FP India (RP)

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 17, (2017) 463–496
doi: 10.1093/irap/lcx011 Advance Access published on 5 September 2017
Explaining India’s Foreign

Policy: From Dream to
Realization of Major Power
Takenori Horimoto*
Gifu Women’s University, Gifu, Japan

*Email: himalayahorimoto@gmail.com
Accepted 4 July 2017
Abstract
A power transformation appears to be taking place in Asia, brought
about by the rapid emergence of China and the relative decline of US
influence. India has sought a way to cope with this new situation. India
itself has been rising to prominence since the 1990s, particularly its nu-
clear weapon tests in 1998 onward. Since the start of the twenty-first
century, India has been perceived as the next country to follow China in
seeking a major power status. Although India has previously tended to
conceal its power aspirations, in 2015 it declared its intention to be a
leading power. This article elucidates this transformation through
India’s policy orientation on a local, regional, and global level and its
key partnerships with Russia and Japan. India’s metamorphosis holds
great implications for the transformation of power in Asia.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 17 No. 3

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by Catherine Sharp user
on 11 January 2018
464 Takenori Horimoto
1 Introduction
After the Cold War, particularly since the 2000s, the rapid rise of
China has presented a challenge to United States (US) influence.
Although the US can still be regarded as the sole superpower, its rela-
tive decline is stark. Asian players, such as Japan, the ASEAN coun-
tries and Australia, and India, have been encountering and adapting to
the new circumstances, which might be designated as a power transfor-
mation in Asia.
Although the US and China can be regarded as the two major
powers of the present and the future, among the Asian players, India is
trying evidently to catch up with those two countries as a major power,
albeit lagging perhaps one or two laps behind them.
Hence, the main objective of this article is to present an examination
of how India is attempting to construct its overall foreign policy in the
current international situation and beyond. To state the conclusion at
the beginning, India is trying to respond to the emerging situation by
aiming to become a major power itself in the future. India has been a
reluctant player in the international theater since its independence in
1947 until the 2000s. With the start of the 2010s, however, India has
metamorphosed itself into a dynamic actor and has switched from deny-
ing to affirming its status as a major power. The dearth of literature on
India’s transformation requires further examination. Accordingly, this
article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of India’s foreign
policy. There is hardly any literature on this topic, and therefore this arti-
cle is an attempt to elucidate a holistic view of India’s foreign policy.
In this context, it might be required to touch upon the definition of
a major power. There is no established definition of a major power, but
some experts offer helpful clues in relation to India. Perkovich (2003–
04), for instance, points out that ‘India cannot get other important
states to comply with Indian demands . . . India does have the capabil-
ity to resist demands placed upon it by other countries.’ Others argue
that India’s foreign policy objective is to become a major power in
terms of having the capability to alter the international system or to be
perceived as a major power (Kondo, 2012, p. 7).1
1 India’s membership of major powers would be conditioned on whether the US as a super-

power recognizes India as a major power (Nayar and Paul, 2004, pp. 113).

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Explaining India’s Foreign Policy 465
Delving into India’s strategic response to the power transformation

in Asia and examining India’s objectives, this article presents four
sections. The first section provides a brief historical context of India’s
foreign policy responses to the situation prevailing in Asia between the
end of the Second World War and the 1990s. The principal characteris-
tic of the period would be India’s self-conception of the inadequacy of
its capabilities. It is possible to say the perception has epitomized the
basic factor for India’s foreign policy of non-alignment and its alliance
with the Soviet Union.
The second section, which mainly addresses the 2010s, analyzes the
puzzling rationale behind India’s major power intentions. Putting it an-
other way, this period shows the metamorphosis of India’s foreign pol-
icy as distinctively different from that of the preceding long period. In
order to clarify such difference, the section shows India’s foreign policy
matrix. The matrix offers a basic and overall framework and percep-
tion toward understanding India’s foreign policy goals.
The third section discusses India’s close relations with Russia and
Japan—currently India’s two key partners. The author believes that
India, in order to smoothly engineer its foreign policies at regional and
global levels, seeks alignments with these two prominent players.
Geopolitically speaking, India is striving to cope with an assertive China
through its relations with Russia in Eurasia and Japan in the Indo-
Pacific. The concluding section considers how India might proceed with
its foreign policy orientation.
2 Historical development of India’s foreign policy

The main thrust of this article examines how India’s quest to be a major
power concretized in the middle of 2010s after the long period of caution
on the international stage. Through elucidating India’s foreign policy in the
past six decades after independence, it is possible to bring the recent emer-
gence of India’s foreign policy as a major power into sharp relief.
2.1 During the Cold War

India, which was partitioned from British India and achieved inde-
pendence in August 1947, had several basic attributes of a typical ma-
jor power: its history, size, and location. Study of its history reveals
that India has a distinctive feature: ‘Of the great world civilizations,

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only India and China embody a civilization in a single large nation-

body politic’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 51). Although India under British colo-
nial rule was not a sovereign state, it became an original member of
the United Nations (UN) at its foundation in 1945. As such, India is
in a position to claim its status as the successor state of British India.
Pakistan, another partitioned entity of British India, joined the UN in
September 1947 as a new state.
In addition, India is one of the largest countries in terms of popula-
tion and area. Its area is nine times bigger than that of Japan. Moreover,
India occupies a central location in the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, these attributes have not naturally catapulted India
into major power status, particularly because of its lack of national
power in terms of economic size and defense capability. The lack of na-
tional power left India with the empty daydream of becoming a major
power. It was a major country, but its sphere of influence was essen-
tially limited to the South Asian region. Given those circumstances,
India’s foreign policy options have remained rather constrained.
Such limitations were readily apparent during the Cold War period.
First, India established and maintained its so-called non-alignment pol-
icy as its basic tenet of foreign policy between the 1940s and the 1960s
under its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The policy meant
alignment to neither the US camp nor the Soviet camp. Although this
was true, this definition explains one-half of the important aspects of
the non-alignment. The other half was in finding common causes with
other non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Egypt
with which it could act in concert.
The non-alignment policy was jettisoned in the early 1970s. However,
India officially claimed it as a continuous policy during the era of
rapprochement between the US and China, and when the Second
India–Pakistan war (also known as the Bangladesh independence war)
was imminent in December 1971. China and Pakistan developed an
all-weather relationship in the 1960s and have maintained it subsequently.
Since ‘for thousands years military threats to India have been perceived
as coming primarily from India’s northwest’ (Brewster, 2012, p. 26), the
emerged combination of Pakistan to the west and China to the north
amplified India’s threat perception further.
In contrast, India effectively abandoned its non-aligned policy by
signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation

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on 9 August 1971, which specified mutual strategic cooperation. If alli-

ances are to be defined as ‘formal associations of states for the use
(or nonuse) of military forces, in specified circumstance, against outside
their own membership’ (Snyder, 1997, p. 4), the treaty2 signified the
creation of bilateral relations between India and the Soviet Union and
aligned these states (Horimoto and Lalima, 2013, pp. 5–8).
Therefore, The Times (London) noted that: ‘India today discarded
her policy of non-alliance and entered into a formal coalition with the
Soviet Union.’3 It is noteworthy, however, that India has officially
maintained its foreign policy of non-alignment, even after signing the
Indo-Soviet Treaty, as outlined in the Ministry of External Affairs’
Annual Reports during the period under review.
Therefore, since independence, India has transformed its foreign
policy from non-alignment to alliance with the Soviet Union. Regarding
this transformation, I would like to introduce an opposite view
among Japanese scholars specializing in the study of India’s foreign
policy. Namely, ‘Even though the treaty was an alliance in nature, if
the bilateral relations of India and Russia were made up of mutually
dependable relations based upon independence, the relations were
equal, then logically speaking, the treaty is not a so-called Cold War
alliance and did not contradict the non-alignment principles’
(Yoshida, 2001, p. 46). But this author opines rather differently. Since
in those days, India depended heavily on Russia for trade and defense
acquisitions, Indo-Russia relations could not be readily regarded as
equal.
Why was India compelled to alter its policy? The basic factor would
be the insufficiency of its national power. The alignment of non-
aligned countries was the first option, followed by alignment with the
Soviet Union. India could not afford to go it alone. India has been
2 Article IX of that treaty stipulated ‘In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a
threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consulta-
tions to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and
the security of their countries.’ The article is available at http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-docu
ments.htm?dtl/5139/Treatyþofþ (20 March 2017, date last accessed).
3 The Guardian (1971, August 10) described it as ‘departure from the Indian policy of
non-alignment’.

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bound to adopt various alignment policies.4 The net result of India’s

two foreign policies was an ineffectual presence on the international
stage. India’s alliance with the Soviet Union was generally perceived to
render it a dependent actor in the prevailing international political scene.
P.A.N. Murthy, India’s East Asian specialist, has regarded India as
an intermediate power in the bipolar international order, which could
not be regarded ‘as a corner or a pole by itself (Murthy, 1986, p. 391).
2.2 In the post-Cold War period of the 1990s: various new

foreign policy initiatives
Entering into the 1990s, India was faced with a difficult situation.
Among others, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant India had lost
the mainstay of its foreign policy. India had no alternative but to grope
at initiating various new policies. This presented difficult challenges for
India because ‘India has generally seen itself as a world power in making,
and conducted its regional and international relations on this basis.
The result has been insignificance abroad, suspicion in the region and
turbulence at home’ (Thakur, 1992).
Moreover, the Soviet Union was not just India’s principal partner,
but its major trading partner. Because of the Gulf War of 1990–91, oil
price spikes, and a sharp reduction of home remittances from Indians
overseas in the Middle East, India faced the prospect of defaulting on
its loans. It had no alternative but to seek assistance from IMF loans.
In return for that assistance, India was required to deregulate its eco-
nomic system and to open up its economy from the closed approach it
had maintained during the Cold War period. Narasimha Rao became
Prime Minister in June 1991 and in the following month introduced
economic liberalization together with Finance Minister Manmohan
Singh (later prime minister).
The transformation of the Indian economy and the crash of the
Soviet Union, along with the changed international structure, have
compelled India to overhaul its foreign policy altogether. Many foreign
4 In contrast, China has consistently implemented its independent foreign policy without
alignment. China ceased to align with other countries in the early 1960s, when its close rela-
tions with the Soviet Union faltered.

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policy initiatives were launched in the 1990s. In 1992, Rao visited the
US. For India, the US was ‘on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile,
but, more often, just estranged’ (Kux, 1993, p. 447) during the Cold
War period. That remark might not be an overstatement. After all,
India’s foreign policy has mirrored its policy toward the US during the
last half-century.
Rao visited China in 1993 and concluded an Agreement on the
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility concerning the lines of actual
control between India and China. The essence of the agreement can be
distilled as normalization of the relationship by shelving the knotty issue
of their mutual border (Horimoto, 2014b). The Look-East Policy has
been followed since 1993 (Haidar, 2012, p. 53). This new orientation
resulted in India achieving the status of a Dialog Partner of ASEAN in
1994 and becoming an ARF member the next year. This change of sta-
tus was attributable to a change of perception by ASEAN, enabling it
‘to digest the implications of China’s rise, not just as an economic power
but also as a military power’ (Naidu, 2013, p. 63).
During the latter half of the 1990s, India set up its first strategic
partnership with South Africa in 1997. Creating strategic partnerships
became established as one of India’s foreign policy pillars (Horimoto,
2012). As of 2015, India has maintained strategic partnerships with 28
countries. At the end of the 1990s, India conducted atom bomb tests
in 1998, for the second time since 1974. These tests were vehemently
denounced worldwide, but helped to elevate India’s image as a major
power.
All these policy initiatives impressed the world with a fresh image of
India, but they were miscellaneous initiatives without any clear indica-
tion of a new objective of India’s foreign policy. Naturally, India’s for-
eign policy invited various critiques: ‘Even as India’s rise in the inter-
state global hierarchy continues steadily, its policymakers still act in
the international arena as if India can continue to afford the luxury of
responding to foreign policy challenges on a case-by-case basis with no
requirement for a long-term strategic policy framework. The same ad
hoc-ism that had characterized Indian foreign policy in the past lin-
gers’ (Pant, 2009). Similarly, Rajiv Sikri (former Foreign Secretary of
the Ministry of External Affairs) said ‘India must have a clear grand
strategic design’ (Sikri, 2009, p. 300).

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3. India’s aspiration to major power status
3.1 India’s emergence

These critical remarks could be directed toward India’s foreign policy
in the two decades of the 1990s and the 2000s. They might be correct
assessments for India of the 1990s, but India of the 2000s onward pre-
sents a completely changed picture. Upon entering the 2000s, India’s
inclination to become a major power gradually emerged. One might
say that 1998 was the latent starting point of this intention, but that
India’s nuclear achievements turned out to be a pipedream until the
term BRICs came into popular use in 2001. The BRICs5 were intro-
duced to the public by the then Chair of Goldman Sachs Asset
Management, Jim O’Neill, in his publication Building Better Global
Economic BRICs (O’Neil, 2001). BRICs denoted the group of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China, all sharing their bright prospects of emerging
economies. India lived up to these predictions. It showed a high eco-
nomic growth rate of 8–10 percent between financial years 2003 and
2010 (Ishigami, 2017, p. 52).
Such amazing economic performance has given India great self-
confidence. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the then ruling party,
presented its slogan of ‘Shining India’ in its 2004 General Election
manifesto. C. Raja Mohan, India’s leading strategic thinker, has said:
‘After disappointing itself for decades, India is now on the verge of be-
coming a great power’ (Mohan, 2006). India’s momentum of emer-
gence continued into the 2010s. The China Daily remarked upon
India’s great power ambitions when India launched the Agni, a me-
dium-range missile in December 2011.6 The Economist in 2013 pub-
lished a special issue carrying the title India as a Great Power.7
Consequently, India looked to be emerging on the global stage in
the 2000s and 2010s. Nevertheless, the Government of India (GOI) it-
self has never publicly proclaimed the country to be a major power
5 BRICs changed its acronym to BRICS when South Africa joined the BRICs summit in 2010.
6 Times of India (2011, December 18, paper edition).
7 The Economist (30 March 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/
21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end (3 March 2017,
date last accessed).

