be a dreadful phe-
nomenon amongst the lowest economic segment of the foreign workforce.
Indonesia’s tie with the Gulf countries dates back to centuries, and Graeme Hugo
vividly narrates the pattern, impact and future determinants of Indonesian migration
to Gulf region. Hugo examines the contemporary socio-economic and demographic
trends of Indonesia and argues that the slowdown in migration is due to the range of
alternative opportunities. The informal migratory channels like social networks play
significant role in the uninterrupted flow of migrants to the Gulf countries. Unlike
other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was never involved directly in the
recruiting process of Gulf migrants until the early 1980s. The startling Asian crisis
in the late 1990s and lack of opportunities have steadfastly accelerated the flow of
migrants to the Gulf region in an unprecedented manner. Hugo pointed that the
dominance of women migrant workers was one of the notable characteristics of
Indonesian–Gulf migration until the ban of female domestic workers going to Saudi
Arabia by the Indonesian government. He argues that the remittances from the Gulf
occupy a vital role in the development of remote rural areas and in the future, gov-
ernment is seeking strong policies to provide more protection to the migrant work-
ers to the Gulf.
Neil Ruiz, who was with the Brookings Institution at the time of conducting this
research, examines how labour export became a well-established occurrence in the
political and economic structure of Philippines’ polity. Philippine economy has
increasingly depended on overseas migration with nearly 10% of the population
working abroad, which has substantially reduced the unemployment among the
educated youth. The unprecedented growth of labour migration and dependency on
remittances has prompted the creation of vibrant emigrant institutions like
Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to safeguard the migra-
tion industry. Neil argues that over a period of time Philippines government has
evolved many policies that extended beyond the ambit of nation-state to safeguard
and manage the large-scale emigrants. The ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act of 1995’ is considered to be a paradigm shift in the realm of international
migrant policies particularly in protecting the rights of hapless migrant workers. He
highlights that prior to the departure all the Filipino workers must undertake manda-
tory deployment process mainly the pre-departure orientation seminar (PDOS) and
subscribe the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) identification cards. Moreover, the
Dual Citizenship Act, 2002, allows natural-born Filipinos who have become foreign
citizens to retain their Philippine citizenship and also encourages overseas Filipino
population to participate in the Philippines’ political system. The Philippine case
provided a picture of how emigrant institutions can give the state powers in areas
that are normally considered a loss.
The recent decision of the Government of Saudi Arabia to implement the Nitaqat
Labour Law is a matter of great concern for the migrant-sending countries. The
decision of Saudi Arabia that one out of every employee in business establishment
will have to be a Saudi national, is leading to displacement and deportation of thou-
sands of Asian migrant workers from the country. Zakir Hussein discusses the
implications of Nitaqat on the South Asian countries and also the sustainability of
Saudi Arabia’s present nationalization process. Hussein argues that the broad aim of
Nitaqat was to showcase the government’s determination to reduce the existing and
growing unemployment among the Saudi national labour force, and to force private
sector to strictly adhere to the norms of Nitaqat. The statistics reveal that the private
sector employs more than 90% of the total nine million expatriates in Saudi Arabia.
Hussein observes that the failure of the past efforts of Saudization has been another
important reason for implementing Nitaqat policy. Moreover, Nitaqat could be seen
as a political strategy of the Saudi government to insulate itself from the severe
impact of the Arab Spring and also to mitigate the socio-economic and political
discontent. Hussein further argues that the triggering of nationalization policy will
neutralize regional turbulence by reducing unemployment among the citizens.
Moreover, it also aims at reducing dependence on expatriate workers and to ensure
the precipitous participation of native workforce in the economy. Hussein opines
that in the future higher wages in private sector will attract Saudis to seek employ-
ment in private enterprises.
Bangladesh is one of the top 10 remittance recipient countries in the world.
Interestingly, the country which started with modest migration of 6087 in 1976 has
reached an astonishing figure of nearly four million at present. Marie Percot dis-
cusses precarious condition of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman based on an exten-
sive field research in both Oman and Bangladesh (see also Kanchana and Rajan
2014). She discusses the complex reasons and context of the Bangladeshi local
fishermen for opting hazardous and risky profession in Oman. Marie reiterates that
majority of the fishermen migrants in Oman have failed miserably to succeed eco-
nomically in spite of their long duration of stay in Oman and ironically most of them
have ended up in jail or debt-trapped. The field survey explores the absence of
authentic and appropriate work contract prior to the departure and the majority has
opted to migrate on the basis of verbal assurances. Marie discusses the exploitative
nature of the Kafala system and narrates the methodical trails of illegality in the visa
system which invariably traps the migrants in the unending web of miseries. Marie
argues that the price of illegality is the constant fear of being caught by the police or
landing in jail. The debt-ridden migrants are further ambushed in the interminable
snares of debts and liabilities, and futilely stay back in Oman in the hope of repay-
ing loans. Marie concludes that debt-ridden migrants and their families not only do
not benefit from the efforts made to go abroad, but most often end up in enhancing
poverty than reducing.
The economic turmoil followed by partition, poverty, religious affiliation, geo-
graphical proximity and volatile political situation led to a large outflow of migrants
from Pakistan to GCC countries. G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq and Nasir Iqbal focus
on the uneven geographical pattern of migration to the Gulf from Pakistan and high-
light the regional disparities in the utilization of remittance and also narrate its
impact. Migration from Pakistan to GCC countries is not properly represented
across the country as majority of the migrants to the Gulf are from central and north
Punjab province followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, North-West Frontier Province
and to a lesser extent from South Punjab. The authors argue that the migration from
poorer regions of country, notably, Sindh, Balochistan and South Punjab is very low,
which invariably affects the development of these regions. The uninterrupted flow
of the young generation to the Gulf has substantially reduced the unemployment
and level of poverty in higher migration regions of Pakistan. However, the authors
opine that the higher level of poverty and underdevelopment in the poorer districts
consistently coincides with the low level of overseas migration. The article pointed
the preference of return migrants to shift from wage employment to self-employment
which invariably helps to create jobs for non-migrants as well in the higher migra-
tion districts. In addition, the article highlights the exemplary impact of migration
in education and health sector largely in the migrant-dominated districts and alerts
the lack of migration-promoting institutions in the poorer regions of the country.
Finally, the article makes few policy recommendations to improve the skill-oriented
overseas migration from the poorer regions and also for the stronger dissemination
of information and opportunities.
Bilesha Weeraratne examines the recent trends, current situation and future out-
look of labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf countries. Sri Lanka, the island
country of South Asia, was a victim of ethnic conflicts and violent bloodshed for
nearly three decades. The recent acceleration of migration to the Gulf is attributed
to the political turmoil in Sri Lanka. She pointed that remittance is the single largest
foreign exchange-earning component in Sri Lanka and 55% of the remittances have
been received from the Gulf countries. While Sri Lanka is the main source for
women domestic workers, the recent trend shows an overall decline in the flow of
women migrant workers to the Gulf region from the country. Moreover, the manda-
tory requirement of Family Background Report since 2013 has also reduced the
flow of female migrant workers from Sri Lanka. Bilesha highlights harsh working
conditions in the Gulf region and pointed the frequent complaints of abuse against
women workers mainly in Saudi Arabia. The author is quite cautioned about the
volatile situation in the West Asian region and urges the government to formulate
contingency plan to meet the unexpected repercussions in the future.
Factors that prompted the Asian women to migrate to the Gulf region were
mainly poverty, hunger, debt traps, oppressive social system, marital discords,
alcoholism of the spouse and aspiration for the betterment of life. The women
domestic workers are more likely to engage in precarious and perilous work while
in the Gulf region (see also Kodoth 2015). Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph explore
the hapless and uncertain lives of the Indian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia,
based on a broader study of low- and semi-skilled Indian migrants in Saudi Arabia
carried out by the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. Rajan and Jolin argue
that despite the ongoing interventions at the origin and receiving states, domestic
services within private households of Saudi Arabia remain among the world’s most
undocumented, unregulated and invisible forms of employment. At the same time,
these flows represent an important livelihood option for South Asian women. The
authors systematically examine the migrant women’s structural and systemic frame-
works that restrict their lives. Rajan and Jolin highlight that the accessible complaint
mechanisms, enforcement of standards, recruiting agencies and sustained interna-
tional cooperation with sending countries could greatly enhance the safety and
security of the of the overseas domestic workers in the Gulf region. Finally, the
authors appeal for a gender-inclusive migration policy to solve the vulnerabilities of
migrant women in the Gulf region.
The discovery of oil in the Gulf countries and the subsequent oil boom in 1970s
initiated a huge wave of immigration from Kerala. The transnational nature of the
Gulf migrants has also significantly influenced the class structure, social hierarchy,
worship patterns, family structure and above all, religion and religiosity in Kerala.
Ginu Zacharia Oommen attempts to explore how migratory movements and remit-
tances affected the religion and religious practices in Kerala, thus, leading to a trans-
formation of the society by examining the trajectories of Christians of Kerala.
Oommen argues that the flow of remittances on the one hand, contributed to larger
investments in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across
Kerala, largely funded by migrants and Gulf-based associations; and on the other, to
the prevalence of new and ostentatious religious practices, doctrines and rituals.
Oommen pointed that reorientation of the lives of Christian immigrants living in the
host country (Gulf countries) and the newly created wealth brings dramatic change
in the lives and practices of Christians back home (in Kerala). The article focuses on
the ‘remittances inspired’ social transformation of Kerala Christians and argues that
the changes in religiosity and religious practices were in turn influenced by migrant
experiences based on their religious beliefs in their host countries. The study asserts
that migration-centred religious reorientation of Kerala Christians is abetting com-
modification of religion, assertion of communal identity, proliferation of radical
religious groups and the emergence of new forms of worship in the Kerala society.
The Indo-West Asian relations date back to antiquity and there had been close
political, economic and cultural ties between the two regions throughout history.
There was a significant presence of Indian trading communities across the Persian
Gulf and there are evidences of regular visits of Indian scholars in the courts of
Fathmids (Egypt) and Abbasids of Baghdad (Jain 1990, 1991, 2003). Prakash
C. Jain presents a historical and sociological profile of Indian trade diaspora in the
West Asian region. Jain pointed that Indo–Gulf ties had flourished in the nine-
teenth and the first half of the twentieth century and during this period that a num-
ber of Indian merchant c ommunities were firmly established throughout the Gulf/
Red Sea region. In the nineteenth century, Muscat hosted three distinct Indian
business communities and Indian merchant communities also existed in Iran, Aden
and the Trucial States. Jain noted that the Indians’ close proximity with the British
had at times created problems and Indian merchants were viewed with suspicion
and ‘as agents of British designs for Oman.’ Jain pointed that the age-old Hindu
temples in Muscat reveal the historical and deep-rooted continuation of Indian
merchant communities in the Gulf region (Allen 1981; Lorimer 1970; Mahajani
1960; Mangat 1969; Markovits 2000).
What will happen to Asia–Gulf migration corridor in the future? During the
global crisis, both migration and remittances were resilient in South Asia (Rajan
2012). The editors examine the future of Asian migration in the Gulf. At the time of
writing this, the oil crisis has already set the minds of policy makers both in Asia
and the Gulf. Will the same experience be repeated at least in the short run? We have
to wait for the answer but the debate is on.
References
Abraham, V., & Rajan, S. I. (2012). Global financial crisis and return of South Asia migrants:
Patterns and determination of their integration to local labour markets (Chapter 11). In S. I.
Rajan (Ed.), Global financial crisis, migration and remittances: India migration report 2012
(pp. 197–224). New Delhi: Routledge.
Allen, C., Jr. (1981). The Indian merchant Community of Masqat. Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies, 44(1), 39–51.
Arasaratnam, S. (1970). Indians in Malaysia and Singapore. Bombay: Oxford University Press.
Arif, G. M. (2009). Economic and social impacts of remittances on households: The case of
Pakistani migrants working in Saudi Arabia (pp. 3–6). Geneva: International Organization of
Migration.
Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2011). Labour immigration and labour markets in the GCC countries:
National Patterns and trend. Kuwait Programme on development, governance and globalisa-
tion in the Gulf States (Paper no. 15). London: London School of Economics.
Bedi, S.A., Rajan, S.I., & Seshan G. (2016). Coming to Qatar: A snapshot of the experiences of
Indian labour migrants (Chapter 8). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India Migration Report 2016: Gulf
Migration (pp. 106–121). New Delhi: Routledge.
Bohra, P., & Massey, D. S. (2009). Process of internal and international migration from Chitwan,
Nepal. International Migration Review, 43(3), 621–651.
Calabrese, J. (2009). The consolidation of Asia-gulf relations: Washington turned in or out of
touch. Washington: The Middle East Institute Policy Brief.
Chowdhury, M., & Rajan, S. I. (Eds.). (2018). South Asian migration in the Gulf. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Datta, P. (2005). Feminisation of Nepali migration to India, International Migration Trends
(pp. 47–61). Moscow: MAX Press.
Gamburd, M. R. (2010). Sri Lankan migration to the Gulf: Female bread winners – Domestic
workers. In Middle East Institute (Ed.), View points: Migration and the Gulf (pp. 13–15).
Washington, DC: Middle East Institute.
Hussain, Z. (2011). Immigration policies of the GCC countries: Implications and responses
(Chapter 4). In S. I. Rajan, & M. Percot (Eds), Dynamics of Indian migration: Historical and
current perspectives (pp. 93–163). New Delhi: Routledge.
Hussain, Z. (2014). Nitaqat – Second wave of Saudization: Is it an answer to the domestic discon-
tent? (Chapter 15). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and develop-
ment. New Delhi: Routledge.
Hussain, Z. (2016). GCCs immigration policies in the post 1990s: Contextualizing south Asian
migrants. In P. C. Jain, & G. Z. Oommen (Eds), South Asian migration to Gulf countries:
History policies and development. New Delhi: Routledge.
Jain, P. C. (1990). Racial discrimination against overseas Indians: A class analysis. Delhi: Concept
Publishing Company.
Jain, P. C. (1991). The social implications of the Kuwaiti crisis: Refugees, returnees and peripheral
changes. In A. H. H. Abidi & K. R. Singh (Eds.), The Gulf crisis. Delhi: Lancers Books.
Jain, P. C. (2003). An incipient diaspora: Indians in the Persian Gulf region. In Bhikhu Parekh et al
(eds) culture and economy in the Indian diaspora. London: Routledge.
Jain, P. C., & Oommen, G. Z. (Eds.). (2016). South Asian migration to gulf countries. Routledge:
History Policies and Development.
Kabeer, L. (2007). Footloose’ Female Labour: Transnational migration, social protection and citi-
zenship in the Asia region. International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Working Paper
on Women’s Rights and Citizenship, IDRC, Canada.
Kanchana, R, & Rajan, S. I. (2014). Indian migrant experiences in Oman and Bahrain (Chapter
14). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and development (pp. 193–
209). Ne Delhi: Routledge.
Kapiszewski, A. (2006). In United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and
Development in the Arab Region, Population Division, Beirut, United Nations Secretariat, 22
May (Ed.), Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries.
Kelegama, S., et al. (Eds.). (2011). migration, remittances and development in South Asia
(pp. 3–10). New Delhi: Sage.
Kodoth, P. (2015). Stepping into the Man’s shoes: Emigrant domestic workers as breadwinners
and the gender norm in Kerala (Chapter 3). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2015:
Gender and migration (pp. 26–43). New Delhi: Routledge.
Kumar, K. (2016). Aspects of Indian migration in the Persian Gulf region, 1820–1947, in Prakash
C Jain and Ginu Zacharia Oommen(eds) south Asian migration to gulf countries: History poli-
cies and development. New Delhi: Routledge.
Lorimer, J. G. (1970). The Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Superintendent,
Government Printing, Calcutta.
Mahajani, U. (1960). The role of Indian minorities in Burma and Malaysia. Bombay: Vora and Co.
Mangat, J. S. (1969). A history of Asians in East Africa. Oxford: Calrendon Press.
Markovits, C. (2000). The global world of Indian merchants, 1950–1947: Traders of Sind from
Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Naufal, G., & Genc, I. (2014). Labour migration in the GCC countries: Past, present and future
(Singapore Middle East Papers, no. 9, Vol. 2). Singapore: National University of Singapore.
Naufal, G., Malit, F. T., & Genc, I. (2016). Contemporary Indian labour migration in the GCC
region: Emerging challenges and opportunities. Chapter 5. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration
report 2016: Gulf migration (pp. 63–74). New Delhi: Routledge.
Oommen, G. Z. (2016). South Asian migration to gulf countries: Emerging trends and challenges.
In P. C. Jain & G. Z. Oommen (Eds.), South Asian migration to gulf countries: History policies
and development. New Delhi, Routledge.
Ozaki, M. (2012). Worker migration and remittances in South Asia (South Asia Working Paper
Series). Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Panicker, K. S. (2013). Migration, remittances and development in South Asia. Diaspora Studies,
5(2), 219–224.
Percot, M. (2006). Indian nurses in the Gulf: Two generations of female migration. South Asia
Research, 26(1), 41–62.
Percot, M., & Rajan, S. I. (2007). Female emigration from India: Case study of nurses. Economic
and Political Weekly, 42(4), 318–325.
Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2012). India migration report 2012: Global crisis, migration and remittances.
New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2016). India migration report 2016: Gulf migration. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2017a). South Asian migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegra-
tion. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (2017b). South Asia-Gulf migration corridor: An introduction. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.),
South Asia migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegration (pp. 1–19). New
Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. 1. (2018). Demography of Gulf region (Chapter 3). In M. Chowdhury & S. I. Rajan
(Eds), South Asian migration in the Gulf (pp. 35–59). Palgrave Macmillan.
Rajan, S. I. (2019). The crisis of gulf migration. Chapter 48, pp.849-68 in Cecilia Menjivar.
In M. Ruiz & I. Ness (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of migration crises. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Rajan, S. I, & Joseph, J. (2013). Adapting, adjusting and accommodating: Social costs of migration
to Saudi Arabia (Chapter 9). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), Global financial crisis, migration and remit-
tances: India Migration Report 2013 (pp. 139–53). New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2015). Migrant women at the discourse–policy nexus: Indian domestic
workers in Saudi Arabia (Chapter 2). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India migration report 2015: Gender
and migration. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I, & Joseph, J. (2016). Gulf migration in times of regulation: Do migration controls and
labour market restrictions in Saudi Arabia produces irregularity? (Chapter 12). In S I. Rajan
(Ed.), India Migration report 2016: Gulf migration. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2017). Migration (in) flux: Impact of legislation on patterns and quan-
tum of irregular mobility between India and Saudi Arabia (Chapter 14). In P. Fargues & N. M.
Shah (Eds.), Skilful survivals: Irregular migration to the Gulf (pp. 269–292). Cambridge: Gulf
Research Centre.
Rajan, S. I., & Narayana, D. (2012). The financial crisis in the Gulf and its impact on south Asian
migration and remittances (Chapter 5). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2012:
Global financial crisis, migration and remittances (p. 74). New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., Varghese, V. J., & Jayakumar, M. S. (2011). Dreaming mobility and buying vulner-
ability: Overseas recruitment practices and its discontents in India. New Delhi: Routledge.
Ratha, D., De, S., Plaza, S., Seshan, G., Yameogo, N. D., & Kim, E. J. (2018). Migration and
remittances: Recent development and outlook (Migration and development brief 30). World
Bank: Washington, DC.
Secombe, I. J., & Lawless, R. I. (1986). Foreign workers dependence in the Gulf and the interna-
tional oil companies 1910-50. International Migration Review, 20(3), 548–574.
Sohan, F. (2011). South Asia migrant commission. In S. Kelegama et al. (Eds.), Migration, remit-
tances and development in South Asia (pp. 3–10). New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Srivastava, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2003). An overview of migration in India: Its impact and key
issues. Paper presented at the regional conference on migration, development and pro-poor
policy choices in Asia, jointly organised by DFID, UK and RMMRU, 22–24 June, Dhaka.
Surk, B., & Abbotarch, S. (2009). India steps up pressure for minimum wages for its Workers in
the Gulf, International Herald Tribune, Dubai, 27 March.
Tamimi al Nasser. (2013, June). Asia- GCC relations: Growing interdependence. ISPI, No. 179.
Thimothy, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2012). Migration of women workers from South Asia to the
Gulf. Research Project, NOIDA, V V Giri National Labour Institute, pp. 84–88.
Tinker, H. (1974). A new system of slavery: The export of Indian labour overseas, 1830–1920.
London: Oxford University Press.
Varghese, V. J., & Rajan, S. I. (2011). Governmentality, social stigma and quasi-citizenship:
Gender negotiations of migrant women domestic workers from Kerala. Chapter 7. In S. I.
Rajan & M. Percot (Eds.), Dynamics of Indian migration: Historical and current perspectives
Wickramasekara, P. (2011). Labour migration in South Asia: A review of issues, policies and prac-
tices, international migration paper-no.108. Geneva: ILO.
Williams, N., et al. (2010). Nepali migrants to the Gulf cooperation countries: Values, behaviors
and plans. In M. Kamrava & Z. Babar (Eds.), Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf. New York:
Colombia University Press.
Winckler, O. (2010). Labour migration to the GCC states: Patterns, scale and policies. Washington,
DC: Migration and the Gulf, The Middle East Institute.
Zachariah, K. C., Prakash, B. A., & Rajan, S. I. (2004). Indian workers in UAE: Employment,
Wages and Working Conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX(22, May 29),
2227–2234.
Zachariah, K. C., Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2014). Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects
under the Nitaqat law (Chapter 16). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2014: Diaspora
and development (pp. 229–248). Routledge.
Chapter 2
Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation
Council: Past, Present and Future
George Naufal and Ismail Genc
Abstract In a relatively short period of time, the Gulf region has positioned itself
as the third most important labour-importing region in the world. Embarking on
ambitious development projects and taking advantage of regional factors, the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were able to provide a safe haven for
millions of workers over the last four decades. The movement of workers to the
region was so large that it altered the demographic structure of the GCC coun-
tries. Foreigners constitute on average more than half of the population in the
region and in some countries, they are more than 80%. This chapter examines
three periods of this migration phenomenon. First, we briefly summarize the his-
tory of labour migration to the region focusing on what made the Gulf a lucrative
destination for many. Second, we provide an update on the current situation of the
labour force in the region. Finally, in the third part, special attention is given to
future opportunities and challenges that labour markets in the Gulf region are
most likely to face.
Introduction
The Gulf region consists of six countries which make up the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), namely, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate
of Oman, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the State of
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).1 The Council intends to unify the member coun-
1
For a macroeconomic analysis of the GDP of the GCC countries altogether, see Genc and Termos
(2011).
G. Naufal (*)
Public Policy Research Institute (PPRI), Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany
I. Genc
The American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

20 G. Naufal and I. Genc
tries on a range of political and economic issues of which labour, especially foreign
labour forms the most prominent concern.2 This is because all of these countries rely
on the foreign labour force to man their tremendously large economies compared to
indigenous populations. Not only are the countries relatively new in the international
political landscape, but they lack educated and competent talent to handle the chal-
lenges and opportunities that a natural resource economy presents.3 For example,
other than Saudi Arabia, the remaining countries gained their independence in 1971
(Oman in 1964). The large oil wealth, the insufficient local population, relatively
high labour compensation, and stable political environment in the GCC have come
together to open the door to one of the largest movement of people in recent history.
These are some of the most frequently cited reasons for migration in the literature.4
Although the reliance on the expatriates is less severe in Saudi Arabia and Oman
with under 30% of the foreign labour force, the percentage of expatriates hovers
around 90% in Qatar and 70% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait.
These figures have built up over time thanks to the conditions mentioned above.
However, the stock of the expatriate labour force evolved over the course of history
with the addition of people from different national backgrounds. The researchers
have identified two main waves/strands of migration to the Gulf region, which can
be stated in the form of the following hypotheses5:
H1. Before 1990s, there were large numbers of Arabs in GCC.
H2. Arabs used to come as families.
The next section discusses migration trends to the GCC countries in more detail
and specifically explores the two hypotheses listed above.
Trends in the Migration History of the GCC
We collect data on migration to the GCC from the World Bank’s World Databank
covering Global Bilateral Migration for the period of 1960–2000 decade by decade.
We concentrate our attention to two different regions of the world which send
2
For legal reasons, foreign labourers are called expatriates in the GCC as they are not allowed to
immigrate to the countries they work. They are there at the status of ‘guest workers’ for which
reasons a better term is ‘expatriates’ to convey the transitory nature of the work environment.
Nevertheless, we will use all these concepts for academic purposes only as they are understood in
the literature.
3
The GCC crude oil production as a share of the world’s production in 2010 is 21% (Naufal and
Genc, 2012).
4
For a review of the literature on migration, including to the Gulf, over several decades refer to
Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970), Bartel (1979), Stark (1984), Birks, Seccombe and
Sinclair (1988), Russell (1989), Khalaf and AlKobaisi (1999), Posel (2002), Fargues (2004), de
Haas (2007), Richards and Waterbury (2008), Adams (2009), Naufal and Termos (2009) and
Naufal and Vargas-Silva (2010).
5
See Naufal and Genc (2012) and references therein for a detailed discussion on the issue.
2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 21
Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of various expatriate groups at different time intervals (%)
Female Male All
Period Arabs Asians EB Arabs Asians EB Arabs Asians EB
60–90 13.68 14.18 9.90 14.21 13.53 8.60 14.06 13.73 9.01
90–2 K 1.05 2.23 1.28 1.23 2.32 2.52 1.18 2.29 2.09
Notes: Period refers to the beginning and the end of the years for which the growth rate is com-
puted. The 60–90 is the 1960–1990 period while 90-2 K refers to the 1990–2000 period. EB stands
for Eastern Bloc. Source: World Bank
labourers to the GCC countries, that is, the Asian countries (Group 1), Arab coun-
tries (Group 2), and Eastern Bloc countries (Group 3). These are the most frequently
cited labour-sending regions of the world to the Gulf.6
The first group (Group 1) includes Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The second group (Group 2) has Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco, and West Bank and Gaza (as Palestine).
And the third group (Group 3) includes Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Moldavia, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It goes without saying that this is not
an exhaustive list of the countries which send labour to the region. For example,
there are guest workers at many levels of business and academia from the Western
countries, as well. Nevertheless, the list for which we gather data is pretty
comprehensive.7
Immigrant population is firstly divided into groups of males and females, and
secondly totalled by the country groupings indicated above. As we lack a frequently
observed dataset, we resort to the growth rate, gX, formula for a variable of interest,
say X, which allows non-consecutive observations yielding annual growth rates:
1
æ X ö t -s
g X = ç t ÷ - 1,
è Xs ø
where t and s are two dates (years), which are not necessarily consecutive but where
t > s. The next subsections examine the empirical validity of the two hypotheses
listed above as they are portrayed by literature on migration.
H1. Before the 1990s, there were large numbers of Arabs in the GCC
To test our first hypothesis, we compute the annual growth rate of various expa-
triate groups who were in the GCC at different time intervals based on the afore-
mentioned formula. The results are in Table 2.1. Arabs and Asians were the major
immigrants in the region due to historical, geographical, and cultural reasons. This
trend continued well into 1990s supported by the economic windfall of the region
Genc and Naufal (2013).

6
Further, these countries are at the heart of the migration and development research agenda that
7
Clemens (2013) passionately called the GCC countries to consider.

thanks to its natural resources, in particular, the oil and natural gas. This phenome-
non is clearly observed in Table 2.1 as the growth of Asians and Arabs are almost
identical prior to the 1990s. Eastern Bloc countries are latecomers to the labour
markets in the Gulf as the table attests. Nevertheless, there is a dramatic shift in the
source of labour in the GCC in the 1990–2000 period. Although all immigrant cat-
egories suffered heavy losses in the latter period, the decline in the Arab group is
much more pronounced than in other groups. Naufal (2011) and Naufal and Genc
(2013) also arrive at the same conclusion by studying the change of direction in the
remittances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Given that the
GCC constitutes a significant portion of the remittance-sending countries in the
MENA, the non-GCC countries are the major beneficiaries of the operation. The
authors observe that there is a structural break in remittances around the 1990s,
where the largest portion of remittances thereof leaves the region, presumably head-
ing to Asia. This finding is anything but the anomaly as shown in the existing litera-
ture. For example, Choucri (1986), Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair (1988), and
Kapiszewski (2004) have all made similar observations around this time frame.
To reiterate our point, we display the immigration data in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
We equate the initial observation in 1960 to 100 to discern the pattern of growth
over time. In the female category of workers, Arabs make up the majority until the
1990s after which Asians take over. Asian female labour migrant population growth
rate surpasses that of Arabs earlier than the 1990s. We conjecture that the earlier
shift in the labour policy of the Gulf as stated in Choucri (1986) must be due to the
impact of the change in the female population. Those who find the shift in later
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Asia EB Arab
NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.
Fig. 2.1 Immigration number – all females (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100)
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Asia EB Arab
Fig. 2.2 Immigration number – all males (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100)
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Asia EB Arab
Fig. 2.3 Immigration number – all (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100)
times are probably observing the behaviour of the male migrant population whose
growth rate among Arabs decline after the 1990s as compared to Asians. This claim
is further supported by the same behaviour discerned for the All migrant graph.
The migration literature lists political and economic causes behind the shift in
the employment policies of the GCC countries (Russell 1989, 1992). Those who
prefer the political explanation cite the First Gulf War which divided GCC and non-
GCC MENA countries in, broadly defined, opposite camps. After the war, GCC
countries retaliated with deporting citizens from countries which did not align with
the position of the GCC. Those who advance economic explanations for the change
in the labour policies cite the well-known financial portfolio theory which advocates
the diversification of financial investment for the purposes of risk aversion (or at
least risk minimization). By that logic, it is not wise to rely on a small number of
countries to meet the labour needs of the region, which would mitigate the bargain-
ing power of the Gulf in labour negotiations with labour-sending countries.8
On a side note, we would like to address a likely observation of readers regarding
the tremendous decline in the growth rate of immigrants in the 1990–2000 period
compared to before. There could be several explanations. One of them is that per-
haps it took a long time for foreigners to come back to the GCC in the aftermath of
the war in the Gulf in 1991. Or alternatively, we can say that the labour market in
the region has attained a somewhat steady state given the more mature economic
structure in the post-1990s period versus the earlier times. Therefore, the region
now needs less growth in the labour force, especially foreign labour to satisfy the
demand. All in all, one finds that the population growth rate of the region in the
1960–1990 period is 5.1%, whereas it is more than halved in the 1990–2000 period
with 2.2%. Additional support for this observation comes from the UN migration
data which find even negative net migration stock for the 1990–1995 and 1995–2000
periods.
H2. Arabs used to come as families
Our second hypothesis points to a typical family structure in the Middle East.
Arab men do not travel abroad without the family, especially if the workplace is in
the Middle East. Unfortunately, we do not have historical data on the family com-
position of the expatriates in the region. We proxy the family structure by comput-
ing the differences between the number of male and female migrants in the GCC
region for the two largest groups – Arabs and Asians. No one would deny the fact
that males and females do not necessarily represent families, but given Arab culture,
chances are the foreign Arab women in the region are with their families. Hence, as
shown in Table 2.2, the male–female difference among the two largest expatriate
groups in the Gulf seems to be always greater/larger on the Asian side. We can
guardedly say that there is at least some evidence that Arabs came to the Gulf with
their families.
Table 2.2 Difference between male and female expatriate populations in the GCC
Year M–F Asia M–F Arab
1960 35,157 22,075
1970 110,761 109,966
1980 583,272 541,133
1990 1,360,446 1,289,434
2000 1,726,037 1,470,383
Source: World Bank
This could be thought as the typical case of a monopoly.

8
Incidentally, some researchers emphasize a particular characteristic of the Arab

labour force, which is their tendency to stay on in the region rather than leave. This,
then, counters the notion of the ‘guest worker’ idea that the policymakers in the
region have in mind when importing foreign labour. Therefore, Asian workers are
more readily willing to come to the Gulf for a transitory period and return home
after their visa expires.9
While the previous analysis has provided new data evidence on migration trends
in the GCC countries, the next section provides a brief summary of current demo-
graphics of foreign workers in the Gulf region.
Current Labour Force Profile
Since we discussed the migration trends in previous sections, we now would like to
turn to the current picture in the region. Obviously, we need data on current statistics
to conduct this analysis. However, one of the main difficulties in studying migration
and labour markets in the Gulf region is the lack of data available. The GCC coun-
tries have not systematically collected and disseminated data on foreign workers
residing in the region. With the advancement in the World Wide Web, several of the
GCC countries have slowly started to share some information using their govern-
ment institutions’ webpages.10 Although the data shared does not provide enough
in-depth coverage of the foreign and local labour force and is difficult to match
across the GCC countries, it is still considered a step in the right direction. Having
said that, that step is still far from doing justice to the importance of the region in
current international migration flows. To complement official efforts to disseminate
existing migrant data, the Gulf Research Center (GRC) and the Migration Policy
Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI) have just launched the
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) initiative to collect, organize, clean
and disseminate data on Gulf labour markets.11 The following section uses data
from both official and GLMM sources in order to shed light on the demographics of
the foreign population in the Gulf.
Figure 2.4 shows the latest estimates of the share of foreigners from the total
population in each GCC country in 2013 for Oman, Kuwait and KSA. In the case of
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, the number reflects 2010 values. Foreigners constitute
on average, 62% of the population in the Gulf region with the highest numbers
9
This should not, however, give the wrong impression that everybody duly obeys the law. See, inter
alia, Kapiszewski (2001), Shah (2008) and Shaham (2008).
10
Some of these initiatives include Open Data Platform in Bahrain, government online in Kuwait,
Omanuna initiative in Oman, Qatar census in Qatar, Saudi in KSA, and the National Bureau of
Statistics in the UAE.
11
The Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) website can be seen at www.
gulfmigration.edu, at this moment it only includes data on Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and some
aggregate statistics on the region.
100 88.5
85.7
80 68.5
Percentage
60 54
43.7
40 32.4
20
0
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE
Fig. 2.4 Share of population as foreigners. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and eco-
nomic database 2014)
600 569
500 466
Men per 100 Women
420
400
293 287
300
209
200
101 93 102 99 102 100
100
0
Men per 100 Women Non-Nationals Men per 100 Women Nationals
Fig. 2.5 Nationals and non-nationals sex ratio. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and
economic database 2014)
found in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. If one puts these figures in terms of absolute
numbers, then the Gulf region is home to more than 30 million migrants.
An interesting aspect of migration to the Gulf region is its distinct gender bias
towards males. Most of the low-skilled jobs are manned by South Asian men while
female migration from neighbouring Arab countries is more difficult due to tradi-
tional and cultural reasons. Fig. 2.5 highlights this gender imbalance by showing a
ratio of more than four foreign men to one foreign woman in half of the GCC coun-
tries (Oman, Qatar, and the UAE).12 The smallest migrant gender disproportion is
found in Kuwait but the number of men is still twice that of women. The gender
The data for Bahrain and the UAE reflect 2010 statistics, Kuwait and Qatar reflect 2012 and
12
Oman and Saudi Arabia’s numbers are for 2013.

distribution of migrant workers is consistent with the shift in the source of labour
from Arab towards South Asian workers. The skewed distribution of migrant popu-
lation by gender is also mirrored in the age distribution with more than 80% of
foreigners being of working age (between 15 and 64) (Fig. 2.6). Interestingly, the
share of the population above 65 is very similar across nationality, reflecting a very
young local population.
While Figs. 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 have focused on the demographic side of the total
population in the GCC countries, Fig. 2.7 presents the distribution of the employed
population. In all GCC countries, working foreigners outweigh the number of work-
ing locals, with large differences in all of them (foreigners constitute at least 70% of
the working population) except in Saudi Arabia. Out of the employed population in
Qatar and the UAE, more than 90% are foreigners.
All the previous statistics and figures divide the population into nationals versus
non-nationals. Historically, most GCC countries did not publicly provide in-depth
breakdowns between nationals, using instead a more generic distribution for national
security concerns. We use Kuwait as a case study due to the availability of data that
include the distribution of foreigners by ethnicity. Figure 2.8 presents the share of
Arabs, Asians, Westerners and Africans out of the total foreign population. This
means that 55% of the foreign population comes from Asian countries (mainly
South Asian countries) while 41% comes from neighbouring Arab countries.
In terms of gender, Asian females constitute 17% of the foreign population while
Arab females make up 14%. Males constitute 66% of the foreign population.
Finally, out of the total foreign population, 48% is the share of employed Asians
while the figure is 20% for Arab workers. This suggests that 29% of foreigners in
90 84
80
70
60
60
Percentage
50
40 37
30
20 15
10 4
1
0
0-14 15-64 65+
Age
Nationals Non-Nationals
Fig. 2.6 Age distribution by nationality: GCC countries. (Source: GLMM database – demo-
graphic and economic database 2014)
100 93.8 92.9

90 82.8
74.8 77.4
80
70
56.5
Percentage
60
50 43.5
40
30 25.2 22.6
17.2
20
6.2 7.1
10
0
Employed Non-Nationals Employed Nationals
Fig. 2.7 Distribution of employed population by nationality. (Source: GLMM database – demo-
60% 55%
50% 48%
41%
40%
Arabs
30% Asians
20% Westerners
20% 17%
14% Africans
10%
1% 3% 1% 2% 1% 2%
0%
Population Female Employed
Fig. 2.8 Share out of total foreign population in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database –
demographic and economic database 2014)
2012 were not employed. Although not reported in Fig. 2.9, out of the foreign Arab
population, 49.7% were employed in 2012, while for Asians workers, this number
was 86.8%. The large discrepancy between the percentages of Arabs versus Asians
working is due to fundamental differences in migration patterns, skill levels and
cultural distinctions; all documented in the Gulf migration literature.
We next look at the unemployment and labour force participation rates in Kuwait
for 2012. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show that unemployment rates for both Kuwaitis and
foreigners are very similar and vary between 1.2% and 3.6%. Female unemploy-
3.6%
3.4%
2.6%
1.2%
Unemployment Rate for 2012
Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female
Fig. 2.9 Unemployment rate in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database – demographic and
economic database 2014)
84%
52%
36%
30%
Labor Force Participation Rate for 2012
Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female
Fig. 2.10 Labour force participation rate in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database – demo-
ment rates are higher. The picture is very different when one considers the labour
force participation rates. Male foreigners have the highest participation rates (84%)
while both male and female Kuwaitis have 36 and 30% rates of participation. Even
foreign female participation rate is higher than 50%. It would be interesting to fur-
ther examine the foreign female participation rate by Arab and Asian ethnicity, but
unfortunately, the data are not available.
Table 2.3 Occupation by nationality and gender – Kuwait 2012

Kuwaitis Arabs Asians
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Senior officials and managers
Professionals 12% 26% 12% 29%
Technicians 15% 15%
Clerks 32% 52% 11% 22%
Service/sale workers 31% 19% 14% 24% 82%
Agriculture workers
Craft workers 10%
Production supervisors 12% 27%
Regular work professionals 20% 22%
Not stated 21%
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data from the GLMM database – demographic and economic
database 2014
We then focus on the occupation of the main three components of the popula-
tion: Kuwaitis, Arabs and Asians. The last two constitute more than 95% of the
foreign population living in Kuwait in 2012. Table 2.3 highlights the distribution
of workers by occupation. We only show the percentage if it is at least 10% to
avoid cluttering the table and to allow the reader to clearly distinguish the differ-
ence in occupations by nationality and gender. For instance, 32% of Kuwaiti males
work as clerks. What is clear from Table 2.3 is the concentration of Kuwaitis in the
upper-level occupations such as professionals, technicians and clerks while Arab
and Asian males are found in the production sectors. Arab females work as profes-
sionals, service work or are not stated while Asian females are mainly found in
service and sales work.
While the above brief analysis has presented some data on the current pop-
ulation in the GCC and labour in Kuwait, one has to acknowledge the limita-
tions of the data and therefore analysis. 13 What is available on the foreign (and
local) labour force in the Gulf region is scarce at best and mainly descriptive.
The data cannot be used to draw comparisons across different GCC countries
since they either differ by definition, collection, year or availability (Naufal,
2014). Further, the data are not good enough to examine correlations and
causal effects to draw policy implications. Despite the growing efforts in cre-
ating, organizing and disseminating data on migration in the Gulf, we are only
at the beginning and there is still a lot left to do in order to be able to study the
determinants and effects of migration and remittances in the GCC countries.
Ultimately, these studies would bring policy recommendations to better deal
with the challenges and opportunities that the region is facing. This is the
main topic of the next section.
13
For a more thorough analysis of the latest available data on the Gulf region, refer to Naufal
(2014).
Challenges and Opportunities of the GCC Countries
The GCC countries embarked on ambitious development plans two decades ago,
updating their infrastructure and building financial and tourist sectors. These proj-
ects have made the region one of the top labour-receiving regions in the world,
second only to traditional and historical destinations (North America and Europe).
These development projects, while significant and very ambitious, do not even
come close to the ones the region is about to embark on in order to host the Dubai
Expo 2020 and the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. With such tremendous expected
growth, one has to wonder about future challenges and opportunities in its labour
markets that the region might be facing.
We first identify the current and future concerns for local governments, that is,
the development of the local human capital. With cheap and abundant foreign work-
ers available, the incentives for local labour to invest in its own human capital are
weak. In fact, the GCC countries at this point can afford to be very meticulous and
choosy in terms of whom to bring into the region, because they face an almost hori-
zontal supply of labour. The Gulf region can import labour from all non-GCC Arab
neighbouring countries that are suffering from political instabilities (Egypt, Libya,
Yemen, Syria and Lebanon). In addition, other countries that are not struggling with
instability are facing dire economic conditions. Difficult economic situations are
being faced not only by neighbouring Arab countries but also by South and East
Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Nepal)
and African countries. Even Western countries have struggled with the latest eco-
nomic and financial crisis (Spain, Greece, Portugal among others) giving the GCC
countries a huge potential pool of skilled western workers, not just unskilled work-
ers. In fact, one can estimate the size of the potential pool of foreign workers to
exceed two billion people. Even though the GCC countries have an unlimited sup-
ply of labour at their disposal, local governments have invested heavily in human
capital development through education, training and initiatives to employ local
labour in the private sector. So far, these initiatives have not brought the needed
results (Naufal, 2014). In certain sectors such as health, the need for increased par-
ticipation from the local labour market is very high. Due to the nature of migration
to the region, most foreigners are temporary workers and therefore turnover is high.
This brings additional costs and has long-term consequences on areas like business
reputation and quality of service, to name a few.
Another concern comes in the form of demographic changes in the local com-
munity. The GCC countries are experiencing declining levels of fertility in two
decades that Western countries achieved over centuries. Late marriages and increas-
ing levels of female education have contributed to this drop in fertility (Al Awad and
Chartouni, 2010). With the exception of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the GCC coun-
tries have a total population of fewer than four million. The local population is actu-
ally less than one million for each of the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain and is less than
two million for each Oman and Kuwait.14 Facing a growing economy with declining
fertility levels and an already small local population means that the Gulf region will
always be depending on a large population of foreign workers. Given that expecta-
tion, better data on migration are crucial to not only study the effects of mobility and
remittances on local Gulf economies, but also to contribute to the international
debate on the relationship between migration and development. A recent study by
Seshan and Yang (2014) is a fine example of desperately needed empirical evidence
from the region.
Another consequence of demographic trends in the GCC countries is the chang-
ing role of women in the labour market. More local females are entering labour
markets in the region. The increasing labour force participation rate of females in
the Gulf does not only have implications on the fertility rate, but also on other social
aspects such as the marriage market. More local females are not only marrying at a
later age, but are also are marrying foreigners. This is contributing to a growing
trend of local men choosing foreign women as wives. The GCC countries in the near
future will face a growing generation of mixed locals, triggering a re-examination
of national identity and belonging in the context of a population that is no longer as
ethnically and culturally monolithic. In fact, the UAE government has not shied
away from discouraging locals from marrying foreigners.15
While demographic concerns will bring serious challenges to the local popula-
tions in the region, other economic worries are also looming on the horizon. Most
of the economic growth and improved standards of living are reflections of the large
supply of natural resources that the Gulf region enjoys, specifically hydrocarbon
resources. Gulf countries have always relied heavily on the oil sector and while they
have spent significant efforts to diversify the local economy, the region is still far
from oil independence. What could potentially bring more competition to the GCC
countries is the emergence of shale oil in several countries, specifically large econo-
mies such as the US (Sultan, 2013). The implications of shale oil and shale gas
extractions on the Gulf region are still not clear and may remain that way in the near
future. However, the GCC countries have to take into consideration possible long-
term repercussions on their budgets and the ability to maintain support for the local
population.
Conclusions
In a relatively short period of time, the Gulf region has positioned itself as the third
most important labour importing region in the world. By embarking on ambitious
development projects and taking advantage of regional factors, the GCC countries
were able to provide a safe haven for millions of workers over the last four decades.
14
Authors’ calculations using GLMM database.
15
See Al Sadafy (2012) and Sherif (2012).
Large natural reserves endowment, significant and continuous political instability in

the region, and weak economic performance of neighbouring economies all contrib-
uted to the status of the Gulf region as a labour destination hub. The movement of
workers to the region was so large that it altered the demographic structure of the
GCC countries. Foreigners constitute on average more than half of the population in
the region and in some countries, they are more than 80%. The average male-to-
female ratio is 3.7 across the Gulf and in some instances reaches as high as
5.6 (Oman).
This article examines three periods of this migration phenomenon. Firstly, we
briefly summarize the history of labour migration to the region focusing on what
made the Gulf a desirable destination for many. Secondly, we provide an update on
the current situation of the labour force in the region focusing on Kuwait due to data
availability. Finally, in the third part, special attention is given to future opportuni-
ties and challenges that labour markets in the Gulf region are most likely to face.
What we find is that the region was an attractive migration destination for non-GCC
Arabs for historical and cultural reasons until the early 1990s and they used to come with
their families. However, the trend has changed thereafter. South Asians have become the
most preferred source of foreign labour in the region, especially in the low-skilled labour
market. While the source countries of labour differ over time, the reason for moving and
the type of the move to the Gulf has not. People move to the region because of job oppor-
tunities and wage differential. The move is almost always temporary. The GCC coun-
tries do not offer an opportunity to permanently settle (citizenship).
This historical trend seems to have taken root in the region in terms of changing
dynamics of the population and more importantly, in the labour force. Not only is
the concentration of non-locals increasing in the region, but it is also changing
demographic and lifestyle tastes among the locals. Governments’ efforts to induce
local labour force growth and participation have not yielded the desired outcome so
far and face tremendous challenges in the future. On the one hand, foreign workers
are simply cheaper to hire. They are more readily available, more flexible (in terms
of geographical location), and are more experienced than their local counterparts.
That said, every private business owner would have clear preference towards for-
eign workers versus local labour. On the other hand, working in the private sector is
not appealing to the local labour force. The intensive job requirements (working
hours and often work-related stress), and lack of job security relative to the public
sector, coupled with generous welfare system have directed the interest of the local
workforce towards the public sector. The key struggle of the GCC governments is to
alter the incentives of both, that is, private business owners and the local labour force.
The Gulf region offers a fantastic opportunity to study migration. On one hand,
it hosts large numbers of foreign workers and is growing economically, but on the
other hand, it is constrained by a small local population. These three factors lead to
a potentially increasing demand for workers. In other terms, the opportunity is here
to stay. Unfortunately, most of the current research is descriptive and therefore
highly speculative and the need for policy-oriented academic studies should remain
a priority not only for local governments but also for international organizations
as well.
References
Adams, R. (2009). The determinants of international remittances in developing countries. World

Development, 37(1), 93–103.
Al Awad, M., & Chartouni, C. (2010). Explaining the decline in fertility among citizens of the GCC
countries: The case of the UAE. Institute for Social and Economic Research, working paper 1.
Al Sadafy, M. (2012, January 20). Emiratis advised to not wed foreign women. Emirates 24|7
News. Accessed on March 3, 2014.
Bartel, A. (1979). The migration decision: What role does job mobility play? American Economic
Review, 69(5), 775–786.
Birks, J., Seccombe, I., & Sinclair, C. (1988). Labor migration in the Arab Gulf States. International
Migration, 26(3), 267–286.
Choucri, N. (1986). Asians in the Arab world: Labor migration and public policy. Middle Eastern
Studies, 22(2), 252–273.
Clemens, M. (2013). Seize the spotlight: A case for gulf cooperation council engagement in
research on the effects of labor migration. Center for Global Development, Essay.
de Haas, H. (2007). Remittances, migration and social development: A conceptual review of litera-
ture. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Fargues, P. (2004). Arab migration to Europe: Trends and policies. International Migration Review,
38(4), 1348–1371.
Genc, I. H., & Naufal, G. (2013, February 19). Women migrants, remittances and their impact in
the GCC region: Towards a more supportive social and policy environment. The White Paper
presented to Tamra for Western Union (WU), Sharjah, UAE.
Genc, I. H., & Termos, A. (2011). Is there a catch-up effect in the Gulf? The Middle Eastern
Finance and Economics, 15, 197–207.
Harris, J., & Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, unemployment, and development: A two-sector analy-
sis. American Economic Review, 60(1), 126–142.
Kapiszewski, A. (2001). National and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the GCC
states. Reading: Ithaca Press.
Kapiszewski, A. (2004). Arab labour migration to the GCC states. Arab Migration in a Globalized
World, Conference organized by International Organization for Migration in Geneva,
Switzerland, in 2003.
Khalaf, S., & AlKobaisi, S. (1999). Migrants’ strategies of coping and patterns of accommoda-
tion in the oil-rich gulf societies: Evidence from the UAE. British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, 26(2), 271–298.
Naufal, G. (2011). Labor migration and remittances in the GCC. Labor History, 52(3), 307–322.
Naufal, G. (2014). The economics of migration in the Gulf cooperation council countries” forth-
coming in Regional studies: Persian Gulf in the Handbook of the economics of international
immigration edited by Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, Elsevier B.V.
Naufal, G., & Genc, I. (2012). Expats and the labor force: The story of the Gulf cooperation coun-
cil countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Naufal, G., & Genc, I. H. (2013). Structural change in MENA remittance flows (July 2013), IZA
Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP No. 7485. Also Naufal, G. and I. H. Genc. Structural change
in MENA remittance flows. NEP-ARA Blog: Discussion about the latest research in the eco-
nomics of the MENA – Middle East and North Africa, posted on August 5, 2013. The blog is
hosted by the Editorial Board at NEP-ARA. Paul Makdissi (Editor), University of Ottawa.
Available at http://nepara.wordpress.com/
Naufal, G., & Termos, A. (2009). The responsiveness of remittances to price of oil: The case of the
GCC. OPEC Energy Review, 33(3/4), 184–197.
Naufal, G., & Vargas-Silva, C. (2010). Remitters in Dubai. Swiss Journal of Economics and
Statistics, 146(4), 769–780.
Posel, D. (2002). A review of current literature and recent research on migration in southern
Africa. University of Witwatersand, Johannesburg: WISER – Agincourt Programme of
Migration Research.
Richards, A., & Waterbury, J. (2008). A political economy of the Middle East. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Russell, S. (1989). Politics and ideology in migration: Policy formulation: The case of Kuwait.
International Migration Review, 23(1), 24–47.
Russell, S. (1992). International migration and political turmoil in the Middle East. Population and
Development Review, 18(4), 719–727.
Seshan, G., & Yang, D. (2014). Motivating migrants: A field experiment on financial decision-
making in transnational households. Journal of Development Economics, 108, 119–127.
Shah, N. M. (2008, October). Irregular migration and some negative consequences for develop-
ment: Asia-GCC context. Discussion Paper prepared for the Civil Society Days of the Global
Forum on Migration and Development, Manila.
Shaham, D. (2008). Foreign labor in the Arab gulf: Challenges to nationalization. Al Nakhlah: The
Fletcher School Online Journal for Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization.
Sherif, I. (2012, June 29). Think before marrying a foreigner: Study. Gulf News. Accessed on 3
Mar 2014.
Stark, O. (1984). Migration decision making: A review article. Journal of Development Economics,
14(1), 251–259.
Sultan, N. (2013). The challenge of shale to the post-oil dreams of the Arab Gulf. Energy Policy,
60, 13–20.
Todaro, M. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed coun-
tries. American Economic Review, 59(1), 138–148.
Chapter 3
Understanding Labour Migration Policies
in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries
Zahra R. Babar
Abstract In light of mounting international criticism over the living and working
conditions for many migrant workers in the region, over the past few years, many of
the Gulf Cooperation Council governments have initiated reforms in relation to
their mechanisms for governing regional migration. Critical interventions have been
initiated to address problems that have arisen as a result of the kafala or worker
sponsorship system, as well as to mitigate shortfalls within regional labour law. This
chapter will examine the evolution of Gulf labour migration policies, contentious
areas which have come under criticism by proponents of migrant workers’ rights,
and current reforms that are underway.
Introduction
With the discovery of oil in the middle of the last century, the six Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates began a process of development which changed these countries at
multiple levels. In addition to the transformation of the region’s physical landscape,
manifesting in the mushrooming of sky-high cities of steel and glass, the other
emphatic reminder of what petrodollars have brought to the Persian Gulf is glimpsed
in the region’s distinctive demography. From about the 1960s onwards, the arrival of
immense hydrocarbon wealth rapidly fuelled expansive development projects across
the region, resulting in a demand for manpower that far outstripped what was indig-
enously available. With their small populations and low levels of citizen participa-
tion in the workforce, the GCC states began to import large numbers of foreign
workers to meet their domestic labour needs (Kamrawa and Babar 2012). Over the
course of the past five decades, there has been little indication that this reliance on
an externally sourced labour supply is diminishing, and currently about 43% of the
Z. R. Babar (*)
Centre for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar

38 Z. R. Babar
population across the Gulf is made up of foreign workers (Fargues 2011; Edwards
2011). While determining the exact number of migrants at any given time is not
simple, given both fluctuations in the number of arrivals and departures and the lack
of easily accessible and transparent data, recent estimates indicate that there are
about 20 million migrants present in the region (Lori 2012). According to the United
Nations, all six of the GCC countries are listed amongst the top 20 nations in the
world boasting on the highest proportion of migrants to nationals (Razgallah 2008).
Foreign labour comprises a majority of five out of six of the GCC countries
national workforces, and only in Saudi Arabia very recently have nationals begun to
outnumber foreigners in the labour market (Lori 2012). Foreigners dominate the
labour force, as well as constitute an absolute majority of the populations of Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Lori 2012). The demographic
breakdown in some of these countries is quite unique – in Qatar and the UAE, for
example, over 90% of the total population and over 95% of the workforce is for-
eign – a condition which is not replicated anywhere else in the world. Foreign work-
ers in the Gulf come from a variety of countries, but in recent times the largest
cohorts originate from the African and Asian continents (Kapiszewski 2006). While
the majority of this foreign labour force consists of ‘unskilled’ or ‘low skilled’
workers, typically engaged in low-paying positions in sectors such as construction,
skilled migrants also populate a host of professional positions, particularly in the
private sector.1 Thus, oil wealth has turned this small, historically sparsely popu-
lated, arid corner of the world into the third largest hub of global migration.
This region has also increasingly become a site of contestation for what are in
fact globalized debates over migration. Much of the international discussion on
Gulf migration fixates on regional specificities, and highlights the particularly egre-
gious nature of local practices of migration management. Yet, these debates that
draw attention to the lack of basic rights’ protections given to Gulf migrants, ignore
the fact that migration policy and practice in the region is certainly informed by
global migration policymaking and practices. Criticism of the Gulf migration sys-
tem is equally relevant if applied in many other countries of destination. At the most
fundamental level, the implementation of national immigration policies by all states
often inherently clashes with the basic human rights of migrants. In recent years, of
the multiple sites of contestation on issues of migration – for example, in the south-
west of the United States, in Europe or in Australia’s territorial waters – the Persian
Gulf region has emerged as an area of intense study and scrutiny by scholars and
human rights’ advocates. The Gulf region, in fact, is receiving an inordinate deal of
scrutiny insofar as the rights of migrants are concerned, and much of this scathing
attention appears to be divorced from global migration policies and practices.
1
In Qatar, for example, where foreigners far outnumber locals in the labour market, non-nationals
account for the bulk of jobs across most sectors. But in spite of this, 72% of the foreign population
is engaged in lower-income categories or ‘elementary occupations’. The average ‘foreign worker’
in Qatar is male and works in the construction sector. For more on this please see: Fancoise De
Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar”, Gulf Labour Markets and
Migration Research Note, No. 8, 2014.
3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 39
Gulf Migration Policy and Practice
In the GCC, the policymaking and management of migration has evolved within
each state’s national context, based on their national interests and needs. As is the
case in most other nation-states, each Gulf country maintains strict control over who
has entry rights to its sovereign territory, and who can reside and participate in the
domestic labour market. While migration policies have developed as per national
requirements, the GCC policies reflect a degree of similarity due to comparable
labour market conditions. Internal discussions of labour migration amongst GCC
nationals and policymakers also reflect similar concerns. It needs to be stated that
GCC policymakers have repeatedly asserted that viewing foreign workers based in
the region as ‘migrants’ is in fact incorrect (Lori 2012). The GCC is not a destina-
tion for traditional migration leading to settlement, and region-wide, the system is
structured to only grant foreign workers opportunities for temporary cycles of
employment (Kamrava and Babar 2012). A common concern that frames much of
the national debates on migration centres on the demographic ‘imbalance’ in the
Gulf, with foreigners outnumbering locals in several of GCC states. Another com-
mon feature to GCC states’ migration deliberations is that this reliance on a foreign
workforce is framed as a temporary condition, despite the fact that in reality the
phenomenon has persisted for decades now and shows no indication of disappear-
ing. Additionally, all six GCC countries stress their commitment to establishing a
citizen workforce, and suggest that once they are successful in this goal they will no
longer have an unhealthy dependency on foreign workers. It is within the context of
these common themes or anxieties that Gulf migration policies have developed.
For several decades, in all six GCC states the migrant labour population has been
governed through the kafala, or worker-sponsorship system. This system was his-
torically rooted in traditional Bedouin practices of tribe members standing as per-
sonal guarantors for visitors, and evolved out of local Gulf customs of hospitality
and protection offered to strangers (Longva 1997). In its present-day rendition, the
kafala creates a direct relationship between each labour migrant and his citizen-
sponsor or kafeel, and binds each migrant worker to a particular job for a specified
period of time. The kafeel maintains control over a worker’s mobility for the dura-
tion of his or her stay in the Gulf, and a migrant’s visa status is thus tied to his
continued employment with his sponsor. Workers cannot change their place of
employment nor exit the country without obtaining prior approval from their
sponsor.
In addition, the kafala is grounded by the contractual agreements which are
signed between foreign workers and their sponsors. These contracts, particularly for
the lower skill categories of migrants, are usually drawn up for a 2-year period of
employment and residency, but may be renewed or extended. Upon the completion
of the contracted period of employment, sponsors are responsible for ensuring that
workers are immediately repatriated to their country of origin. Both the kafala and
the labour contracts are structured so as to ensure that migrants’ stay in the Gulf
States is of a temporary nature, and tied to their employment statues. There are
40 Z. R. Babar
almost no pathways to obtaining permanent settlement or citizenship. Migrants may

choose to engage in repeated cycles of employment within one or more of the GCC
states, interspersed with periods of repatriation home. Several of the Gulf States
have instituted reforms to their citizenship laws to allow for processes of naturaliza-
tion. However, the multiple and onerous conditions which must be met by appli-
cants means that hardly any migrants qualify for naturalization (Babar 2014).
The kafala and the labour contracts they are girded in have placed employers in
an advantageous position vis-à-vis their sponsored employees at multiple levels.
This system that privileges the needs and interests of citizen-employers in essence
also provides them with a central role in managing regional migration (Gardner
2010). While the states and their apparatus of course administer much of this migra-
tion system, citizen-employers and private sector actors such as labour recruiters
and manpower agencies have increasingly assumed a central role in governing the
lives of migrants to the Gulf.
Gulf States have often asserted that national labour laws provide the necessary
corrective and are there to check bad practices. Employers are bound to comply
with the labour laws that have been crafted to ensure that workers’ basic rights are
protected. In each of the GCC states, labour law provides for a host of specific pro-
tections for foreign migrants and curtails the potential workers’ exploitation. Laws
established include: stipulations that licenced recruiters are not allowed to receive
any recruitment fees or costs from the migrant workers; that contracts should include
details of the work that is to be undertaken and need to be signed in advance of the
worker’s departure from his home state; that the wages that are to be paid for the
same work are agreed to in the contract, and are to be paid in a timely manner.
Regional labour laws also provide elaborate regulations on maximum working
hours, paid leave, annual leave, sick leave, health and safety rights, and compensa-
tion for injuries sustained in the work place.
The highly unequal power dynamics between worker and citizen-employer
through the kafala arrangements, and the inability for labour laws to adequately
protect migrants’ rights have been raised by international organizations. There have
been frequent calls for Gulf States to dismantle the kafala, and for regional govern-
ment to accept a greater degree of responsibility in ensuring that their labour law is
complied with.
Reforming the Gulf Migration System
Increasingly, GCC governments have acknowledged the limitations of the kafala,

and over the past few years are showing a more vigorous engagement with address-
ing shortfalls in migration governance. Several of the GCC states have initiated
reforms to tackle the most problematic elements of the kafala, but at this stage we
have not seen a complete dismantling of the sponsorship system. In 2009, the gov-
ernment of Bahrain omitted one of the more restrictive practices of the sponsorship
system, by enacting a ‘mobility law’ allowing migrants to change employers
without requiring the approval or consent of their sponsors. In 2011, Kuwait and the
United Arab Emirates followed suit, and also allowed foreign workers to change
places of employment without needing their sponsor’s permission or losing their
visa status. In 2010, Kuwait also changed its labour law to establish minimum
wages for foreign workers and domestic workers. In May 2014 Qatar announced a
series of labour law reforms, which include a renaming of the kafala, the removal of
restrictions on changing places of employment (in certain cases) and the establish-
ment of a ‘Grievances Council’ as a space of mediation for foreign workers who are
facing challenges from employers wishing to deny them the exit permits necessary
to leave the country.
Further to these, broader reforms to regional labour law and new programmes
targeting some of the most frequently occurring infringements of workers’ rights
have either been implemented or are in the process of being executed in several of
the GCC states. The UAE pioneered a system for electronic validation and registra-
tion of workers contracts (Al-Ramahi 2014; Barakat 2014). The purpose of this is to
bypass deceitful recruiters and Gulf employers who often misinform potential
migrants in the sending countries about their job conditions. The electronic registra-
tion of workers contracts necessitates that UAE employers provide information of a
worker’s contract through an online application which is vetted by the Ministry of
Labour. This application process ensures a full disclosure of all the details of the
work contract, including, information on wages, the sort of work that is to be under-
taken, working hours and benefits. The Ministry of Labour in the UAE processes the
application, and then passes the contract on directly to the responsible recruitment
agency in the sending country. The agency in the sending country is required to
obtain the worker’s attested consent, and a duly designated government agency also
accesses the record for the purpose of reviewing the terms of employment prior to
granting emigration clearance. Once these steps have been followed, the Ministry of
Labour will register the legally binding work contract and issue a work permit.
While the UAE was the first GCC to develop system, other GCC countries have
committed to adopt similar electronic mechanisms for ensuring that contracts are
transparent and open.
The Wage Protection System (WPS) is another recent programme adopted by
several of the GCC states, that is meant to ensure that workers are receiving their
full wages and in a timely manner.2 Initially launched in 2009 by the Ministry of
Labour in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also adopted the system. Starting
in December 2016, Qatar has also introduced a WPS, requiring employers to trans-
fer salaries directly to employee bank accounts within 7 days of their due date to
avoid fines; the requirement of online bank transfers is to ensure employer account-
ability as well as simplify both monitoring and employee complaints (Zahra 2016).
The WPS creates a link between the citizen-employer, the country’s central bank
2
For more on this, please see the United Arab Emirates Ministry Of Labor website: UAE, Ministry
of Labor, Wage Protection System Guideline, 2009. http://www.mol.gov.ae/newMolGateway/eng-
lish/wpsGuidelineEng.aspx#3
42 Z. R. Babar
and the Ministry of Labour to ensure timely and accurate payment of workers.
Additional areas of reform under discussion by the GCC are as follows:
• Adopting of a unified draft contract for domestic workers.
• Establishing processes for direct recruitment and bypassing recruiting agencies.
• Creating stronger mechanisms for dispute settlement between workers and
employers.
• Enhancing the capacity of the Ministries of Labour by increasing the number of
labour inspectors;
• Banning mid-day outdoor work during the summer months.
• Increasing the financial penalties for the illegal confiscation of workers’ pass-
ports (Financial Times 2014; Al Jazeera 2014; Ministry of Interior 2015).3
Given that contract-related and salary issues are consistently the areas where
migrant workers most frequently express dissatisfaction, such measures to address
specific shortfalls are indeed positive. Developing standards and policies which
serve to improve workers’ rights and also strengthen the role of the state in enforc-
ing labour law are good steps forward. However, none of these reform processes are
willing to actually consider a systematic reconfiguration of the status of migrant
workers within the host state. Past experience with reform in the GCC has largely
occurred as a result of domestic pressures and rather than external ones (Ehteshami
and Wright 2007; Rathmell and Schulze 2000). While over the past 5 years, almost
all the GCC states have taken measures to reform and realign the kafala, there con-
tinues to be strong domestic incentives to maintain some sort of system which care-
fully controls migrants’ entry into and participation in the local labour markets. For
example, despite severe international criticism and pressure to address shortfalls in
the labour migration system, the pace of change in Qatar has remained very slow.
While there seems to be acceptance that reform is inevitable, the state is grappling
with how to implement labour reforms without creating instability in the domestic
political milieu. Beginning in early 2014, key Qatari government figures made pub-
lic comments on proposed reforms to the kafala system, but these statements were
made cautiously and indicated that the state was reluctant to challenge the status
quo head-on (Booth et al. 2014; Bollinger 2014; Qatar Today 2014). Most recently,
Qatar provided revisions to its labour law in December 2015 which were fully
implanted by December 2016. Amongst other reforms, Law No. 21 of 2015, the
‘Law on the Regulation of Expatriates’ Right to Entry, Exit and Residence’ has
withdrawn (the somewhat politicized) the use of the word kafala from labour law
when identifying the designated employer/sponsor of a foreign worker (Zahra
2016). Instead being identified as a ‘sponsor’, the employer is now to be referred to
3
“Gulf States to reform contracts of domestic workers,” Financial Times, November 2014, http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82c820aa-756b-11e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3POyJ3hyL; “Qatar
promises to reform ‘kafala’ labour law,” November 16, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/mid-
dleeast/2014/11/qatar-promises-reform-kafala-labour-law-2014111661154969555.html; “Qatar
Announces Wide-Ranging Labour Market Reforms,” May 14, 2015, http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/
english/news/2014/05/14/32204.html
as the ‘recruiter’ of a foreign worker. This change in official terminology demon-

strates the Qatari government’s keen sensitivity to the fact that the kafala system as
whole has gained global notoriety. Law No. 21 modifies the previously existing full
control that employer-sponsors maintained over the mobility of their employees.
While previously foreign workers were unable to exit Qatar without the explicit
permission of their employers, under the new reforms foreigners may now contest
their employers’ denial of an exit permit at the newly established Committee on
Expatriates’ Exit Grievances if they feel that the denial is unfairly grounded.4
Additionally, the law against employers’ rights to hold their employee passports (a
common complaint made by many foreign workers) has been strengthened, with
greater penalties and higher fines now established. These tighter laws also apply to
cases where employers have provided written evidence to suggest that they have
been holding passports because they are requested to do so by their workers (De
Bel-Air 2015a). With respect to the transfer of sponsorship, the new law provides
some amendments to previous legislation, primarily granting the Ministry of Labour
and the Ministry of Interior with a greater role in the process. While previously
foreign workers could not change their place of employment without the explicit
permission of their employer-sponsor (in the form of a No Objection Certificate),
Law 21 allows foreign workers to change their jobs via directly submitting a request
to do so to the Ministry of Labour, either after completing their fully contracted
period of employment (if employed on a limited duration contract), or else after
completing 5 years of employment (on an open-ended contract). The reforms also
allows for the Ministry to intervene and allow a foreign worker to change his or her
job in cases where they have faced abuse and exploitation or if the transfer is
‘deemed to be in the public interest’ (Al Jazeera 2016).
In addition to Law No. 21, the Qatari government has over the past several years
adopted new measures to address some of the concerns around the treatment and
care of foreign workers which have received international attention. In 2014 the
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Decision No. (18) for the year 2014 was
adopted specifically to address issues relating to the substandard living conditions
of lower-income foreign workers. This decree has mandated that employers are
bound to provide housing to their workers that is set to certain national standards.
Decision No. 18 of 2014 provides detailed stipulations regarding what is considered
adequate in terms of workers’ housing. Employers must provide basic furnishings
such as a bed, mattress, air-conditioner, refrigerator, gas oven and a full water closet
with a water heater for their workers. The decree also sets minimum standards for
cleanliness and sanitation as well as safety and health standards for all workers’
accommodations. In addition, it is mandated that there must be an adequate number
qualified resident nurses or doctors on site, if the number of workers in the accom-
modations exceeds 100. The decree does not allow employers to deduct any money
from workers’ wages for housing equipment and maintenance.
Another common feature of recent GCC labour reforms is the effort to increase
the number of Gulf nationals in the labour force, with particular focus on expanding
Article 7, Qatari Law No. 21 of 2015.

