Citizenship Studies

Vol. 12, No. 1, February 2008, 107–123

International marriage and the state in South Korea:

focusing on governmental policy
Hye-Kyung Lee*

Pai Chai University, Korea

( Received 14 November 2006; final version received 2 August 2007 )

With globalization, the number of individuals traveling, working or studying abroad is

rising globally, and so is the number of international marriages. However, there has been
a dramatic rise in the number of ‘mail-order brides’ through matchmaking since the
1970s in the Western world and since the 1990s in several Asian countries. The so-called
‘mail-order bride’ phenomenon has become an important route for international
migration, especially for gendered migration. Since official relations with China began
in August 1992, the number of Korean Chinese women who came into Korea for
marriage with native Korean men is about 100,000 between 1990 and 2005. The number
of Japanese women who married Korean men is approximately 17,000, while the
numbers of Filipino women who married Korean men is about 6000. Recently, the
nationalities of these foreign wives of Korean men have expanded to include women
from Vietnam, Russia, and Uzbekistan. In 2005, among a total of 250,000 foreign
spouses in Korea, 160,000 of them were women. The Korean state had contributed to
initiate these international marriages by importing Korean Chinese women for their
unmarried rural citizens. As international marriages have become a social issue, the state
tries to cope with these new issues through changing the laws and policies. Utilizing
several government statistics, a nationwide questionnaire survey of nearly 1000 foreign
brides with various nationalities, which was conducted in May and June 2005, and some
interviewed data of foreign wives and government personnel, this paper analyzes (1)
patterns and trends of marriage migration to Korea; (2) the issues and problems of
foreign brides, such as their status and citizenship, economic situation, access to social
security and ‘fake marriages’ issues; and (3) recent changes in governmental policies
towards them. Special focus will be on what factors influenced the recent governmental
action and how the ideology that ‘A married daughter is no longer a daughter
( )’ is still reflected in recent policies even in today’s more progressive society.
Keywords: Marriage migration; governmental policy; South Korea

Introduction
International marriage was not popular until the early 1990s, and it was a female
phenomenon. Some Korean women married foreigners such as Japanese and Americans.
However, in the mid 1990s, international marriage had become a male phenomenon.
In other words, more Korean men than women tended to marry foreigners. From 1990 to
2005, of the 250,000 Koreans who registered international marriages, about 64%
(160,000) were marriages between Korean men and foreign wives. In the early 1990s,
international marriage was common among bachelor farmers, who found it difficult to find

*Email: hklee@pcu.ac.kr

ISSN 1362-1025 print/ISSN 1469-3593 online

q 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13621020701794240
http://www.informaworld.com
108 H.-K. Lee

their partners domestically. Nowadays this phenomenon does not only occur among men
in rural areas but also among urban men.
International marriages, like other marriages, are regarded as private and not a concern
of the state. However, international marriages pose a ‘citizenship’ and ‘partnership’ issue
to the fore of the ‘homogeneous’ and ‘patriarchal’ Korean society and even to the fore of
inter-state relations. Therefore, the Korean state began to intervene in order to control the
influx of foreign wives and to support the social integration of internationally married
families in Korea. The first policy was the revision of the Nationality Law in 1997 and the
most recent was the ‘Grand Plan’, a number of policies for the social integration of foreign
wives and their families (I will refer to this as the ‘Grand Plan’) in April 2006. The revision
of the Nationality Law in 1997 was a symbol that Koreans accept that their society is
becoming a multicultural one, and the announcement of the ‘Grand Plan’ in April 2006
was the stepping stone to a successful multicultural society.
Previous studies on international marriages tend to examine the phenomenon from one
of three perspectives of: (1) the ‘mail-order bride’, (2) the labor migration’, and (3) the
‘gendered geography’. After reviewing these perspectives, this paper analyzes
international marriages and the state in South Korea. The major questions for this paper
are: (1) how did the number of international marriages increase in Korea?; (2) what are the
issues and problems caused by this phenomenon?; and (3) how and why does the Korean
government intervene in these issues?