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and has instead adhered to its traditional external policy of coopera-

tion or alliance with like-minded nations. The first document made
public by GOI was the Report of GOM on National Security, which
suggests that India has no reasonable alternative but to opt for closer
relations with the US (Group of Ministers, 2001).
The second document was The Challenge: India and the New
American Global Strategy, 2006, which was submitted to Prime Minister
Singh by the task force headed by K. Subrahmanyam, who was assumed
to be the greatest strategic thinker in independent India. Although this
document remains secret, Sanjaya Baru disclosed the gist of it as ‘the
time has come for India to advance its interests through greater integra-
tion with the global economy, making the best use of economic opportu-
nities provided by developed economies, especially the US’ (Baru, 2014,
p. 168). It carries an almost identical tone to that of the 2001 report.
Certainly, and particularly for foreigners, these documents provide
excellent materials and data elucidating India’s current foreign policy.
Aside from these two, since the 2000s, various arguments have been
put forth to characterize India’s foreign policy as a diversified, multilat-
eral policy. However, they remain incomplete, failing to provide a total
picture of foreign policy, particularly the main objectives of its foreign
policy. Perhaps, India might have had difficulty taking suitable steps
during the transitional period because India’s emergence as a major
power is a recent phenomenon.
3.2 Negation of major power and Taoguang Yanghui

Although India has been generally acknowledged to be a future major
power, an interesting and strange phenomenon emerged: India’s nega-
tion of such a status and role. Perhaps one can find a similar tendency
in the report Nonalignment2.0 in 2012 (Khilnani et al., 2012), which
has been regarded as a quasi-official document. In it, one might iden-
tify the basic principles used to guide India’s foreign and strategic pol-
icy over the next decade. The report is filled with references to India as
a major power, but is wary of this status, suggesting rather that the
country should maintain its status of strategic autonomy. Subsequently,
the report attracted severe criticism particularly from the strategic

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community in India.8 Its main argument can be summarized as empha-

sizing strategic autonomy and the means to realize this (Khilnani
et al., 2012)
India’s wariness has been pointed out by Miller, who observed that
India’s diplomatic elites tend to resist the rise of their own country
(Miller, 2013). In a similar vein, M.K. Narayanan, India’s ex-National
Security Advisor, has characterized India as a reluctant power
(Narayanan, 2014). In addition, India has been characterized as using
swing-state policies (Kliman and Fontaine, 2012).
One can interpret such wariness from the historical tendency of India’s
strategically defensive posture (Tanham, 1992, pp. 52–53). A similar ana-
lytical attempt has been made to explain the application of the strategic
restraint concept to India’s defense policy after its independence, which
shows no clear-cut approach (Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010).
India seemed to have adopted a la Taoguang Yanghui ( ) the
line of biding one’s time while strengthening one’s power. This has been
the basis of China’s external policy propounded by Deng Xiaoping
and observed by Hu Jintao, but not currently by Xi Jinping. This
approach is now taken only by the the US.9 In short, India aspires to
be a major power, but it continues to conceal its true objective. If
India were to set out its aspiration of becoming a major power, it
might elicit unfavorable situations and reactions. India looked to have
adopted its Taoguang Yanghui under the prevailing circumstance then.
This makes it difficult to draw comparisons with other rising powers.
The geopolitical condition that has driven Indian strategic thinking
through the Cold War is sui generis in nature. For example, China
adopted Deng Xiaoping’s tenets, Japan mobilized its resources, and
sought to become an economic power and achieve great power status
under the Yoshida Doctrine. However, there remained several inconsis-
tencies in Indian economic policies and security interests which
8 No clear-cut definition of the term exists in India. Generally, those who are engaging in for-
eign and national security issues comprise such experts as university professors, think-tank
analysts, ex-officials of the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, and journalists.
They are opinion makers-cum-leaders influencing India’s external policies.
9 An interview with Wang Jisi ( American Studies Center of Peking University) re-
garded as the foreign policy advisor to Hu Jintao (then President of China) appeared in the
Asahi Shimbun of 5 October 2012 (paper edition). He said the line did not apply to India
and Japan.

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compelled it to seek help from both the US and the Soviet Union at
different times of crisis.
3.3 India as a leading power

Now, one can discern a shift of India’s foreign policy since the BJP
came to power as a result of the General Election in April to May 2014.
The BJP won 282 seats out of 543 seats of the Lok Sabha (the lower
house) with allied parties winning a further 54 seats. Narendra Modi
was sworn in as Prime Minister in May. The BJP is a right-wing party
whose parent organization is a Hindu nationalist organization: Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer/Patriotic Organization). The
BJP alone commands a parliamentary majority for the first time since the
1989 general election in India.
With its election slogan of Shreshtha Bharat (Great India) and high
economic growth, the BJP has sought to capture the people’s imagina-
tion by presenting a plan to make India a richer and stronger nation.
The election manifesto was settled in Modi’s favor after an intra-party
struggle. The slogan of Great India was an effective means of stimulat-
ing the Indian people to feel happy, serving as the best means in terms
of domestic political mobilization.
Modi has brought about a popular majority with the so-called Modi
Wave. He is truly at the helm of the government. Moreover, his
approach as Prime Minister is unprecedented in Indian diplomatic his-
tory. He is not a follower of the so-called Nehru diplomacy, unlike all
his predecessors, including the BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee.10 Modi is
a perfect follower of Sardar Patel, the first Home Minister and later
Deputy Prime Minister (August 1947 to December 1950). Where
Nehru was an idealist, pragmatist, and realist, Patel was thoroughly re-
alistic and pragmatic.11
Modi’s foreign policy orientation was apparent at an early stage in
his remarks at Chennai on 18 October 2013 during the election
10 Vijay Goel, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, has known Vajpayee for about
30 years. When Goel asked who his favorite leader was, he named Nehru, available at
http://muraleedharan.tripod.com/legends_vajpayee.html (2 March 2017, date last
accessed).
11 Modi has initiated its foreign policy of placating, utilizing and restraining vis-
a-vis China
(Takenaka, 2014).