4
44 Z. R. Babar
the hiring of citizen workers in the private sector. There is a variance amongst dif-
ferent GCC states in terms of how vigorously they are pursuing their plans to
‘nationalize’ their labour forces, based on internal pressures and the differing
domestic contexts of the six states. The Saudi Arabian government, which faces a
legitimate and grave challenge in providing public employment to its burgeoning
youth population, has shown the greatest commitment amongst the GCC states in
terms of prioritizing the expansion of citizens’ employment. This is clearly demon-
strated through the 2011 ‘Nitaqat’ reforms adopted in Saudi Arabia, with the spe-
cific aim of expanding ‘Saudization’ of the labour force and gradually replacing
foreign workers in the Saudi private sector (De Bel-Air 2015a). The programme is
largely driven by concerns about Saudi dependency on foreign labour combined
with increasing demographical pressures as a result of high Saudi population growth
rates and anticipated increases in the coming years as a result of women’s growing
participation in the work force (De Bel-Air 2015a). The underlying concern of the
regime is that unless employment and economic concerns of the citizen population
are met, social and political stability could be eroded through a growth in public
anti-government sentiments (De Bel-Air 2015a).
The Nitaqat both incentivizes and rewards Saudi employers who are able to
increase their number of Saudi employees through a system of financial subsidies
and tax cuts (De Bel-Air 2015a). Companies in Saudi Arabia are measured and
scored based on the percentage of their employees who are Saudi citizens, and
tiered along categories that are colour-coded from red to platinum, with red desig-
nating a company’s poor performance in terms of attracting/hiring/retaining citizen-
employees and platinum companies demonstrating that they are top performers who
are successfully hiring locals. The Nitaqat provides additional rewards to compa-
nies successfully applying affirmative action programmes that succeed in employ-
ing women, nationals with disabilities and other designated groups of citizens (De
Bel-Air 2015b). Any company failing to meet the green status faces punitive mea-
sures, including fines for foreign workers deemed to be ‘redundant’ and limited
ability to issue work visas for new foreign hires (De Bel-Air 2015b).
From the perspective of the Saudi government, the initial results of the Nitaqat
programme seemed promising, as between September 2011 and the end of 2013,
the number of Saudi workers had increased by 1,063,669, about 430,000 (40% of
which were women (De Bel-Air 2015b). Of this employment increase, however,
around 40% of new job creations were in the public sector and while the rest were
in private sector positions, during the same time frame, 67% of private sector jobs
still went to non-nationals (De Bel-Air 2015b). The programme therefore largely
failed to deliver the increase in Saudi-held private sector jobs. In response to these
shortcomings, the Saudi government launched the ‘balanced Nitaqat’ in 2016 to
address the failures of the original programme to deliver the desired reductions in
unemployment among Saudi citizens, especially women. The new, revised pro-
gramme hopes to increase Saudi women’s labour market participation from 22% to
30% as part of the Saudi Vision 2030 (Halligan 2016).
The Nitaqat measures have, however, been met with apprehension from Saudi
Arabia’s foreign workforce, especially those who are already working in the coun-
try and whose career prospects are at risk under Nitaqat efforts to increase Saudi
citizens’ employment figures. Exacerbated by the economic downturn brought on
by low oil prices, 2016 saw reports of thousands of Indian workers left without a
job, sufficient funds to buy food and the necessary exit permits to leave Saudi Arabia
(Venkataramakrishnan 2017). The situation worsened to the point that the Indian
External Affairs Minister got involved and vowed to help the unemployed Indian
citizens unable to leave Saudi Arabia (Balachandran 2017). These issues have been
partially attributed to the government’s Nitaqat reforms, which have encouraged
employers to replace foreign labourer with Saudi nationals, leading to layoffs of
foreign workers. There are concerns that the situation of the Indian diaspora in
Saudi Arabia may become increasingly precarious now that the ‘balanced Nitaqat’
programme is set to expand the number of sectors included in the Saudization proj-
ect (Kasim 2016).
There is clearly a gender imbalance when it comes to Gulf migrants, and existing
data clearly indicate that the vast majority of migrants present in the region are
male.5 However, there is a discernible pattern that shows that female migration has
also increased over the past few years (Manseau 2017). Migrating to the GCC is
appealing to women as much as it is to men, as it offers them the opportunity to
increase income generation to support their families and their communities, to
potentially expand their skill-sets and broaden their horizons. While women migrate
to the Gulf for a variety of employment opportunities, and increasingly we see that
skilled and highly skilled foreign women are entering the labour markets, most of
the existing research on female migrants to the region looks at female domestic
workers. It is extremely difficult to assess the total number of female domestic
workers in the GCC, and there are wide variations between official data released by
the states estimates and put forward by international organizations. The estimates
vary from suggesting that there are about one million to upwards of three million
domestic workers currently working in the GCC (Fernandez 2014).
Previous research demonstrates that female migrants to the GCC are even more
vulnerable to violation of their rights, particularly if they are engaged in the domes-
tic work sector (Fernandez 2014). Women are more likely to be exploited at pre-
departure points in their states of origin, by recruiters who actively misinform them
about wages and job conditions awaiting them in the Gulf (Philipose 2012; Nicola
Piper 2003). Women tend to also not have the same economic resources as men do
to cover the costs of formal migration, so may be more likely to migrate through
irregular and thus unsafe channels. Upon arrival in the Gulf to take up occupation,
women will find that as domestic workers they are excluded from protections
afforded through national labour law. In essence what this means is that domestic
workers are left completely to the mercy of their employer-sponsors and have little
legal recourse should they face situations of exploitation and abuse. The only bind-
ing document that these women have in hand are the work contracts signed between
5
For example, the Qatar Statistics Authority released date in 2014 which indicated that only 17.6%
of the foreign population in Qatar is female. Women migrants also make up only 11.4% of the
foreign labour force.
46 Z. R. Babar
themselves and their employers. These contracts which are meant to specify respon-
sibilities, duties and obligations of both parties are frequently problematic. Contracts
often do not contain correct information on wages, maximum work hours, weekly
days off, paid annual leave and other benefits. The GCC states have come under
increasing pressure to address the outstanding problems relating to protection for
domestic workers, and over the course of the past 2 years there have been region-
wide discussions on reforming the regulation of the domestic work sector. There is
little indication that the reform process will extend national labour law to cover the
domestic work sector, rather efforts have been focused on strengthening workers’
contracts and enacting piecemeal legislation to address some of the areas of conten-
tion. For example, in 2013 Saudi Arabia introduced new regulations which stipulate
mandatory daily rest hours for domestic workers, weekly holidays and paid leave on
a bi-annual basis (Fernandez 2014).
GCC Regional Migration Platforms
Regional and international frameworks for managing migration are becoming a

preferential route for states that wish to engage on the issue of migration and
migrants’ rights, but are not willing to consider accession to the Migrant Workers
Convention. While the GCC states have not to date formally harmonized policies
for managing migration, they have begun to take a more proactive role in addressing
the issue as a bloc. In 2005, GCC countries, as observers, attended the annual meet-
ing held under the Colombo Process. The Colombo Process brings together a num-
ber of migrant-sending countries of Asia, and is primarily concerned with the
protection of overseas workers. Building on this involvement, and spearheaded by
the United Arab Emirates, all six of the GCC states in 2008 launched the Abu Dhabi
Dialogue. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue is a regional consultative process on labour
migration to the Gulf. It serves to bring labour sending countries from South and
Southeast Asia together with labour receiving countries of the Gulf, with the aim of
addressing the concerns of both. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue, however, evolved pri-
marily as a response to increasing international sounds of alarm around migration
management in the Gulf, as opposed to out of strictly GCC-based concerns.
Efforts such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue underlie the fact that in the GCC there is
recognition that improvements in migration governance are necessary. The region
continues to bring in scores of migrant workers on an annual basis, and these flows
do not appear to be diminishing any time soon. Given the increasing scrutiny being
given to the issue of migrants’ rights at the international level, maintaining their
domestic requirements without drawing censure requires the regional leadership to
show dexterity and skill. Importing non-national workers to meet domestic labour
needs brings with it benefits as well as costs. Non-nationals can be brought in
quickly – and in most cases cheaply – to meet labour needs as and when required on
a project-by-project basis. They can also be easily released and sent back to their
countries of origin when no longer needed. There is, however, considerable discus-
sion amongst both state actors and local citizens about the potential costs of hosting
such large numbers of non-nationals for long periods of time. These costs are not
merely economic in nature, but are also potentially social and cultural as well. The
massive influx of foreigners from all over the world is often seen as a threat to
national heritage and cultural values, and even a latent threat to political stability.
International Migrants’ Protections
From about the middle of the last century, international workers’ rights organiza-
tions began to acknowledge that unless migrant workers were included under
national labour law, the climate for promoting the rights of workers in societies in
general would be eroded. The International Labour Organization (ILO) pioneered
the initial efforts towards including migrants’ rights within global discussions on
workers’ rights. The preamble to the ILO’s 1919 constitution highlights this com-
mitment by explicitly mentioning the organization’s interest in serving workers who
are ‘employed in countries other than their own’ (ILO 1919). Over the decades,
several international labour standards and migrants’ rights conventions have been
put forward by the ILO, and adopted by a host of countries. In addition to the eight
fundamental rights provided in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundament Principles
and Rights at Work, specific instruments such as those which provide for wage pro-
tections, occupational health and safety, employment policies, labour inspections,
social security provisions and domestic workers’ rights comprise the host of ILO
conventions which address the needs of labour migrants.
There are four migrant-specific instruments that have developed under the ILO’s
aegis: (1) the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention, (2) the 1949 Migration
for Employment Recommendation, (3) the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention and
(4) the 1975 Migrant Workers Recommendation. These ILO migrant-specific instru-
ments are complemented by a host of United Nations’ international human rights
mechanisms, which are applicable to all people regardless of their nationality. Of
the United Nations’ core human rights protocols, the one most relevant to migrant
workers is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1990 and entered into force in 2003. The United Nations con-
vention broadens the discussion of migrants’ protections beyond the realm of secur-
ing their labour rights, already established through the ILO instruments, and strives
to establish more holistic set of norms regarding migrants’ inclusion in national
human rights agendas. While the ILO conventions focus primarily on securing
migrants’ economic rights and protections within their working environments, the
UN convention stipulates the more general needs of securing adequate social and
cultural rights for migrants, and promotes the expansion of earlier views which
conceived of labour migrants as purely economic agents. Increasingly, migrants’
rights agendas have built on this recognition and seek to address their social and
cultural exclusion within host states. Within these global debates the remaining area
48 Z. R. Babar
of rights that migrants continue to still be excluded from are political rights; politi-
cal rights are normatively accepted as been reserved for citizens alone.
The evolution of special protections for migrants within the domain of interna-
tional human rights discussions has not been a seamless one. There continues to be
a persistent ambiguity within international norm-setting in terms of determining
how and exactly to what extent the needs and interests of non-citizen populations
are to be accommodated by sovereign states. In an environment of increasing sur-
veillance and hyper scrutiny of interstate travel, and where a latent threat to states’
interests comes head-to-head with the cross-border mobility rights of individuals –
state sovereignty seems to be trumping over multiple areas of migration
governance.
The ILO instruments, the UN convention and subsequent multilateral frame-
works for migration all recognize that migration is a transnational phenomenon,
impacting millions of individual migrants, countries of origin, countries of transit
and countries of residence and seek to establish and harmonize basic principles
around the treatment of migrant workers that take into account the needs and inter-
ests of different stakeholders. The UN convention highlights the particular situation
of vulnerability to which migrant workers and their family members are exposed.6
Migrants’ designation as a category of persons of vulnerability arises in the first
place from the fact that they are not in their country of citizenship, and thus do not
enjoy the usual rights and protections that citizens are accorded. The convention is
embedded in the understanding that the rights of migrants have been insufficiently
addressed by states, and thus there is a need for supranational agreement to establish
protections that are specific to migrants’ particular conditions.
In themselves, conventions are to a degree structurally deficient, as they do not
come with enforcement mechanisms, and it is largely left up to the signatory states
to ensure their compliance. In terms of drafting national laws, states are left to their
own devices, but with the expectation that having signed on to a specific convention,
they will attempt to not undermine the spirit of the convention through the ways in
which they implement it domestically. Parties to a United Nations convention are
also provided with a loophole, in that they can become signatories to a convention
while also inserting a ‘reservation’ or caveat which exempts them from certain com-
mitments upheld in the agreement. A number of Arab states have on occasions
inserted reservations upon becoming signatory to various human rights conventions,
reserving their rights to not abide by the clauses or articles which are at variance
with Islamic law or practice.
Regardless of the limited enforcement capacity of international conventions
within sovereign states’ domestic domain, becoming a signatory to universally rec-
ognized agreements such as UN conventions is a significant step forward in declar-
ing a state’s intentions and obligations. Becoming party to such conventions does
For further elaboration of this point, please see: “The International Convention on Migrant
6
Workers and its Committee”, Fact Sheet No. 24 (Rev.1), Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, (New York and Geneva: 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/FactSheet24rev.1en.pdf
impose upon the signatory state the commitment to recognize certain inalienable
human rights. Several of the GCC states have taken active steps to become signatory
to a host of UN agreements, including amongst them: the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on Ending
Discrimination Against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child. However, none of the GCC states are signatories to any of the specific
migrant conventions. Becoming party to international agreements on human rights
may be problematic for many countries. These conventions propose a principle of
universality, where it is accepted by all signatories that certain rights or protections
are granted on a basis which supersedes the state’s sovereignty or authority. Many
states dispute the principle of universality, and argue that this principle does not
allow for the exceptional circumstances that some states may face, nor does it allow
for differences in religious, social and cultural practices. The GCC states have grap-
pled with how to appropriately incorporate or adopt many universal principles on
human rights, and how to negotiate accession to the various United Nations conven-
tions on rights and protections.
It needs to be stated, however, that the Gulf region is not exceptional in its reluc-
tance to adopt the Convention on Migrant Workers. Of the 47 countries that are
party to the convention, almost all are labour-sending nations rather than host states.
None of the Western migrant-receiving states, including the traditional immigration
hubs of North America, Australia and most of Europe have signed on to the
Convention, and as such, the treaty is not in effect in those parts of the world most
heavily populated by labour migrants (The International Convention on Migrant
Workers and its Committee 2005). The primary challenge to its ratification lies in
the perception by most states that the Convention would encroach too deeply on
their sovereign rights. It is an interesting fact that out of the eight core international
human rights conventions, the Convention on Migrants Workers is the one that has
been so strongly resisted in the West, and is often referred to as the ‘orphaned’
Convention. It is clearly the lack of political will in the domestic milieu of labour-
receiving states that remains the primary obstacle towards the treaty’s ratification.
This reluctance demonstrates that expanding the rights of migrants is universally a
politicized issue. The contradiction seems to lie in how different stakeholders con-
ceive of migrant workers’ rights in the first place. For the United Nations and
assorted human rights organizations, migrants’ rights are largely conceived of as
being essentially in the same basket as internationally recognized and accepted
human rights. These rights arise from our common understanding that all human
beings have a basic dignity which is to be protected above other considerations and
regardless of their country of citizenship. However, from the perspective of labour-
receiving states, migrants’ rights are considered to be directly linked to national
immigration policy rather than to human rights platforms. As such, creating or
broadening commitment to migrants’ rights impinges on the state’s ability to imple-
50 Z. R. Babar
ment policy decisions that best serve their national interest in terms of effectively
managing migration.7
Growing levels of globalization coupled with increasing labour shortages in cer-
tain segments of the labour market in the developed world have led to a situation
where many temporary jobs are being filled by labour migrants. As a result, for
labour-receiving states throughout the world there is increasingly an interest in lim-
iting the rights of temporary migrants to those rights that are most closely associated
with their economic and employment status. There is a convergence in the develop-
ment of immigration policies adapted to suit contemporary circumstances, with a
growing set of restrictions being imposed on migrant workers’ access to important
social and cultural rights, such as the access to education and skill training, health
services, family reunification and social security. These restrictions are largely justi-
fied on the basis of the temporary nature of these workers’ residence in the host
country. Governments have been searching for migration policies that suit their
national interests, and significant attention has been directed at those programmes
and policy frameworks that support the flow of temporary labour migrants rather
than permanent ones. These policies address national labour shortages by importing
workers for short periods of time, but remove the need for integration, marginalize
pathways to citizenship and reinforce the concept of migrants existing in a host state
solely as economic agents.
Global ways in which labour migration are currently been discussed and thought
of, such as the migration and development discourse promoted heavily by many
international bodies, or the circular migration framework, continue to demonstrate
that there is an evident disconnection between the promotion of universal human
rights and the management of migrants’ rights. When viewed through the migration
and development lens, migrants are conceived of largely as autonomous economic
agents who, through the experience of entering foreign labour markets, are able to
generate incomes for themselves, contribute to the development of their host coun-
try and through financial and social remittances also contribute to the development
of their home states. Labour migration is thus conceived of as a structural necessity
of the world we live in, and the role of states is to effectively and seamlessly manage
migration flows to ensure that there are ‘win–win–win’ developmental outcomes for
individual migrants, host states and countries of origin. Circular migration, which is
currently being heavily promoted in Europe and whose language we are seeing used
more frequently by GCC governments, also adopts a similar positivist posture of
linking migration with successful economic outcomes for states and migrants alike.
Positing labour migrants as independent economic actors who choose to take up
temporary periods of employment overseas in order to meet certain economic goals
before a return home, endows them with far greater agency and choice than they in
reality have. Framing current patterns of temporary migration within the circular
migration framework alleviate the anxieties of labour-sending states that have not
managed to establish healthy economic opportunities to keep their citizens at home,
7
For elaboration on this argument please see Martin Ruhs, The Price of Rights: Regulating
International Labor Migration, (Princeton University Press: 2014).
while it also assuages the disquiet of host countries who wish to fill their labour
market shortages through inexpensive pools of foreign labour, but without necessar-
ily accommodating the needs or interests of these foreign workers beyond those
linked with their employment conditions. Both the migration and development and
circular migration frameworks conceptually reinforce the notion that according
migrants limited rights which are associated with their ‘temporary-ness’ and link-
age to their labour status is normatively acceptable.
Conclusion
Almost all the labour reforms already established, underway, or under discussion in
the GCC are largely tied to a common perception that it is migrants’ working condi-
tions, relationships with their employers and structural status as ‘workers’ that is
impinged upon through a lack of adequate state protections. This replicates the pre-
vailing global discourse on migrant workers, which tend to view migrants’ vulner-
abilities as located principally in their status as purely economic agents, and who
are in need of economic protections and deserving of a protection of their associated
economic rights. The broader human rights doctrine which conceives of migrants as
human beings with agency, in need of broader social and cultural fulfilment, deserv-
ing of personal respect and human dignity, appears to lack salience not only at the
regional level of the Gulf, but also at the international level. Labour migration is
thus accepted as a practical necessity of the development demands of the region’s
political economies, a positive contributor to the development needs of the labour
sending states as well as a natural element of the global economic structure.
While migration policy in the Gulf has developed in response to specific national
and region-wide challenges, it is also informed by broader, global shifts in the dis-
course on migration. Throughout the world, peoples’ mobility across borders is
more and more scrutinized and embedded in issues of state sovereignty and gover-
nance. Borders are being made less permeable, channels for permanent settlement
for new migrants are being narrowed, pathways to inclusion and participation pared
down and criterion for citizenship made more stringent. Beyond the impersonal
machinery of the state clamping down on potential migrants, it is also the politiciza-
tion of immigration debates and public sentiment in the developed world that indi-
rectly supports these policies. Indeed, throughout the developed world, recent trends
indicate public opinion moving sharply against migration. Much of this hinges on
anxieties of governments and citizenry around the presence of new streams of
migrants who could become eligible for rights of full citizenship and place added
pressures on the socio-economic and political capacity of the state. Framing migra-
tion as a threat to the development of politically and economically viable societies
is a global phenomenon that is leading to a global climate of migration fear.
Invariably, regardless of a particular national context, enforcement of immigration
laws encroaches on the human rights of migrants. There are multiple sites of contes-
tation around the world, where states’ upholding of their immigration laws and the
52 Z. R. Babar
human rights of migrants are coming head to head. Be it in North America, Europe,
Australia or in the Persian Gulf the overarching sources of tension remain largely
the same.
What is increasingly apparent to researchers studying the patterns of Gulf migra-
tion, is that the foreign labour force and its experience is more varied than suggested.8
Despite the rigid mechanisms and policies in place which are meant to ensure that
the pool of foreign workers is constantly rotating, over time, in many parts of the
Gulf, migrants are staying for longer and longer periods. Recent research has sug-
gested that in addition to the longer duration of stay for Gulf migrants, family uni-
fication is also on the rise, as is the phenomena of mixed marriages between Gulf
citizens and foreigners (De Bel-Air 2014). While these trends may cause palpita-
tions in the breast of many a Gulf national, what they also demonstrate is that in this
age of global migration, despite the intentions of states, controlling peoples’ mobil-
ity, their length of stay and the ways in which they impact a host nation is not so
easily possible.
References
Al Jazeera. (2014, November 16). Qatar promises to reform ‘kafala’ labour law. http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/qatar-promises-reform-kafala-labour-
law-2014111661154969555.html
Al Jazeera News Team. (2016, December 14). Qatar introduces changes to labour law. Al Jazeera
English.
Al-Ramahi, N. J. (2014, July 12). UAE Ministry of Labour: e-contracts will be issued
within 48 hours. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/employment/
uae-ministry-of-labour-e-contracts-will-be-issued-within-48-hours-1.1358714
Babar, Z. (2014). The cost of belonging: Citizenship construction in the State of Qatar. The Middle
East Journal, 68(3), 2014.
Balachandran, M. (2017). Narendra Modi government scrambles to help 10,000 stranded and hun-
gry Indians in Saudi Arabia. Quartz India, August 1, 2016. Accessed 2 Feb 2017.
Barakat, N. (2014, July 5). UAE labour cards and contracts go electronic. Gulf News. http://gulf-
news.com/news/gulf/uae/general/uae-labour-cards-and-contracts-go-electronic-1.1356047
Bollinger, S. (2014, May 15). Qatar announces changes to labor law. Al Jazeera Online.
http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/05/qatar-announces-changes-labour-sys-
tem-2014513115014474205.html
Booth, R., Black, I., & Gibson, O. (2014, Wednesday May 14). Qatar promises to reform labour
laws after outcry over world cup slaves. The Guardian.
De Bel-Air, F. (2014). Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar (Gulf labour markets
and migration research note, No. 8).
De Bel-Air, F. (2015a). The legal framework of the sponsorship system in the Gulf cooperation
council countries: A comparative examination. (Gulf labour markets and migration explana-
tory note, no. 10).
De Bel-Air, F. (2015b). The socio-economic background and stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the workforce in
Saudi Arabia: The Nitaqat policy. (Gulf labour market and migration explanatory note, no. 3).
For example, please see: Fancoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in
8
Qatar”, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Research Note, No. 8, 2014.
Edwards, M-B. (2011). Labour immigration and labour patterns in the GCC countries: National
Patterns and trends (Research Paper No.15, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance
and Globalisation in the Gulf States). London: London School of Economics.
Ehteshami, A., & Wright, S. (2007). Political change in Arab oil monarchies: From liberalization
to enfranchisement. International Affairs, 83, 913.
Fargues, P. (2011). Immigration without inclusion: Non-nationals in nation-building in the Gulf
states. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 20(3–4), 273–292.
Fernandez, B. (2014). Essential yet invisible: Migrant domestic workers in the GCC (Gulf labor
markets and migration research note no. 4/2–14).
Financial Times. (2014, November). Gulf States to reform contracts of domestic workers. http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82c820aa-756b-11e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3POyJ3hyL
Gardner, A. (2010). City of strangers: Gulf migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain.
New York: Cornell University Press.
Halligan, N. (2016, June 12). Saudi Arabia plans new ‘Balanced’ Saudisation scheme. Arabian
Business. Accessed 2 Feb 2017.
International Labor Organisation Constitution. (1919). Preamble.
Kamrava, M., & Babar, Z. (Eds.). (2012). Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Kapiszewski, A. (2006). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. United Nations
Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut:
United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Kasim, S. (2016, April 26). Indians expected to be hit as Nitaqat expanding to more sectors.
Mathrubhumi English. Accessed 2 Feb 2017.
Longva, A. N. (1997). Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder:
Westview.
Lori, N. (2012). Temporary workers or permanent migrants? The Kafala system and contesta-
tions over residency in the Arab Gulf States. Note d’Ifri. Paris: Center for Migrations and
Citizenship.
Manseau, G. S. (2017). Contractual solutions for migrant Labourers: The case of domestic Workers
in the Middle East. Human Rights Law Commentary, 3, 25–47.
Ministry of Interior. (2015, May 14). Qatar announces wide-ranging labour market reforms.
http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/english/news/2014/05/14/32204.html
Philipose, P. (2012, June 11). Global: Gulf journeys: Securing the lives of South Asia’s women
migrants. Women’s Feature Service.
Piper, N. (2003). Feminization of labor migration as violence against women international,
regional, and local nongovernmental organization responses in Asia. Violence Against Women,
9(6), 723–745.
Qatar Today. (2015). An announcement of labor reforms that are still to come. June 6, 2014. http://
www.qatartodayonline.com/an-announcement-of-an-announcement-of-labour-reforms-that-
are-still-to-come/
Qatari Law No. 21. (2015).
Rathmell, A., & Schulze, K. (2000). Political reform in the Gulf: The case of Qatar. Middle East
Studies, 36(4), 47.
Razgallah, B. (2008, June). The macroeconomics of workers’ remittances in GCC countries.
(Economic Research Forum Working Paper No. 410).
The International Convention on Migrant Workers and its Committee. (2005). Fact sheet no. 24
(rev.1). New York/Geneva: Office of The United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
Venkataramakrishnan, R. (2017, January 3). The 10,000 starving Workers in Saudi will not be the
last shocking story from the Gulf. Scroll.in. Accessed 2 Feb 2017.
Zahra, M. (2016). Qatar’s legal framework of migration (Gulf labour market and migration
explanatory note, no. 2).
Chapter 4
South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-
Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics
in the Gulf
M. H. Ilias
Abstract This chapter examines how the idea of popular politics has flourished
among a marginalized section of expatriate labourers in the Gulf society through a
set of subtle informal expressions. Taking cues from the experience of Indian
labourers in the Gulf, this chapter seeks to provide accounts of non-citizenry aspects
of popular politics apparently manifested in the recent labour strikes. As it happens
all over the region, popular politics of expatriate labourers revolves around the ideas
and practices of rights rather than around ideas of political power which in the case
of Gulf States is inaccessible for immigrant population. The ways in which values
and practices of dissent and democracy become entrenched in popular politics and
thereby in the political imagination of non-citizen labourers in a subtle manner are
examined by analysing the experience of protest movements of South Asian
labourers.
Introduction
One way or another, politics of non-citizen labourers has become the subject of
intense debate in the Gulf today. The recent South Asian labour unrest in the UAE
and Bahrain appears to be an indicator of politics of that sort gaining momentum in
the region. What is more significant is the way in which these protests were
Some parts of this work have already been published in two earlier works of the author. See M. H.
Ilias, Malayalee Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Re-conceptualizing
‘Political’, Contextualizing the Modern Middle Eastern Diaspora, Anthony Gorman & Sossie
Kasbarian (ed.), Edinburgh University Press, 2015, pp. 303–337 & M.H. Ilias, South Asian Labour
Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the Arab Gulf Region, Indian Journal
of Politics and International Relations, Vol.4, No. 1& 2, 2011, 74–102
M. H. Ilias (*)
India Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

56 M. H. Ilias
organized; it was previously unimaginable in a place where labour unions remain

illegal and protests of any sort can end in termination and immediate deportation.1
However, unlike the region-wide Arab Spring-induced popular protests, in the
specific contexts of Arab Gulf, the politics of immigrant labourers has been not nec-
essarily about equal political rights as the aim of protestors not in any way is the
recognition as full citizens by the state. Fully aware of peculiar social and political
status, the migrant workers seek no citizenship rights and what figures in their
demands are economic rights and a dignified life in the hosting countries. The politi-
cal imagination in such cases is limited by the matters of legality and legal protection
of labour.2 The protests demonstrations staged by them were not necessarily against
the rulers or the system of ruling, but in most cases point to the inherent anomalies
in the system which cannot be solved through the means of political reforms.
These uprisings, therefore, did not make much of political resonance in the host
society’s politics nor did gain any recognition by the other groups engaged in popular
politics of various sorts. Often pitched against the employment providers, the state
cannot fully comprehend the political content of such demonstrations. The limited
recognition of the rights of foreign labourers and the narrowly defined non-citizen
rights often become more profound with the government effort to institutionalize it
with complex sponsorship legislation, unequal compensation structure, selective
nationalization of workforce and controlled access to opportunity for non-nationals.
The recent cases of labour unrest have brought into focus the inherent but not-so-
open hostile relationships between the state institutions and non-citizen workers.
The popular politics among Indian migrants based mainly on the discriminatory
practices takes various forms: informal gathering with political undertones on spe-
cific occasions and not-so-open demonstrations and campaigns operating clandes-
tinely. Strangely enough, most of these political expressions are not formal or
apparent and, therefore, do not invite unfriendly and intolerant reactions from host
states. The labour unrest of 2006 in Dubai in which Indian migrants had a greater
role to play was the only exception, wherein the authorities noticed the content and
assertiveness of expatriate politics. Massive open demonstrations raised many
eyebrows and the UAE government became concerned by the demonstrations’ pop-
ularity. This was particularly significant when it happened in a country where all
sorts of political organizations remain illegal and evidence of political associations
of any sort can end up in imprisonment or immediate deportation for activists.
This work examines how the idea of popular politics is flourished among a mar-
ginalized section of expatriate labourers in the Gulf society through a set of subtle
informal expressions. Taking cues from the experience of Indian labourers in the
Gulf, this chapter seeks to provide accounts of non-citizenry aspects of popular
1
M. H. Ilias, South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the
Arab Gulf Region, Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.4, No. 1& 2, 2011,
74–102.
2
Ahamed Kanna, ‘A Politics of Non-recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in the
Year of Uprising’, Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements, vol. 4(1), 146–164, May
2012.
4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 57
politics apparently manifested in the recent labour strikes. As it happens all over the
region, popular politics of expatriate labourers revolves around the ideas and prac-
tices of rights rather than around political power which in the case of Gulf States is
inaccessible for immigrant population. The ways in which values and practices of
dissent and democracy become entrenched in popular politics and thereby in the
political imagination of non-citizen labourers in a subtle manner are to be examined
by analysing the experience of protest movements of South Asian labourers.
Politics of Translocality
There are many ways to understand the specific political context in which the popu-
lar politics of non-citizen workers of South Asia in the Gulf emerged. The nature of
immigration, living conditions, work cultures and the relationship between the
labourers and employers and discriminatory practices of the state institutions – all
have contributed to the making of this. Without exception, foreign labourers in the
Gulf are sojourners whose stay in the host countries lasts normally for a period
specified in the labour contract. This sojourning nature of labour emigration along
with at least once a year or once in 2 years trips to the ‘homeland’ makes expatriate
labourers maintain links with their places of origin. Maintaining constant relation-
ship with the ‘homeland’, especially in the case of ordinary labourers, offers an
escape from the harsh economic ambiguities and uncertainties with regard to chang-
ing labour rules in the Gulf.
As outsiders, migrant labourers in the Gulf live in a state of legal and political
ambiguity, and the lack of involvement in the host country’s political and social
processes drives them to seek shelter within the politics of their homeland. This lack
of political involvement also contributes to the process of producing translocal
political consciousness and affinities among the expatriate population in the GCC
States. What seems to be happening is not simply the extension of political dis-
course beyond the boundaries, but this extension offers an avenue of subtle expres-
sion for the otherwise politically ‘silenced’ South Asian expatriates in the Gulf.
Although it is placed mostly within an imaginative setting, translocal South
Asian politics significantly touches upon the issue of identity. The expatriate labour-
ers from the region look to this refashioned politics to give themselves a coherent
identity and a ‘national’ narrative in order to compensate for the lack of political
space in the receiving countries’ politics. The increasingly observable collective
identity formation and diasporic political consciousness primarily reflect a response
to the inhospitable climate and the social discrimination being faced by the South
Asian labourers in the Gulf States. Several studies on the evolution of translocal
political structures among Malayalee migrants argue that their form generally takes
root in the struggles for civil rights in the host land.3 The new media that allow dias-
3
Nisha Mathew, ‘Between Malabar and the Gulf: History, Culture and Identity in the Making of
the Transnational Malayalee Public Sphere’, Unpublished Paper, 2011., M.H. Ilias, Malayalee
58 M. H. Ilias
pora communities to be involved in and influence the day-to-day political develop-

ments in their homeland play a significant role in order to maintain this identity.
Furthermore, the translocal politics helps individuals and communities find positive
and revitalizing sides to the experience of migration and gradually adjusts to new
conditions and circumstances. In most of the cases, this refashioned identity may
not directly address alienation from the host states’ political process, but it creates
new forms of politics whose dynamics have, under translocality, brought forth a
diverse set of popular political practices in the Gulf.
As has been discussed earlier, the expatriate workers in the GCC Countries are
the flashpoint of a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its
fast shifting socio-political backdrop. They are represented by multiple criss-
crossing divides and boundaries that give separate ethnicities their own national
identification in the region.4 The harsh experience of migration and relocation
always shapes a new national awareness of self and this awareness, under favour-
able conditions, can be riveting and transformative. This national awareness along
with linkages with home country’s politics eventually metamorphoses into special-
ized polities within the host countries with the capability to create new forms of
political space.5 With concern over the issues happening in both the host countries
and homeland, this kind of informal politics is deemed to be private, existing out-
side the formal institutions, thus allowing one to create important forms of popular
politics. They take many different forms and states in the Arab Gulf never fully
containing the everyday experience of such spaces.
Understanding various forms of informal associations and networks existing
with minimum encounters with the political and social institutions of the host coun-
tries also constitutes a major means to study the nature and evolution of popular
politics flourished among the South Asian immigrant labourers. As discussed ear-
lier, this popular politics is, actually, a product of a particular political situation and
the informal nature does not permit it to gather tangible institutional form. With
complete departure from clear institutionally protected relations, this popular poli-
tics often tends to remain either as covertly operated political associations or as
formal social, cultural or community organizations with unrevealed and subtle
political agendas. While some of the community organizations are politically neu-
tral, some enjoy the backing of major political parties in India like the Indian
National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of
India-Marxist (CPIM) and the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML).
Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Malayalee Migrants and Translocal Kerala
Politics in the Gulf: Re-conceptualizing ‘Political’, Contextualizing the Modern Middle Eastern
Diaspora, Anthony Gorman & Sossie Kasbarian (ed.), Edinburgh University Press, 2015 & Jose
Itzigson, ‘Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’ Political
Transnationalism’, pp. 1126–54.
4
Sulayman Khalaf, ‘The Evolution of City Type, Oil and Globalization’, in J. Fox, et al. (eds.),
Globalization and the Gulf, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 244–266.
5
The distinction between citizen and immigrant is integral to these specialized polities. See Paul
Dresch, ‘Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society’, in J. Fox, et al. (eds.),
Globalization and the Gulf, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 200–223.
The perceptions of South Asian expatriates in the Gulf States are generally influ-
enced by a sense of alienation, which is deeply rooted in their relationships with the
nationals. The informal associations stress on this alienation which results ulti-
mately in a form of ‘imagined politics’ that offers an escape from the political reali-
ties in the host country and drifts away from the political constraints of the state.
The feeling of cultural suspicion is another issue being faced by the South Asian
expatriates.6 Nationals in many of the Gulf States clearly began to see the large
South Asian workforce as a threat to the cultural identity of their nation.7 South
Asian community’s pattern of earnings and relatively low spending has become a
major cause of displeasure for the GCC States.8
Although the cultural national identity debates in the GCC Countries have gener-
ally been revolved around prominent ‘others’ (mainly ethnic and religious minori-
ties like Iranians and Shias9), the increasing cultural influence of South Asian
expatriates becomes a source of acute socio-economic concerns.10 The new demo-
graphic composition, which previously was neither so menacing, has generated a
great deal of debate over the huge presence of South Asian workers, whose popula-
tion outnumbers locals in some of the Gulf States. Making up 90% of the total work
force,11 they constitute nearly four to one in every Gulf society. A large part of the
worry is about the Indians who outnumber locals in places like Qatar, and the GCC
authorities have changed the way they look at the overwhelming presence of the
Indian expatriates.12
There is the issue – perhaps must be the most significant of all – seeing the for-
eign presence as a threat to national culture and identity. In a ministerial meeting of
6
Due to the particular nature of their job (domestic workers, house drivers, caregivers, school-
teachers and babysitters) and greater access to women and children in the Gulf societies, nationals
in most of the Gulf countries see South Asians as a group with a potential to alter the local culture.
This has been shared by many nationals during my field visits held between 2008 and 2010.
7
This worry was echoed in the GCC’s meeting held in Doha in 2008 in which participants openly
shared their uneasiness and warned about the possible repercussions. See Gulf News, 29 November
2008.
8
Most of the GCC States are now more concerned about the large amount of money being sent out
by the Indians. A substantial amount of hard currency earnings is flowing to the home country as
direct remittances.
9
The religious and political dimensions of Iran–GCC conflicts often leave a mark on the treatment
of Shias in the GCC states barring UAE, where Shias are an affluent group. The ill-treatment of
Shias has resulted in Shia uprisings in Bahrain and Saudi.
10
Niel Patrick, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf States’, Kuwait Programme on Development and
Globalization in the Gulf States, 2009, no. 3.
11
www.news.bbc.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7266610.stm. Accessed on 24 September 2013.
12
As per the recent statistics published by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, New Delhi
(www.moia.gov.in), nearly 5.5 million Indians work in the Gulf. The new demographic composi-
tion has become a matter of serious concern for some of the Gulf States. In order to deal with this
issue of growing Indian presence, the governments in the GCC countries have taken some control-
ling measures and administrative regularizations. The UAE, for instance, fixed matriculation as the
minimum requirement for Indian labourers, while Bahrain put in practice a quota system for
Indians.
60 M. H. Ilias
GCC members held in 2005, Abdul Rahman Al-Attiya, General Secretary of the
Organization, had openly shared his uneasiness and warned about the possible
repercussions of the situation. He stressed on ‘the need to look at the massive pres-
ence of expatriate workers basically as national security issue and not merely as an
economic matter…’13 This worry was also echoed in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s
meeting held in Doha in 2008. Along with serious regional issues of security, com-
mon energy policies, joint nuclear energy plant and currency union, this issue
topped the agenda of talks.14 The formation of a collective political identity and soli-
darity can also be seen as a response to this cultural suspicion.
The popular politics among the South Asian migrants, perhaps, may also be seen
as an expression of political nostalgia that motivates ordinary workers to maintain
their political affiliations left behind in the homeland. Sometimes, this nostalgia
becomes a norm which is required to be reproductive for a group in order to survive
in a political atmosphere of complete alienation.15 This is very evident in the case of
labourers from Kerala. While the politics in the Gulf, by and large, remains alien to
them, Malayalee expatriates find refuge in some nostalgic events of the past in
Kerala politics. With certain elements of emotional identification, this nostalgia is
being used strategically by the Malayalee organizations for mobilizing expatriates.
The reinvention of the past in the form of nostalgia, however, becomes a tactic for
using collective memory to selectively manipulate certain aspects of Kerala’s past.
While organizations maintaining links with the communist movement in Kerala
often take advantage of memories of a series of agitations launched by the move-
ment against the landlords, Muslim organizations use the tradition of resistance
raised by the community against the European colonialism in the state.16
A close look at the composition of Malayalee migrants in the Gulf reveals that
the majority of the workers are overwhelmingly young males in their twenties or
thirties coming from a backward but politically vibrant area, Malabar. This area
comprising six districts of north Kerala has traditionally been a strong bastion of
leftist movements and Muslim organizations both of which offered a tradition of
challenge against the European colonial powers and their cronies, the local rulers
who enjoyed relentless support of the former. Having come from poor but politi-
cally active backgrounds, expatriates from Malabar generally carry forward the
anti-imperialist political legacies of the region with them and try to create a subtle
replica of their political positions in a diasporic setting. The anti-imperialist posi-
tions of these organizations are manifested mainly through their consistent but
covert criticism over American policies in the Gulf and support for the boycott
called against American and Israeli products against the backdrop of events like the
13
Gulf News, 24 November 2005.
14
Gulf News, 29 November 2008.
15
Politics in the homeland continues to be a primary generator of memory for the diasporic com-
munities. See Baba, Nation and Narration for the details of this debate.
16
During a field visit in Oman, the author personally witnessed to a function commemorating
Sayyid Fadl, a champion of anti-colonial (anti-British) struggle in Malabar in nineteenth century
by an organization of Malayalees in Muscat dominated by Muslim migrants from North Kerala.
US invasion of Iraq.17 However, with a secret mode of operation alien to the host
countries and limited reach outside Malayalee community, the extension of Kerala
politics finds no substantial resonance among the nationals.
Almost all political developments in Kerala make a ripple in the Gulf. This is
evident from the popularity of new social movements among Malayalee expatriates.
Single issue-oriented movements revolving around particular social and political
issues in Kerala have caught the popular imagination over the last decade. Kerala-
centric environmental and human rights groups are active in creating new forms of
politics that hinge on signature campaigns, protest meetings and street plays in
response to the sensitive issues taking place in Kerala, though the scope of such
debates and campaigns may always be limited to the four walls of residential areas
where the Malayalee migrants stay collectively or labour camps. Except on certain
occasions, governments in the GCC Countries are unaware of the serious political
content of these activities.18
The issues related to the Malayalee workers in the Gulf have also found a place
in the agenda of Malayalee organizations recently. New informal social movements
and networks have sprung up, dedicated to the issue of exploitation of Indian work-
ers in the Gulf which the old movements are not able to take up. While the old
movements provide an important venue for sharing information and participating in
the diasporic culture without being a direct or indirect threat to the state, the new
movements tend to clandestinely deal with highly sensitive issues like violation of
human rights in labour camps.
Signs of Political Assertion
The recent South Asian labour unrest19 in which Indian labourers took a lead role is
actually a pointer to a larger political assertion. Although India-centric clandestine
networks played no direct role in the labour strikes, the political consciousness they
created has been instrumental in instilling confidence among the labourers from the
country to go against their employers by demanding salary hikes and improvement
in living conditions. There is an opinion which has been echoed in Indian dailies
17
As a means of protest to the US aggression in Iraq in 2003, Left organizations in Kerala (mainly
CPI (M)) led a ‘boycott American goods’ campaign. This call for boycott received responses from
the organizations in the Gulf attached to CPI (M). Soft drinks like Coca-Cola and Pepsi and the
soaps made by Hindustan Lever were the major targets of this boycott. The Hindu, 12 April 2003.
18
In 1992, the play the Ants Feast on Corpses had invited the wrath of administration for its alleg-
edly blasphemous content in Sharjah. The court sentenced 6-year jail term to a Malayalee theatre
group for staging this play. India Today, 15 November 1992.
19
The strike of South Asian expatriate labourers that began in Dubai in 2007 had a lively spread all
over the region. Though, the main reason at the initial stage was low wage in the context of infla-
tion and the lowering exchange of the currencies of the Gulf countries, the focus of strikers later
on turned to the issues of poor living conditions, unequal compensation structure and lack of
proper health care. The Hindu, 22 November 2007.
62 M. H. Ilias
discussing South Asian labour unrest as an indicator of the increased bargaining

power that Indian labourers gained.20 Much of the migration from India to the
Middle East has now been stimulated mainly by market considerations. Unlike the
1970s and 1980s when the majority of Indian labourers had little bargaining power,
the present Indian migration of skilled and semi-skilled labourers in the Gulf con-
tributes significantly to the development of the receiving countries, simultaneously
impacting the sending country.
The criticality of Indian labourers is the major factor as there is a huge demand
for them and tremendous pressure from employers in the UAE and Qatar to employ
more Indian labourers despite area-wide extensive nationalization drive. Media
reports state that major contracting companies in the UAE and Qatar are frantically
trying to hire labourers from India.21 India is still the number one supplier of labour
and about 80% of new workers are from India. In Dubai and Doha, many mega
projects face long delays to finish off due to shortage of skilled Indian manpower. A
booming economy in India also means that many there no longer see the need to
travel to the Gulf. Risks to their living in the Gulf are inflation and currency instabil-
ity due to the (fixed) dollar peg system. The labourers complain bitterly that the
money they earn in the Gulf stretches less far when sending to their families in India
due to the increasing rate of inflation and consequent price hike in the region.22
With tremendous pressure from employers, the governments in the Gulf had
taken a soft stand regarding the labour strike, which could otherwise end in severe
punishment of people who were involved. Companies did not want the government
deporting any more workers as they were having trouble finding enough to complete
the works. The newfound assertiveness was only a tip of the iceberg and the
circumstance provided a clue to Indian labourers’ calculations in striking, even if
they were aware of the dire consequences of termination and deportation.
The movement of Indian labour in the Gulf, therefore has, to a large extent, been
influenced by the force of the global free market. When the business firms are
searching for an economic and competent workforce, which is relatively inexpen-
sive and efficient, Indian skilled workers have advantage of the situation. That is the
reason why Indians are being given priority in recruitment even when the Gulf
States like the UAE are cutting down on expatriates in order to overcome the pinch
of recession and to bring down the unemployment rate among their citizens.23
India is still the major supplier of labour and the Indians constitute a large pro-
portion of the skilled workforce, although there is a selective use of Indians labour-
ers in certain categories. While unskilled labourers are replaced by inexpensive ones
from other South Asian states like Nepal and Sri Lanka and are forced to return to
20
Atul Aneja, ‘Growing Assertions of Asian Workers in the Gulf’, The Hindu, 22 November 2007.
21
Ibid.
22
An average Indian worker in the UAE construction industry makes about AED 1000–1500 per
month. In the present economic regime, this is not enough to meet their own expenses in the Gulf
and support a family in India. From the conversation with the Indian labourers during a field trip
in the UAE in May 2015.
23
Ibid.
India, employers insist on the continued employment of semi-skilled or skilled

Indian labourers beyond their contract period despite massive nationalization pro-
grammes.24 With the pressure from employers, the UAE government has taken a
soft stand regarding strikes, which could otherwise end in severe punishment of
people who are involved. Moreover, the boom in the economy and the consequent
infrastructural development spree have created an enormous amount of job oppor-
tunities for semi-skilled and skilled labourers especially in states like Kerala, where
the labourers are less enthusiastic to migrate.25 So, a flourishing economy in India
means that many there no longer see the need to travel to the Gulf.
Failure of targeted nationalization of the labour also forms to be a major reason
for the growing assertion of Indian labourers. Nationalization remains a distant
dream, and the process has met several obstacles. Only in certain fields like banking
and the hydrocarbon sector the governments in the Gulf could achieve a position
close to the target. Most of the job opportunities coming in current phase of Gulf
countries’ development are in manufacturing, construction and other allied services,
which require skills that have traditionally not appealed to nationals. The private
sector jobs are, generally, designed for expatriates, with long and strict working
hours and salaries that do not meet local standards. Work in the private sector is
sometimes perceived as debasing the nationals’ social status.26 Because of their
‘superior position’, locals are averse to accepting the low-skilled, low-salaried posts
and they are inclined to work mostly in the government sector. The majority are
employed in simple jobs like administrative support, clerical and security services.
But the case is not so in the states with low-growth rate, like Oman, where all sorts
of jobs are attractive for relatively poor locals.
Nationalization measures meet the same problems in highly skilled job fields
also. Mismatching profiles of nationals have hindered the removal of other nationals
in highly skilled positions. In the UAE, for example, there are abundant job oppor-
tunities in information technology, but the education and training systems are
unprepared for the boom in this field. Economic diversification efforts have, thus,
expatriate participation more inevitable. The other reason is the alleged non-
flexibility of nationals, especially in terms of salary and work culture. Despite
emerging strains of unemployment and competition in the labour market, the wage
structure of nationals throughout the region remains high and uncompromising.
Furthermore, the mandatory nationalization and the quota system have attracted
the wrath of entrepreneurs across state lines. They genuinely fear that such moves
will finally lower productivity and erode profit. Nationalization in the UAE (encap-
sulated by the term Emiratization), for instance, was grudgingly accepted by private
sector companies, though they were asked by the government to employ more locals
to curtail the rate of unemployment. Ironically enough, the drive in many Gulf
States has met fierce opposition from the nationals themselves. The sponsorship
24
M.H. Ilias, ‘South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the
Arab Gulf Region’.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
64 M. H. Ilias
regime, kufala,27 makes the citizens privileged employers and business owners,
drawing surplus from the foreign presence. It also allows nationals to make money
out of selling visa documents and to extract rents through discriminatory pricing.28
Nationals, fearing a considerable drop in their sponsorship money, have come vehe-
mently against the nationalization agenda. So, nationalization, contrary to the highly
placed wish, cannot contain unemployment pressures, though it may lead to
increased employment of nationals in government sectors regardless of their com-
petencies and skills.29
The measures for the replacement of relatively expensive Indian workers are
generally insufficient even in the time of deepening economic crisis. The govern-
ments brought many controlling measures and administrative regularizations to halt
the movement of Indian labourers in excess. The UAE, for instance, fixed matricula-
tion as the minimum requirement for labours. But the unavailability of skilled and
competent labourers in bulk number torpedoed their plan. The latest example is of
the State of Qatar, which took a complete U-turn to the earlier decision to limit the
number of Indians despite the constant pressure due to increasing unemployment
and economic crisis.30 The Labour Ministry in Qatar is now in a massive hunt for
skilled workers for its booming gas and construction industry and bringing tens of
thousands of new workers from India.
Non-citizenry Aspects
Incapable of exercising political rights in a state of expatriation, all non-citizens in

the Gulf are socially vulnerable. All expatriates are lawfully denied political rights
and the asymmetry in the structural and human relations between the two popula-
tions – citizens and non-citizens – leaving its imprint on the Gulf countries’ political
regimes. Relations among nationals and expatriates are affected by specific laws and
conditions that relegate most migrant groups to subordination. In an ‘ethnocratic’31
27
The sponsorship system means that expatriate workers can enter, work and leave the host country
only with the assistance of their local sponsor.
28
Paul Dresch, ‘Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society’, 2006, p. 203.
29
Nevertheless, progress has been made to nationalize certain areas of employment, such as gold
and vegetable markets in Saudi Arabia, though large-scale nationalization remains next to impos-
sible. Oman is the only state which continues to go ahead with nationalization though other States
have taken serious measures, especially in the wake of financial crunch.
30
Based on discussion with the recruiting agents during author’s field research in 2010.
31
The privileged status of ‘national’ or muwatan is sharper and conceived sometimes in tribal or
genealogical terms. Natives’ work is rewarded with disproportionately high compensation. The
presence of non-GCC workers and their inferior legal, social and political subjection to the GCC
citizens lead to a sort of ‘ethnocracy’. See Ang N. Longva, ‘Neither Autocracy or Democracy but
Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political Systems in Kuwait’, in P. Dresch and
J. Piscatori (eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the
Gulf, London: IB Tauris, 2005, pp. 114–36.
set up, citizens enjoy a certain amount of privilege, and the distinctive identity of
citizens is protected in sometimes unusual ways. ‘The exclusion of foreign workers’
according to Longva ‘may entirely be in line with the widely accepted principle that
political rights are a function of national citizenship’.32 Non-citizens, especially the
South Asian expatriates, despite their wealth and economic influence, find them-
selves at the bottom of the socio-political structure.33 No expatriate community in
this sense is a part of the political community in the Gulf. Not only their low social
rank but also their visible alienation from the political process deprives foreigners of
a voice in Gulf society.
The development of popular politics in the Gulf revolves mainly around this
sense of alienation. The ideas and practices associated with it, therefore, pay little
attention to the formal politics in the region and does not enter into direct interac-
tions with the formal politics dominated by the state and its institutions. The infor-
mal nature of it also does not permit to gather tangible institutional form. Majority
of their actions do not remain strictly inside the state and their ‘legally ambiguous’
position does not put pressure on the state to act against them. Operating from
within the permissible legal boundaries, their activities also never pose any real
threat to the state or exacerbate worries about national political coherence. Their
operative styles also are not ways that would attract widespread tensions in the host
society.
A closer look at the context of origin of the popular politics reveals that it is the
marginal status (economically disadvantaged and right-less) of a section of expatri-
ate population that makes them politically alert and active. But the content of such
a politics remains limited to seeking minor changes in the polity. Serious reforms
within the existing system or an immediate end to the regime through revolution are
nowhere in the agenda of this politics. The political imagination is often limited by
the matters of legality and economic rights. Anyway, the experience associated with
the popular politics among the South Asian labourers goes beyond the procedural or
institutional political development which often seeks formal structures, procedures
and contracts to flourish.
Recently, there has been a dramatic rise in support for such popular politics and
movements (not much organized) which present themselves as the promoters of the
rights of underprivileged in the Arab Gulf region. This development is very signifi-
cant in the absence of organized political forces to aspire the demands of such sec-
tions. Recent uprisings of Kuwaiti Bedoon – stateless people – whose mixed status
create uncertainties about the national self and citizenship is illustrative of the right-
based popular politics gathering momentum all over the region. Their legally
ambiguous national status, of course, puts pressure on the government to take coer-
cive measures and their movements threaten the policing of borders. Their cultural
orientation and specific dialect in most cases exacerbate worries about modern
32
Ang N. Longva, Wells Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait, Boulder: West
View Press, 1997, p. 118.
33
Situation may be slightly different in the UAE and Dubai in particular, where the elites among
the immigrant population, to some extent, are considered alternate or unofficial citizens.
66 M. H. Ilias
national cultural coherence. However, the Kuwaiti administration does not see any
serious political threat in their uprising as it does not pose any direct challenge to the
state sovereignty.
As discussed in the introductory part, political assertions of the marginalized
sections in the Gulf barring the case of Bedoons in Kuwait34 are not necessarily
about equal political rights. It could also be often not about to secure equal citizen-
ship rights or recognition as full citizens by the state.35 Connecting them to the
experience of Arab Spring-induced political development in the region becomes a
futile exercise.
The Arab Spring-induced political uprisings of citizens are more political ori-
ented while those of non-citizen workers appear to be more oriented towards rights.
Keeping awareness about the peculiar social and political status, the migrant work-
ers seek no citizenship rights or equal access to the resources of the state. In place
of that what figures in their demands are recognition of their legal rights as non-
citizen workers and dignified life in the hosting countries.36 These uprisings, accord-
ing to Kanna, ‘seem to want, at most, a limited recognition by the state, the
recognition that they are not citizens’.37 However, this non-citizenry aspect has deep
political implications as the demand moves beyond the regular discussions of par-
ticipation by opening up the polity for outsiders. Political practices associated with
this popular politics often base their strength and legitimacy on the principle of
popular sovereignty which stands in conflict with the notions of procedural and
institutional politics.
Taking the scope of politics further, these uprisings expose the issues involved
in the neo-liberal economic reconfiguration of the states in the region. Over the last
two decades, the Gulf States have endured an advanced experience of economic
liberalization and these experiences have deeply accentuated the unevenness of
capitalist development-widening gaps between labourers (mainly non-citizen) and
the private sector and state employers.38 The recent cases of labour unrest have
brought into focus not just the inherent hostile relationships between the non-citi-
zen workers and the employment providers but the limitations of legal system to
protect the rights of non-citizen workers fully in the context of burgeoning exploi-
tation. This is very significant in the context that the civil society movements in the
Gulf, which are mostly patronized by the government39 and with its elite social
34
The stateless Bedoon’s uprising in Kuwait advocates for constitutional reforms which have wider
political implications than others.
35
Ahmed Kanna, ‘A Politics of Non-recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in the
Year of Uprising’, p. 147.
36
Ibid., 148.
37
Ibid.
38
Adam Hanieh, Class Capitalism in the Gulf: The Political Economy of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, interview with Adam Hanieh by Ed. Lewis, Global Research 15 December 2011.
39
Jill Crystal, ‘Public order and Authority: Policing Kuwait’, in James Piscatori and Paul Dresch,
Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, London:
I.B. Tauris, 2005.
content are restricted to a small section of politically equipped citizens, never rep-
resent a site of negotiation for the non-citizen labourers or a possibility opened by
the activities of them.
Conclusion
With novel political explorations, informal networks and particular community

practices, Indian migrant workers in the Gulf, to a certain extent, are able to adjust
to the not-so-open political system of the Arab Gulf monarchies that do not entertain
political participation of any sort by the expatriate communities. Politics in the host
communities being hostile to foreigner participation and determined merely by citi-
zenship rights, the extension of a sort of popular politics becomes a gravitational
force connecting up with and pinning down a large immigrant population the Gulf
over.
This popular politics also becomes a practice very much resorted to, when the
formal politics in the host community is determined only in terms of citizenship and
foreigners need to find other ways of connecting a large number of people to each
other. Being connected politically to the issues of the homeland, a new political
space is construed into which they clandestinely bring ideologies and political doc-
trines which are otherwise sensitive to the local dynasties.
The role of popular politics in the political process of the Gulf societies is often
left unexplored or underexplored by the more formal and macro approaches of
understanding the political development. As discussed earlier, the popular politics
in the context of Indian migrants does not enter into direct interactions with the poli-
tics dominated by the state and its institutions. So its failure to catch the attention of
others is obvious. Its efforts are not fully rooted in the popular quest for the
democratization of the state and society, but to retain the rights of a politically and
socially excluded section as non-citizens.
Similarly, unlike the experiences happening elsewhere in the Arab World, these
issue-oriented mobilizations do not have the baggage of coherent political ideology
or strategies to pursue with and the protest movements popular among the Indian
migrants in the region are largely subtle in its methods of raising demands. Still they
are significant as their intervention even in its subtlety set in motion a new sort of
politics being emerged and provide accounts of the ways in which a non-citizenry,
non-institutional politics acquiring social roots in the region.
Chapter 5
Contemporary Forms of Slavery,
Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant
Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council
Countries
M. V. Bijulal
Abstract Independent investigations by human rights organizations and public

interest reports through investigative journalism have exposed many areas of urgent
human rights concerns for the workers. Governments across South and South East
Asia have responded to such precarious situations in varying degrees. Some inter-
ventions have resulted in immediate strategies for reinstating confidence and guar-
antee of rights and dignity to the workforce. In some Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries, official sources have acknowledged the highly deplorable state of
life of the workers and have even opined that the unrest among workers is an expres-
sion of their angst. Governmental response to crises has varied across the GCC;
from minimal regulation measures, to radical intervention for protection of rights of
the workers. However, in the last decade, there are indications of a common GCC
policy on migrant labour. Recent press reports also indicated fresh diplomatic
moves in this direction.
Unskilled labour from India in the GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain – number nearly 1.2 million
(Kapiszewski 2006). However, contemporary field data and assessments from expe-
rienced community workers in the Gulf tend to place the figures higher to account
for undocumented workers. Since 2004, labourers of South Asia including Indian
workers have been part of massive labour strikes in the GCC countries. Such mas-
sive non-Arab-speaking migrant labour strikes were unheard of in the GCC coun-
tries.1 Independent investigations by human rights organizations and public interest
reports through investigative journalism have exposed many areas of urgent human
1
There were large-scale strikes and protests by Arab-speaking workers (mainly Egyptians and
Palestinians) in the 1970s and 1980s. The Gulf countries responded to these struggles with a long-
term strategy of higher intake of more non-Arab Asian labour.
M. V. Bijulal (*)
School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University,
Kottayam, Kerala, India

70 M. V. Bijulal
rights concerns for the workers. Governments across South and South East Asia
have responded to such precarious situations in varying degrees. Some interventions
have resulted in immediate strategies for reinstating confidence and guarantee of
rights and dignity to the workforce. However, since last decade there are indications
of a common GCC policy on migrant labour (Ditto 2008). Recent press reports also
indicated fresh diplomatic moves in this direction.2
While authentic informal documentation3 of migrant workers elsewhere has led
to changes in the policy framework, in the GCC countries, where the human rights
violations have not have been considered actively under the legal and political sys-
tem, the conditions are extreme. Here, the expatriate/guest worker classification
attached to the migrant workforce leads to a discriminatory legal status in terms of
access and the right to judicial redressal. Arguments for integrating legal and human
rights principles into the policies governing migrant work are considered in this
paper. In the light of studies and selected life writings (Ayesha 2008) in contempo-
rary slavery, modern slavery and the development of human rights instruments on
human trafficking, this study advocates a transnational approach, ensuring the legal
and human rights obligations of the states involved. Also, it refers to the importance
of civil, informal mechanisms to constantly monitor the working conditions. From
a workers’ rights perspective (Bijulal 2012), this study argues that a rights denying,
growth-seeking development approach has emerged in governing the world of
work. It seeks to revisit the significance of the statistical narratives that usually opt
for a ‘neutral’ numerical existence for the migrant person. Economistic and one-
dimensional construction of the migrant identity is questioned here using the stand-
point of studies in citizenship.4 While the universality of legal standards and ethical
concern on the rights protection of the workers inform the academic/and systemic
initiatives, it is argued here that non-hegemonic means of human rights protection
are highly warranted in such situations, along with strong legal actions that protect
rights and the dignity of workers.
This study is an effort to understand the reasons for the deterioration of labour
rights in the GCC countries and to suggest legal and civil means for the protection
and promotion of the human rights of workers. In this context, the evolution of the
rights discourse in identifying rights at work, as developed with the International
Labour Organization (ILO) since 1937, discussions on social, legal and political
rights at the international scenario, integration of rights of the families as inherent to
labourers’ rights, new research on contemporary slavery (Bales 2005), international
agreements on the forms of trafficking in persons (UNCJIN 2000) and regional pol-
icy developments in the sphere of human rights law are discussed here. The concept
of ‘lifeworlds’ is drawn on to explain the transnational contexts – political, social
and economic – that constitute the violations of rights of migrant workers.
2
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/GCC-to-discuss-standardised-contract-for-migrant-
domestic-workers-2656 (Downloaded on 20 May, 2013).
3
Belgian government’s responses to investigations conducted by De Stoop.
4
Observations of Partha Chatterjee (2004) on formal and real types of citizenship are important an
mentioned here.
5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 71
Background
The lifeworlds of workers, in this context, are placed in an amorphous spatio-legal

condition that places them in a peculiar state of being divided between two different
political systems with different cultural and social specificities, and without being
effectively considered under any universally justiciable labour rights and/or human
rights regime. The urgent need, therefore, is to evolve a transnational rights approach
in understanding and to resolving the problems and violations involved. This study
based on the data on direct interactions with workers considers various acts of
direct, indirect and contributory forms of violence, violations of laws, denials of
freedoms, exploitation, etc., from the standpoint of a transnational rights perspec-
tive. This situation of ‘pawning of life’5 for livelihoods needs serious rethinking
based on emerging definitions6 of human trafficking as informed by the Palermo
Protocol on forced work and trafficking in persons.7
A special case is to be made in the case of construction workers of the semi-
skilled and non-skilled orders. In the last two decades, large-scale expansion of
urban infrastructure intended to host international commercial/business hubs has
attracted worldwide attention to the GCC countries. The completion of monumental
infrastructural projects like the Burj Khalifa as well as setting up of landmarks of
national pride as in the case of the FIFA World Cup stadiums required massive orga-
nization of less paid, irregular workforce, ‘on war footing’. The immediate result of
such high-paced growth of economic and infrastructure was a regime of lawless-
ness. From the year 2004 onwards, many of the GCC countries witnessed violent
5
Jeevan panayappeduthuka, an expression in Malayalam, meaning ‘pawning life’ dominated the
workers’ registry of narrating experiences of forced labour. This expression was found inalienable
to most of the reminiscences on life at work, from a workers’ standpoint. Another expression of
similar order was adimappani/ adimavela which means ‘slave labour’. Majority of the respondents
testified that they found their expectations on security of the place of work, workload, freedom and
leisure were quite misplaced once they entered their jobs. The expression, ‘slave-like’ was given
by majority of workers.
6
Studies in modern slavery (see Bales 1999) as a disciplinary approach have captured the situation
in the language of rights and dignity. According to Professor Gary Craig, Professor in Community
Development and Social Justice, School of Applied Social Sciences, Durham University, UK. The
practice of trafficking workers from Asia through extremely hazardous means (stocking-up work-
ers in refrigerated trucks, etc.) has led to deaths of many Asian workers in France, Italy and other
places. Modern slavery is an extension of Kevin Bales’ study (1999) on ‘disposability’ of people
in the context of his studies in slavery. (Interview with Professor Craig, November 2008, Delhi.)
7
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm (referred on 30 October, 2012).
72 M. V. Bijulal
demonstrations by Asian workers demanding better working conditions and wages.

The labour strikes in 2008 and 20118 almost repeated the same demands.9
According to 2010 estimates10, GCC countries account for the first three posi-
tions on a global level in terms of percentage of migrant population in the total
population.11The critical importance of remittances from the GCC countries to
South and South East Asian economies has been a major topic of research in the last
decades (Rashid Amjad 1989, Prakash 1998). A majority of academic sources that
deal with migrant work have paid little attention to the conditions of life and work-
place experiences of labour within the economy in the Gulf countries. This aca-
demic invisibility on the life and work of labourers was quite prominent in public
sphere as well.12 At the same time, reports on gross violations of security norms in
hazardous occupations became a matter of concern. There was under-reporting of
fatalities at work, as Sönmez et al. (2011) says:
There are conflicting reports on numbers of injuries and deaths; for example, two
construction workers are reportedly killed each week (104 per year) in Abu Dhabi,
while the Municipality of Dubai recorded only 34 construction worker deaths in all
of 2004 and 39 in 2005, despite the significantly greater construction activity there.
Independent research reported 880 deaths in the UAE among migrant construction
workers in 2004 (483 Indians, 397 Pakistanis). Although the causes of death were
not disclosed, a representative of the Indian Community Welfare Committee noted
that 30 percent of deaths among Indians in Dubai were related to accidents on con-
struction sites. An official at Dubai’s Indian Consulate reported to HRW (Human
Rights Watch) that 971 deaths were registered in 2005, from which 61 were attrib-
uted to site accidents. The Bangladesh Embassy in Abu Dhabi estimates repatriating
about eight to 10 bodies of construction workers each month, of which three are
work-related deaths.13
8
The immediate response to the 2004 strikes was the restrictive practices in recruitment by intro-
ducing quota systems in different Arabian Gulf countries. The South Asian unskilled workers’
influx, especially after the 1991 Gulf War, was looked upon as a strategy to displace politically
oriented Arab workers from non-monarchic Arab countries to avoid political threats to the Arabian
Gulf monarchies. New efforts of control and putting a cap on Indian labour may promote labour
influx from countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka where cheap labour is in abundance.
9
As per a report in The Sydney Herald (2011), nearly 2000 labourers of Jams HR Solutions went
on a violent struggle in 2011, causing widespread losses. They were protesting against the mis-
treatment by security personnel of the company.
10
http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp
11
Israel is another country of the West Asian region which ranks among first 10 countries with large
numbers of migrants as a percentage of population.
12
Charles Tilly (2007) deliberates on this situation and even suggests that we use the migrant expe-
rience narrations as primary materials for concept building on transnational migrant workforce.
13
The authors speculate that discrepancies in reporting site accidents are due to the UAE’s efforts
to downplay risks associated with construction work.
Review of Instruments for Migrant Human Rights
This section undertakes an analysis, structured on the conceptualization of migrant

workers’ rights as codified in the international instruments, namely, the Convention
on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families 1990; the UN General
Assembly Palermo Protocols Regarding Forced Work; Human Rights of Migrants
2004; the ILO Convention No. 97 on Migration for Employment, 1949; and the ILO
Convention No. 143 on Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions), 1975.
The ILO Convention of 1949 advocated unrestricted exchange of migration-
related state data, as well as policies (free service to assist migrants, mechanisms for
employment-related travel, appropriate health care, hygienic conditions of living,
equal rights, etc.) among parties of the Convention (Art.1). It also called for ‘an
adequate and free service to assist migrants for employment, and in particular to
provide them with accurate information’ (Art. 2). Article 4 of the Convention talks
about appropriate mechanisms for employment-related travel, stay and departure of
migrants to be dealt with by appropriate state interventions. Article 5 emphasizes
the responsibility of the receiving state to provide appropriate health care and to
ensure hygienic conditions of living to the migrants. Conceptualization of the right
to equality as per Article 6 of the Convention would be one of the earliest concerns
of the international order on the right to equality of migrant workers.14
The ILO Convention on Rights of All Migrants and Families 1990 identifies the
need ‘to make further efforts to improve the situation and ensure the human rights
and dignity of all migrants in addition to the existence of an already established
body of principles and standards’. The Convention on Rights of All Migrants and
Families 1990 indicates to a journey from the rights to survival – freedom of move-
ment, protection from torture, degrading and inhuman treatment, protection from
slavery or servitude, protection from performing forced or compulsory labour to
social and cultural rights, to freedom to practise one’s religion and freedom to seek,
receive and impart information. The coordinated effort to formulate an international
Convention on Rights of All Migrant Workers 1990 was an extended process start-
ing from 1979 to 1989. The Convention was made with specific reference to ‘instru-
ments within the framework of the International Labour Organization’ like the
Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No. 97), the Convention con-
cerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143), the Recommendation
14
Article 6 talks about ‘non-discrimination based on nationality, race, religion, or sex, to immi-
grants lawfully within its territory, treatment no less favourable than that which it applies to its own
nationals in respect of the matters: relating to remuneration, including family allowances where
these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restric-
tions on home work, minimum age for employment, apprenticeship and training, women’s work
and the work of young persons’. Article 6 also refers to freedom of organization though member-
ship of trade unions and enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining. It refers to provisions
for accommodation; social security according to national laws or regulations is covered by a social
security scheme to a great extent.
74 M. V. Bijulal
concerning Migration for Employment (No. 86), the Recommendation concerning

Migrant Workers (No. 151), the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labour (No. 29) and the Convention on Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105).
Article 7 of the 1990 convention refers to cross-cutting themes in human rights as
per the international human rights instruments followed by Part II, which deals with
the human rights of all migrant workers and their families. These include the right
to freedom of movement ‘at any time to enter and remain in their State of origin’
(Art. 8); legal protection to the right to life of migrant workers and members of their
families (Art. 9); protection from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (Art. 10); protection from slavery or servitude, protection from per-
forming forced or compulsory labour (Art. 10 and 11); and social and cultural rights
(Art. 12). The ILO Convention on Domestic Work is another important instrument
that comes as rights defining apparatuses for marginal, footloose labourers, mainly
invisible women.
Other important provisions of the convention are the right to access to legal pro-
ceedings in matters of verification by law enforcement officials of the identity of
migrant workers (Art. 16); immediate communication to consular or diplomatic
authorities of the migrant concerned in the event of arrest or detention, and to avail
legal protection while in custody to prevent abuse, etc. (Art. 17); the right to equal-
ity with nationals before law at the host country, and right to protection from collec-
tive expulsion (Art. 18); equal status in remuneration and other work-related
conditions and benefits with nationals (Art. 25); right to form unions (Art. 26); right
to medical care (Art. 28); right to personal liberty and right to education of children
and to transfer earnings and savings, personal effects and belongings (Art. 32).15
The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 2003 was the
most recent international human rights instrument that extended the debate on
human rights of migrant workers. The definition of trafficking in persons is given as
in the following extract (Art. 3):
For the purposes of this Protocol: (a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or prac-
tices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
The protocol was a reiteration of the right to protection of human rights as listed in
the conventions. The prominent contribution to the discourse regarding forced work
in the protocol is the most mentionable aspect, which has immediate applications to
all situations where question of forced work as well as denial of dignified work is
concerned. In the context of universal human rights documents, the rights experi-
ence in GCC countries could be looked at, considering that the legal rights regime
for migrant workers may not encode the rights as prescribed by the ILO conventions
15
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm. Downloaded on 17 May, 2013.
or other relevant international bodies. As we see from the ILO data on ratifications16
of important labour rights, the conventions had a relatively low rate of participation
by the GCC countries or those countries from which manual and unskilled labour
force come. Among the migrant source countries, Sri Lanka was the only South
Asian state to ratify the ILO Convention of 1990. Bangladesh was another country
that had signed any other significant human rights instrument. However, in the case
of GCC countries, country reports in select cases, as the response to the Committee
on International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations
(ICERD), indicate commitments to the United Nations Human Rights Mechanism.17
Remittances, Citizenship and Development
Studies on migrants’ remittances and their implications for host economies, as well
as relations between migration and trade (Sajitha Beevi Karayil 2007), continue to
be a major area of interest in academic research. Some studies (Singh 2009; Ratha
and Xu 2008; Panda 2009) have cited the importance of migrant remittances18 in a
way indicating national interest in these transactions.19
16
According to estimates, among the GCC Countries, ratification of labour rights, instruments were
highest among Kuwait and Bahrain. Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ratified four to eight
instruments, while it was 74 and 21 in the case of Kuwait and Bahrain respectively. Source (http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.subject?p_ lang=en&p_classification=17: Downloaded on
17 May, 2012)
17
Compatibility of national regimes with standard international norms, however, is not a foolproof
yardstick to assess human rights situations. For example, in India, despite the strong domestic
regime starting from 1948, labourers’ working and living conditions continue to be dirty, demean-
ing and dangerous.
18
According to a study (Ratra and Xu 2008), worldwide flows of remittances were around $320
billion in 2007, with remittances sent home by migrants from developing countries accounting for
$240 billion. Remittances were twice as large as foreign aid and nearly two-thirds of foreign direct
investment flows were to developing countries. India is considered to be the biggest beneficiary of
remittance flows. With more than ten million workers worldwide, many of them highly skilled
workers in the West, India’s annual remittances are said to have crossed $27 billion in 2007, fol-
lowed by China ($25.7 billion), Mexico ($25 billion), the Philippines ($17 billion), France ($12.5
billion), Spain ($8.9 billion), Belgium ($7.2 billion), Germany ($7 billion), UK ($7 billion) and
Romania ($6.8 billion). According to the World Bank, figures for the year 2012, India ($ 69 billion)
and China ($ 60 billion) still stay on the top. Philippines ($24 billion) and Mexico ($23 billion) are
the other large recipients. (Source: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,co
ntentMDK:20648762~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html) Downloaded
on 17 May 2013.
19
Panda (2009: 177) points to migrant workers’ contribution to Kerala’s economy as a backdrop
for advocating a more serious view of the issue of migrant workers hailing from India. He cites the
potential of migrant workers as powerful economic backup for the state at the time of any eco-
nomic crisis, the impact of their remittances on not just India’s economy, but also the morale of the
country. Panda writes ‘For the longest time, the government took no note of the inflow, notwith-
standing occasional stories about how the Gulf workers fuelled the boom in Kerala. It was the
nuclear tests in May 1998, when New Delhi floated the Resurgent India bonds to cushion the pos-
sible impact of sanctions, which first tested the depth of the NRI commitment.
76 M. V. Bijulal
Detailed interactions with workers whom the author met personally, mostly dur-
ing the migrant labourers’ rights advocacy campaigns have strongly testified on
such trade-offs in the life in Arab countries. Some respondents strongly observed
the conflict between the moral principles of Islam – the state religion in Arab coun-
tries influencing all ethical, social, political and economic matters – and the system
of exploitation in the labour sector. To many workers, such conflict explains the
strengthening of new exploitative arrangements in work and the lack of formal
legal/governmental systems in addressing this ethical and moral crisis in the Arab
societies and cultures.
The workers feel that as long as workers’ rights realization is kept in a grey area
of inaction, shared by the country of origin and destination, as well as unattended by
law or human rights principles, the crisis is set to remain. Since this is related to
workers’ individual status as migrants, at some point they conflict with rights con-
nected to institutional citizenship. Here, the post-national citizenship advocates’
arguments need to be considered for uniform acceptance of respect to rights when
rights are restricted for a person as a citizen of a country. Benhabib (2007) recog-
nizes that changes in patterns of political belonging have been accompanied by
forms of exclusion, and some groups (e.g. asylum seekers and refugees) have not
benefited from the spread of cosmopolitan norms. Ong (2006, 23) similarly
acknowledges that citizenship rights have been extended only to some migrants,
‘instead of all citizens enjoying a unified bundle of citizenship rights’. These read-
ings constitute counter-hegemonic discourses because they question particular ele-
ments of state sovereignty and would, if accepted, undermine those facets of the
global political economy that require the labour of underpaid and insecure migrants.
Many circumstances connecting to lives of the expatriate lower skilled workers
across the world have exposed the limitation to the term ‘global governance’ (Betts
2011: 5–8). Managed migration and its application through local and wider scales
are often seen as a law-oriented initiative, with a clear role for interest groups
(Mentz 2009: 5–8). Another important aspect is the increasing role of the non-state
agencies in the formulation of principles as well as the prominence of humanitarian
and human rights organizations in matters related to managing migrations (ibid.).
The involvement of many such organizations, like Amnesty International, needs to
be seen in this context: their argument is for ensuring basic human rights to all
migrants, irrespective of the legal sanctity of their stay in a host country.
An important, universal issue regarding the status of workers in host countries is
the legally sanctioned discrimination against workers as non-citizens on various
concerns connected to their social, economic, political and cultural rights. This also
involves a human rights reading on contemporary practices of organizing and
employing migrant workers in different parts of the world. It seeks to employ a
transnational framework to restore the rights and dignity of labour, which has
emerged as a major concern of academic works in legal aspects of modern slavery/
contemporary slavery (Bales 2005:41–44) and new scholarship20 in citizenship
20
New scholarship could be characterized as enquiries on the lack of human rights culture in shap-
ing state policies as well as the role of non-state locations to advocate means to avoid a ‘legitima-
tion crisis’ for states parties, in the case of ensuring rights and dignity of migrant workers.
(Benhabib 2007; Basok 2009). As Aihwa Ong (2006: 15) states that migrant rights
are better protected by disengaging citizenship into bundles of rights, as in the case
of European countries. Ong raises this in continuation with the discussion on how it
becomes important to disengage the concept of citizenship in the context of viola-
tions against migrant workers, especially in the globalized sites of hyper growth
(ibid p. 23). The rights deficit for the migrant workers is quite relevant to be read
along with Article 1 of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
Considering labour as an integral part of development, this institutional model
becomes more applicable with nuanced adaptations in various countries. Another
important model in civil engagement is the effort to revise rights situations with the
application of non-codified human rights principles. According to Basok (2009),
while exploring the contributions of civil initiatives on advocating for non-
hegemonic rights in the case of migrants in the USA and Canada ‘hegemonic human
rights norms are congruent with liberal notions of formal equality between indi-
viduals and individual freedom from coercion, as well as principles of national sov-
ereignty while counter-hegemonic human rights values are the ones that in one way
or another challenge the status quo, either by undermining the political economic
foundations of liberal democracies and/or the principles of national sovereignty.
The need for open non-state perceptions on rights is furthered by Benhabib (2007)
through an argument for “delinking citizenship rights, from mandatory membership
in a nation-state, a core to the new human rights debate on migrants, opting for a the
conceptualization of citizenship membership and more towards citizenship of resi-
dency with civil and social rights, and, in some cases, political participation rights,
extended to non-citizens”.
Response from GCC Countries
Interviews with workers show that GCC countries generally avoid concerns related
to poor wage structure, non-payment of salaries, lack of medical care and substan-
dard housing. It is also to be noted that the states promulgated legislations that
offered restricted participation of workers. In many cases, practices of control and
exclusion clearly point to violation of universal human rights principles, inalienable
and non-negotiable for the dignified and safe human existence in any situation.21
Initiatives in providing elementary forms of participation were accompanied by
stringent measures against organizing or participating in strikes. To explain this
21
In 2002, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs promulgated new regulations that
authorized the establishment of ‘workers’ committees’ in private businesses with 100 or more
employees. The ILO Director-General Juan Somavia called this development ‘a milestone in the
labor history of Saudi Arabia’, and said it was ‘gratifying for the ILO to be cooperating with a
country which is making real efforts to promote social and labor rights’ (ILO 2002).
78 M. V. Bijulal
situation, Human Rights Watch (2004) refers to Article 191 of the Saudi Labour
Law which states: ‘Where an employee, head of an enterprise, employee or work-
man stops work with the object of exerting pressure on public authorities or of
protesting against a decision or measure adopted by such authorities instead of hav-
ing recourse to legitimate means, each such offender shall be punished with impris-
onment for a terms of 2–6 years or a fine of 4000 riyals to 10,000 riyals, or both.’
In the meantime, the Government of Saudi Arabia decided to initiate a represen-
tative system of workers in those units where 100 or more workers were enrolled.
Though this development in 2002 was hailed as an important step in the history of
social and labour rights by the ILO in 2009, critics mark this development as sym-
bolic and nominal, with no real power vested in the Committee of Workers. The ILO
did not publicize the fact that the committees would lack real independence.
Employees in each company could form only one committee, with three to nine
members. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs must approve the committee
members; the Minister and companies’ management have the right to send repre-
sentatives to committee meetings; and the minutes of all meetings are required to be
provided to management.
There are interesting examples indicating the seamless powers of international
capital in nullifying efforts to protect labour rights. In 2006 and 2007, the UAE
Labour Minister Ali al-Kaabi implemented some basic life protection of measures
for the workers. Mid-day work breaks during the hot, summer months was notable
in this regard. In another instance, the minister ordered a well-known company to
pay about $2 m as fines for failing to pay its workers. However, these labour-friendly
measures ended when Mr. Kaabi was replaced in 2008, invoking doubts about the
extent of acceptability of his measures. On the other hand, Bahrain is reported to
have taken a consultative course to deal with situations arising from the labour
unrest. One of such measures following the 2008 unrest is the setting up a commis-
sion to arbitrate in the dispute. Another important step initiated in the GCC coun-
tries is the effort to change the ethnic composition of the workforce by opening up
more areas of work for nationals.22
Conclusions
The lifeworlds of labourers in the Gulf communicate a condition of statelessness,

peculiar to migrant work in situations similar to bondage and distressed labour.
Connecting the labour rights movements with the ongoing global process of urban
development has become more relevant in this contest. There are direct linkages to
the excessive pace of development (infrastructure projects in the main) and the
increasing depth and spread of denials and violations of rights. In GCC countries, it
‘Unified Gulf plan needed to tackle labour issues’, IANS, Wednesday, 10 September 2008,
22
12:30 hrs.
is also important to see how Islamic principles for decent work as given in the
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) are been followed.23
The unquantifiable pain of loss involved in the terms of engagement (i.e. forgo-
ing better emotional and physical security as well as civil and cultural rights at home
for more income) never becomes a valid point for academic as well as official
enquiries into worker rights issues. Rather, the classic condition of alienation of less
privileged migrants is seen from the logic of instrumental rationality by official and
popular sources.
There are two usual ways of understanding migrant rights experience which may
be broadly termed as ‘methodological nationalisms’. The interpretation of rightless-
ness of workers from a ‘progressive citizen’ (Varghese 2011) point of view uses a
‘nationalist diction’ which focuses on their ‘inescapable’ drudgery. Similarly, there
is an academic endorsement of indispensability of progressive realization through
hegemonic human rights mechanisms. Various academic outlooks are also affected,
which I would refer as a ‘State plus’ category, endorsing official state positions in a
conscious and unconscious manner. In this context, lies the importance of the civil
society as agency to accelerate those forms of non-hegemonic spaces for the protec-
tion of workers’ rights. Worker accounts from many South Asian countries suggest
an urgent need for joint diplomatic missions to take up violations with the host
country in times of emergency. In the context where the importance of rights protec-
tion for migrant workers is emerging stronger in South and South East Asian
countries,24 India needs to consider the safety and dignity of its citizens working in
dangerous and difficult situations as a major component of its bilateral policy
agenda with the GCC countries. There is a soft-pedalling in Indian policy on human
rights and dignity at work to informal workers, who are in millions. Initiating aca-
demic efforts to identify common threads for an inclusive policy, focusing on rights
deficits of the informal, semi-skilled and unskilled workers is pertinent in this
context.
Human rights approaches on the study of conditions of migrant workers (ex.
Human Rights Watch (2004)) has brought in an academic turn, giving prominence
to organic narratives and human rights activist reportage which attained several
forms of recognition and influence in social and public policy. The migrant person
having separated from assuring situations of humane and legal care at home is often
forced to live in a sense of anonymity, political and social invisibility and amidst
23
Regarding the status of workers and their dignity, the preamble part G (3) is unambiguous on the
stance against forced labour. Article XVII reads that ‘Islam honours work and the worker and
enjoins Muslims not only to treat the worker justly but also generously. He is not only to be paid
his earned wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure’. Source: http://www.
alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html. (Downloaded on 23 May 2013).
24
The proactive stance for rights of workers by some Indian officials in GCC countries has, how-
ever, led to diplomatic chaos. While this made the issue more visible, countries like Thailand and
Indonesia have demanded fair wages and other facilities as minimum conditions for their citizens
to work as housemaids in Gulf countries. However, this position has angered governments like
Saudi Arabia, leading to a temporary ban on workers from these countries. The ban was lifted in
late 2012.
80 M. V. Bijulal
many forms of vulnerabilities. Body of the workers as captive site for profit has
been used in such situations, resembling indentured or forced labour references of
which needs to be in place while we engage with aspects of rights in transnational
migration.
The States and their parties must undertake a comprehensive mapping of the
migration processes with emphasis on isolating factors that promoted humane and
safe means. The host countries (GCC) can see how the expatriate labour force can
lead a peaceful and meaningful life with more opportunities for social life for the
workers. This has two dimensions: one, on the possibilities for larger interaction
among various migrant communities. And, an effort to explore more areas of com-
munication between the local population and the migrant population can be made as
a second action. Both actions can be done by introducing the idea at the civil–social
milieu with active roles assigned to the local citizens and the representatives of
expatriates. Such efforts at enhancing communications through efforts to mutually
inform the lifeworlds can bring about solutions to the present crisis of foul play,
denials of rights, xenophobic tendencies, etc. Such efforts may inform a transna-
tional action to protect and promote human rights, with the play of active, direct
human persons entering the conventional areas of state-oriented management of
migrant work scenario. Labour-sending countries in South and South East Asia can
form an intergovernmental body to help the functioning of a people-oriented man-
agement of migration. This is especially relevant since sharing of the data (on
migrant life experiences, needs, aspirations and challenges of women and men who
migrate from similar economic and social situations) is essential. It is also relevant
to individual countries so that they may formulate their own policies on labour,
considering the changes in the factors that influence migration from a particular
country to another. States need to develop immediate systems for the protection of
rights to life and dignity of legal as well as undocumented migrant persons in diffi-
cult conditions. People languishing in jails, people fearing state action for non-
possession of essential documents, people suffering from cruelties from employers,
etc., need to be restored to their families through transparent arrangements between
the governments. With the introduction of direct state-mediated recruitment chan-
nels in different GCC countries, there are chances for reducing the abuse of migrants
in these countries. However, there are chances for corrupt practices by the citizens
of the host country who act as recruiting agents. It is also argued that transparent
traditional linkages that have maintained migration for a long time should remain.
Promoting and ensuring workers’ rights to life, livelihood and dignity has to emerge
as a prominent aspect of managing migration through meaningful transnational
policy initiatives. Promoting the emerging concerns in defence of broader citizen-
ship rights, both in academic writings as well as human rights defence initiatives, is
the key to a meaningful transnational approach for the protection of the rights of
migrant workers.
References
Amjad, R. (Ed.). (1989). To the Gulf and Back: Studies on the economic impact of Asian labour
migration. International Labour Organisation, Asian Employment Programme: New Delhi/
Geneva.
Ayesha, N. (2008). Jeevithathinte Arangu. Kottayam: Current Books.
Bales, K. (1999). Disposable people: New slavery in the global economy. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Bales, K. (2005). Understanding global slavery a reader. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Basok, T. (2009). Counter-hegemonic human rights discourses and migrant rights activism in
the US and Canada, International Journal of Comparative Sociology (pp. 183–205). London:
Sage.
Benhabib, S. (2007). Twilight of sovereignty or the emergence of cosmopolitan norms? Rethinking
citizenship in volatile times. Citizenship Studies, 11(1), 19–36.
Betts, A. (2011). Global migration governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bijulal, M. V. (2012). Struggle as political communication: Migrant lifeworlds and human
rights questions in the GCC countries’. South Asian Journal of Diplomacy, 3(1), School of
International relations, Kottayam.
Chatterjee, P. (2004). Politics of the governed reflections on popular politics in most part of the
world. New York: Colombia University Press.
Ditto, M. I. (2008). GCC Labour Migration Governance, United Nations expert group meeting on,
international migration and development in asia and the pacific, United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Population Division, Department of Economic and
Social affairs, Bangkok, Thailand.
Human Rights Watch. (2004). Saudi Arabia: Bad dreams exploitation and abuse of migrant work-
ers in Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch, 165(E).
IANS. (2008, September 10). Unified Gulf Plan needed to tackle labour issues. IANS.
ILO (International Labor Organization). (2002, April 18). Boost for workers’ rights in Saudi
Arabia. Press Release. ILO/02/17. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-
releases/WCMS_007782/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. Accessed on 4 April 2013.
International Migration Report. (2002). United Nations. Geneva: Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division.
International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2003). World migration report 2003: Labour
migration: Trends, challenges and policy responses in countries of origin. Geneva: International
Organization for Migration Press.
IOM. (2012). http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/mission.html. Accessed on
24 May 2013.
Kapiszewski, A. (2006, May 15–17). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries’.
Paper presented at United Nations expert group meeting on international migration and devel-
opment in the Arab region, Beirut. http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_
Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf. Accessed on 12 Dec 2012.
Karayil, S. B. (2007). Does migration matter in trade? A study of India’s exports to the GCC coun-
tries. South Asia Economic Journal, 8(1), 1.
Mentz, G. (2009). The political economy managed migration non-state actors, Europeanization,
and the politics of designing migration policies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ong, A. (2006). Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in sovereignty and citizenship. Durham:
Duke University Press.
Panda, R. (2009). Migration remittances: The emerging scenario. India Quarterly, 65(2), 167–183.
Prakash, B. A. (1998). Gulf migration and its economic impacts: The Kerala experience.
Economic and Political Weekly, 33(50), 3157–3159.
Ratha, D., & Xu, Z. (2008). Migration and remittances factbook. Washington, DC: The World
Bank.
82 M. V. Bijulal
Singh, B. (2009). Structural shifts in the current account of India’s balance of payments. Margin:
The Journal of Applied Economic Research, 3, 133.
Sonmez, S., Apostolopoulos, Y., Tran, D., & Rentrope, S. (2011). Human rights and health
disparities for migrant workers in the UAE. Health and Human Rights: An International
Journal, North America, 13(7), 12. http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/viewArti-
cle/435/665. Accessed on 21 May 2013.
The Sydney Herald. (2011, January 3). Workers strike in UAE after labour riot.. http://news.smh.
com.au/breaking-news-world/workers-strike-in-uae-after-labour-riot-20110103-19dz9.html.
Accessed on Apr 4 2013.
Tilly, C. (2007). Trust networks in transnational migration. Sociological Forum, 22(1, March),
3–24.
UNCJIN. (2000). http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/
convention_%20traff_eng.pdf. Accessed on 24 May 2013.
Varghese, V. J. (2011). ‘Outside and inside the nation:: Narratives and the making of a productive
citizen in Kerala. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), Migration, identity and conflict, India migration report.
New Delhi: Rutledge.
Chapter 6
A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants
in Contemporary Qatar
Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al-Ghanim,