Three perspectives on international marriages

Recently the feminization of migration has accelerated and the incidences of international
marriage have increased, but previous academics have tended to concentrate on the former
and ignore the latter. I want to divide previous literature on international marriage into
three categories depending on how it approaches the subject: (1) the mail-order bride
(MOB) phenomenon; (2) the labor migration phenomenon; and (3) the gendered
geography phenomenon.

The mail-order bride (MOB) phenomenon

The MOB phenomenon is characterized by international marriage between a woman from
a less developed country to a man from a more developed country. The marriages are
arranged by a commercial agency. The men chose women from a list or catalogue and after
a period of letter exchanges, they marry and the agency receives an introduction fee
(Chia-Wen 2006, p. 17). When describing this phenomenon, some media and NGO reports
tend to concentrate on the women as commodities and victims of human trafficking
(HRSWM 2001, KWDC 2003, WeHome 2003).
There has been very little serious academic research into the MOB phenomenon, with
the exception of Chia-Wen (2006). She differentiates between the Western phenomenon
of MOB and the Asian approach. She disputes the classification of Taiwanese international
marriages as an MOB phenomenon. Instead she insists that a commercial agency occupies
a modernized version of the matchmaker role in traditional ‘arranged’ marriages.
Taiwanese as well as Korean men choosing their potential brides within a very short
period of time without ample time to get to know each other is rooted in their tradition of
‘arranged’ marriages, which is ‘first wed, then love’ (Jordan 1999, recited from Chia-Wen
2006, p 17). In addition, she argues that such commercially arranged marriages do not
necessarily mean that the foreign brides are passive victims.
 Citizenship Studies 109

Labor migration
There have been several researchers (Truong 1995, Piper 1997, Yu 2001) who regard
international marriages as a form of labor migration, operating via supply and demand
factors between receiving and sending countries. The difference between the two is that
supply occurs due to the care-work drain, while demand is caused by labor scarcity.
Therefore, international marriage is treated as labor migration and cross-border marriage
brides are classified as economic migrants, highlighting their role as ‘reproductive
workers’. Rising demand for fragmented reproductive work in the form of domestic
services has been achieved through wages or a marriage contract (Truong 1995, Yu 2001).
The trends in female international migration in the last decades point to an emerging
international division of labor in ‘reproduction’ or ‘transfer of reproductive labor’ (Truong
1995, pp. 142, 143). Lee (2005a) showed how the international marriage phenomenon in
Korea was a response to restrictive immigration policies.

Gendered geography
Applying Massey’s (1994) concept of ‘power geometry’ to international marriages,
Constable (2005) discussed the ‘gendered geographies of power’ in international
marriages. In her edited book, there were two studies (Abelmann and Kim 2005, Freeman
2005) which reported case studies of international marriages in Korea. Contrary to studies
that emphasize the intensification of male privileges and the exacerbation of gender
inequality through transnational mobility (Clark 2001, recited from Freeman 2005, p. 99),
Freeman (2005) showed that ethnic Korean women residing in China (I will call this group
as ‘Josunjok’ hereafter) are often well poised to use cross-border marriages to their own
advantages. In comparison to their male counterparts in China and their South Korean
husbands who hail from the poorest and least mobile sectors of South Korean society,
Josunjok women not only have greater access to channels of transnational mobility, but the
movement sometimes has immobilizing effects on the men they leave behind (Freeman
2005, p. 99). They can control the balance of power within international marriage as they
can threaten divorce, and are able to move away. In this context, ‘gender’ becomes a
‘capital’. Abelmann and Kim (2005) also interpret that Korea’s position in a globalized
world allows even lower-class rural men to engage in international marriage.
Since 1998, many local governments began to report their survey results on foreign
wives in their regions.1 They describe in detail the circumstances of the marriage, the
consequent adjustment to married life, and the ongoing struggle to integrate into Korean
society. Recent academic research (Han, G.S. 2006, Kim, M.J. et al. 2006) has shown how
foreign brides actively search for more equitable marital relationships as well as better
lives in Korea through strategies and negotiations.