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campaign: ‘India’s foreign policy should be built on the foundation of

our culture, tradition, strength, economy, trade, strategy and security.’
After becoming Prime Minister, Modi emphasized the gist of his for-
eign policy orientation at the meeting of Heads of Indian Missions in
February 2015. He urged them to use the present unique opportunity
to help India position itself in a leading role, rather than just a balanc-
ing force globally12 (emphasis added). Indian people have not in gen-
eral been surprised at Modi’s pronouncement which they regard as the
natural corollary of the BJP’s election manifesto.
However, when Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (the
second son of K. Subrahmanyam), who was appointed to the post
by Modi, declared on 20 July 2015 at his IISS-Fullerton Lecture
(Singapore): India’s foreign policy dimension is ‘to aspire to be a lead-
ing power, rather than just a balancing power’13 (emphasis added), his
speech marked the first time a high-ranking Indian official had made
public such an intention. A great difference exists, however, between
playing a leading role and being a leading power: the former is ab-
stract, but the latter is concrete in terms of its implications. Although
his speech was talked about in several of India’s national newspapers,
apparently its significance was not clearly noticed.14 India’s unan-
nounced Taoguang Yanghui was set aside.
Therefore, India has self-evidently crossed the threshold of circum-
scribing its self-imposed external stance: from negation to affirmation
of its aspiration to be a major power. This change of stance might be
attributable to Modi, the first non-Nehruvian Prime Minister of India.
3.4 India’s Foreign Policy Matrix

As pointed out previously, India has basic attributes of various magni-
tudes and a geopolitical position sufficient for status as a major power.
12 PM to Heads of Indian Missions on 7 February 2015, available at http://www.pmindia.gov.

in/en/news_updates/pm-to-heads-of-indian-missions/?comment¼disable (21 March 2017,
13 His speech was ‘India, the United States and China,’ available at https://www.iiss.org/en/
events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e (20 March 2017,
14 In India and the US, noted specialists on India’s foreign policy were rather late in com-
menting on Jaishankar’s speech. See Tellis (2016), Mohan (2016) and Huntsman and
Gopalaswamy (2015).

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During the Cold War period, India’s national power was deficient, in
terms of economy and defense. Therefore, it seemed only a pipe dream
that India might someday become a major power. In the 2016 world
rankings, India now ranks seventh in terms of national GDP (Japan
ranks third)15 and fifth in terms of defense expenditures (Japan ranks
eighth).16
At the moment, the US is the largest and the only major power.
China chases it, as does India, although it remains one or two lengths
behind China. There appears to be no other emerging country with an
objective, like India’s, to become a major power. In fact, the National
Intelligence Council of the US predicted as early as 2012 that: ‘In 2030
India could be the rising economic powerhouse that China is seen to
be today. China’s current economic growth rate – 8–10% – will proba-
bly be a distant memory by 2030’ (National Intelligence Council, 2012,
p. 36).17
Nevertheless, in reality, for overseas observers and scholars, the
substance of India’s foreign policy has been extremely difficult to grasp
because India deploys its policies depending upon circumstances and
timings. India sometimes leans on the US and Japan while at other
times befriending China and Russia. Such foreign postures have contin-
ually puzzled outsiders.
To resolve India’s conundrum of foreign policy and how India en-
deavors to achieve its foreign policy objective, I have formulated
India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala) as shown below. The Matrix
aims at attempting to present an overall framework of contemporary
India’s foreign policy framework. Although enormous works by many
scholars and practitioners, both domestic and foreign, on India’s
foreign policy exist, they almost uniformly deal with individual case
studies. Several anthologies combine a theoretical analysis of Indian
15 World Development Indicators database, Gross Domestic product 2016, available at http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (20 May 2017, date last accessed).
16 SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in world military expenditure, 2016, available at https://www.sipri.
org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf (20 May 2017, date last
accessed).
17 Its report also predicted ‘As the world’s largest economic power, China is expected to re-
main ahead of India, but the gap could begin to close by 2030. India’s rate of economic
growth is likely to rise while China’s slows (Ibid.).’

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Table: India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala)
foreign policy and its approach to individual countries in a bilateral

context.18
The Matrix is a provisional attempt to delve into India’s foreign pol-
icy and provide a grand outlook. India since the 2000s onward has
been unfolding various foreign policies depending on regions to a
18 One of the most interesting resources and one overlapping with my objective is Karnad
(2015). As the title of the book Why India is not a Great Power (yet) suggests, it is the first
of its kind discussing India’s emergence as a major power. Karnad laments this is attribut-
able to the lack of combination between economic and hard power policy orientations and
stress the importance of military and economic trajectories have complemented each
other. Ganguly (2010), Khilnani et al. (2012), Bajpai and Pant (2013) show us excellent ex-
aminations of India’s foreign policy, but they do not cover the period under the Modi gov-
ernment. Malone et al. (2015) could be termed as an encyclopedia of India’s foreign
policy with more than 700 pages but it is noteworthy that it does not include addressing
issues such as major power status or Japan.

on 11 January 2018
greater or lesser degree. Such tendencies of foreign policy implementa-

tion have turned out to be distinctive in the mid-2010s.
The Matrix has several characteristics. First, it constitutes the three
tiers of levels: the Global level, the Regional (Indo-Pacific region) level,
and the Local (South Asia region) level. Each level has specific and dif-
ferent objectives with corresponding measures.
The inconsistencies in Indian approaches at the three levels tend to
puzzle outsiders, as India has always appeared to be ‘playing off’ major
powers to achieve its diverse interests. Perhaps such various differentia-
tions make outsiders wonder at the objectives and contents of India’s
foreign policy, unlike the non-alignment policy and the alliance with
the Soviet Union. Japan’s newspapers tend to characterize India’s for-
eign policy as omnidirectional,19 an overly superficial view. Even
Indian experts have not analyzed their country’s foreign policy
structurally.
Second, from the standpoint of time sequence, the present and fu-
ture objectives at the Global level are basically future aspirations to be
achieved, particularly so, in the case of international order building ca-
pability. After the end of World War II, the US as the victorious na-
tion, with its incomparable national power – half of the global GDP
and extraordinary military capabilities – led the founding of political
and economic institutions such as the United Nations, the World
Bank, and the IMF. For India, the present and future objectives of the
Regional and Local Levels are crucially important areas to achieve the
Global objectives in the present and beyond.
Now, the outline of each level will be explained. The Global level is
India’s overall target to achieve. The process of getting to that target
would first be to establish multi-polarization of the international sys-
tem and possibly at the same time to acquire its position as a pole in
the international system in the coming years.
Next, India’s major and ultimate objectives – and China’s also – is
to acquire the capability of international order building. At the mo-
ment, China is striving to emulate the US by equipping itself with simi-
lar capabilities through the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure
19 For example, Japan’s newspaper, Sankei Shimbun (2014, October 7, paper edition), termed
Modi’s approach and stance to the US and Japan as unrestrained by its traditionally con-
tinued omnidirectional foreign policy.