Kien Le Trung, and Laura Harkness
Abstract Though transnational labour migration in the Gulf States has increas-
ingly been of scholarly interest, that scholarship has to date relied largely on qualita-
tive ethnographic methodologies or small non-representative sampling strategies.
This chapter presents the findings of a large representative sample of low-income
migrant labourers in Qatar. The data describe the basic characteristics of the low-
income migrant population in Qatar, the process by which migrants obtain employ-
ment, the frequency with which this population of migrants encounters the problems
and challenges described by previous ethnographic work, and the role played by
nationality, ethnicity and religion in patterning that experience. While the findings
generally affirm many of the claims made in earlier ethnographic studies, they pro-
vide a means by which the extent of these problems and challenges can be ascer-
tained more directly.
Introduction
By some estimates, labour migration to the petroleum-rich states of the Arabian

Peninsula comprises the third-largest transnational migration flow in the contempo-
rary world (ESCWA 2007; Gardner 2011). Current estimates suggest that more than
11 million foreign workers are currently employed in the region.1 Given that many
1
See Martin Baldwin-Edwards for a recent estimate [Baldwin-Edwards, ‘Labour Immigration and
Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends’ (2011)]. Andrzej Kapiszewski
estimated the 2004 total to be over 12.5 million [Kapiszewski, ‘Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers
in the GCC Countries’, United Nations Secretariat (2006), p. 3].
A. Gardner (*)
University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA, USA
S. Pessoa · L. Harkness
Carnegie Mellon University, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar
A. Diop · K. Al-Ghanim · K. Le Trung
Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University (QU), Doha, Qatar

84 A. Gardner et al.
migrants remain in the GCC states for only one or two contract periods, and consid-
ering that many of them are best conceptualized as emissaries of large Asian and
African households that are deeply dependent on Gulf-sourced remittances, it seems
obvious that the millions of foreign workers currently employed in the region are
only the visible component of the total social field encompassed by Gulf migration.
However, the scale of labour migration to the Arabian Peninsula stands in stark
contrast, to the lack of data concerning labour migration in the region. In part, this
lack can be attributed to the traditional peripheralization of the GCC states in the
larger field of Middle Eastern studies. But, it is also due to the long-standing anxiet-
ies of the authoritarian regimes typical of the Peninsula, since research and schol-
arly inquiry focused on the transnational migrant populations has often been made
difficult, if not impossible, by the results of such anxieties. Yet even in Qatar –
where for the last 5 years the state has, ostensibly, been interested in learning more
about the living and working conditions faced by the migrants in the region – rele-
vant publications and accessible data concerning migrant populations remain few
and far between.
This chapter seeks to address this dearth of material by describing a subset of the
findings produced by a large, 2-year project funded by the Qatar National Research
Fund.2 Recognizing that much of the qualitative and ethnographic work concerned
with labour migration in the Gulf States has been focused on the challenges, prob-
lems and rights-based issues facing migrants in the region, this project sought spe-
cifically to develop a quantitative portrait of issues previously identified through
qualitative and ethnographic analysis.3 We also sought to verify, and potentially
improve upon, the findings of the occasional small-scale survey projects that under-
pin substantial portions of contemporary analysis of migration in the Gulf.4 Building
2
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Qatar National Research Fund under its
National Priorities Research Program (award #09–857–5-123). Its contents are solely the respon-
sibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Qatar National
Research Fund.
3
Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait (1997); Longva,
‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf’, Middle East Report 211
(1999); Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant
Housemaids (2000); Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas
of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (2001); Jureidini, ‘Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the
Middle East’ (2003); Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in
Bahrain (2010); Gardner, ‘Engulfed: Indian Guest Workers, Bahraini Citizens and the Structural
Violence of the Kafala System’, in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and Freedom of
Movement, eds De Genova and Peutz (2010); Gardner, ‘Gulf Migration and the Family’; Strobl,
‘Policing Housemaids: The Criminalization of Domestic Workers in Bahrain’, British Journal of
Criminology 49 (2009); Kanna, Dubai: The City as Corporation (2011).
4
For example, see: Human Rights Watch, ‘Dubai: Migrant Workers at Risk’ (2003); Human Rights
Watch, ‘Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in the
United Arab Emirates’ (2006); Human Right Watch, The Island of Happiness: Exploitation of
Migrant Workers on Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi (2009); Human Rights Watch, ‘Building a Better
World Cup: Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022’ (2012); Human Rights
Watch, ‘For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda’
6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 85
on the sampling framework developed by the Social and Economic Survey Research
Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University for its 2010 Omnibus Survey, our research
team devised a comprehensive structure through which a representative sample of
1189 low-income migrants in Qatar was surveyed during February and March
2012.5 In addition, the team conducted a series of follow-up interviews with a subset
of the survey participants throughout 2012, to help clarify the particularly puzzling
and complex issues revealed through our analysis of the survey data.
Overall, the survey administered to a random sample of these low-income
migrants in Qatar was attentive to 95 distinct variables. This is obviously too large
a number to be dealt with in any comprehensive fashion here. Instead, the analysis
concentrates on the sets of variables pertaining to three distinct questions: First,
what do these data reveal about the basic characteristics of the low-income popula-
tion of labourers in Qatar? Second, what do these data reveal about the variations in
the ways migrants obtain work in Qatar? Third, what perceptible roles do national-
ity, ethnicity and religion play in determining migrants’ various experiences while
abroad in Qatar? Finally, the discussion and conclusion of this chapter provides an
opportunity to explore further what these data reveal about the labour problems
typically portrayed by ethnographic and qualitative research conducted among this
migrant population. Following a brief discussion of the methodology used, these
questions and issues provide a roadmap to the remainder of the chapter.
Survey Data and Methodology
The key to our contribution to the existing literature is the representative sample
underlying these findings. Our goal was to explore the experiences of low-income
workers in Qatar. Therefore, our sample was limited to foreign workers with an
income of less than QR2,000 (US$549) per month. This arbitrary delineation, based
on ethnographic work conducted in Qatar and elsewhere in the GCC region, seemed
to represent a viable threshold between the ‘unskilled’ and ‘low-skill’ underclass of
(2012); Endo and Afram, ‘The Qatar-Nepal Remittance Corridor’, World Bank Study (2011);
ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’, Union View 21 (2011).
5
The first Omnibus Survey was conducted by SESRI in Qatar in 2010, and looked at ‘Qatari citi-
zens, resident expatriates, and migrant laborers’ [SESRI, ‘First Annual Omnibus Survey: A Survey
of Life in Qatar’ (2010), p. i]. Our project utilized portions of the SESRI team’s sampling frame,
particularly that for labour camps, and significantly expanded the scope of questions included in
the survey, so as to reflect the substantial ethnographic findings that had explored the experiences
of transnational migrants over the past decade. The list of labour camps comprising this sampling
frame was assembled by SESRI, in cooperation with the government ministries that administer
utilities to these camps. As discussed in the conclusion of this chapter, while this sampling frame
allowed us to derive a representative sample of low-income migrants in Qatar, it does not include
the smaller portion of migrants who live and work in the domestic sector, nor the small but sub-
stantial portion of migrants who do not dwell in ‘labour camps’.
foreign workers and the ‘semi-skilled’ lower middle class.6 Our respondents, framed
as ‘low-income’ migrants or labourers in the remainder of this chapter, comprise the
largest segment of the foreign workforce in Qatar and, indeed, in all the GCC states.
However, beyond this purposeful limitation, our sampling strategy did not allow
us any access to workers in the domestic sector – the drivers, nannies, maids, gar-
deners, servants and other domestic workers typically employed by Qatari and elite
expatriate households. Although the domestic sector of the foreign workforce in the
region has been the subject of intensive scrutiny and international rights-based criti-
cism, social norms in Qatar make it extremely difficult for survey enumerators (and,
for that matter, any outsiders) to have access to these men and women. This is a
noteworthy caveat to the findings presented here and will be further discussed in the
chapter’s conclusion.
As noted, the sampling frame was based on a comprehensive list of migrant
labour dwellings in Qatar assembled by SESRI at Qatar University for Qatar’s first
omnibus survey. These labour camps were divided into five strata, ranging from
very small (those with less than seven inhabitants) to very large (those with 200 or
more inhabitants). Based on these five categories, we employed proportionate strati-
fied sampling to randomly select larger numbers of subjects from larger camps and
smaller numbers of subjects from smaller camps. Supervisors initially visited each
camp to deploy this sampling procedure and identify the languages spoken by ran-
domly selected subjects.7 These subjects were then visited by a linguistically appro-
priate survey enumerator.
In addition to the pre-test of the survey instrument and debriefing meetings with
interviewers and supervisors, all the interviewers were trained for a period of 3 days
before the survey began. With this training, the research team was able to ensure that
all the interviewing staff members had a clear understanding of the objectives of the
study and a detailed understanding of the survey instrument. Overall, 1189 inter-
views were completed using this procedure, yielding a maximum margin of error of
±4.4%. This overall sampling strategy was to ensure the representativeness of the
sample and to increase the accuracy of the estimates derived from the data set.
The term ‘low-income migrant’, perhaps, requires a brief explanation, particu-
larly as we envision this as an unfamiliar and, perhaps, unwelcome addition to the
lexicon of terms used to describe the foreign workers on the Arabian Peninsula. In
the authors’ long experience with the population of foreign workers in the region,
6
For example, see the ethnographic project A Longitudinal Analysis of Low-Income Laborers in
Contemporary Qatar, funded by the Center for International and Regional Studies at the
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, and resulting in: Gardner, ‘Why Do
They Keep Coming? Labor Migrants in the Gulf States’, in Migrant Labour in the Persian Gulf,
eds Kamrava and Babar (2012).
7
Initial visits by survey supervisors provided an opportunity to update information about the
labour camp (or collective household) and to inform camp managers about the research project’s
official relationship and its sponsorship by the Qatar government. In the context of the GCC, such
visits improve cooperation and facilitate access to the camps. In the survey, 3.76% of the labour
camps (19 of 504) denied our team access. Two of those 19 camps or collective households were
for female labour.
we developed a deep skepticism about any strong correlation between skill levels
and income levels in the Gulf. The term ‘low-income migrant’ reflects this convic-
tion and the nature of our sample. Our concern was only with the migrants’ eco-
nomic class in the Gulf and was consciously blind to the fact that many of these
migrant men and women earning QR2,000 or less have extraordinary training, skills
and previous work experiences that go unremunerated in the Gulf labour force.
Basic Characteristics of Low-Income Migrants in Qatar
The low-income migrants in our sample came from more than 25 different coun-
tries. The largest contingent of low-income labourers in Qatar, comprising 39% of
the total sample, came from Nepal. India (29%), Sri Lanka (9%) and Bangladesh
(9%) were next, followed by the Philippines (5%), Pakistan (3%) and Egypt (3%).8
The remaining nationalities made up about 2% of the total sample. Almost all the
migrants surveyed were male, which is explained partly by the preponderance of
male labourers in this transnational circuit, and partly also by our sampling frame’s
omission of the domestic sector in which many low-income female migrants are
employed. In addition, the low-income labour migrant population in Qatar is rela-
tively young, with an average and median age of 32 and 30 years respectively.
Overall, 72% of low-income migrants in Qatar were married at the time of the sur-
vey, and on average, low-income migrants supported an average of 2.4 children.
Considering the states that send the most low-income labourers to Qatar, the
religious constitution of the low-income workforce was unsurprising. Nearly half of
the respondents (49%) were Hindu, and a substantial number were Muslim (37%).
Smaller proportions of the workers identified themselves as Christians (9%),
Buddhists (5%), or adherents to other religions (less than 1%). Education levels of
low-income migrants in Qatar vary, with low-income migrants having on average
completed 8.7 years of education. Almost all migrants in Qatar report themselves as
being literate in their native language (93%). However, regarding the languages that
they used in Qatar’s public sphere, only 18% of low-income migrants reported
being able to speak at least some Arabic, while approximately a third (32%) could
speak at least some English.
One open question in the existing literature ponders the duration of stay for
transnational migrants in the GCC. While there is no question that the presence of a
foreign underclass has become a perennial demographic characteristic of all the
GCC States, some have suggested that individual transnational migrants are
8
These percentages differ slightly from those previously reported in Qatar. For example, the 2010
SESRI Omnibus survey found that the Filipino migrant population made up 10% of the total
migrant population. These differences are partly explained by the continually shifting sources of
foreign labour throughout the GCC, but more directly by the QR2,000 screening for monthly
income deployed in this survey.
increasingly extending their stay in the region.9 Our data are more indicative of the
opposite – that the low-income labour force in Qatar remains a temporary and trans-
nationally cyclical labour force. The duration of stay of low-income migrants in
Qatar varied, from less than 1 year to 45 years, with a mean of 5.5 years and a
median of 4 years. Over half of the migrants we sampled (58%) had been present in
Qatar 4 years or less. The graph in Fig. 6.1 presents the overall distribution of the
migrants’ length of stay in Qatar in early 2012, the time of the survey (Fig. 6.1).
Our survey also asked subjects to estimate how long they intended to remain in
Qatar. While their long-range plans and aspirations are frequently scuttled by the
challenging realities of life as a labour migrant in Qatar, on average the migrants in
our survey intended to remain in Qatar for an average of 3.6 years beyond the date
they were surveyed (after excluding 17% of respondents who said they did not
know). However, a bit more inspection of the data revealed interesting and notewor-
thy patterns. First, of the 1189 migrants surveyed, over one-fifth intended to return
home after the conclusion of their current contract. Moreover, the average intended
stay was much higher for migrants from some sending states such as Pakistan
(6.8 years) and Egypt (6 years) than for those from Bangladesh (4.9), India (3.7), the
Philippines (3.2) and Nepal (2.6 years). Overall, we believe that this quantitative
portrait of low-income migrants in Qatar indicates that substantial numbers of
migrants – and particularly South Asian migrants – clearly conceptualize their stay
as a temporary one. This portrait of low-income migrants in Qatar generally fits
descriptions of the migrant population as a temporary and transnationally cyclical
population rather than a growing and imminent population of semi-permanent dia-
sporic residents.
30
25
20
Percent
15
10
5
0
less than 2 2 to 3 4 to 5 6 to 7 8 to 9 10 or more
Years since beginning work in Qatar
Fig. 6.1 Duration of low-income migrants’ stay in Qatar, 2012
9
For example, this was a central premise in recent workshop convened at Oxford University, enti-
tled Migrations to the Gulf Countries: From Exception to Normality, held on 18 June 2010.
Further extending this hypothesis, our survey found that low-income migrants in
Qatar typically had little or no previous work experience outside their home coun-
try. The great majority of low-income foreign workers in Qatar (68%) were first-
time migrants. Conversely, about one-third (32%) of the low-income migrants in
Qatar had previous experience working outside their country of origin. Nearly two-
thirds of those previous migrants (64%, or 21% of the total sample) had previous
work experience specifically in one of the GCC states. Although previous labour
migration experience was varied, low-income migrants in Qatar were employed in
a constellation of different vocations. Altogether, survey participants listed more
than 80 different job titles. A quarter (25%) of the participants described their job
title as ‘labourer’ or ‘helper’, job titles that are often (but not always) analogous to
the Euro-American idea of a ‘construction worker’. Other common responses
included driver (10%), cleaner (6%), mason (5%), carpenter (6%), electrician (4%),
painter (3%), salesman (3%) and security guard (3%).
The average and median monthly salaries reported by the foreign workers in our
sample were respectively QR1,061 (US$291) and QR1,000 (US$274). On average,
the workers in our sample sent home an average of QR764 (US$209) every month,
with an average monthly living expense in Qatar of QR418 (US$114). In addition
to the migrant’s reported basic salary, low-income migrants reported various other
sources of remuneration while in Qatar: Over half (56%) worked overtime and
received overtime pay, with a monthly average amount of QR327 (US$90); a third
(33%) received a food allowance, with a monthly average amount of QR228
(US$63); only 2% of the migrants surveyed had additional remunerated part time
work, with an average monthly supplemental income of QR399 (US$110). As many
researchers have noted, much of the money remitted from Qatar and the other Gulf
States is typically used, first and foremost, to service debts incurred to send migrants
to the Gulf States in the first place. As discussed in Sect. 4 of this chapter, low-
income labourers in Qatar report a mean total migration cost of US$1031. While
nearly 3 of 10 (29%) of our respondents reported paying nothing for migration, the
amount of the average migration cost for low-income migrants is considerable,
given the average of the salaries reported by respondents in our sample.10
Overall, the findings presented in this section generally align with the qualitative
estimations described previously by researchers and scholars working in the
GCC. Through the processes of chain migration, the composition of the low-income
labour forces in other GCC states often differs significantly. Although the national
proportions in these low-income migrant populations may vary between GCC coun-
tries, in the GCC states, all the various migrant populations are nationally diverse.
10
In our data set, we utilized a ‘total cost of migration’ estimate because we felt that the migrants
themselves could provide us with a better and more reliable estimate than we could generate using
any method that attempted to grapple with the diversity of costs they often face. For reliability,
these costs were reported to us in the home (sending country) currency. Considering the fact that
the migrants in our sample had arrived in Qatar in several different decades, we adjusted and con-
verted these amounts to US dollars based on the appropriate exchange rates at the time the amount
was paid.
In Qatar, this low-income migrant labour force is also religiously diverse and con-
sists mostly of first-time migrants. Even though our sample was specifically tailored
to locate and survey workers who make under QR2,000 a month, we were nonethe-
less surprised by the variable levels of income within those parameters. In all these
reported data, we saw ample evidence of a migration system that results in a transi-
tory and temporary workforce. As reported, the vast majority of low-income
migrants were relatively new arrivals in Qatar, and large numbers of our respon-
dents wished to return home permanently at the conclusion of their current contract
or after the contract following the current one. Although it is clear that foreign
workers have become a perennial feature of GCC demography, we see little support
for contentions that the majority of migrants in Qatar have established a more per-
manent life abroad or intend to do so.
Arranging for Work in Qatar
In the existing literature concerning labour migration in the Gulf States, there is
little clarity about the processes and procedures by which potential migrants secure
employment in Qatar or the other GCC states. With some notable exceptions,
detailed qualitative portraits of the transnational labour brokerage system are not
available.11 In part, this is because more pressing issues (migrants’ experiences
while abroad, remittance flows to sending countries) have eclipsed concern for this
particular and complicated juncture of the migration experience. Perhaps more
importantly, the labour brokerage system in the sending states is difficult to study:
labour brokers are reluctant to speak about their methods and profits, and the system
itself is geographically diffuse. While it does not provide a comprehensive portrait
of the mechanics of the labour brokerage system, this section of the chapter does
explore those parts of our data set that relate directly to the process by which
employment is obtained in Qatar.
For readers unfamiliar with labour migration in Qatar and the Arab Gulf States,
all migrants to the GCC submit to the sponsorship system (in Arabic, the kafala).
This system locks the foreign worker to a particular job, and that worker’s sponsor
is his or her primary representative in the institutions and ministries that regulate the
migrant population. He or she cannot legally obtain other employment in Qatar
without that sponsor’s permission. As a system, the kafala exists at the junction
between law and custom,12 reinforced by legal contracts, typically 2 years in length,
11
Notable exceptions include Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle (2000); Breeding, ‘India-
Persian Gulf Migration: Corruption and Capacity in Regulating Recruitment Agencies’, in Migrant
Labour in the Persian Gulf, eds Kamrava and Babar (2012).
12
The historical emergence of the kafala is perhaps best described by Elizabeth Frantz in ‘Exporting
Subservience: Sri Lanka Women’s Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan’ (2011). For an expla-
nation of the connections between culture and the kafala as law, see Gardner, ‘Engulfed’, (2010),
pp. 212–13.
signed by most migrants. Over the past decades, the work visas that permit men and
women to enter this employment system have been commodified. Prospective
migrants often pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars for the right to work in
Qatar or one of the other Gulf States for 2 years (Human Rights Watch 2009;
Gardner 2010a, b); in doing so, they typically risk significant familial and house-
hold resources. The debts incurred to meet these migration costs remain in the send-
ing country; migrants in Qatar often spend their first year or more attempting to pay
back the debts incurred for the visa costs associated with their transnational migra-
tion (Gardner 2011, 2012). Over the past decade, the kafala (sponsorship system)
and the labour brokerage system have been the focal point of a global human-rights-
based critique.13 Qatar and many of the other GCC states have long been exploring
the possibility of altering aspects of this system in response to these assessments
(Anon 2012; Toumi 2012).
In our sample, over half of the migrants (56%) reportedly obtained their position
in Qatar through a labour broker in their home country. Most of the remainder
secured their position through family connections (21%) or friends (22%) already
working in Qatar. This clearly suggests that the formal labour migration system
(labour brokerages in sending countries, mostly connected to manpower agencies or
other employers in the receiving countries) continues to coexist with the informal,
network-based system that historically characterized labour migration to the region.
In addition to these variable pathways to employment in Qatar and the GCC, we
found that over half (60%) of the migrants in our survey had friends or family who
had previously migrated to the Gulf States. We interpret this number as notably low:
Despite decades of migration between the common sending states and the GCC, a
vast reservoir of human capital with little or no experience with, and understanding
of, the Gulf migration system continues to flow to Qatar and the other GCC states.
While there is often consternation in Qatar and the other GCC states about
undocumented migrants, almost all (96%) of the low-income workers in our survey
arrived under a formal work visa. Although previous qualitative analysis often por-
trays the associated work visa fees as a ubiquitous aspect of Gulf migration, we
were surprised to find that only 71% of the migrants in our sample paid for their
visa. Low-income migrants in Qatar paid an average of US$1031 for the right to
work in Qatar for 2 years (with a median amount of US$933). Since this is a sub-
stantial sum for most potential migrants and their respective households, and since
a large majority of low-income migrants pay these work visa fees, our survey also
explored how migrants assembled the necessary funds. The three most significant
sources of funding for these trips were loans (reported by 45% of migrants sur-
veyed), household/family savings (30%) and personal savings (26%).
Ideally, this transnational labour brokerage system provides potential migrants
with an opportunity to inspect and sign a labour contract in the sending country
prior to any agreement and prior to departure. However, in our survey, less than half
For example, ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Building a
13
Better World Cup’.

(44%) of low-income migrants signed a contract before departing for work in Qatar,
and most (78%) of those who did sign a contract before departing for Qatar were
required to sign another contract when they arrived in Qatar. Conversely, of the 56%
of low-income migrants who did not sign a contract before departing, slightly more
than two-thirds (67%) were required to sign one upon arrival. Overall, these find-
ings point to a diversity of processes and arrangements that continues to coexist in
Qatar: Some migrants never sign a contract, some migrants sign one contract before
departure, some migrants sign a contract only after arrival in Qatar, and some
migrants sign contracts before departure and after arrival. The large number of low-
income migrants who do not sign a contract before leaving for Qatar is surprising:
without a signed contract prior to departure, new migrants have to rely on the verbal
assurances of labour brokers, acquaintances and friends working in Qatar.
Overall, the transnational labour brokerage system and the labour contracts in
that system are portrayed as a key junction in the ongoing generation of labour
problems, exploitation and human trafficking in Qatar and the GCC (Human Rights
Watch 2012a, b; Gardner 2011, 2012; Breeding 2012). The data presented here
reinforce that analysis and, more generally, reinforce the role that misinformation,
deception and unrealistic expectations continue to play in the migration conduit
which shuttles migrants to Qatar and the other GCC countries (Gardner 2012).
Labour Problems
Qatar and all the GCC states perennially occupy the lower rungs of the US
Department of State’s Human Trafficking Report and have, in the past decade, been
subjected to scathing criticism for the various human rights violations systemati-
cally endured by migrants throughout the region (US Department of State 2007;
Human Rights Watch 2006, 2009, 2012a, b). These reports and evaluations were
preceded by a decade of ethnographic work that discerned many of the same prob-
lems and conditions among the population of foreign workers in the GCC states.
Much of the existing work, while qualitative in nature, paints a fairly dire portrait of
the living conditions and labour relations faced by migrants in the region. This sec-
tion reviews our findings in relation to several of the most commonly discussed
problems reported in the existing literature: passport confiscation, lack of documen-
tation, job switching, salary withholding and problems related to labour camps and
living conditions common to low-income foreign workers in Qatar and the neigh-
bouring states.
One of the most commonly reported problems in current research among
migrants in the Gulf States focuses on the control and possession of the migrant’s
passport. By law, Qatari sponsors or their delegates are allowed to possess the pass-
ports of the workers they sponsor only for the period of time required to complete
residency or renewal processes (Jaffir 2009). However, as researchers and human
rights activists have long noted, it is common practice for employers to maintain
possession of worker passports for the entire duration of their stay abroad.14 This
practice is often framed by employers as means of ensuring workers do not flee the
country or otherwise abscond from their contractual obligations. Our findings con-
firmed the widespread nature of passport confiscation among the lowest economic
segment of the foreign workforce: 90% of the respondents in our survey reported
that their employer possessed their passport.15 It is worth noting that our qualitative
interviews also revealed that some migrants were content with the status quo, par-
ticularly since they felt they had no secure location at their labour camps in which
to store important documents like the passport. Regardless of the migrant perspec-
tive on this issue, the high proportion of migrants who lack possession of their
passport is a testament to the poor enforcement of this law.
Although possession of the passport remains a predominant issue for migrants,
sponsors and their proxies also fail frequently to document, properly and legally, the
workers they bring to Qatar under the sponsorship system. Small sections of the
foreign workforce are partly undocumented, in the sense that they have never
received a residence permit, or that a previously valid residence permit was never
renewed. In our survey, 7% of the foreign workers reported that they did not have a
QID (residence permit). Similarly, a much larger percentage (56%) of the workers
lacked a government-mandated ‘health card’, which is needed for accessing health
care in the state’s expansive public health system. Failing to provide low-income
migrants with a residence permit and/or a health card is generally assumed to result
from employers seeking to avoid the fees and surcharges levied by the government
for each of these types of official documentation.
Salary withholding is also commonly identified as a widespread problem among
this segment of the foreign workforce in Qatar and the other GCC states. Through
the imbalances of power resulting from the sponsorship arrangement, through the
lack of enforcement or regulation of employer practices and through the inexperi-
ence of many first-time migrants to the region, unscrupulous sponsors can readily
withhold months of salary from employees. In our findings, 21% of low-income
workers in Qatar reported that they received their salary on time only sometimes,
rarely or never. This should be compared with the 79% who reported that they ‘usu-
ally’ or ‘always’ received their salary on time. The average amount owed to these
workers was QR 1750 (US$481) with a median amount of QR 1400 (US$385).
Our survey also asked respondents to identify the employers’ justifications for
withholding their salaries. Those justifications included deductions related to ‘visa
14
For example, Longva, Walls Built on Sand; Longva, ‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check’;
Human Rights Watch, ‘Dubai: Migrant Workers at Risk’; McGeehan, ‘Trafficking in Persons or
State Sanctioned Exploitation? The False Narrative of Migrant Workers in the United Arab
Emirates’, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 26 (2012).
15
Although previous surveys in Qatar have, at times, utilized different methodologies and designs,
earlier reports concerning the frequency of passport confiscation in Qatar have been strikingly
similar: 91% [SESRI, ‘First Annual Omnibus Survey’, p. 17] and 88% [Pessoa et al., ‘The State of
Migrant Workers in Qatar’, p. 11].
fees’, absence from the workplace, perceived poor job performance, ‘agent fees’,
insurance and ‘security deposit’. Survey respondents, quite commonly, also reported
that no reason was given at all. While most low-income workers in Qatar always or
usually receive their salary on time, the experience of this 21% of the low-income
workforce suggests that employers and their proxies, empowered by the sponsorship
relationship and the lack of oversight, can and sometimes do act with impunity with
regard to their employees’ salary.
Our findings related to ‘job switching’ – the reportedly common scenario in
which migrants are promised one job in their home country, but find themselves on
arrival directed to work in an entirely different job – were somewhat ambivalent. In
Qatar, 15% of low-income migrants found themselves put to work a different posi-
tion when they arrived. Similarly, 20% arrived in Qatar to a salary different from the
one promised to them in the sending country. However, when we correlated these
two sets of workers with answers to a second survey question concerning overall job
satisfaction in Qatar, in both cases the number of migrants who self-reported as
being ‘satisfied’ or ‘somewhat satisfied’ with their job was significantly higher than
those who were ‘somewhat unsatisfied’ or ‘not satisfied at all’ (78% versus 47% in
the case of having the same job, and 78% versus 56% in the case of receiving the
promised salary). These findings suggest that while ‘job switching’ (and alterations
to the promised salary) are relatively common, those changes are not always per-
ceived by migrants as detrimental to their overall interests.
Finally, our research team asked low-income migrants a series of questions
related to the labour camps in which most of them live. A great majority of the low-
income migrants in Qatar (88%) reported that their accommodation in Qatar was
provided by their employer, while the rest arranged for their own accommodation.
Regarding the labour camps themselves, survey enumerators recorded the type of
camp for all participants in the survey. Dormitory-style camps were the most com-
mon (40%), followed by ‘villa camps’ (single Qatari family homes now occupied
by contingents of workers) (25%), apartment flats (16%), portacabins (7%), private
homes (5%) and other types of accommodations (7%) (Fig. 6.2).16 As noted earlier
in this chapter, migrants in Qatar reported an average of just over six people per
room. The survey also inquired about the supplies of electricity, water and the provi-
sion of air conditioning. Overall, small proportions of low-income migrants faced
challenges in this area: 5% reported that they sometimes or never had sufficient
water at their camp, 2% reported that they sometimes or never had a sufficient sup-
ply of electricity at their camp and 2% reported that they sometimes or never had
ample air conditioning in their rooms.
For more information and detail concerning labour camps in Qatar and the GCC, see Bruslé,
16
‘Who’s in a Labour Camp? A Socio-Economic Analysis of Nepalese Migrants in Qatar’, European

Bulletin of Himalayan Research 35–6 (2009–10); Gardner, ‘Labor Camps in the Gulf States’,
Viewpoints: Migration and the Gulf (2010); Marsden, ‘Lords of a Dubai Labour Camp: Pakistani
Migrants in the Gulf’, ILAS Newsletter 49 (2008).
Fig. 6.2 Living quarters

for low-income labor
migrants in qatar
Nationality, Ethnicity, Religion and Migrant Success
One of the open questions amenable to quantitative analysis in labour migration

studies in the Arabian Gulf concerns the variability of migration experiences among
the low-income population. So far, this chapter has considered the surveyed popula-
tion as a homogeneous group. In this section, however, we examine and explore
patterns and variations in the circumstances and experiences of low-income
migrants, with particular attention to variations by nationality, ethnicity and reli-
gion. Although the sample sizes for some of these migrant subpopulations were
small, we nonetheless discerned the significant role played by some of these vari-
ables in determining low-income labourers’ circumstances and experiences in
Qatar. Because of the limitations of our sample, these findings should be understood
as suggestive rather than representative.
With the limitations of the sample in mind, the data allowed us to explore the
impact of nationality on migrant experiences and outcomes. Significant differences
are readily apparent in the basic salary levels received by low-income migrant
labourers from different sending countries when obtaining work in Qatar. Basic
monthly salaries for low-income workers from the Philippines (mean = QR1,443)
and Egypt (mean = QR1,454) were, for example, substantially higher than those
obtained by workers from Nepal (mean = QR853), the lowest-earning nationality in
Qatar’s population of low-income migrants. Moreover, obvious correlations
between average monthly salaries and the value of the commodified Qatari work
visa were not apparent (Fig. 6.3): for instance, low-income Bangladeshi migrants
paid much more for the right to work in Qatar than other nationalities, but arrived to
earn some of the lowest wages (mean = QR1,050/month) among all low-income
migrants. Conversely, Filipino workers were among the highest earners from our
sample of low-income workers (mean = QR1,443/month), but paid the least in total
migration costs to come to Qatar.
Fig. 6.3 Monthly basic salary and migration costs, by nationality
Overall, these data and variations by nationality can be partly explained by a

confluence of forces and processes in the transnational migration industry that shut-
tles workers from sending states to Qatar and the other states of the GCC. Some
sending states have established bilateral agreements or unilateral policies that insu-
late migrants from exploitative labour relations, that instigate minimum wages for
their transnational migrants, or that help potential migrants navigate the complexi-
ties of a transnational work arrangement before they travel abroad. In the Philippines,
for example, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 established a
certification process for host countries, increased oversight of recruitment agencies,
levied penalties for common offenses (including illegal recruitment) and much
more (Agunias et al., 2012). Variations induced by these policies and agreements
often coalesce with the organic patterning of labour migration to the region, a pro-
cess through which men and women from particular sending states are perceived by
GCC-based sponsors, manpower agencies and employers as ‘appropriate’ for par-
ticular types of work (Indonesian women as domestic servants, West African
migrants as security guards and so forth). Combined with the process of chain
migration (where migrants already in Qatar arrange for friends or acquaintances to
follow their migratory path) and price-based competition in the globalized labour
market, numerous forces and processes collude in patterning this transnational
migration flow over time.
We were also interested in the impact of ethnicity and cultural affiliation on
migration experiences. To gauge the differences in the migration experiences by
ethnicity, we classified all of our respondents into one of three categories: South
Asian, Arab or Other. ‘South Asian’ included low-income migrant workers from
Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In our sample, ‘Arab’ included
migrant workers primarily from Egypt, along with a few migrant workers from
Syria. The classification of ‘Other’, omitted from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, included
migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere. While many of the variables
established in our survey yielded no discernible differences when examined through
the lens of ethnicity, we noted significant differences in several key areas when
comparing the experiences of these two ethnic groups (Table 6.1). For example,
although our sample included only small numbers of Arab migrants, those migrants’
Table 6.1 Averages for key variables, by ethnicity

Basic salary Total migration Workdays/ Owed money by
(QAR) cost (USD) week Roommates employer?
Arab 1446 1604 5.87 4.93 0.0%
South 1028 1052 6.18 6.17 11.0%
Asian
Table 6.2 Averages for key variables for South Asian migrants, by religion
Basic salary Total migration Workdays/ Owed money by
(QAR) cost (USD) week Roommates employer?
Muslim 1169 1190 6.10 5.60 13.16%
Hindu 916 984 6.22 6.63 9.46%
salaries were, on average, QR418 (US$114) higher than their South Asian counter-
parts. Those higher salaries, however, corresponded with higher up-front costs for
migration to Qatar. On average, low-income migrants from Egypt and Syria paid
almost QR552 (US$151) more for the right to work in Qatar than those from the
South Asia. Once in Qatar, Arab low-income migrants in our sample reported work-
ing fewer days per week and living in slightly less crowded conditions; unlike their
South Asian counterparts, they reported no problems with salary withholding
(Table 6.1).17
The data do not allow us to ascertain some of the causal forces determining these
differences, but we can at least speculate on the basis of our own observations,
qualitative follow-up interviews and other previous ethnographic work. However,
from those sources, we speculate that even low-income Arab migrants, with a cul-
tural and linguistic facility in Qatari society, are better able to assert their basic
rights, build and call upon social capital while abroad, navigate the bureaucratic
complexities of work in Qatar and respond appropriately to alterations in their liv-
ing and working situation while abroad. While the total cost of migration to Qatar is
higher for this Arab sub-population of the low-income workforce, our data reveal
that their living and working conditions are substantially better than those of their
South Asian counterparts.
With those findings concerning ethnicity and migration in hand, we approached
the same issues again through the lens of religion. By distilling only those cases
where our respondents were South Asian, we were able to examine the impact of
religious affiliation on the migration experience and circumstances, while control-
ling for ethnicity (Table 6.2). Our findings were much less conclusive than when
driven by ethnicity alone: While low-income Muslim migrants from South Asia
earn an average of QR248 more than their Hindu counterparts and live in less
crowded conditions, their workdays per week are almost equal, and Muslim low-
income foreign workers from South Asia actually report a higher frequency of
17
Note that the small numbers of Arab migrants in our sample make these data speculative at best.
employers withholding their salary than their Hindu counterparts (Table 6.2). In our
interpretation, these data suggest that unlike ethnicity, cultural affiliation and flu-
ency in Arabic, religious affiliation alone does not play a discernibly significant role
in the migrant’s experience in the foreign low-income workforce in Qatar.
Overall, while our general findings suggest that low-income migrant labourers in
Qatar face a similar regime of strictures, practices and challenges, there is signifi-
cant variation within the total population of low-income migrants. Of the three vari-
ables explored in this section, nationality and ethnicity seem to play the most
significant role in shaping migrant experiences. In part, these differences can be
explained by the historical development and subsequent differentiation of the migra-
tion apparatus in each sending state. Over time, we hypothesize that migration expe-
riences and migration costs become established and normalized in a variety of
different cultural and ethnic contexts. The large and substantial fees paid to labour
brokers in Bangladesh, for example, become normalized over time in Bangladesh,
while the smaller fees paid by Filipino migrants are, over time, normalized in the
Philippines as the typical and appropriate costs of Gulf employment. At the same
time, however, there is the striking coincidence that the Philippines, with one of the
most active states in terms of its regulation and management of this transnational
migration flow, is also the nation with the lowest migration costs in the constellation
of countries sending low-income migrants to Qatar.
We also recognize that market forces most certainly play a role in this calculus.
The fact that the lowest-paid national contingent (the Nepali contingent) is also the
largest component of Qatar’s low-income labour force is what one would expect in
an international market in which labour is the commodity. Our interpretation of
these data is influenced by the numerous stories we heard in qualitative interviews
concerning entire national contingents of low-income labourers being replaced by
less expensive migrants from Nepal or elsewhere. While we recognize the important
role played by the forces implicit in this international market for labour in determin-
ing the constitution of the low-income labour force in Qatar and the other GCC
states, the data presented in this section also point to the role of nationality, ethnicity
and cultural affiliation in shaping the experiences of the men and women in the low-
income foreign labour force.
Discussion and Conclusion
The burgeoning quantity of research, studies and reports concerned with Qatar and
its neighbours have spotlighted the junction between labour migration and human
rights in the GCC. Our growing understanding of this migratory conduit has long
relied on a qualitative, ethnographic foundation. That ethnographic work has
explored and unpacked the complex arrangements and junctures that typify this
migrant flow and has more recently been joined by a florescence of publications
from non-governmental organizations and other state-based actors and institutions.
While all of this collective work has been instrumental in shifting concern with
labour migration in the GCC away from the periphery of scholarly and public atten-
tion, our collective understanding remains largely limited to ethnographically pro-
duced insights and their corroboration in small-scale studies and rapid appraisals.18
The data set and analysis presented in this chapter are intended to address this issue
and to add a statistical foundation to our current understanding of labour migration
in Qatar and the GCC as a whole. While we see no points of major disagreement
with the existing canon of research concerning migrants in the Gulf States, the find-
ings presented here help by adding to the expanding and nuanced portrait of the
labour migrant in Arabia. These findings also indicate a host of more specific issues
that merit further research and analysis.
From our vantage point, some of those specific issues would include the fact that
low-income migrants pay extraordinarily different amounts for the right to work in
Qatar for 2 years. These amounts certainly vary by sending nation, but they also
coexist with the fact that some low-income migrants pay nothing at all. A better
understanding of the brokerage system, the commodification of the work visa and
the circumstances that produce exceptions to the norm is needed. A significant per-
centage of low-income migrants also encounter a constellation of labour problems
in Qatar, from the almost ubiquitous relinquishing of their passports to sponsors or
sponsors’ proxies, to the non-payment of promised wages and various fees and
deductions appropriated from their promised salaries. While the analysis presented
here has been attentive to some of the ethnic, national and religious patterns that
may bring about these experiences, a better understanding of the legal and ministe-
rial context that permits, condones and/or overlooks these experiences is also needed.
Regarding the interpretation and findings presented in this chapter, several
important caveats are worth mentioning. First, because our sample of low-income
migrants excluded all workers in the domestic sector, these findings do not incorpo-
rate the problems and challenges that ethnographic work portrays as commonplace
(and perhaps even endemic) to that sector (Nagy 1998; Gamburd 2000). Considering
the observations and findings found in previous work focused on the domestic sec-
tor, we suspect that many of the frequencies ascertained here – and particularly
those concerned with labour problems – would rise if our sample had incorporated
migrant workers in the domestic sector.
Furthermore, while we hope that these findings can eventually be correlated and
compared with similar quantitative data describing the low-income labour migrant
population in other GCC states, we recognize that a confluence of forces has, his-
torically, patterned different demographic constitutions in those receiving states, as
well as different experiences for low-income migrants. We expect that such a com-
parison would largely support the contention that the GCC states generally com-
prise a singular and fairly homogeneous experience for low-income migrants, but
also that noteworthy and possibly substantial differences would be observed as a
For example, ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Building
18
Towers, Cheating Workers’; Human Rights Watch, The Island of Happiness; Human Rights Watch,
‘Building a Better World Cup’; Human Rights Watch, ‘For a Better Life’; Gardner, City of
Strangers.
result of different policies, laws, bilateral agreements, enforcement and labour cul-
ture, specific to each GCC state.
With regard to what these findings contribute conceptually to our understanding
of labour migration in Arabia, we suggest that first and foremost the data described
here point to the variability of the migration experience in Qatar. As previous work
has argued, by distributing the responsibility of regulating and governing foreign
workers to sponsors and their proxies, the kafala produces highly variable experi-
ences among migrants in the region (Longva 1997). This also seems to be the
portrait resulting from our review of the data sketched in this chapter. Without a
proactive and established legal and regulatory system in place and in operation, the
fate of a low-income migrant worker depends heavily on his or her sponsor and that
sponsor’s proxies. Low-income migrants in Qatar encounter all sorts of different
challenges and difficulties, although in many realms of the migration experience,
there is extraordinary variation in the frequency and impact of these issues. We
interpret this variation as the direct result of the kafala arrangement and the vari-
ability it structures.
Finally, although the kafala is paramount in framing the findings presented here,
it is also important to note that few Qataris are employed in positions that directly
supervise and manage low-income migrants in Qatar. Unlike Bahrain, Oman and
some other GCC states, Qatar’s extraordinary per capita wealth allows most citizens
to secure public sector employment. While citizens may be partners, silent partners,
owners or hold other positions in the business concerns that employ these low-
income migrants, it is typical of Qatar that the individuals directly involved in the
governance of contingents of foreign labourers are themselves migrants. As this
suggests, the data presented here should not be framed as evidence of how transna-
tional migrants are simply exploited by Qataris in Qatar. Rather, with both debt and
money circulating transnationally through that migration system, with migrants
themselves coming from a variety of different sending states, and with other
migrants often directly responsible for some or most of the challenges and exploita-
tion they face while abroad in Qatar, it is difficult to construe this migration system
and the problems that it currently produces as a purely Qatari – or even Arab – prob-
lem. Instead, the data presented here further confirm an understanding of labour
migration in the GCC states as the manifestation of a truly transnational migration
industry.
References
Agunias, D., Aghazarm, C., & Battistella, G. (2012). International Organization for Migration
Report “Labour migration from Colombo process countries”.
Anon. (2012, September 27). Kuwait to get rid of Kefala system. The Gulf Blog. Available online
at www.thegulfblog.com
Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2011, March). Labour immigration and labour markets in the GCC coun-
tries: National patterns and trends (LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance
and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research paper 15). Available online at www2.lse.ac.uk/
government/research/resgroups/kuwait/home.aspx
Breeding, M. (2012). India-Persian gulf migration: Corruption and capacity in regulating recruit-
ment agencies. In M. Kamrava & Z. Babar (Eds.), Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf (pp. 137–
154). New York: Columbia University Press.
Bruslé, T. (2009). Who’s in a labour camp? A socio-economic analysis of Nepalese migrants in
Qatar. European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 35–6(2009–2010), 154–170.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). (2007). International migration
and development in the Arab Region: Challenges and opportunities (UN population and devel-
opment report, 3rd issue). New York: The United Nations.
Endo, I., & Afram, G. G. (2011). The Qatar-Nepal remittance corridor (World Bank Study).
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Frantz, E. (2011). Exporting subservience: Sri Lanka women’s migration for domestic work in
Jordan, PhD thesis: London School of Economics.
Gamburd, M. R. (2000). The kitchen Spoon’s handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s migrant
housemaids. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gardner, A. (2010a). City of strangers: Gulf migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain.
Ithaca: Cornell/ILR Press.
Gardner, A. (2010b). Engulfed: Indian guest workers, Bahraini citizens and the structural violence
of the Kafala system. In N. De Genova & N. Peutz (Eds.), The deportation regime: Sovereignty,
space, and freedom of movement (pp. 305–349). Durham: Duke University Press.
Gardner, A. (2011). Gulf migration and the family. Journal of Arabian Studies, 1, 3–25.
Gardner, A. (2012). Why do they keep coming? Labor migrants in the Gulf states. In M. Kamrava
& Z. Babar (Eds.), Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf (pp. 41–58). New York: Columbia
University Press.
Human Rights Watch. (2003). Dubai: Migrant workers at risk. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2006). Building towers cheating workers: Exploitation of migrant con-
struction workers in the United Arab Emirates (Vol. 8.18). New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2009). “The island of happiness”: Exploitation of migrant workers on
Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2012a). Building a better world cup: Protecting migrant workers in Qatar
Ahead of FIFA 2022. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2012b). For a better life: Migrant worker abuse in Bahrain and the govern-
ment reform agenda. New York: Human Rights Watch.
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). (2011). Hidden faces of the Gulf miracle.
Union View 21, pp. 1–24. Available online at www.ituc-csi.org/hidden-faces-of-the-gulf-mira-
cle,9144.html?lang=en
Jaffir, A. (2009). Sponsorship law: A comparative study of the 20th century sponsorship law and
the 21st century sponsorship law in Qatar. Law Update, 219. Available online at http://alta-
mimi.newsweaver.ie/Newsletter/10o0jspqam5.
Jureidini, R. (2003). Migrant workers and xenophobia in the Middle East. Identities, conflict and
cohesion programme (Paper 2). Switzerland: UN Research Institute for Social Development.
Available online at www.unrisd.org
Kamrava, M., & Babar, Z. (Eds.). (2012). Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Kanna, A. (2011). Dubai: The city as corporation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kapiszewski, A. (2001). Nationals and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the Gulf
Cooperation Council States. Reading: Ithaca Press/Garnet Publishing.
Kapiszewski, A. (2006). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. Presented at
the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in
the Arab Region, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United
Nations Secretariat, Beirut, 15–17 May 2006.
Longva, A. (1997). Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion and Society in Kuwait. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Longva, A. (1999). Keeping migrant workers in check: The Kafala system in the Gulf. Middle East
Report, 211, 20–22.
Marsden, M. (2008). Lords of a Dubai labour camp: Pakistani migrants in the Gulf. ILAS
Newsletter, 49, 5–6.
McGeehan, N. (2012). Trafficking in persons or state sanctioned exploitation? The false narrative
of migrant Workers in the United Arab Emirates. Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law,
26, 27–39.
Nagy, S. (1998). ‘This time I think I’ll try a Filipina’: Global and local influences on the relations
between foreign household workers and their employers in Doha, Qatar. City and Society, 10,
83–103.
Pessoa, S., Carlson, M., Al Thani, H., Kamel, S., Nedjari, H., Ramadan, R., & Watfa, K. (2008).
The state of migrant workers in Qatar: The workers’ perspective (Final report of the QNRF
undergraduate research experience program project #07-12-03).
Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI). (2010). First annual omnibus survey: A
survey of life in Qatar (Executive summary report). Doha: Qatar University.
Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI). (2011). Annual omnibus survey: A survey
of life in Qatar, 2011 (Executive summary report). Doha: Qatar University. Available online at
http://cisco.qu.edu.qa
Strobl, S. (2009). Policing housemaids: The criminalization of domestic workers in Bahrain.
British Journal of Criminology, 49, 165–183.
Toumi, H. (2012, May 1). Qatar May Allow Trade Unions, Scrap ‘Sponsorships’ for Foreign
Workers. Gulf News. Available online at www.gulfnews.com
US Department of State. (2007, June). Trafficking in persons report. Washington, DC: Under
Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs. Available online at
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/
Chapter 7
Determinants of Future Indonesian
Labour Migration to the Gulf
Graeme Hugo
Abstract Indonesia has a long history of labour migration to Gulf countries. This
chapter examines the evolution of this movement and its determinants with a view
to identifying likely future flows and their determinants. Indonesia has been a quint-
essential migration source nation, but recent demographic, social and economic
developments are producing some significant changes, which will influence the
scale and composition of future emigration.
Introduction
Indonesia has been one of the world’s most important emigration nations over
recent decades, and Gulf countries have been a major destination. Indeed, Indonesia
has been a quintessential emigration nation with high rates of growth of its work-
force, high underemployment and increasing levels of unemployment, especially
among the educated and the young. However, Indonesia is undergoing rapid eco-
nomic, social and demographic change, which is predicted to see it moves from
currently being the sixteenth-largest economy in the world to the seventh largest by
2030 (Oberman et al. 2012, 2). To what extent will the changes currently sweeping
Indonesia impinge on its role as a pre-eminent source of labour migrants?
The chapter begins with an analysis of recent labour flows from Indonesia to the
Gulf countries and summarizes what is known of the drivers and impacts of those
movements. It identifies the areas and groups which have been the main sources from
which these migrant workers have been drawn. It then examines recent demographic,
social and economic trends in those areas and argues that there has been a reduction
in the push pressures in those areas not only due, partly, to reduced population growth
but also due to the development of a range of alternative economic opportunities.
One of the major factors in bringing about these changes has been the prolonged
G. Hugo (*)
Australian Population and Migration Research Centre, University of Adelaide,
Adelaide, SA, Australia

104 G. Hugo
inflow of remittances into these areas as a result of the long history of migration to
the Gulf. On the other hand, the development, maintenance and strengthening of
social networks between these areas and the Middle East are a strong element in
maintaining the flow. Indeed, many of these linkages are direct to families in Middle
Eastern countries and will result in continuity in the migration pattern.
Another element that will be examined is the policy content in Indonesia.
Indonesian governments are taking an increasing interest in labour migration and
increasingly building it into development strategies. However, there also have been
concerns about the rights of migrant workers, and bans have been imposed on par-
ticular countries and particular types of workers. Government policy and engage-
ment will be of additional importance in the future. Another element relates to the
increasing attraction of Asian destinations for Indonesian labour migrants. These
flows may well be enhanced after 2015 with the introduction of the ASEAN
Economic Community. This will be an important determinant of future patterns of
labour migration.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of likely future scenarios of labour
migration between Indonesia and the Middle East. It is argued that the migration
corridor which has been a development between Indonesia and particular Middle
Eastern countries has developed to such an extent that labour migration will be only
one element in a more varied pattern of movement. However, there will continue to
be significant demand for Indonesians to work in the Gulf for the foreseeable future.
A Quintessential Emigration Nation
The United Nations (2013a) identified some 2.99 million Indonesia-born persons
living in foreign countries and their distribution is shown in Fig. 7.1. The equivalent
figures in 1990 were 1.34 million which increased to 2.01 million in 2000 and 2.83
million in 2010. It is apparent from Fig. 7.1 that the Gulf countries of the Middle
East are an important destination for Indonesian emigrants. However, the United
Nations’ data probably miss significant numbers of contract labour migrant workers
since they are based mainly on censuses. Table 7.1, for example, shows a range of
estimates of the stocks of overseas migrant workers and indicates significantly
higher levels than the United Nations’ data. However, even these figures underesti-
mate the scale of labour migration. The Indonesian National Agency for Placement
and Protection of Indonesian Workers Abroad (BNP2KI), the Indonesian govern-
ment agency involved in managing labour migration authoritatively, estimates that
there are 6.5 million Indonesians working abroad who remitted $7.4 billion in 2013
(Migration News, 21, 2 April 2014). The reasons for the underestimation are the
significance of undocumented migration and the fact that much of the movement is
on temporary visas and not detected in population censuses.
There can be no doubt, however, that Indonesia globally is a major emigration
nation. It is the fourth-largest nation in the world, and despite rapid economic, social
and demographic change, it remains a ‘labour surplus’ nation. Although rates of pop-
7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 105
Fig. 7.1 Indonesia: Migrant Stocks by Country of Destination. (Source: United Nations 2013a)
Table 7.1 Indonesia: estimated stocks of overseas contract workers around 2013
Destination Estimated stocks Sources
Saudi Arabia 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 DeBel-Air (2014, p. 7)
Kuwait 64,780 IOM (2010a, p. 63)
United Arab Emirates 100,000 Ruiz (2012)
Malaysia 2,000,000 Migration News, April 2013, Vol. 20, No.
2
Hong Kong 150,600 Migration News, April 2012, Vol. 19, No.
2
Singapore 54,400 Yeoh and Lin 2012
Taiwan 100,000 Jakarta Post, 6 October 2006
South Korea 31,000 Statistics Korea (2012)
Japan 22,862 Okushima (2005, p. 14)
Philippines 26,000 SCMP, 10 December 1998
Brunei 40,000 Hassan (2010)
Total 4,589,642
ulation growth have declined due to a reduction in fertility, it continues to grow and
the workforce is still growing. Moreover, although there have been major structural
changes in the economy and significant advances in education, there are still large
numbers of workers in low productivity jobs and high levels of underemployment.
The levels of unemployment are low by OECD standards; however, unemployment
in the Indonesian context is not comparable because there are no government unem-
106 G. Hugo
ployment provisions which means that the poor are forced to undertake some form of
employment regardless of its remuneration, danger, time demands, etc., because they
have to survive. Accordingly, whereas the unemployed in OECD nations tend to be
drawn predominantly from the poor in Indonesia, they are generally from the better-
off whose family can afford to support them until they can get the job they want.
Underemployment is a far more meaningful indication of a labour surplus
Evolution of Migration from Indonesia to the Gulf
Linkages between Indonesia and the Middle East go back many centuries when
Islam first came to the archipelago. For centuries, there have been Arab communi-
ties in Indonesia. Indonesains have been in working in Mecca for centuries
(Vredenbregt 1962). Associated with the hajj, communities of Indonesians devel-
oped in Mecca (Vredenbregt 1962, 109) during the colonial era, and they have been
maintained. Indonesians often worked in Saudi Arabia to fund their hajj. The
deployment of overseas contract workers (OCWs) to the Middle East, however, is
relatively recent. Although there were contract workers sent to Malaysia, Surinam,
Fiji and elsewhere during the colonial period, there were none sent to the Middle
East at this time (Hugo 1980).
Figure 7.2 presents the official statistics relating to the deployment of Indonesian
labour overseas, and the increasing tempo of movement is apparent as is the domi-
nance of the Middle East as the major destination. Since most workers are on 2 years
or longer contracts, the actual number of workers officially overseas in any 1 year is
greater than the numbers deployed in an individual year. Indonesia was slow to
develop its international contract worker industry in the 1970s following the 1973
oil shock when its ASEAN neighbours, the Philippines and Thailand were sending
large numbers of workers overseas, especially to the Middle East. Whereas in other
countries, the government became involved in sending workers to the Middle East,
but this did not happen in Indonesia until the early 1980s, although private agents in
Indonesia were sending small numbers of workers to the Middle East (Anon 1984).
Figure 7.2 shows clearly an increasing tempo of movement. The number of ‘offi-
cial’ international labour migrants was very small in the First Five-Year Plan
(1969–1974) but more than trebled to be nearly 20,000 in the Second Plan. During
the Third Five-Year Plan, it quadrupled to almost attain the target of 100,000. In the
following 2 years, the number moving was almost as great as the total over the entire
first three Five-Year Plans. This reflects both the government’s growing interest in
promoting this movement and also, perhaps, the ‘capturing’ of a greater proportion of
movement in official statistics than was previously the case. The increasing govern-
ment involvement saw targets for deploying OCWs overseas built into the F ive-Year
Plan from the Third Five-Year Plan onwards. The programme reached a new level in
the 1990s when the government became more active. The target of the Department of
Labour in sending labour migrants overseas in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1984–1989)
was 225,000, which was exceeded. This encouraged the government to increase the
Manpower, 1979-2013
800.00
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
year
Other malayasia/Singapore Middle East
Fig. 7.2 Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979–
2013. (Source: Suyono 1981; Singhanetra-Renard 1986, 52; Pusat Penelitian Kependudukan,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1986, 2; Antar Kerja Antar Negara; Soeprobo 2004; Ananta and Arifin
2008; BNP2KI (National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers), unpub-
lished data)
target for Repelita V (1989–1994) to 500,000 (Tempo, 45, XIX, 6 January 1990,
p. 15), and it was exceeded. Similarly, with Repelita VI (1994–1999), the unusual
increase in 1996–1997 was a function of more than 300,000 irregular labour migrants
in Malaysia being regularized. The onset of the Asian crisis in 1998 coincided with a
parametric increase in the outflow. Work overseas became a more attractive proposi-
tion because of the reduction in opportunities within Indonesia, a decrease in the
value of the rupiah and increased purchasing power of foreign earnings in Indonesia.
Thereafter, Figure 7.3 which uses the Migration Policy Database on flows of
Indonesian citizens into the Gulf indicates the upwards trend has continued.
Several important features of the official overseas worker scheme in Indonesia
need to be stressed. One is the dominance of women, most of whom are to be
employed as domestic workers at the destination. In 1997–1998, the sex ratio of the
outflow was one of the lowest on record being 20. The dominance of women seems
to have been reduced in recent years. This may be, at least in part, a function of bans
108 G. Hugo
700,000
600,000
500,000
Number
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000
2011
Year
Arrivals Departures
Fig. 7.3 Saudi Arabia: Arrivals and departures of non-Saudis with Indonesian country of citizen-
ship, 2000–2011
on the deployment of female domestic servants in Saudi Arabia and, for a period, in
Malaysia. Nevertheless, the dominance of women among official migrant workers
is one of the most consistent features of Indonesian international migration.
Saudi Arabia has remained the dominant destination of Indonesians working in
the Middle East, in part, reflecting the long association based on hajj migration. The
flows to the Middle East continued at high levels and reached a new high in 2009.
However, subsequently, there has been a significant fall, which is associated with a
prolonged ban on the deployment of Indonesian women to be employed as domestic
workers in Saudi Arabia.
The data in Fig. 7.2 relate to international labour migration which goes through
official channels, but there has been, and continues to be, significant irregular migra-
tion to both of the main areas of destination – Malaysia and the Middle East. In
relation to the Middle East, the following types of irregular migration can be
identified:
• OCWs recruited within Indonesia and sent overseas on tourist visa without going
through the official labour migration system.
• OCWs who travel to Saudi Arabia on a hajj or umrah visa and remain in the
region to work.
• OCWs who move through the official system but ‘run away’ from their employ-
ers because of abuse, exploitation, lack of payment or underpayment.
Their numbers vary from time to time, and irregular channels of migration
become most significant when there are some kinds of official bans as has recently
been the case with the ban on deployment of female domestic workers. Nevertheless,
the official OCW migration from Indonesia to Gulf Countries understates the full
scale of mobility. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the scale of undocumented
migration, but Andrevski and Lyneham (2014, 3) argue: ‘While official data indi-
cates that approximately 400,000 Indonesians migrate for work annually, (evidence)
... suggests one million may be a more accurate estimate when taking into account
documented and undocumented migration.’
Indonesian migration to the Gulf is overwhelmingly to Saudi Arabia, which in
most years is the largest single destination country. The UAR and Qatar are also in
the top 10 destinations, but the strongest linkages are with Saudi Arabia.
Feminization of Migration to the Gulf
Women have outnumbered men among official OCWs leaving Indonesia every year
since 1984–1985. Indeed, Indonesia is one of the largest countries of origin of
female migrant workers who are employed in domestic situations as household help
and carers. It is estimated that there are around a million Indonesian women in such
work at any one time. Table 7.2 presents an estimate of the numbers in individual
nations with the largest groups in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia although Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Singapore are increasingly significant. These women can be vulner-
able to exploitation not only by virtue of being a migrant (often undocumented) and
a woman but also because of the asymmetrical power relations of their work context
and the lack of protection because of households not being seen as workplaces by
protection agencies.
Reports of abuse of Indonesian female migrant domestic workers are many (e.g.
Asian Migration News, 1–15 November 2006), but there are also contexts where
Table 7.2 Estimates of stock of Indonesian female domestic overseas contract workers,

2011–2013
Country Number Sources
Saudi Arabia 1,000,000 Santolan (2011)
Malaysia 300,000 Jakarta Globe, 5 January 2012
Hong Kong 150,000 Amnesty International News, 21 November
2013
Singapore 90,000 Jakarta Globe, 5 January 2012
United Arab Emirates 65,000 Ruiz 2012
Taiwan 150,000 Kennedy 2012
Oman 29,000 Jakarta Globe, 3 July 2012
Bahrain 12,395 Jakarta Globe, 3 July 2012
Total 1,796,395
110 G. Hugo
women are empowered, and gain from this experience. In Qatar alone, 553
Indonesian domestic workers ‘ran away’ from their sponsors in 2005 because of
maltreatment, physical and sexual harassment, disputes over contracts and non-
payment of salary (Asian Migration News, 15–31 January 2006). In Saudi Arabia,
between 19 September and 24 October 2011, 4,550 workers had run away from their
employers after being unpaid or suffering abuse (Jakarta Globe, 7 November 2011).
There are a number of indicators of the problematic situation with Indonesian female
domestic workers in Saudi Arabia:
• A high rate of non-completion of work contracts and early return to Indonesia

among female domestic workers.
• High rates of ‘running away’ from individual employers.
• Significant numbers of female domestic workers who die in Saudi Arabia.
• High-profile cases where maids have been tried and executed for killing an
employer.
The problems of Indonesian female domestic workers in Saudi Arabia are of
long standing. A study more than two decades ago (Hugo 1992, 182–184) docu-
mented cases of mistreatment and exploitation and concerted efforts by Muslim
organizations, NGOs and human rights groups to ban the movement. In 2011,
Indonesia stopped sending domestic workers to Saudi Arabia after the Saudi gov-
ernment, without informing the Indonesian government, beheaded a domestic
worker who confessed to killing her employer (Migrant News, October 2013). This
ban is partly responsible for the overall downturn in the number of OCWs deployed
evident in Fig. 7.2. However, it is evident that many workers bound for Saudi Arabia
are, in fact, now travelling via other Gulf countries, especially the UAE. In addition,
there has been an increase in the numbers moving irregularly.
The Indonesian government has also occasionally placed bans on deployment of
workers to other Gulf countries. For example, it briefly banned sending domestic
workers to Bahrain because manpower agencies refused to accept new regulations
regarding a minimum salary (BP60 per month) and sick and annual leave entitle-
ments (Asian Migration News, 16–30 April 2005). There was a similar ban imposed
on the United Arab Emirates in response to human rights violations (Asian Migration
News, 1–15 February 2005), but as with other such bans, it had little impact on the
outflow of Indonesian migrant workers.
Labour Migration and Development in Indonesia
There is very limited empirical evidence to assess the impact of migration on eco-
nomic and social development in Indonesia. The main element which has been at
the centre of the new focus on the beneficial impact of migration upon development
in origin countries and communities has been remittances (IOM 2010b). Indonesia’s
large size means that the relative impact of remittances on the overall economy has
been less than in smaller nations, but several points need to be made in this context.
• Migrant workers tend to be drawn from specific areas so that remittance impact
is much greater on regional and local economies than at the national scale.
• The areas which migrant workers are drawn from include some of Indonesia’s
poorest and most isolated areas so that remittances are a crucial element of capi-
tal inflow.
• There has been rapid growth of remittance flows in recent years.
Official Bank of Indonesia estimates of remittances received in Indonesia are
presented in Fig. 7.4. The pattern is dominated by a sudden upturn in 2005. Manning
and Cronin (2008, 19) point out that this dramatic increase was due to the inception
of a revised methodology for calculation of remittances by the Bank of Indonesia.
Manning and Cronin (2008) consider that the new methodology is more robust and
that past methods have severely underestimated remittance levels. Hence, the esti-
mate is that the present annual level of remittances to Indonesia is around US$7
billion. Table 7.3 indicates that this represents almost 4% the size of exports and of
import levels. It is also apparent from the table that remittances have been increas-
ing both their relative share of the economy and absolute size.
It is shown elsewhere (Hugo 2005) that international labour migration has con-
siderable potential to deliver significant development dividends to Indonesia through
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
Million
3,000
2,000
1,000
Year
Fig. 7.4 Indonesia: growth of remittances, 1983–2013. (Source: World Bank, Annual Remittances
Data, April 2014, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPE
CTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.
html)
112 G. Hugo
Table 7.3 Main Asian labour exporting countries: workers’ remittances relative to exports and
imports in US$ million, 1980–2012
Total merchandise R R
Country Year Workers remittances Exports (X) Imports (M) X M
Indonesia 1980 33 21,908 10,834 0.2 0.3
1992 264 33,815 27,280 0.8 1.0
2012 7212 186,146 190,225 3.9 3.8
Philippines 1980 421 5744 8295 7.3 5.1
1992 2538 9790 15,465 25.9 16.4
2012 24,641 51,995 65,360 47.4 37.7
Thailand 1979 189 5240 7158 3.6 2.6
1992 1500 32,473 40,466 4.6 3.7
2012 4713 229,519 247,590 2.1 1.9
Vietnam 2000 1340 14,483 15,638 9.3 8.6
2006 3800 39,826 45,014 9.5 8.4
2012 10,000 114,573 113,793 8.7 8.8
Source: Hugo 1995; World Bank World Development Report, various issues; World Bank
Remittances dataset
remittances and other economic and social effects. However, there are a number of
barriers which are diluting those impacts (Hugo 2005):
• The high transaction costs of migration
• A lack of articulation of national, regional and local development policy and
programmes
• High costs of transferring remittances
• Poor governance of migration, high levels of corruption
Determinants of Future Migration to the Gulf
Global international migration is in a rapid state of change. The most recent United
Nations (2013b) Report on International Migration indicated that the number of
people living outside their country of birth in 2013 was 232 million, increasing from
175 million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990 (United Nations 2013b, 1). One of the
major trends evident in 2013 is that south–south migrations are now almost as large
as north–south migration. Asia is assuming increasing significance in the global
migration system.
The speed of change in global economies and demographics has been such that
individual countries have undergone rapid transitions from being predominantly
emigration nations to net immigration nations. In Asia, this has been the case in
South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, and Malaysia and Thailand in the
1990s and 2000s. Hence, it is important to assess trends in the drivers of Indonesian
labour migration to Gulf countries and assess the potential of changes to them.The
Global Commission on International Migration (2005, 12) argued:
In the contemporary world, the principal forces that are driving international migration are
due to ‘3Ds’: differences in development, demography and democracy.
Accordingly, we will examine recent and impending change in Indonesian eco-

nomic, demographic and political situations and draw out the implications for future
labour migration to the Middle East. However, there are a number of other elements
which will impinge on future labour migration.
Indonesia’s Rapidly Changing Economy
As was indicated earlier, Indonesia has long been a quintessential emigration nation,
but Table 7.4 indicates that the economic and demographic elements which have
driven high emigration levels have undergone significant change. In the early 1990s,
Indonesia was squarely within the ranks of the countries classified as low income.
However, in 2013, Indonesia’s per capita annual income was 36.5 million rupiah,
more than three times that in 2004 (Bank Indonesia 2013, 43). Indonesia is on the
verge of entering the middle-income category of nations.1
Indonesia is now recognized as one of resurgent Asia’s strongest growing econo-
mies. A recent analysis (Oberman et al. 2012, 2) found that the Indonesian economy:
… has performed strongly over the last decade or more and is more stable and diverse than
many observers from beyond its shores realise.
Table 7.4 Indonesia: Comparison of key economic and demographic indicators, early 1990s and
2010–2013
Early 1990s (Source: 2010–2013 (Source: Bank
Indicator Hugo 1995) Indonesia 2013)
Population growth rate (% pa) 1.6 1.1
Total fertility rate 2.9 2.2
Annual growth of workforce 3.1 1.4
GNP per capita US$ 670 3592
Annual growth rate of GDP 5.7 6.2
Annual increment of workforce 2.54 m 500,000
Percent employed in agriculture 48.2 38.3
Percent unemployed 2.8 9
Percent working less than 44.6 69.6
35 hours per week
Male labour force participation 70.6 84
Female labour force participation 43.1 51.4
1
According to the World Bank, low-income nations have annual per capita monies of less than
US$1005 and lower middle-income nations between US$1006 and 3975. Indonesia’s 2013 annual
per capita income was US$3499.90 (Bank Indonesia, 2013, 43).
114 G. Hugo
The report identifies that Indonesia had the lowest level of volatility in economic
growth of any OECD nation. Moreover, it anticipates that Indonesia’s economic
growth should benefit from a number of powerful positive trends. Moreover,
improved productivity has been more important than a higher number of workers in
driving Indonesia’s recent economic growth. Labour productivity has grown at
around 3% per annum which is among the highest rates in the region. Nevertheless,
overall productivity in Indonesia remains low.
Despite strong recent economic performance and a most promising future out-
look, Indonesia remains a labour surplus nation. Table 7.5 presents recent employ-
ment data. Open unemployment has increased, and the informal sector still accounts
for 60% of workers.
Although fertility has fallen by almost two-thirds over the last four decades, the
population is still growing at 1.1% per annum. Moreover, its labour force is increas-
ing at 1.4% per annum – a net increment of around 1.6 million workers are added
annually to the almost 111 million currently in the labour force. Indonesia remains
a low-income nation. While there is considerable debate about the definition of
poverty in Indonesia, the Indonesian Central Statistical Agency reported that 19.6%
of the population lived in poverty in 2004 compared with 11.3% in pre-crisis 1996.
Bank Indonesia (2013, 49) estimates that in 2013, 11.5% of the population lived in
poverty (28.6 million). For a long period, Indonesia has had relatively low unem-
ployment rates because the poor in Indonesia simply could not afford to be unem-
ployed and must take on whatever work they can get regardless of the low income,
low status and long hours associated with it. Despite rapid structural change, more
than a third of Indonesian workers remain in agriculture. Hence, experiencing rapid
and far-reaching change, it remains emphatically a labour surplus nation and one
which in a globalizing world has become an important origin country of interna-
tional migrants.
In discussing Indonesia’s comparative advantage in the international labour ser-
vices trade, Manning and Cronin (2008, 20) point to the abundance of low-skilled
labour. The share of the labour force with primary level or no education continues
to decline – a long-term trend. However, more than half of the work force still are in
the lowest education category and only 5% of the workforce has tertiary-level train-
ing. It is also relevant as Manning and Cronin (2008, 21) point out that despite the
declining share of the workforce in the lowest education categories, there are
Table 7.5 Indonesia: labour force and unemployment