Patterns and trends of marital migration to South Korea

Historical background
There is a prehistoric myth that during the period 42 BC to 532 BC, the King’s first wife
‘Kumkwan Kaya’ came from India. Nonetheless, international marriages were rare
throughout Korean history. Most international marriages were associated with the
invasion of Korea by other countries, such as China, and later, Japan. Korean women
rather than men tended to be the victims of these invasions. Therefore, there has been a
serious prejudice against international marriage in Korea, mainly towards women because
the social stigma associated with ‘virginity’ is more important for women than for men.
110 H.-K. Lee

Women who were abused were referred to as having ‘dirty bodies’ and this image
symbolized the failure of national defense. During the Chung Dynasty in China, Korean
women were captured as spoils of war. When some of these women returned home, they
were looked down on as shamed outcasts, and had to move to live in a segregated area,
now known as ‘Itaewon’. However, their succeeding generations were able to survive and
adjust in Korean society because they resembled their fellow Koreans.
Although the exact figures are unknown, a significant number of Korean women
became mistresses to Japanese men during the Colonial period from 1910 to 1945. Since
1945, there has been an increasing number of international marriages due to the presence
of the US military. As a result derogatory terms such as ‘Yanggonju’, which means
‘a vulgar and shameful social object’, and ‘GI Brides’ were used to refer to Korean women
who engaged in sexual labor or were married to American soldiers (Kim 1998). Therefore,
international marriages in general and especially those involving Korean women have
been condemned as betrayals of nationalism. As a result, biracial children, especially those
who do not resemble their fellow Koreans, such as children of a Korean mother and an
Afro – American father, encountered social prejudice and discrimination during and after
the Korean War.

Marriage migration to Korea: after the 1990s

Although there were some international marriages before the 1990s, it was a female
phenomenon. Until then, only a few Korean men married foreign women. Since the 1960s,
the Unification Church has organized such marriages for Korean men and most brides
were Japanese women. During the 1990s, the Church expanded to include Filipino and
other Asians on its bride’s lists (Kim, Y.S. et al. 2006, p. 11). Up to 2004, about 20,000
brides had come through such arrangements.2
Figure 1 shows the trends of international marriages in Korea after 1990. It shows the
number of foreigners, divided by gender, who married Koreans between 1990 and 2005.
Up to 1990, international marriage involved mostly Korean women, while Korean men
were involved in only 600 cases. However, the Korean men’s rate of international
marriage started to increase in 1992, when Korea reestablished official relations with

Figure 1. Trends of international marriages in Korea, 1990– 2005. Source: KNSO (1999 – 2005).
 Citizenship Studies 111

China. From 1995, the number of men participating in international marriages surpassed
that of women.
International marriages numbered 43,121 in 2005, representing 13.6% of all marriages
in Korea. Such marriages account for 35.9% of marriages in rural areas. According to
Table 1, the number of foreign women married to Korean men between 1990 and 2005 is
about 160,000. The leading group is Chinese women (110,000), most of whom are
Josunjok, which is followed by Japanese (17,000), Vietnamese (10,000) and Filipino
(6000) women. The number of foreign men who married Korean women between 1990
and 2005 is 80,000. Among them, the majority are Japanese (44%) and American (24%),
so the number of Asian unskilled migrant husbands, who are lowest in the socio-economic
scale in Korea, is not significant.
Figure 1 shows two peak periods for Korean men. The first peak resulted from ethnic
Koreans residing in China (or ‘Josunjok’) who went to Korea due to the ‘Korean Wind’
phenomenon of the early 1990s. Josunjok brides matchmade with Korean farmers
contributed significantly to this phenomenon. The first case occurred in December 1990,
when an old bachelor farmer in Kyunggido married a Josunjok woman. This marriage was
arranged by a former assemblyman and professor in order to unite Korea and its diaspora
in China (Chosun Ilbo, 16 December 1990). After this, some local governments,
assemblies and related agricultural associations arranged marriage meetings between their
local farmers and Josunjok women (Lee 2005a, pp. 80– 81). Since 1992, the biggest group
of female foreigners who married Korean men is Chinese (mostly Josunjok) women
(Table 1). Therefore, local governments have played an important role in promoting such
cross-border marriages.