on 11 January 2018
Investment Bank (AIIB) along with the One Belt, One Road Initiative
(BR Initiative), and other associated measures. Like China, India also
dreams of having such capabilities in the future. In short, the two
countries have aspirations to become rule-makers rather than rule fol-
lowers as they have been in the past. Now China appears to be gradu-
ally acquiring such capability, while India is lagging behind. However,
after acquiring such capabilities, what China and India’s new interna-
tional order desires to create is opaque.
To materialize these objectives, India cooperates with China and Russia
vis-
a-vis the US and other associated countries. India’s full memberships
at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS summit
signify its cooperation with Russia and China at the Global level. If one
regards China, Russia, and India as revisionist powers, then the US and
its associated countries could be termed status quo powers. For India,
membership of the UN Security Council and other measures would be
one of its first major gambits.
At the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region), India is striving to
achieve a dominant position and to display its relative presence
through joining hands with the US, Japan, and other like-minded
countries while facing China. One of Japan’s South Asian security spe-
cialists pointed out, ‘it is natural that Japan designs Indo-Japan coop-
eration in tandem with the India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation’
(Izuyama, 2013, p. 195). It is said Japan–India security relations could
be seen as distinctively apparent in the field of maritime cooperation
(Kiyota, 2016, pp. 175–191). More specifically, building the interopera-
bility of the two navies and undergirding peace and stability in the
Indo-Pacific region are said to be indispensable (Nagao, 2017, p. 71).
At the Local level (South Asia), India has become a de facto major
power in consolidating its dominant position. It does not hesitate to co-
operate with the US and others in matters directly or indirectly related to
China, but it would fundamentally prefer to act independently, particu-
larly in the Indian Ocean (Jain and Horimoto, 2016, pp. 26–42).
For India, the realization of foreign policy objectives at the Regional
and Local levels would help in cementing its final Global objectives
which are more long term in nature. India’s leading power aspirations
would cause a ‘ripple-effect’ to the future configuration of Asia’s inter-
national relations.

on 11 January 2018
Thus, India’s foreign policy is neither omnidirectional nor double-

dealing. It is possible to point out in the coming one or two decades
that the Matrix might transform its present three levels to two levels,
concomitant with changes of objectives and measures.
Ultimately the characteristics of a future international order are
expected to be based on the relationships between the major powers of
Asia and their political ambitions.
4 India’s foreign policy at work: implications of its

relations with Russia and Japan
At the moment, India’s two closest partners are Russia and Japan. For
India, from the viewpoint of the Matrix, the main raison d’être of its
relations with Russia exists at the Global level whereas Japan operates
at the Regional level. Maybe, for Russia and Japan, India’s aspiration
is seen to be transformation into a major power. Its concretization
would be welcome in terms of coping with the emerging and assertive
China against the backdrop of obfuscating and elusive perceptions and
implementation of US policy toward China, particularly so under the
Trump administration.
4.1 Partnership with Russia

Regarding Russian relations with India, several factors underlie their
close relationship. India maintained its close relations with the Soviet
Union during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even after the Union devolved
into Russia and several independent republics, India established its a
strategic partnership in 2000 with Russia preceded only by South
Africa (1997) and France (1998). India and Russia have held bilateral
annual summits since 2000. At that time, Russia was the only country
with which India held a regular summit. They continue to the present
day. It is noteworthy that Russian affairs tend to be off the table when
India’s foreign policy is discussed in Japan.
At the Global level since the 1990s, India has never been a member
of mini-lateral20 international organizations. India ended such practices
20 The term ‘mini-lateral’ might be used to designate a small group of countries situated just
between bilateral and multilateral.

on 11 January 2018
in 2003 when the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established, consisting of

India, Brazil, and South Africa. In fact, during its first meeting, they
agreed on the urgent necessity for reform of the UN, particularly the
Security Council. These three countries have common traits: demo-
cratic countries and leading candidates to be future permanent mem-
bers of the UN Security Council.
India joined another mini-lateral meeting of the Brazil, Russia,
India, and China (BRICs) Summit, which was established in 2009. The
summit was re-named the BRICS summit when South Africa joined in
2011. The summit mainly addresses means of improving the global eco-
nomic system and reforming international financial institutions. It is
noteworthy that the three IBSA countries can be characterized as a
group within the larger group (the BRICS Summit) to check the pre-
dominance of China (also that of the China–Russia combination).
If the summit represented the first chance for India to play its cards
well, then another case was membership in the SCO, which is charac-
terized as a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization.
India has maintained observer status since 2005, mirroring US atten-
dance of the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India,
along with Pakistan, signed the memorandum of obligations on 2016,
thereby starting the formal process of joining the SCO. They were des-
ignated as full members in 2017.
Moscow has consistently championed the admission of India to the
SCO to balance China’s dominance and strengthen the group’s clout
(Vladimir, 2011). However, China has objected to India’s membership
under the pretext of a lack of standards and procedures. Subsequently,
China has favored reviewing its unofficial moratorium on admitting
new members in the wake of the planned drawdown of the US-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). China has prepared its
own quid pro quo of India’s membership by admitting Pakistan as a
full member, whereas other countries aspiring to be full members have
been shelved.
India has its own calculations. India during the Manmohan Singh
Government (May 2004 to May 2014) remained wary by not sending
the Prime Minister to attend the SCO Summit except on one occasion,
perhaps principally not to damage its relations with the US. When the
BJP government came to power, India initiated its move to full mem-
bership after its relations with the US consolidated. Indian confidence

on 11 January 2018
held that the full membership of the SCO would not necessarily infuri-
ate the US.
The two mini-lateral organizations of the BRICS Summit and the
SCO have a common trait: Russia and China are members. Probably,
India expects Russia to play a role of checking and balancing vis-a-vis
China. Russia expects India to play a role of balancer vis-a-vis China.
For India, the SCO also carries a significant implication in terms of its
Central Asian diplomacy, which is yet to be fully explored politically
and economically.
For India, its relations with Russia are indispensable in terms of acqui-
sition of defense equipment and energy resources and also diplomatic
cards vis-
a-vis China and the US, although the bilateral trade between
India and Russia has waned in importance21 compared to the Indo-Soviet
era.
4.2 Japan as the second close country

Russia is followed by Japan as the country with the second-closest rela-
tions to India.22 It might be possible to say Japan would be more im-
portant than Russia because of the recent international situations
where Russia tends to be rather cooperative with China and the Indo-
Pacific is of increasing importance for India.
To conclude this section in advance, economy and security are the
two major engines bringing forth the contemporary close bilateral rela-
tions. In other words, the close relations are the result of growing con-
vergence between the two countries’ world views, interests, and goals.
In one way or another, these two factors are related to the emergence
of China. As early as in 2006, it was pointed out that ‘In the emerging
Asia, the two major non-Western democracies, India and Japan, look
like natural allies as China drives them closer together’ (Chellaney,
2006, p. 221).
Viewed from India’s diplomatic history, India’s close relations with
Russia have far antedated those with Japan. In fact, Japan’s relations
21 India’s trade with Russia in 2016–17 is not ranked within the India’s top 25 countries
(Department of Commerce, Government of India, Export Import Data Bank, 16 April 2017,
available at http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopn.asp (20 April 2017, date last accessed).
22 Reflecting the recent development of closer bilateral relations, there emerge various publi-
cations: Khan (2017), Borah (2017); Mukherjee and Yazaki (2016).