Main activities February August February August February August
Productive age (≥15 years) 170.7 171.7 172.9 173.9 175.1 176.7
Labour force participation (%) 70.0 68.3 69.7 67.9 69.2 66.9
Labour force 119.4 117.4 120.4 118 121.2 118.2
Full-time worker (%) 64.6 64 64.2 64.8 64.6 62.6
Part-time worker (%) 15.5 17.9 17.2 18.2 18.3 21.9
Partial unemployment (%) 13.2 11.5 12.3 10.8 11.2 9.2
Open unemployment (%) 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.9 6.3
Source: Bank Indonesia (2013, 49)
increasing levels of unemployment in this group. In the past, unemployment has

been strongly concentrated in the more highly educated groups. As Manning and
Cronin (2008, 21) point out, jobs are becoming harder to get among the less e ducated
as the economy modernizes. This is clearly of significance when we consider the
demand for low-skilled workers in domestic services, agriculture and construction
in the Middle East and in higher-income Asian countries. In Indonesia, while agri-
culture still accounts for over a third of the workforce, it is growing at an extremely
slow rate and it is the higher skill occupations which are growing most rapidly.
Although the fact that the educated, skilled workforce has grown faster than the
low-skill group in recent years, Manning and Cronin (2008, 21) point out that the
number of secondary and tertiary graduates in the workforce grew at 4.4% and 7%,
respectively, over the 2001–2006 period, while the total growth of the labour force
was only 1.5%. Nevertheless, unemployment rates increased for the secondary edu-
cated and declined only marginally for the tertiary educated, but 10.8% of the latter
and 15% of the former remained unemployed. This may provide potential for some
more skilled workers to be involved in international migration.
Manning and Cronin (2008, 22) also point out that labour market pressures have
been experienced more by females than males. Unemployment rates are higher for
females than for males for all levels of education. As they point out ‘Indonesia’s
comparative advantage for export of labour lies particularly in an abundance of
secondary educated females who are searching for better paying jobs’. They argue
that while Indonesia does not have a relatively comparative advantage among pro-
fessional workers in the international arena, the high levels of unemployment among
professionals, especially females, suggest that Indonesia could fill many niche areas
in international labour markets such as aged care and nursing, where tertiary train-
ing is increasingly required.
They sum up the situation as follows (Manning and Cronin 2008, 22):
To sum up, from trends in labour supply and demand, the excess supply of semi-skilled
labour remains a key characteristic of the Indonesian labour market, although this situation
is changing slowly as education standards rise. Secondly, there is clearly an excess supply
of secondary educated people, especially females, who might be able to take lower-middle
skill jobs, or upgrade their skills and education for jobs in specific niche markets abroad.
Finally, although job opportunities have grown fastest for tertiary educated people, profes-
sionals and managers in particular, unemployment among this group is also high and hence
specialist areas such as IT, design and work in other service industries, could be an impor-
tant area in which Indonesia could penetrate labour markets abroad.
Indonesia’s Changing Demography
Like most Asian nations, Indonesia has undergone a demographic transformation

over the last four decades as is evident in Table 7.6 (McDonald 2014). Most signifi-
cantly, Indonesia has experienced a massive decline in fertility as both a conse-
quence and cause of the economic and social transformation it has undergone. The
population doubled over this period, but fertility was more than halved from 5.3 to
116 G. Hugo
Table 7.6 Indonesia: demographic variables, 1970 and 2010

1970 2010
Population (‘000) 114,067 240,676
Annual growth rate 2.49a 1.39b
TFR 5.3 2.5
Life expectancy at birth 54.1a 69.6b
% Urban 17.1 49.9
% Aged less than 15 43.2 29.8
% Aged 65+ 3.3 5.0
Source: (United Nations 2012, 2013a, b, c)
a
1970–1975, b2005–2010
Table 7.7 Indonesia: growth and projected growth of population aged 15–34
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
15–24 19,437 29,349 37,383 42,684 40,530 46,119 47,023
25–34 19,437 29,349 28,407 36,326 40,987 39,587 45,226
Total 38,875 58,698 65,790 79,010 81,517 85,706 92,249
Total population 114,067 145,494 178,633 208,939 240,676 269,413 293,482
15–34 as % of total 34.08 40.34 36.83 37.81 33.87 31.81 31.43
population
Average annual percentage growth rate
1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010–2020 2020–
1980 1990 2000 2010 2030
15–24 4.21 2.45 1.33 −0.52 1.30 0.19
25–34 4.21 −0.33 2.49 1.21 −0.35 1.34
Total 4.21 1.15 1.85 0.31 0.50 0.74
Total population 2.46 2.07 1.58 1.42 1.13 0.86
Source: United Nations (2013c)
2.5 children per woman, and more than 15 years of life were added to the average
Indonesian with the reduction in mortality. In 2010, the population growth rate was
only a little more than half that in 1970. From the perspective of international labour
migration, the impacts of demographic change on age structure are important.
Labour migration is highly selective of young adults in the prime working ages.
Rapid fertility decline in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has meant that there has been
a significant reduction in the rate of growth of the dependent child age groups.
However, the cohorts born in the years of higher fertility, when they move into the
young working years, provide Indonesians with a potential demographic dividend
because they constitute a comparatively large proportion of the total population.
This is usually interpreted as being due to their engagement with the labour market
within their country, but in emigration contexts, it increases the potential numbers
of migrant workers. Table 7.7 shows that the numbers of Indonesians in the peak
mobility age groups (15–34) increased rapidly in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
However, the impact of reduced fertility is increasingly being felt with small
declines in the numbers 15–24 in 2000–2010 and 25–34 in the current decade.
The important point from the perspective of the future of labour migration out of
Indonesia, however, is that the numbers in this age group are continuing to grow,
albeit at a significantly lower rate than was the case in the last three decades of the
1990s. This is in contrast to several other countries in the Asian region, where over-
all declines in the young working ages have commenced. This means that there will
continue to be a substantial increase in young adults entering the Indonesian labour
market and, hence, put pressure on underemployment and unemployment levels.
Figure 7.5 overlays the contemporary Indonesian age structure with that of the pro-
jected 2030 population, and it is strikingly apparent that the prime migration age
groups of 15–34 will continue to grow over this period, while there will be actual
declines in the young dependent age groups.
Hence, while there have been substantial and promising shifts in Indonesia’s
economy and demography, there is every indication that there will continue to be
significant emigration pressures within Indonesia, which will be associated with
significant labour surpluses, especially of the low skill, low levels of education
group. Hence, the Gulf region will continue to be an attractive opportunity for
young Indonesians weighing up their life options.
80+ Males Females
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
r
Age
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

Number (‘000)
Fig. 7.5 Indonesia: age–sex structure of the population, 2010 (shaded) and 2030
118 G. Hugo
The Role of Political Factors
The GCIM (2005) formulation of the three ‘Ds’ intercountry differentials driving
increased levels of international migration identifies ‘democracy’ or variations
between countries. In Indonesia, this factor has been a driver of some migration,
such as the outflow of ethnic Chinese in the late 1990s following anti-Chinese riots
(Hugo 2000). While there is little evidence of forced labour migration to the Middle
East of Indonesians seeking greater freedom, political factors have become an
increasingly important influence on labour migration, as governments recognize the
contribution that remittances and other effects can contribute to development.
Indonesia’s future policy on labour migration to the Gulf will be a major factor
influencing future flows.
Concerns about the poor governance, exploitation and corruption in the
Indonesian labour migration system are of longstanding (Hugo 1995), but it has
been in the post-Suharto era that most concerted efforts to improve governance of
labour migration in Indonesia have occurred. In 2005, the government issued a law
(No. 39/2004) on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers.
Ananta and Arifin (2008, 28) summarize some of the elements in the new law as
follows:
• The objectives of the law were to bring about.
1 . Better management of migration flows.
2. Establishment of institutional mechanisms for placement and protection of
OCWS.
3. Advocacy
• Inclusion of administration and penal sanctions for breach of provisions of act
aimed especially at agents and others exploiting migrant workers in Indonesia.
• The rights of workers are specified – equal rights, opportunities and treatment,
rights to correct and timely information regarding overseas placement, freedom
to practise religions, receive standard destination salary, access to legal protec-
tion and retain an original of the contract.
• The obligations of workers are also specified – follow laws in origin and destina-
tion, perform job specified in contract, report on arrival and departure to
Indonesian embassies.
• The law was also the constitutional basis for setting up BNP2 TKI. The issuing
of the law was followed by a Presidential Instruction (INPRES No. 6/2006) to
reform the placement and protection, brokers/sponsors, placement institutions
and support from banking institutions and included the following (Ananta and
Arifin 2007, 28–29):
1 . The necessity of simplifying and decentralizing the placement of workers.
2. Having ‘one-stop shop’ systems in embarkation and disembarkation areas.
3. Improving the quality and quantity of workers sent overseas.
4. To improve intelligence and understanding of the global market for Indonesian
workers.
• It specified the administrative structure of BNP2 TKI with a Head, General

Secretariat and three Deputies (Foreign Collaboration and Promotion, Placement,
Protection). Service Centres of Placement and Protection were to be set up in the
capital only of each province and designated cities of embarkation. Service posts
were to be established in each part of embarkation.
• A strong relationship was to be maintained with the Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration which remains the main policymaker and regulator, while BNP2
TKI is the operator which coordinates the activities of several ministries – man-
power and transmigration, immigration, foreign affairs, population administra-
tion, health and police.
There is evidence of the Indonesian parliament and government seeking to pro-
vide more protection for OCWs to the Gulf and elsewhere. In addition, civil society,
which was for so long hampered in its activities with OCWs in Indonesia, has
become much more active. Hence, while there are significant issues of corruption
and poor governance, it is likely that steps like the current ban on deployment of
Indonesian women as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia will continue unless there
is a bilateral agreement on migrant worker issues.
The Immigration Industry
In examining both undocumented and documented labour migration from Indonesia

to Gulf countries, it is important to recognize that there is an element of ‘self-
perpetuating momentum’ which has developed so that while movement is influ-
enced by economic trends and policy, it is, to some degree, independent of them. In
particular, two elements are important in this momentum. One relates to the involve-
ment of the complex varied group of recruiters, travel agents, lawyers, agents of
various kinds, travel providers, immigration officials and an array of gatekeepers of
various kinds. There can be no doubt that much Indonesian migration is at least
facilitated, and often initiated, by these crucial intermediaries, and this is especially
the case for international labour migration and especially for the segment of that
movement which is clandestine. The high levels of profitability associated with
people smuggling and the ‘new slave trade’ involving workers who are effectively
indentured to their owners have led a diverse range of players at local, regional,
national and international levels to move into this arena. The role of such groups
goes back to the ‘contract coolie’ trade in the latter part of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when most countries in the region were under colonial rule.
In examining the role of the migration industry, it is crucial to recognize a num-
ber of its characteristics:
(a) That it is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It has a history extending over
centuries.
(b) The migration industry with Indonesia is very large and multilayered with the
involvement of international criminal organizations down to large cities with
agents and local communities with subagents and sub-subagents.
120 G. Hugo
(c) There is a high level of complicity of government and government workers at

all levels.
(d) Many agents are involved in both legal and illegal movements.
(e) It is interlinked with family and regional networks.
(f) It operates for both internal migration with Indonesia and international
movement.
(g) It is extremely flexible with workers in the industry able to diversify in other
activity if demand for their services in one area of migration should dry up.
Accordingly, the industry can be very quick to respond to new opportunities,
and it cannot be killed off by destroying one avenue for undocumented migra-
tion (Munro 2011).
(h) The industry is embedded in local communities.
(i) The industry has strong linkages with the fishing industry.
(j) The migration industry has very strong, long historical connections with the
Middle East, which have been utilized in facilitating the flow of intending
IMAs.
(k) In most cases, there is not a single agent, but migrants and intending migrants
are passed through networks of agents at different points and often with new
payments at each point.
(l) It is becoming an increasingly professionalized.
The strong importance of the industry in Indonesia is seen in the fact that there
are four Indonesian words for migration industry agents – tauke, mandor, calo and
taikong. During the Dutch colonial period, mandors were used extensively, not only
for recruiting overseas labour migrants but also for recruiting workers in densely
settled areas to work on mines, plantations and forests in less densely settled areas.
These roles have continued and proliferated, especially since the 1970s when labour
migration to the Middle East and other parts of Asia (especially Malaysia) has
grown massively. The government has been involved in attempting to regularize the
industry in various ways over the last three decades, but most of the industries are
not in the formal migrant agents’ associations or registered with authorities. The
highly convoluted nature of the migration industry in Indonesia is reflected in
Figure 7.6, which provides examples of the number of intermediaries that intending
contract migrant workers need to go through in seeking to work in Saudi Arabia.
Social Networks
It is not sufficiently acknowledged that the majority of international movers from

Asia move along well-trodden paths or corridors, which, if they have not travelled
along them before themselves, have been traversed by family members and friends.
Migrants tend to travel with friends or family and have a range of contacts at the
destination. The networks that are established linking origin and destination become
key elements in sustaining and enhancing population flows between them. These
Info Info
Loan Fee Fee
Prospective Associate of Agency

Local broker
migrant local broker Jakarta
Information
Fee Info
Debts and Interest
Info
Info Friends/ Info Agency Saudi AKAN

relative Info Arabia Centre
Demand
7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf
Wage/ accommodation
Employer
Demand
Fee
Fig. 7.6 Example of a brokerage network for official migrants to Saudi Arabia. (Source: Spaan 1999, 297)
121
122 G. Hugo
networks inject a self-perpetuating dynamism into flows of population, which allows

movement to continue long after the original economic reasons for the flow have
been superseded or rendered redundant. Whenever a person immigrates, every indi-
vidual that he or she knows acquires social capital in the form of a contact at the
mover’s destination, which can be ‘cashed in’ at any time to obtain help in getting a
job or accommodation and social support while adjusting to the destination. The
networks established by earlier generations of movers from families and localities act
as conduits to channel later generations of movers to those destinations in an atmo-
sphere of certainty. Previous generations of movers have not only supplied valuable
information and encouragement but often paid for, or arranged and eased, the pas-
sage. Moreover, when the immigrant arrives at the destination, the destination end of
the network lends valuable assistance in the adjustment process, especially through
assisting in gaining access to housing and employment. The fundamental role of
networks is to greatly reduce the risks associated with migration, and many movers
from Asian origins, thus, operate in an environment of total certainty. This risk mini-
mization factor is important. While other factors are necessary to initiate the begin-
ning of a new limb of the network once the pioneer(s) is established at the destination,
the increase in the subsequent flow can be rapid. The pioneer immigrants constitute
anchors to which much larger numbers of subsequent immigrants are drawn. The
pioneers can be people who gain access through some form of recruitment or refugee
migration but then can facilitate substantial movement through legal family reunifi-
cation movement. On the other hand, illegal migration is virtually impossible unless
there is an informal network linking origin and destination to facilitate the clandes-
tine movement. The pioneer migrants to the Middle East may have been people
undertaking the hajj. The networks may link employers with agents, former migrants
or communities in Indonesia. The increase in international migration from Indonesia
to the Gulf resulted in a lateral extension and increasing density of social networks
linking Indonesia with the region. There has been a massive increase in the channels
along which both documented and undocumented migrations can occur. These will
ensure that Indonesia will remain an important origin of labour migrants, even in the
face of bans like that currently in place on domestic workers.
Conclusion
While the Indonesian government in recent years has recognized the role that inter-
national labour migration can play in reducing unemployment and underemploy-
ment, in earning foreign exchange and in training its workforce, there is little
integration of labour migration and development policy within Indonesia. As is the
case elsewhere, there is little of linkage and coherence between labour migration
and development policy. Martin (2008, 17) has argued that there are three chal-
lenges facing countries like Indonesia in this respect:
• Further incorporation of the range of issues captured by the migration develop-

ment nexus into policy formulation
• Implementation and evaluation of the strategies to capitalize on the benefits that
migration may bring for development
• Institution of more effective international collaborations
The real challenge is clearly moving towards strategies which take into account
and use the positive interconnections between migration and development and seek
to minimize negative impacts. In the Indonesian case, however, it is apparent that
there is an initial, necessary step that needs to be taken. This involves the removal
of the impediments and barriers which currently intervene to prevent the benefits
generated by labour migration to fully flow back to origin families and communi-
ties. The poor governance of the Indonesian labour migration system results in a
significant part of the earnings of migrant workers not being available to impact on
development because it is siphoned off by excessive transaction costs, corruption
and exploitation of migrant workers. Only if there is a sound system of governance,
will the earnings of workers be fully available to be channelled into development
activity. Indonesia has undergone massive economic, social and demographic
change in recent decades, which have impinged on the determinants of its long-held
status as labour surplus and labour sending country. However, the fundamental
demographic and economic drivers remain. Moreover, long-established corridors of
mobility linking it with the Gulf, the burgeoning activity of the migration industry
in both countries and the cumulative experience of millions of Indonesians who
have lived and worked in the Middle East would suggest that labour migration will
continue over the foreseeable future.
References
Ananta, A., & Arifin, E. (2007). National agency of placement and protection of Indonesian over-
seas workers: Marketization of public services. Revision of a Paper presented at Regional
Symposium on Managing Labour Migration in East Asia: Policies and Outcomes, ILO and
Wee Kim Wee Centre of Singapore Management University, Singapore, 16–18 May.
Ananta, A., & Arifin, E. (2008, March 25–26). Demographic and population mobility transitions
in Indonesia. Paper presented at PECC-ABAC conference on demographic change and interna-
tional labour mobility in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Business and Cooperation,
organised by Korea National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (KOPEC) in col-
laboration with Korea Labour Institute (KLI) held in Seoul, Korea.
Andrevski, H., & Lyneham, S. (2014, February). Experiences of exploitation and human traffick-
ing among a sample of Indonesian migrant domestic workers (Trends and issues in crime and
criminal justice, no. 471). Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.
Anon (1984) Mencari tuan di negeri minyak, Tempo, 12.
Bank Indonesia. (2013). 2013 economic report on Indonesia: Maintaining stability, advancing
structural reform for sustainable economic growth, Bank Indonesia.
DeBel-Air, F. (2014). Demography, migration and labour market in Saudi Arabia, Gulf Labour
Markets and Migration, Gulf Research Center, No. 1.
124 G. Hugo
Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). (2005). Migration in an interconnected

world: New directors for action (Report of the Global Commission on International Migration,
Switzerland).
Hassan, S. R. M. (2010, April 25). More than 40,000 Indonesians working in Brunei.
Hugo, G. J. (1980). Population movements in Indonesia during the colonial period. In J. J. Fox,
R. G. Garnaut, P. T. McCawleyand, & J. A. C. Mackie (Eds.), Indonesia: Australian per-
spectives (Research School of Pacific Studies) (pp. 95–135). Canberra: Australian National
University.
Hugo, G. J. (1992). Women on the move: Changing patterns of population movement of women
in Indonesia. In S. Chant (Ed.), Gender and migration in developing countries (pp. 174–196).
London: Belhaven Press.
Hugo, G. J. (1995). Labour export from Indonesia: An overview. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 12(2),
275–298.
Hugo, G. J. (2000). The crisis and international population movement in Indonesia. Asian and
Pacific Migration Journal, 9(1), 93–129.
Hugo, G. J. (2005). The new international migration in Asia: Challenges for population research.
Asian Population Studies, 1(1), 93–120.
International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2010a). Labour migration from Indonesia.
Philippines: International Organization for Migration.
International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2010b). International migration and migrant
workers’ remittances in Indonesia. Philippines: International Organization for Migration.
Kennedy, J. (2012). Female Indonesian domestic workers in Taiwan, Seminar in Global health and
Development 2, June, Taipei Medical University.
Manning, C., & Cronin, M. (2008, May). Indonesia’s interests in labour services at international
trade negotiations (Final Policy Research Paper).
Martin, S. (2008). Policy and institutional coherence at the civil society days of the GFMD.
Working paper prepared for the Experts Meeting, Chicago, 11–12 August in preparation for
the Civil Society Days of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Manila, October.
McDonald, P. (2014). The Demography of Indonesia in comparative Perspective. Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, 50(1), 29–52.
Munro, P. (2011). People smuggling and the resilience of criminal networks in Indonesia. Journal
of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 6, 1, April, pp. 40–50
Oberman, R., Dobbs, R., Budiman, A., Thompson, F. & Rossé, M. (2012, September). The archi-
pelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s potential. Francisco: McKinsey Global Institute,
McKinsey and Company.
Okushima, M. (2005). Introduction to a special issue: International trends of Indonesian migrant
workers, and their employment system in Japan. Intercultural Communication Studies, 17,
Japan, 1–47.
Ruiz, R. (2012, May 30). Indonesian envoy wants fewer maids sent to UAE. The National.
Santolan, J. (2011). Saudi Arabia Bans Maids from Indonesia and the Philippines. World Socialist.
wsws.org
Singhanetra-Renard, A. (1986). The Middle East and beyond: dynamics of international labour
circulation among Southeast Asian workers. Mimeo.
Soeprobo, T. B. (2004, February 6–7). Recent trends of international migration in Indonesia.
Paper presented at the workshop on international migration and labour markets in Asia, Japan
Institute of Labour, Tokyo, Japan.
Spaan, E. (1999). Labour circulation and socioeconomic transformation: The cost of East Java,
Indonesia (Report 56), The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute.
Suyono, M. (1981). Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Timur Tengah Makin Mantap, Suara Karya, h.v.k.,
2–6.
United Nations. (2012). World urbanization prospects: The 2011 revision. New York: United
Nations.
United Nations. (2013a). Trends in international migrant stock: Migrants by destination and origin,
United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013.
United Nations. (2013b). International migration report 2013. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (2013c). World population prospects: The 2012 revision. New York: United
Nations.
Vredenbregt, J. (1962). The Haddj: Some of its features and functions in Indonesia. Bijdragen,
118, 91–154.
Yeoh, B., & Lin, W. (2012, April 3). Rapid growth in Singapore’s immigrant population brings
policy challenges, Migration Information Source.
Chapter 8
The Rise of the Philippine Emigration
State: Protecting Migrant Workers
in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries
Neil G. Ruiz
…for a long time to come, the Philippines will continue to offer a major highly competitive
source of trained labor for the needs of countries abroad. We look forward to the day when,
having attained some of our major objectives in the industrialization of the economy, there
will be enough resilience and flexibility for us to absorb our own labor surpluses.1
–Blas F. Ople, Minister of Labor and Architect of the Philippine Labor Export Policy.
Introduction
This chapter focuses on how labour export became entrenched in political, eco-
nomic and social institutions of the Philippines. This period of labour export
entrenchment began with the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and con-
tinued through 2006 with the building of more state institutions for facilitating the
export of Filipino labour. During the Marcos era, overseas employment became one
of the major solutions to alleviate the problems from an oversupply of educated
degrees coming from a highly unregulated and autonomous private higher educa-
tional system. Furthermore, the Marcos regime made efforts to control the educa-
tional system and align it with the Philippine national economy. But over the years,
the Philippine economy increasingly depended on overseas labour markets not only
to relieve the educated unemployment problem but also to create a massive new
domestic economy geared towards jobs abroad. With about 10% of the Filipino
population working abroad and financial rewards from foreign earnings returning to
the Philippines, the labour export industry became a flourishing business for the
private sector, the state and the Filipino people. This growth and dependency
Philippine Development Magazine, vol. 6, no. 12 (November 15, 1978: 21–29), 29.
1
N. G. Ruiz (*)
The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, Washington, DC, USA

128 N. G. Ruiz
increased the role of the Philippine state in this industry through the creation of
emigrant institutions to regulate and protect the overseas labour industry; it also
created a cycle of dependency on emigration – from the Filipino population, gov-
ernment and private businesses.
he Expanding Role of the State in the Labour Export

T
Industry
The ability of the state to expand the Philippine labour export industry and to reap
the benefits of emigration depends on its ability to provide for its migrants abroad.
The Philippine state evolved several times since 1974 to expand its role in managing
migration. As overseas employment continued to grow, the Overseas Employment
Development Board (OEDB) evolved to become two agencies within the Labor
Ministry on May 1, 1982: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and the Welfare Fund Administration (WFA).2 The POEA was tasked to:
• Establish and maintain a registration and licensing system to regulate private sec-
tor participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers.
• Maintain a registry of skills for overseas placements.
• Recruit and place trained and competent Filipino workers.
• Promote the development of skills and careful selection of Filipino workers for
overseas employment.
• Undertake overseas market development activities for placement of Filipino
workers.
• Secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract
workers and ensure compliance.
• Generate foreign exchange from the earnings of Filipinos employed under its
programmes.
• Promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.3
This move to change the OEDB into the POEA was to encourage the participa-
tion of the private sector in the labour export industry, especially recruitment agen-
cies and construction contractors.4 Within the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), the POEA licenses private recruitment agencies. It informs potential over-
seas workers of agencies that have issued false contracts or have not complied with
rules during the deployment process. The POEA publishes an updated list of over-
seas job openings, recruitment agencies’ contact information and the number of
2
Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, Working Abroad: The Socio-Economic Consequences
of Contract Labor Migration in the Philippines (Manila: Ministry of Labor and Employment,
1984), 13–16.
3
Ibid., 14–15.
4
Ibid., 15.
8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 129
vacancies available through their website. The POEA also provides a quality control
service by rating the status of the private recruitment agencies.5 Through Philippine
Overseas Labor Offices and a dedicated labour attaché in embassies and consulates,
the POEA monitors the treatment of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs),6 verifies
labour documents and assists OFWs in employment- and labour-related disputes.
A 1977 Philippine Department of Labor and Employment White Paper proposed
that the government should not focus solely on recruitment and placement of
Filipinos into overseas employment, but should also create an agency for protecting
and promoting the rights and welfare of OFWs.7 This white paper argued that pri-
vate recruitment agencies were not in a position to protect overseas Filipinos and
that there was a role for the Philippine government on welfare issues. This new
reorganization of the overseas employment programme in 1982 created a frame-
work for the WFA, which required recruitment companies and workers to contribute
to a welfare fund that would provide services and assistance.8 This evolution set the
stage for the politics that would arise around protecting overseas Filipinos in the
1980s and 1990s. As labour export became larger, the Philippine state developed
policies that extended beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and into other
countries. The politics surrounding overseas labour further developed state emi-
grant institutions.
The State and Protecting the Welfare of Overseas Filipinos
As a result of state involvement and an increase in Filipino emigration, major politi-

cal issues arose around reports of the maltreatment, illegal recruitment and even
deaths of OFWs. Between 1987 and 1991, a total of 23 Senate bills and 32 House
bills were filed in the Philippine Congress in an attempt to investigate several mys-
terious OFW deaths and issues related to overseas work.9 According to the Philippine
Department of Labor and Employment, about 1224 overseas Filipino workers were
sent back home dead during this period.10 All of them are said to have died of
5
The POEA rates recruitment agencies in the following categories: good standing, delisted, can-
celled, forever banned, inactive, revoked, suspended and denied renewal. For a list of the current
recruitment agency ratings, see: http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all
6
This refers to Filipinos who are temporary workers on overseas employment contracts for 2 years
or more years.
7
Department of Labor and Employment, ‘White Paper on the Phase-Out Policy’, Unpublished
(Manila: Department of Labor and Employment, 1977).
8
Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, Working Abroad, 16.
9
Maruja M.B. Asis, ‘The Overseas Employment Program Policy’, in Graziano Battisetlla and
Anthony Paganoni (editors), Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy (Quezon City:
Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992: 68–112).
10
Michael A. Bengwayan, ‘When Filipino maids return home in coffins’, New Straits Times,
Opinion Section, March 7, 2001, 10.
130 N. G. Ruiz
‘unknown or mysterious circumstances’. Reports from the hearings revealed that

many of the dead bodies, particularly from domestic workers working in Taiwan
and Hong Kong, ‘bore bruises and deep cuts’. In some cases, autopsy examinations
discovered that internal organs were missing and were possibly sold for transplants
to unknown beneficiaries.11
During the 1990s, the Philippine government had to deal with several major
overseas Filipino cases that sparked major changes in how the government now
handles overseas employment. During the 1991 Gulf War, the government brought
home about 30,000 Filipinos from Iraq and Kuwait. The repatriation highlighted
problems in coordination, lack of reliable data on the Filipinos in the region and the
inadequate number of government personnel abroad. The repatriation also strained
relations between government officials and the workers they were trying to
repatriate.12
In 1991, Flora Contemplación, a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore, was
charged for a double murder of another domestic worker, Delia Maga, and the child
of Maga’s employer. Having minimal knowledge of English and after being drugged
and administered electric shocks, she was reportedly coerced into a confession
without a lawyer present.13 She was later put to death despite the Philippine presi-
dent’s direct appeal to the government of Singapore.14 This incident sparked an
upheaval of protests in the Philippines challenging the state’s labour export policy.
A grenade exploded at the Singapore Airlines office in Metro Manila following the
news of Contemplación’s death,15 and mass demonstrations also took place at the
Embassy of Singapore in Manila and at the departments of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
and Labor and Employment (DOLE). The Philippines downgraded its diplomatic
relations with Singapore, the secretaries of DFA and DOLE resigned, and the
deployment of domestic helpers to Singapore was temporarily halted.16
The perceived injustice surrounding Contemplación’s death captured the senti-
ments of an increasingly uneasy society after more than two decades of large-scale
temporary emigration. A 42-year-old mother of four children and sole provider to
her family, Contemplación came to symbolize the sacrifices of Filipino migrants –
the ‘modern-day heroes’ who are willing to risk even death to provide for their
families back home. As Joaquin Gonzales, an expert on Philippine studies, noted,
11
Ibid.
12
Graziano Battistella, ‘Return Migration in the Philippines: Issues and Policies’, in International
Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed, Douglas Massey and Edward Taylor
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 232.
13
Anne-Marie Hilsdon, ‘The Contemplacion fiasco: The hanging of a Filipino domestic worker in
Singapore’, in Anne-Marie Hilsdon, Martha Macintyre, Vera Mackie and Maila Stivens (eds.),
Human Rights and Gender Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 172–173.
14
Ibid.
15
US Department of State, ‘1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism’, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_95/terasi.htm.
16
Joaquin Gonzales, Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 6–7.
Contemplación’s death ‘heightened long-standing debates in the Philippines and

exposed the lack of adequate government attention to the plight of Filipino overseas
contract workers (OCWs), not just in Singapore but in all the labor-receiving
countries’.17
Other negative reports about OFWs spread throughout the Philippine media.
Illegal recruitment for positions as prostitutes or ‘comfort women’ became another
politicized issue. In Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, many Filipina
women are brought to work as hostesses at bars. Reports illustrate how many of
them were being imprisoned and under guard during the daytime and released at
night to work as prostitutes.18 They had been recruited from the Philippines to work
as entertainers under contracts that did not inform them of having to provide sex in
the job description. For example, Rosa, who was fresh out of high school, was lured
to Japan from Manila in 1988 with promises of a trip to Tokyo Disneyland and
opportunities to make good money. When she arrived in Japan, her employer turned
out to be a gangster who ordered her to sit with the customers, pour their drinks and
make dates. When she refused to make dates, her employer beat her and kept a close
watch on her by prohibiting her from straying outside of the neighbourhood.19 As a
Filipino migrant, she was forced into modern-day slavery. Government statistics
showed that women are more likely to be victims due to the nature of their work
(Table 8.1).
These events in the early 1990s resulted in the most significant reorganization to
date of the Philippines’ labour-export policy, namely the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995. The so-called Magna Carta responded directly to the
Table 8.1 Number of OWWA welfare cases, January to September 1994

Nature Total Male Female Female/male ratio
Overall (number) 9368 3021 6347 2.1
Overall (percent) 100 32 68
Maltreatment 1419 546 873 1.6
Delayed or non-payment of salaries 1272 565 707 1.2
Contract violations 1373 691 682 0.9
Physical abuse 187 6 181 30.0
Rape and sexual abuse 15 0 15 N/A
Sexual harassment 330 0 330 N/A
Health problems 42 13 29 2.2
Mental illness 6 0 6 N/A
Other 3769 694 3075 4.4
Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, as cited in ‘Filipino Women Migrants: A
Statistical Factbook’, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women and the Asian
Development Bank
17
Ibid.
18
Glenn Schloss, ‘Sex-trade women kept like slaves’, South China Morning Post, News section,
January 21, 2001, 3.
19
Teresa Watanabe, ‘Without a Country’, Los Angeles Times, View Section, March 31, 1992, E1.
132 N. G. Ruiz
Contemplación case. The law called for the government to promote the welfare of
migrant workers and place their protection above all else. It states:
While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the national
economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas
employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development. The
existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity
and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizen shall not, at any time, be
compromised or violated.20
The Philippine government put in place many programmes to protect and repre-
sent Filipino migrants. The Magna Carta created an Office of the Legal Assistant for
Migrant Workers Affairs (OLAMWA) within the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) to take responsibility ‘for the provision and coordination of all legal assis-
tance services to be provided to Filipino migrant workers as well as overseas
Filipinos in distress’.21
The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
Republic Act 8042 was an attempt to create a more centralized overseas migration
system to control the recruitment, representation and return of Filipinos living
abroad. It was created ‘to institute the policies of overseas employment and estab-
lish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant work-
ers, their families and overseas Filipinos in Distress’.22 Republic Act 8042
institutionalized labour recruitment by creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for licensing and supervising recruitment agencies. In
order to be licensed, an agency had to ‘fulfill minimum capital requirements, pay
annual licensing fees, and follow a complex set of regulations’.23 As of April 2004,
there were about 2884 recruitment agencies licensed by the POEA.24 The POEA
publishes an updated list of overseas job openings, recruitment agencies’ contact
information and the number of vacancies available through their website.25 They
also rate the status of the agency (good standing, delisted, cancelled, forever banned,
20
Senate Bill No. 2077, ‘To Institute the Policies of the Overseas Employment Program and
Establish a Higher Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers and
for Other Purposes’, Ninth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Third Special Session,
May 24, 1995.
21
Philippine House of Representative, ‘Republic Act 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995’. Available at http://pinoymigrant.dole.gov.ph/ra%208042.htm
22
Ibid.
23
Peter Stalker, Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2000), 123.
24
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Status of Recruitment Agencies as of April 4,
2004’, http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all
25
See http://www.poea.gov.ph
inactive, revoked, suspended and denied renewal) based on assessments made by

the POEA. This provides information about available jobs while also serving as a
quality control of the private recruitment agencies.
The Workers Welfare Administration evolved to becoming the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) as the main agency for protecting Filipinos while
abroad due to its much larger scope of responsibilities, which extend beyond the
provision of legal assistance.26 OWWA was reorganized to become the most exten-
sive operation organized by a migrant-sending government for protecting its citi-
zens abroad. It featured a complex organizational structure that now includes a
board of trustees, a secretariat, and regional and international offices. Today,
OWWA’s board of trustees is a tripartite body with the DOLE secretary as chair and
12 members representing government, management and OFWs. The president of
the Philippines appoints all board members. The board is broadly representative of
a cross-section of government agencies, including the Departments of Foreign
Affairs, Finance and Budget. OFWs are allotted sea-based, land-based and women’s
sector representatives. An overwhelming majority of board members are not OWWA
members, a major source of criticism from civil society and OFWs.
The board plans and implements policies and programmes, crafts rules and regu-
lations, oversees fund sources and creates yearly appropriations for the Secretariat,
OWWA’s administrative arm.27 Unlike other Philippine government agencies that
administer trust funds, OWWA has no charter. This setup allows for more flexibility
but may also allow the board to exercise blanket and unregulated authority. As a
permanent government agency, changes to OWWA’s operations can only be made
through legislation.
The Secretariat, headed by an administrator, manages day-to-day operations in
the Philippines and abroad. Of its staff of 580, only about 100 employees are sta-
tioned at its main office in Manila. The rest are stationed at regional offices within
the Philippines (about 300 employees) or based in countries with particularly large
numbers of temporary workers (about 180 employees).28 In 2006, 28 welfare offi-
cers were assigned to 16 countries, with more than half of them placed in the Middle
East, including nine in Saudi Arabia alone.
The OWWA administrator recommends welfare officers, whom the DOLE sec-
retary nominates and whom the president of the Philippines appoints. The welfare
officers abroad work together with the labour attachés and the ambassadors or
consuls-general to assist Filipino migrant workers (Fig. 8.1). They are usually
attached to Philippine embassies and consulates. Indeed, the government considers
26
Edgar Rodriguez and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the
Philippines’, In University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper Series (Toronto:
University of Toronto Department of Economics, 1995), 18.
27
Overseas Worker’s Welfare Administration, Board of Trustees, http://www.owwa.gov.ph/page/
board_of_trustees/.
28
The staff numbers are estimates; actual numbers are unknown according to OWWA.
134 N. G. Ruiz
Department Department of
Department of Foreign Department of Labour and Employment
of Finance Budget and
Affairs (DFA) (DOLE)
(DOF) Management
(DBM)
Overseas Philippine
Workers Overseas
Welfare Employment
Administration Agency
(OWWA) (POEA)
Embassies OWWA
and/or Board
consulates
Secretariat
Philippine International Head - Regional

Overseas Labor Offices quarters offices
Offices (POLOs)
Migrant workers
and other
overseas Filipinos
resource centers
Foreign service Labor attaches Welfare

personnel officers
Fig. 8.1 Overseas workers welfare administration within the Philippine government. (Source:
Author interview of stakeholders and government documents)
OWWA staff abroad to be part of its unified team in that country, with the ambas-
sador as the leader.29
Membership in OWWA, which is mandatory for migrants going abroad through
official channels, may be obtained in two ways: By enrolment upon processing of a
contract at POEA or by voluntary registration of a would-be member at a job site
overseas. Membership is valid until the OFW’s employment contract expires. For
voluntary members who register at a job site, membership does not exceed 2 years.30
Ideally, the employer and/or agency pays the membership fee, a practice that some
29
Section 23 of the Rights and Enforcement Mechanism Under International and Regional Human
Right System of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, as cited by Arnel F. de Guzman, ‘A
Critical Assessment of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042)’,
unpublished paper, September 2010.
30
Overseas Worker’s Welfare Administration, ‘Omnibus Policies, Board Resolution No. 138’
(Manila: OWWA, 2003). Available at http://www.owwa.gov.ph/filemanager/download/.
$45,000,000
$40,000,000
$35,000,000
$30,000,000
$25,000,000
$20,000,000
$15,000,000
$10,000,000
$5,000,000
$0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Membership fees Interest income Other income
Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006. (Source: Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration Financial Management System, 2001–2006)
critics say rarely happens. A 2004 independent field study by the Scalabrini
Migration Center, a Manila-based research institute, confirmed that the membership
fee is ‘routinely passed onto migrant workers’.31 Although the mandatory nature of
membership has been instrumental in shoring up the fund’s assets, some migrant
organizations are questioning the authority of OWWA to require such payment.
The number of OWWA members has increased through the years, reflecting the
general upward trend in OFW emigration. It is important to note that, despite the
mandatory membership requirements, a large proportion of temporary workers are
not OWWA members. As of May 2007, OWWA had over one million members,
which represents just 28% of the 3.8 million legal temporary workers abroad in
2006, as estimated by the Commission on Overseas Filipinos, another government
body. Through these membership fees, OWWA managed to raise about $40 million
dollars per year between 2002 and 2006 (Fig. 8.2).
The OWWA created a number of programmes that fall under four major catego-
ries targeting contract workers. It offers integrated support services for: participa-
tion in pre-departure orientation seminars, public assistance programmes, on-site
services abroad and an OWWA identification system.32
Prior to departure, all overseas contract workers must undergo the Philippine
government’s mandatory deployment process, two key components of which are
pre-departure orientation seminars (PDOSs) and the issuance of OFW identification
cards. PDOSs are largely organized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that work in partnership with the Philippine government’s Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) for OFWs and the Commission on Overseas
Filipinos for permanent emigrants. Every departing OFW and Filipino emigrant
must attend a one-day seminar and provide the government with a certificate of
31
Maruja Asis, Preparing to Work Abroad: Filipino Migrants’ Experience Prior to Deployment
(Manila: Philippine Migrants Rights Watch and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), 52.
32
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, ‘Programs and Benefits’, http://www.mydestiny.
net/~owwa/integrated.html
136 N. G. Ruiz
completion to receive permission to emigrate. Attendees learn about destination

country customs and laws, resources available to them at the embassy or consulates,
important contacts for any problems that might arise and financial management
seminars. The goal of this programme is to give emigrating Filipinos as much
knowledge as possible about their country of destination and the resources available
to them abroad. Through financial management seminars, banks and other money
transfer operators educate emigrating workers about methods of sending their
money home, and in some cases, they open bank accounts for emigrating workers.
The POEA also processes overseas contracts and provides every OFW a government-
issued identification card, which can also be used as an ATM card with one of the
major Philippine banks.
The OWWA created Filipino Resource Centers throughout the world in order to
provide further assistance abroad. These centres operate six programmes: commu-
nity reach-out, on-site repatriation, welfare assistance, reintegration preparedness,
sociocultural and sports development and country-specific pilot programmes.33 The
community reach-out includes projects that enhance awareness, unity, cooperation
and self-reliance among Filipino communities at the destination country. Through
on-site repatriation, the OWWA can negotiate with employers/brokers and receiving
country authorities, facilitate the documentary requirements such as exit visas,
clearances, medical and police reports, and provide airport assistance. The welfare
assistance programme offers counselling for distressed workers, paralegal services
and some diplomatic services. Reintegration preparedness helps OFWs who are
returning to the Philippines by providing business development information, train-
ing schemes and psychosocial counselling services. The sociocultural and sports
development programme organizes cultural activities and celebrations around
Philippine national events and sports activities to build the OFW community in the
destination country. The pilot programmes are aimed at specific issues, such as
gender-related and country-specific projects.34 Lastly, the identification system is
used for easy processing of OFWs and to keep records of them and their dependents
living in the Philippines.
The OWWA repatriation programme facilitates the immediate repatriation of
distressed and physically ill contracts workers, as well as the remains of those who
die while working abroad. In both planned and forced return, OWWA negotiates
with employers/brokers and other host-country authorities; facilitates documentary
requirements for issuance of exit visas, clearances, monetary claims and medical or
police reports; and coordinates with Philippine embassies and DFA for other neces-
sary administrative actions and airport assistance. Recently, for instance, the gov-
ernment negotiated the release of 700 OFWs jailed in Saudi Arabia, mostly for
cultural offenses like carrying a Bible or drinking alcohol. OWWA is instructed by
law to maintain, among others, an Emergency Repatriation Fund to evacuate OFWs
33
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, ‘Programs and Benefits’, http://www.mydestiny.
net/~owwa/integrated.html
34
Ibid.
in case of wars, disasters or epidemics. The 1995 act allotted a seed amount of 100
million pesos (US$2.2 million) to comply with this law.35
During the war in Lebanon in July 2006, for example, OWWA reserved US$ten
million for the evacuation of Filipino workers.36 About 6300 workers were repatri-
ated between July and October 2006, with OWWA eventually spending $1200 per
returnee.37 It is not clear how many of the repatriated were OWWA members. In
2006, OWWA assisted in the repatriation of 10,834 workers from Lebanon and
other countries, spending almost 170 million pesos (US$3.7 million) in airfares.
This represented about 13% of revenue in 2006.
Apart from repatriation, OWWA offers other forms of assistance, services and
programmes in its offices abroad, including counselling for distressed workers,
paralegal services and low-key diplomatic initiatives (e.g. negotiations for impris-
oned OFWs, mobile welfare services, hospital and prison visits, sports development
projects like sport leagues, cultural and recreational activities, and contingency
operations during crisis situations.) About 600,000 members, or 62% of total mem-
bership in 2006 (both within the Philippines and overseas), received various kinds
of assistance or services.38 Embassies and consulates abroad provide legal assis-
tance for overseas Filipinos in distress. OLAMWA coordinates all legal assistance
services for Filipino migrant workers. The Philippine Congress created a legal assis-
tance fund of 100 million pesos, partly sourced from OWWA, to pay for foreign
lawyers, bail bonds, court fees and other litigation expenses.39
Another item provided by OWWA is insurance claims. OWWA provides mem-
bers with life and personal accident insurance while abroad. The coverage includes
100,000 pesos (US$2173) for natural death and 200,000 pesos (US$4347) for acci-
dental death; a burial benefit of 20,000 pesos (US$434) is also provided. OWWA
charges an additional 900 pesos (US$19.50) per year for health insurance. As a rider
to the life insurance, OWWA also offers monetary assistance to workers who suffer
work-related injuries, illness and disabilities during employment abroad. The ben-
efit ranges from 2000 pesos (US$43) to 50,000 pesos (US$1086) and up to 100,000
pesos (US$2173) in case of permanent disability.
Between 2001 and 2006, a growing number of OFWs have used the death and
disability benefits, from fewer than 600 in 2002 to more than 1500 in 2006.40 This
35
Philippine House of Representatives, ‘Republic Act No. 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995’.
36
Manila Standard, ‘Few Pinoys in Lebanon Want to Go’, Manila Standard, August 24, 2006.
37
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Annual Report 2006, 27.
38
Note that members who used the workers assistance program might also be accounted for in
other services, such as repatriation. Given the limitations of OWWA data, it is difficult to verify
this assumption.
39
Renee E. Ofreneo and Isabelo A. Samonte, ‘Empowering Filipino Migrant Workers: Policy
Issues and Challenges’, In International Migration Papers (Geneva: International Labour
Organization, 2005), 8–12.
40
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Insurance and HealthCare Availment Report,
2002–2006.
138 N. G. Ruiz
has been an effective tool used to protect overseas Filipinos while they are working
abroad to ensure that their families are covered from the risks of overseas employ-
ment. But critics, especially among migrants, note that the OWWA needs to be more
accountable to migrants to ensure the funds are properly used. These criticisms stem
from government scandals involving misuse of the OWWA funds for other
purposes.41
Expansion of Emigrant Institutions
In addition to regulation and protection of overseas Filipinos, the Philippine govern-

ment also sponsors many programmes to represent Filipino migrants. These include
the Commission for Filipinos Overseas (CFO).42 The CFO is a group of government
officials who advise the President with specific concerns from Filipinos abroad.
This body formulates policies and provides representation in the executive branch
for the millions of Filipinos living outside of the country.
On January 20, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 203 to create
the Interagency Committee on Shared Government Information System for
Migration (SGISM). This committee included leaders from the following govern-
ment agencies: Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and
Employment, Department of Justice, Department of Tourism, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Bureau of
Immigration, National Bureau of Investigation, National Statistics Office and the
Commission on Filipinos Overseas.43 Through the SGISM, the Philippine govern-
ment can facilitate a more efficient and speedy response to the needs of OFWs.
Furthermore, the Philippine government has attempted to gather accurate demo-
graphic information about their overseas contract workers and permanent emigrants
so that the private sector and NGOs can provide migrant services. The POEA and
the Commission on Filipinos Overseas keep a record of Filipinos who are departing
the country on overseas contracts or for permanent emigration. Since 1993, the
National Statistics Office has conducted an annual Survey of Overseas Filipinos,
which provides socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and statistics on cash and
in-kind transfers sent by migrants to their families. The Philippine government also
developed an interagency committee to facilitate a more efficient response to the
needs of OFWs.44 However, due to a lack of funds, this group has not been able to
41
Angie M. Rosales, ‘OWWA faces Senate inquiry over OFW fund disbursement’, Tribune, July
13, 2013.
42
Edgar Rodriguez and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the
Philippines’, 18.
43
Department of Labor and Employment Administration, ‘SGISM Shared Government Information
System for Migration’, http://pinoymigrant.dole.gov.ph/about.htm
44
These include the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment,
Department of Justice, Department of Tourism, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
fully integrate information sharing between its various components. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)45 works closely with the Association of Bank Remittance
Officers Incorporated46 to ensure that regulations are favourable for a competitive
remittance industry. Since 2006, the BSP has required banks and other financial
institutions to clearly state remittance charges, available options for sending money
and other information posted on BSP’s website for the benefit of both remitters and
their recipients.47
Table 8.2 provides an overview of the Philippine emigrant institutions involved
in recruitment, representation and returns since the passage of the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8042).
Extending Democratic Institutions Abroad
New policies have been developed to further institutionalize the representation of

overseas Filipinos. Two significant pieces of legislation were passed in the Philippine
Congress in November 2002 extending full citizenship rights beyond the Philippines’
national borders. The Dual Citizenship Act allows natural-born Filipinos who have
become foreign citizens to retain their Philippine citizenship.48 Additionally, the
Absentee Voting Act permits qualified overseas Filipinos to register and vote for the
positions of president, vice-president, senator and party-list representatives from
abroad.49 These legislative pieces would finally implement the 1987 Philippine
Constitution proposition of granting OFWs the right to vote. Article V, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution states: ‘The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.’50 Together with the Republic Act No. 8042 and Executive Order
No. 203, these two pieces of legislation create a state outside the country’s boundar-
ies. Not only is the Philippine state responsible for the welfare of overseas Filipinos,
the migrants can also make demands on the government – using the same instru-
ments of citizenship rights as those residing in the Philippines. Table 8.3 gives an
overview of the major legislation and policies implemented by the Philippine gov-
ernment to deal with emigration.
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Bureau of Immigration, National Bureau of

Investigation, National Statistics Office and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas.
45
Translated as the Central Bank of the Philippines.
46
A network of bank officials in charge of remittances products and services in the private sector.
47
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, SP Circular No. 534 dated June 26, 2006. For website of remit-
tances costs by destination country, see: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/advocacies_ofw.asp
48
Rocky Nazerno, ‘Senate Passes Dual Citizenship Bill’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 24,
2002.
49
Aurea Calica, ‘Brother-Sister act speeds up passage of voting bills’, Philstar.com, http://www.
philstar.com/philstar/print.asp?article=58915
50
Republic of the Philippines, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987.
140 N. G. Ruiz
Table 8.2 Post-1995 Philippine emigrant institutions

Emigrant Institutionalized
institution Role Responsibilities by
Philippine Recruitment Supervision of the deployment of Republic act no.
overseas regulation, OFWsb under the best possible 8042
employment protection terms, and the regulation of private
administration sector participation in recruitment
(within DOLE)a and overseas placement
Licenses recruitment agencies
Pre-departure orientations
Monitor migrants abroad and
protect their rights
Reintegration programme
Overseas workers Welfare and Extension of social, welfare and Republic act no.
welfare protection other assistance to OFWs and their 8042
administration dependents
(within DOLE) Pre-departure loans and family
assistance loan for Filipino
migrant workers and their families
Funds for emergencies
Filipino resource Welfare and Extension of OWWA duties to the Republic act no.
centers protection following programmes abroad: 8042
Community reach-out, on-site
repatriation, welfare assistance,
reintegration preparedness,
sociocultural and sports development
and country-specific pilot
programmes
Inter-agency System for To facilitate a more efficient and Executive order
committee on information sharing speedy response to the needs of no. 203
shared on migration OFWs by sharing information
government between the Department of Foreign
information Affairs, Department of Labor and
system for Employment, Department of Justice,
migration Department of Tourism, Philippine
overseas employment administration,
overseas workers welfare
administration, Bureau of
Immigration, National Bureau of
investigation, National Statistics
Office and the commission on
Filipinos overseas
(continued)
Table 8.2 (continued)
Emigrant Institutionalized
institution Role Responsibilities by
Commission on Representation, Provide assistance to the president Executive order
Filipinos promote stronger and the congress of the Philippines no. 203
overseas economic and in the formulation of policies and
cultural ties measures concerning or affecting
between the Filipinos overseas.
Philippines and Develop and implement programmes
Filipinos overseas to promote the interest and
Well-being of Filipinos overseas.
Serve as a forum for preserving and
enhancing the social, economic and
cultural ties of Filipinos overseas
with the motherland.
Provide liaison services to Filipinos
overseas.
DOLE Department of Labor and Employment
a
OFW Overseas Filipino Workers

b
Table 8.3 Philippine legislation and policies dealing with emigration

Legislation or policy What it does? Source of legitimacy
Republic act no. 8042: Creates a comprehensive piece of Passed in house and senate,
Migrant workers and legislation that gives the Philippine signed into law by
overseas Filipinos act of government responsibility for overseas president Fidel Ramos
1995 Filipinos.
Institutionalizes the Philippine overseas
employment administration and
overseas workers welfare
administration within the Department
of Labor and Employment.
Executive Order No. 203: Creates new institutions to carry out the Ordered by former
Shared Government republic act no. 8042: president Joseph Estrada
Information System for Establishes the interagency committee
Migration, 2000 on shared government information
system for migration.
Establishes the commission on
Filipinos overseas.
Republic act no. 9225: Allows former citizens to obtain Passed in house and senate
Dual citizenship Philippine citizenship even if gave up and signed into law by
retention and citizenship to obtain a new one, allows president Gloria
re-acquisition act of 2003 Filipinos to have more than one Macapagal-arroyo
citizenship
Republic act no. 9189: Allows overseas Filipinos to vote either Passed in house and senate,
Overseas absentee voting through embassies and consulates or current negotiations and
act of 2003 via mail signed into law by
president Gloria
Macapagal-arroyo
142 N. G. Ruiz
These polices extend the representative powers of the Philippine nation-state

abroad. Through citizenship rights, absentee voting and representation in the execu-
tive branch, the state provides an avenue for migrants to participate in the state’s
domestic institutions. The sending government’s emigrant institutions also become
a legitimate force abroad. Through these policies and emigrant institutions, the
Philippine state obtains compliance, participation and legitimacy from its emi-
grants – fulfilling all of the characteristics of a state functioning abroad.
The Expanding Business of Overseas Labour
The expansion of Filipinos working in the overseas labour market not only benefit-
ted Filipino households and the Philippine government but also the private sector.
The business of labour export involves transnational transactions among various
actors both at home and abroad with potential and contracted overseas employees.
It involves dealing with the various Philippine government agencies that manage the
emigration process, making sure the OFW has the necessary contract and travel
documents to enter the country of destination. Facilitating the transfer of migrant
earnings to migrants’ families has become a lucrative business for private financial
institutions and money transfer operators. Education targeting specific overseas
positions has also become a large business, especially with the laissez-faire system
of tertiary education adopted by the Philippines (as discussed extensively in Chap.
3). Three industries have flourished because of labour export: recruitment, remit-
tances and education. Together with the increasing demand by the Filipino popula-
tion to work abroad and the government’s need for foreign currency and to reduce
the unemployment rate, businesses have managed to supply the market for labour
export with services allowing them to make money off the prospect and deployment
of overseas employment.
The Recruitment Industry
The recruitment industry focused on deploying overseas workers annually is a

multi-billion dollar industry. Recruiters make money on both the prospect and
actual deployment of OFWs abroad. The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration’s (POEA) main purpose is to regulate private recruiters to ensure
that Filipinos who hope to work abroad are not cheated by the recruitment agencies.
There are many opportunities for businesses to take advantage of Filipinos’ aspira-
tions for working abroad; in fact, this prospect led the Philippine government to
attempt to take over the entire recruitment industry from 1974 to 1978.51 But because
Maruja M.B. Asis, ‘The Overseas Employment Program Policy’, in Graziano Battistella and
51
Anthony Paganoni (editors), Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy (Quezon City:
Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992: 68–112), 70–72.
Table 8.4 Recruitment and placement by recruitment intermediary, 1986

Recruitment intermediary Number of workers Total placement (in percentage)
Construction/service contractors 53,348 17.0
Private employment agencies 176,741 56.0
Government placement 13,188 4.0
Manning agencies 70,973 23.0
Total 314,250 100.0
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Annual Report, 1987
it had difficulties keeping up with the huge demand by employers abroad who were
looking for Filipino workers and the high interest by Filipinos to work overseas, this
ban on private recruitment agencies was lifted in 1978.52
Since 1978, private recruitment agencies have grown tremendously. According
to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, about 56% of all overseas
placements were made by private employment agencies – the largest share com-
pared to other intermediaries (Table 8.4).
The government has a very small share (4%) of all overseas placements. It
focuses primarily on regulating the large private industry that also includes place-
ment agencies (23%) for sea-based workers and contractors (17%) for land-based
construction companies. The small percentage where the government is involved in
recruitment is focused on bilateral agreements between the Philippine government
and the foreign government.53
For private recruitment agencies to participate in the overseas employment pro-
gramme, they must obtain a license from the POEA by demonstrating that at least
75% of the company controlled by Filipino citizens; paying a 10,000 peso applica-
tion fee, a 50,000 peso licensing fee, a bond to the government in the amount of one
million pesos; and demonstrating a minimum capitalization of two million pesos.54
New licenses are given on a year-by-year conditional basis to ensure that the recruit-
ment agency complies with the regulations. After 3 years, the agency can obtain a
full license that lasts for another 3 years. The POEA may also ban travel agencies
and members of government agencies dealing with migration from obtaining
licenses. As of 2013, there were 3479 private recruitment agencies listed in the
POEA directory. Of these, 876 have valid licenses to recruit for land-based overseas
jobs and 400 have licenses as manning agencies that recruit for sea-based posi-
tions.55 The large majority of this directory consisted of private agencies that at one
52
Ibid.
53
Patricia Santo Tomas, former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Republic of the Philippines,
Personal Interview, July 22, 2004.
54
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Participation of the Private Sector in the
Overseas Employment Program’, available at http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/POEA%20Rules.pdf
55
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Status of Recruitment Agencies’, accessed
August 11, 2013. Available at http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all
144 N. G. Ruiz
Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987 (in Philippine pesos)

Year Placement fees (average) New hires total Total expenses
1980 2020 214,590 433 million
1981 1821 266,243 485 million
1982 3897 314,284 1.2 billion
1983 5658 291,197 1.6 billion
1984 6421 260,161 1.6 billion
1985 3002 232,391 3.0 billion
1986 11,707 255,341 2.9 billion
1987 9381 314,250 2.9 billion
Source: Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, ‘Response to New Market Opportunities: The Case of the
Overseas Employment Sector’, Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper Series
No. 89–11, June 1989
point had licenses but were either ‘delisted’, ‘suspended’ or ‘banned’ from recruit-
ing overseas employees because of rules violations or fraudulent activity. According
to the former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia Santo Tomas, the pur-
pose of POEA is to ensure that OFWs are not being taken advantage off. It is a
complete public–private partnership, where the government concentrates its efforts
on protecting the OFW and the private recruitment agencies concentrate on negoti-
ating the details of the position with the employer abroad and with the employee.56
Private recruitment agencies require fees and payments from the prospective
OFW in order to operate. By law, the POEA does not allow recruitment agencies to
charge more than the maximum placement fee to the OFW. This maximum place-
ment fee grew from 300 pesos in 1979 to 5000 pesos in 1985, to the equivalent of
one month’s salary from 1995 onwards.57 To provide an idea of placement expenses,
a 1989 study by Abrera-Mangahas provides recruitment costs for migrating abroad.
The paper shows that between 1980 and 1987, placement fees averaged between
2020 pesos and 11,707 pesos (Table 8.5).
Examples of specific destinations reveal how it varies by destination country. In
1999, the costs for migrating OFWs going to Hong Kong and Italy are between
$784 and $1487 for Hong Kong and between $1556 and $6038 for those bound for
Italy. These included the placement fee charged by the recruitment agency, the
OWWA contribution, a POEA administrative fee and fees for medical treatment,
56
Patricia Santo Tomas, former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Republic of the Philippines,
Personal Interview, July 22, 2004. Patricia Santo Tomas was also the first Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and also worked for Blas Ople, the architect of
the Philippine Labor Export Policy.
57
Dean Tiburcio Alegado, ‘The Political Economy of International Labor Migration from the
Philippines’, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1992; Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, ‘Hiring Filipino Workers’, accessed August 11, 2013, available at http://www.
poea.gov.ph/about/hiring.htm
passports, medical clearances, a pre-departure orientation, a POEA certificate of

overseas employment and agency registration.58
Where do potential OFWs obtain the capital to pay these fees before working? A
1990 survey was conducted to understand the financing of overseas employment.
The large majority of financing came from loans (8 of 10 respondents exclusively
relied on loans). Additionally, 10% supplemented these loans by selling property
and another 5% supplemented the loans with personal savings.59 The large majority
of loans were provided by relatives (50%), money lenders (38.9%) and banks
(6.1%); 27.7% of these loans were interest free; 29.5% had preferred rates of 10%;
10.4% carried a yearly interest rate between 11% and 30% a year; and the balance
of 32.3% carried rates of 120% a year. The Philippine government does have a lend-
ing wing of OWWA to offset the costs of working abroad, but these programmes are
a marginal source, accounting for only 1.8% of all funding transactions in overseas
employment and used only by 2.6% of all OFWs in 1990.60
The Remittance Industry
The Philippine state has always had an interest in securing the foreign currency that
overseas Filipinos send to the Philippines as remittances. Since 1968, mandatory
remittances of OFW earnings were a requirement for overseas employment,
although this remittance policy proved difficult to enforce. In 1982, an interagency
body formed by the Central Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry
of Labor and Employment issued Executive Order (EO) 857, which required
migrants to send mandatory remittances of 50%–70% of overseas workers’ sala-
ries.61 Under EO 857, if overseas workers did not show proof of sending remittances
back to the country, they would be unable to renew their Philippine passports – mak-
ing it impossible to continue working abroad.62 Sea-based workers and overseas
workers employed by contractor and construction companies and various profes-
sional workers were required to send 70% of their salaries as remittances through
official banks or intermediaries approved by the Central Bank. Other land-based
workers such as domestic and service workers and workers who are not provided
free housing during their overseas work had to send 50% of their salaries.63
58
Edita A. Tan, ‘The Wage Structure of Overseas Filipino Workers’, University of the Philippines
School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 0503, March 2005, 18.
59
Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas and Luz Aguila-Bautista, Profiling Filipino Worker-Families through
a Socio-Economic Survey Module (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1990), 36–37.
60
Ibid., 43.
61
Rodriguez, Edgar and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the
Philippines’, 19–20.
62
Philippines’, 192–193.
63
Philippines’, 193.
146 N. G. Ruiz
Table 8.6 Philippine Central bank remittance figures $7.6 billion

remittance industry revenue Average transaction size $350
estimate, 2004
Transaction volume 21.7 million
Average price $8.00
Average foreign exchange spread 1%
Transaction revenue $174 million
Foreign exchange revenue $76 million
Total revenue $250 million
Source: Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the
Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, July 2004)
The Central Bank enforced this policy by requiring all recruitment agencies
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to sub-
mit basic information about each OFW that included the names and account num-
bers of the bank(s) that the worker used to send remittances back to the Philippines.
This top-down state policy met protest by OFWs and private recruitment agencies,
as well as criticism from the International Labour Organization for violating article
6 saying that employees should have freedom to use their earnings as they wish.64
The policy was ineffective, and the government eventually abandoned it in the
mid-1980s.
There have been few estimates of the size of the Philippine remittance market. In
2004, the Asian Development Bank estimated that the remittance industry produces
about $250 million to $500 million dollars in revenues per year.65 Table 8.6 outlines
how this estimate, which is based on official remittances that have flowed through
the Philippine Central Bank, the size of remittances and average price for each
transaction based on surveys and internal estimates from the Central Bank.
In 2004, the formal remittance industry had 17 Philippine-headquartered finan-
cial institutions that provided services through their branches or affiliates abroad.
About 80%–90% of the formal remittance market is controlled by six major finan-
cial institutions: Philippine National Bank (PNB), Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), Equitable PCI Bank, MetroBank, Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Each of these banks reported
handling at least $700 million dollars of remittances annually from overseas
Filipinos annually.66 These private financial institutions are part of the Association
of Bank Remittances Officers Incorporated (ABROI) that promotes the interests of
the private remittance industry. In particular, ABROI has worked with the Central
64
Ibid., 193–194.
65
Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances (Manila:
Asian Development Bank, July 2004), 21.
66
Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances, 21–22.
Bank of the Philippines to reduce the price of remittances by agreeing that 11 of the
ABROI members would use the Central Bank’s real-time settlement system called
PhilPass – that would serve as a local clearing house to credit banks.67 Before
PhilPass, banks used different clearing houses for interbank transfers that would
pass on another 150-peso charge to the remittance sender.68 The PhilPass payment
system infrastructure eliminates settlement risks when money passes through differ-
ent clearing houses – making it faster, efficient and less risky to transfer money from
the origin institution abroad to the Philippine bank account. This also allows ABROI
member banks to reduce costs.
There are also non-financial institutions such as cargo companies that are in the
business of transferring overseas remittances. Companies such as iRemit
Incorporated and LBC Express handle about $25–$500 million in remittances vol-
ume per year. Other key players in the remittance market are the international money
transfer agencies (MTAs), such as Western Union and MoneyGram. Western Union
has the largest presence in the Philippines with a large network of 6000 agents, sub-
agents and partnerships with BPI and many pawnshops and rural financial institu-
tions. These international MTAs are able to deliver remittances in the least amount
of time, although they are also the most expensive.69
The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) coordinates with pri-
vate remittance companies – whether banks or money transfer operators – to edu-
cate migrants before they depart the Philippines. Every Overseas Filipino Worker
(OFW) is required to attend Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars (PDOS) that ori-
ents the departing emigrant with information about their destination country; what
to do in case of emergency, labour disputes or maltreatment; and government assis-
tance programmes abroad. Additionally, the PDOS has financial education seminars
that a bank or money transfer operator conducts to inform the OFW about financial
planning, savings and options for sending remittances to their families back in the
Philippines. During this multi-hour session, the OFW has the opportunity to open a
bank account with the bank conducting the PDOS seminar that day.70 Although this
is a great opportunity for OFWs to open a bank account prior to departing the
Philippines, it also prevents OFWs from getting perfect information about competi-
tor remittance transfer companies. In order to run the PDOS financial seminar, the
individual remittance service provider must submit a bid to OWWA for a multi-year
partnership. OWWA has received multimillion dollar bids to conduct these seminars
since it is one of the best opportunities to capture the remittance sender before being
deployed for overseas work. The PDOS seminars are just one example of the intense
competition among migration-centred businesses.
67
Amando M. Tetangco, ‘Supporting Overseas Workers through lower Remittances Fees’, Speech
made at PhilPass-ABROI Memorandum of Agreement Signing, Manila, December 2, 2009.
68
Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances, 11.
69
Ibid., 21–22.
70
Based on observations during author’s participation in Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars in
September 2004.
148 N. G. Ruiz
The Evolution of Labour Export Institutions
This chapter illustrated how labour export extended the economic and political
boundaries of the Philippine state abroad. It argued that new political and economic
forces arising from overseas employment led to the institutionalization of the over-
seas labour export programme that made the Philippine state increasingly respon-
sible for not only managing the emigration process but also the protection of
Filipinos working abroad. From 1986 to 2006, the labour export industry became
entrenched into the economic, political and social institutions of the Philippines.
The returns for labour export were high for Filipino households and the Philippine
government through the flow of foreign currency into the country as remittances
from Filipinos working abroad. The Philippine state expanded its role to protect and
manage the labour export programme and developed institutions for extending citi-
zenship rights to overseas Filipinos.
Not only did labour export expand employment opportunities beyond the limited
domestic labour market overseas, but it also reaped major financial returns for the
overseas worker and the migrant household-receiving remittances. For the Philippine
state, the labour export programme continues to expand the labour market so that
educated Filipinos can obtain a job – whether in their preferred profession or in a
different occupation with higher salaries than if they stayed in the Philippines. For
private businesses, the overseas employment programme was filled with business
opportunities to make a profit. The overseas labour market has penetrated the
recruitment, remittances and education industries. Altogether, labour export has
penetrated all aspects of Philippine society. As the former Secretary of Labor and
Employment Patricia Santo Tomas said, ‘overseas migration is now part of
Philippine life’.71
The ability of the Philippine state to control the benefits of migration depends on
its ability to provide for its migrants abroad. This chapter showed that a close analy-
sis of the development of policies and emigrant institutions in the Philippines helps
us understand how states can gain from migration. The Philippine government
relied heavily on foreign borrowing from official and private lenders to finance both
agricultural and industrial growth. This reliance led to the rise of external debt from
$360 million in 1962 to $28.3 billion by 1986, making the Philippines one of the
most heavily indebted countries in the developing world.72 The development of emi-
grant institutions allowed the state to capture the benefits from migration. The
Philippine case provided a picture of how emigrant institutions can give the state
powers in areas that are normally considered a loss. As pointed out in this analysis,
emigration does not necessarily hurt national economies. Instead, domestic institu-
tions are capable of restructuring to transform the benefits from migration into
71
Patricia Santo Tomas, ‘Filipinos Working Overseas: Opportunity and Challenge’, in World
Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration.
72
James K. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the
Marcos Era (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 10.
Department of Labor and Department of Foreign

Employment (DOLE) Affairs (DFA)
Overseas Workers Commission on

Philippine Overseas Office of the Undersecretary
Welfare Office of the
Employment Overseas Filipinos for Migrant Workers Affairs
Administration Undersecretary for
Administration (POEA) (CFO) (OUMWA) Special and Ocean
(OWWA)
Concerns
Migrant Workers and Embassies

International Philippine Overseas other overseas Filipinos and Overseas Absentee
Offices Labor Offices (POLOs) resource centers Consulates Voting Secretariat
(Representation in
Welfare Labor Attachés Foreign Service Philippine Elections)
Officers Personnel
Fig. 8.3 Philippine government emigration institutional organizational chart
sources of state strength for the government and private businesses. The Philippine
government continues to be deeply involved in facilitating the labour migration of
its citizens throughout the world. The state negotiated, intervened and provided
resources in its attempt to increase the flow of remittances back to the domestic
economy. In response to problems occurring abroad, the Philippine state developed
emigrant institutions to protect and facilitate the employment of its OFWs.
Citizenship rights were also given to Filipinos abroad to increase their representa-
tion. The Philippine state stood at the centre of all of this with its ability to design
policies and emigrant institutions to extend its arms beyond the territory of the state
(see Fig. 8.3 for overview of the Philippine government emigrant institutions).
Chapter 9
Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour
Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic
Discontent?
Zakir Hussain
Abstract This chapter attempts to answer two aspects of the Nitaqat programme:
(1) How does Nitaqat differ from the earlier versions of Saudization? and (2) What
is the contextual reality of Nitaqat? Is it a rentier response to the Arab Uprising? The
timing of the renewed emphasis of Saudization under the new name of ‘Nitaqat’
seems essential and opportune for the Kingdom now, both from the political and
economic angles. Politically, Saudi Arabia needs to insulate itself from the political
‘tsunami’ of the Arab Uprising, spearheaded by the youth who are mainly discon-
tent with the growing unemployment, social inequality and suspicious role of the
regime. The government has vigorously revised, at least in policy prescription, the
employment policy of the private sector and attempted to generate employment
opportunities. It has mandated the private sector firms to employ a certain percent-
age of the nationals. Economically, the regime can afford the high cost of addressing
emergent problems and create an enabling atmosphere for redressing and mitigating
socio-economic and political discontent. The high level of oil prices has given an
enormous economic capability to the regime to afford a lavish lifestyle and largely
unproductive policies to appease the citizens, particularly the youth who are wit-
nessing relatively a high level of unemployment.
On September 12, 2011, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labour (MoL) announced

Resolution 4040 (Hussain 2014), ‘necessitating some radical rethinking of its cur-
rent “localisation” policies’ of jobs in the country’ (Ramady 2013). The Resolution
termed the new labour law as Nitaqat, which classified local companies broadly in
four different colour code zones according to the percentage compliance in terms of
Saudi nationals employed, with penalties imposed for non-compliance (ibid.). The
broad aim of Nitaqat appeared to be focusing on two major aspects: First, to show-
case the government’s determination to reduce and finally weed out the existing and
growing unemployment among the Saudi national labour force, and second, to force
private sector to strictly adhere to the norms of Nitaqat, which has been a more
systematic, comprehensive and time-framed result-oriented plan for achieving
Z. Hussain (*)
Indian Council for World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi, India

152 Z. Hussain
Saudization in the Kingdom. Although since the First Five-Year Plan (1970–1975)
the government inclined to increase the share of national labour force in the
economy, due to one or other reasons, it could not implement it firmly. Nevertheless,
the regime kept passing royal decrees time and again to reserve or fix quotas for the
nationals in different business units and professions, but unemployment among
them remained one of the chronic issues of the Kingdom’s labour policies. Though
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country in real terms grew from USD 70
billion to USD 365 billion between 1970 and 2005, it also created thousands of
employment opportunities, but the rate of joblessness among the nationals contin-
ued to grow. On the other side, the share of foreign workers in the Kingdom steadily
grew (Table 9.1).
Today, amid nine million foreign workers employed in gainful professions in the
Kingdom; officially, 12–15% Saudi labourers are unemployed; currently, over
6,22,533 Saudis are reported to be the active job seekers in Saudi labour market.
Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to examine the following aspects of
the Nitaqat programme:
A. How does Nitaqat differ from the earlier versions of Saudization?
B. What is the contextual reality of Nitaqat? Is it a rentier response to the Arab
Uprising?
Defining Nitaqat
In the present context, Nitaqat (‘scope’ in Arabic) is meant to limit private sector
companies’ employment of expatriate workers. According to Al-Alami, a
US-educated management consultant, the new Nitaqat programme was part of a
25-year plan drawn up in the mid-2000s to gradually wean the economy off foreign
labour dependence by a skilled Saudi workforce to replace it. Official statistics
reveal that the private sector employs above 90% of the total nine million expatri-
ates in Saudi Arabia. Nitaqat aims to achieve its objective by applying three distinct
policy measures: (1) constricting the ‘scope’ or ‘ability’ of the private-sector enter-
prises to employ foreign workers, (2) limiting the ‘duration’ of foreigners’ stay in
the Kingdom and (3) a ‘stick-and-carrot’ policy approach to penalize and support
the abiding and non-abiding private enterprises.
Broadly Nitaqat has three distinct features: (1) identification of business/market
activities, (2) determination of Nitaqat zones/bands and (3) fixation of quota for
Saudization.
(i) Identification of Business/Market Activities
Nitaqat divides private sector enterprises into four categories: Silver/Excellent,
Green, Yellow and Red – depending on the degree of adherence to quotas of
Table 9.1 Share of foreign workers in total Saudi labour force (in thousands)
1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Saudi 1027 1440 1934 2357.10 3172.9 3284.8 3431.6 3584.8 3681.6 3838 3955.2 4143 4397.4
Non-Saudi 773 2662 2878 3628.20 4003.4 3835.7 4091 4181.6 4278.20 4310 4879.7 5792.5 5992.9
Total 1800 4102 4812 5985.30 7176.3 7120.5 7523 7766.4 7959.80 8148 8834.9 9935.5 10,390.3
Percentage of non-Saudi in total 42.9 64.9 59.8 60.6 55.8 53.9 54.4 53.8 53.7 52.9 55.2 58.3 57.7
Source: Hertog 2012; Ramady 2005; Data from Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2013, Saudi Arabia
9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic…
153
154 Z. Hussain
Table 9.2 Categories of Business unit Labours employed

business units under Nitaqat
Micro Less than 9
Small 10–49
Medium 50–499
Large 500–2999
Giant 3000 and more
Source: Labour Bureau, Saudi Arabia
Saudization. The new programme avoids the earlier blanket imposition of 30%
Saudization on all companies; it identifies 41 business/market activities, each con-
sisting of five units, namely, giant, large, medium, small and micro, which depends
on the number of persons employed in each units, that is, 41 × 5 = 205 (Table 9.2).
The business units, which employ less than nine workers, are exempted from the
purview of Nitaqat mandates. These units are termed as Micro or White Zones com-
panies. As a result, a total of 164 (41 × 4 = 164) market activities are identified for
implementing Nitaqat-determined quota policies by the Ministry of Labour (MoL).
The percentage of quota for these market/business categories depends on the num-
ber of workers employed as well as nature of work. For instance, in the banking
sector, 70% employment will be reserved for Saudis; in the media, 19%; and in the
construction sector, 10% as reported in Arab News; ‘[c]ommercial establishments,
insurance companies and public schools will have the same-19 per cent quota’,
according to Al-Madinah. Some job categories do not have quotas, while others are
reserved exclusively for Saudis ... [t]he Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ordered the immediate Saudization of shops selling women’s attire, including
abayas and lingerie (Arab News 2011b). It further stated that ‘all saleswomen
should be Saudis’ and that the working time should follow ministry regulations
(ibid.). In addition, there are ‘exclusive working zones’ for women (ibid.). A total of
49 economic activities, including four recent ones – petrol stations; works related to
stone, granite and tiles; four – transport of goods and passenger outside cities – have
been added to the Nitaqat list (Arab News 2012).
(ii) Determination of Nitaqat Zone/Bands
Nitaqat divides the total 164 market activities into four zones or bands: Silver or
Excellent, Green, Yellow and Red. The division of bands or zones is determined by
the outcome of their quota adherence. Nitaqat also gives grace period to the compa-
nies to improve their records. Companies categorized as ‘Silver/Excellent’ and
‘Green’ need to meet 100% Saudization. ‘Silver’ companies have a grace period of
1 year, ‘Green’ companies have 6 months and ‘Yellow’ companies have 9 months.
‘Red’ enterprises are deprived of all benefits, including issue of visas, renewal of
iqama (work permit), transfer of visas, opening new branches or facilities with
Labour Offices. If they do not improve their nationalization records within 6 months,
they also face closure. According to the Labour Minister, around 30%–40% enter-
prises fall in this category.
9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 155
‘Green’ companies enjoy complete freedom to manage their expatriate workers.