Table 1. Number of foreign spouses of Koreans by gender and nationality, 1990– 2005.

1990 –1999 2000– 2005 Total %

Foreign wives
American 3629 1719 5348 3.3%
Japanese 10,118 6787 16,905 10.6%
Chinese 37,171 70,163 107,334 67.1%
Filipino 1593b 4623 6216 3.9%
Vietnamese – 10,392 10,392 6.5%
Thai – 1727 1727 1.1%
Mongolian – 1773 1773 1.1%
Russian – 1329 1329 0.8%
Other 3116 5802 8918 5.6%
TOTAL 55,627 104,315 159,942 100.0%
Foreign husbands
American 12,209 7435 19,644 24.3%
Japanese 19,266 15,962 35,228 43.6%
Chinese 2010 10,574 12,584 15.6%
Pakistani – 681a 681a 0.8%
Bangladeshi – 696a 696a 0.9%
Filipino – 121a 121a 0.1%
Nepali – 116a 116a 0.1%
Other 3951 7792 11,743 14.5%
TOTAL 37,436 43,377 80,813 100.0%
Source: KNSO (1999–2005).
a
KNSO (2006).
b
CFO (2004).
–: not classified
112 H.-K. Lee

Like other migrations to Korea, the marriage migration was led by Josunjok. In the early
1990s, the Korean government took two different stances to the migration influx: (1) an open-
door policy for Josunjok women as ‘cross-border’ brides and (2) a closed-door policy for
unskilled migrant workers in general and Josunjok in particular. As many Josunjok became
undocumented workers, while visiting their relatives back in Korea in the late 1980s, the
government began to find ways to reduce their influx, first by setting a minimum age limit in
1992, on those intending to visit their relatives, and second by not issuing tourist visas to
Josunjok in 1993 (Lee 2002, pp. 179–183, Lee 2005b, p. 351).3 As some Josunjok returned
home with their earnings, the rest of the people in their villages were eager to go to Korea. This
phenomenon is called the ‘Korean Wind’.
Although the Korean government is anxious to limit the return of Josunjok, its promotion
of cross-border marriages between Korean farmers and Josunjok has resulted in widening
the doors for both young and older Josunjok women to enter the country. This means that
international marriages have become not only an easy and important channel for Josunjok
women, but also provide a route for others to return to Korea because Josunjok wives are
allowed to send two invitation letters to their parents to come to Korea. Exploitation of the
‘invitation of parents’ visas occurred as the sale of invitations were common (Lee 2005b).
As the ‘Korean Wind’ became a typhoon during 1994 and 1996, and as international
marriage became the easiest passport to Korea, ‘fake marriages’ became a social problem in
1996 (Kwon 2005, Lee 2005a, pp. 81– 82). Then the government concluded a memorandum
with China in 1996 which turned international marriages between Koreans and Chinese into
a more complicated process.4 Later, these processes were simplified again from 1 July 2003.
Therefore, the stagnation from 1996 to 2002 in Figure 1 was due to: (1) the IMF Crisis
in Korea during 1997 and 1998; (2) a change in the international marriage process between
Koreans and Chinese from 1996 to 2003; and (3) a significant change in the ‘Nationality
Law’ in 1998.
The second increase in international marriages involving Korean men after 2002 can
be explained by the flourishing of commercialized international marriage agencies.
In August 1999, marriage agencies did not have to get licenses from local governments and
became free businesses. This allowed an increase in the number of such agencies as well as
in the number of mediated marriages. Since then, the nationalities of these ‘mail-order
brides’ have diversified further to include Thais, Vietnamese, Mongols, and Russians.
The limitations imposed on unskilled and entertainment migrants accelerated the increase
in the number of Josunjok and other Asian women who arrived as marriage migrants.