on 11 January 2018
with India are a recent phenomenon that has unfolded during the past
quarter century since the 1990s.23
The transformation of Japan–India relations has transpired against
the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the shift of US
policy to Asia with the US’ relative diminution of power, and particu-
larly the rapid emergence of China.
Realistically speaking, as illustrated by various aspects of India’s
Foreign Policy Matrix, India’s main foreign policy theater at the mo-
ment is confined primarily to the Regional Level (Indo-Pacific) and the
Local level (South Asia). With the passage of time and following the
consolidation of its interests at these two levels, India might then be-
come more active at the Global level. India might still need time before
becoming more active at the Global level. Russia’s presence is insuffi-
cient on a regional level whereas Japan’s presence (along with the US)
constitutes an effective partnership vis-a-vis China. For Japan also,
India could be a reliable cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific. In
short, at the moment, Japan and India have become, for all practical
purposes, mutually indispensable partners: for Japan, to cope with the
rise of China, to say the least of utilizing economic opportunities; and
for India to buy time as it becomes a major power.
The development of the closer relationship of Japan and India might
be described as a triple jump of hop, step, and jump: the 1990s, the
2000s, and then the 2010s onward. The favorable improvement in
Japan–India relations, which began as a mere rivulet in the 1990s, grew
into a stream in the early 2000s onward. By around 2005, it had gained
all the momentum of a major river.
Such a metamorphosis of bilateral relations is readily apparent from
the number of mutual VIP visits by prime ministers, cabinet ministers,
and other high government officials of both countries. There were only
16 mutual visits of VIPs in the 1980s, but 27 in the 1990s, 84 in the
2000s, and 47 already in the first half of the 2010s. The gradual but
sharp increases of mutual VIP visits clearly mark the rapprochement
23 The two countries enjoyed a brief honeymoon period after mutual relations were estab-
lished in 1952. They did not last, however, because efforts to foster the relationship were
thwarted by the unfolding Cold War. The two countries pursued incompatible policy ori-
entations in terms of foreign policy and economic policy. Therefore, the present phase
might possibly be regarded as the second honeymoon period. For detailed discussions, see
Horimoto (2016).

on 11 January 2018
between the two countries. The Japan–India Nuclear Agreement of

2016 signified a major culmination of bilateral relations (Tamari, 2017,
pp. 232–237).
These close contacts paved the way for the bilateral annual summit
between of the prime ministers of Japan and India which started in
2005. For Japan, India is the first and only country, whereas for India,
Japan is the second country after Russia. The Strategic Partnership be-
tween the two countries was established in 2006. Consequently, India
maintains close relations with Japan in addition to Russia.
Another major factor cementing these bilateral relations is economic
relations. First, there is the so-called China risk. In 2004, Japan’s trade
with China (including Hong Kong) reached 22 trillion yen, replacing
the 20 trillion yen trade between Japan and the US. Thereby, China be-
came Japan’s largest trading partner. In that year, markedly anti-
Japanese behavior was displayed by Chinese spectators against
Japanese players at the AFC Asian Cup football match in Chongqing,
China in July 2004. Furthermore, between March and April in 2005,
large-scale anti-Japanese riots targeting Japanese stores broke out in
Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities.
This turn of events raised grave concern. As a consequence, ‘spurred
by the anti-Japanese demonstrations occurring in China in spring that
year, companies began increasing their direct investment in Vietnam
and India to take advantage of the high growth and significant market
scale expected in these countries, as well as to defuse the risk of invest-
ment concentration in China’ (Tsutsumi, 2005). India’s China expert,
Kondapalli, pointed out that: ‘It is only since 2005 that China started
considering relations with India “strategic” in nature’ (Kondapalli,
2013). It would not be sheer coincidence.
Secondly, Japan’s ODA to India plays a crucial role (Jain 2017).
Japan has been devoting attention to India as the destination of its
ODA viewed from the angle of India’s bright prospect as an emerging
market. Japan’s ODA has been serving as a forerunner of Japan’s ex-
ploration of new business opportunities (Ghosh, 2017, pp. 71–80).
India, with high economic potential and gigantic size, was evaluated as
a worthwhile country to be a recipient of Japan’s major share of ODA.
In fact, Japan has been the largest ODA provider to India from 1986
to the present day, except during 1998–2001 when Japan used economic

on 11 January 2018
measures24 to protest India’s atomic testing in 1998. Since fiscal year

2003, the largest share of Japan’s ODA has been given to India, replac-
ing China, the perennial leading recipient. Japan has been supporting
various mega-infrastructure developments such as the Delhi–Mumbai
Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and the Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial
Corridor (CBIC) (Choudhury, 2014; Kojima, 2017).
In 2011, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
between Japan and India was promulgated. The Modi Government car-
ries ‘Make in India’ in its economic policy and ‘Act East Policy’25 in its
foreign policy, which combine well with Japan’s active and forward-look-
ing posture toward India. The prime ministers of the two countries em-
phasized the importance of the Act East Policy and the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific strategy in their joint statement of 2016.
4.3 China factor

Economic circumstances were certainly an important factor in the
Japan–India rapprochement. An even more important factor is security
policy, designed to cope with the rise of China as a common priority.
Rather than initiation based on a clear policy direction, the mutual
rapprochement policies adopted by both Japan and India were the re-
sult of fortuitous timing for gradual convergence since 2000 in the two
countries’ foreign policy objectives on both economic and security
fronts. One of India’s Japan specialists has suggested that the China
factor has risen to the fore, and that it has assumed major importance
in India–Japan relations (Jain, 2007; Varma, 2013, p. 52).
Viewed from the perspective of their China policies, both countries’
policy needs might also be regarded as having drawn the two countries
closer together, with engagement in economic areas and hedging in
terms of security, although hedging and engagement are used infre-
quently these days in the US, where the phrase originated. This same
double-sided policy of engagement and hedging underpinned the
approaches to China pursued by the US and other of China’s
24 An official terminology used by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of economic

sanction. For details, see (Tamari, 2017, pp. 226–227).
25 ‘Change 0 Look East Policy0 to 0 Act East Policy0 : Sushma Swaraj,’ NDTV (2014, August
25), available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/time-to-change-look-east-policy-to-act-
east-policy-sushma-swaraj-653063 (2 March 2017, date last accessed).