They can transfer or change the services or professions of expatriate workers and
even transfer them without fulfilling the condition of spending 2 years with their
current employers. They can renew the iqama irrespective of their period of stay in
the Kingdom. They are also authorized to sign up expatriate workers of the ‘Red’
and ‘Yellow’ categories directly even without taking permission of their current
employers (Tables 9.3 and 9.4).
According to Haatab Al Anazi, spokesman of the Ministry of Labour, the new
system allows renewal of iqama for expatriates working in ‘Green’ and ‘Silver’
companies freely; iqama of the foreign workers in ‘Red’ companies will not be
renewed, irrespective of the years they have spent in the Kingdom, ‘Yellow’ compa-
nies will need to correct the Saudization conditions to get the iqama of their workers
to be renewed. Expatriate workers of ‘Red’ companies would not be allowed resi-
dency of above 6 years. The Nitaqat system does not apply to the household sector,
which absorbs a sizeable percentage of expatriate workers. Table 9.4 schematizes
the provisions of the programme for different categories.
(iii) Fixation of Saudization Quota
The MoL has fixed quota for every business units falling under different Nitaqat
zones. For instance, if a company that wants to be in the Silver zone, it has to reserve
40% of its jobs for Saudis. Likewise, companies falling under Green zone will have
Table 9.3 Nitaqat zones
Source: Compiled from FAQs Document: Nitaqat-Incentive Programme for Entities to Nationalise
Jobs, Ministry of Labour, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
156 Z. Hussain
Table 9.4 Schematization of the Nitaqat provisions for business units under different categories
Category Provision Features regarding expatriate workers
Silver/ Concession Can change their professions, including those restricted to Saudi
excellent nationals except for professions exempted (these professions are
reserved for Saudis even in the silver/excellent categories like
receptionists, expediter, cashier, civil security guard, etc.)
Can transfer their services to themselves together with change of
profession simultaneously (in silver/excellent category, an enterprise
will be allowed to transfer the services of expatriate workers to it
together with change of profession simultaneously provided the
enterprise does not fall below the excellent category; it does not submit
applications for transfer of workers’ services more than once every
2 months).
Can transfer their services to themselves even if the worker has not
spent 2 years with his current employer (silver/excellent group
companies will be allowed to transfer the services to expatriate workers
to it without the need to fulfil the condition that the workers should
spend 2 years with the current employees).
Can renew their work permits irrespective of their period of stay in the
kingdom, provided the remaining period before the expiry of the iqama
is at least 3 months on the day of renewal of the work permit.
Can sign contracts with expatriate workers from companies and
establishments falling in the red and yellow categories and transfer
their services to themselves without the consent of the employer.
Penal action Applications for visas will be received according to the new rules
provided the enterprises do not fall to a category lower than green after
granting the visas.
Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every
2 months.
Grace 1 year
period
Green Concession Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for
exit-only visas (i.e. one visa for every two workers departing from the
kingdom for good).
Can change the profession of their expatriate workers except for
professions restricted for Saudi nationals.
Can renew work permits irrespective of the workers’ period of stay in
the kingdom.
Can directly sign contracts with expatriate workers from yellow and
red companies (provided it does not drop below the green category).
Penal action Can avail the benefits provided they do not fall to a lower category
after granting the visas.
Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every
2 months.
Grace 6 months
period
(continued)
Category Provision Features regarding expatriate workers
Yellow Concession Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for
exit-only visas, provided the two workers have actually departed from
the kingdom and the application for replacement visa is submitted
within 1 year from the date of departure of the first worker.
Can renew the work permits of its expatriate workers provided they
have not spent a total of more than 6 years in the kingdom, irrespective
of the period the worker has spent with the employer.
Penal action Applications for new or seasonal visas will not be accepted.
Cannot transfer the services of expatriate workers to itself.
Cannot change the profession of its workers.
Their expatriate workers can freely sign contracts with a new employer.
Grace 9 months
period
Red Concession Can renew the work permits of expatriate workers irrespective of their
period of stay on condition that the remaining period in the visa does
not exceed 3 months on the date of renewal of work permit.
Penal action Cannot change workers’ professions.
Cannot transfer expatriate workers’ services to themselves.
Cannot get any new, replacement or seasonal visas.
Cannot open files for new enterprises (whether they are entities or
branches) at the labour offices.
Cannot renew work permits.
Cannot stop their expatriate workers from signing contracts with a new
silver or green company employer.
Grace 6 months
period
White Nitaqat New rules do not apply to household servants.
rules do not Renewal of their iqama is not linked to the duration of stay in the
apply country.
Their visa would be automatically renewed, depending on the
sponsors’ will.
Source: Compiled by the author from various Gulf-based newspapers and concerned websites
to reserve 10%–39% of the jobs for the Saudi nationals. The companies, which fail
to meet the quota targets, will be listed under Yellow and Red zones (Table 9.5).
Ultimately, a company has to attain Silver status if it wants to continue its business
in the country. ‘The quota compliance is monitored through the government inte-
grated social and visa records’ (Peck 2014). Peck (2014) also views Nitaqat as a
government instrument to combat the ‘resource curse’ on the labour market and
manage common economic problems, including corruption, political instability,
high unemployment, problem arising due to weak institutions, etc.
By this, government plans to generate approximately or absorb around 50%,
including graduates, of the total national labour force. According to David B. Ottawy,
the Saudi government has ‘adopted the U.S. Republican political mantra, “jobs,
jobs, jobs.” It is pressing the private sector as never before to solve a problem it can-
158 Z. Hussain
Table 9.5 Percentage of Saudization under different Nitaqat zones

Business size Silver/excellent Green Yellow Red
Small (10–49) 40 10–39 5–9 0–4
Medium (50–499) 40 12–39 6–11 0–5
Large (500–2999) 40 12–39 7–11 0–6
Giant (3000+) 40 12–39 7–11 0–6
Source: Tala Al-Hejaila: ‘Be Aware: Focus on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, Be Aware Newsletter,
June (2012)
not: jobs for 250,000 to 300,000 Saudi university graduates and other youth enter-
ing the labour market every year’ (2012: 5).
The Labour Minister Adel Fakeih recently announced the launch of a new pro-
gramme ‘Jahiz’ or ‘ready’ and ‘will create job opportunities for Saudi students who
have just finished their scholarship programmes abroad and returned home’ (Zawya
2012). Since King Abdullah ascended the throne in 2005, under international schol-
arship programme, the Kingdom has sent large number of students, particularly to
the USA for higher education. Approximately 130,000 students are abroad and the
total cost incurred on their scholarship is estimated approximately of USD 5 billion
(Knickmeyer 2012). Prior to 2001, 66,000 Saudi students were present in different
universities and colleges of the USA; however, after 9/11, the US authorities almost
closed the visa service to Saudi students. As result, by 2004, their number declined
to 1000. It was only after the pivotal meeting in 2005 at the president’s ranch in
Crawford, Texas, the King was able to convince George W. Bush that ‘the education
program between the two countries “was crucial for the two countries” long-term
relationship’ (Knickmeyer 2012). ‘The stated goal of the program, which, the Arab
News daily in December reported cost more than 20 billion riyals [USD5.3 billion],
is to prepare Saudi nationals to replace expatriate workers in better-paid technical
jobs in the kingdom, reducing unemployment’ (McDowall 2012).
The wave of returnees ... is growing yearly. From just a few hundred graduates from U.S.
institutions in 2006, their number reached 6000 in 2012, a 50 per cent increase...[Mody]
Alkhalif [Director of Cultural Affairs at the Saudi Embassy in Washington] said, “very few”
graduates were electing not to return home. Another embassy official quoted in March by
the English-language Arab News said that so far “only 13 students applied for citizenship
in the United States” (Ottaway 2012: 4).
How Nitaqat Is Different from Past Efforts
The Nitaqat programme avoids taking direct administrative measures by imposing

a blanket quota or restricting inflow of contract workers in the country. But, it has
indirectly prepared the ground for it by tightening the private companies’ employ-
ability of expatriate workers: ‘the state will impose a six-year cap on residency visas
for expatriate workers, if their employers fail to meet quotas’ (Sfakianakis 2011).
The new programme ‘is more dynamic and pragmatic’; it is based on ‘applying 205
categories of quotas that vary on the line of the nature of “work” and “employment
size” of the company’ (ibid.). The new labour policy divides all the 205 business
activities into four categories termed as Nitaqat zones (Table 9.3). Each zone has to
reserve fixed percentage of jobs for Saudis, which depend on the number of workers
employed by these business units (Table 9.4). However, a business unit that employs
less than nine workers is not subjected to Nitaqat mandates. This is known as White
Zone category firms. The criterion of reserving jobs is based on a meticulous
approach of striking a balance between creation of employment opportunities for
Saudis and economic viability of private enterprises. The programme systematically
analyses current and projected demands for jobs and the economic capacity of dif-
ferent enterprises to absorb Saudi employees. Its provisions also seem futuristic,
proposing adoption of Saudization in a phased manner.
Table 9.6 provides the estimated level of nationalization required for companies
employing 3000 and more people in Saudi Arabia. The thriving private sector has
Table 9.6 Saudization bands across the select business lines (in per cent)
Category Profession category Red Yellow Green Silver
Category I (preferred by Personal services 4% 12% 64% 65%
Saudis) Printing, publishing and media 14% 34% 64% 65%
Electricity, gas and water 7% 19% 69% 70%
Kindergartens, institutes and 14% 34% 69% 70%
colleges
Maritime transport 9% 29% 74% 75%
Communications 9% 29% 74% 75%
Community services and social 9% 21% 74% 75%
Petrochemical, coal and rubber 19% 44% 74% 75%
Private and public schools girls 39% 49% 79% 80%
Oil and gas extraction 14% 34% 84% 85%
Employment agencies 51% 76% 86% 87%
Financial institutions 49% 64% 89% 90%
Offices of public services 9% 29% 89% 90%
Recruiters eligibility 9% 29% 89% 90%
Category II (mixed Nutrition services 4% 15% 30% 31%
preferences) Manufacturing 7% 19% 34% 35%
Wholesale and retail trade 9% 24% 36% 37%
Private and public schools boys 14% 19% 39% 40%
Accommodation and tourism 5% 17% 41% 42%
Ground transportation to 4% 11% 44% 45%
passengers, within cities
Insurance and business services 4% 19% 54% 55%
Cement industry 7% 29% 59% 60%
Trading gold and jewellery 9% 28% 59% 60%
Air transport 9% 29% 59% 60%
Collection offices and real estate 4% 17% 59% 60%
services
(continued)
160 Z. Hussain
Category Profession category Red Yellow Green Silver
Category III (predominantly Transport of goods within cities 7% 11% 21% 22%
for expatriates) Farmers, fishermen and 1% 8% 26% 27%
herdsmen
Agriculture, fishing, grazing and 4% 13% 26% 27%
horse raising
Agriculture and livestock 5% 9% 26% 27%
production
Pharmacies and drug stores 9% 14% 29% 30%
Foreign schools 6% 14% 29% 30%
Building materials and 4% 7% 30% 31%
construction
Construction maintenance, 3% 6% 30% 31%
operation and subsistence
Source: Al Masha Capital Limited (2011:33)
maintained its growth and competitiveness on account of cheap, efficient contract

workers working for long hours; non-Saudis are paid one-fourth the average salary
of Saudis. For instance, in 2009, the average monthly private sector wage for nation-
als was SR3,137 per month, and for expatriates for the same job, it was around
SR765. The authorities have also raised minimum wages in the private sector, to
encourage Saudi employment.
Failure of the past efforts of Saudization has been another important reason for
implementing Nitaqat policy. Although, even before the oil-price revolution
(1973–1974), the Saudi government realized the need of maintaining a fair percent-
age of national labour force in overall employment stream, it could not succeed;
rather the percentage of foreign workers steadily kept growing, particularly in pri-
vate sector (Fig. 9.1). As a result, Nitaqat can be seen as a stringent response to
non-abidance of private sector enterprises to the nationalization of employment
policy of the government (Alhamad 2014; Al Masiah Capital Limited 2011).
Figure 9.1 shows the declining share of Saudis in private sector. In 1970, Saudis
were holding 84% of the total jobs in private sector, but in 2010, it reduced to 13%,
while the share of non-Saudis increased to 78% from 15% during the same period.
Nitaqat and the Arab Uprising – Is it a Rentier Response?
The timing of the renewed emphasis of Saudization under the new name of Nitaqat
seems essential and opportune for the Kingdom now, both from the political as well
as economic angles.
Politically, Saudi Arabia needs to insulate itself from the political ‘tsunami’ of
the Arab Uprising, spearheaded by the youth who are mainly discontented with the
growing unemployment, social inequality and suspicious role of the regime. The
Per cent
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Saudis 84.1471.7249.3540.17 34 29 25 10.1 11.6 12.8 13.1 13.3 12 13
Non-Saudis 15.8628.2850.6559.83 66 71 75 89.9 88.4 87.2 86.9 86.7 88 87
Fig. 9.1 History of Saudization in private sector (in per cent). (Source: Central Department of
Statistics (CDS), Labour Force Statistics in Saudi Arabia, 1977, 1990, 2001 (Jeddah). Figures for
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are taken from Hertog 2012 and 2009 and 2010 are author’s
estimates)
government has vigorously revised, at least in policy prescription, the employment

policy of the private sector and attempted to generate employment opportunities. It
has mandated the private sector firms to employ a certain percentage of the nationals.
Economically, the regime can afford the high cost of addressing emergent prob-
lems and create an enabling atmosphere for redressing and mitigating socio-
economic and political discontent. The high level of oil prices has given an enormous
economic capability to the regime to afford a lavish lifestyle and largely unproduc-
tive policies to appease the citizens, particularly the youth who are witnessing rela-
tively a high level of unemployment.
The immediate objectives of Nitaqat are as follows:
(a) Neutralizing the spillover effects of ongoing regional turbulence in the country
by reducing unemployment among citizens, thus ensuring a medium- to long-
term socio-economic and political stability in the country.
(b) Stimulating economic growth by plugging the huge remittance outflow.

According to Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), over the last 18 years
(1990–2008), expatriate workers remitted approximately SR 524 billion
(USD139 billion) (Ramady 2005).
(c) Preparing the nationals to take up their labour market responsibilities through
better education, training and skill upgradation programmes and weeding out
skill mismatch.
(d) Reducing dependence upon expatriate workers through effective labour man-
agement policy.
162 Z. Hussain
Unemployment
John Sfakianakis, Chief Economist, Banque Saudi Fransi (SFB), views the new
programme as ‘desperate measures’ in ‘desperate times’ (Sfakianakis et al. 2011).
Another reason that perhaps goaded the Saudi authorities to announce the new pol-
icy is the increasing unemployment among nationals, despite the large number of
jobs generated in recent years and the robust economic growth. Today, ‘there is a
striking paradox in Saudi Arabia’s labour market. Expatriates working in the king-
dom send home more remittances than those living in any country in the world apart
from the U.S. Yet youth unemployment among Saudi citizens are higher than [in]
every country in the Middle East and North Africa, except Iraq’ (cited in Focus
Migration 2012). According to official statistics, unemployment is currently run-
ning as high as 10.5% (Fig. 9.2).
Men in the age group 20–24 experienced 30.3% unemployment, while 12.7%
men in the age group 25–29 are without work. According to Al-Dosary et al. (2005),
around 20%–30% university graduates are unemployed. Another source estimates
that unemployment rose to more than 30% from about 12% between 2000 and 2005.
Citing the latest statistics, the Labour Minister, Adel Fakeih, noted that ‘there were
about 500,000 unemployed Saudi men and women against the presence of eight
2010, 35.6
2006, 31.8
2009, 30.2
2007, 29
2008, 27.8
2006, 12
2007, 11 2010, 10.5
2008, 10 2009, 10.5
Saudi Youth Unemployment Total Saudi Unemplyment
Fig. 9.2 Total and youth unemployment in Saudi Arabia, 2006–2010. (Source: ILO 2009 (G20
Statistical Report))
million foreigners, of whom about six million are employed by the private sector’
(Arab News 2011a). Overall, unemployment in Saudi Arabia ‘is running at 10.5 per
cent’ of which ‘28 per cent... were women and 40 per cent were high school gradu-
ates’ (ibid.). Citigroups’ Chief Economist for the Middle East Farouk Soussa
warned that.
serious imbalances have been building in the country over decades and that we believe
require urgent attention: only 40% of Saudis of working age are in employment, 43% of
20–24-year-olds are officially unemployed, 51% are below the age of 21, expat workers
make up 90% of the private sector work force (quoted in Zawya 2011).
Locating Causes of Unemployment
The foremost reason for high rate of unemployment among nationals lies in resource
distribution – the distribution of oil wealth among citizens on the principles of natu-
ral justice than on economic rules of efficiency and marginal productivity, which
suited the objectives of the political regime to maintain its legitimacy by lavishly
purchasing the will and consent of the citizens. Since the first oil bonanza occurred
in the region, other productive forces such as agriculture, sea-based economic activ-
ities and service sector gradually lost their sheen and the classic ‘Dutch disease’
gripped the economy. Furthermore, private sector jobs came to be regarded as
menial and below par socially and culturally, fit only for migrants. The Saudis, con-
sequently, opted to remain unemployed rather than be employed in the private sector.
In the Gulf, there is a problem of reluctance by citizens to take up technical and productive
jobs and their preference of administrative, office and supervisory jobs... their preference of
the public sector is also aggravating the redundancy problem and widening the gap in real
production (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, quoted in
Kawach 2010).
There is an economic angle too, which fuelled unemployment or plateaued the

employment opportunities for the Saudi nationals even the policy of Saudization
had been put into practice more vigorously since. Saudis were generally paid three
times higher wages than the expatriates holding the same position. Since the Arab
Uprising started the government has also raised the amount of the minimum wage
to SR 3000 per month to the Saudis, but there has been no such upgradation to the
expatriates’ wages (Table 9.7). This variation in wage rates is present across the
professions. Table 9.8 shows the gap of salaries paid to the Saudis and non-Saudi in
select professions. It is noted that the gap is as high as 61% (clerical jobs) between
nationals and expatriates.
As a result, most of the jobs created in the Kingdom went to the foreign workers.
During the 6 years (2005–2011), almost 2.5 million jobs were created in Saudi
Arabia, and it went to the benefit of foreign labourers (Bel-Air 2014). This is also
evident from the increased number of work permits issued to the foreign workers to
different private enterprises in the country (Fig. 9.3). In fact, job creation has not
been a problem in the entire GCC bloc, including Saudi Arabia. According to the
164 Z. Hussain
Table 9.7 Average monthly wage to Saudis and non-Saudis in private sector in Saudi Arabia (in
Saudi Riyal)
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007
Saudis 4367 3878 3596 3624
Non-Saudis 1037 1028 1060 1011
Source: Hertog (2012)
Table 9.8 Salary gap between Saudis and non-Saudis in select profession (in per cent)
Saudi Non- Salary gap between Saudis
Main occupation nationals Saudis and non-Saudis (%)
Building and construction 3320 1029 31.0
Professional, technical and related 9394 4758 50.6
work
Administrative 14,858 13,160 88.6
Clerical 6212 3816 61.4
Sales 3676 777 21.1
Electricity, gas and water 8659 4187 48.4
Service 3619 1204 33.3
Agriculture, animal husbandry and 3191 1000 31.3
fishermen
Production, transport, equipment 6721 1119 16.6
operator and related work
Mining, oil and gas 16,927 4916 29.0
Not reported 3963 2512 63.4
General average 7034 2354 33.5
Source: Alshanbri et al. (2014)
11,41,601
9,70,805
7,16,347
5,97,272
5,31,434 5,16,826 538892 5,65,124
4,20,928 4,23,172
4,15,619
3,52,924
Fig. 9.3 Work permits issued to foreign workers to different enterprises, 2001. (Source: Hertog
2010)
Table 9.9 Reasons for Saudi unemployment

Issue Private sector justifications
Labour The relatively high cost of Saudi manpower
Social and cultural perceptions Saudis are reluctant to take up and seriously pursue certain
types of jobs. Work-related social status affects marriage and
other social relations
Control over process of Expatriate workers are more disciplined. They are prohibited
production from changing jobs without their sponsor’s permission
Lack of social integration in a Local populations are reluctant to integrate into multi-cultural
multi-cultural environment work environments, fearing that it might diminish their
existing status
Job tenure Saudi workers cannot be dismissed easily
Inadequate qualifications Saudi employees may have inadequate qualifications, lack
English fluency, or have a non-technical background
Mobility Saudi workers are less mobile than foreign workers
Source: Ramady (2005)
Ahmed, ‘Over the past 10 years, the GCC created about seven million new jobs – a
significant achievement for a region with a total population of about 40 million.’
But, fewer than two million – less than one-third – went to nationals. The sharp rise
in expatriate employment took place mostly in the private sector (Ahmed 2012).
According to Torofdar (2011), ‘unemployment among nationals is driven by a
number of factors such as lack of skills, low motivation to work, and high salary
expectations’.
Ramady (2005) cites the reasons for Saudi unemployment as given in Table 9.9.
Figure 9.4 shows the projected rate of job requirements over the next five
decades. It also characterizes the possibility of two major trends in the Saudi labour
markets, including its impact on society in the long term: one, an ever-increasing
rate of male–female labour force participation; and second, increasing share of
female labour force in the total. The participation of male and female labour force
will almost become equal, with economic necessity giving way to gender equality
and mitigating gender bias. Willoughby (2004) termed this a silent revolution in the
GCC labour market, which would potentially replace the expatriate workers.
Politically, the new programme seems a timely motivated intervention in the
labour market, which has become a hot playground of restive youth politics. This is
most likely due to the demonstration effect (emphasis added) of the Arab Uprising
currently underway in the entire Islamic Crescent. Another plausible reason for the
Nitaqat policy is the aspect of diverting the hearts and minds of the Sunni-majority
population through regional balancing. The Kingdom appears more concerned with
maintaining peace and stability in the oil-rich eastern region, which is Shia domi-
nated. Shias account for approximately 10–11% of Saudi Arabia’s population and
are more susceptible to the current upheaval. The Sunni Saudi regime is also cau-
tious about the rising Shia crescent in the post-Saddam Gulf era and in the wake of
the Arab Uprising, which emphasizes rule by majority. Demographically, the Shia
population is larger than the Sunnis in the Gulf region, constituting approximately
166 Z. Hussain
15Million
11 Million
7 Million
3Million
Total, 2020- Total, 2030- Total, 2040-

2024, 0 2034, 0 2044, 0
Women
Fig. 9.4 Projected national labour force, 2010–2050. (Source: http://www.zwaya.com (accessed
11 December 2013))
61% of the total population (Hussain 2011, 2012). Iran is emerging as a natural
leader of the Shia sect, leading to a Shia encirclement of Sunni Saudi Arabia (empha-
sis added). To counter Iran’s growing influence and isolate it in the region, Saudi
Arabia invited, in the recent annual GCC meeting, two Sunni-majority countries –
Morocco and Jordan – to join the bloc. It has also renewed its interest in Yemen and
is promoting a regime change in Syria, a staunch Iranian ally. The Saudi king also
proposed to form a Gulf Union by forgoing an alliance with Bahrain. He urged the
kings, emirs and sultans gathered at the meeting, ‘you all know that we are targeted
in our safety and security’ (Knickmeyer and Delmar-Morgan 2012).
Economic Rationale of the New Labour Programme
Another significant reason for announcing the new labour policy is the financial
luxury which allows Saudi Arabia the fiscal profligacy after a long time. It is esti-
mated that due to sustained rise in oil prices, the Kingdom has a surplus of approxi-
mately USD 900 billion (The Economist 2014). This luxury of surplus finance has
occurred after more than one and half decades; between 1985 and 1998, the
Kingdom managed its expenditure through deficit financing and increasing its
debt–GDP ratio reached almost 100%, which was reduced to 16.7% in 2010 from
21.6% in 2009.
Besides these surpluses, Saudi Arabia has huge cash deposits in Western coun-
tries and a huge sovereign wealth fund (see IMF 2011; Hussain 2009). It has more
than 1.5 trillion SR wealth for emergencies.
In addition, growth rate of the non-oil economy is less prone to fluctuation and
has maintained a consistent rate of growth than the oil economy. This means that the
Saudi economy is heading towards diversification, which will open more avenues
for job creation (Looney 2004a, b; Sadi 2013). The economy will expand laterally.
Thus, more people will be involved in the economic and political systems, and the
country will move towards democratization in the medium to long run.
Feasibility, Expectations and Impact of the New Programme
The Nitaqat programme has evoked a mixed response among different stakeholders.
Officials and Government Employees
According to the Labour Minister, the plan will help reduce joblessness in the coun-
try. He also ‘expects to end 99 per cent of black-market visas and with help from the
private sector, this market would be totally dissolved’. ‘The program will also end
commercial concealment, where foreigners run businesses under Saudi cover’
(Arab News 2011a). According to the ministry, ‘50 per cent transport companies
have achieved the required Nitaqat level. “The Saudization levels set by the Nitaqat
program in each sector are determined by what can be achieved practically”, it said’
(Arab News 2012). Due to Nitaqat, ‘250,000 Saudis were employed in less than a
year. Before introducing the system in Shawwal 1432H, it took five years to create
such amount of jobs for Saudis. Nitaqat has also helped 54,000 women get jobs
within seven months’ (ibid.). The Labour Minister has great hopes of meeting the
challenges of unemployment. He maintains that ‘if the government succeeds in
pushing 50 per cent of private Saudi companies into the green zone, “after three to
five years, we will run out of real Saudi job seekers” in the kingdom’ (Ottaway
2012:6).
Peck (2014) has collected a detailed data of the number of firms of different
categories, employing both Saudis and non-Saudis. He reached to the conclusion
that between July 2011 and October 2012, Nitaqat succeeded in creating approxi-
mately 462,000 jobs for Saudis in private sector as well as ‘improving the colour-
band assignments, with most Red and Yellow firms moving into the Green or
Platinum bands’. He found that the industries/firms falling under large and medium
business groups have absorbed the highest percentage of Saudi workforce, 36.84%
and 29.47%, respectively, while Giant Business group employed only 18.83% of the
total 645,716 Saudi nationals (Table 9.10).
A detailed analysis of the share of Saudis employed in different industries is
given in Table 9.11.
168 Z. Hussain
Table 9.10 Share of Saudis in different business units

% of Total % of Saudis
Business Number of Number of workforce Saudi employed in Share of
group firms workers employed workers different groups Saudis
Tiny (<10) 1027,017 1,780,937 24.02 21,250 3.29 1.19
Small 102,693 1,823,386 24.60 74,759 11.58 4.10
(10–49)
Medium 12,935 1,582,555 21.35 190,263 29.47 12.02
(50–499)
Large 1187 1,428,220 19.27 237,851 36.84 16.65
(500–
2999)
Giant 58 798,029 10.77 121,593 18.83 15.24
(3000+)
Total 1,143,890 7,413,127 100% 645,716 100% 8.71
Source: Pack (2014, table IV, page 46)
Table 9.11 Share of Saudis employed in different industries (July 2011)

Share of
Number Number of Share of Saudi
of firms employees workforce Total Saudi workforce Industry
in each in each industrywise workers industrywise share
No. Industry category firm (%) industrywise (%) Saudi
1 Building and 40,147 2,627,940 46.66 1,52,046 24.35 5.79
construction
2 Wholesale and 20,597 9,27,861 16.47 1,27,711 20.45 13.76
retail trade
3 Manufacturing 6981 4,18,025 7.42 69,096 11.06 16.53
4 Multiple 16,050 1,99,166 3.54 4795 0.77 2.41
economic
activities
5 Maintenance and 1331 1,67,817 2.98 12,791 2.05 7.62
cleaning services
6 Farmers, 6435 1,28,447 2.28 1532 0.25 1.19
fishermen and
shepherds
7 Restaurants and 4847 128,118 2.27 7961 1.27 6.21
catering services
8 Health services 1292 1,24,640 2.21 20,358 3.26 16.33
9 Social and 2321 1,32,849 2.20 39,229 6.28 31.67
communal
services
10 Workshops and 6679 1,22,235 2.17 3196 0.51 2.61
maintenance
services
11 Personal services 2545 82,198 1.46 11,923 1.91 14.51
(continued)
Share of
12 Petroleum and 73 70,720 1.26 53,699 8.60 75.93
gas extraction
13 Passenger 1447 65,567 1.16 4929 0.79 7.52
transportation
(intercity)
14 Lodging and 1289 62,190 1.10 8185 1.31 13.16
tourism
15 Agriculture and 418 42,124 0.75 4878 0.78 11.68
livestock
16 Consulting 551 38,015 0.67 5691 0.91 14.97
services
17 Passenger 501 35,215 0.63 3654 0.59 10.38
transportation
(intercity)
18 Insurance and 637 33,701 0.60 8251 1.32 24.48
business services
19 Governmental 406 30,045 0.53 11,390 1.82 37.91
and private
schools
20 Financial 80 28,777 0.51 23,040 3.69 80.06
institutions
21 Electricity, gas 114 23,330 0.41 8329 1.33 35.70
and water
22 Cement 83 20,292 0.36 4584 0.73 22.59
23 Institutes and 222 20,292 0.36 8607 1.38 42.42
colleges
24 Foreign schools 281 17,794 0.32 6776 1.09 38.08
25 Collection offices 233 14,599 0.26 2172 0.35 14.88
and real estate
26 Mining and 85 12,111 0.22 4808 0.77 39.70
quarrying
27 Petrochemicals, 85 11,735 0.21 5298 0.85 45.15
coal and rubber
28 Pharmacies 268 11,316 0.20 1907 0.31 16.85
29 Printing, 273 10,922 0.19 2127 0.34 19.47
publishing and
media
30 Fishing, grazing 217 9731 0.17 835 0.13 8.58
and horses
31 Gold and 92 8847 0.16 2750 0.44 31.08
jewellery trade
(continued)
170 Z. Hussain
Share of
32 Private labour 77 5391 0.10 234 0.04 4.34
recruitment
agencies
33 Air transportation 92 2897 0.05 352 0.06 12.15
34 Shipping 59 2376 0.04 518 0.08 21.80
35 Communications 12 1661 0.03 198 0.03 11.92
36 Storage 22 1602 0.03 428 0.07 26.72
37 General office 31 644 0.01 188 0.03 29.19
service
Total 1,16,873 5,632,190 – 6,24,466 – 11.09
Non-Nitaqat 10,27,017 17,80,937 31.62 21.250 3.40 1.19
firms
Source: Peck (2014)
Note: This table provides sample statistics on the composition of the workforce by industry at
baseline (July 9, 2011). Column 1 counts the number of forms in each industry category, and col-
umn 2 shows the number of employees at firms in those industries. Column 3 sorts industries by
their share in the total private sector workforce. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of Saudi work-
ers in each industry and the share of workers in that industry in total Saudi private sector work-
force. Column 6 calculates the share of workers in each industry that are Saudi nationals, that is,
the overall industry Saudization rate. The last line reports the same statistics for the firms that were
too small to be included in the Nitaqat programme (less than 10 employees)
Reactions of the Business Class and Private Sector
On Nitaqat, a Saudi businessman opined thus:

We have had such proposals in the past. I don’t think they are feasible?... [L]et us take the
case of accountants. Almost all the accountants working in Saudi Arabia have been here for
more than six years. If we send them back home tomorrow, do we have enough accountants
to replace them? These questions need to be asked... Another Jeddah-based businessman,
Ahmad Al Faroqi, too expressed fears that such a decision would potentially impact nega-
tively on Saudi business sector... ‘Many jobs here require qualified expatriates and there are
no Saudis ready to do these jobs’, he said (Arab News 2011a).
Increasing the employment share of Saudis in private enterprises through admin-

istrative measures instead of following economic rules would bring irrevocable eco-
nomic losses to the companies and will compel employers to shut down their units
in the short to medium run. As noted by the Labour Minister, almost 40% of the
enterprises will fail to meet the Saudization targets and, hence, will face the axe.
The 6-year departure programme of expatriates may also induce experienced work-
ers to seek employment in other neighbouring countries before their term expires.
Peck (2014) has also reached to some of the following conclusions of the quota
policy that can negatively influence the Saudi Arabia’s economy and labour market:
First, it may propel the firms to exit the business; second, it can induce the firms to
downsize below the 10-employee cut-off (White category) and avoid to maintain
quota adherence; third, it may increase the tendency of temporary hiring of the
Saudis, which does not reflect the long-term increase in Saudization. Exit and
downsizing of firms may result into the following cascading effects: emergence of
big corporate houses and inducement to monopolize the economy, which may lead-
ing to the development of inward looking tendencies. Consequently, it may jeopar-
dize the spirit of competition and entrepreneurship in the economy and, hence, spoil
the objective of making Saudi Arabia a vibrant and globally competitive economy.
An Alternate View of Nitaqat
The provision of 6-year residency applies only to those expatriates whose compa-
nies fail to meet their targets of Saudization. The companies would prefer to become
capital intensive rather than expanding horizontally. This will reduce the demand
for more workers in the long run. Higher wages will be paid to workers, as capital
will be cheaply available. Silver/Excellent and Green companies will also earn the
opportunity to poach on workers from the Yellow and Red companies. These com-
panies can also recruit or transfer workers, letting the workers complete 2 years
under their sponsors.
The official government figure of unemployment in the country also requires
scrutiny. It is around 10.5% of the population, which was estimated at around 28
million in 2010. Thus, the absolute number of unemployed in the country is around
2.94 million. This is only 32.6% of the total nine million expatriate workers present
in the country. The government can easily create space for these unemployed Saudis
in the private sector, which can absorb this number comfortably. Two conclusions
may, thus, be drawn: Either the government is not furnishing the exact percentage
of unemployment in the country or there is much ado about nothing. The govern-
ment has attracted the attention of the public and given them a sense of care and
sympathy, particularly in the current political milieu. In both cases, the expatriates
should not worry much about their future in the country.
Nonetheless, if Nitaqat remains a sustained policy goal, in medium to long term,
it will create some of the following positive spinoffs in the Saudi Arabian economy
and labour market. First, trainings and skill acquisition programmes are the manda-
tory part of the new labour policy. A sustained training and skill acquisition pro-
gramme will improve the skill profiles of the Saudi labour force; hence, it not only
increases the willing of the private firms to employ nationals but also improves the
overall productive of the economy, which has significantly gone down in recent
decades (Al-Asmari 2008; Aljazira Capital 2013). Second, higher wages in private
sector will attract Saudis to seek employment in private enterprises. As a result, it
will gradually change the psychology of the Saudis, who treat private sector enter-
172 Z. Hussain
prises as migrants’ domain. Better payment and changed psychology will help
reduce the segmentation of labour market in the Kingdom. This ‘will also likely
affect the human capital investments of Saudi nationals’ (Peck 2014) and align the
education system with labour demand of private sector in the long term. Better edu-
cation and changed attitudes will inculcate better corporate ethics among the Saudi
workers, which ultimately fructify the goal of promoting ‘knowledge’ economy,
based on innovation and global competitiveness in the Kingdom.
Policy Attention
The new policy should address the private sector’s labour dilemma. The Labour
Ministry should strike a balance between Saudization and the economic capacity of
the private enterprises to afford Saudi employees. Moreover, the provision of grace
period needs attention. The failing companies would simply fill up their quotas with
unqualified Arabs and bail out themselves. This will hurt the economy in the long
run. For the employed Saudis, these jobs will be sinecures. In the medium to long
run, the economy will generate a substandard national labour force and there will be
a compromise with low productivity, low competitiveness and the country will have
to go again for skilled expatriates.
The authorities should also analyse the impact of a 6-year residency cap on expa-
triate workers. This may promote a flight of experienced and trained guest workers
to neighbouring countries, which will mean a net loss to the Saudi economy; the
country will incur an undue cost of training new workers every 6 years. A better
policy would be to screen out the excess and inefficient labour ab initio. For this, a
few actionable steps may be considered: (a) a holistic labour market survey could be
undertaken, including gender, skill, age cohort specifics and market requirements.
The labour deficit should be managed by the central authorities by fixing a quota for
each country and visas issued accordingly; (b) the multiple sponsorship (kafala)
system should be managed; otherwise, this would lead to a potential leakage in the
new system.
The problem of skill mismatch could be removed by policy attention at the fol-
lowing levels:
(a) Hardware Reform: Reform in the national education system and expansion of
relevant infrastructure facilities. The curriculum at all levels – school, college
and university – should be flexible, so changes as per requirements of the labour
market can be brought in.
(b) Software Reform: Transforming the Saudi minds towards education and employ-
ment responsibilities. To achieve this, preference for suitable subjects and the
significance of modern education in terms of career, economic contribution and
corporate work ethics should be promoted. The intervention of religion in the
education system, mode of learning and overemphasis on traditional subjects
among students should be changed through persuasion, reservation and by
implementing strict eligibility criteria for employment, particularly in the pub-

lic sector. Punctuality, responsibility and accountability should also be brought
into the employment criteria.
The subcontracting of labour that has mushroomed in the Kingdom in recent
years needs serious attention. This has generated a huge opportunity for exploitation
of expatriate workers by agents, sponsors and other intermediaries involved in the
migration process. It is found that a worker, mostly unskilled, is getting as low as
SR250 per month; the rest is appropriated by the intermediaries.
The authorities should also pay attention to those sectors which are exempted
from the new programme and those enterprises marked as ‘Red’. The problem of
illegal or overstaying expatriates will emerge soon. The 6-year residency cap of
Red-category enterprises will compel workers to flee. In such a situation, interme-
diaries will exploit the situation: sponsors will issue excess fake visas in sectors that
are exempted from the Nitaqat programme. The Labour Ministry needs to be vigi-
lant at two levels, mainly: (a) the number of visas issued in those sectors that do not
fall in any of the four categories and (b) maintaining updated records of expatriate
workers.
At the administrative level, authorities should be prepared to deal with the prob-
lem of overstaying migrant workers; locking them up would not be the appropriate
solution. Companies which employ them should be made liable if their workers run
away. Close cooperation with the labour-sending countries will also help in manag-
ing the problem of illegal emigration and other related problems. Since all GCC
member countries are facing the dilemma of guest workers, they should formulate a
common policy. Any policy pursued in isolation would not lead to optimum benefits.
References
Ahmed, M. (2012, January 12). Meeting the employment challenges in the GCC. iMF Direct,
International Monetary Fund’s Global Economic Forum. http://blog-imfdirect.imf.
org/2012/01/19/meeting-the-employment-challenge-in-the-gcc/. Accessed 8 Dec 2014.
Al Masiah Capital Limited. (2011). MENA: The great job rush: The “Unemployment” ticking time
bomb and how to fix it. http://almasahcapital.com/uploads/report/report_23.pdf. Accessed 9
Dec 2013.
Al-Asmari, M. G. H. (2008). Saudi labour force: Challenges and ambitions. JKAU, Arts and
Humanities, 16(2).
Al-Dosary, A., Rehman, S. M., & Mir, S. (2005). An Integrated Approach to Combat
Unemployment in the Saudi Labour Market. Journal of Societal and Social Policy, 4(2), 1–18.
Alhamad, H. S. (2014). The labor market in Saudi Arabia: Foreign workers, unemployment, and
minimum wage. Student Plus, 6(6). http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/905/the-labor-mar-
ket-in-saudi-arabia-foreign-workers-unemployment-and-minimum-wage. Accessed 7.1.2015.
Al-Hejaila, T. (2012, June). Be aware: Focus on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Be Aware Newsletter.
AlJazira Capital. (2013, December). Saudi economy: Opportunities and challenges’. Economic
Reports. http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/ECO-120.pdf. Accessed 7.1.2015.
174 Z. Hussain
Alshanbri, N., Khalfan, M., & Maqsood, T. (2014, November). Nitaqat program in Saudi Arabia.
International Journal of Innovative Research in Advanced Engineering, (IJIRAE), 1(10). http://
www.ijirae.com/volumes/vol1/issue10/57.NVBS10093.pdf. Accessed 8 Jan 2015.
Arab News. (2011a, May 31). Labour minister explains expat time-bar plan. http://www.arabnews.
com/node/379191?quiktabs_start2=1. Accessed 10 Dec 2013.
Arab News. (2011b, June 14). Labour minister outlines saudisation percentage. http://www.arab-
news.com/node/380653. Accessed 15 July 2011.
Arab News. (2012, August 13). Nitaqat Expanded. http://www.arabnews.com/nitaqat-expanded.
Accessed 9 Dec 2013.
Bel-Air, Françoise De. (2014). Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia. Gulf
Labour Markets and Migration Working Paper No.1. Florence. European University Institute.
Focus Migration. (2012, December). The Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC). Country
Profile, No. 25. Accessed 8 Jan 2015.
Hertog, S. (2010). Prince, Broker, and Bureaucrats, US: Cornell University.
Hertog, S. (2012). A comparative assessment of labour market nationalisation policies in the GCC.
London School of Economics Online Research. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46746/1/A%20compar-
ative%20assessment%20of%20labor%20market%20nationalization%20policies%20in%20
the%20GCC(lsero).pdf. Aaccessed 3 Dec 2014.
Hussain, Z. (2009). India Woos GCC Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy, Scope and Precautions.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Hussain, Z. (2011). Immigration policies of the GCC countries: Implications and responses. In
I. Rajan & M. Percot (Eds.), Review of dynamics of Indian emigration: Historical and current
perspectives. New Delhi: Routledge.
Hussain, Z. (2012). Syria and the evolving politico-strategic dynamics in the Gulf (Sapru House
Paper) New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs.
Hussain, Z. (2014, February 4). Nitaqat – The second wave of Saudisation: implications for
Indian. Issue Brief. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/
IBsecondwaveof.pdf. Accessed 8 Jan 2015.
IMF. (2011). Gulf cooperation council countries enhancing economic outcomes in an uncertain
global (Economy, Middle East and Central Asia Department). International Monetary Fund.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf
International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2009). Saudi Arabia: Economic weakness led to
unemployment rate hike’. G-20 Statistical Updates, G-20 Meeting of Labour Employment
Ministers, 20–21 April, Washington, DC. http://www.dol.gov.ilab/media/events/G20_
ministersmeeting/G-20-SaudiArabia.stats.pdf. Accessed 14 Dec 2013
Kawach, N. (2010, July 20). Arab states need to create 40 million jobs by 2020. Emirates Business.
Knickmeyer, E. (2012, July 27). Saudi students floods in as U.S. reopens door. The Wall Street
Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304830704577492450467667154
154.html. Accessed 9 Dec 2013.
Knickmeyer, E., & Delmar-Morgan, A. (2012, May 13). Bahrain, Saudis to Clinch Ties. The Wall
Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230350550457740194180022
3750.html. Accessed 9 Dec 2013.
Looney, R. (2004a). Saudisation and sound economic reforms: Are the two compatible? Strategic
Insights, 3(1), 1–9.
Looney, R. (2004b). Can Saudi Arabia Reform its Economy in Time to Head Off Disaster?
Strategic Insights, 3, 2.
McDowall, A. (2012, June 6). Wider world opened to Saudis studying abroad. Reuters.
Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia ‘New “nationalization” program announced’: Accessed 20 July
2011.
Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia ‘Nitaqat system will be fully implemented to companies with red
category’. Accessed 20 July 2011.
Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia. Website: www.mol.gov.sa
Ottaway, D. B. (2012). Saudi Arabia’s race against time. Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars,
Middle East Program.
Peck, J. R. (2014, April). Can hiring quotas work? The effect of the Nitaqat Program on the Saudi
Private Sector. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://economics.mit.edu/files/9417.
Accessed 8.1.2014.
Ramady, M. A. (2005). The Saudi Arabian economy: Policies, achievements and challenges.
New York: Springer.
Ramady, M. A. (2013). Gulf employment and government policies: Prospects for the Saudi Labour
Quota or Nitaqat System. International Journal Economics and Business Research, Vol. X (Y).
Accessed 10 Jan 2015.
Sadi, M. A. (2013). The implementation process of nationalization of workforce in Saudi Arabian
private sector: A review of “Nitaqat Scheme”. American Journal of Business and Management,
2(1). http://worldscholars.org/index.php/ajbm/article/view/273. Accessed 8 Jan 2015.
Sfakianakis, J. (2011). Riyadh: New employment rules to shake up Saudi private sector. Arab
News, 15 June. http://www.arabnews.com/node/380796. Accessed 10 July 2011.
Sfakianakis, J., Merzaban, D., & Al Hugail, T. A. (2011, June 14). ‘Quota Counting’. Saudi
Arabian Economics.
The Economist. (2014, December 6). Making the best of a low price. http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21635510-what-oil-cartel-up-making-best-low-price
Torofdar, Y. A-J. (2011). Human Resource Management (HRM) in Saudi Arabia: A closer look at
Saudization. Paper presented at 14th International Business Research Conference on ‘Research
for Re-thinking’, 28–30 April, Dubai.
Willoughby, J. (2004). A quiet revolution in the making? The Replacement of Expatriate Labour
through the Feminization of the Labour Force in GCC Countries, Department of Economics,
American University, Washington, DC.
Zawya. (2011, June 5). Replacing Expats. http://www.zawya.com/stroy/ZAWYA20110605052943/.
Accessed 20 June 2011.
Zawya. (2012, September 17). 380,000 jobs in 10 months for Saudis Thanks to Nitaqat. http://
www.zawya.com/story/380000_jobs_in_10_months_for_Saudis_thanks_to_Nitaqat-
ZAWAYA201209170423267/. Aaccessed 9 Dec 2013.
Chapter 10
Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman:
Migration as a Gamble
Marie Percot
Abstract In Oman, Bangladeshis are now the most important community of

migrants among South Asians. Among them are fishermen who represent a paradig-
matic example of the difficult situation most low skilled workers have to face in the
Gulf countries. Based on fieldworks in Hatiya, a small island of the Bay of Bengal
from where these fishermen are originating, and in several harbours of Oman, I
intend to highlight the different mechanisms which make migration a very risky
gamble for these men. From the recruitment process through local networks, the
conditions of work and salaries, the unavoidable path to an irregular status and
eventually the arrest and deportation of most of these workers, I propose to show
how, structurally, their migratory experience almost always leads to failure and
increased poverty.
‘They do not pay us our proper share, they cheat us on the price of the fish; But if we
try to argue, they beat us with whatever they have at hand: rope, tool, fish, shoe...
They insult us and say that we are not even Muslim, just useless people from a des-
titute country’. I heard this remark again and again in the harbours I visited in Oman
where the vast majority of fishermen come from Bangladesh, all of them eager to
speak about the ill-treatment they were enduring from the Omani owners of the
This paper is based on a fieldwork carried out in Oman in November and December 2014 where
approximately 100 fishermen were interviewed and on two fieldworks in Hatiya, Bangladesh, in
2014 and 2015 where I met around 50 ex-migrants and many families of the migrants I met in
Oman. The interviews were done in Bengali and translated to me in English by Morsedur Sagor
Rahman a more than talented interpreter and a very precious collaborator.
M. Percot (*)
Laboratoire d’ Anthropologie Urbaine/Institut Interdisciplinaire d’ Anthropologie du
Contemporain (EHESS), Paris, France

178 M. Percot
boats.1 No need to ask any question for that: I was directly presented the migrant
whose back was showing the scars of having been beaten by a hammer, another one
whose leg was badly infected after a work accident and to whom his boss had denied
any treatment, the young one who had been kicked in the stomach for not under-
standing a few Arabic words when he had been in Oman for less than a month, etc.
Beside verbal and physical abuse, all of them were also insisting on how poorly they
were earning: theoretically paid by a share on the fishing, all of them were com-
plaining of never getting it properly. Some of them, like in the island of Masira, even
claimed that they did not get anything for months: Some crews had abandoned their
boat and fled in search of better opportunity; more than 15 empty boats in the har-
bour were shown to me as evidence. All the Bangladeshi fishermen I met had
borrowed a huge amount of money to migrate and all of them had come with great
expectations although, as they acknowledged, it is known in their villages that
Oman is not a good place.
Introduction
Few researches until now have been done precisely on the Bangladeshi migrants in
the Gulf. Their exact number is not even known. Official data from Bangladesh only
give a cumulative figure of 7.1 million documented migrants between 1976 and
2015 (BMET 2015). It is estimated that between 4 and 5 millions of Bangladeshis
would be living now in the Gulf countries, although these estimates are hazardous
considering the high numbers of undocumented workers (Rahman 2011). The first
country of destination is Saudi Arabia, followed by the UAE. Oman has become the
third destination for Bangladeshis with nearly a million of departure, half of them
having taken place these last 4 years. The Omani General Directorate of Civil Status
gives a figure of 522,652 Bangladeshi nationals living legally on its territory in
2014, just a little bit less than Indian migrants.
International migration is regarded very positively by the Bangladeshi authori-
ties for the remittances it generates (11.2 billion USD in 2014), but also as a means
to mitigate the effect of climate change on rural employment (Government of
Bangladesh’s BCCAS 2009). Yet, even if the government has initiated negotiations
with the GCC countries regarding labour recruitment, it has not been able until now
to really negotiate the conditions of employment of its migrant citizens. The latter
are, in their vast majority, unskilled migrants whose salaries are among the lowest,
compared especially to Indians or Pakistanis (Rahman 2011; Kibria 2011) and who
most often find themselves in a very vulnerable situation in the destination country.
1
Although they were very cautious to only speak when there was not boat’s owner around. In a
place, Al Khaluf, Bangladeshi fishermen refused to answer any question, specifying that they had
been forbidden to speak to any foreigner. (It seems that a foreign TV channel had some years ago
filmed on the spot and had pointed out the bad situation of the migrants.)
10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble 179
Bangladeshi migrants moreover have to face a very expensive system of recruitment

through ‘travel agencies’ that the State has to date failed to properly regulate.
This paper presents the case of Bangladeshis working as fishermen in Oman. By
examining the condition of the migrants before and after their departure, I will argue
that – for the majority of them – their trajectory can nearly amount to forced migra-
tion. In a first part, I explain the local context which leads these men to opt for a
move notoriously hazardous and precise the ways of migration. The second part
deals with the situation in the destination country and highlights in particular how
the migrants are pushed and trapped into illegality. At last, the third part is dedicated
to a discussion regarding voluntary/forced migration and the question of
migrants’ agency.
Hatiya, an Island Under Pressure
Most fishermen met in Oman where coming from an island in the Bay of Bengal,
Hatiya. This island counts 452.463 inhabitants living on 371 km2, that is, a density
of 1.219 inhabitants per km2. The first striking view when arriving there is the high
number of working children compared to other places in Bangladesh, a clear sign of
poverty.2 People in Hatiya make a livelihood out of agriculture and fishing. Few
fishermen own their boat and most of them work as day labourer during the 6 months
of the fishing season. They then join the already high number of people looking for
a daily job in agriculture. Landlessness is moreover a growing phenomenon because,
firstly, of the land fragmentation due to division between too many inheritors, but
also because of erosion, an endemic problem, which has however increased in the
recent years. There is thus a fierce competition on jobs, ending up in a high rate of
unemployment. According to the local fishermen, fishing used to be good and to
insure relatively decent income, at least for the season, but two facts have compro-
mised the situation: the fish wholesalers to whom money was borrowed to buy the
nets have become more greedy, either paying less for the fishing or raising interest
rates, thus reducing the share that fishermen can get; then, these last 10 years,
dacoits – pirates have started to racket fishermen, regularly capturing men and boats
for ransom. Most fishermen in Hatiya have been confronted directly with the prob-
lem, some having been badly beaten, some severely injured, all of them only freed
after having paid huge amounts of money.3 All of the fishermen now fear to go to sea.
2
Hatiya is indeed ranked among the 10% of « worst » upazilas (districts) according to several fac-
tors concerning education of children (number of schools and teachers, school attendance rate…)
(BBS, Census 2011).
3
To return a boat, the dacoits may ask around 50.000 takas (approximately 500 USD) and 20.000
to free a man. A fisherman’s salary amounts to 5.000–10.000 takas per month. It seems that the
instauration of a rather anonymous system of payment via mobile phone (BKash) has boosted this
traffic. Furthermore, the coastguards and local politicians do not appear to be very efficient in
struggling against piracy, leading most fishermen to think that they have common interests through
corruption.
180 M. Percot
In Hatiya, most landless families have some members working as fishermen

whilst the others work in the fields when they are able to get a job. In any case, the
incomes are too limited for a decent livelihood. Many of them are illiterate.4 Some
do not even own their homestead land and had to build their hut on khas land (gov-
ernmental land) which means mainly on the digs surrounding the island, a danger-
ous place in this cyclone and erosion prone area. It is in this class of people that
many have opted for a migration to Oman.
In Hatiya, the candidates to migration, being particularly poor, a bit isolated on
an island and not familiar with travelling to big cities, rely almost exclusively on the
local networks to go abroad. The network for Oman has really started 10 years ago.
A few islanders had reached this Gulf country earlier, already employed as
fishermen. These pioneers had often succeeded in becoming maji (captain) on the
Omani boats; they are at the origin of the flux of migration to the Sultanate.5 As a
matter of fact, they soon started to become middlemen between the Omani boat
owners and the prospective migrants. If in the previous years it seems that they had
done it for free, mostly for some relatives or neighbours, they soon began to negoti-
ate the visas they were able to get for a price which has grown up to 200.000 takas
(approximately 2.000 USD).6 This is a huge amount in a place where monthly
incomes barely cross 5.000 takas (50 USD). All the migrants I met had borrowed the
money to go, gathering the amount from different sources: local usurers, relatives
and several micro-credits from different NGOs. To attract candidates to departure is
not so difficult because, on the one hand, the maji who sell visas are typical images
of migration success (having often been able to build a good house, to buy at least a
bit of land, to pay for the education of their children) and because, on the other hand,
poor people of the island are left with no real opportunity to earn a decent liveli-
hood. To go as fisherman, a job that most islanders master, is even rather reassuring
compared, for instance, to go driving a rickshaw in Dhaka. It is not possible to give
a precise figure of the number of people who have left for Oman, but it is in thou-
sands: in some villages of Hatiya, there is no house where there is not at least one
migrant there.
Yet, the interviews of ex-migrants or of migrant’s relatives show a rather desper-
ate picture: To make it short, except for the few who have been able to become
captain I have not found a single example of successful migration. Three types of
scenarios were met again and again:
4
Hatiya has a particularly low literacy rate: 34.2% compared to 51.2% for Bangladesh (BBS, 2011
Census).
5
I am still not able to explain how exactly one becomes captain in Oman. Clearly, the fist migrants
had better chances, but it has also surely a link with the local hierarchy in Hatiya. Those employed
as simple fishermen stated that they had no chance to become maji.
6
This price includes the money the maji had to pay himself to the Omani boss (who sells him the
visas at first), the fees of the different ‘travel agents’ (a local one and another one in a big city like
Dhaka or Chittagong) and the travel fees. From my interviews, I can estimate that the benefit the
maji makes on a visa ranges between 400 and 600 USD.
A significant proportion of migrants had been deported, after being sentenced up

to 1 year of jail, for working illegally in Oman, be it due to a cheating on their visa
or to having fled from their original job. For some of them they had been arrested a
few weeks only after their arrival. It is thus felt as a direct and total failure to be back
home with the full debt to repay and after having earned nothing for months because
of a long incarceration.
Another part of the migrants are in a way stuck in Oman, altogether because until
now they have not been able to pay back their debt and because they are – for dif-
ferent reasons – in a situation of illegality which does not allow them to leave Oman
without being jailed. Yet, they cannot send enough remittances to support the family
and to repay the debt. The fathers, mothers or wives of such migrants, pressurized
by the lenders, are altogether blaming the migrant for not sending more money and
complaining of not having seen him for years. As a father said: ‘My son left nine
years ago. His mother passed away six years ago and he did not come for the
funeral. He left when my daughter-in-law was expecting her third child, his first son,
and he has never seen him. What life is it? If he was doing well, it would be possible
to bear, but no, he was only able to send 60.000 takas [600 USD] last year. With the
debt we have to pay what can we do?’. In several instances, I met with women who
had been sent back to their father’s house because the migrant could not send enough
to support his wife and children. In an extended family homestead, the migrant’s
wife was living with her children under a sloping roof, hardly protected from rain:
The only place left to her by brothers-in-law who were repeatedly telling her that
her husband was enjoying life in Oman, playing cards and having mistresses, instead
of supporting his family. When I gave her the picture I had taken from her husband
in Oman, she hardly looked at it.
At last, one finds in Hatiya, the returnees who came back without having been
evicted or who had chosen to be evicted in order to come back. They, until now,
represent a minority considering the time migration to Oman has started in Hatiya.
These are men who have realized that, in no way, they would improve their situation
by staying longer or who – having become illegal – were too tired of living with
constant fear of police. At best, they have been able to clear the debt contracted for
their departure, but I have met no people who have been able to improve their stan-
dard of living: they were just back to square one, looking for daily job. Having
stayed between 6 and 10 years, most of them still had at least part of the debt
to repay.
Those who had been evicted as well as those who had voluntary come back how-
ever had a rather fatalistic approach of their bad experience in Oman. As several of
them put it: ‘I have played and I have lost.’ All of them were presenting the money
invested as a bet on a move they knew as risky. For instance, Nazrul, who has spent
7 years in Oman and has failed to pay back his debt, remarked: ‘Yes, it is well known
that in Oman the situation is not good, but still there are some people in the island
who have done well. I took my chance and I had hopes that I would be among the
happy ones. Here, anyway, there is no hope at all, so I had to try my luck.’ When
asked to precise who ‘has done well’, the few examples given were without excep-
tion of migrants who were captain and selling visas. Regarding the risk taken by the
182 M. Percot
migrants and its rationality, one also has to consider that fishermen in Hatiya already
live in insecurity, like Mohammad explained: ‘I have been here [in Oman] for six
months. To come, I have sold our two cows and borrowed two lakhs. It is surely a
hazardous bet […] but at home I was risking my life everyday when I was going to
fish. With this problem of dacoits, I feel that I may have saved my life by com-
ing here’.
This willingness to go despite the evidence of so many failures can also be traced
in the way migrants do not care about the contracts they are presented. Some of
them have not even see any papers and have not signed anything; the rest of them
have signed contracts written in English and Arabic, languages that they, of course,
do not know. To decide to leave for Oman, they thus just rely on the oral promise
given by the local visa seller concerning the type of job and the amount of money
they would get. None of the people I met had been given a copy of his contract.
As I said, the bad situation of migrants in Oman is well known in Hatiya. The
migrants do not hesitate to describe the bad treatments they endure and everybody
can witness how poorly they have succeeded. It is so true that prices of visas seem
to have decreased a bit lately,7 but it has not stopped the flux of candidates to depar-
ture. It is clear that migration, in this precise case, is basically a sign of desperation
from people ready to anything to escape poverty and having no other perspective at
hand. If, of course, they are the ones to decide to go, if they are not ‘passive sub-
jects’ and, in a way, ‘exercise a great deal of agency’ (Khonder and Jahan 2015), it
is nevertheless clear that they do not go with an informed consent.
‘Kulu Oman Haram’ (Everything Is Bad in Oman)
In Oman, except for locals fishing on very small boats, all the fishermen are migrants.
They mostly work on boats with a crew of 8–10 people, all of them belonging to the
same nationality. It seems that, 20 years ago, most of them were Indians – often
from Kerala or from Gujarat – but today, the vast majority is from Bangladesh.
According to my respondents, Indians have found better opportunities and Omanis
would now prefer Bangladeshis because they are cheaper labour.8 The recruitment
of foreign fishermen has increased after the Omani government has decided to
develop the fishing sector, and to do so, has largely subsidized the purchasing of
fishing boats (WTO 2008). If it is legal to hire migrant workers as crew for the big-
ger ships, it is illegal for the smaller boats, theoretically reserved for local fisher-
men.9 A law which is not respected since everywhere Bangladeshis can be seen
fishing on these small fibreglass crafts.
7
When I was in Hatiya this year (January–February 2015), visas were sold for 150.000 takas
instead of 200.000 the previous year.
8
Several of my interlocutors stated that the situation was so difficult in Bangladesh that people
were ready to accept to lower their wages in order to come or to stay.
9
The idea was to turn Bedouins, who were hardly doing anymore a livelihood out of their tradi-
tional nomadic occupation, into sedentary villagers.
‘Kulu Oman haram’ (Everything is bad in Oman). This is with this sentence in
Arabic that I was welcomed on the first boat with a Bangladeshi crew I visited in
Sur, a big fishing harbour in Oman. I was then given a depiction of the physical and
verbal abuse the workers were suffering from, a depiction that was renewed in every
place I went. They were then complaining about the poor income they were getting.
Indeed, fishermen have no fixed salary. They are paid by a share of the fishing: the
owner of the boat theoretically takes 50%; on the 50% left, he takes in addition the
amount he has spent for the fuel, and most often, for the food of the crew. The rest
of the benefits are supposed to be shared between the fishermen including the cap-
tain. The captain normally gets in addition a fixed amount of between 1.000 and
2.000 USD a year. But no worker is allowed to go to the market where the fish sell-
ing takes place; they thus entirely depend on their boss’s goodwill. In Masira, a
small Omani island, most of the crews had not even got any payment for more than
5 months when I visited the place: The Omani owners were just giving them food
and sweet water. In such cases, be it a too little pay or no pay at all, many fishermen
eventually decide to find another boss who may pay better. To do so they should
have the agreement of their first boss, the one who have sponsored them to come in
Oman, something which seems to be very difficult to get. Pushed to leave anyway,
they thus end up as illegal workers. Many of the migrant fishermen I met were in
this situation.
Indeed, it is the kafala system, the rule in Oman as in the other Gulf countries,
which generates illegal workers, although – as everywhere – it is the migrants who
are always blamed and stigmatized. Four circumstances may be observed that lead
migrants to illegality. According to this system, the worker is supported by a local
‘sponsor’ (the kafil) who has to be his employer. The system is supposed to give
better control over migrants, but it is not oriented towards the protection of the
migrants (Gardner 2012). Practically, migrants have few options when confronted
to an exploitative kafil, as it is often the case for Bangladeshi fishermen and obvi-
ously the easiest, if not the only alternative is to run away: To just go back home is
not a really possible choice because of the debt the workers have contracted to
come. The second scenario comes from the fact that some Omanis have now made
a business of selling visas. They ask to the authorities more visas for workers they
actually do not need: Once on the spot, the migrant worker discover that he will
have pay to this kafil a monthly amount, but that he will have to manage to find a job
by himself. This type of visas is known as ‘free visas’, but it is indeed directly put-
ting the migrant in a situation of illegality (Pessoa et al. 2014). Many fishermen met
were in this situation since they were working on boats which were not belonging
to their kafil. Another factor pushing to illegality takes place at the time of visa
extension. The contracts are generally for 2 years; to renew them, many kafils ask
the equivalent of 200 USD to their workers, an amount which can be too high for
many. The kafil may even chose not to renew the contract and to instead hire a new
migrant since he will make more money by selling this new visa. These three sce-
narios can be observed everywhere in the Gulf, but the last factor leading to illegal
status is more specific to Oman and to fishermen; it is a consequence of the govern-
mental ban on hiring foreign labour for the very artisanal fishing on small boats:
184 M. Percot
Since most nationals prefer to hire migrant workers than going to fish themselves
and since they cannot get visas for workers, they directly and very consciously hire
illegal workers.
As a consequence, if the fishermen left Hatiya with a visa they thought was valid,
a large proportion of them find themselves directly or soon in an illegal position.
The market for illegal workers seems to be rather open, in a way giving some space
to workers whose kafil are too exploitative. But the burden of illegality has a price:
The constant fear of being caught by the police, of being jailed and then evicted and
the impossibility to get any help from their consulate in such situation.10 Yet, if
many evictions are carried out as I could check in Hatiya, a certain tolerance can
also be observed which leads to believe that undocumented workers may indeed be
useful to the Omani economy: For instance, the Bangladeshi fishermen who ille-
gally work on small boats are housed in sort of slums very visible on some beaches.
No other occupation than fishing could justify their living in such places; they are
nevertheless not systematically chased and some of them I met have been working
illegally there for more 10 years.
A Free Choice?
Many academic studies have described the vulnerability and the exploitation of low
skilled or unskilled migrant workers in the Gulf countries and some NGOs continue
to denounce the worst cases they observe (Rajan and Sunkendran 2010; Mahdavi
2011; Human Right Watch 2015). Yet, a new trend in the academic field (see, for
instance, Khondker and Jahan 2015; Tristan Bruslé 2015) is to reject the picture of
migrants as victims to mainly insist on their agency, following the approach devel-
oped by J. C. Scott in his book ‘Weapons of the Weak’ (1985). These studies more-
over stress out the benefit of migration for the families of the workers as well as for
the country they come from.11 The case of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman rather
leads to highlight how debt contracted to leave added to the perverse effects of
kafala deprive the migrants of rights and freedom.
D. Turton (2003) warns against a too simplistic approach in terms of voluntary
migration as opposed to forced migration in a binary opposition. He insists on the
fact that, even refugees, may have some agency. And certainly, the fishermen from
10
All my interlocutors in Oman insisted on the poor help they anyway get from the Bangladeshi
consulate, even when they are staying legally. All of them compared their situation in this regard
with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts who would get a lot better support in case of problem
with a boss, in case of accident or of imprisonment. Some undocumented fishermen I met tried to
get help from the Bangladeshi consulate to go back home, but they were just rejected.
11
Concerning the benefit for the country of poor people’s migration, I will follow J. O’Connell
Davidson who writes: “Governments also often have a strong economic interest in emigration, not
least because remittances from migrants can substitute for social welfare that they are unable to
provide” (O’Connell Davidson, 2013).
Hatiya decide at a certain point of time to go to Oman, as they often decide, once in
Oman, to flee from a bad kafil in search of a better job. They are for sure very active
when, as undocumented workers, they have to find a new place to work, and to do
so, resort to solidarity networks. In the same way, families at home use their agency
when juggling with the lenders who come to get their due each time some remit-
tances come. There is no reason to question the rationality of the migrants and of
their families. It is nevertheless possible to discuss their freedom of choice, unless
one acknowledges that these men are willingly consenting to their own exploitation
or vulnerability abroad. If one considers the situation they are trapped in at home
(unemployment, pirates’ attacks, exploitation by wholesaler, landlessness, etc.),
migration may indeed be seen at first as the choice of a lesser evil, but once they are
trapped in debt and in illegality abroad, the notion of choice become more
questionable.
As J. O’Connell Davidson writes: ‘The vulnerability of migrant-debtors […] to
exploitation and coercion is a political construction’ (2013: 1). To mainly consider
the decision of migration as an individual one, without taking into account the local
political context (at home and abroad) may lead to understate the responsibility of
States in the situation migrants have to face before and after their departure. For
instance, in Hatiya, if piracy was stamped out by the coastguards, if landless people
were attributed land as they are theoretically entitled to, if wholesale trade of fish
was regulated, fewer fishermen would probably be ready to leave, knowing how
difficult it will be for them in Oman: It is at least what they say; if there was a con-
trol over visa business and travel agencies, prospective migrants would not be
trapped in debts for years and thus trapped in the destination country. (To quota
again O’Connell Davidson (2013: 5): ‘The right to quit is meaningless for those
who have heavily indebted themselves in order to go.’) Similarly, the hardship
Bangladeshi fishermen have to bear in Oman is a result of a policy regarding foreign
labour, especially through the kafala system, which institutionalize exploitation, or
at least, leave workers without protection against it.
Migrant fishermen and their family definitely exercise their agency into the limits
of survival strategies. Migrant fishermen indeed largely acknowledge their helpless-
ness when they describe themselves as slaves, a word many of them used during the
interviews I did in Omani harbours. When people in Hatiya decide as they say ‘to bet’
everything on a possibly ‘better luck’ abroad, they are certainly aware of the risks,
and confronted to the sure ‘discomfort of their localized existence’ (Bauman 1998:
2), migration appears at least as a hope. However, the only hope often left after a few
years in Oman is to be able to come back home after having cleared part of the debt.
Conclusion
The research I did on migration of Indian nurses to the Gulf countries led me to
argue that it was a factor of economic and social empowerment for these qualified
women (Percot 2006, 2015). The case of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman clearly
186 M. Percot
shows another picture. It is rather a paradigmatic example of exploitation and

discrimination.
The potential success of their migration is – right from the outset – jeopardized
by the debt they contracted in order to go since, with the poor incomes they get in
Oman, they are not able to pay back. As shown in other case studies (Sahoo and
Goud 2015; Rahman 2013), the debtor migrants and their family not only do not
benefit from the efforts made to go abroad, but most often end up into more poverty.
In Oman, these workers are left without any protection against abuse and exploi-
tation. The perverse effects of the kafala system even lead many of them to an
illegal status, thus reinforcing their vulnerability. Trapped abroad because of their
debt and because of illegality, the migrants manage to survive by fleeing from a boat
owner to another, constantly facing the risk of incarceration and deportation. This
‘agency of subalterns’ (Khondker and Jahan 2015) is however exercised through the
limits of survival strategies which leave most of them in a distress situation.
Fishermen from Hatiya are clearly at the bottom of the migrant hierarchy as eco-
nomically very poor people, mostly illiterate, low qualified and coming from a
country which has failed until now to protect its migrant citizens be it from fraudu-
lent travel agents or fraudulent contractors. The unregulated way this migration
takes place – in the home country as well as in the destination country, the lack of
protection from their own consulate once abroad, the structural violence they face,
indeed leave these men with no real chance to win the gamble they have placed in
search of a better future.
References
Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The human consequences (p. 126). Cambridge: Polity Press.
BMET. (2015). http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=20
Accessed 11/05/15.
Bruslé, T. (2015). Les Népalais au Qatar: entre contrainte et projets d’avenir. Moyen Orient, 25
(January–March), 74–79.
Gardner, A. (2012). Why do they keep coming? Labor migrants in the Gulf states. In M. Kamrava
& Z. Babar (Eds.), Migrant labor in the Gulf states. New York: School of Foreign Service in
Qatar/Georgetown University. 276 p.
Government of Bangladesh. (2009). Bangladesh climate change strategy and adaptation plan.
http://www.moef.gov.bd/climate_change_strategy2009.pdf
Human Right Watch. (2015). Migrant workers’ rights on Saadiyat Island in the United Arab
Emirates. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uae0215_ForUploadR.pdf. Accessed
20/05/2015.
Khondker, H. H., & Jahan, M. (2015). Coping and overcoming: South Asian domestic workers in
the United Arab Emirates. In A. K. Sahoo (Ed.), Diaspora, development and distress (pp. 181–
200). Jaipur/New Delhi/Bangalore/Hyderabad/Guwahati/Kolkata: Rawat Publications.
Kibria, N. (2011). Muslims in motion. Islam and National Identity in the Bangladeshi diaspora
(Vol. 167). New Brunswick/London: Rutgers University Press.
Mahdavi, P. (2011). Gridlock: Labor, migration and human trafficking in Dubai. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 264 p.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2013). Troubling freedom: Migration, debt and modern slavery. Migration
Studies, 1(2), 176–195.
Percot, M. (2006). Indian nurses in the Gulf: Two generations of female migration. South Asia
Research, 26(1), 41–62.
Percot, M. (2015). Malayali nurses in the Gulf: Migration as a factor of women empowerment.
In A. K. Sahoo (Ed.), Diaspora, development and distress (pp. 87–98). Jaipur/New Delhi/
Bangalore/Hyderabad/Guwahati/Kolkata: Rawat Publications.
Pessoa S., Harkness, L., & Gardner, A. M. (2014). Ethiopian labor migrants and the “free visa”
system in Qatar. Human Organization, 73(3). https://www.academia.edu/8115756/Ethiopian_
Labor_Migrants_and_the_Free_Visa_System_in_Qatar. Accessed 15/05/2015.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Bangladeshi workers in the UAE: Gender-differentiated patterns of migra-
tion experiences. Middle Eastern Studies, 47(2, March), 395–411.
Rahman, M. M. (2013). Migrant Indebtness: Bangladeshis in the GCC countries. International
Migration, I.O.M.
Rajan, S. I., & Sunkendran, S. (2010). Understanding female migration: Experience of house-
maids. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), Governance and labour migration (India migration report 2010)
Sahoo, A. K., & Goud, T. C. (2015). Development and distress: A study of gulf returnees in Andhra
Pradesh. In A. K. Sahoo (Ed.), Diaspora, development and distress (pp. 201–215). Jaipur/New
Delhi/Bangalore/Hyderabad/Guwahati/Kolkata: Rawat Publications.
Turton D. (2003). Conceptualizing forced migration. University of Oxford, Refugee Studies
Center, Working Paper n° 12, http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/
wp12-conceptualising-forced-migration-2003.pdf. Accessed 19/05/2015.
WTO. (2008). Examen des politiques commerciales. Rapport du secrétariat: Oman. https://www.
wto.org/french/tratop_f/tpr_f/s201-00_f.doc. Accessed 19/05/2015.
Chapter 11
Labour Migration from Pakistan
to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation
of Regional Disparities in Outflows
of Workers, Remittances and Poverty
G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq, and Nasir Iqbal
Abstract During the last four decades, according to the official statistics, Pakistan
has placed abroad approximately eight million workers for employment, mainly in
the Middle East labour market. While throughout this period, Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates (UAE) remained the main destination countries for Pakistani
workers, their placement in other oil-exporting countries of the region, such as
Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, has also been a common phenomenon. Migration
for employment out of the Middle East region is not very common, suggesting that
Pakistan has not been able to find new overseas markets for its workers. The annual
placement of Pakistani workers in the Gulf seems to be a major source in easing the
demographic pressure on the domestic labour market. This outflow was equal to
approximately one-third of the total new entrants in the local labour market, and the
annual placement of migrants in the Gulf constitutes more than 10% of the total
unemployed labour force of Pakistan. Pakistan is currently passing through a demo-
graphic transition which has resulted in a youth bulge and an increase in the
working-age population. Migration to the Gulf has probably provided opportunities
for productive and remunerative employment for young work force.
G. M. Arif
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan
S. Farooq
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Islamabad, Pakistan
N. Iqbal (*)
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Islamabad, Pakistan