Issues and problems caused by international marriages

Citizenship and legal status
The increase in international marriages has challenged the definition of Korean nationhood
and citizenship. The first challenge was posed by Korean woman who married foreign men
and suffered more prejudice against international marriages than their male counterparts.
Until 1998, before the revised Nationality Law was enacted, the old law was patrilineal
and gender-biased, reflecting a traditional ideology that ‘A married daughter is no longer a
daughter (Korean)’. On the one hand, the old law permitted the nationalities of children to
follow those of their fathers only. It meant that children with a Korean mother and a
foreign father could not acquire Korean nationality by birth. On the other hand, the old law
discriminated by gender: female foreigners who married Korean men could obtain Korean
citizenship immediately after their marriage, while male foreigners who married Korean
women had to wait two years, and meet certain eligibility requirements in order to apply
 Citizenship Studies 113

for nationality. The government revised the Korean National Act in November 1997 which
went into effect in June 1998, thus solving these two problems. It is true that the revision of
the law has alleviated sexism, but its main purpose was to prevent the bogus marriages to
female foreigners, especially Josunjok.
After 1998, the remaining issue was the legal status of foreign spouses before they
could obtain Korean nationality. At first, foreign spouses received the Visiting and Joining
Families (F-1) visas, but the F-1 visa holders could not apply for permission to work in
Korea. This was a serious problem for foreign spouses, especially for foreign husbands, to
maintain their economic situation. In May 2002, all foreign spouses could get residence
(F-2) visas, which allowed them to work.
Although the 1998 Nationality Law and succeeding changes in the F-visa problem
improved the situation of international marriage families of foreign (Asian) men and
Korean women, this group has suffered the most from social prejudice and discrimination.
Since most Southeast Asian migrant worker husbands were undocumented workers, their
precarious legal and working status caused serious problems for these families. According
to Table 1 in 2005 the number of international marriage families of unskilled Southeast
Asian husbands was about 2000, but the actual number would be higher because most
families lived together without registering their marriages, as migrant worker husbands
were undocumented. Some civic groups estimated it to be between 5000 and 10,000 in
2002 (HRSWM 2001). However, this group has got the least attention from the authorities.
Regarding foreign wives, the related issues were denizenship and the legal status of
divorce cases. First, some foreign wives who did not want to be naturalized had difficulties
in their daily lives without Korean resident cards which they could get after they became
Korean citizens. For example, they could not open a bank account or get a driving license
without the Korean resident card. In April 2002, the denizenship was established in Korea
for the first time. In the beginning, it was created for foreign investors and Chinese
residents ( ) in Korea but since September 2005, foreign spouses who had resided in
Korea for more than two years could apply for denizenship.
Second, since 1998, there were cases in which some female foreigners who wanted to
divorce within two years of marriage had to leave their children and return to their country
of origin. Since December 2003, a divorced foreign wife is allowed to apply for
naturalization in the following cases: if her husband is dead or missing, if she lives apart
from her husband or is divorced due to her husband’s imputation, or if she has to take care of
children. However, since 2007, in the case of divorce and legal separation, she has to prove
that she is a victim of her husband’s imputation first before any mitigation could be done.