on 11 January 2018
neighbors, albeit with different degrees of intensity. India’s dual policy

of engagement and hedging is a new policy orientation after the Cold
War period. During the Cold War, India could not afford such a risky
strategy because of its insufficient power. And thus it could only pur-
sue an engagement policy.
The engagement and hedging policy might be regarded as India’s re-
sponse to China’s assertive external orientation in the 2000s and the
2010s, particularly since Xi Jinping reached power in China in 2012 as
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He under-
scored the importance of the Dream of China. His Chinese Dream is
described as ‘achieving the “Two 100s”: The material goal of China be-
coming a “moderately well-off society” by about 2020, the 100th anni-
versary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the modernization goal
of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic’ (Kuhn, 2013). In other words, the
Dream of China is a national construction project producing a wealthy
superpower with a powerful military (Mifune, 2016, p. 31). China’s as-
sertive policies are likely to continue to achieve its two dreams.
Perhaps, when China realizes its dream, it might acquire international
order building capability. However, it is not clear what concrete
institutions and systems China would create based on its capability.
India’s ambitions in this respect are even more opaque than those of
China. China is one of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council and concretizing various plans such as the AIIB and
the BR Initiative, implying a new world order, whereas India is not a
permanent UN Security Council member and does not have plans
like those of China.
Viewed in this way, the China factor seems unlikely to disappear in the
Indo-Pacific region in the coming years. In the region, Japan and India,
the most affected countries, will continue their close relations and join to-
gether along with the ASEAN countries, Australia, and the US, even be-
yond the personally close relationship between the leaders Abe and Modi
(Horimoto, 2014a). Albeit, personal relationships between top leaders ex-
ert influence more or less on bilateral diplomatic relations. Abe, who pro-
motes a pro-active foreign policy, appears to be keener to have close rela-
tions than Modi (Basu 2016).
Additionally, we should not rule out another possibility that continued
tension between India and Pakistan nudges India to opt for maintaining

on 11 January 2018
close relations with Japan in considerations of the power relations among

the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Japan. Probably, the power
gap separating India and China can be expected to dwindle gradually.
Thereafter, China, instead of direct confrontation with India, might
choose to enhance its all-weather diplomatic relations26 with Pakistan to
limit India’s influence to South Asia or to obstruct India’s expansion of
national influence in Asia. It is possible that the China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is an integral part of the BR initia-
tive, would enhance China–Pakistan relations. Conversely India–Pakistan
relations would aggravate further.
Putting it in another way, ‘the enduring Sino-Pak partnership has
long been seen in New Delhi as aimed at boxing India within the sub-
continent and preventing it from ever emerging as a rival to China in
Asia and beyond’ (Mohan, 2012, p. 21). China’s support of Pakistan
can be expected to keep India–Pakistan tensions intensified or at least
persistent: a situation of tension by proxy.27
Consequently, India might augment its relations with Japan as an
important countermeasure. For Japan, which relies closely on the US
only, India is an indispensable country. Beyond dovetailing mutual
strategic interest, Japan and India should take the lead to create a sta-
ble multipolar Asia (Rajagopalan, 2012, p. 252).28
4.4 India’s wary foreign posture and Modi’s foreign policy

Against such a backdrop how would Japan–India and other elements of
India’s foreign policy proceed? Plainly speaking, the present bilateral
26 On 20 April 2015, China and Pakistan elevated their relations by their ‘Joint Statement on
Establishing an All-Weather Strategic Co-operative Partnership during Xi Jinping’s visit
to Pakistan’ (The Express Tribune, 2015, April 21), available at https://tribune.com.pk/
story/873290/strategic-partnership-pakistan-china-ties-hit-a-new-high/ (18 April 2017,
date last accessed). All weather relations have been repeatedly stated in their bilateral doc-
uments but it was the first time their relations were officially characterized as All- Weather
Strategic Co-operative Partnership.
27 Ed Royce, Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee (the US) said in his opening state-
ment in 16 December 2015 ‘But while the U.S. was quick to embrace Pakistan, Pakistan
has hardly reciprocated. Pakistani Governments have come and gone, but its northwestern
frontier has remained a terrorist haven. With its security services supporting what it con-
siders to be good Islamist terrorist groups, these good groups—under Pakistan’s calcu-
lus— destabilize Afghanistan and threaten neighboring India while the government
simultaneously opposes what it considers the bad Islamist groups’ (Royce, 2015).
28 The book admirably delves into the military strategies of four powers (China, the US,
Ruassia and Japan).

on 11 January 2018
relations can be characterized as a relationship of convenience based on

mutual necessity and benefit. The two countries would make the best
use of their present close relations to maximize their respective national
interests.
However, one might notice that subtle differences of perceptions ex-
ist between the two countries toward China, although fundamentally
the two countries are commonly adopting engagement and hedging
policies. Japan looks to try to prevent China from occupying the domi-
nant position in Asia, particularly in the Western Pacific region in co-
operation with the US and other like-minded countries, whereas
India’s basic orientation is to maintain stable relations with China.
When the Modi government rose to power, Sandy Gordon of the
Australia National University noted the government’s attempt to ‘play
both ends against the middle’, especially since this approach has been
a classic feature of Indian foreign policy. Under this scenario, India
would seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in
terms of a possible border settlement, while attempting to maintain its
hedge against a possible difficult rise of China with powers such as the
US and Japan (Gordon, 2014).
In a similar vein, Kanwal Sibal, the former Foreign Secretary of
India, remarked: ‘Japan’s economic stakes in China are huge; our own
political and economic stakes in China are high, given China’s contigu-
ity with us and our direct exposure to its power. Neither Japan nor
India seek a confrontation with China, but both have a responsibility
to build lines of defence against any disruptive exercise of power by a
rising China’ (Sibal, 2014).
Prime Minister Modi, since coming to power in May 2014, looks to
have been practicing his foreign policy, as predicted by two experts.
President Mukherjee’s Parliamentary Address on 9 June 2014 might be
particularly revealing of Modi’s policy framework: ‘We will pursue our
international engagement based on enlightened national interest, com-
bining the strength of our values with pragmatism.’29
The Matrix presented herein shows that Modi has been practicing
his policy of expediting economic growth and expanding defense
29 The President of India is vested with all the executive authority but, in practice exercised
by the Prime Minister with the help of the Council of Ministers (Article 53 of the
Constitution of India).

on 11 January 2018
capabilities to create a rich and powerful nation. For Modi, a strong

economy means not only the economy per se, but also the infrastruc-
ture of his diplomacy: ‘A strong economy is a base of effective foreign
policy.’30 He appears to be implementing his foreign policy from the
perspective of geo-economics rather than geopolitics.
Nevertheless, he is compelled to confront the dilemma of domestic
politics versus foreign policy. For example, the issue has arisen of a
Trade Facilitation Agreement with economic benefits said to be worth
1 trillion US dollars. India agreed to join it in December 2013 in Bali
with a grace period of four years with regard to its agricultural pro-
curements. However, in July 2014, India backpedalled due to consider-
ations of farmers’ concerns. Such a tendency is discernible in the case
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initi-
ated in 2013, which was to have been concluded by 2015 (extended to
2017).
His slogan of Make in India must be seen in the context of the inter-
ests of consumers and other relevant parties in India. He must cope
with the difficult political dichotomy of localism versus globalism.
5. Conclusion: Prospects
Japan is struck by typhoons in summer and autumn every year. When
the Japan Meteorological Agency forecasts that a typhoon is heading
towards Japan, the agency cannot say exactly when and where it might
strike. In the same vein, India appears to be heading toward a global
power status now and is metamorphosing into a major power, but it
remains unpredictable ‘when’ that might occur.
5.1 Variables: the US, China, and their mutual relations

Various influences are likely to affect India’s journey to take the mantle
of a major power in the future. Among them, the US and China might
be the most influential factors at the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region).
Many Indian newspapers predicted that US President Trump would
be likely to boost the Indian–US strategic relationship with special em-
phasis on defense ties and counter-terrorism cooperation. Prime
30 Business Standard (19 October 2014), available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/

StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

on 11 January 2018
Minister Modi was the fifth world leader to speak with Trump both
soon after the US Presidential election and also after the inaugura-
tion.31 Trump and Modi certainly have a common perception related to
Israel and Islamic fundamentalism. Setting aside their personal predilec-
tions, no one knows for sure what will happen to Indian–US relations
because of Trump’s renowned unpredictability.
At the moment, perhaps, the Trump administration’s main concerns
are how to address Asian issues such as China, the Western Pacific,
North Korea, and the Middle East quagmires. South Asia and the
Indian Ocean would be positioned as circumferential issues. Therefore,
India might be able to afford to wait and see how the US–China rela-
tions develop. Simultaneously with their development, India can deploy
its foreign policy.
5.2 India’s theoretical formulation as a major power

If we assume that India is on the verge of becoming a major power,
then it might be necessary to provide a theoretical explanation of its
emergence. Such aspects have been completely lacking in India by the
2000s. Upon entering the 2010s, when India showed its upswing, there
appeared some moves, particularly among the strategic community of
India.
Reflecting atmosphere, the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis (under the Ministry of Defence) started various seminars on
The Arthasyastra and Kautilya since 2012. The Arthashastra32 is an an-
cient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy, and military strat-
egy, written in Sanskrit. Kautilya is traditionally credited as the author
of the treatise. In India, the treatise is often likened proudly to China’s
The Art of War by Sun Tsu. It can be said that the Arthashastra is the
fountainhead of India’s international politics (Ito, 2015).
Shivshankar Menon, the former National Security Advisor and pre-
sumed to be one of prominent members of India’s strategic community,
31 The Hindu (25 January 2017), available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-

a-%E2%80%98true-friend%E2%80%99-Trump-tells-Modi/article17092065.ece (3 March
2017, date last accessed).
32 Business Standard (2014, October 19). He has also stressed the importance of study of
Arthashastra in the previous occasion, available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/
StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

on 11 January 2018
has insisted during one of the seminars in October 2014 that India’s
strategic thoughts have been imported from overseas. He has asserted
that they instead must have maximum strategic autonomy, and that one
should read the Arthashastra.33
When the first convention of the Indian Association of International
Studies was held in 2012, Amitabh Mattoo congratulated its establish-
ment in his opening remarks but simultaneously warned: ‘If Asia
merely mimics the West in its quest for economic growth and conspicu-
ous consumption, and the attendant conflict over economic resources
and military prowess, the “revenge of the East” in the Asian century
and “all its victories” will remain “truly Pyrrhic”’ (Mattoo, 2012).
Be that as it may, India’s pursuit of its own theoretical international
relations remains at an inchoate stage. For that reason, India cannot
help but start with its political classics to formulate a theoretical foun-
dation as its gambit.
Entering the 2010s, India has just started to explore measures and
plans to achieve major power status alongside a new international
framework to be formulated to legitimize its rise to power. This is per-
haps the way in which India tries to respond to the power transforma-
tion in Asia and in the world. India is recognized generally as a major
power in the future. However, for legitimization, India needs to devise
universally acceptable narratives, though this might be an uphill task
and challenge. Probably, one of the keywords would be inclusivity as
India has propounded over the past seven decades. In order to realize
such narratives, Japan–India relations should be molded in a way
which is neither exclusive nor antagonistic toward China (Ito, 2013,
pp. 113–131; Singh, 2013, pp. 133–152). Kesavan, the senior most East
Asian specialist, pointed out that: ‘India believes in constructing a
transparent, inclusive and democratic regional order free from the
hegemony of any single country’ (Kesavan, 2015).
5.3 Implication of India’s metamorphosis into a major power

Modi’s ascent to power constitutes a historic confluence of interests
and opportunities. After the end of the Cold War, various models such
33 Business Standard (2014, October 19). He has also stressed the importance of study of
Arthashastra in the previous occasion, available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/
StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon.

on 11 January 2018
as the Washington consensus, the Beijing consensus, and the Arab

spring have been attempted without much success. Now India’s attempt
to develop as a major power under a liberal democratic setup might
carry great historic significance.
In that sense, the country watching India’s future with the greatest
curiosity is likely to be China. India’s success in achieving its ultimate
aims would deal the strongest blow to China, which increasingly serves
domestic demands for economic equality more than it meets mounting
clamour for democratic rights.
How can Modi and his successors successfully coordinate and ac-
commodate domestic policies and foreign policies? Upon overcoming
these challenges, India might be making a great step forward to becom-
ing a major power in the future. No one would object to the percep-
tion that a power transformation or shift is taking place in Asia. The
most important issue might be whether the shift turns out to be a par-
adigm shift, bringing about the emergence of a new international order.
In tandem, India would be required to put forward its vision of how it
will function as a global major power. K. Subrahmanyam stressed the
importance of India’s grand strategy34 in an article made public imme-
diately after his death as he requested (Subrahmanyam, 2012) (May
2017).
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International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 17, (2017) 463–496

doi: 10.1093/irap/lcx011 Advance Access published on 5 September 2017

Explaining India’s Foreign

Gifu Women’s University, Gifu, Japan

Accepted 4 July 2017

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 17 No. 3

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1 India’s membership of major powers would be conditioned on whether the US as a super-

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Delving into India’s strategic response to the power transformation

2 Historical development of India’s foreign policy

2.1 During the Cold War

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only India and China embody a civilization in a single large nation-

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on 9 August 1971, which speciﬁed mutual strategic cooperation. If alli-

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bound to adopt various alignment policies.4 The net result of India’s

2.2 In the post-Cold War period of the 1990s: various new

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3. India’s aspiration to major power status

3.1 India’s emergence

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and has instead adhered to its traditional external policy of coopera-

3.2 Negation of major power and Taoguang Yanghui

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community in India.8 Its main argument can be summarized as empha-

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3.3 India as a leading power

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campaign: ‘India’s foreign policy should be built on the foundation of

3.4 India’s Foreign Policy Matrix

12 PM to Heads of Indian Missions on 7 February 2015, available at http://www.pmindia.gov.

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Table: India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala)

foreign policy and its approach to individual countries in a bilateral

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greater or lesser degree. Such tendencies of foreign policy implementa-

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Thus, India’s foreign policy is neither omnidirectional nor double-

4 India’s foreign policy at work: implications of its

4.1 Partnership with Russia

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in 2003 when the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established, consisting of

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4.2 Japan as the second close country

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between the two countries. The Japan–India Nuclear Agreement of

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measures24 to protest India’s atomic testing in 1998. Since ﬁscal year

4.3 China factor

24 An official terminology used by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of economic

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neighbors, albeit with different degrees of intensity. India’s dual policy

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close relations with Japan in considerations of the power relations among

4.4 India’s wary foreign posture and Modi’s foreign policy

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relations can be characterized as a relationship of convenience based on