190 G. M. Arif et al.
Introduction
International migration of Pakistani workers, along with the inflows of foreign

remittances, is considered one of the key factors that have influenced positively the
concerned households, communities and nation as a whole. A large Pakistani dias-
pora exists in three regions of the world: Middle East, Europe and North America.
However, the types of migration to these regions are not same; movement to Europe,
particularly to United Kingdom (UK) and North America, is permanent in nature for
settlement while migration to the Middle East is temporary movement of labour for
employment. Under a temporary labour migration system, like the Middle East one,
foreign workers are offered jobs on contractual basis for a fixed period of time. At
the expiry of a contract, a worker has to return home. Overstay, without an extension
in the contract, puts a worker into irregular status, subject to legal action including
deportation.
Migration of Pakistani workers to the Middle East is managed through a well-
established recruitment system, involving private agents and having a mandatory
registration of all outgoing workers with the Protectors of Emigrants. During the
last four decades, according to the official statistics, Pakistan has placed abroad
approximately eight million workers for employment, mainly in the Middle East
labour market. While throughout this period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
(UAE) remained the main destination countries for Pakistani workers, their place-
ment in other oil-exporting countries of the region, such as Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain
and Qatar, has also been a common phenomenon. Migration for employment out of
the Middle East region is not very common, suggesting that Pakistan has not been
able to find new overseas markets for its workers.
All (eight million) workers placed in the Middle East since 1970s are not cur-
rently in the region. At present, the stock of Pakistani workers in the Middle East is
approximately three million; the rest of workers who had a chance to work in the
region have returned home. Many of these return migrants are well settled in their
communities of origin and have started their businesses by investing the money
earned during overseas employment. The contribution of this migration through
regular inflows of remittances and entrepreneurship of returning workers in poverty
reduction, socio-economic improvements of the concerned households and com-
munities and economic growth is well documented (Iqbal and Sattar 2005; Irfan and
Amjad 1984; Oda 2007); although some negative impacts of male emigration on
left behind families, particularly women and children, have also been reported in the
literature (Nasir et al. 2011).
An important, but unanswered question is how widely the benefits of migration
to the Gulf are distributed among the population of Pakistan? In other worlds, do
workers from all geographical areas of the country have benefitted from job
opportunities in the Gulf? Pakistan is administratively divided into more than 100
districts, with a great variation in the total size of their populations. The 40 years of
labour migration, as migration to the Gulf countries started in the mid-1970s, indi-
cate a long period sufficient for its widely spread, through social networkers, across
11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 191
all regions and districts of the country. But a close look at the annual statistics avail-
able from the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) shows an
uneven distribution of workers across these districts. There is a heavy concentration
of migration to the Gulf from districts located in central and north Punjab, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and couple of districts from south Punjab. Migration from rest
of the country, particularly Sindh, Balochistan and south Punjab, is low or very low;
and these are poor regions of the country.
Both the inflows of foreign remittances and entrepreneurial activities of return-
ing workers are likely to be concentrated in areas with high migration to the Gulf
countries. In view of the multiplier effects of remittances, it is likely that households
in high-migration areas are generally better-off than their counterparts in low-
migration areas. Overseas migration thus may contribute in widening regional
(district-wise) disparities.
However, two caveats are noteworthy here. First, there is a possibility that high-
migration areas or districts are generally socio-economically better-off than low-
migration districts, thus making it difficult to separate out the migration effects from
the effects of other development indicators. Second, Gulf is not the only region
where Pakistanis have migrated, a large Pakistani diaspora exists in Europe particu-
larly the UK and North America. If the origin (or districts) of these migrants is not
different from the origin of Middle East migrants, it would also be difficult to attri-
bute all socio-economic effects only to the Middle East migration. In fact, some
districts prominent for migration to Europe, such as Rawalpindi, Gujrat and Jhelum,
are also among the high-migration districts for the Middle East region.
Despite these analytically difficulties, it is worth comparing socio-economic per-
formance of households situated in high-, low- and very-low-migration areas (dis-
tricts). If the performance across these areas varies considerably, it, at least, makes
a case for policy makers to provide overseas migration opportunity to households in
low- and very-low-migration areas to improve their socio-economic conditions. It
would not only help to reduce poverty in low-migration areas, but it will also
improve equalities across the districts and regions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Importance of Gulf migration for
Pakistan’s economy and society is discussed in the next section, followed by a pre-
sentation on theoretical considerations in section “Theoretical Considerations”.
Methodology including the data sources used in this study is the subject matter of
section “Methodology”. Geographical spread (district-level) of migration to Gulf is
analysed in section “Geographical differentiation of Gulf migration” to identify
very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration areas. Section “Regional disparities
in remittances” presents regional (district-wise) disparities in remittances received.
Regional disparities in multidimensional poverty and its three components, educa-
tion, health and standard of living, are examined in section “Migration, poverty and
deprivation”, followed by a brief discussion in the penultimate section on why some
regions of the country have not participated in labour migration to Gulf? Conclusions
are presented in the final section.
I mportance of Gulf Migration for Pakistan’s Economy

and Society
Importance of Gulf migration for the economy of Pakistan and its society has been
the subject matter of various studies carried out since the onset of Middle East
labour migration system in the 1970s, focusing primarily on the contribution of
remittances in balance of payment, GDP growth and poverty reduction. The basic
information required for such analysis including the outflows of workers and inflows
of remittances through banking channel are regularly reported by the concerned
authorities or agencies, for example, State Bank of Pakistan and BEOE through
their official documents. However, one issue, which has not been adequately
addressed in the literature, is the relevance of workers’ outflows with the growth of
domestic labour force and other demographic realities. Table 11.1 sets out data on
population, labour force, annual addition in the labour force and migrants to the
Gulf as percent of new entrants in the labour markets. Whereas the population of
Pakistan increased from 146 million in 2002 to 186 million in 2104, 27% growth in
12 years, the labour force grew during this period by 39%, from 43 million in 2002
to 60 million in 2014 because of both demographic transition (an increase in work-
ing age population) and increased participation of female in the labour market.
More than a million workers are added annually in the labour force. The stock of
unemployed labour force fluctuated between 2.75 and 3.58 million during the last
decade, and the unemployment rate first declined from more than 8% in 2002 to 5%
in 2007, increasing then to 6% in 2014 (GoP 2015b).
Table 11.1 Migration to the Gulf and domestic labour market

No. of Migrants to
Labour Unemployed migrants to the Gulf as Migrants as %
Population force labour force Gulf % labour of unemployed
Year (million) (million) (million) (million) force labour force
2002 145.96 43.21 3.57 – – –
2003 149.03 44.12 3.65 0.21 0.47 5.70
2004 150.47 45.76 3.52 0.17 0.37 4.76
2005 153.96 46.82 3.60 0.13 0.27 3.55
2006 156.77 50.50 3.13 0.17 0.34 5.52
2007 161.98 51.55 2.75 0.28 0.54 10.13
2008 165.45 53.22 2.77 0.42 0.79 15.16
2009 168.99 55.91 3.05 0.40 0.71 13.07
2010 172.57 56.92 3.16 0.35 0.62 11.08
2011 176.20 57.84 3.94 0.45 0.77 11.37
2012 180.71 59.33 5.95 0.63 1.06 10.59
2013 183.57 60.33 3.76 0.61 1.01 16.21
2014 186.19 60.09 3.58 0.72 1.21 20.23
Source: GoP (2015a, b)
The annual placement of Pakistani workers in the Gulf seems to be a major

source in easing the demographic pressure on the domestic labour market, particu-
larly during the last 7 years (2008–2014), when these outflows were equal to
approximately one-third of the total new entrants in the local labour market, and the
annual placement of migrants in the Gulf constitutes more than 10% of the total
unemployed labour force of Pakistan (Table 11.1). Workers who found their place-
ment in the Gulf countries may not be unemployed when they moved out, unem-
ployed labour force is likely to have replaced them. Pakistan is currently passing
through a demographic transition (Amjad et al. 2015; Nayab 2008), which has
resulted in a youth bulge and an increase in the working age population. Migration
to the Gulf has probably provided opportunities for productive and remunerative
employment for young workforce. The literature on age-saving profile suggests that
these young migrants, living abroad without their families, may save a large part of
their earnings to remit home for investment. In this way, migration to the Gulf can
be a source to reap the demographic dividend (Amjad et al. 2015).
Workers’ remittances from the banking channel have increased from US$2.4 bil-
lion in 2001–02 to about US$15.8 billion in 2013–14. The share of Gulf countries
as the source for these remittances has gradually increased from 43% in 2001–02 to
more than 65% in 2013–14. The inflows of remittances in 2013–14, which are over
half the total export value of goods and services (Table 11.2), provide critical sup-
port to a precarious current account situation. Remittances as percent of GDP almost
doubled from 3.3% in 2001–02 to 6% in 2013–14. Considering the share of Gulf
countries in total workers’ remittances as 65% (Table 11.2), remittances from Gulf
were approximately 3.6% of the GDP.
As noted earlier, the contribution of remittances in GDP growth has been
explored rigorously during the last four decades, and in general, it has turned out to
be positive and significant. A survey of some studies carried out during the last
decade is also found to be on a similar line. For example, Iqbal and Sattar (2005)
show that GDP growth is positively related to workers’ remittances during 1972–73
to 2002–03 period. They reported remittances as the third source of capital for eco-
nomic growth and also argued that in the absence of remittances, it was likely that
exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies could have been come under pressures.
A recent study by Javid et al. (2012) found the relationship between remittances and
GDP growth positive in the long run, while in the short, this association is found to
be negative, though the magnitude is small and negligible.
Poverty is generally a part of analyses on the remittances and GDP nexus in
Pakistan. The effect of remittances on poverty reduction is not only positive but also
more important than other factors that can influence well-being of population
(Amjad and Kemal 1997). Poverty in Pakistan, which declined in 1980s, increased
in the 1990s, the period when inflows of remittances declined considerably. Siddiqui
and Kemal (2006) explored the impact of decline in remittances on welfare and
poverty and found that ‘poverty rises due to a decline in remittances during the
nineties’. According to their analysis, remittances affect poverty levels both through
change in income and consumption level as well as through increase in capital
stock. While Irfan (2011) has reached to a similar conclusion that remittances as a
Table 11.2 Workers’ remittances and GDP growth in Pakistan

Remittances Exports GDP
Remittances from Gulf as % Remittances Remittances as % of growth
Year US$ (million) total remittances as % of GDP as % exports GDP (%)
2001– 2389 43.0 3.3 28.2 12.8 2.0
02
2002– 4237 37.7 5.1 38.0 13.5 4.7
03
2003– 3872 42.2 3.9 31.4 12.5 7.5
04
2004– 4169 44.6 3.7 30.0 13.0 9.0
05
2005– 4600 45.0 3.4 28.0 12.0 5.8
06
2006– 5494 48.2 3.6 32.4 11.1 5.5
07
2007– 6451 51.6 3.8 33.9 11.2 5.0
08
2008– 7810 57.0 4.6 44.2 10.5 0.4
09
2009– 8906 58.3 5.0 46.2 10.9 2.6
10
2010– 11,291 58.7 5.2 45.1 11.6 3.6
11
2011– 13,186 60.9 5.9 55.8 10.5 3.8
12
2012– 13,922 60.8 6.0 56.9 10.6 3.7
13
2013– 15,837 65.0 6.5 63.1 10.3 4.0
14
Source: GoP (2015b)
fraction of GDP as well as the total size of the remittances emerged as significant
explanatory variable, leading to poverty reduction, he found a negative influence
(though insignificant) of recent rise in remittances (since 2002) on poverty. His
analysis is probably supported by Javid et al. (2012) who reported that a long run
relationship exists between remittances and poverty reduction due to the fact that
remittances directly increase the income of poor people, smooth household con-
sumption and ease capital constraint.
Return of workers to their countries of origin is an integral part of contemporary
contract labour migration systems including the Middle East one. A close look at
the data indicates that more workers have returned home permanently than the pres-
ent stock of Pakistanis in the region. Return migration is also expected to benefit a
labour-sending country through more productive individuals returning with physical
and human capital earned abroad as well as repatriated savings (Özden and Schiff
2007). The findings of studies on return migration in Pakistan carried out in the
1990s compared pre-and post-migration employment status of workers and revealed
a high preference for self-employment (Arif and Irfan 1997; Ilahi 1999). Ilahi
(1999) considers this behaviour as a rational response to the opportunities and con-
straints during the migration and upon return. However, Mansuri (2007) argues that
return migrants to rural areas of Pakistan are not more likely to become entrepre-
neurs than other individuals. Their investment preference is towards agriculture
land for which the relevance of their skills while abroad is unlikely to be high.
Finally, the social contribution of migration is even more encouraging in improv-
ing children’s school enrolment, housing conditions, eliminating child labour,
empowering women and enhancing the overall social status (Arif 2010). However,
the analysis by Nasir et al. (2011) show an adverse effect of foreign remittances on
the educational performance of children primarily because of the absence of care-
taker in general and parental absence in particular. A joint family system, they
argue, may reduce the negative impact of parental absence.
Theoretical Considerations
The movement of Pakistani workers to the Middle East, which started in the 1970s,
was initially explained using the structural or dependency perspective.1 The rapid
growth of the oil-exporting economies of the Middle East was seen as the emer-
gence of a new oppressive group of core countries (Naseem 1981), and Pakistan was
characterized as the supplier of cheap labour, food and services to these countries.
Although the Gulf economies to which Pakistanis migrated were certainly capital-
rich, they did not share a number of characteristics more usually associated with a
capitalist centre. At the same time, Pakistan and other countries contributing to
Middle Eastern labour forces did not always reflect all the characteristics of the
classical ‘periphery’ state (Addleton 1992).
The classical view prevailed in many of the empirical studies conducted in the
1980s, which showed repeatedly that individual migrants went abroad to improve
their socio-economic position at home. Migration was considered to benefit, through
remittances, the individuals concerned, their families and the country (Arif 2010;
Burki 1988; Gilani et al. 1981). Addleton (1992), apolitical scientist, has used both
approaches, classical and structural, to understand the causes and consequences of
migration from Pakistan to the Middle East. He considered nationalization of banks,
life insurance companies, private schools, shipping and some of the heavy i ndustries
during the period 1971–77, and an aggressive appeal to Islam rather than socialism
during the years 1977–88 to be the centralizing measures of governments which
ruled the country between 1971 and 1988. Despite these strong measures, he argues,
1
De Haas (2010) distinguishes four periods in the post World War II thinking on migration and
development: the ‘migration optimists’ perspective dominated in the 1950 and 1960s; the large
scale pessimism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s; the emergence of more nuanced nets in the
1990s; and but resurging of optimism on migration and development. The structural and depen-
dency views are labelled as pessimistic by (De Haas, 2010).
appeals based on language, ethnicity and religious–sectarian differences became

quite common. In his opinion, the failure of the centralizing efforts was closely
associated with the migration of Pakistani workers to the Middle East, which set in
motion a process that was characterized by decentralized economic decision-making
rather than by enhanced government control (Addleton 1992). However, Arif (1995)
in his doctoral work did not agree with Addleton’s consideration and showed labour
migration as socio-economically beneficial for the concerned households and soci-
ety as a whole. He further argued that is difficult to link appeals based on language,
ethnicity and sectarian differences to labour migration to the Middle East, which
could be rather source for narrowing these differences.
More recent studies have used the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)
perspective to explain labour migration to the Middle East. The NELM approach
models migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households. This approach inte-
grates motives other than individual income maximization that play a role in migra-
tion decision-making. Oda (2007), for example, has used the NELM framework to
identify household characteristics that influence migration decision at the house-
hold level in rural barani (rainfed) areas. Due to the weather-dependent agriculture
and lack of employment opportunities, migration has been used as one of the impor-
tant sources of income and has been actively adopted as a household strategy.
Similarly, Iqbal (2015) has recently used the NELM framework to examine the role
of return migrants in entrepreneurship in Jhelum, a high-migration district in Punjab.
This study also follows the NELM approach and considers temporary migration
of Pakistani workers to Gulf as a household livelihood strategy to diversify income
sources and overcome social, economic and institutional development constraints in
places of origin. The study places the behaviour of individual migrants within a
wider societal context. Different communities are in the different stages of the
migration process. Impacts of migration may vary with these stages. It therefore
attempts to understand the geographically differentiated nature of migration and
remittance impacts on local communities.
Methodology
Two data sources have been used in this study to understand the geographically dif-
ferentiated nature of migration to the Gulf countries and inflows of remittances.
First, the BEOE registers all workers who go abroad for employment.2 It compiles
the registration data by country of employment, occupation of workers and districts
of their origin. More than 95% of workers who went abroad for employment and
have been registered with the BEOE are destined to the Middle East, primarily Gulf
countries. This registration data is a good source of information regarding the origin
2
This registration of outgoing workers with BEOE is mandatory and the data are available since
the mid-1970.
(district) of migrants. Second, the Pakistan Socio-economic Living Measurement

Survey (PSLM) 2012–13 is representative at the province as well as district level,
having a sample size of more than 75,000 households. In the PSLM, the sampled
households were asked to repot ‘remittances received (in cash) from outside of
Pakistan (money received which will not be repaid)’. Through this information, it is
possible to aggregate the inflows of remittances by district (Amjad et al. 2017;
Farooq and Iqbal 2015).
Pakistan is administratively divided into more than 100 districts. As discussed
earlier, the outflows of workers to the Gulf countries, and inflows of remittances
vary greatly across these districts. For this study, the districts of Pakistan are classi-
fied into four categories: very-low, low-, moderate- and high-migration districts.
Two methods are applied for this classification. First, the incidence-of-migration is
estimated by dividing the number of workers went abroad during 1980–2012 period
from a district (BEOE registration data) with its population in 2012.3 Districts are
then classified as high-migration if the incidence-of-migration is 10% or greater.
Medium-migration districts are those where such incidence is in the range of
3–9.99%. If the incidence-of-migration is 1–2.99% districts are classified as low-
migration. The last category of very-low migration includes districts with less than
1% of the incidence-of-migration.
Second, in the PSLM 2012–13, the sampled households were asked to report
‘remittance received (in cash) from outside Pakistan during the year preceding the
survey’. The proportion of households received remittances was calculated at the
district level. The districts are then classified into four categories based on the
reported remittances data. The districts, where 10% or more households have
received remittances from abroad during the year preceding survey are grouped into
high-migration categories while the moderate-migration category includes districts
where the proportion of households received remittances ranges 3 to less than 10%
(9.99%). If the share of remittances receiving households in a district is between 1
and less than 3% (2.99%), they are grouped into low-migration category while the
last category of very-low migration includes the districts where the proportion of
remittances receiving households is less than 1%.
The classification of districts under the incidence-of-migration method shows
that out of the total 104 districts, 60 districts are in very-low- or low-migration cat-
egories while the number of districts in medium and high categories are 21 and 28
respectively. For the remittance-based method, information is available for all 114
districts, of which, 63 districts are in very-low and low categories, 23 in medium
category and 28 districts are grouped into high-migration status. The classification
of districts (104) under two methods is compared in Table 11.3, which shows that
60 districts are in a same category. However, 14 districts which are classified as
medium-migration under remittance-based method are in low-migration status
under the incidence-of-migration method. Similarly, 12 districts which are grouped
3
The district-wise population as shown in the 1998 census is projected for 2012 by population
growth rate.
Table 11.3 Comparison of two methods in district classification into very-low-, low-, medium-
and high-migration categories
Incidence-of-migration method
Remittances-based methods Very low Low Medium High Overall
Very low 29 9 1 0 39
Low 1 13 2 0 16
Medium 1 14 6 2 23
High 1 2 12 11 26
Total 32 38 21 13 104
Source: (GoP (2014, 2015a)
into high-migration status turned into medium-migration status under the incidence-
of-migration method. It appears that remittance-based method shows relatively
more districts in medium, and high-migration categories. There are several possible
reasons for this difference. First, the BEOE data covers a longer period of 30 years
while the remittances in the PSLM are reported for the year preceding the survey
year of 2012–13. Second, the BEOE data show the number of workers placed pri-
marily in the Middle East while the remittance data include other regions as well
(Amjad et al. 2012). Third, occupations of migrants, which directly influence the
earnings of workers and their capacity to remit, may very across the districts.
This study has used both classifications of districts to better understand the geo-
graphically differentiated nature of migration and remittances in Pakistan by com-
paring socio-economic performance of households situated in high-, moderate-,
low-, and very-low-migration areas (districts). Although calorific approach-based
poverty estimates have been used to assess households’ performance, the focus of
the present investigation is on multidimensionality of poverty (MP), with its three
major components, education, health and living standard. Appendix Table 11.11
shows the indicators, their weights and definitions included in each dimension of
welfare. The education dimension contains four variables: male education (no male
over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above schooling), female education
(no female over 11 years age has completed 5 years or above schooling); child
school attendance (any school-aged child (6–11) is not attending school) and educa-
tion quality (not enough teacher, shortage of books, etc.). The health dimension also
includes four indicators: access to healthcare, immunization, prenatal care and insti-
tutional delivery (Appendix Table 11.11). Factors related to housing (overcrowding,
water, sanitation, electricity) and households assets are part of the living standards
dimension. Each of the three dimensions (education, health and living standards)
has an equal weight of one-third while weights assigned to each indicator varies
(Appendix Table 11.11). These weights are used to compute MP, based on a thresh-
old of 33% households which are deprived in 5 (5/15–33%) or more than five indi-
cators. For each indicator, household deprivation is calculated though headcount
ratios: raw and censored. The former shows the proportion of households which are
poor (deprived) in each category while the latter refers to the proportion of house-
holds which are MP poor and are also deprived in the respective indicator.
Geographical Differentiation of Gulf Migration
In the previous section, more than half of the districts are classified as low- or very-
low-migration status while the rest of districts are grouped into high- or medium-
migration status. Table 11.4 presents differences in migration status of districts by
province. First, all districts of Sindh, according to the incidence-of-migration meth-
ods, are either in very-low or low-migration status category. The other method,
remittance-based, puts only two districts of this province in the medium-migration
status. The situation of Balochistan is not different either; only one district (Zhob)
is categorized in high-migration status, according to the incidence-of-migration
method. In fact, the first column of Table 11.4 shows that 30 out of 31 very-low-
migration districts are either in Sindh or in Balochistan. It appears from this simple
analysis that although pockets of high or medium-migration may exist within a
districts in Sindh and Balochistan, the population of these two provinces have not in
general benefitted from the Gulf migration.
The KP presents a situation that is entirely different from Sindh and Balochistan.
Not a single district in KP is in ‘very low’ category, while only two districts, accord-
ing to the incidence-of-migration method, are in the low-migration category. The
rest of districts have been classified as high- or as medium-migration districts. In
fact, the incidence-of- migration method puts the majority of KP districts, 15 out of
23, in high-migration status. Migration is thus widely spread in KP, except couple
of districts in Lakki Marwat–D.I. Khan belt (Appendix Table 11.12).
Punjab, the largest province of country, shows a mixed picture. Although only
one district, Bhakkar, is in very-low-migration status, according to the incidence-of-
migration method, 22 out of total 36 districts of this province are in low- migration
category. The other method, remittance-based puts 10 districts in this category. The
rest of districts are in the medium- or high-migration status categories.
There is heavy concentration of low-migration districts in southern Punjab, while
districts classified in high-migration status are situated either in northern Punjab or
in central Punjab except D. G. Khan that is a southern Punjab district (Appendix
Table 11.12). The spread of districts in medium-migration status is wide across the
whole Punjab province. The migration status of Punjab districts suggests that migra-
tion to the Gulf which started from northern and central districts four decades ago
has gradually spread to southern districts, though still high-migration districts are
located in central-north belt of the province (Appendix Table 11.12).
This analysis shows that disparities are outflows of workers to the Gulf region in
two ways; the first is the inter-province disparity, where both Sindh and Balochistan
are lagged behind KP and Punjab. Second, despite a recent spread in migration out-
flows, the incidence-of-migration remains ‘low’ in southern districts of Punjab.
It is important to report here that low- or very-low-migration districts of the
country (Sindh, Balochistan and South Punjab) are the poorest districts. Moreover,
movement into and out of poverty between 2001 and 2010 period has largely hap-
pened in the poor regions where migration is low (Arif et al. 2014). It appears that
migration and associated remittances have enhanced the capacity of concerned
200
Table 11.4 District classification into low-, medium- and high-migration categories
Very low Low Medium High Overall
Incidence- Incidence- Incidence- Incidence- Incidence-
of- Remittances- of- Remittances- of- Remittances- of- Remittances- of- Remittances-
Province migration based migration based migration based migration based migration based
Punjab 1 10 22 10 8 6 5 10 36 36
Sindh 12 15 5 4 2 0 0 0 19 19
KP 0 0 4 2 11 6 8 15 23 23
Balochistan 18 21 6 1 0 1 0 1 24 24
Total 31 46 37 17 21 13 13 26 102 102
Source: (GoP (2014, 2015a)
Note: Information on two districts is missing
G. M. Arif et al.
households and communities in high and medium-migration areas to absorb shocks

and this cushion is not available to poverty stricken regions of the country.
Regional Disparities in Remittances
Overseas migration contributes in well-being of the concerned households and

development of communities or regions through regular inflows of remittances,
their uses (savings and investment) and entrepreneurship of migrants when they
return home permanently. First, take the case of inflows of remittances. Table 11.5
presents some interesting facts. The population of 70 districts in low- or very-low-
migration status is 60% of the total population of Pakistan, but their share in Gulf
migration for the 1980–2012 period is only 27%. In total inflows of remittances, as
reported in the PSLM 2012–13, the share of these 70 districts is only 21%. In con-
trast, 11 high-migration districts, where only 12% of the total population live, have
more than one-third (35%) share in total outflows of workers and 40% share in total
inflows of remittances (Table 11.5).
It is noteworthy from Table 11.5 that 30 very-low-migration districts where 16%
of the country’s population live have only 2.5% share in total outflow of workers
and less than 3% share in total inflows of remittances. All, except one, very-low-
migration districts are in Sindh and Balochistan. Irfan (2011) has empirically shown
that inflows of remittances are considerably under reported in the HIES type of
surveys not only in Pakistan but in other labour-sending countries as well. In 2014,
Pakistan received about US$ 15 billion as workers’ remittances through formal
banking services, and about half of this inflow is from the Gulf countries.
From the data presented in Table 11.5, it is estimated that 80% of these inflows
of remittances go to the population of 34 high- and medium-migration districts,
constituting only 40% of the country’s population. The remaining 60% of popula-
tion living in very-low- and low-migration districts get only 21% share in total
inflows of workers’ remittances. Almost all high- and medium-migration districts
are in KP and Punjab (Table 11.4).
Remittances diversify the sources of household income, providing an opportu-
nity not only to combat poverty but also to free some resources for investment. In
Table 11.5 Distribution of inflows of remittances (%) by migration status

% Distribution of
Migration No. % Share in % Share in migration remittances
status districts population (1980–2014) (PSLM-2012–13)
Very low 32 16.3 2.4 2.8
Low 38 43.1 24.6 17.7
Medium 21 28.8 37.9 39.1
High 13 11.8 35.1 40.4
All 104 100 100 100
Source: (GoP (2014, 2015a)
this regard, one more dimension that can influence the quality of life in areas or
communities where overseas migration is common is the resettlement pattern of
return migrants. It is well documented that workers who go abroad for temporary
employment generally resettle in their communities of origin, though their migra-
tion to other areas particularly cities cannot be ruled out. As reported earlier, during
the last four decades Pakistan has placed about eight million workers in the Gulf
countries, but the current stock in the region is almost three million, indicating the
return of remaining five million workers to their communities in Pakistan after com-
pleting overseas job. In general, they return in their prime working age, mid-thirties,
having 25–30 more economically active years.
The studies carried out in Pakistan and elsewhere have shown a preference of
returnees to shift from wage employment to self-employment by starting a new
business or investing in the existing family business after return. These returnees are
considered in the literature as entrepreneurs, since they not only create job for them-
selves but also they, some if not all, may generate jobs for others. Iqbal (2015) has
recently carried out a survey of return migrants in Jhelum, a high-migration district
in Punjab (Appendix Table 11.12), to examine their contribution in entrepreneurial
activities. She shows a strong preference of returnees to engage in a business; 56%
of migrants returned from Europe were involved in business while the correspond-
ing percentage was 47 for migrants returning from the Middle East. A considerable
proportion of returnees have used their overseas experience and savings in entrepre-
neurial activities. The new business started by return migrants include agriculture,
livestock, general store, commercial shops, rent a car, raw material, furniture shops
and dairy farms.
Both the investment pattern of remittance-receiving households and entrepre-
neurship of returnees are likely to have promoted self-employment, through busi-
ness activities, in their communities. Table 11.6 presents data on the share of
self-employed in non-agriculture sector in total employed labour force by migration
status. In very-low-migration districts, the share of self-employment in non-
agriculture sector is 14% of the total employed labour force, while it is 22% in high-
migration districts. There is no major difference in results based on two methods,
incidence-of-migration and remittances, applied to classify districts into low- or
high-migration categories. Migration thus promotes self-employment to ease the
demographic pressure. Iqbal (2015) has recently shown that by starting a new busi-
ness, some entrepreneurs employed up to 5 people after returns. More than half of
the returnees from the Middle East and Europe who are engaged in a business after
Table 11.6 Share of Incidence-of- Remittance-

self-employed (non- Migration status migration method based method
agriculture sector) in total
Very low 14.2 13.9
employed labour force by
migration status Low 18.2 18.3
Medium 21.5 20.6
High 22.3 21.4
Source: GoP (2014)
return have given employment to one or more persons. They could be from their
families or hired workers outside the family.
Migration, Poverty and Deprivation
It is hypothesized that the population of high-migration (or even medium) areas is

socio-economically better-off than very-low- or low-migration areas because of the
consumption, and investment behaviour of migrant households and reabsorption
patterns of returning workers in the domestic labour market. As argued earlier, both
temporary migration of workers and their return promote economic activities in the
concerned communities, which are beneficial for non-migrant households as well.
So, the quality of life of the population of these communities and areas is in general
better than the population of those areas (districts) where the incidence-of-migration
and inflows of remittances are low. It is also hypothesized that the persistence of
such migration patterns, where the investment in overseas employment is geograph-
ically differentiated for a long period of time, could lead to generate regional eco-
nomic and social disparities or could reinforce the existing disparities.
Poverty and Deprivation
It has been shown earlier that both the incidence-of-migration to the Gulf countries
and inflows of remittances are very-low or ‘low’ is Sindh, Balochistan and southern
Punjab, where poverty and deprivation has been high for a long period. Table 11.7
shows the statistics on the incidence of both multidimensional poverty (MP) and
Table 11.7 Migration, poverty and deprivation

Multidimensional poverty index Income (expenditure)-based poverty
(PSLM 2012–13) (HIES2010–11)
Per capita monthly
Migration Headcount consumption (Rs.)
status Method-I Method-II poverty Method-I Method-II
Very low 18.7 19.6 14.3 2349 2311
Low 10.8 8.9 13.7 2942 3245
Medium 7.3 7.2 12.0 3194 3612
High 4.1 7.1 10.4 4296 3672
All areas 9.8 9.8 12.4 3029 3029
Source: GoP (2014) for multidimensional poverty and GoP (2011) for income (expenditure) based
poverty
Note: Method-I and method-II refer to methodology used to group districts into ‘very low’, ‘low’,
‘medium’ and ‘high’ categories. The former is based on the incidence-of-migration data while the
latter is based on the inflows-of-remittances
household expenditure (calorific approach)-based poverty. The latter is calculated

using the official poverty line methodology with the threshold of 2350 calories per
adult per day. The differences in MP between very-low- and high-migration districts
are much larger than the difference shown on the income (expenditure)-based pov-
erty. Why is it so? All very-low-migration districts found are Sindh and Balochistan,
where social indicators, such as health and education, on which MP is based, are
very weak. The case of South Punjab, where the incidence-of-migration is low, is
not much different from Sindh and Balochistan. Migration and remittances, which
have enhanced the capacity of population living in high or medium-migration areas
to invest in health and education, are largely missing in low- and very-low-migration
areas. No major improvements in social indicators could be witnessed in these low-
migration areas for a long period.
Income (expenditure)-based poverty differences by migration status are also sub-
stantial (Table 11.7). Poverty in very-low-migration districts is 35% higher than in
high-migration districts. It is also supported in Table 11.7 by monthly per capita
household expenditure data, which show much higher expenditure in high- and
medium-migration districts than in very-low migration districts. Remittances thus
help explain short-term regional disparities in household expenditure as well as
long-term disparities in social indicators.
Education
The above discussion has set the ground to investigate the disparities in different
dimensions of MP. Three dimensions, education, health and standard of living are
analysed below. As outlined in Appendix Table 11.11, educational dimension of MP
has four indictors: no male over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above
schooling; no female over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above school-
ing; any school-age child (6–16) in the household is not attending school, and qual-
ity of schooling (not enough teacher, etc.). Two headcount ratios are reported in
Table 11.8: raw, which indicates the level of deprivation (%) in an indicator, and
censored, which shows the proportion of household (%) which are multidimen-
sional deprived as well as deprived in the said indicator. The district classification
into very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration categories, as reported in
Table 11.8, is based on both methods, incidence-of-migration and remittances. This
scheme of data presentation is also applied to other Tables (11.9 and 11.10) report-
ing data respectively on health and standard of living dimensions of poverty.
As expected, censored headcount ratios for all four educational dimensions are
lower than raw headcount ratios irrespective of the migration status. In
very-low-migration districts, the headcount ratios for male and female are approxi-
mately three times higher than the corresponding ratios for high-migration districts.
The difference is even larger for medium-migration areas. In fact, Table 11.8 shows
that in very-low-migration areas, 25% and 38 of households had respectively no
Table 11.8 Proportion of households (%) deprived in education dimension of multidimensional

poverty by migration status
Any person of age
6–16 year does not
attend school
because of low
quality (not enough
No. male over No. female over Any school-aged teacher, distance
11 years of age has 11 years of age has child (6–16) in the high cost) or
completed 5 year completed 5 years household is not dissatisfied with
or above schooling or above schooling attending school services
Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored Censored
Migration head head head head head head Raw head head
status count count count count count count count count
Very low 32.9 24.9 65.5 38.0 28.5 23.8 21.4 15.2
Low 27.9 16.5 52.0 22.6 16.6 13.1 12.5 7.2
Medium 14.1 5.3 27.7 8.1 7.0 4.4 8.1 3.0
High 19.3 8.8 40.9 14.7 9.9 6.9 8.6 3.7
Remittances-based method
Very low 33.5 25.9 68.4 40.2 29.5 24.8 21.8 15.5
Low 24.9 13.4 44.4 18.4 13.9 10.7 11.2 6.0
Medium 23.6 11.2 41.0 15.2 11.9 8.7 10.0 4.8
High 18.4 8.3 37.7 13.8 9.6 7.0 9.2 4.3
Source: Author’s own calculation based on GoP (2014)
Table 11.9 Proportion of households (%) deprived in health dimension of multidimensional

poverty
Does not use health If women
facility because it is 15–49 years old
costly, not enough If child 12–- gave a birth in last
facilities or uses but 15 months has not 3 year but did not Did not have a
not satisfied fully immunized have antenatal care safe delivery
Migration Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored
status of head head head head head head head head
districts count count count count count count count count
Very low 9.9 7.7 29.0 16.0 16.8 12.4 8.3 6.9
Low 9.3 5.9 26.5 10.4 13.6 7.7 4.7 3.0
Medium 8.5 3.3 21.3 4.4 6.8 3.2 3.6 2.1
High 10.7 6.4 26.5 8.3 12.0 6.2 10.1 6.4
Remittances-based method
Very low 10.0 8.0 28.8 16.9 17.3 12.7 8.7 7.2
Low 9.9 5.5 23.0 8.5 10.4 6.4 4.1 2.6
Medium 7.5 3.9 24.5 7.1 10.6 5.3 3.4 2.0
High 11.0 6.1 26.9 7.8 11.5 6.0 8.3 5.4
Table 11.10 Proportion of households (%) deprived in standard of living dimension of multidimensional poverty by migration status
Assets: does not have
two small asset (iron,
fan, TV) or has no
large asset
(motorcycle car,
Water source does not Toilet facilities does etc.), no land, no
If more than 3 persons meet MDG standard not meet MDG Solid fuels are used No access to large animal or < 3
Deprived in wall per room –unsafe standard for cooking electricity goats/sheep
Raw Censored Censored
Migration head head Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw head Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored
status count count headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount count headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount
Incidence-of-migration
Very low 10.5 6.9 54.0 26.8 16.4 12.3 39.9 25.8 75.6 38.4 13.9 11.6 18.7 14.8
Low 11.5 3.0 43.1 16.6 5.1 1.8 28.5 15.9 74.1 23.4 7.0 5.1 8.6 5.7
Medium 21.9 2.1 28.9 5.6 9.7 3.1 11.0 4.7 33.0 7.6 4.0 2.0 3.4 1.9
High 10.6 6.4 31.2 10.0 10.1 4.4 17.3 8.1 68.2 16.3 3.2 1.7 3.8 2.1
Remittance-based
Very low 10.0 5.0 53.3 27.4 17.3 12.7 43.4 28.3 75.4 40.4 16.0 13.2 18.8 14.8
Low 18.0 3.6 38.1 13.9 5.4 1.6 21.6 12.0 56.7 18.4 5.4 3.6 7.2 4.8
Medium 14.4 2.6 37.3 11.0 5.8 1.4 20.5 10.6 56.6 15.3 5.4 3.6 6.0 3.7
High 12.7 2.9 32.5 9.6 11.7 5.3 17.5 7.9 63.8 15.2 3.3 1.7 3.9 2.1
male and female member who have completed 5 years of schooling. And these areas
are primarily in Sindh and Balochistan.
Alarmingly, a quarter of households in very-low-migration areas had a school-
age child (6–16 years) who is not attending the school while the corresponding ratio
for medium- or high-migration areas is only 7–8%. Similarly, the ratio of not-
attending school because of the low quality of schooling in terms of teaching staff,
distance or dissatisfaction with the provision of other services is three to four times
higher in very-low-migration areas than in high- or medium-migration areas. It
shows disconnect between the provision of education services and local communi-
ties in very-low-migration areas, which are predominantly located in Sindh and
Balochistan.
Furthermore, during last one decade, enrolment of children in private schools has
increased remarkably in both rural and urban areas. The quality of education in
private schools in terms of cognitive skills of children is considered better than in
public schools. Overseas migration and inflows of remittances have particularly cre-
ated demand in high-migration areas for better (private) schooling. In some high-
migration areas, such as Jhelum and Gujrat in Punjab, return migrants have opened
up schools providing good quality education to local communities.
Health
Health dimension of poverty also includes four indicators use of health facilities, immu-
nization, prenatal care and safe birth delivery (Appendix Table 11.11). For the use of
health facility, the indicator used is as follows: ‘does not use health facility because it is
costly or uses it but not satisfied’. Interestingly, no major difference is found in this
indicator among household living in very-low- or high-migration areas (Table 11.9).
The likely reason is that migrant families use private health facilities, so in terms of the
use of public health services, their experience is not different from the experience of
population in low-migration areas. However, the difference exists in child immuniza-
tion indicator particularly based on the censored method. Compared to 8% in high-
migration districts, 17% of households in very-low-migration areas have not fully
immunized a child aged 12–15 months. Similarly, the prevalence of not having antena-
tal care in very-low-migration areas is twice (12.4%) the corresponding prevalence in
high- and medium-migration areas. However, no profound difference is found in ‘safe
delivery’ indicator between high- and very-low-migration areas (Table 11.9).
The health indicators included in the analysis under the MP approach may not
truly reflect the impact of migration and remittances and health outcomes. For
example, Arif (2004) analysed the impact of migration on mortality for male and
female children separately and found the effect more profound for female than
for male.
Standard of Living
Seven indicators are part of the standard of living dimension of poverty: housing
(wall material), overcrowding (more than three persons per room), unsafe drinking
water, toilet facility, fuel for cooking, access to electricity, and assets (do not have
two small assets – iron, fan, etc. – or has no large assets – car, refrigerator, motor-
cycle, etc. – no land, no large animal or less than three goats/sheep). The first nota-
ble difference between households living in very-low-, low- or high-migration areas
is in overcrowding or person per room, an important indicator of quality of life
(Table 11.10). The censored headcount shows that the incidence of overcrowding in
‘very-low-migration districts is three times (27.4%) of the incidence in high-
migration areas. It reflects well the investment preference of migrant households for
improving housing quality by building a new house or at least adding some new
rooms in the existing dwelling unit. This investment pattern of migrant families may
have influenced overall housing quality in high- and medium-migration areas. The
same is the case for other indicators of the standard of living dimension of poverty
including the use of safe drinking water, having toilet facility that meet MDG stan-
dard, use of solid fuel for cooking and access to electricity.
Compared to 15% of households in very-low-migration districts, only 2 and 4%
of households respectively in high- and medium-migration areas have no assets
(Table 11.10). In other words, holding of assets are universal in high-migration areas.
iscussion: Why Participation in Gulf Migration Is Low

D
from some Regions?
The empirical evidence, as presented in last few sections of this study, about the
outflows of workers and inflows of remittances indicates high participation of
population from some regions of the country, notably KP, central and north
Punjab, to the Gulf migration while it is very low or low from Sindh and
Balochistan, and to some extent from South Punjab. The analysis reveals both the
inter-province and intra-province disparities where both Sindh and Balochistan
provinces are lagged behind in benefiting from the Gulf migration. Regional dis-
parities can also be seen in Punjab where high-migration districts are situated
either in northern Punjab or in central Punjab while participation from southern
Punjab is relatively low. Why some areas have not participated in Gulf migration?
The answer probably lies in the socio-economic factors, regional linkages, politi-
cal structure, migration policies and recruitment system. Low-participation
regions are relatively less developed, with low human capital, and high incidence
of poverty. Awareness about the job opportunities in the Gulf region could be very
weak particularly in rural areas of Sindh and Balochistan. The populations of
these regions are probably averse to take risk of investing in overseas employment
or they do not have capacity for such investment.
Political structure also plays a significant role not only in the provision of socio-
economic facilities but also keeping them in loop of development. The prevalence
of feudal system is relatively high in low-migration regions as compared to other
regions like central Punjab. This type of system leads to underdevelopment of the
region. Institutional school of thought argues that underdevelopment of the regions
(Sindh, Balochistan and south Punjab) is primarily linked with the existence of
feudal system and the elite capture of resources keep poor in the state of poverty for
a long period.
The nature and design of overseas migration policies also contribute in migration
disparities or access to overseas employment opportunities. Majority of the
migration-promoting institutions are located in well-off regions ignoring the
deprived regions. Government has uniform migration policy for all regions instead
of adopting area-specific policies that help create awareness among the people from
low-migration poor areas.
Migration opportunity to the Gulf may be used as a tool for poverty reduction
and narrowing the regional disparities in socio-economic indicators. Low-migration
regions which are poor in all dimensions deserve to be targeted not only for creating
awareness about overseas employment opportunities but also for supporting the
poor financially to bear the cost of migration.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The present study has made a socio-economic comparison of districts by the level
of their participation in labour migration to the Gulf region. Incidence-of-
migration and remittance-based methods were used to classify more than 100 dis-
tricts of Pakistan into four categories: very-low-, low-, medium-, and
high-migration/remittances-receiving districts. More than half of the districts
were found in low- or very-low-migration categories, as identified by these two
methods. The analysis reveals both the inter-province and intra-province dispari-
ties where both Sindh and Balochistan provinces are lagged behind the KP and
Punjab with heavy concentration of low-migration districts in the former two
provinces. Regional disparities can also be seen within Punjab where high-migra-
tion districts are situated either in northern Punjab or in central Punjab lagging
behind the southern Punjab. The low-migration districts have long been consid-
ered among the poorest regions of the country.
It is beyond the scope of this research to separate out the welfare impact of Gulf
migration from the effects of other developments across the districts. Nevertheless,
both the incidence-of-migration and remittance-based methods yield similar socio-
economic results by expressing that migration appears to be beneficial to districts
having comparatively high migration. Migration has promoted in these areas, self-
employment in non-agriculture sector. Both the outflows of workers at a large scale
and return migration have also contributed in promoting businesses activities in
their communities of origin. Overseas migration and remittances have been influen-
tial in improving socio-economic status of populations in these high-migration (or
even medium) districts as signified by various indicators including headcount pov-
erty, education, health, asset accumulation and overall multidimensional poverty.
It is recommended that to reduce regional disparities in socio-economic indica-
tor, the government needs to take steps to improve the standard of living of popula-
tions in poor regions by promoting and supporting overseas migration. First, targeted
intervention is required to raise employability and productivity in deprived regions
and districts that could be attained though a multisectoral approach aiming to
improve human capital and asset creation in these regions. It could be done through
provision of better education and health services, improvement in village-level
infrastructure, rural–urban linkages and microfinance schemes in these areas.
Second, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project could be another mile-
stone initiative to connect these deprived regions with economically better-off regions
and to provide enormous livelihood opportunities for the population of these areas.
Third, the poor in low-migration regions are prone to various natural and non-
natural shocks since they have been facing the flash floods almost on annual basis.
Shock mitigation policies are crucial to minimize these risks including the social
safety nets at micro-level and macroeconomic policies to lower down unemploy-
ment, inflation and to control floods and other shocks.
Finally, the government can improve overseas migration from these low-
migration areas by three ways:
• Technical training along with dissemination of opportunities for overseas
employment in these low- and very-low-migration districts; it would be helpful
to raise skill-oriented migration from these areas.
• By opening the offices of Protector of Emigrants in these low-migration regions,
say interior Sindh, Balochistan and southern Punjab will not only promote over-
seas migration from these areas but also will help to maintain close links with
emigrants to resolve their problems and grievances. It will also create awareness
about the overseas employment opportunities in the Gulf region and elsewhere.
• Credit facilities may also be provided especially to poor households who cannot
finance their overseas migration expenditures. It can be treated as loan to be
reimbursed through their overseas earnings.
Appendix
Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators, weight and definitions

(dimensions are equally weighted)
Dimension Indicator Weight Definition
Education Male education 1/12 No male over 11 years of age has completed 5 years and
above of schooling
Female 1/12 No female over 11 years of age has completed 5 years
education and above of schooling
Child school 1/8 Any school-aged child (6–11) is not attending school
attendance
Educational 1/24 If any person of age 6–16 does not attend school
quality because of quality (not enough teachers, far away, too
costly, no male/female teacher, substandard school), or
is attending but dissatisfied with service (shortage of
teacher, books, substandard education, far away,
education costly, latrine/water not available)
Health Access to 1/6 If does not use healthcare facility because is costly does
healthcare not suit, lacks tools, not enough facilities, or uses and is
facility not satisfied
Immunization 1/18 If any child of 12–59 month has not fully been
immunized
Prenatal care 1/18 If any women 15–49 who gave birth in last 3 years did
not have antenatal care
Institutional 1/18 If any women 15–49 who gave birth in last 3 years did
delivery not have a safe delivery (born at home and is not
facilitated by some skilled health person)
Living Housing 1/36 Deprived in wall: Mud, uncooked/mud bricks, wood/
standards bamboo, other if in rural area
Deprive if in urban area, if household is not owned
Overcrowding 1/36 If more than 3 people per room are residing
Water 1/18 If water source does not meet MDG standards
(unprotected well, surface water, tanker truck, other)
Sanitation 1/18 If toilet facility does not meet MDG standards (digged
ditch, other, no facility)
Clean energy 1/18 If solid fuels are used for cooking (wood, coal/charcoal,
agricultural dung, crop residue, other)
Electricity 1/18 If there is no access to electricity
Assets 1/18 If household does not have two small assets (iron, fan,
TV) or has no large asset (motorcycle or refrigerator,
car or tractor) or does not own land/commercial
property or does not have no large animal or less than 3
goats/sheep. If deprive in all then it is deprived
212
Table 11.12 Classification of districts into high-, medium-, low- and very-low-migration categories-based remittance share and incidence-of-migration
methods
Province Remittance share-based method Incidence-of-migration-based method
High- Medium- Very High- Very low/
migration migration Low-migration low-migration migration Medium-migration Low-migration migration
district district district districts districts districts districts districts
Khyber Bannu Tank Lakki Marwat Bannu D. I. Khan Lakki Marwat
Pakhtuankhaw Battagram Abbottabad D. I. Khan Attock Batttagram
Haripur Kohistan Kohat Hari pur Kohistan
Mansehra Karak Dir lower Mansehra Shangla
Hangu Chitral Malakand Hangu
Kohat Peshawar Swat Karak
Bonair Mardan Bonair
Dir lower Swabi Chitral
Malakand Charsada
Shangla Nowshera
Swat Peshawar
Mardan
Swabi
Charsada
Nowshera
G. M. Arif et al.
Punjab D. G. Khan Islamabad Bahawalnagar D. G. Khan Islamabad Bahawalnagar Bhakkar
T. T. Sindh Bahawalpur Layyah Gujrat Gujranwala Bahawalpur
Gujranwala Rahim Yar Muzaffargarh Sialkot Mandibahaudin RahimYar Khan
Khan
Gujrat Faisalabad Rajanpur Khanawal Narowal:Ayya Layyah
Mandi Jhang Kasur Jhelum Lahore Muzaffargarh
Bahauddin
Narwal Hafizabad Vehari Attock Rajanpur
Sialkot Lahore Okara Rawalpindi Faisalabad
Attock Nankana Pakpattan Mianwali Jhang
Jhelum Sheikhupura Bhakkar T. T. Singh
Rawalpindi Khanawal Khushad Hafizabad
Lodhran Kasur
Multan ………
Chakwal Sheikhupura
Sahiwal Khanawal
Mianwali Lodhran
Sargodha Multan
Vehari
Okara
Pakpattan
Sahiwal
Khushab
11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation…
(continued)
213
214
Sargodha
Sindh Karachi Badin Karachi Tando Allah Yar Badin
Larkana Hyderabad Tharparkar Jacobabad Dadu
Shahdad pur Tando Allah Larkana Hyderabad
Yar
Nawabshah Tando Nawabshah Tando
Muhammad Muhammad
Thatta Sukkur Thatta
Jacobabad Shadad Kot
Mirpur Khas Mirpur Khas
Sanghar Sanghar
Tharparkar Umer Kot
Umer Kot Ghotki
Ghotki Khairpur
Khairpur Nowshera Feroz
Nowshera
Feroz
Sukkar
Balochistan Zhob Kech Gawadar Awaran Kalat Awaran
Kalat Kharan Lasbela
Kharan Khuzdar Mastung
Khuzdar Gawadar Kech
Lasbela Chaghi Jafarabad
G. M. Arif et al.
Mastung Zhob Jhal Magsi
Jafarabad Bolan
Jhal Magsi Nasir Abad
Bolan Qilla Saifullah
Nasirabad Pishin
Chaghi Quetta
Qilla Kohlu
Saifullah
Pishin Sibbi
Quetta Ziarat
Kohlu Barkhan
Sibbi Qilla Abdullah
Ziarat Loralai
Barkhan Musa Khel
Qilla
Abdullah
Loralai
Musa Khel
11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation…
215
References
Addleton, J. S. (1992). Undermining the centre: The Gulf migration and Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
Amjad, R., & Kemal, A. R. (1997). Macroeconomic policies and their impact on poverty allevia-
tion in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 36(1), 39–68.
Amjad, R., Irfan, M., & Arif, G. M. (2015). An analysis of the remittances market in Pakistan.
In R. Amjad & S. J. Burki (Eds.), Pakistan: Moving the economy forward (p. 411). Delhi:
Cambridge University Press.
Amjad, R., Arif, G. M., & Iqbal, N. (2017). The cost of migration from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia
and the UAE. In R. Amjad (Ed.), The Pakistani Diaspora: Corridors of Opportunity and
Uncertainty, Lahore School of Economics (pp. 137–150).
Arif, G. M. (1995). International contract labor migration and reintegration of return migrants:
The experience of Pakistan. PhD unpublished thesis. Australian National University, Cambera.
Arif, G. M. (2004). Effects of overseas migration on household consumption, education, health
and labour supply in Pakistan. In H. Oda (Ed.), International labour migration from South
Asia. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies and Japan External Trade Organization.
Arif, G. M. (2010). Economic and social impacts of remittances on households: The case of
Pakistani migrants working in Saudi Arabia. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Arif, G. M., & Irfan, M. (1997). Return migration and occupational change: The case of Pakistani
migrants returned from the Middle East. The Pakistan Development Review, 36(1), 1–37.
Burki, S. J. (1988). Poverty in Pakistan: Myth or reality? In T. N. Srinivasan & P. K. Bardhan
(Eds.), Rural poverty in South Asia (pp. 69–88). Columbia: Columbia University Press.
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: A theoretical Perspective1. International
Migration Review, 44(1), 227–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x.
Farooq, S., & Iqbal, N. (2015). Migration and health outcomes: The case of a high migration
district in South Punjab, population & health working paper series 4. Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics (PIDE), http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/cphsp/PIDE-CPHSP-4.pdf.
Gilani, I., Khan, M. F., & Iqbal, M. (1981). Labour migration from Pakistan to the Middle East
and its impact on the domestic economy: Part I (cost-benefit analysis) (Research report series,
RR-no 126).
GoP. (2011). Household integrated economic survey (HIES) 2010–11. Islamabad: Statistics
Division, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan.
GoP. (2014). Pakistan social and living standards measurement survey (PSLM) 2012–13 pro-
vincial/district. Islamabad: Statistics Division, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of
Pakistan.
GoP. (2015a). Migraton statistics of Pakistan. Islamabad: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas
Employment, Government of Pakistan.
GoP. (2015b). Pakistan economic survey 2014–15. Islamabad: Economic: Advisor’s Wing, Finance
Division, Government of Pakistan.
Ilahi, N. (1999). Return migration and occupational change. Review of Development Economics,
3(2), 170–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9361.00059.
Iqbal, S. (2015). Return migration and entrepreneurship in District Jhelum. MPhil unpublished
thesis. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad.
Iqbal, Z., & Sattar, A. (2005). The contribution of workers’ remittances to economic growth in
Pakistan (PIDE-Working Papers). Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
Irfan, M. (2011). Remittances and poverty linkages in Pakistan: Evidence and some sugges-
tions for further analysis (PIDE-Working Papers) (Vol. 78). Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics.
Irfan, M., & Amjad, R. (1984). Poverty in rural Pakistan. In Poverty in Rural Asia. Bangkok: ILO/
ARTEP.
Javid, M., Arif, U., & Qayyum, A. (2012). Impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty.
Academic Research International, 2(1), 433–447.
Mansuri, G. (2007). Does work migration spur investment in origin communities? Entrepreneurship,
schooling, and child health in rural Pakistan. In Ç. Özden & M. Schiff (Eds.), International
migration, economic development and policy. Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave
Macmillan.
Naseem, S. M. (1981). Underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard
Publications.
Nasir, M., Tariq, M. S., & Rehman, F.-u. (2011). The effect of foreign remittances on school-
ing: Evidence from Pakistan (PIDE Working Paper) (Vol. 66). Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics.
Nayab, D. (2008). Demographic dividend or demographic threat in Pakistan? The Pakistan
Development Review, 47, 1–26.
Oda, H. (2007). Dynamics of internal and international migration in rural Pakistan: Evidence of
development and underdevelopment. Asian Population Studies, 3(2), 169–179.
Özden, Ç., & Schiff, M. (2007). International migration, economic development and policy.
Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan.
Siddiqui, R., & Kemal, A. R. (2006). Remittances, trade liberalisation, and poverty in Pakistan:
The role of excluded variables in poverty change analysis. The Pakistan Development Review,
45(3), 383–415.
Chapter 12
Labour Migration from Sri Lanka
to the Gulf: Current Status and Future
Outlook
Bilesha Weeraratne
Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an important corridor of labour migration

from Sri Lanka. This importance emerged due to the alignment of demand and sup-
ply forces in the destination countries and Sri Lanka. On the demand side, after
1970s Gulf countries experienced the two oil booms which were associated with an
excess demand for labour (Gunatilleke 1986), and on the supply side, after the late
1970s Sri Lanka underwent policy changes that introduced open market policies
such as the relaxation of foreign exchange control and restrictions on labour migra-
tion. As a result departures to the Middle East grew to a staggering 27,000 in 1980
from 1500 in 1976 (Gunatilleke 1986). Since then, the importance of the Gulf region
as a destination has increased over time. In 2015, departures to the GCC countries
were 232,869, while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE together accounted for
over 84% (SLBFE 2016).
This chapter examines the recent trends, current situation and future outlook of
labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. The remainder of the chapter is orga-
nized as follows. Section “Institutional framework” describes the institutional
framework in Sri Lanka for labour migration, while section “Recent trends” exam-
ines the recent trends in migration in terms of remittances, and composition of
migrants’ skills, gender and age. Section “Importance of the Gulf region” discusses
the importance of the Gulf as a destination, while section “Recruitment to the Gulf”
discusses recruitment of Sri Lankan workers to the gulf. The chapter is concluded in
section “Future directions” with a discussion about future directions for labour
migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf.
B. Weeraratne (*)
Labour, Employment and Human Resources Development Unit, Institute of Policy Studies,
Colombo, Sri Lanka

220 B. Weeraratne
Institutional Framework
The labour migration industry in Sri Lanka has a few key stakeholders with well-
defined roles. One of the main stakeholders in the industry is the Ministry of Foreign
Employment (MFE), which is entrusted with the role of governing the industry.
Closely linked with the MFE is the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment
(SLBFE), which regulates the industry, for instance by handling approvals of for-
eign job orders, registration of migrants and recruitment agents, and conducting of
pre-departure training, to name a few. Another important group of stakeholders in
the industry are recruitment agents, who connect the foreign employer with the Sri
Lankan worker. The government recruitment agency for foreign employment is the
Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency (SLFEA), while most licensed private
recruitment agents are organized under the Association for Licensed Foreign
Employment Agencies (ALFEA), which ensures and enforces the best ethical prac-
tices for foreign employment trade in Sri Lanka. Currently there are 1006 licensed
agents registered with the SLBFE (SLBFE 2016). Apart from agents, the migration
industry in Sri Lanka also includes sub-agents—informal representatives of licensed
agents, who are involved at grass root level for scouting of potential migrant work-
ers. Recruitment for foreign employment from Sri Lanka in general is either through
licensed recruitment agencies or on own through personal contacts, while the coun-
try level arrangement for recruitment is either Government-to-Government, Private-
to-Private or an arrangement that lies in between these two extremes.
These stakeholders in the migration industry in Sri Lanka are guided by the
National Labour Migration Policy of 2008, which focuses on governance; protec-
tion and empowerment; and linking migration to development. Together, these com-
ponents of the institutional framework have developed a coherent system which
prepares potential migrants at pre-departure stage, strives for the wellbeing of
migrants and their families during the migration stage and reintegrates migrants
with family and socio-economy upon return to Sri Lanka.
Before migration potential migrants undergo a compulsory pre-departure train-
ing. As of April of 2016 there are 25 training SLBFE centres operating in Sri Lanka
and the duration and content of the training depends on the destination and the
occupation category. In general pre-departure training covers job specific training
(such as caring for the elderly and children for caregivers and cooking for house-
maids), language skills, financial literacy, laws and customs of the host countries,
safe migration, migrant workers’ rights and responsibilities, and arrangements for
family left behind (Thimothy et al. 2016). In addition to training at pre-departure,
potential migrants are also provided with low interest pre-departure loans. At the
migration stage, the state provides many benefits to the families left behind such as
awarding scholarships and conducting child protection programmes for the children
of migrant workers, and low interest housing loans for migrants themselves.
Additionally, the state also pays the insurance premium on behalf of migrant work-
ers, and when in adverse situations migrant workers are repatriated with the media-
tion of the MFE, SLBFE and the Sri Lankan embassy in the respective destination
12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 221
country, while upon return migrants are offered low interests self-employment loans
(MFE 2016).
Recent Trends
Along with the well-developed institutional framework labour migration from Sri
Lanka has evolved over the years to become an integral component of the economy.
In 2015, remittances account for nearly 8.4% of GDP by standing at USD 6.98 bil-
lion (CBSL, AR 2016). Currently, remittances is the single largest foreign exchange
earning component in Sri Lanka, towering over export earnings from tea, rubber and
apparel as well as earnings from tourism.
Nonetheless, for the first time in many years in 2015 remittances deviated from
its growing trend and recorded a decline of 0.53% compared to the USD 7.01 mil-
lion received in 2014. As identified by the CBLS (2016) one of the main reasons for
the decline in remittances in 2015 is the decrease in income of oil exporting coun-
tries in the Middle East, which channels majority of remittances to Sri Lanka. Other
reasons include the decline in the share of housemaids—whose migration have tra-
ditionally been positively associated with growing remittances to Sri Lanka, and the
change in the skills and gender composition of recent migrants in favour of more
skilled labour migration.
Historically, despite its overall downward trend, female domestic workers have
been the largest occupational group among migrant workers from Sri Lanka, (see
panel 1 of Fig. 12.1). Compared to the share of domestic workers in 1996 (68%), its
share has more than halved to 28% in 2015, and the same year marked the first year
since 1994, where the share of housemaids dipped below that of skilled workers
(31%). Along with the upward trend in skilled and unskilled workers, other skills
groups, such as professionals and semi-skilled also experienced growth to reach
higher shares of 2.4% and 2% of departures, respectively, in 2015. Despite a notice-
able dip, the skills groups of middle-level and clerical & related have also main-
70 Skilled 10 professional
Unskilled
60 middle-level
Housemaids 8 clarical and related
50 Other Semi-skilled labor
% of departures
6
40
30 4
20
2
10
0 0
Fig. 12.1 Skills of migrant workers 1994–2015. (Source: CBSL, AR, various years)
222 B. Weeraratne
tained overall upward trends in their respective shares among departures (see panel
2 of Fig. 12.1).
Amidst the declining share of housemaids among all migrant workers, they still
account for a bulk of female departures. In 2015 housemaids accounted for 80% of
the 90,677 female departures. Nonetheless, the decline in the share of housemaids
among total departures also affects the significance of female migrants, and in 2008
for the first time in 20 years the share of females dipped below the share of male
departures. Despite a few fluctuations, by 2010 the share of males have been consis-
tently higher than that of females (see left panel of Fig. 12.2). Before 2013, the
lower share of female departures was mainly due to the increase in male departures
and not due to a significant decrease in the absolute number of females migrating
for foreign employment. However, since 2013 the absolute number of female depar-
tures is also declining (see right panel of Fig. 12.2).
The overall gender composition of departure for labour migration in 2015 was
66% males to 34% females. Among disaggregated skills groups, the highest share
of males was reported among skilled workers (94%) followed by Professionals
workers (93%). The highest share of females in 2015 was reported by the group of
unskilled workers (13%) (see Table 12.1). As seen in Table 12.1, in none of the
% females 200
80
% males Females Males
70
150
60
Thousands
50 100
%
40
50
30
20 0
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
1986
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
1986
Fig. 12.2 Gender distribution of migrants. (Source: CBSL, AR, various years)
Table 12.1 Departures by skills and gender—2015

Skills group Male (%) Female (%) Total
Professional 93 7 6257
Middle level 90 10 6921
Clerical & related 88 12 12,472
Skilled 94 6 82,098
Semi-skilled 91 9 4837
Unskilled 87 13 77,444
Housemaid – 100 73,278
Total 66 34 263,307
Source: SLBFE (2016)
Fig. 12.3 Migrant Departure by Age and Gender: 2015. (Source: Author’s illustration based
on SLBFE 2016 data)
disaggregated skills groups the share of females is close to national average of 33%.
This shows that the share of females among departures is heavily bolstered by
housemaids and if one was to exclude them and re-calculate the national average,
the share of males would increase to 91% males and the share of females would
drop to 9%.
In terms of the age distribution of migrants workers from Sri Lanka, as seen in
Fig. 12.3, in 2015 male migrants were composed of more younger cohorts than
female migrants. Specifically, most male migrant workers were concentrated in the
five year age groups in 20–34 years, while on the contrary the bulk of female
migrants were in the age five year age groups between 35 and 50 years. Among
females also the disaggregation of gender and age group of departures by skills level
shows that Housemaids and Unskilled departures of females are more mature than
females departing for other skilled groups.
In addition to these general trends in labour migration from Sri Lanka in terms of
remittances, skills, gender and age, another predominant trend is the importance of
Gulf as a region of destination, which is discussed next.
Importance of the Gulf Region
Among all alternative destination regions the Gulf has been consistently attracting
the largest share of departure of labour migrants from Sri Lanka. As seen in
Table 12.2, the GCC has traditionally accounted for 80–90% of total departures, and
among GCC countries Saudi Arabia accounted for the highest share of nearly a third
of departures to GCC. However, in 2013 Qatar attracted more migrant workers from
Sri Lanka to account for an equal share as Saudi Arabia. The rising importance of
224 B. Weeraratne
Table 12.2 Distribution of departures to GCC countries 2011–2015

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015*
Country No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Saudi Arabia 68,552 26 97,964 35 80,887 28 80,480 27 74,910 28
Qatar 52,743 20 57,504 20 80,724 28 84,622 28 65,111 25
U.A.E. 39,320 15 38,297 14 48,502 17 50,347 17 43,601 17
Kuwait 50,635 19 44,244 16 42,740 15 43,552 14 38,451 15
Oman 5379 2 4886 2 5317 2 5759 2 7077 3
Bahrain 5423 2 4536 2 4547 2 3979 1 3719 1
GCC Total 222,052 84 247,431 88 262,717 90 268,739 89 232,869 88
Other 40,909 16 35,016 12 30,501 10 31,964 11 30,438 12
TOTAL 262,961 100 282,447 100 293,218 100 300,703 100 263,307 100
Qatar was further consolidated in 2014, by surpassing Saudi Arabia and emerging
as the single destination country with the highest share of (28%) departures.
Nonetheless, in 2015 Saudi Arabia regained its dominance by accounting for a share
of 28% of departures while Qatar accounted for 25%.
Despite accounting for similar shares among all departures from Sri Lanka, these
two leading GCC countries attract different skills sets from Sri Lanka. In the case of
Saudi Arabia, the majority of migrant workers in 2015 were housemaids (38%),
while to Qatar the majority of Sri Lankan worker departures were for skilled work
(46%) (see Table 12.3). Nonetheless, in terms of gender composition both these
leading countries attract a majority of males, but the share of Sri Lankan males
heading to Qatar is much higher (93%) than the share of Sri Lankan males to Saudi
Arabia (59%). Among other GCC countries Kuwait attracts more females, while
UAE attracts more males from Sri Lanka, and Oman and Bahrain attract almost
equal share from both genders.
In addition to departure, the Gulf region is also important in terms of remit-
tances. As seen in Table 12.4, in recent years the Middle Eastern region which
includes the Gulf accounts for over half of all remittances received by Sri Lanka. In
2015, Middle East accounted for 54% of remittances, while the European Union
and East Asia accounted for 18% and 9%, respectively. However, a noticeable trend
in remittances is the slow decline in the importance of the Middle East region as a
source of remittances to Sri Lanka.
Similar to the importance of the Gulf region for the positive attributes of the
labour migration industry in Sri Lanka, this region is also prominent in terms of
complaints made by the stock1 of Sri Lankan workers. In 2015, there was a total of
8366 complaints made by the stock of Sri Lankan workers abroad, out of which
92% were reported in the Gulf. Among all Gulf countries Saudi Arabia accounts for
the largest share of complaints (55%), followed by Kuwait with 17% and Qatar with
1
It is important to distinguish the stock of migrant workers from the annual flow of migrant depar-
tures from Sri Lanka.
Table 12.3 Skills composition by destination: 2015
Destination Professional (%) Middle (%) Clerical & related (%) Skilled (%) Semiskilled (%) Unskilled (%) Housemaid (%) Total
Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 27 1 31 38 74,910
Kuwait <0 <0 1 25 1 12 59 38,451
UAE 4 4 11 25 5 29 21 43,601
Qatar 3 4 8 46 2 33 5 65,111
Oman 7 7 4 19 1 12 49 7077
Bahrain 4 3 6 37 2 17 31 3719
GCC 2 3 5 32 2 27 29 233,369
Other 5 2 2 27 1 46 17 30,438
Total 2 3 5 31 2 29 28 263,307
12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook
225
226 B. Weeraratne
Table 12.4 Composition of remittances: 2015

UDS (million) %
Region 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Middle East 3030 3358 3562 3902 3769 58.9 56.1 55.6 55.6 54
European Union 885 1071 1160 1270 1222 17.2 17.9 18.1 18.1 17.5
Far East Asia 401 509 557 611 698 7.8 8.5 8.7 8.7 10
Europe-Other 232 275 308 337 307 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.4
North America 154 174 186 204 209 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3
South East Asia 206 263 288 316 391 4 4.4 4.5 4.5 5
Australia and 103 132 147 161 161 2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
New Zealand
South Asia 51 90 83 91 98 1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4
South and Central 41 48 58 63 63 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
America
Other 41 66 58 63 63 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
TOTAL 5145 5985 6407 7018 6980 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CBSL, AR (2016)
Table 12.5 Gender distribution of departures and complaints origins—2015

Departures Complaints
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Destination % % No. % % % No. %
Saudi Arabia 59 41 74,910 28 19 81 4641 55
Kuwait 37 63 38,451 15 6 94 1425 17
UAE 66 34 43,601 17 21 79 793 9
Qatar 93 7 65,111 25 83 17 607 7
Oman 46 54 7077 3 7 93 188 2
Bahrain 48 52 3719 1 13 88 56 1
GCC total 66 34 232,869 88 22 78 7710 92
Other countries 64 36 30,438 12 42 58 656 8
Total 66 34 263,307 100 23 77 8366 100
SLBFE (2016)
9%. As seen in Table 12.5, in Saudi Arabia 81% of the complaints were made by
females, while on the contrary, 87% of complaints in Qatar were made by males.
Regardless of region, among all complaints 77% were made by female migrant
workers, and 90% of all complaints in 2015 were made by Sri Lankan female
domestic worker abroad.
The predominant complaint by all migrant workers to all destinations in 2015
were related to breach of employment contract (3055 complaints), sickness at des-
tination (1191 complaints), not being allowed to return to Sri Lanka upon comple-
tion of contract (1110 complaints) and non-payment of agreed wages (1017
complaints). Other issues reported by Sri Lankan workers abroad include lack of
communication with family in Sri Lanka and physical and sexual harassment
(SLBFE 2016). Consequences of such difficulties faced by migrant workers include

emotional trauma, physical injuries and financial losses or costs (HRW 2007).
To minimize the risk of vulnerability at Gulf countries, Sri Lankan authorities
have introduced many Gulf specific measure, such as the minimum age for recruit-
ment of females to the Gulf is higher than that of rest of the world. Specifically, for
Saudi Arabia this minimum age of female labour migrants from Sri Lanka is
25 years and 23 years for the rest of the Gulf countries, while for other countries the
corresponding minimum age is only 21 years. Such a higher minimum age is
imposed with the intention of limiting the departure of very young girls who are
more likely to be immature and hence more vulnerable to adverse situations at des-
tination. In addition to higher minimum wages, another such measure is the intro-
duction of mandatory pre-departure training, with specialized training available for
the Middle East countries, which includes the Gulf. In the case of first time migrants
as housemaids to the Middle East, the SLBFE conducts a 21 day residential pre-
departure training programme, while for veteran migrant housemaids a 7 day
refresher course is offered. The main difference in this region specific training is the
greater emphasis on the culture and rules and regulation in the Gulf, which are
aimed at minimizing issues for migrant workers in these Gulf destination.
As discussed in the next sections the mechanism for recruitment of Sri Lankan
workers to the Gulf has evolved in to a unique one, in part as a response to the issue
of high vulnerability of Sri Lankan workers in the region.
Recruitment to the Gulf
Recruitment of migrant workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf are Private-to-Private
arrangements between the two countries based on private sponsorship arrangements
between the employer and employee often with the assistance of recruitment agen-
cies in destination and Sri Lanka. The recruitment process is initiated in the Gulf by
the employer who in most instances approaches a recruitment agency in the destina-
tion country to employ a Sri Lankan worker. The recruitment agent in the Gulf
submits a job order to the Sri Lankan embassy in the respective destination country.
At this point the embassy in the Gulf country checks the credibility of the r ecruitment
agent in the destination country as well as that of the employer with the objective of
ensuring the well-being of the Sri Lankan worker at destination. Subsequently, the
embassy communicates the certified job order to the SLBFE. The recruitment agent
in Sri Lanka who is liaising with the foreign agent obtains a first approval and maxi-
mum chargeable recruitment fee for this job order from the SLBFE.
As per Amendment No. 56 in 2009 to the initial SLBFE Act of 1985, licensed
agents in Sri Lanka are now allowed to charge the actual expenses to be incurred in
placement in foreign employment, in the event of not receiving any form of pay-
ment from overseas. In such instances, maximum chargeable amount is calculated
based on monthly salary, duration of employment contract and exchange rate. For
instance, in 2016 the maximum chargeable for a low skilled male worker to the
228 B. Weeraratne
GCC was LKR 125,000, and LKR 35,000 for garment workers (male/female).
Recruitment of Female Domestic Workers to the Gulf countries is a unique situation
(see next sub section for details), where the maximum chargeable is set to zero
given the practice of employer paying all recruitment charges.
Subsequent to obtaining the first approval, local agents seek potential migrant
workers to fill the vacancy. In the case of recruitment for foreign employment
through own-account, the employer in the Gulf would obtain the approval of the
embassy and links directly with the potential migrant worker in Sri Lanka
(Weeraratne et al. 2016). For such own account recruitment of FDW’s, the employ-
ers are required to make a non-refundable deposit worth US $ 400 at the respective
embassy (MFE 2016). The purpose of this non-refundable deposit is to cover any
unpaid wages or repatriation costs. This non-refundable deposit is only applicable
to those recruiting Sri Lankan migrant workers without the involvement of recruit-
ment agents, because the absence of an agent limits the accountability of employer
at destination (Weeraratne 2014).
Once a potential migrant worker is matched to an employer, the former needs to
undergo pre-departure training and fulfil other requirements based on the occupa-
tion category. For instance, female domestic workers are required to obtain docu-
ments including Family Background Report (FBR), medical report and police
report. However, in Sri Lanka, the issuance of medical certificates for employment
in the Gulf is restricted to 15 medical clinics. As noted in ILO (2013) this restriction
results in inconveniencing prospective migrant workers and the recruitment agency,
and affects the speedy procurement process. Subsequent to completion of documen-
tation the potential migrant obtains a visa to the GCC country to depart for foreign
employment. Prior to departure the employment contract is signed at the SLBFE,
and the migrant worker and the relevant contract is registered with the SLBFE.
However, often in GCC countries Sri Lankan migrant workers are compelled to
sign a second agreement at destination, which locks the migrant worker to a new set
of working terms and conditions different from those agreed before departure. This
system of double contracts often leads to confusion and related disagreements
among employer and employees (Weeraratne 2014). In addition to double contract-
ing, Block Visas—where approval is granted to a group of migrants, and the Table
System—where more than one agency registered under the same name, are other
practices in the Gulf that complicates recruitment for foreign employment in Sri
Lanka and leads to greater vulnerability of Sri Lankan workers in the Gulf. For
instance, under the Table System it is nearly impossible to trace the responsible
agent in the event of a complaint by a migrant worker.
Recruitment of Female Domestic Workers
The recruitment of female domestic workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf has evolved
into a unique arrangement, where in addition to the payment of recruitment cost, an
upfront incentive is also paid to the FDW. Initially upfront incentives were paid only
to Muslim FDW heading to the Gulf, mainly as a way of attracting them due to their
racial and cultural similarity with that of the employers at Gulf. Nevertheless,
regardless of race of employees in Sri Lanka, employers in destination have paid the
same recruitment fee. Amidst this background, the introduction of mandatory pre-
departure training in 1996 leads to greater interaction among potential housemaids
and subsequent common awareness about the practice of upfront incentives. This
led the demand and eventual payment of upfront incentives to all ethnic groups of
female domestic workers from Sri Lanka to Gulf. In 2016 this upfront incentive to
FDW and her family was LKR 225,000–250,000 (SAR 5860–6512) (Weeraratne
et al. 2016).
This payment of upfront incentives in Sri Lanka is unique to female domestic
workers destined to the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East countries. FDWs head-
ing outside the Middle East are not paid such an incentive, while other occupation
categories from Sri Lanka to the Middle East countries are also not paid such an
incentive. Moreover, among all sending countries to the Gulf only Sri Lankan
housemaids receive such an incentive. The exact reason why employers in the Gulf
are willing to pay an upfront incentive to Sri Lankan housemaids is unclear.
Nevertheless, from a financial point of view even with the payment of an incentive,
Sri Lankan housemaids still appear cheaper than similar workers from other send-
ing countries. For instance, the monthly salary of Sri Lankan female domestic work-
ers in 2016 was approximately SAR 900, while a similar housemaid from Philippines
earned approximately SAR 1500 per month in Saudi Arabia (Weeraratne et al.
2016). When a 2 year contract period is considered the upper limit of the total cost
including incentives for a Sri Lankan female domestic workers amounts to SAR
28,112, while the cost of a Philipino female domestic workers—even in the absence
of any such incentives, amounts to a much higher SAR 36,000.
As analyzed previously female domestic workers are highly vulnerable at Gulf
destinations, and their well-being has remained a concern for Sri Lankan authori-
ties. In recent years, authorities in the Gulf also have been under more pressure to
improve the working conditions and safety of migrant workers. Due to this grow-
ing concern in both Sri Lanka and the receiving countries, with effect from 2017
the recruitment of female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia is carried out under
the Musaned system. This new online system of recruitment is aimed at facilitating
the procedures for recruitment of female domestic workers for Saudi Arabia and
increasing the protection of all parties involved by clarifying their rights and
duties. The benefits of the newly introduced system include the ability to apply
online for foreign labour visas, provision of an online market place for female
domestic workers, where electronic employment contracts can be issued under the
close monitoring of both Sri Lankan and Saudi authorities. Additionally, the
Musaned system has a facility for workers to lodge complaints related to employ-
ment and or employer. As such, it is expected that this new recruitment system
would contribute to minimize the vulnerability of Sri Lankan housemaids employed
in Saudi Arabia.
230 B. Weeraratne
Future Directions
Based on the foregone analysis a few key trends emerge in terms of labour migra-
tion from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. They are (1) increasing dominance of male migrants
from Sri Lanka to the Gulf; (2) rising importance of skilled workers migration from
Sri Lanka to the Gulf; (3) stagnation in the female centric nature of complaints of
Sri Lankan migrant workers in the Gulf; (4) the slow decline in the importance of
Gulf as a destination region; and (5) the slow decline in the importance of Gulf as a
remitting region to Sri Lanka.
Among them the combination of the first two trends contributes to the final trend
of decline in remittances. Specifically, the increase in skilled migration involves the
increase of tied migrants—where spouse as well as children of migrant workers
leave Sri Lanka for the Gulf. The absence of a left behind family leads to lower
receipt of remittances to Sri Lanka. Similarly, the greater departure of skilled work-
ers alters the temporary/circular nature of labour migration from Sri Lanka and
leads to more long-term migration, despite the lack of opportunities to naturalize in
the Gulf. This disappearance of temporary migration also contributes to the decline
in remittances. Literature notes that compared to males, females have a greater
involvement with the operation of the left behind household and thus are more reli-
able remitters (Le Goff 2016). However, despite being less reliable, when they do
remit, males are more likely to remit more because of their higher wages. As such,
perhaps the recent years offer an early indication that the higher salaries of male
migrant workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf are not compensating for their irregu-
larity in remitting behaviour, and skilled migrants are in fact remitting less to Sri
Lanka. To increase its receipt of remittances in this emerging scenario, Sri Lanka
ought to make policy changes to maintain closer links with skilled and male migrant
workers in the Gulf.
In recent years, Sri Lanka’s labour migration policy has emphasized on destina-
tion diversification. As such, this slow decline in the importance of the Gulf may be
early evidence of destination diversification of Sri Lanka’s labour migration flows.
Nevertheless, no other region outside the Gulf has emerged to increase its domi-
nance as a destination or as a remitting region to Sri Lanka. At the same time this
region still accounts for the largest share of issues faced by migrant workers from
Sri Lanka, and among them females continue to report most issues. Nevertheless,
the increasing dominance of male migrants from Sri Lanka to the Gulf calls for
labour migration policies to broadening its scope on addressing vulnerability of Sri
Lankan workers in the Gulf. In recent years, most female migrant workers in the
Gulf have been working in isolation and within the premises of a household. On the
contrary, male migrant workers from Sri Lanka have more opportunities to collec-
tivize at destination (i.e. at work, at places of accommodation and at social settings).
This necessitates male migrants to be adequately sensitized about the cultural
norms, rules, regulations and laws in destination countries. For instance, in many
Gulf countries unionization is not allowed for migrant workers and striking is ille-
gal, and punishment for illegal conduct such as brewing of illicit liquor is severe
(Motaparthy 2015). In this context, the pre-departure training provided to male

migrants would require a region specific focus in future. For example the pre-depar-
ture training for construction workers to Qatar could emulate the existing Middle
East bound pre-departure training for Female Domestic Workers.
In conclusion, the Gulf region has been and will continue to be a key corridor for
labour migration from Sri Lanka. Due acknowledgement to the emerging trends in
labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf and appropriate policy changes would
allow Sri Lanka to maximize the gains and minimize the losses from this region.
References
CBSL. (2016). Annual report 2015. Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Gunatilleke, G. (1986). Sri Lanka. In G. Gunatilleke (Ed.), Migration of Asian workers to the Arab
World (pp. 167–170). Tokyo: United Nations University, Japan.
HRW. (2007). Exported and exposed abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights Watch.
ILO. (2013). Recruitment Practices of Employment Agencies Recruiting Migrant Workers: A
review aimed at improving recruitment regulations and drafting recruitment guidelines.
Geneva: International Labour Office.
Le Goff, M. (2016). Feminization of migration and trends in remittances. Bonn: IZA World of
Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor.
MFE. (2016). Progress report 2015. Ministry of Foreign Employment.
Motaparthy, P. (2015, March 11). Understanding Kafala: An Archaic law at cross purposes
with modern development. http://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/03/understanding-kafala-an-
archaic-law-at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/. Accessed on June 30 2015.
SLBFE. (2016). Annual statistical report of foreign employment 2015.. Sri Lanka Bureau of
Foreign Employment.
Thimothy, R., Sasikumar, S. K., Ratnayake, P., & Alvin, P. A. (2016). Labour migration structures
and financing in Asia. Bangkok: International Labour Organization, ILO.
Weeraratne, B. (2014). Sri Lankan female domestic workers in the Middle East: Does recruitment
through an agent minimize vulnerability? (Labour economic series no. 18). Colombo: Institute
of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka.
Weeraratne, B., Wijayasiri, J., & Jayaratne, S. (2016). Cost of low-skilled workers: Value chain
analysis – Sri Lanka. Unpublished manuscript.
Chapter 13
Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC:
Negotiating Contested Politics
and Contradictory Policies
S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph
Sitting with us on the floor of the Dammam Tarheel (deportation centre) in the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 2012, Ferzana Begum1spoke, almost inaudibly,
about her experiences as a domestic worker in a multi-family household. In her late
fifties and older than her peers at the centre, Ferzana had embarked on her first emi-
gration after the passing of her husband a year ago. She had only been working with
her employer for 7 months before they unceremoniously dropped her off near the
passport office without her documents. Ferzana had been put to work in the kitchen
and was also tasked with general housekeeping tasks and hand-washing clothes. The
work she described was gruelling and involved going up and down the three-storied
house multiple times a day. She began having difficulties keeping up and had to rely
on the two other domestic workers also employed in the home. Ferzana had asthma
and a medical condition that caused her right leg to swell. What had begun as an
arduous yet uneventful employment experience took a turn after her employer’s dis-
covery of her health concerns. With some support, Ferzana stood and slowly pulled
back her abaya2 to show us her painfully bloated foot. She had hoped that her condi-
tion would go undetected; however, as the work continued to take a toll, she became
increasingly mobility-impaired. Her employers reacted with frustration and anger,
beating her often and accusing her of cheating them. She was later barred from han-
dling food and personal items and forbidden from interacting with the children.
Despite harsh working conditions and being discriminated against for her illness,
Ferzana felt unsure about her return to Hyderabad, India, where she had been living
Names changed for protection and privacy of respondents. No identifying information included.
1
A long, loose-fitting garment worn over clothing by women.

2
S. I. Rajan (*)
J. Joseph
York University, Toronto, Canada

234 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph
with her older son. She had grown wary of imposing on her son’s family life and
finances after being widowed. For a time, she helped out at a provision shop that he
ran but was unable to stand for long lengths of time. This made tensions between
them worse and stoked her sense of disquiet. She then began looking for employ-
ment as a domestic worker. It proved difficult to land local jobs as an older woman
without work experience. The only opportunities were low-paying and required
travelling long distances daily. For 2 years, the family had been working together to
pay off loans incurred for the migration of Ferzana’s youngest son to Kuwait. On his
advice, Ferzana contacted a local agent to broker her passage to the Gulf. Her migra-
tion had been a strategic choice that would enable her to contribute to paying down
the family debt and retain a measure of independence. Now, having lost legal status
and faced with her impending repatriation, Ferzana was overcome with a feeling of
personal failure, looking past the structures that had systematically failed her.
Migrant domestic workers, like Ferzana, have become emblematic figures of
migration in the region. Caught at the interstice of restrictive policy regimes and
ongoing demand for flexible, feminized care labour, they comprise a highly precari-
ous, largely female global workforce. This chapter presents observations from inter-
views with 56 Indian domestic workers conducted as part of a broader study of
low- and semi-skilled Indian migrants in Saudi Arabia.3 Situated within the broader
structures and regimes that govern the labour market and their social lives, the
migration experiences of migrant domestic workers are both facilitated and con-
strained by an assemblage of factors including the kafala sponsorship system,
nationalization and regularization efforts, labour laws and migration policies.
Through this chapter, we comment on the staying power of migrant domestic work
along this regional corridor, owing to the distinct political economy that underpins
their mobility and labour and the ongoing structural demand for and dependence on
migrant domestic workers.
The continued presence of South Asian domestic workers in the Gulf region,
despite less-than-favourable political and policy conditions in sending and receiving
countries, warrants further consideration. This is particularly timely as many South
Asian countries prepare to reckon with the rapid repatriation of migrant workers from
the Gulf region owing to stagnation in oil economies, socio-political unrest in an
unstable Gulf bloc, and structural reconstruction of Gulf labour markets away from
migrant employment. Inconsistent with the tide of returning migrants, streams of
migrant domestic workers appear to be steadily resisting this trend – much as wit-
nessed during the global recession a decade ago that saw the retreat of migrant work-
ers across other sectors (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; Rajan and Joseph 2013).
The chapter also links and develops two analytical themes that have emerged
from the study. The first section attends to the contested politics around
gendered-racialized modes of migration and domestic work that have resulted in
their systemic devaluation and discrimination. The second section examines the
insufficient, and often contradictory, legislative and regulatory frameworks that
3
Study supported by the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs – Research Unit on
International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India.
13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 235
shape the migration experiences of South Asian migrant domestics in the Gulf and
set the conditions of their precarity. Following some recent shifts in policy develop-
ment, it reveals gaps and fissures in how their migration and labour are organized,
managed and protected by sending and receiving states. While specific national and
regional cases are analysed as examples, the authors do not suggest a generalizing
or collapsing of contextual dynamics. The chapter concludes by highlighting the
importance of responsible, responsive state and supra-state support for migrant
domestic workers.
Contested Politics of Gender and Care Work
The Gulf bloc has been recorded as the largest migrant labour-receiving region in
the world. The ILO estimates that over 3.16 million migrant domestic workers are
employed across Arab States (including 6 Gulf countries) with over 80% of these
roles undertaken by women, largely from Asia and Africa (ILO 2015). The gender
composition of domestic work in the Gulf region is weighted heavily towards
women, with over two-thirds of female migrant workers employed as domestic
workers. According to official estimates, Oman had 87,500 registered female
migrant workers in 2009, of whom 69,250 were employed in private households
(ILO 2011). An estimated two million migrant domestic workers currently live and
work in Saudi Arabia alone, accounting for over 47% of total female employment in
the Kingdom (ILO 2010). Of this, non-Saudis are estimated at 99.87% of the female
domestic workforce (CDSI Manpower Survey 2013).
Migration for domestic and household care work follows deeply gendered and
racialized transnational patterns of migration that take place under neo-liberal con-
ditions of uneven development, welfare austerity, and flexibilized labour (Kofman
and Raghuram 2015). While increasingly apparent on a global scale and a topic of
several academic and policy studies (Silvey 2006; Varia 2007; HRW 2008a, b, 2010;
Fernandez 2010; Vlieger 2012; Bajracharya and Sijapati 2012; Begum 2014), the
increased attention has not parlayed into enhanced policy protections for this criti-
cal cadre of workers. This is, in part, due to the diminished value associated with
reproductive tasks, particularly those that are increasingly performed by racialized
women within private homes. Asian women migrants continue to occupy a narrow
range of reproductive labour roles characteristically assigned to female migrants
(Piper and Yamanaka 2005). The non-recognition of their crucial socio-economic
contributions has much to do with its invisibility within private homes and relega-
tion to peripheral, feminized and racialized workers, primarily from the global
South. This discursive care/work distinction props up the assumed binary in legisla-
tion and further contributes to driving down conditions in this sector. Furthermore,
prevailing gender norms across sending and receiving often serve to constrain
women’s rights and roles – whether citizens or not. The scale of migrant domestic
worker presence and their limited legal coverage accentuates stark power asymme-
tries skewed in favour of local employers in the Gulf. This leaves little incentive for
states and sponsors to adequately value the lives and labour of migrant domestic
workers.
Asian migrant domestic workers in the Gulf region have been identified among
the fastest growing sections of Gulf labour forces (Sabban 2002). Their rising pres-
ence has been linked to a number of factors. At the transnational level, these include
the feminization of particular migration streams, protracted income inequalities,
and the growing privatization and marketization of the care sector amidst declining
state social-service delivery (Moors et al. 2009; Malit and Ghafoor 2014; Kofman
and Raghuram 2015). The consistent demand for domestic work in the Gulf states
can be connected to women’s increasing participation in the labour force, higher
living standards, a burgeoning middle and elite class of expatriates who can afford
part-time or full-time domestic service, and local workforce non-participation in
‘undesirable’ service sectors. Socio-demographic transitions including (a) shifts in
family structures and composition towards nuclear arrangements, (b) decreased
birth and fertility rates, and (c) longer life expectancies (Sabban 2002; Begum
2014;Malit and Ghafoor 2014; Tayah and Assaf 2018; Malit et al. 2018) also con-
tribute to these emergent patterns.
In her analysis of migrant domestic workers in UAE, Rima Sabban (2002) sug-
gests that the large-scale and longstanding import of migrant domestic workers was
strategically implemented by the Gulf States in a bid to secure political legitimacy
amongst the local citizenry. Extending this analysis, Malit et al. (2018) note that
UAE state supports for their local population have included protectionist labour
localization policies as well as education and land subsidies and marriage and child
allowances that free up disposable income that may be put towards the hire of
domestic workers. Migrant domestic work has therefore been structured into states’
social policy through commodification and contracting-out of care provision
(Bergem 2006). In this way, the embedding of migrant domestic workers into Gulf
labour markets has served to substitute and supplement government services amidst
structural shrinking of formal care provision.
On the South Asian sending-side, the significant increase in migrant domestic
work has been attributed to a number of interconnected factors (Rajan and Joseph
2015). Women are frequently excluded from the formal sector and statutory cover-
age, leaving many such as Ferzana Begum in need of alternative opportunities.
Structural and social constraints to women’s local employment and skill training,
the lack of well-remunerated and decent work opportunities commensurate with
economic growth, acute poverty and socio-economic vulnerabilities, and state and
societal reliance on remittances, combine to present the Gulf as an important and
aspirational avenue for these workers (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; Ghosh
2013). Their migration is actualized through the operation of social networks, for-
mal and informal institutional actors that make migration accessible to even the
poorest and remotest sections of society (Rajan et al. 2013). The relative proximity
and connectivity to Gulf states and established patterns of migration to these regions
further facilitate these flows. For Ferzana Begum and a few other respondents of our
study, transnational mobility into domestic work in private Gulf households was a
move away from the yoke of cultural and gender mores that cast them as dependents
and a burden. For some, this represents a move towards empowerment and auton-
omy (Sijapati 2015). Entrenched social inequalities based on gender norms, caste
hierarchies, class relations, and religious differences, and the potential to shift and
subvert these through the social mobility that migration accords constitute some key
vectors driving South Asian women’s interest in Gulf migration (Gamburd 2000).
Alongside sectoral feminization, domestic work in the Gulf displays an ethnic
concentration that is notably ‘Asianized’. Intra-regional Arab mobility provided the
labour resources for initial oil-led infrastructure development in the region. In the
1980s, Gulf governments gradually turned to Asian migrants who were considered
more politically and socially acquiescent and less expensive (Kapiszewski 2017).
This Asianization impulse has since expanded and diversified. The economic reces-
sion of the late 1980s saw a fall in demand for workers in construction and allied
sectors, while the demand for domestic workers continued. This resulted in particu-
lar circuits of migration from Asia becoming increasingly feminized (Moors
et al. 2009).
Domestic service represents the leading occupation of South Asian women in the
Gulf (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012). The majority of domestic workers in the
region are from South and Southeast Asian countries of the Philippines, India,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Both the compensation of domestic workers
and associated measures of status for employers are informally stratified in a racial-
ized hierarchy. Bina Fernandez (2010) notes that Filipina women are widely consid-
ered to occupy top-tier status, followed by Indonesian and Sri Lankan women, and
African women at the bottom of this cascading socio-economic ladder. Studies have
highlighted the social standing attached to the employment of domestic workers,
signalling a life of luxury and leisure (Sabban 2002; Fernandez 2010; Malit et al.
2018). Specific ethnic groupings of migrant domestic have been seen to embody
differential symbolic capital. This has produced and maintained a specific demand
for Asian domestic workers.
Our 2015 study noted multiple interlocking factors that determine the quality of
life, social positioning, and job satisfaction of women domestic workers in Saudi
Arabia (Rajan and Joseph 2015). The contours of care work in this context are con-
tingent on prevailing economic inequalities between countries, histories of racial
and gender subordination, and labour and (im)migration policies. The informal,
underregulated working environment of domestic work lends itself to exploitation,
especially where workers are not organized or unionized. The freedom of associa-
tion and assembly is often denied, and migrant women domestic workers cannot
form or join trade unions, collective bargaining efforts, or engage in public social
interactions. Many migrant women domestic workers remain sequestered in their
employer’s home and cut-off from wider society. Unlike other workers who congre-
gate and more freely move through public spaces, domestic workers in Saudi Arabia
are often confined behind closed doors with little flexibility and time off. This, in
turn, can exacerbate vulnerability as employers wield near-total control over the
women they employ as domestic workers. Despite lingering rights deficits, migra-
tion for domestic work remains a significant source of employment for South Asian
women in the Gulf and an important arena for policy reform.
Contradictory State Policies of Labour and Mobility
The precarious status of migrant domestic workers has been maintained and institu-
tionalized by migration and labour policies. Sending and receiving countries are
co-implicated in structural processes of racialized–gendered labour exploitation.
The bulk of local labour laws and standards in the Gulf explicitly write out migrant
domestic workers from their purview and protections. This leaves them with limited
legal rights to fair wages, decent and safe working conditions, and with no recourse
for exploitation. Most South Asian countries do not incentivize or manage migra-
tion, having in fact laid down barriers and bureaucratic controls over the emigration
of women, particularly domestic workers (Kodoth and Varghese 2011; Sijapati
2015). These contradictions are not merely incidental, they are characteristic of the
low value accorded to women migrants and domestic workers and constitutive of
migrant sending and receiving governments’ investment in competitive capital
accumulation. For many years, the large-scale labour flows of domestic workers in
the region occurred with minimal formal state intervention. More recently, several
countries have introduced laws, policies, or schemes to protect domestic workers,
regulate the sector, and pre-empt care deficits. This has taken the form of labour law
reforms, standard contracts, specific domestic work legislation, (im)migration and
recruitment reforms, and bilateral agreements to secure standards and maintain
markets for their overseas workers (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2011,
Ministry of Labour and Employment 2013, Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment
2016). These efforts remain largely incremental and do not constitute comprehen-
sive reform (Varia 2011).
The fundamental institutional architecture governing domestic work migration
in the Gulf region is the kafala sponsorship system. Under its aegis, private sponsors
assume near-total control over the visa and legal status of migrant workers.
Privatization of migration management via local citizen-employers allows states to
secure profits while delegating administrative control (Gardner 2010). Tethering
migrant workers to their local employers constrains their agency and heightens the
already insecure legal status and diminished citizenship of migrant domestic work-
ers. Migrant domestic workers are explicitly constructed as transient workers. Their
residence is linked to temporary, non-transferable work permits that, upon expiry,
render them irregular and deportable. The distribution of power vests authority
in local employers and fosters rampant criminalization of domestic worker-related
labour disputes. Domestic workers in our study often struggled to find adequate
legal representation, accepted unfair financial settlements, suffered harsh penalties,
and waited for months in overcrowded shelters with little information about the
progress of their cases. Among the respondent pool, 29 had left abusive situations,
usually their employer’s home, and were seeking refuge or repatriation at shelters.
A legal safeguard for Gulf sponsors allows them to report migrant workers that have
absconded from work and avail a supplementary permit to bring in another worker
in lieu of the ‘runaway’. Fieldwork revealed widespread misuse of this loophole,
rendering thousands of workers wrongfully labelled huroob (absconder), and cur-
rently living in legal limbo – facing detention, expulsion, and flogging. Explicit
legal counterbalances are required to ensure security and protection of migrants that
come out of and bring complaints about hostile work environments.
A number of proposed policy measures and reforms to the kafala system have
recently emerged across Gulf countries. Yet as Zahra Babar (2013) notes, ‘conclu-
sive structural change has remained absent region-wide. Reforms have been
attempted but none to date have led to a complete dismantling of the sponsorship
system’. In a landmark announcement in 2016, Bahrain proposed a ‘flexible work
permit’ allowing migrant workers to act as their own sponsors. This proposal fol-
lowed the 2009 Mobility Law that granted migrants the right to change employment
without employer consent. Paradoxically, a follow-up legislation in 2011 required
migrants to remain with employers for a minimum of 1 year before switching jobs
and reinforced bonded labour aspects of the kafala (ADHRB 2016). While these
changes have important implications for labour regimes and conditions in the
region, they do not spell the end of the sponsorship system. Both pieces of legisla-
tion were only extended to certain groups of workers. This has further amplified
class-based differential inclusion, leaving domestic workers and other vulnerable
migrant groups outside the ambit of real reform.
The content and configuration of local labour laws define the legal, social, eco-
nomic, and civil liberties of migrant and non-migrant workers. Migrant domestic
workers are excluded from virtually all Gulf labour laws and protections. Without
legislated standards and protections, particular groups of workers may face perva-
sive precariousness. The paucity of representative information on domestic workers
has proved a challenge in designing policies, programmes, and monitoring systems
to ensure legislative and social entitlements for migrant domestic workers.
Insufficient legislative coverage is also tied to the private nature of the household-
workplace that does not customarily lend themselves to labour inspections and
monitoring. Bahrain currently stands alone in the region for having extended the
scope of its labour laws to cover domestic workers in some measure (ITUC 2014).
This move has set the agenda for change and has seen gradual reverberation across
Gulf policy circles. Qatar has acted on its commitment to revamp domestic labour
conditions and replace the sponsorship system. In 2017, the Qatari government
entered into a 3-year technical cooperation agreement with the ILO to shepherd
these changes and set minimum stipulated entitlements (HRW 2018).
In another vein, attempts have been made to enact special legislation to protect
migrant domestic workers and incorporate standard contracts. Saudi Arabia passed
specific legislation pertaining to domestic workers that guarantee improved work
conditions and set basic terms of employment. The regulation warrants monthly
payment of wages, paid vacation at the end of 2 years, and 9 hours of rest (Varia
2014). Even so, this does not offer the same protections available to workers in other
sectors. Saudi also launched the Musaned e-platform for recruitment of domestic
workers as part of a concerted effort to develop and regulate the sector. This may be
a step towards restricting the operation of illicit intermediaries. It currently appears
to simply facilitate faster processing of e-visas through automated documentation
approval, with little mention of improved oversight and rights protections (Hassan
2019). Kuwait implemented a compulsory standard contract detailing conditions of

work, a day of rest and annual leave and set up a separate nodal department for
domestic worker affairs. Since 2014, UAE has also made overtures in these direc-
tions and is reviewing a Domestic Worker Law (ITUC 2014; Malit and Ghafoor
2014). Reports on Qatar’s Domestic Workers Law that was ratified in 2017 have
called for the implementation of further safeguards and better reference wages/
hours (HRW 2018). These efforts remain difficult to enforce, as evidenced in their
limited impacts and lax and uneven implementation. Crucially, specific legislation
does little to fundamentally overhaul existing structures that disempower migrants.
Rights and issues of migrant domestic workers should be included within broader
legislative frameworks. Comprehensive reform in this regard would attend to the
weaknesses of the overarching kafala system that shapes and structures migrant-
employer relations.
The turn to bilateral agreements and regional arrangements endorsing fair
and ethical employment and recruitment of domestic workers between Asian and
Gulf countries has recently been gaining ground. These negotiated agreements
serve to set mutually agreed on intentions and guidelines for the protection and
promotion of labour mobility. However, these lack enforcement methods and cannot
replace labour law protections or override legally stipulated standards. There is also
the inherent danger of prioritizing particular state interests and neoliberal impera-
tives of profit maximization over the needs of migrant groups. Memoranda of
understanding that facilitate intra-regional mobility often differ in the degrees to
which they offer or curtail freedom of movement, settlement, or residence (Kofman
and Raghuram 2012). Variability in tone and tenor of agreements may also confer
special treatment to certain segments of workers. The Philippines and Indonesia
have remained in dialogue with a number of Gulf countries to facilitate the migra-
tion of their domestic workers. Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf country to have signed
bilateral agreements on migrant domestic worker mobility with countries of South
Asia (India and Sri Lanka). They have also indicated that they will enter into agree-
ments with other Asian countries (Malit and Ghafoor 2014). In January 2014, India
and Saudi Arabia entered into an agreement on the protection of the rights of domes-
tic Indian workers in the Kingdom (Khan 2014). The new arrangement was set to
guarantee that Indian women working in Saudi homes will be able to keep their
passports, communicate with their families, get regular monthly pay, and have time
off (Varia 2014). This has yet to significantly alter entrenched exploitationary condi-
tions in this context.
Evidently, Gulf states have so far developed divergent, and often incoherent,
policies concerning domestic workers. This slippage has significant implications for
the future of the sector. Apart from individual country plans to mitigate the exploita-
tion of domestic workers, a regional, unified Gulf law on domestic worker conditions
is under review (Babar 2013). This has remained in draft stages for a number of
years and previous iterations have been critiqued as failing to adequately incorpo-
rate the interest of migrant workers (ITUC 2014). Efforts to induct migrant domes-
tic workers into formal labour markets and stimulate growth in this sector are being
drafted against a backdrop of heightened regulation and securitization of the broader
migrant labour populace (Shah 2005). Ongoing policy shifts attempting to improve
working and socio-legal conditions of domestic workers have been insufficiently
articulated, inconsistently implemented, and largely lack coherent frameworks for
enactment, evaluation, and regional coordination (Malit and Ghafoor 2014).
Formulation of specific laws and practices around domestic work has rendered these
workers exceptional while maintaining the exclusion from existing labour laws.
Studies on migrant labour frequently lay the responsibility of protecting migrant
domestic workers on host nations of the Gulf. What is relatively less considered is
that caustic conditions and insufficient protections in the Gulf, closely mirror infor-
mal sector milieu in South Asia. The ILO World Employment Social Outlook 2017
suggests that among the major challenges in South Asia is low female labour force
participation. Only 28% of women actively participate in the labour market and over
80% of them are in vulnerable forms of employment (ILO 2018). Triggering media
accounts of ‘rescues and repatriations’ from the Gulf do the double-duty of alerting
prospective migrants to potential risks, while also glossing over local conditions.
This narrative feeds into the rhetoric of the Gulf destinations as particularly inhos-
pitable to migrant workers. Another aspect to consider is how emigration policies
from communities of origin inflect the migration experience. A number of Asian
sending countries have been imposing and retracting regulatory restraints on the
mobility of migrant domestic workers. This has taken the form of intermittent bans,
recruitment regulation, mandatory minimum age requirements, and in the case of
Sri Lanka ‘The Family Background Report’. Restrictions based on destination, age,
gender, skill, or parental status serve to extend the legal basis of gendered discrimi-
nation in this regard (Kodoth and Varghese 2012; Sijapati 2015). Women’s rights to
freely seek employment, migrate, and remain free from discrimination are enshrined
under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
Across the board, Gulf and South Asian countries have withheld ratification of
ILO Convention C189 concerning decent pay and working conditions for domestic
workers. Existing labour laws and migration protections have been found out-of-
step with international human rights standards. Ratifying international instruments
is a vital step in ensuring compliance with global norms and standards of worker
dignity and safety. This presents an important opportunity for coalitional efforts to
engender reform and craft enabling environments for migrant domestic work.
Migration of domestic workers has been seen to persist in the face of even the most
restrictive regulations. Twenty-two domestic workers in our study were found to
have circumvented state controls on entry, exit, and employment at some point in
their sojourn. In some cases, this was through procurement and use of falsified doc-
uments, others overstayed on visas or were smuggled across borders by illicit agents
or employers. This demonstrates the capacity of transnational migrants to challenge
indiscriminate migration controls through strategies that transgress borders and
bureaucracy. It also underscores the need to see a sustained shift towards transna-
tional governance of migration, and to examine the potential roles of supra-state
organizations and regional alliances in setting the terms and guidelines around
regional mobility.
Engendering Reform and an Enabling Environment
Domestic work is at once the largest sector of employment for Asian migrant women
across the Gulf, and the least protected. Demand for migrant domestic workers is
likely to endure since their employment is structurally and socially embedded into
Gulf care economies. Migration of Asian migrant domestic workers has proven
resilient to economic shocks and downturns and regional instability that impacted
the residence, employment, and legal standing of migrants in other sectors (Thimothy
and Sasikumar 2012; Rajan and Narayana 2010).
Over the past decade, Gulf governments doubled down on nationalization poli-
cies to temper unemployment rates and stave off domestic dissatisfaction. This
renewed labour localization drive has responded to public agitations and high unem-
ployment recorded across the Gulf, especially in Oman and Bahrain. Demographically
distinct from the rest of the region, more than half of the Saudi population is under
the age of 30 (GLMM 2018). Job creation, education and skill acquisition, and res-
ervations for locals have been identified as critical areas of intervention. Policy push
in this direction has had little impact on the quantum and flows of migrant domestic
workers. The quota system has not been extended to domestic work and other sec-
tors that were not expected to have domestic demand for participation. The migra-
tion of domestic workers was not considered a sensitive issue by most Gulf countries
as there is no real competition between locals and migrants. In addition, as local
women were able to participate more fully in the labour force, the need to augment
the import of migrant care labour became apparent.
Despite economic slumps and workforce nationalization policies in the region,
the demand for and presence of migrant domestic workers have been resilient (Shah
et al 2012; Malit et al. 2018). With labour mobility agreements, ageing populations,
lower fertility rates, local workforce non-participation in ‘undesirable’ service sec-
tors, insufficiency of state services for children, elderly and the disabled in the
region, and the increasing percentage of local women entering the labour market,
migrant domestic work is projected to remain a mainstay of Gulf labour markets.
Recent statutory provisions notwithstanding, the need for structural reform in
this sector is palpable. Indonesia, Philippines and other Asian sending governments
have made attempts to flex diplomatic power and negotiate more favourable condi-
tions for their domestic workers or ban their deployment. However, growing com-
petition among countries of origin has driven down labour standards. In lieu of
substantive change, Gulf governments have responded by diversifying their
recruitment patterns. This has resulted in retaliationary recruitment bans or shifting
demand away from Asian countries towards African source countries such as
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda that demand lower wages for their workers
(Fernandez 2010).
Both Gulf and South Asian states stand to gain from implementing comprehen-
sive reforms. However, the political will remains to be realized. Improving the con-
ditions of migration and care work would certainly drive up wages and associated
costs. A critical area of intervention is the need for regulation of employment condi-
tions and circumstances under which informal, home-based work is carried
out (Neetha 2009). Regular diplomatic visits, consular checks on employers, and
monitoring of contractual agreements are a gateway to ensuring workers’ protec-
tion. Reworking emigration protocols of sending states and revoking the sponsor-
ship system of receiving states represents an important arena for change. Accessible
and secure complaint mechanisms, monitoring of transnational labour recruitment
systems, and sustained international cooperation with sending countries can greatly
enhance the migration experience of the migrant domestic workers within the region
(Rajan and Joseph 2015). States must find a careful balance between overhauling
the migration and recruitment process and preserving the practical elements of the
current processes for migration. Enacting more broad-based civil society engage-
ment policies in this context might contribute to a political agenda that addresses the
marginalization of domestic work within migration and labour regimes.
Striking the right balance between the promotion of socio-economic develop-
ment interests and protection of rights and requirements of citizens and migrants
remains among the most difficult priorities of governments in the region. Institutional
capacities need to be strengthened to implement policies enhancing women’s access
to employment and decent work. Increasing emphasis on knowledge mobilization
and skill development could raise employability and facilitate decent work for
migrant domestic workers. A telling observation from our study was that over 30
respondents had no formal skill training, 29 had no previous work experience, only
5 respondents had acquired a working knowledge of Arabic, and just 3 had attended
pre-departure sessions. Greater cooperation among sending and receiving govern-
ments, and with civil society groups and activists advocating for domestic workers’
rights will allow those closest to the workers to drive policy change. Design and
delivery of training material must incorporate local actors and return migrants to
reach a broad swath of prospective emigrants.
Perhaps most significantly, ‘[f]eminized, and therefore gendered, migration
experience calls for gender-specific responses to widespread abusive practices and
the largely unprotected status of female migrants’ (Piper and Yamanaka 2005). A
closer analysis of prevailing gender norms, migration patterns, and the role of
migrant domestic work in propping up capitalist social relations is required to
address extant discrimination. Gender-discriminatory approaches to entry, exit and
employment accentuate the vulnerabilities of migrant women domestic workers and
channel them into irregularity. In considering the political economy of care work
migration, it is important to acknowledge the complex entanglements of gender,
race, class, and domestic work. Relational and contextual analysis of these
gendered–racialized migration processes will allow stakeholders to better represent
and respond to the multifaceted needs of migrant domestic workers in these contexts.
Acknowledgements This chapter builds on earlier published work by the authors. See Rajan and
Joseph (2015). Migrant women at the discourse–policy nexus: Indian domestic workers in Saudi
Arabia. In S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.) India Migration Report 2015. Routledge, India.
References
Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (2016). Bahrain Moves to Reform
Kafala, Exclusions Remain.
Babar, Z. (2013). Migration policy and governance in the GCC: A regional perspective. Labor
mobility: An enabler for sustainable development, 121–142. Emirates Center for Strategic
Studies and Research (ECSSR) Conference.
Bajracharya, R., & Sijapati, B. (2012). The Kafala system and its implications for Nepali domestic
workers (Policy brief (1)). Kathmandu: Center for the Study of Labour Mobility.
Begum, R. (2014). “I already bought you”: Abuse and exploitation of female migrant domestic
workers in the united Arab emirates. Human Rights Watch.
Bergem, K. (2006). The role of the state in the in-migration of domestic workers to Jordan and
the GCC countries. In Françoise de Bel-Air (Ed.), Migration and politics in the Middle East.
Beirut: Ifpo Press.
CDSI Manpower Survey, Round one. (2013). Gulf labour markets and migration database.
Fernandez, B. (2010). Cheap and disposable? The impact of the global economic crisis on the
migration of Ethiopian women domestic workers to the Gulf. Gender and Development, 18(2),
249–262.
Gamburd, M. R. (2000). The kitchen spoon’s handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s migrant
housemaids. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gardner, A. (2010). In N. de Genova & N. Peutz (Eds.),. The deportation regime: Sovereignty,
space, and the freedom of movement Engulfed: Indian guest workers, Bahraini citizens and the
structural violence of the Kafala system. Durham: Duke University Press.
Ghosh, J. (2013). The plight of domestic workers in India. Frontline, 30, 2.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. (2018). Saudi Arabia: Population by nationality, sex and age
group. Online demographic database.
Hassan, R. (2019, March 7). Saudi Arabia’s Musaned platform makes e-visa easy for domestic
workers. Arab News.
Human Rights Watch. (2008a). As if I am not human: Abuses against Asian domestic workers in
Saudi Arabia. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2008b). Perpetual minors; human rights abuses stemming from male
guardianship and sex segregation in Saudi Arabia. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2010). Saudi Arabia: Domestic worker brutalized. New York: Human
Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2018). Qatar: Fix gaps in domestic worker law. Beirut: Human Rights
Watch.
International Labour Organization. (2010). Moving towards decent work for domestic workers: An
overview of the ILO’s work. Bureau for Gender Equity.
International Labour Organization. (2011). Domestic work policy brief no. 4. Global and regional
estimates on domestic workers. Conditions of Work and Employment Programme — Advancing
decent work for domestic workers.
International Labour Organization. (2018). World employment social outlook 2018: Trends for
women. Geneva: ILO.
International Labour Organization. (2015). ILO global estimates on migrant workers: Results and
methodology, special focus on migrant domestic workers. Geneva: ILO.
International Trade Union Confederation. (2014). Facilitating exploitation: A review of labour

Laws for migrant domestic Workers in Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Legal and Policy
Brief.
Kapiszewski, A. (2017). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In P. C. Jain
& G. Z. Oommen (Eds.), South Asian migration to gulf countries (pp. 66–90). New Delhi:
Routledge.
Khan, G. A. (2014, January 3). KSA- India pact protects domestics, Arab News.
Kodoth, P., & Varghese, V. J. (2011). Emigration of women domestic workers from Kerala: Gender,
state policy and the politics of movement (Working Paper No. 445). Thiruvananthapuram:
Centre for Development Studies.
Kodoth, P., & Varghese, V. J. (2012). Protecting women or endangering the migration process:
Emigrant domestic workers, gender and state policy. Economic and Political Weekly, xlvii(43),
53–65.
Kofman, E., & Raghuram, P. (2012). Women, migration, and care: Explorations of diversity and
dynamism in the global south. Social Politics, 19(3), 408–432.
Kofman, E., & Raghuram, P. (2015). Gendered migrations and global social reproduction.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Malit, F. T., Jr., & Ghafoor, S. (2014). Domestic work legislation in the Gulf cooperation council
(GCC): A comparative policy review. Policy Report, 01. International Association International
Gulf Organization.
Malit, F. T., Jr., Awad, M. A., & Alexander, K. (2018). The “Khadama dependency syndrome”:
Determinants and prospects for the future of domestic work demand in the United Arab
Emirates. Arabian Humanities, (10).
Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2011). Extension of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana to the
domestic workers. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.
Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2013). Policy on domestic workers. Press Information
Bureau, Government of India.
Moors, A., Jureidini, R., Özbay, F., & Sabban, R. (2009). Migrant domestic workers: A new public
presence in the Middle East? In S. Shami (Ed.), Publics, politics, and participation: Locating
the public sphere in the Middle East and North Africa. New York: Social Science Research
Council.
Neetha, N. (2009). Contours of domestic service: Characteristics, work relations and regulations.
Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 52, 3.
Piper, N., & Yamanaka, K. (2005). Feminized migration in East and Southeast Asia: Policies,
actions and empowerment (No. 11) (UNRISD Occasional Paper).
Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2013). Adapting, adjusting and accommodating: Social costs of migration
to Saudi Arabia. In S. Irudaya Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2013. New Delhi: Routledge.
workers in Saudi Arabia. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2015. India: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Narayana, D. (2010). The financial crisis in the Gulf and its impact on South
Asian migrant workers (Report submitted to the Asian Development Bank and the MOIA).
Government of India.
ability: Overseas recruitment practices in India. New Delhi: Routledge.
Sabban, R. (2002). Migrant women in the United Arab Emirates: The case of female domestic
workers. Geneva: ILO-GENPROM.
Shah, N. (2005). Restrictive labour immigration policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf: Effectiveness and
implications for sending Asian Countries. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Social and
Economic Implications of Changing Population Age Structure.
Shah, N., Badr, H., & Shah, M. (2012). Foreign live-in domestic workers as caretakers of older
Kuwaiti men and women: Socio-demographic and health correlates. Ageing & Society, 32(6),
1008–1029.
Sijapati, B. (2015). Women’s labour migration from Asia and the Pacific: Opportunities and chal-
lenges. Issue in Brief (MPI – IOM Joint Series).
Silvey, R. (2006). Consuming the transnational family; Indonesian migrant domestic workers in
Saudi Arabia. Global Networks, 6(1), 23–40.
Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. (2016). Different perspectives of departure details.
Colombo: SLBFE.
Tayah, M. J., & Assaf, H. (2018). The future of domestic work in the countries of the Gulf coopera-
tion council. Abu Dhabi Dialogue Secretariat.
Thimothy, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2012). Migration of Women Workers from South Asia to the
Gulf, V.V. New Delhi: Giri National Labour Institute, UN Women.
Varia, N. (2007). Sanctioned abuses: The case of migrant domestic workers. Human Rights Brief,
14(3), 5.
Varia, N. (2011). “Sweeping changes?” a review of recent reforms on protections for migrant
domestic workers in Asia and the Middle East. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law,
23(1), 265–287.
Varia, N. (2014, February 19). Dispatches: New protection for Saudi Arabia’s domestic workers,
Human Rights Watch.
Vlieger, A. (2012). Domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and the emirates: A socio-legal study on
conflicts. New Orleans: Quid Pro Books.
Zachariah, K. C., Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2014). Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects
under the Nitaqat law. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and develop-
ment. New Delhi: Routledge.
Chapter 14
Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion:
Interplay of Faith and Prosperity Amongst
Syrian Christians in Kerala
Introduction
The religious topography of Kerala, southern state of India, is quite unique. Muslims
and Christians together constitute nearly 40% of the total population, which is a
rather different demographic pattern from the rest of India. Along with the social
changes, by the beginning of twentieth century, the newly introduced colonial econ-
omy prompted Keralites to migrate to plantations in Sri Lanka, Singapore, and
Malaysia (Malaya) as clerks and coolies.
The discovery of oil in Gulf countries and the subsequent oil boom in 1970s
generated a huge wave of migration from Kerala. Currently, the state of Kerala
sends the largest volume of immigrants to the Gulf countries. The ‘Gulf migration’
provided a new lease of life for the otherwise poor employment situation in the
state, and at present, nearly 2.28 million Keralites are working in different Gulf
countries (Rajan and Zachariah 2012). As a result of migration, Kerala has wit-
nessed a series of diverse economic and social changes including amongst others, a
money order-depended economy.
The circular nature of the Gulf migrants has significantly influenced the class
structure, social hierarchy, worship patterns, family structure, and, above all, reli-
gion and religiosity in Kerala. Though several previous studies have examined the
economic consequences of migration and remittances in Kerala, no attempt has
been made so far to explore how migratory movements and remittances affected
religion and religious practices in Kerala, thus leading to a subsequent social trans-
formation. Consistent with many postcolonial, trans-feudal societies, religion in
Kerala provided a clear avenue for the newly rich migrants from Gulf to establish
their legitimacy and position in the social order as well as a medium of re-entry for
the erstwhile upper classes. This on the one hand, contributed to larger investments
G. Z. Oommen (*)

248 G. Z. Oommen
in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across Kerala, largely

funded by migrants and Gulf-based associations; and on the other, to the prevalence
of new and ostentatious religious practices, doctrines and rituals.
The broad question that this study attempts to investigate is as follows: Whether
the reorientation of Syrian Christian immigrants’ lives in the host country (Gulf
countries) and the newly created wealth there has brought about any major change
in the lives and practices of Christians back home (in Kerala)? The broad question
that this study investigates is whether migration-centred religious reorientation of
Kerala Christians is abetting commodification of religion, assertion of communal
identity, proliferation of radical religious groups, rise of ‘Prosperity Gospel’/Tele-
Evangelists, and the emergence of new forms of worship in the Christian community.
This is an empirical study based on the field research in Kuwait and Kerala. The
field research was conducted at Abassiya, the Indian settlement in Kuwait from
December 2009 through January 2010 and at the Pathanamthitta district of Kerala
during June–August 2013. Pathanamthitta district is one of the prosperous ‘Gulf
pockets’ in Kerala with a sizeable Syrian Christian population and also the first
wave of migration to Malaya and Singapore was from the outskirts of Pathanamthitta
in 1900. The main methods of documentation were through detailed interviews of
immigrants and observances at various cultural performances and festivities.
During the fieldwork, in-depth interviews of nearly 70 immigrants in Kuwait,
along with professionals, Indian journalists, community leaders, priests, and acade-
micians of the Kuwait University, were conducted with help of a detailed interview
schedule. Moreover, nearly 100 respondents were interviewed at Pathanamthitta
alongside academicians, theologians, bishops, clergies, journalists, local politicians,
community leaders, and so on. A convenient sampling was followed in the study
whereby the informants were selected through the links established within the com-
munity. The key persons of each parish helped to identify the possible respondents.
In Kuwait, interviews were conducted in both Malayalam and English. – lan-
guages the respondents/subjects and author were comfortable with. It is significant
to note that in Kuwait, much of the background information of the workers, profes-
sionals, and analysts came mostly from the older generation of immigrants who
experienced both the invasion and liberation phase of Kuwait.
In Pathanamthitta, the author interviewed nearly 100 people, particularly the
return migrants who are very active in Parish affairs and had in-depth discussions
with bishops, clergies, theologians, and pastors of the charismatic/new-generation
churches. The author’s participation in the services of different parishes, especially
the newly build churches helped in understanding the internal intricacies. His asso-
ciation with the vicars of various Christian denominations, Kerala Associations, and
clubs further helped in conducting the research more thoroughly. Moreover, the
author had the opportunity to attend various social gatherings like marriages, bap-
tism, Christmas carols, feasts, processions, funerals, and other church celebrations,
that provided an opportunity to interact and get responses from people outside of the
subject list. This undoubtedly helped to understand the internal dynamics of the
community.
14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 249
This study deals with the three Syrian Christian denominations – Syrian
Orthodox, Syrian Marthomite, and Syrian Jacobite as they were the pioneers of
migration. Though the Syrian Catholics could be included in this study, but their
social and historical formation is quite different from the rest of the non-Catholic
Syrian denominations. The Latin Catholics and the Protestants were also largely
untouched in the study. In brief, this study focuses mainly on the Eastern Syrian
non-Catholic denominations in Kerala.
For the purposes of this chapter, the names of the respondents have been changed
to hide the real identity.
Migration and Changing Dynamics of Kerala Society
Subsequent to the oil-price boom in the Gulf countries in 1973–1974, the large-
scale infrastructural and economic development projects were planned and initiated
which included creation of amenities like schools, hospitals, houses, improvement
of transport and communication, etc. These programmes created a spurt in demand
for not only highly skilled technical experts but also for semi-skilled and unskilled
workers. Therefore, the major outflow of Indian migrant workers and other person-
nel during the past four decades or so to the Gulf countries was about six million
(Ramachandran, 2013). The maximum number of Indian workers is in Saudi Arabia.
Other major employers of Indian workers are the United Arab Emirates, Oman,
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The Gulf migrants are the transitory migrants as strin-
gent residency and citizenship laws as well as the contractual nature of their work
forbid them from settling permanently in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries.
Due to the large-scale migration and remittances flow, a commoditized economy
and conspicuous consumption practices have developed as integral features of
Kerala’s society. Remittances are spent on daily household consumption, consumer
durables, construction, repair of building, acquisition of lands, education and reli-
gious ceremonies (Zachariah and Rajan 2012).
Migration and remittances are twin pillars which supported the sustenance of the
much acclaimed ‘Kerala Model’. The Centre For Development Studies (CDS) sur-
vey shows that out of the total emigrants, in 2007, nearly 89% emigrated to GCC
countries and around 5.7% moved to USA and Europe (Zachariah et al. 2006). The
CDS survey further explores that around 18% of Kerala households send minimum
one emigrant abroad and 26.5% had either an emigrant or return emigrant. In 2008,
INR 16,493 crores was received by Hindu households, INR 7800 crores was
received by Christian households, and INR 19,000 crores was received by Muslim
households (Zachariah 2006). The district-wise data suggests that the Muslim-
dominated Malappuram district sends the largest contingent of migrants, particu-
larly to GCC region and also receives the highest amount of remittances.
250 G. Z. Oommen
There is a general argument that Kerala society has shifted its orientation to con-
sumerism as a result of Gulf migration. Importantly, Kerala’s social and cultural
landscape is highly influenced by migratory process and remittances.
CDS data narrate that a substantial amount of remittances have been channelized
by the families of emigrants to buy lands and also to build luxury/dream houses in
Kerala. Since the 1980s, the remittances and migration have had a huge influence in
the socio-cultural and political dynamics of Kerala. A consumerist culture with dif-
ferent shades of ‘new richness’ has a profound influence in the Kerala society par-
ticularly in the Gulf migrant-dominated areas or ‘Gulf pockets’.
Since Gulf migration is both transitory and circulatory in nature, its impact is
strongly reflected in all spheres of the society including the religious space. The
most transparent impact of migration is in the realm of religion and a new religious
market is emerging in Kerala through social remittances. Though a large amount of
research had been conducted on the economic consequences on Kerala’s society, the
socio-cultural changes associated with the migration process, particularly its impact
on the religious spaces, has been largely untouched.
Conceptual Framework
Contemporary migration is marked by an acceleration of the pace of interaction

between the host and home setting through multiple networks. Margolis argues that
‘immigrants establish and maintain familial, economic, political and cultural ties
across international borders, in effect making the home and host society a single
arena of social action’ (Ruiz Baia 1999). The current phase of international migra-
tion has set in motion a plethora of such transnational movements. They are trans-
national in the sense that they refer to movements which come into being within the
social intricacies and specificities of certain communities, yet, are increasingly
identified and appropriated outside (Roger and Fitzgerald 2000). Technological
advancements have further strengthened the migrants’ links with the home coun-
tries on a day-to-day basis. The migrants make efforts to sustain their relations with
the sending country through transnational religious practices as well (Levitt 2004).
Religious communities simulate transnational movements which challenge the
way in which we imagine religion and politics traditionally. The migrants often
retain their religious beliefs and traditions through various kinds of social and eco-
nomic links with the home country (Levitt 2003). Although social scientists have
written extensively on the role of religion in the diaspora, very little research has
been done on the impact of transnational religious groups in the sending countries.
Transnational Migration and Fading States (1997) by Rudolph and Piscatori con-
cludes that in today’s post-modern age religious communities have become vital
agents in the creation of a transnational civil society (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997).
Immigrants lean towards religious institutions to escape the hostility and discrimi-
nation of their settings and also to achieve social recognition. Hirschman argues that
for immigrants who are separated from their homeland and from many relatives,
religious membership offers a refuge in the sense that it creates a sense of belonging
and participation in the face of loss and the strains of adjustment (Hirschman 2004).
Ebaugh noted that religious mobilization also helps immigrants to cope with mar-
ginalization by providing fellowships, social services, and leadership positions to
compensate for the downward mobility many of them experience (Yang and
Ebaugh 2002).
Vertovec argues that the new rituals and religious practices reinforce the home-
land ties of the immigrants (Vertovec 1997). At the same time, newly moneyed
migrants rely heavily on the religious trajectory for the strategic conversion of their
economic capital into prestige and status (Osella and Osella 2003). In the case of
Syrian Christian immigrants, the transnational religious institutions are operating as
one of the viable networks connecting sending and receiving countries. Moreover,
the socially isolated situation in the GCC region has reshaped their religious and
ritual practices and reinvigorated community/denominational centred identity.
In the host setting, the transnational religious practices enhance the transforma-
tion and reshaping of identity, perception, and ritual practices of immigrants. Non-
acceptance and alienation of the immigrants have strengthened their quest for
spiritual and religious identity. The immigrants in Gulf region are socially isolated
and alienated from the mainstream society. New places of worship have emerged as
‘community centres’ to fulfil the identity vacuum the alienated immigrants experi-
ence in these societies.
The reorientation of immigrants’ lives in the host setting has a direct impact in
the sending society as well. The religious restructuring and the ghettoization of
immigrants have inadvertently affected the socio-cultural realm of the sending soci-
ety (Kerala). The change in religiosity and religious practices were in turn influ-
enced by the migrant experiences based on their religious beliefs in their host
countries. These differential experiences made them reinvent their own religions in
a transnational environment but exclusivist in spirit, in the home state of Kerala.
Katy Gardner (1995) in her research highlights that the Muslim return migrants in
Bangladesh engage into more orthodox, dogmatic forms of Islam, which challenges
saints and shrines of the old order (Gardner 1995). In Kerala, the Gulf returnee fre-
quently spends substantial amount of money in becoming patrons of religious activ-
ities – a culturally approved way of transforming wealth into political power and
social status (Osella and Osella 2003). Ebaugh and Yang (2001) identified a number
of immigrant congregations that kept in daily contact with their sending country
through Internet (Ebaugh and Saltzman Chafetz 2002). Levit argues that the reli-
gious institutions such as protestant groups reinforce localized transnational attach-
ments and also encourage civic and political engagement based on religious beliefs
in the home country (Levitt 2001). The migrants often retain their religious beliefs
and traditions through various kinds of social and economic links with the home
country.
Contemporary studies have mainly examined the economic consequences and
impact of remittances in the sending countries, but left unnoticed the deep influence
of ‘Social Remittances’. Social Remittances are ideas, practices, identities, and
social capital that flow from the host country to the receiving country (Levitt 2004).
252 G. Z. Oommen
The socio-cultural-ideological reorientation in the lives of migrants in the host soci-

ety is directly transmitted through identifiable pathways and their source and desti-
nation are very clear. Interestingly, one of the crucial variables which stimulates the
‘social remittances’ is the transnational religious networks.
Hence, this study argues that the socio-cultural influences from host settings
would be transmitted directly to the sending society through multifarious transna-
tional networks including religion. The transnational religious networks play a sig-
nificant role in the reorientation of the societal space in the sending society. The
change in immigrants’ lives and the restructuring of their beliefs has a direct impact
on the religious realm in the home society as well.
Syrian Christians of Kerala and Migration
The Christians, including the Syrian Christians of Kerala, constitute 18.6% of the
population of Kerala accounting for six million people (Zachariah 2006). Of them,
the Syrian Christians – one of the oldest Christian sects in the world – comprise
nearly three million.1 Syrian Christians of Kerala are defined as persons born to
Syrian Christian parents and who follow the ‘Syrian rite’ (Mathew and Thomas
2005). The Syrian Christians comprise different denominations, such as Syro-
Malabar, Malankara Catholics, Jacobites, Orthodox Syrian Church, Marthomites,
Caldhaites, Caananites, and Protestant Syrians. Earlier, the community was concen-
trated in and around five or six districts of Kerala. But, with the high rate of educa-
tion, occupational diversification, few local job opportunities in the community,
Syrian Christians have migrated to other states in India and abroad.
This study focuses on the three Syrian Christian denominations – Syrian
Orthodox, Syrian Jacobites, and Syrian Marthoma.
The history of Syrian Christian migration dates back to early twentieth century
when there was a massive flow of them to Southeast Asia, mainly to Singapore and
Malaysia. In the beginning of twentieth century, the educated and able amongst the
Syrian Christian and Ezhava community from Central Travancore migrated to Sri
Lanka, Burma, and Southeast Asia as teachers and skilled labours in British-owned
plantations.2
The migration to Southeast Asia was always unstable due to the hostile situation
in East Asia region, a traditional area of emigration since colonial times. Later, in
the 1960s, proximity of Syrian churches in Kerala with Ethiopian Orthodox Church
has opened new avenues of migration to Ethiopia and African countries mostly as
teachers, paramedics, and skilled labours for Syrian Christians. Subsequently, with
the relaxation of immigration laws in the United States of America, paramedics and
1
Ibid.
2
Ezhavas are a prominent Hindu Community with origins in Kerala. Ezhavas make up more than
40% of Kerala Hindus.
professionals from the Syrian denominations also emigrated to North America

and Canada.
Finally, with the consolidation of oil in the Persian Gulf in 1970s Syrian Christian
also joined the fellow Keralites to explore the new fortunes in West Asia. Kuwait
was the first Arab Gulf country that had opened doors to the indigenous Christian
community of Kerala.
In the late 1940s, a small group of members of the Marthoma Syrian Church was
the first to set up worship services in the region. The oil boom of the 1970s has
accelerated further the immigration of Syrian Christians to GCC countries, which
simultaneously led to the establishment of Syrian churches across the Gulf coun-
tries except Saudi Arabia.
The migration has unequivocally altered the socio-economic landscape of the
Syrian Christian community and in 2003 the non-Catholic Syrians received nearly
INR 3000 crores as remittances from abroad (Zachariah 2006). In Kerala, the
Christians rank second in the proportion of population that emigrated abroad and
the Marthoma Syrian community has the distinction of sending the highest number
of international emigrants (Zachariah 2006). In 2003 of the total remittances sent to
Kerala, Roman Catholic households received 9.4%, Marthoma Syrians, 5.6%,
Orthodox/Jacobite Syrians 7.0%, and Church of South India and Protestants
received 2.0%. Interestingly, nearly 31% of the Syrian Marthoma households
received the minimum INR 22,000 as remittances in 2004 (Zachariah 2006).
Moreover Christians’ share in the migration to the United States is much higher
than the other communities. In 2008, Christian households received nearly INR
7800 crores as remittances (Zachariah 2006).
Interestingly, maximum remittances have been received from the GCC countries.
Since the late 1960s, remittances from the Gulf States have been a major source of
income for Syrian churches in Kerala. It is to be noted that all the Syrian churches
have separate Gulf Diocese/Diocesan bishops and serving in a Diaspora diocese is
considered a very prestigious assignment amongst the clergy. The Marthoma Syrian
community ranks high when compared to all other communities in terms of literacy,
education, migration rate, expenditure in health, ownership of land and house,
remittances and so on. The path-breaking prosperity and socio-economic develop-
ment of the Syrian Christians is highly attributed to the unprecedented flow of
remittances from the international Diaspora particularly from Gulf region.
he Assertion of Religion Amongst Kerala Immigrants

T
in the Host Setting
Currently, there are nearly 60 Malayalam churches in the GCC countries that include
both Syrian Christian and Catholic denominations, besides various neo-Pentecostal
and Charismatic groups. Until the 1990s, the Church trying to woo immigrants was
nothing more than a routine and low key affair. However, in the last one decade or
254 G. Z. Oommen
so the role of religion has dramatically increased amongst Indian immigrants, espe-
cially within the Syrian Christian community.
During the author’s field research amongst the Kerala migrants to the Gulf, it was
observed that religion is a salient factor in a migrant’s day-to-day life, as it fills the
emotional vacuum created in the context of extreme social isolation that migrants
experience in foreign countries. The Christian immigrants of Kerala in Kuwait have
noted that in the last one decade or so the spirituality and the role of religion have
increased exorbitantly amongst Kerala migrants.
Till the 1990s, in Kuwait, religious activities in Kerala and amongst the migrants
in the GCC was nothing more than a routine and low key affair. Charismatic reli-
gious groups such as the neo-Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian denominations,
Muslim groups with strong Wahabi traditions such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and
Hindu groups like the RSS and various cults like Mata Amritanandamayi have made
deep inroads in the lives of Kerala immigrants in the GCC states, particularly
Kuwait. These religious groups are transnational in nature and they are actively
linked to both home and destination countries. Moreover, the lack of social interac-
tion with the local people and social alienation felt by the immigrants in GCC coun-
tries has only strengthened their quest for spiritual and religious identity.
The major development amongst migrants particularly Christians in the begin-
ning of 1990s was the rise of neo-Pentecostal and new religious groups. Digging
deeper, one can see that there is a gamut of issues that led to the assertion of the
religious organizations in the life of expatriate workers. Two major Gulf Wars and
the subsequent War on Terror contributed to the emergence of a new politico-
religious context that aggravated the situation further. The region’s political instabil-
ity and economic slump, the hostile social environment and the community’s
continued social alienation from the host society has invigorated the phenomenon.
For instance, in Kuwait, Iraq’s invasion of the country in 1990 and the subsequent
expulsion of immigrants from Kuwait inflicted a sense of insecurity and deep-seated
fear in the minds of the migrants. The proliferation of prayer groups with charis-
matic priests, huge donations to missionary activities, popularization of donation to
religious activities, increasing dependence on godman/sadhus/pastors/clergy, and
emerging trends for pilgrimage to the holy shrines in India and abroad reflects the
exuberant presence of religion in an immigrant’s life.
The re-assertion of belief amongst the immigrants has some personal reasons
also. The stress in the life of a construction worker to earn the requisite money in the
limited contract period or the anxiety over the extension of the period of stay deep-
ens this assertion. Interestingly, the major activities of the transnational religious
groups are mainly in labour camps which were neglected by the mainstream host
society for many years thereby garnering a vast majority of discipleship from the
working class section. Geo-political churnings, socio-political isolation, and the
exclusion of immigrants from the social structure of the host society has further
consolidated the religious space.
The accumulation of wealth remains another major concern for immigrants and
struggle towards this process is met with anxiety, stress, competition and insecurity.
Consequently, in Kuwait, ‘popular religion’ like neo-Pentecostals has attained an
upper hand over the ‘official religion’ since the popular religion emphatically
stresses on the prosperity gospel. The volatile situation is being exploited success-
fully by the former with a large number of immigrants especially the youth moving
towards the new religious movements.
Diaspora religious practices play a major role in sustaining the transnational
links between home and host settings and also it creates an alternative sense of
belonging to the sending country. In the contemporary context, religion provides the
opportunity for immigrants for community formation and produces intense conflict
between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘popular/conservative’ religious groups and also
helps to carve a unique ‘denominational/Born Again identity’. Moreover, the host
settings have paved the way for the emergence of ‘popular religion’ and it creates
unique ‘global identity’ which transcends the national boundaries.
ulf Migratory Networks and the Upsurge of ‘Prosperity

G
Gospel’ in Kerala
Over the time, lives of migrants and non-migrants have become trans-nationalized,
incorporating ideas, practices, beliefs, and traditions from both societies. Religious
beliefs and practices could also act as key components of social remittances. The
broad question that needs to be addressed here is whether the reorientation of immi-
grants’ lives in the host country (Gulf countries) and the newly created wealth
brings dramatic change in the religious sphere of Kerala.
The dynamics in the host setting has a direct bearing on the lifestyle, consumer
patterns, spiritual and worship modes, architecture, and the outlook of the Kerala
society. The transitory and circulatory nature of the Gulf migration has strengthened
the migrants’ connectivity with the home society and thereby made tremendous
changes in the practices and nature of the home society as well as the religious
institutions. One of the arenas which had a profound impact through migratory pro-
cess was undoubtedly the religious space of the Syrian Christians. The change in
religiosity and religious practices were in turn influenced by the migrant experi-
ences based on their religious beliefs in their host countries. These differential expe-
riences made them reinvent their own religions in a transnational environment but
exclusivist in spirit, in the home state of Kerala. The transitional migration has
highly altered the socio-cultural and the spiritual landscape of the Syrian Christians.
As indicated above, the spiritual reorientation in the lives of Syrian Christian immi-
grants and the change in religiosity echoed in the home society, which has a direct
impact on the traditional nature of the Church.
Presently, ‘Popular Religions’ such as neo-Pentecostal churches made deep
unprecedented inroads amongst the Syrian Christians. These evangelic groups have
well-knitted networks in Kerala with large congregations to cater to the need of
returning migrants. Proliferation of Evangelical prayer groups with charismatic pas-
tors, huge donations to missionary activities, popularization of ‘tithe’, proliferation
256 G. Z. Oommen
of diocese in both India and abroad, increase of seminaries and Bible colleges,
reflects the brazen and lively presence of religion on communal life.3 In this context,
traditional churches such as Syrian Christians find it difficult to compete with the
charisma of these ‘new’ religious variants and thus they struggle fervently to stop
the exodus of its members to the neo-Pentecostal churches.
The Syrian denominations in Kerala have been following Orthodox traditions
and Eastern Syriac liturgy due to their long-standing communion with the Middle
Eastern Patriarchates. Most of the Syrian churches are highly organized, with a
muscular hierarchy, ritualistic in nature, and have oriental-ecclesiastical traditions.
Even interventions of European missionaries during the colonial period have not
changed the oriental eastern traditions and other ritualistic behaviours. But the neo-
Pentecostal new-generation churches have been quite successful in creating a dent
into the Syrian community through the active support of the migrants. The
Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches are very popular in the Diaspora setting
with large followers from the Syrian denominations. Moreover, there are numerous
transnational-Charismatic churches operating in GCC countries with a loosely knit-
ted hierarchy.
The neo-Pentecostal is also predominantly an American-based movement and its
theology is centred on the ‘Prosperity Gospel’, and the churches are predominantly
a Global Religion. It is a unique theology connecting both faith and wealth within
the frame work of the Bible and the globalized market. The ‘prosperity gospel’, is a
consumerist theology, whose popularity amongst American Christians has boomed
in recent years and it teaches ‘God blessing is the material wealth’. The aim of pros-
perity gospel is to achieve material prosperity, which is seen as evidence of the love
of God. Neo-Pentecostalism is in a way a neo-liberal commercial theology which
provides a new kind of religious space, a blend of neo-liberal materialistic values
and spirituality and promotes accumulation of wealth and material consumption. In
other words, it upholds a new version of ‘commercial Christianity’ and sanctifies
the ‘material prosperity’. The spiritual reorientation of emigrants in Gulf and their
quest for new spirituality makes significant impact amongst the Syrian Christians in
sending society as well. During my field research in Kerala, I had visited a popular
neo-Pentecostal Church in the Pathanamthitta town on a Sunday morning. The large
congregation comprised largely of middle-class and most of the participants
belonged to the various Syrian denominations. During my interaction, I had under-
stood that most members of the congregation were either migrant families or return
migrants.
Currently, the neo-Pentecostal groups are very popular amongst the Syrian
Christian community in Kerala. The codified liturgy, colourful sacraments, altar,
cassocks, and candles of Syrian churches are replaced with electric organs, theatri-
cal prayer sessions, thundering orations, amplified guitar, trumpet, thrashing drums,
3
Tithe is an Old Testament concept. Portion of one’s annual income or one-tenth of the income to
be contributed voluntarily to the Church.
and loud music. Spirited prayers, miracles, speaking in tongues, thundering oratory,
and devil-beating preachers have become the order of worship.
Looking closer, varied issues have been responsible for the sudden popularity of
these Charismatic groups. The cradle of the neo-Pentecostalism is amongst the
migrant workers in Gulf region as most of these churches are transnational in nature.
For example, the major activities of ‘Heavenly Feast Church’ are in the GCC coun-
tries and they have more than 25 congregations in the West Asian region.
The Diaspora connections, uninterrupted financial flow and the deep influence of
social remittances have significantly reoriented the outlook and functioning of the
religious institutions in Kerala. Katy Gardner’s work on the migrant communities in
Bangladesh indicates that return migrants engage with the purist and orthodox ver-
sion of Islam and rejects local practices particularly Sufi worship modes. Similarly,
Levitt also explores the spiritual influence of Dominican Diaspora from USA
in local Dominican churches and argues that migrants make tremendous changes in
the homeland religious setting through ‘social remittances’ (Levitt 2003).
Interestingly, Kurien (2014) writes that ‘religious institutions undergo tremen-
dous transformations not merely as a result of remittances but also as a consequence
of the very process of developing overseas branches of their diasporas’. The ideas
and practices that had been generated through the reorientation of migrants’ lives in
the host setting have been transmitted via social remittances, which inadvertently
reshaped the traditional structure of the Kerala’s Syrian Christian denominations.
One of the respondents pointed that ‘I was a staunch Jacobite before migrating to
Sharjah. But the hardships in the alien desert have moved me closer to God. The
Grace Fellowship pastors visited me regularly when I was in need and I got baptized
in UAE. After returning to Kerala, I have planted the ‘Grace Fellowship Church’
(transnational neo-Pentecostal Church) along with my friends from UAE. For the
last 7 years, I regularly organized a 2-day spiritual convention in the local
community’.
In Pathanamthitta, I have encountered return migrants with similar stories, and
they have been the torchbearers of the neo-Pentecostal Churches in Kerala. I have
personally observed that church has become the ‘epicenter’ for many respondents
and the frequency of their participation in religious activities has increased
tremendously.
In Kuwait, Pastor Josey Joseph, said.
In the beginning we had many challenges and the response in India was very cold. But we
got an unexpected response from the Gulf migrants particularly in Kuwait. At present we
have nearly 60 parishes across GCC region and the TV channel has been operational at the
initiative of Gulf migrants. Now we got strengthened in Kerala with the help of migrants
and their relatives.
There are numerous neo-Pentecostal churches in the Gulf pockets in Kerala and
most of them have been flourishing with the support of remittances. For instance,
Bishop Barnabas of Syrian Marthoma Church commented that ‘neo-Pentecostals
are a by-product of migration and conspicuous consumerism in Kerala. Neo-
Pentecostal churches have been a new phenomenon and is has been flourishing at
258 G. Z. Oommen
the cost of the uncertain lives of Gulf migrants’. He further noted that many mem-
bers of the neo-Pentecostal groups do not severe their ties with the traditional Syrian
church. Interestingly, many members keep dual membership in both Syrian as well
as neo-Pentecostal Church and would prefer all the sacraments (marriage, baptism,
funeral) to be conducted at a traditional church. The vast flow of remittances,
modernity and consumerism had also brought immense uncertainties and instability
in the lives of the families and the new-generation churches have been using this
volatile context. Miracles, financial prosperity, and individual economic growth are
some of the core teachings that have been suited well for anxious and uncer-
tain public.
Significantly, most of the new churches are quite transnational in nature with
deep roots amongst the younger generation. The neo-Pentecostal new-generation
churches are quite dogmatic and maintain high rigidity in their teaching. For
instance, they explicitly forbid participation in the festivals and ceremonies of other
religions including other Christian denominations. These churches never support
ecumenism and maintain purist rules for the believers. Most of these churches are
quite exclusivist and promote a unique ‘born again transnational identity’.
In the mid-1980s, some of the neo-Pentecostal pastors along with American
preachers have made some efforts to penetrate into the Syrian Church, but they
could not succeed due to the stiff resistance from the traditional Church. The Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent uncertainties in GCC had been a turning
point in the unprecedented growth of the neo-Pentecostal Churches amongst the
Syrian Christian denominations. The ghettoized, hostile environment, and spiritual
reorientation of the Syrian Christians in Gulf have a direct impact in Kerala, and it
has been responsible for the formation of a dogmatic identity and space in the send-
ing society. The neo-Pentecostals groups separate themselves from the rest of the
world and project an ‘exclusive’ spiritual identity from the rest of the
denominations.
‘Holy Land’ Pilgrimage and the Assertion of ‘Biblical Israel’
The neo-Pentecostals have brought varying ‘American Evangelical’ theological

concepts and traditions to Kerala via GCC region. Tithe, Tele-Evangelists, Gospel
Channels, Prayer and Worship, Holy Land (Israel) pilgrimage, notion of ‘Biblical
Israel’ are some of the concepts that had origins in American evangelical theology
which are very popular in Kerala.
Currently, pilgrimage to Israel/Palestine (holy land) is extremely popular and
thousands of believers from Kerala are undertaking a pilgrimage to Israel every year
to visit holy sites. Though pilgrimage to Holy Land never existed in Kerala due to
the costs, the practice is now quite popular amongst the Gulf migrants. The pilgrim-
age to Israel/Palestine is another significant aspect which is widely prevalent
amongst Syrian Christian immigrants. Each year almost all the churches in GCC
states organize a pilgrimage via Jordan to the Holy Land, especially during the sum-
mer vacations.
Perhaps, due to the influence of Gulf immigrants, the pilgrimage to Israel/
Palestine has become very popular in Kerala too. The travel stories of Gulf migrants
to Israel and Palestine have had a tremendous impact amongst the people in Kerala
and at present numerous travel and tour agencies have been facilitating the visits to
Israel very frequently. In addition, some of the Malayalam dailies have also taken an
initiative for these visits.
Fr. K.M. George, noted theologian and the former Principal of Syrian Orthodox
Seminary observed that
interest for ‘Holy Land trips’ is very high among the Kerala Christians and this indeed a
new phenomenon. These trips had initially started among the migrant community in GCC
countries in the late 1990s and finally Gulf migrants had introduced this to Kerala. Now the
parishes across the denominations are competing each other to visit Israel. Some of the
clergies are also running tour agencies to facilitate these visits.
Salvation Through Tithe
Another theological conception which has been popularized through Gulf migration
is ‘tithe’. Tithe is an Old Testament conception of contributing one-tenth of one’s
income to the poor and needy. This was not widely prevalent among the Syrian
Church in Kerala. Tithe had been popularized by the neo-Pentecostals, particularly
among the migrants, as a mark of thanksgiving for economic success. Earlier the
annual subscriptions and ceremonial/festival contributions were the main income of
the Church. However, the ‘Tithe’ became a practice widely among the Gulf migrants
in response to the unprecedented fortunes and capital they had received in the host
setting. The trustee of a local Syrian Church mentioned that the annual income of
the church had increased 300 times in the last three decades. One of the Gulf
migrants pointed that ‘regular contribution of “Tithe” would multiply the income
and blessings’. Another respondent commented that ‘I went to Gulf from an eco-
nomically weaker family. At present I am blessed with immense wealth and thus I
have decided to give one tenth of my income to “missionary activities” in India’.
Through Tithe, the people are expecting both salvation as well as the protection of
their unexpected wealth. Eminent theologian Fr. K. M. George said ‘Tithe was never
popular among the Syrian Christians. The Gulf migrants have popularized this con-
cept in Kerala. Tithe is the backbone of the neo-Pentecostal Churches as they propa-
gate that both salvation and prosperity could be achieved through the enormous
contribution of Tithe’.
The Pentecostals, along with Tele-evangelists, have reshaped and popularized
the concept of religious contributions as an avenue for more richness and material
prosperity. Neo-Pentecostals have made ‘Tithe’ to be the compulsory duty of a
believer and this has turned out to be the major revenue for the preachers and tele-
evangelists. The critics have alleged that the split of neo-Pentecostals into numerous
260 G. Z. Oommen
splinter groups is largely centred on the financial disputes that emanate due to the
unaccounted flow of ‘Tithe’. Like the American Gospel TV channels, the idea of
‘Tithe’ is being highlighted by the Malayalam tele-evangelists as the main path for
material blessings.
Liberation Theology and Commercial Christianity
The socialist-communist legacy of Kerala had a significant impact on the Christian

community. Though the church hierarchy, particularly Catholics, were at logger-
heads with the Communist parties many Bishops and clergies openly supported the
Marxian ideas and the liberation theology had immense influence among the church
leadership. Liberation Theology is an attempt to interpret scripture through the
plight of the poor.
This Christian school of theology was developed in Latin America in the 1960s
and 1970s and it focuses on the liberation of the oppressed and poor (Lukas 2012).
The main emphasis was on the redistribution of wealth, allowing poor peasants to
share in the wealth fight for social justice. A section of the youth and student move-
ments of the Syrian denominations embraced the revolutionary theology and this
was quite popular in the parishes in 1970s and 1980s, particularly in the Marthoma
Church. The decline of the left discourse in the church along with the influence of
large-scale migration has severely hampered the prospects of progressive theologi-
cal moorings and has given rise to the tide of ‘commercial Christianity’ in Kerala.
The rise of aspirant-rich migrants coupled with an ambitious and uncertain social
situation has further weakened the liberal ethos and have fortified the ‘commercial
Christianity’ in Kerala. The large-scale migration to Gulf has jeopardized the pros-
pects of ‘liberal’ ideas and this vacuum have been filled by the radical religious
groups. The eminent liberation theologian Fr. Sam Koshy commented that ‘earlier
the humane and social action of the Church was quite popular among the younger
generation. But with the large flow of remittances, consumerist and careerist think-
ing gained more momentum, which invariably strengthened the prospects of “com-
mercial Christianity” and “Prosperity Gospel”’.
Remittances, Renovations, and Religious Investments
At present the Syrian Christians have been using religion as a strategic platform to
transform the economic capital earned from migration to achieve social prestige,
status, and legitimacy in the home society and to maintain links with Kerala and also
as an easier entry to the home community. The migration and remittances have
made significant changes in the Syrian Christian churches. A vast majority of
migrants to the Gulf were mostly middle-class or from the poor strata of society.
The flow of remittances from abroad has transformed the class structure of the
Kerala society by promoting upward mobility for families that have sent migrants to
the Gulf. Migrant-sending families have increasingly used income earned in the
Gulf to promote religion in the public sphere in Kerala, in the process, enhancing
their visibility and power in social hierarchy. This contributed to larger investment
in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across Kerala. Since the
beginning of 1990s, there has been a proliferation of temples, churches, mosques,
and other religious institutions, particularly in Gulf pockets.
Successful migrants have invested remittances and savings in culturally signifi-
cant arenas – marriages, education, temples, churches, etc. The absence of migrant
in the home society is filled through his spending pattern contributions in religious
institutions and charity. Migrants’ contribution to the religious institutions is mani-
fested as his presence even if he/she residing in the Gulf. The Syrian Christians tried
to display their social mobility through the renovation or construction of churches,
parish halls, parsonages, cars for Vicars, arch gates, flag staffs, and memorial halls.
The local Bishops pointed that nearly 90% of all the old churches have been
either renovated or reconstructed or new churches have been built by demolishing
the old ones. The Vicar General of Syrian Orthodox church highlighted that the
uninterrupted flow of contributions has prompted the church towards the mega con-
struction spree. Bishop Mar Barnabas of Syrian Marthoma Church pointed that
‘migrants contribute voluminous amount of money for the construction projects and
local vicars now spend more time at construction sites rather than pastoral care’.
During the church visits an announcement made by the secretary of a parish was
quite amusing, as he said ‘Saturday is the deadline for the installation of “family
plaque” at the Parish Hall. Those who are interested to erect the family plaque
should kindly pay INR 3 lakhs to the trustee’. On inquiry, it was found that nearly
70 parish members had already paid the required amount and all of them were either
migrants or return migrants.
On vacation, when migrants visit Kerala it is common practice to donate the
cushions, candle stands, pulpit covers, altar candles, carpets, altar curtains to the
church. The absence of migrant from the society is filled through these monumental
donations. The local religious institutions also play a central role in providing sys-
tematic support for the reintegration of emigrants into the community when they
return home on vacation or permanently after completing the contracts. In Kerala,
the construction extravaganza is responsible for the growth of local ‘parish com-
plexes’. The church complex comprises church, flag staff, arch gates, marble lambs,
parish hall, parsonage, and sometimes buildings for rentals. The church documents
reveal that the entire complex has been sponsored by the migrants’ families to take
over the patronage of the church.
This process of obtaining social mobility by acquiring religious capital often
disrupts the existing power structure within the community. The society witnessed
the emergence of a new class, generally known as ‘new rich’. It is noted that signifi-
cant growth of the ‘new rich’ had upset the rural power structure. The position and
status enjoyed traditionally by a few landed and aristocratic families are now
challenged.
262 G. Z. Oommen
The demolition of the old churches often creates conflicts and legal disputes in
the community, which is often termed as the conflict between the old landed fami-
lies and the ‘new rich’. The emerging rich class consider the church as the symbol
of the feudatory structure and reconstruction and demolition of the old ones is often
termed as the attack on the old class structure of the community. Migration has
nevertheless allowed families to use capital to invest in status and class enchanting
activities, engendering changes in local power structure. For instance, in one of the
parishes, the construction of a new church had been stalled for nearly 5 years due to
a prolonged legal battle two groups of certainly between old traditionally rich and
the ‘new rich’ migrant families. An elderly member of the traditional faction com-
mented sarcastically that the old church was built by our forefathers and only few
families had the resources to regulate the affairs of the church. Now most of the
parishioners have money due to migration and these ‘new rich’ want to demolish the
old edifice and to build a new one. The old church is quite strong and there is no
need for a new church, but this is an indirect attempt to grab the patronage of the
church and also to be elevated into the hierarchy.
The enormous contributions to church and the erection of concrete religious
building by newly rich migrants is a covert attempt to capture the hierarchy of
church which had been denied to them due to the feudal structure of the community.
Hence, the new construction boom in the Christian community could be termed as
the demolition of the past class hierarchy and the formation of a new social configu-
ration. Generally, the new rich migrant families receive the support of local Diocesan
bishops since the church hierarchy is highly dependent on remittances from
Diaspora.
In Pathanamthitta, the clergies highlighted fierce conflicts in the church with the
entry of new rich migrant families into the system. Bishop Mar Kurilos com-
mented that
migrants are not interested to support the activities of education or healthcare, because the
construction of schools and hospitals will not help to attain fame and also it doesn’t enable
him to enter into the social hierarchy. Thus, most of them would like to invest or contribute
in local parish to enhance their social status.
In fact, in Kerala, since the beginning of twentieth century, the Syrian denomina-
tions were in the forefront to establish schools, colleges, and hospitals, and church
played a crucial role in the field of education and health. However, at present, the
resources of the church are diverted more towards the construction boom than the
other social deeds. Hence, the current trends of the Syrian church indicate that the
space of religion/local parish is used by the migrants to attain the social legitimacy
and to bounce back to the community. The active involvement and participation in
the church is to disseminate ones’ newly attained economic mobility.
The worship centres are also places for recognition and the display of individual
success. The patronages of church or parish designations like secretary or trustee
are seen as symbols of social mobility and recognition. The annual elections for
church office bearers have turned to be the spaces of stiff competition to display
individual success and socio-economic mobility. One of the vicars pointed that
competition for leadership in church often ends up in conflicts and personal rival-
ries. Elections for the church hierarchy are a month-long affair with house-to-house
campaigns by the candidates, which was not a very common practice in Kerala.
The migrants also fiercely negotiate with the hierarchy to enhance their role in
the affairs of the church. For instance, presently with the influx of surplus money
there is greater demand for the elevation of parishes’ to be equivalent to Cathedral.
Earlier, the Cathedral title was given to a parish with more members/income and
also it could be attached to the Bishop house. The reason behind the new demand is
that the Cathedral can send more lay representatives in the church council and also
laity could play a crucial role in the election of Bishops. In the Syrian Orthodox
denominations, certain newly built parishes have been given special status and more
lay representatives in the church councils since the parishes agreed to make a sig-
nificant increase in the annual subscription to diocese. Thus, the parish committees
and councils have thus been seen as social mobility and turned to be the spaces to
exhibit individual prosperity.
ommoditization and Revitalization of Rituals

C
and Ceremonies
Religious ritual is another significant area to a migrant’s strategic conversion of

economic capital into prestige and status. Migration in particular to the Gulf has
accelerated the ongoing process of commoditization of ritual practices. The elabo-
rate revitalisation of local festivals and feasts should be understood within the con-
text of emigration. The sustained interest of the emigrant on local festival is related
to the display component of religious rituals. Pastors, astrologers, tantris, godmen,
and ritual specialists in general have all been able to exploit this growing religious
market. Therefore, the new upsurge in religious activity has inadvertently commer-
cialized the rituals and ceremonies. The migration-related wealth has led to an ever-
increasing commoditization of ritual practices allowing for new performers and
sponsors of local church procession or feast. The high spending of money on reli-
gious ceremonies and social occasions like baptism and marriage are increasing
amongst the Christian immigrants. Large parts of remittances are used to organize
performances of ritual activities, which work towards maintenance and augmenta-
tion of migrant households’ honour.
Pilgrimages to various religious places in Kerala are increasingly popular
amongst immigrants in the GCC countries. These pilgrimages and participation of
immigrants at the feast in native churches could be termed as expressing their
attachment to the home society. The participation in the local church Perunal (local
church feast) or feast shrines reinforces their roots, an opportunity to express their
attachment to the sending society and also to create an alternative category of
belonging by the immigrant community (Levitt 2003).
264 G. Z. Oommen
Local festival is an important factor in a migrant’s life; it is an announcement of

his arrival for vacations. The focal point of Perunal is Rasa or procession. During
the feast, a new practice which is widely prevalent is to donate a silver- or gold-
plated cross to church and also carry it proudly during the procession. Carrying the
silver cross in Rasa becomes a perfect vehicle for return migrants to showcase and
project to the community his transformed status and mobility. Caroline Brettell
argues that, ‘the catholic church and its various activities provide a context where
Portuguese emigrants can convert economic success abroad into social prestige
when they return to their native village’ (Brettell 2003).
The processions are also arenas for competitive and conspicuous consumption
and also provide opportunities for the display of hierarchy (Raj 2008). In Kerala, the
church procession provides fewer opportunities to display some of the material pos-
sessions of the migrant families. Social prestige cannot be achieved in host environ-
ment and it is only in his home village that degree of social mobility is valued and
social prestige is accorded. In this context, villagers are the jury that measures the
success of the emigrants. Thus, carrying the silver cross provides for the affluent
migrants a public space to demonstrate the newly acquired social status and eco-
nomic prosperity. Through these displays the individual status has been transcended
as well as reinforced.
Interestingly, one of the ceremonies which has been highly commoditized and
turned to be the space of display is the funeral. In the Syrian Christian community
the simple, sober, and most painful religious affairs are being made occasions to
flaunt wealth and social status. The funeral processions are taken out with pomp and
show with expensive and decorative coffins, hiring of choirs to sing the devotional
songs and which move along with the procession with a large convoy of cars, and
distribution of ‘heavy’ food packets after the ritual. The tradition of serving just
black coffee is also giving way and is being replaced with gala lunch.
According to the bishops the average Christian spends enormous money on
funeral as a result of which a new funeral industry has emerged which is positioned
around flower merchants, coffin sellers, caterers, newspapers, and videographers.
There is a rush for frontpage obituary space in leading local newspapers. Even the
poor and non-migrant have begun to imitate the rich in buying costly coffins popu-
larly known as ‘Swarga Petti’ (heavenly coffins), which are fancy expensive coffins
imported from China and this has turned to be the marker of prestige and status.
Rev. George Tharakan, a local priest, explained that ‘in the past a large number of
friends and relatives would gather to sing hymns, read the Bible at a bereaved house,
now that being replaced with professional and expensive choirs and singing groups.
Moreover, the practice of funeral service being videotaped is another unique
feature of the Kerala Christian Community. This practice started in connection with
migration. Earlier the ceremony was photographed for the children staying abroad
who missed the funeral. However, over the period of time it has become an avenue
to publicize the honour and prestige of the family. With the advent of social media
within hours after the funeral this is uploaded on the web for the public. Dr. Mohan
Varghese, who teaches in a local college, comments that ‘nowadays in the funeral,
the participants have to perform, and participation of local MLA, Municipal
Chairperson, politicians and bishops are considered to be the symbol of status and
prestige. Now the funeral became more elaborate to add colour to the video
graphing’.
Conclusion
The arrival of new religious practices and remittances from the GCC countries is
changing the Syrian Christian landscape in Kerala with a long-history of Christian
presence. Religious and spiritual reorientation amongst Syrian Christian communi-
ties in the host countries is abetting the assertion of communal identity, proliferation
of radical religious groups, rise of godmen and cults, and the emergence of new
forms of worship in the Kerala society. The Gulf migrants and their families are
invariably using the trajectory of religion to achieve social mobility and prestige in
the sending society. The spiritual restructuring in the lives of migrants in the host
setting has strengthened the quest for spirituality and thus the doctrine of ‘prosper-
ity gospel’ is making deep inroads in the Syrian Christian community. The tradi-
tional, oriental, masculine, and hierarchical nature of the Syrian churches has been
replaced with loosely knitted ‘neo-Pentecostalism’ and ‘commercial Christianity’.
The transnational nature of neo-Pentecostal churches has a direct impact on the
religious space of Kerala society and the diaspora networks are playing a crucial
role in restructuring the homeland churches. The impact of social remittances is
quite visible in the religious spheres and the Gulf connections are directly respon-
sible for an ‘Americanized’ version of Christianity in Kerala.
Gulf migration perhaps has eroded the traditional nature of Syrian Christians,
giving rise to a more exclusionary, dogmatic, and a consumerist version of spiritual-
ity. Rituals and ceremonies have become the avenue to display the mobility and also
to strengthen the honour of the family. In Kerala, religion is being used as a strategic
platform to transform the economic capital earned from migration to achieve social
prestige, status, and legitimacy in the home society, and to maintain links with
Kerala and facilitate easier entry of the migrants to the home community. In other
words, the religious spaces are being utilized by the migrants to display the newly
acquired socio-economic mobility and also to demolish the feudatory class struc-
ture. The large flow of remittances and the urge to display the newly acquired socio-
economic mobility could be termed as the reasons for the commoditization of rituals
and ceremonies in Kerala. The local religious spaces have turned to be the jury to
evaluate the economic mobility of Gulf migrants and this often disrupts the existing
class hierarchies. The aspirant ‘new rich’ migrants is inadvertently relying on ‘spiri-
tuality’ and ‘religion’ to erase the ‘past’ and to elevate into the status of erstwhile
upper classes.
266 G. Z. Oommen
References
Brettell, C. (2003). Emigration, the church and the religious Festa in the Northern Portugal. In
C. Brettell (Ed.), Anthropology and migration: Essays on transnationalism, ethnicity and iden-
tity. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.
Ebaugh, H. R., & Saltzman Chafetz, J. (Eds.). (2002). Religious cross borders: Transnational
immigrant networks. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.
Gardner, K. (1995). Global migrants, local lives: Travel and transformation in rural Bangladesh.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Hirschman, C. (2004). The role of religion in the origins and adaptation of immigrants groups in
the United States. International Migration Review, 38(3), 1228.
Kurien, P. (2014). The impact of international migration on home churches: The Marthoma Syrian
Christian Church in India. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 109.
Levitt, P. (2001). The transnational villagers. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Levitt, P. (2003). You know Abraham was really the first immigrant: Religion and transnational
migration. International Migration Review, 37(3), 847.
Levitt, P. (2004). Redefining the boundaries of belonging: The institutional character of transna-
tional religious life. Sociology of Religion, 65(1), 1.
Lukas, L. (2012, January 1). Pentecostalism in Brazil: Churches, business and political parties
(KAS International Reports).
Mathew, C. P., & Thomas, M. M. (2005). The Indian churches of Saint Thomas. New Delhi:
Cambridge Press.
Osella, F., & Osella, C. (2003). Migration and commoditisation of ritual: Sacrifice, spectacle and
contestations in Kerala. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 37, 109.
Raj S. J. (2008). Public display, communal devotion: Procession at a South Indian Catholic festi-
val. In K. A. Jacobsen (Ed.), South Asian religions on display: Religious processions in South
Asia and in the diaspora. New York: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Zachariah, K. C. (Eds.). (2012). Kerala’s demographic future: Issues and policy
option. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.
Ramachandran, S. (2013, April 25). Saudi’s Nitaqat Law: Trouble for Indian Expats. The Diplomat.
Roger, W., & Fitzgerald, D. (2000). Transnationalism in question. American Journal of Sociology,
109(5, March), 1178–1179.
Rudolph, S., & Piscatori, J. (1997). Transnational religion and fading states. Colorado: Westview
Press.
Ruiz Baia, Lariza (1999) “rethinking transnationalism: Reconstructing National Identities among
Peruvian Catholics in New Jersey”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.
41, No. 4 (1999):95.
Vertovec, S. (1997). Three meanings of diaspora exemplified among south Asian religions.
Diaspora, 6(3), 273–275.
Yang, F., & Ebaugh, H. R. (2002). Transformation of new immigrant religions and their global
implications. American Sociological Review, 66, 278.
Zachariah, K. C. (2006). The Syrian Christians of Kerala: Demographic, socio-economic transi-
tion in the twentieth century. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
Zachariah, K. C., & Rajan, S. I. (2012). Kerala’s Gulf connection, 1998–2011: Economic and
social impact of migration. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan.
Zachariah, K. C., et al. (2006). Return emigrants in Kerala. New Delhi: Manohar Books.
Chapter 15
Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian
Peninsula: An Overview
Prakash C. Jain
Abstract This chapter presents a historical and contemporary sociological profile

of Indian trade diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula countries, namely Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Although in
modern times, the presence of Indian traders in the Persian Gulf region can be traced
back to at least the sixteenth century in Oman, and the early nineteenth century in
Bahrain, Yemen and the present-day UAE, it got consolidated during the inter-war
period throughout the region. Indian traders’ status as ‘British subjects’ particularly
helped them in this regard. Further fillip to Indian commercial and entrepreneurial
activities was provided by the emergence of Gulf countries as oil-exporting econo-
mies since the mid-1970s. Liberalization of economies and opening of free-trade
zones in many countries further helped the Indian entrepreneurs in launching a wide
variety of commercial and trading activities in the region.
Conceptual Framework
One important feature of Indian emigration since the late nineteenth century has
been the migration of traders and entrepreneurs to various parts of the world. At
times, they emigrated on their own as in the case of eastern and southern African
countries, but mostly they followed or accompanied the emigrating Indian labourers
and others. The Gulf countries were no exception. A schematic presentation given
below highlights this phenomenon (Table 15.1).
The above table suggests that in the Persian Gulf countries and elsewhere trading
and entrepreneurship among the overseas Indians is as much a caste and/or
community-bound phenomenon as in India itself. It is likely that the hereditary
occupational specialization which is one of the central features of the traditional
Indian caste system greatly helps in acquiring and using the entrepreneurial skills.
P. C. Jain (*)
Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, India

268 P. C. Jain
Table 15.1 Trading and entrepreneurial ethnic groups among overseas Indian communities
Main ‘ethnic’ groups engaged in
Emigration type Major host countries entrepreneurial activities
1. Indenture labour
(i) Exclusively Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Mixed and locally evolved from
indentured labour Surinam within the labouring classes
(ii) Indentured labour South Africa, Fiji Gujaratis – both Hindus and
plus free emigrants Muslims
2. Kangani/maistry Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Coromandel Coast Muslims,
labour plus free Lanka Chettiars, Sikhs
emigrants
3. ‘Passage’/free Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Ismailis, Bohras, Gujarati
emigration Africa Hindus, Sikhs, Sindhis and Jains
4. Brain drain type U.K., U.S.A., Canada, Australia, Gujaratis, Panjabis/Sikhs,
emigration New Zealand Keralites
5.Persian Gulf Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Sindhis, Bohras, Khojas,
emigration Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Gujarati Hindus, Malabaris
Qatar and UAE
Source: Adapted from Jain (2010: xi)
As such, the community and family must be playing important roles in these
matters.
Modern diasporas constitute trans-state triadic networks involving diasporas,
their host countries and homelands, and as such they have significant ramifications
for international relations as well as their community affairs. Most diasporas play
their role in international relations through various forms of networking which facil-
itate and promote international trade and commerce, economic investment and
remittances, transfer of skills and technology, homeland visits and pilgrimage and
political lobbying.
Within a diaspora, traders, entrepreneurs and other middle-class segments often
emerge as the epicentre of numerous kinds of activities. They turn out to be the
instigators of various socio-cultural, economic and political associations and orga-
nizations, so that their community could move towards institutional completeness.
It is also these groups that take lead in establishing multiple linkages between dias-
pora and homeland which in turn continue to provide them with their ethnic/national
identity, and a sense of belonging. At the same time, the need to enhance their self-
image as diasporic entities also continually motivate them to engage themselves in
various activities for the socio-economic betterment of their homeland. Seen in this
perspective, the situation and role of Gulf-based Indians is illuminating and
instructive.
15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 269
Historical Background
Archaeological and literary evidence suggest that India and West Asia had trade
relations since the Indus Valley Civilization days. A considerable number of Indians
appear to have migrated to the Persian Gulf region in the pre-Islamic era ‘either to
establish businesses, seek employment with Arab traders, or just to escape instabil-
ity at home. Thus at the time of the advent of Islam, there were many Indian settlers
in Arabia who were involved in various activities’ (Ahmad 1971). Apparently, all
these groups completely assimilated into the respective societies of their
migration.
Medieval Arab sources provide the earliest evidence of the presence of colonies
of Indian merchants in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas. ‘They reveal that Hindu
merchants were present in the port of Shiraj on the Persian shore of the Gulf at least
in the ninth century and that they also frequented the coasts of Oman, Socotra and
Aden’ (Gopal 1998; Markovits 2000: 10). Sindhi and Gujarati merchants, both
Hindu and Muslim, played dominant role in maritime trade and finance across the
Indian Ocean (Marcovits 2000). During the later medieval period, there was a con-
siderable amount of exchange of Arab and Indian scholars and religious leaders
(Ahmad 1971: 38).
Vasco da Gama found the presence of Indians on the shores of East Africa in
1498 and subsequently in the ports of the Red Sea and in the interior of the Arabian
Peninsula (Gopal 1992). During this time, a Hindu temple existed in Iran. Port
towns of Mocha and Aden and inland cities of Taif and Sanna were also inhabited
by the Indians (Gopal 1998). The ruins of a Hindu temple were found at Kalhat, the
principal Omani port of the fifteenth century which further suggests a settlement of
Indians in Oman (Miles 1966: 526).
In Iran besides Omuz, Indians in small numbers had settled down in Yezd, Shiraj,
Isfahan, Tehran, Resht, Gilan, Khorasan and Mashad. Following the establishment
of a new port of Gombroon or Bandar Abbas in the late seventeenth century, Ormuz
declined to insignificance and Indians shifted to the new city. In 1760 when Bandar
Abbas was abandoned by the Persians, the Indians shifted to Abu Shehr, Bushahr,
and to the Iraqi port of Basra. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Gujarati
Baniyas were replaced by a new group of emigrants known as Shikarpuris who
hailed from Sindh (Gopal 1997).
In contrast to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which India’s impact
on the Persian Gulf region was sporadic confined mostly to trade, it was quite com-
prehensive in the later nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Indo-
Gulf relations during this period were ‘varied and multi-faceted’. For about a
century or so, India was not only a major partner in the Indo-Gulf trade and com-
merce, its impact on the Gulf countries in terms of initial modernization and cultural
renaissance, reform movement and many other aspects of socio-cultural life such as
cuisines, musical instruments, interior designing and architecture was also
270 P. C. Jain
substantial (Elmadani 2003). It was also during this period that a number of Indian
merchant communities were more firmly established throughout the Gulf/Red Sea
region. It hardly needs to be emphasized here that the Gulf region was virtually an
extension of British India and that the Indians in the Gulf enjoyed privileges as
British subject.
The British administration in the Gulf helped settle a number of Indian commu-
nities across the region. Among these the nineteenth-century Muscat hosted three
distinct Indian communities: Thattai Sindhi Bhatias, Kuttchi Bhatias and Khojahs
or Luwatiya. Some of the prominent entrepreneurs from these communities still
continue to flourish even today (Allen 1981, pp. 39–51). Besides Oman, Indian mer-
chant communities also existed in Iran, Aden and the Trucial States (United Arab
Emirates) (Al-Sayegh 1998).
Besides trading a wide variety of goods, Indians were also involved in pearl-
fishing industry in some of the Gulf countries, namely Bahrain, Oman and United
Arab Emirates. Pearl fishing was the mainstay of the Gulf economies in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. With the decline of pearling industry in the
1920s and 1930s, Indian merchants began to concentrate their attention on general
trade, importing goods not only from India but also from Europe, America and
Japan. These trends were further to strengthen after the Second World War and
beyond.
Oman
By the late eighteenth century, Muscat had emerged as a major port with lucrative
trade and commerce. Omanis had also secured the East African trade from the
Portuguese. Muscat was regarded a secure port. It offered very competitive infra-
structural facilities and tax and customs rates. In Muscat, the Indian merchants,
mainly Hindus who lived there part of each year, were ‘well represented and influ-
ential’. ‘The Hindus were allowed their own religious practices. There were already
in existence four Hindu temples in Muscat by the mid-1760s’ (Kechichian 1995:
215). Apparently, the Hindu merchants in Oman had security to life and property.
The tolerant and cosmopolitan outlook of the Omani rulers who followed the Ibadi
sect of Islam provides one probable explanation for this.
In the late eighteenth century, one of the prominent Indian traders operating at
Muscat was Tipu Sultan of Mysore. He conducted his trade activities through a
permanent representative stationed at Muscat. About this time, the customs farmer
at Muscat was a wealthy Indian from Kutch named Mowjee Seth whom British
Resident Seton described as ‘the richest subject in the place’ (Gopal 2001: 395). A
prominent broker Vishnu Das not only served for the Sultan but also for Hajji Khalil,
a wealthy merchant and broker of Bandar Abbas. Sultan’s first wakil at Bombay was
Ibrahim b. Ali (Ibrahim Mulla Ali), who purchased commercial goods, marine
stores and ammunition from the company. Besides these, there were a number of
other influential Indian merchants at Muscat.
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were three distinct Indian
merchant communities in Muscat. The first were the Thatta Bhatias – so-called after
the city of Thatta located on the Indus River in Sind – who had been living in Muscat
under Portuguese dominance since at least the sixteenth century and continued to
prosper through most of the eighteenth century (Allen 1981). But strong competi-
tion both in India and in Muscat and the decline of Thatta as a commercial centre
drove the Sindi Bhatias from Muscat to Bahrain and other Gulf ports. The Sindi
Bhatias were replaced by Kutchi Bhatias since the early nineteenth century. The
community grew in size and influence, and continued to thrive until the brief estab-
lishment of the conservative Ibadi regime during 1868–71. Meanwhile in the post-
Ibadi period a new group of Kutchi Bhatias with international business connections
and dealing in a wide variety of merchandise had emerged on the scene. These
included such illustrious business families as Virji Pursottam Toprani, Prem ji
Jamnadas Bhimani, Ratansi Pursottam, Dowlatgirji, Marupgirji, Virji Ratansi and
Damodar Dharamsi. The last four families were considered the ‘four pillars’ of the
Hindu society in the nineteenth-century Muscat. ‘Upon this base a number of other
Banians established prosperous businesses that have continued to flourish in
Muscat.' These include Khimji Ramdas, Dayal Purshottam, Danji Murarji, Vallabdas
Umarsi and Gopalji Walj (Allen 1981: 48).
A third group of Indians during the period under review were the Khojas
(Khwajars) – also called Luwatiyas – originating in Hyderabad, Sind (Allen 1981:
50). They were settled in Matrah (Sur Luwatiya) living in segregation from the
Arabs as well as the Hindus. Luwatiyas had monopolized the trade of dried fish,
besides trading other usual items. Mohammand Fadl born in Bombay in 1858 was
one of the well-known Luwatiya merchant in the late nineteenth-century Muscat. In
recent times, Ali Sultan’s name figure as a prominent member of the Luwatiya com-
munity. The community was more or less permanently settled in Oman. Since 1970,
the Luwatiyas have made active efforts to become assimilated into Omani Society.
Since 1875, the Indians enjoyed British protection in Oman. This protection
however was like a ‘double-edged sword’. The Indian community’s association
with the British ‘insulated the Indians from Omani interference, but it also increased
guilt-by-association sentiments that developed among Omanis’ (Kechichian 1995:
218). Many Indian merchants were viewed with suspicion and ‘as agents of British
designs for Oman’ (Allen 1987). Notwithstanding these misgivings, however, the
number of Indian merchants continued to increase and by the turn of the twentieth
century, there were over 2050 of them. Beside trade, Banyans were also involved in
customs farming and pearl-fishing.
The first half of the twentieth century is characterized by minimal contacts
between India and Oman and a self-imposed isolation on the part of Oman amid
mega events of two World Wars, the economic depression of 1930s and the abdica-
tion of throne by Sultan Taymur bin Faysal in 1932. In spite of all these, the pre-
dominant role the Indian merchants in Omani economy was recognized by all
concerned. The relations were further strengthened between India and Oman fol-
lowing the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in
March 1953.
272 P. C. Jain
Since the early 1970s, old-timer Indian merchants were joined by new breed of
Indian entrepreneurs who cannot own independent business but are allowed to enter
into partnership with the Omanis. Thus, presently two kinds of Indian merchants are
there in Oman: (1) those who belong to the Peoples of Indian Origin (PIOs) cate-
gory, and (2) those who are Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The prominent business
houses which are owned by Omanis of Indian Origin (PIOs) are as follows: (1)
Khimji Ramdas, (2) Dharamsey Nency, (3) Ajay Group of companies, (4) Ajit
Khimji Group of companies, (5) Shah Nagardas Manji & Co., (6) Purshottam Kanji
Trading Co. LLC and (7) Laxmidas Tharia Ved & Co.
Large-scale Indian immigration into Oman, as in other Gulf countries, is rela-
tively a recent phenomenon. The oil price boom in 1973 and subsequently the infra-
structural development activities in the region created a high demand for a variety
of manpower. There has been a steady and phenomenal increase in the Indian popu-
lation in Oman from 1145 in 1948–4500 in 1970, 66,000 in 1981 and 150,000 in
1992 and about 700,000 in 2014.
Majority of Indians live in Muscat and other major towns like Salalah, Sohar and
Nizwa although they are found in relatively small numbers in the interiors of the
country also. In terms of skill composition, Indian work force comprises 25%
unskilled workers; 30% semi-skilled workers; 35% skilled workers and 10% profes-
sionals such as doctors, engineers, bankers, finance experts, managers, etc.
The Indian community is currently represented by the Indian Social Club (ISC)
in Muscat, with a branch in Salalah. The Social Club has nine regional language
wings representing different communities, viz., Hindi, Marathi, Bengali, Tamil,
Malayalam, Gujarati, Punjabi, Kannada and Telugu. The Kerala Association and
Indian Ladies Group also function under ISC. Omanis of Indian origin who hail
from Kutch (Gujarat) have a separate outfit called Hindu Mahajan Association
which was founded in 1941. The Association also manages the one of the two Hindu
temples in Muscat, and oversees the socio-religious matters of the Omani Hindu
fraternity. There are 25 Indian schools in Oman.
Muscat has two Hindu temples where congregations are regularly held with daily
Puja being performed. One of the two temples a Shiva Temple is estimated to be
over 100 years old, and is located in the old quarters of Muscat. The other one
devoted to Lord Krishna is in Ruwi. Two temporary gurudwaras have also been set
up in labour camps. There are also seven churches to meet the need of various
Christian Sects. The Basic Law of the State promulgated in December 1996 guaran-
tees freedom of worship.
Indians have lived in Oman for three centuries. Indians’ contributions to the
development of the country as a whole and particularly in developing its commerce,
healthcare network, housing and communications, are huge and widely
acknowledged.
Yemen
When the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean trade in the sixteenth century, the
Indian merchants, particularly the Gujaratis were found in all the major ports
between Aden and Malacca (Marcovits 2000: 11). In the seventeenth century, Indo-
Yemen trade involved locally produced Yemeni coffee and Gujarati textiles, spices
and other necessities (Gavin 1975: 17). Surat was the main trading partner of Yemen
during this period. In the eighteenth century, Gujarati merchants were settled in all
the Yemeni towns. These merchants were both sojourning as well as the settled
ones.
Aden was occupied in 1839 by a combined forces of European and Indian troops.
Aden and its Eastern and Western protectorates in the Yemeni hinterland were tied
to the British Administration in Bombay until 1937 when Aden became a Crown
colony. Aden was of great strategic importance to the British interests in the Gulf
region. The major components of the Indian population around this time were ‘the
old Indian trading community engaged in commerce of the Red Sea, the garrison
and the new Indian community which served it’. (Gavin 1975: 61). The new Indian
community comprised the merchants especially the Bombay Parsis and the subordi-
nate administrative staff of the settlement and the police force (Gavin 1975: 60–61).
According to Gavin, the Parsi community at Aden was from the outset closely con-
nected with the garrison. Some of these Parsi merchants who supplied livestock,
fowls, eggs, vegetables, milk, beer, liquor, firewood and other provisions to the
steamers and other vessels and the garrison had become quite prosperous and influ-
ential in due course of time. The major items of trade around this time were coffee,
raw cotton, piece goods, grain and ivory.
In the early 1870s, Indians formed the majority of blacksmiths, carpenters,
mechanics and sweepers. They were also shopkeepers, bricklayers, bumboat men
and merchants. Some were jewellers. ‘The Banyans, who were the wealthiest among
the Hindus, had in their hands the wholesale trade of Aden as well as the banking
and exchange business. At the other end of the scale, most of the menial servants
were Hindus. In contrast with the Banyans, the Parsis were mainly retail merchants’.
(Kour 1981: 52).
In 1947, Aden’s formal link with India ended, but rupee continued to be the cur-
rency until 1951 (Bidwell 1983: 76). In the mid-1960s, the Indian population rose
to about 20,000. In 1955, a wealthy Indian V.K. Joshi was elected to the Legislative
Council. He was re-elected in 1959, and was a Minister in the Adeni Government in
the early 1960s (Sheth 1998: 109).
The rise of Arab nationalism in the late 1940s and 1950s, problems of political
succession, widening schism between the traditionalists and modernists in the
Yemeni society, the unsuccessful coups d’état of 1948 and 1955, dismemberment of
the short-lived confederation with the UAR (1958–61) and the 1962 Yemeni
274 P. C. Jain
r evolution and the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 – all these events had their
unsettling impact on the Indian immigrant and other population groups in both the
Yemens which forced them to go elsewhere.
The independence of Aden from the British on 30 November 1967 and subse-
quently a Marxist revolution led to the establishment of Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The socialist policies of the PDRY Government led to
the takeover of Indian businesses and properties. These developments ‘resulted in
the hasty departure from Aden of many PIOs, either for India or some other country.
But a large number belonging to Bohra, Khoja and Kachchi communities decided to
remain behind and gradually became Yemeni citizens’ (High Level Committee
2001: 43).
In 2001, about 109,000 Indians (100,000 PIOs and 9000 NRIs) were reported to
be present in the united Yemen by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora
of the Government of India (2001). The NRIs consisted of professionals, skilled
workers, nurses and paramedical staff, semi-skilled workers and housemaids. Thus,
besides mentioning the presence of an Indian school in Sana’a and the installation
of Mahatma Gandhi’s statue in its hall, in a significant passage it does lament the
on-going demise of the Indian heritage in Aden including ten Hindu and Parsi tem-
ples, and a church. Recently developed civil-war like situation, however, must have
forced many Indian origin traders to leave the country. The Government of India
itself evacuated about 5000 Indians from Yemen through the operation ‘Rahat’ in
March/April 2015.
United Arab Emirates
The Indian traders in the nineteenth century ‘Trucial Coast’ emirates were involved
in diverse economic activities of which pearl trading, until its demise in the 1930s,
was the most important one. Except India or Indians, no other subject or country
was allowed to do pearl fishing (Zahlan 1979: 22). In the late nineteenth century,
according to S.B. Miles, in Debaye (Dubai) with a population of 12,000–14,000, the
trade was ‘practically in the hands of the Banians whose strong business capacity
gives them a leading position’ (Miles 1966: 441).
Pearl was mainly bought by Indian merchants who exported them to India.
According to Lorimer (1971), there were about 400 Indian pearl merchants sta-
tioned in various Trucial States Sheikhdoms in 1901. Of the 408 Indian merchants,
173 were resident traders. The number of Indian traders further increased when
some of them who previously lived in Lingah began to settle in Dubai following the
decline of Lingah in 1902. Dubai was a free port in 1904 (Al-Sayegh 1998: 89).
Since the late nineteenth century, the Indians comprised the second biggest mer-
chant group after the native tribal Arabs who dominated the pearl fishing and trad-
ing – two honourable occupations. The Indian merchants called Banians financed the
pearling expeditions, besides taking the banking. They monopolized shopkeeping
and retail trade. A number of them ‘represented British Indian firms in Bombay’
(Al-Sayegh 1998: 88). The Indian merchants were rich and enjoyed commensurate
political privileges and influence along with the other merchant groups. The merchant
oligarchy continued until the collapse of the pearl industry and the advent of the oil
revenues in the early 1930s when rulers began to have direct income and political
independence. Early in the twentieth century, the Indian rupee began to replace the
Turkish currency in region. Soon the Indian paper rupee, with British consent acquired
the status of sole legal tender in the Gulf countries (Tharyam 1987: 57).
In the post-depression period and particularly after the Dubai reform movement
of 1938, the Indian merchants continued to enjoy relative prosperity, but less of the
political influence. Thus, in the Majlis al Tujfair in the early 1950s and in the Dubai
Municipal council elections of 1957 the Indian as well as Persian merchants were
excluded. In fact, in 1953 the National Front, a loose organization of Dubai Arab
merchants, ‘opposed the growing influence of Persian and Indian merchants’
(Al-Sayegh 1998: 98). These developments, however, did not preclude them from
participating in Dubai’s evolution as a centre of international trade and exchange,
and a cosmopolitan city with excellent educational community and social services.
Merchants were and are still dominant figures in Dubai, playing a vital role in its
continued growth and development. Dubai’s ancient calling as a ‘city of merchants’
is still as strong today as it was 200 years ago.
In the early 1980s, in Dubai alone about 3000 Indian merchant families were liv-
ing. The textiles trade was dominated by the Sindhis and the gold market by the
Hindu Gujaratis (Weiner 1982: 13). These were joined by the ‘new’ immigrants who
came to Duabi with the oil and construction boom and who were employed as doc-
tors, nurses, supervisors, clerks, salesmen, technicians, masons, cooks, domestic ser-
vants, construction workers, etc. These new immigrants also included the following
three categories of Indian entrepreneurs: (1) independent entrepreneurs who operate
mostly in free trade zones, (2) partner entrepreneurs (with local traders) who cannot
be harassed or removed from the company and (3) sponsored entrepreneurs. There are
a number of well-established Indian business houses in the country (see Jain 2010).
Bahrain
In modern times, Bahrain has been home to an important Indian merchant colony
since the beginning of the eighteenth century. British Indian merchants included
Sindhi and Gujarati. Apparently, the Sindhi merchants were the Bhatias of Thatta.
There were also other Sindhi merchants.
Like other Gulf countries, its traditional economy was mainly based on pearl
fishing and trade which continued to thrive until its decline in the 1930s in the
face of the great economic depression as well as the manufacturing of artificial
Japanese pearl. In the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 69 Hindu
traders in Manama, according to the Lorimer’s Gazetteers (1971: 2383). This
number could go up to 175 in the pearling season. A small number of Muslim
traders were also there.
276 P. C. Jain
Besides pearl financing, Indian merchants were also involved in trading of a wide
variety of other items. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, ‘Indian merchants estab-
lished import businesses in rice, tea, sugar and shoes, subsidized Arab smugglers in
gold and in hashish and opium, trans-shipping from Kabul to Bombay, then from
Bombay to the Gulf and elsewhere. In the wake of the modernization process after
the First World War when administrative reforms in various government depart-
ments were carried out in Bahrain, further immigration of Indians took place in the
country. For example, the very first directors or organizers of customs, post and
passport departments in Bahrain were Indians. So were the heads of the first medi-
cal clinic in 1925, and the very first doctors, nurses, midwives, banks and “customs”
senior clerks and agricultural advisers (Elmadani 2003:118). Some Indian traders in
Bahrain were quite wealthy. ‘In a confidential report, on the richest among Bahrain’s
merchants in the 1930s, six out of thirteen names were Indian’ (Elmadani 2003:
118).
Bahrain gained independence in 1971. The oil boom period that followed since
1973 onwards brought an ever-increasing number of expatriate labour force, includ-
ing professionals. The largest expatriate community. Indians originate mostly from
Kerala (70%) and other south Indian states. The Indian workers constitute about
30% of the total workforce of Bahrain. Among the professionals, most NRIs are
engineers, doctors, teachers, managers, accountants, architects and executives in
various establishments. A very small segment of non-resident Indians is that of trad-
ers and entrepreneurs. Among the most successful Indian entrepreneurs in Bahrain
one name figures prominently: a ‘toy seller turned hotel baron’ Mohammed
Dadabhai.
Mohammed Dadabhai and his group of companies epitomizes the Indian success
story. Mohammed Dadabhai who migrated to Bahrain at the age of 4 and whose
father Ahmedali Dadabhai migrated to Bahrain in 1925 from the princely State of
Dungarpur in Rajasthan. Senior Dadabhai initially hawked samosas and later owned
a small toy shop in Manama. As a young man, Mohammed sold toys after school on
the pavement outside his father’s shop. Subsequently, he got into construction and
tourism business. By 1998, the Dadabhai Group owned six blocks of service apart-
ments with 275 luxury flats and two 4-star hotels, with a third under construction.
‘Apart from these, Dadabhai Group also ran the Hawar Island retreat of the Amir’
(Kent 1998). With an initial investment of over two million dollars, the group has set
up an institute for training Bahrainis in hotel management and catering. Dadabhais
hold Bahraini passport.
Unlike some other Gulf countries, Bahraini government’s attitude towards non-
Muslims has been liberal since the very beginning of the Indian immigration into
Bahrain. This has enabled the Indians to build and maintain five churches, a Hindu
temple and three Sikh Gurudwaras in the country.
Kuwait
By the second half of the eighteenth century, Kuwait had come to occupy an impor-
tant posit as a maritime city. Its geographical location on the desert trade route
between the Gulf and Syria, covered by camel caravan in 25–30 days, made it an
important city for merchants. Kuwait’s position as a mercantile port around 1792
was further strengthened following the decline of Basra.
Traditionally, the Kuwait economy was based on pearl fishing, ship-building and
modest sea trade with the Indian subcontinent and East Africa. Apparently, unlike
elsewhere in the Gulf, very few Indian merchants were involved in pearl financing
in Kuwait. In spite of the British protection extended to Indians during the British
era which began in 1896 and ended in 1961, the situation did not change apprecia-
bly. The Indian business community continued to remain relatively very small in
number. An important reason for this was the fact that the Kuwaiti rulers themselves
were merchants and therefore resisted to any significant growth of Indian-owned
businesses. So much so that ‘the ruler of Kuwait attempted in the 1930s to exclude
all Indians from his state and, as a result, he entered into a dispute with the British
Political Agent’ (Elmadani 2003: 121). Besides merchants, other components of the
Indian ‘community’ in Kuwait included employees working for education, post and
communication and other government departments.
In Kuwait, the discovery of oil led to the formation of Kuwait Oil Company
(KOC) which has been importing a large number of Indian labourers since the mid-
1940s. Indians were employed as clerical staff, skilled artisans, and semi-skilled
and unskilled workers. In spite of better wages, living and working conditions of
Indian workers in Kuwait were bad and deplorable.
Indian labour continued to flock to Gulf countries including Kuwait even after
India’s independence. Oil price hike in 1973 and subsequent period served an impe-
tus to the migration process which has been continuing in ever-increasing numbers.
This migration dynamics is further reflected in the progressive strength of the Indian
expatriate community in Kuwait – from about 32,000 in 1975 to 100,000 in 1987
and 170,000 in 1990. The 1990–91 Kuwait crisis due to the Iraqi invasion led to the
evacuation of about 150,000 Indians. Since then the number of Indians in Kuwait
has gone up to 750,000 in 2014.
Apparently, these Indians have been operating their business in partnership with
local persons or entities as foreign nationals are not allowed to own a business or
purchase immovable property in their own name. According to the High Level
Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora (2001: 36), these businessmen are
‘mostly engaged in food stuffs, jewelry, garments and motor parts trading’ and ‘they
are very well off’. Indian expatriates employed in public as well as private sectors
in Kuwait include a large number of unskilled, semi-skilled workers and skilled
workers like technicians and nurses. There are about 200,000 domestic workers,
278 P. C. Jain
both males and females, which includes housemaids and governesses. A sizeable
number of professionals working in Kuwait include engineers, doctors, architects,
chartered accountants, management consultants, scientists, information technology
professionals, etc.
As in the case of other Gulf countries, in Kuwait too, the Keralites constitute the
largest segment of the Indian community. Yet, the Indian community is sufficiently
diverse to have an all-India character. This diversity is fully reflected in more than
100 cultural and professional associations.
Rao Sahib Jashanmal was one of the early Indian entrepreneurs who in 1934 had
opened a general store in Safaat Square, Kuwait. A second Jashanmal store selling
most prestigious lines of products was opened in 1963 on the fashionable Fahad Al
Salem Street. In 1964, a wholesale division was created by the then General Manager
of Jashanmal in Kuwait, Gangu Batra. By then the Jashanmal was a very well-
known name in the other Gulf countries too.
Among other prominent Indian entrepreneurs mention must be made of the
Malhotras. A.K. Malhotra, began his career in Kuwait in 1946 with a popular res-
taurant. Subsequently, in collaboration with Al-Zahem Co., he diversified into
wholesale and distribution of consumer products. Incorporated in its present form in
1980, today Al-Zahem and Malhotra is a leading conglomerate of Kuwait which is
involved in a vast array of sectors ranging from manufacturing to hospitality indus-
try. Outside Kuwait, their business is also spread in the UAE, the UK and India.
Qatar
The pearling and fishing was the mainstay of the Qatari economy, which continued
to remain so until the establishment of oil industry in the mid-twentieth century. It
was in connection with the pearl trade that a small number of Indians had settled in
Qatar in the nineteenth century. In 1883, the local ruler Qasim had expelled the
Indians from Qatar as unlike Bahrain and Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms, any formal
treaty to Britain did not bind Qatar and therefore the Indians were not entitled to
special privileges as British subjects. Moreover, Qasim himself was a pearl trader of
major importance and regarded the Indians as business competitors. Although
Qasim was compelled by the British Political Resident to apologize and pay com-
pensation on two occasions, the net result was that Qatar ‘became the only Gulf
Sheikhdom until the recent past without an Indian community’ (Zahlan 1979: 56).
Even after a treaty with the British in 1916, ‘with the exception of one Baluchi bar-
ber, there were no Indians living in Qatar’ in the 1920s (Zahlan 1979: 99). By 1939,
the total population of Qatar was estimated at 28,000. The state of Qatar became an
independent country on 3 September 1971 and has been a Gulf Cooperation Council
member since 1981.
In Qatar, as in other Gulf countries, the immigration of a large number of Indians

is limited to the oil industry. ‘Oil was first discovered in 1937, but it was not until
1949 that it was actually exported from Qatar’ (Birks and Sinclair 1980:57). The
British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPQ) obtained oil concessions in Qatar in
1935 and in 1936 Petroleum Development Qatar (PDQ) was setup to operate Qatar
concessions. However, preferential treatment in recruitment was given to local
labour, and therefore very few Indians were employed by PDQ until 1947. In spite
of this, a small number of Indians continued to migrate to Qatar during the 1950s
and 1960s. And the Indian immigrant community in Qatar remained very small.
Thus, in 1975, the total number of Indian immigrants was estimated at 27,000.
Since the mid-1970s, the migration of contract Indian workers to the Gulf coun-
tries began to take place, which is still continuing along with the migration of entre-
preneurs and professionals. The strength of the Indian immigrant community in
Qatar kept progressively increasing from 30,000 in 1979 to 50,000 in 1987,
75,000 in 1991, 150,000 in 2005 and about 500,000 in 2014. The Indian community
has set up a number of institutions and organizations which are rendering valuable
social, cultural and charitable support and assistance for the community.
Concluding Remarks
Indian traders have been trading with West Asian countries since ancient times, but
permanently settled Indian diasporic communities in the region did not emerge until
the fifteenth century. The Portuguese colonizers had taken note of the presence of
Gujarati banians in the Perian Gulf region and the East African countries. Substantial
increase in the size and geographical spread of the Indian traders and entrepreneurs
however occurred during British colonialism in India and the Gulf region. Among
the successful Indian trading communities, mention must be made of Gujarati
banians, Kutchi and Thattai Bhatias, Parsis, Muslim Bohras, Khojas and Ismailis
and more recently of Keralite entrepreneurs (often called Malabaris). It would
appear that the Indian entrepreneurship in the Arabian Peninsula is largely a caste/
community-bound phenomenon. Social capital in the form of ethnic resources has
been an important factor in their entrepreneurial success in the region.
From petty merchants to wholesale dealers and multinational franchisee from
pearl financiers to bankers and business tycoons, Indian traders and entrepreneurs in
the Persian Gulf region have traversed a long way. The Indian traders and entrepre-
neurs and other middle class professionals constitute the core of Indian diaspora in
the Gulf countries. They have been deeply entrenched into the Gulf economies for
the last four decades. Their sudden departure from the Gulf would be disastrous to
the Gulf economies, especially to their trade and service sectors.
280 P. C. Jain
References
Ahmad, M. S. (1971). Indians in West Asia. In A. Gupta (Ed.), Indians Abroad: Asia and Africa.
Delhi: Orient Longman.
Allen, C., Jr. (1981). The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat. Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies, 44(1), 39–51.
Allen, C. H., Jr. (1987). Oman: The modernization of the sultanate. Boulder: Westview Press.
Al-Sayegh, F. (1998). Merchants’ role in a changing society: The case of Dubai, 1900–90. Middle
Eastern Studies, 34(1), 87–102.
Bidwell, R. (1983). The Two Yemens. Boulder: Westview Press.
Birks, J. S., & Sinclair, C. A. (1980). Arab manpower: The crisis of development. London: Croom
Helm.
Elmadani, A. (2003). Arabia Gulf during the British Era: The impact of India. In N. N. Vohra (Ed.),
History, culture and society in India and West Asia (pp. 109–124). Delhi: Shipra Publications.
Gavin, R.J. (1975). Aden under British rule, 1939-1967. London: C. Hurst and Co.
Gopal, S. (1992). Indians in Central Asia in 16th and 17th centuries. In Proceedings of Indian
History Congress, 52nd Session, New Delhi.
Gopal, S. (1997). Indians in Iran in the 17th & 18th Centuries. Journal of Indian Ocean Studies,
4(2), 160–170.
Gopal, S. (1998). Indian Diaspora in West, Central Asia and Russia in Medieval Times. Journal of
Indian Ocean Studies, 5(2), 116–128.
High Level Committee, Government of India. (2001). High Level Committee Report on the Indian
Diaspora. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs.
Jain, P. C. (2010). Non-Resident Indian Entrepreneurs in the United Arab Emirates. New Delhi:
Manak Publications.
Kechichian, J. A. (1995). Oman and the World. Santa Monica: Rand Publication.
Kent, M. (1998, January 25). Little India in the Gulf. The Express Magazine.
Kour, Z. H. (1981). The history of Aden, 1839–72. London: Frank Cass.
Lorimer, J. G. (1971). Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, I Historical Part
2, Superintendent. Calcutta: Government Printing.
Markovits, C. (2000). The global world of Indian Merchants, 1950–1947: Traders of Sind from
Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miles, S. B. (1966). Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (2nd ed.). London: Kegan Paul.
Sheth, V. S. (1998). South Arabia, 1959–1967. Mumbai: Somaiya Publications.
Tharyam, A. O. (1987). The establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–85. London: Croom
Helm.
Weiner, M. (1982). International migration and development: Indians in the Persian Gulf Region.
International Migration Review, 8(1), 1–36.
Zahlan, R. S. (1979). The creation of Qatar. London: Croom Helm.
Chapter 16
The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf
Introduction
International migration is one of the most ubiquitous realities in the Gulf states. In
many ways, the inexhaustible availability of a foreign labour force has allowed the
Gulf nations to become what they are today. Migration has been instrumental in
nation-building processes in the Gulf (Chowdhury and Rajan 2018; Rajan 2017a,
b). At the same time, the sheer scale of the phenomenon – with foreign majorities in
the workforce as well as in total population of several states – is regarded as a chal-
lenge to nationhood. At the other end of the migratory routes, for many countries of
origin in South Asia, the Arab world and East Africa, migration to the Gulf is an
integral part of the lives of tens of millions and a constitutive element of economies
and societies.
The Gulf countries receive a majority of migrants from two broad regions: Asia
(including South and Southeast Asia) and several Arab countries, with a clear and
persistent predominance of the former (Rajan 2018, 2019; Jain and Oommen 2016).
Most of their emigrants are relatively low-skilled workers, and males constitute the
bulk in all cases, except for Indonesia and the Philippines where more than half of
all emigrants are female. They all perceive Gulf migration as an important solution
to the problems of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation in the home country,
some defining it as ‘survival migration’ for the families (Ratha et al. 2018; Rajan
2012, 2016a, b).
As in the case of Asian countries, the five leading Arab sending countries also
seek to facilitate emigration to the Gulf through an ‘open door’ policy without
S. I. Rajan (*)
G. Z. Oommen

restrictions of age and skills. One of the fundamental reasons for such policies is the
high levels of unemployment in these Arab countries, especially among the highly
educated nationals. Arabs have, however, lost ground to Asians because they are
perceived by the host countries as exerting potentially disruptive influences on the
Gulf political systems, being more difficult to control, and demanding higher wages
than Asians. There has been a consistent and significant shift from Arab workers to
Asians since the late 1970s, mainly to safeguard the political interests of oil rich
monarchies. Arab countries have also sought to harness the potential of emigrants
through diaspora policies that could attract investments in home countries.
Two major events that particularly enabled this process of ‘Asianization’ were
the intensification of globalization since the 1990s which accelerated developmen-
tal activities and the demand for immigrant manpower in the Gulf states, and the
withdrawal of Yemeni and Palestinian labour from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
countries on account of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the wake of their support to
Iraq. Both these factors were instrumental in rendering numeric primacy to South
Asians in the Gulf countries. Thus, the proportion of the Arab expatriate population
which was 72% in the 1970s was reduced to 31% in the late 1990s. Certainly, this
preference was also enhanced and encouraged by the characteristic features of
South Asian migrant labour – namely docility, political neutrality, flexibility and
willingness. The willingness to work for lower wages, and capacity to work hard,
helped in the process.
Among all the countries with migrants in the Gulf, India has the largest number.
Expatriate Indians in the Gulf numbered about seven million in 2013, accounting
for about 40% of the region’s labour force (Vinod and Rajan 2012; Rajan and
Narayana 2012; Rajan and Saxena 2019). Despite this visible presence in the Gulf,
India does not have any exclusive policy for migrants going there, unlike some of
the other Asian countries. The Philippines is another country with large numbers of
workers in the Gulf, about 55% being females in domestic service. The Philippines
presents a contrast to other Asian countries in terms of having exceptionally vocal
policies to protect their workers, especially the ones in domestic work.
The impact of migration is multilayered. For the sending country or region, the
impact of migration is often quantified in terms of economic remittances on one
hand and on the other, socio-cultural remittances, such as the ‘changed world views
and way of life’ of the migrants that they import back to their home countries. In the
context of South Asia, this has meant higher living standards, and escape from
unemployment and poverty, as true in the case of India as that of Sri Lankans seek-
ing livelihood and respite from the civil war that tore apart their tiny country, or
Bangladeshis seeking a way out of the grinding poverty in their villages and towns.
Not only has migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) become a major
contributor to their home countries’ foreign exchange income, but they have also
helped transform the economy of their respective hometowns, villages, cities and
states, leading to higher indices of social welfare. Migration has had other major
by-products, not always qualified – it has led to greater autonomy for women
migrants from India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, who travelled there to work as domestic
16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf 283
helpers and later – as the healthcare industry expanded – as health caregivers and
nurses (Percot and Rajan 2007; Rajan and Joseph 2015; Varghese and Rajan 2011).
The Present
Since 1990, annual outflows to the GCC countries from most Asian senders have
seen a remarkable increase. In the case of Pakistan, the annual outflows increased
by almost 20 times from 41,611 persons in 1990 to 822,032 in 2016. The outflows
from Bangladesh and India increased by about six times and from the Philippines
by four times. Thus, the general policies to increase or maintain the level of outflows
have been highly successful and offer scope for optimism. Indonesia seems to be an
exception with a decline in the annual outflow of migrants from 2007 to 2014. There
are substantial differences in terms of the specific destination country in the GCC to
which migrants from Asia go. Looking at the most recent outflows, the majority of
migrants from Bangladesh went to Oman or Saudi Arabia. A majority of Indians
and Pakistanis as well as Filipinos went to either Saudi Arabia or UAE. Destinations
of Sri Lankans were more varied and most went to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the
UAE. In the case of Nepal, Qatar was the most prominent destination country fol-
lowed by Saudi Arabia. Being the most populous GCC country, Saudi Arabia has
attracted the largest number of migrants within the region (Hussain 2011, 2014,
2016; Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2016, 2017; Zachariah et al. 2014).
GCC destinations accounted for more than 95% of all migrants in the case of
India and Pakistan and about 88.4% in the case of Sri Lanka (Kelegama 2011).
Nepalese, Bangladeshi and Filipino workers have explored markets beyond the Gulf
countries. About 58% of Nepalese workers headed to the GCC and a very substan-
tial proportion went to Malaysia in 2014–15. About one-fourth (24.5%) of
Bangladeshis went to destinations other than the Gulf in 2016. Also, about 60% of
all Filipino workers and 66% of new hires went to the GCC while the rest headed to
a number of other countries in 2014.
Asian countries vary in terms of the gender composition of migrants they send to
the Gulf. Migration from Nepal is primarily that of males, constituting about 96%.
In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, more than half the migrants in recent
years were female, and about one-third of those from Sri Lanka were female. The
sex ratio of outflows from Sri Lanka has changed markedly over the years. Almost
three-fourths of all Sri Lankan migrants were female in 1997; since then, the trend
has reversed and women constituted less than half of all migrants in 2008.
Moreover, only a small percentage of migrants from Asia to the Gulf are highly
skilled professional workers. A vast majority are semi-skilled or low-skilled. Among
women, a majority are domestic workers. About 57.3% of migrant workers from
Bangladesh were semi-skilled or unskilled in 2016, while the figure was 57% for
Pakistan. From the Philippines, almost half were service workers while 32% were
production workers in 2013. From Sri Lanka, 41.7% of the males were semi-skilled
or unskilled while 81% of the females were domestic workers in 2015.
The Future
Migration to the Gulf being temporary and circulatory in nature, return migration
and rehabilitation of returnees have also emerged as important issues in most South
Asian countries. Nevertheless, it is fascinating when we consider that many of the
expatriates from South Asia, especially India, which constitutes the largest group,
are today second- or third-generation migrants. For instance, about 2.6 million
Indians live in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alone, constituting the largest expa-
triate community there. While they send back home about $13.2 billion annually,
they are also the largest investors in the UAE’s real estate market. So, though tem-
porary in nature, the symbiosis has engendered a kind of continuous temporariness,
even an emotional dividend.
Changing geopolitical dynamics has injected another element – that of strategic.
This was most starkly demonstrated when the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the
deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan became the Chief Guest at the Republic Day celebra-
tions in New Delhi in January 2017. A slew of accords were signed between India
and the UAE, elevating bilateral relations from transactional to strategic. Similarly,
India has defence agreements with other GCC countries like the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and Oman and these ties are set to only expand and deepen.
However, it has not all been rosy and smooth sailing. There have been enough
reports and cases of the abuse, oppression of migrant labour in the GCC country,
especially of women with few, if any, laws existing for safeguarding their rights and
for their protection. In many cases, unscrupulous middle-men from the home coun-
tries are also culpable (Rajan et al. 2011). The job market is not egalitarian in the
GCC states and that the wage differential is quite high between the expatriates and
the natives, with the former employed mostly in the private sector which offers
lower wages and fewer facilities. In addition, a variety of factors – high unemploy-
ment among the GCC natives, economic burdens due to the various Gulf Wars, the
increase in the female participation in the labour market have all determined a more
restrictive policy for migration, like the Saudi Nitaqat law, which aims at the
‘Saudization’ of the workforce in private sector in the country by easing out expatri-
ate workers.
Nevertheless, there has been no decrease in the flow of migrant workers to the
GCC region in the last one decade inspite of political upheavals in the Middle East,
low oil prices, or even the global economic slump. This may, of course, change in
the future.
Globalization, liberalization of the societies of the GCC countries, widening of
human rights regime in South Asia has led to greater dialogue among these coun-
tries and their respective governments and a number of checks have been put in
place to pre-empt and prevent the abuse and torture of the migrants and misuse of
labour laws.
The fact that through the changing economic–political dynamics, the South
Asian, especially the Indian migrant community in the GCC, has endured, is a
16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf 285
pointer to the contribution that migrants make to their host countries (Zachariah
et al. 2004; Naufal, Malit and Genc 2016; Kanchana and Rajan 2014; Bedi et al.
2016). Moreover, when migrants make no political claims, and their contribution is
acknowledged and appreciated, the relationship between the host and the migrant
becomes symbiotic, beneficial to both. The narrative of migration from South Asia
to the GCC serves as a beacon in these times of migrant scepticism.
References
Bedi, S. A., Rajan, S. I., & Seshan, G. (2016). Coming to Qatar: A snapshot of the experiences
of Indian labour migrants (Chapter 8). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2016: Gulf
migration (pp. 106–121). New Delhi: Routledge.
Chowdhury, M., & Irudaya Rajan, S. (Eds.). (2018). South Asian migration in the Gulf. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Hussain, Z. (2011). Immigration policies of the GCC countries: Implications and responses
(Chapter 4). In S. I. Rajan, & M. Percot (Eds), Dynamics of Indian migration: Historical and
current perspectives (pp. 93–163). New Delhi: Routledge.
Hussain, Z. (2014). Nitaqat – Second wave of Saudization: Is it an answer to the domestic discon-
tent? (Chapter 15). In S. I. Rajan (Eds.), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and develop-
ment (pp. 210–228). New Delhi: Routledge.
Hussain, Z. (2016). GCCs immigration policies in the post 1990s: Contextualizing south Asian
migrants. In P. C. Jain, & G. Z. Oommen (Eds.), South Asian migration to Gulf countries:
History policies and development. New Delhi: Routledge.
Jain, P. C., & Oommen, G. Z. (Eds.). (2016). South Asian migration to gulf countries: History
Policies and Development. New Delhi: Routledge.
Kanchana, R., & Rajan, S. I. (2014). Indian migrant experiences in Oman and Bahrain (Chapter
14). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and development (pp. 193–
209) New Delhi: Routledge.
Kelegama, S., et al. (Eds.). (2011). Migration, remittances and development in South Asia
(pp. 3–10). New Delhi: Sage.
Naufal, G., Malit, F. T., & Genc, I. (2016). Contemporary Indian labour migration in the GCC
region: Emerging challenges and opportunities (Chapter 5). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migra-
tion report 2016: Gulf migration (pp. 63–74). New Delhi: Routledge.
Percot, M., & Rajan, S. I. (2007). Female emigration from India: Case study of nurses. Economic
and Political Weekly, 42(4), 318–325.
Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2012). India migration report 2012: Global crisis, migration and remittances.
New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I (Ed.). (2016a). India migrations reader. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (2016b). India migration report 2016: Gulf migration. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2017a). South Asian migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegra-
tion. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I. (2017b). South Asia-gulf migration corridor: An introduction. In S. I. Rajan (Ed),
South Asia migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegration (pp. 1–19). New
Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. 1. (2018). Demography of gulf region (Chapter 3). In M. Chowdhury, & S. I. Rajan
(Eds.), South Asian migration in the Gulf (pp. 35–59). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rajan, S. I. (2019). The crisis of gulf migration. Chapter 48, pp. 849-68 in Cecilia Menjivar.
In M. Ruiz & I. Ness (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of migration crises. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Rajan, S. I, & Joseph, J. (2013). Adapting, adjusting and accommodating: Social costs of migration
to Saudi Arabia (Chapter 9). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), Global financial crisis, migration and remit-
tances: India migration report 2013 (pp. 139–53). New Delhi: Routledge.
workers in Saudi Arabia (Chapter 2). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2015: Gender
and migration (pp. 9–25). New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2016). Gulf migration in times of regulation: Do migration controls and
labour market restrictions in Saudi Arabia produces irregularity? (Chapter 12). In S. I. Rajan
(Ed.). India migration report 2016: Gulf migration (pp. 162–183). New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2017). Migration (in)flux: Impact of legislation on patterns and quantum
of irregular mobility between India and Saudi Arabia (Chapter 14). In P. Fargues & N. M. Shah
(Eds.), 2017. Skilful survivals: Irregular migration to the Gulf (pp. 269–292). Cambridge: Gulf
Research Centre.
Rajan, S. I., & Narayana, D. (2012). The financial crisis in the Gulf and its impact on south Asian
migration and remittances (Chapter 5). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2012:
Global financial crisis, migration and remittances (p. 74). New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S. I., & Saxena, P. (2019). India’s unskilled migration to the Middle East: Policies, politics
and challenges. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
ability: Overseas recruitment practices and its discontents in India. New Delhi: Routledge.
Ratha, D., De, S., Plaza, S., Seshan, G., Yameogo, N. D., & Kim, E. J. (2018). Migration and remit-
tances: Recent development and outlook (Migration and development brief 30). Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Varghese, V. J., & Rajan, S. I. (2011). Governmentality, social stigma and quasi-citizenship:
Gender negotiations of migrant women domestic workers from Kerala. Chapter 7. In S. I.
Rajan & M. Percot (Eds.), Dynamics of Indian migration: Historical and current perspectives
Vinoj, A., & Irudaya Rajan, S. (2012). Global financial crisis and return of South Asia migrants:
Patterns and determination of their integration to local labour markets. Chapter 11. In S. Irudaya
Rajan (Ed.), Global financial crisis, migration and remittances: India migration report 2012
Zachariah, K. C., Prakash, B. A., & Rajan, S. I. (2004). Indian workers in UAE: Employment, wages
and working conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX, (22, May 29), 2227–2234.
Zachariah, K. C, Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2014). Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects
under the Nitaqat law (Chapter 16). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India migration report 2014: Diaspora
and development (pp. 229–248). New Delhi: Routledge.

S. Irudaya Rajan, Ginu Zacharia Oommen - Asianization of Migrant Workers in The Gulf Countries-Springer Singapore (2020)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

S. Irudaya Rajan, Ginu Zacharia Oommen - Asianization of Migrant Workers in The Gulf Countries-Springer Singapore (2020)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

S.

ISBN 978-981-32-9286-4 ISBN 978-981-32-9287-1 (eBook)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India S. Irudaya Rajan

1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook�������������������������������������������� 1

9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy:

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala (India). He has 35 years of research experience.

Ginu Zacharia Oommen, PhD, is a member of the Kerala Public Service

Commission, Trivandrum. Prior to this, he was a visiting professor at the Fondation

Kaltham Al-Ghanim is Professor of Sociology, Qatar University.

G. M. Arif is a demographer and currently he is the Joint Director at the Pakistan

Zahra R. Babar is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International

M. V. Bijulal is Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations and

Abdoulaye Diop is Associate Research Professor and Head of the Research

Shujaat Farooq is working in Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP),

Andrew Gardner is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Puget Sound

Ismail Genc is Professor of Economics and the Head of the Economics Department

Laura Harkness is Freelance Researcher and she was a research associate at

Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru

M. H. Ilias is Professor at the India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia,

Nasir Iqbal is Director of Research at the Benazir Income Support Programme

Prakash C. Jain is UGC Emeritus Fellow following his superannuation as

Jolin Joseph is Doctoral Scholar at York University, Canada.

George Naufal is Senior Research Associate at PPRI and a Research Fellow at the

Marie Percot is an anthropologist and is associated with the Laboratoire d’

Silvia Pessoa is Associate Teaching Professor of English at Carnegie Mellon

Bilesha Weeraratne is currently a Research Fellow, attached to the Labour,

Fig. 2.1 Immigration number – all females (NB: 1960 value

Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006.������������������������������������ 135

Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of various expatriate groups

Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987

Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators,

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 1

e­ conomic implications of Asianization on migration and remittance flows are quite

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 19

Trends in the Migration History of the GCC

Genc and Naufal (2013).

Clemens (2013) passionately called the GCC countries to consider.

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

This could be thought as the typical case of a monopoly.

Incidentally, some researchers emphasize a particular characteristic of the Arab

Current Labour Force Profile

Oman and Saudi Arabia’s numbers are for 2013.

100 93.8 92.9

Employed Non-Nationals Employed Nationals

Unemployment Rate for 2012

Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female

Labor Force Participation Rate for 2012

Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female

Table 2.3 Occupation by nationality and gender – Kuwait 2012

Challenges and Opportunities of the GCC Countries

Large natural reserves endowment, significant and continuous political instability in

Adams, R. (2009). The determinants of international remittances in developing countries. World

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 37

Gulf Migration Policy and Practice

almost no pathways to obtaining permanent settlement or citizenship. Migrants may

Reforming the Gulf Migration System

Increasingly, GCC governments have acknowledged the limitations of the kafala,

as the ‘recruiter’ of a foreign worker. This change in official terminology demon-

Article 7, Qatari Law No. 21 of 2015.

GCC Regional Migration Platforms

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India S. Irudaya Rajan

1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook�� 1

9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy:

Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006.�� 135

Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987

Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators,

e conomic implications of Asianization on migration and remittance flows are quite

Trends in the Migration History of the GCC

Current Labour Force Profile

Challenges and Opportunities of the GCC Countries

Gulf Migration Policy and Practice

Reforming the Gulf Migration System

GCC Regional Migration Platforms

International Migrants’ Protections

Signs of Political Assertion

Review of Instruments for Migrant Human Rights

Remittances, Citizenship and Development

Response from GCC Countries

Survey Data and Methodology

Basic Characteristics of Low-Income Migrants in Qatar

Arranging for Work in Qatar

Nationality, Ethnicity, Religion and Migrant Success

A Quintessential Emigration Nation

Evolution of Migration from Indonesia to the Gulf

Feminization of Migration to the Gulf

Labour Migration and Development in Indonesia

Determinants of Future Migration to the Gulf

Indonesia’s Rapidly Changing Economy

Indonesia’s Changing Demography

The Role of Political Factors

The Immigration Industry

he Expanding Role of the State in the Labour Export

The State and Protecting the Welfare of Overseas Filipinos