Economic difficulties and exclusion from the social security system

Although the international marriage phenomenon has increased in Korea since the early
1990s, it was only recognized by the public after the second peak in Figure 1. As mentioned in
an earlier part of this paper, the first peak was led by Josunjok women, or ethnic Koreans from
China. Due to their resemblance to the Koreans or same ethnic background, the Korean public
did not recognize the phenomenon, except for the issue of bogus marriages. However, the
mass media and the Korean public became aware of the phenomenon when the nationalities
of foreign brides became diversified to include Filipinos and Vietnamese women since the
second peak, and when one out of three rural Korean men married foreign brides in 2005.
As several NGOs and mass media publicized domestic violence, poverty and the
human trafficking of foreign wives (HRSWM 2001, KWDC 2003, WeHome 2003), the
Ministry of Health and Welfare asked some academics including this researcher
114 H.-K. Lee

to investigate the problems that migrant women in international marriages face in Korea
(Seol et al. 2005). Therefore, a countrywide survey participated in by 945 foreign wives
was carried out in May and June of 2005.
According to our data (Seol et al. 2005), 53% of the families of migrant women live
below the poverty line, but only 14% receive basic aid. In fact, 44% of the families
survived with a family income less than half of the minimum cost of living. Thus most
foreign female spouses cannot maintain a basic subsistence level because of the lack of an
adequate social welfare system in Korean society. For example, 15.5% of foreign female
spouses have experienced starvation due to these economic reasons.
The basic social security policy is dysfunctional because it does not include families of
foreign female spouses. The reasons why the basic social security policy is almost useless
to families of migrant women are because foreigners are excluded from the social security
program5 and because half of them are not aware of the existence of the policy itself.
In addition, a third of all foreign female spouses are not in the medical security system
and many of them were not even aware of whether they were medical insurance
subscribers. Most of them presumed that foreigners were not eligible for medical
insurance, reflecting how insufficient public awareness campaigns on this issue have been.
In late 2005, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health tried to alleviate the problems of
economic hardship, exclusion from social welfare and health care programs and a related
policy was introduced by the government on 26 April 2006.

The ‘fake marriage’ issue

Although ‘fake marriage’ has been a social problem since 1996, it is difficult to estimate its
magnitude due to its blurred criteria. ‘Fake marriage’ is a means, for a foreigner, of using
international marriage as a route to migrate and/or as a means of changing his (her) status
in the destination country. However, in reality, people’s minds and actions are subject to
change. According to my interviews with Josunjok women (Lee et al. 2006), some
Josunjok women came to Korea in order to build a happy family but had to run away later
due to disappointment, dissatisfaction, and/or domestic violence. At the same time, there
were other Josunjok, whose initial intention was to engage in a ‘fake marriage’, but stayed
on because their husbands were sincere and generous, although not rich. This phenomenon
problematizes the dichotomy between ‘real marriage’ and ‘fake marriage’.
According to the Ministry of Justice (2001), out of 20,172 people with foreign spouses,
111 or only 0.6% of the total percentage divorced their spouses. However, when the number
of people who ran away from their abusive spouses are included, almost 10% of foreign
spouses did not live with the Korean men whom they married. In addition, most of the people
who ran away (a total of 1763) were Chinese (1206) and Filipinos (106). Thus, 16.2% of
Chinese spouses and 3.8% of Filipino spouses have experienced family dissolution.
The ‘fake marriage phenomenon’ applies mostly to Josunjok women because of their
easy access to employment in Korea (Lee 2005a). Unlike other foreign brides, Josunjok
women can find jobs in the service industry due to their ability to speak Korean and their
resemblance to native Koreans.6 Recently, there has been an increase in the number of
Vietnamese, Filipina and other Asian women taking advantage of this route into Korea.
The spotlight on ‘fake marriages’ of the Josunjok women in newspapers led Korean
people to form a stereotype of them, which led their Korean husbands to be suspicious of
them and to disallow them from working outside the home. This then led to their Josunjok
wives’ decision to run away.7
 Citizenship Studies 115

Policies on international marriage families

Although there has been a serious need for governmental assistance for international
marriage families and their children, the Korean government only revised the Nationality
Law in 1997. In the new millennium, several ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice,
Social Welfare and Health, and the Ministry of Gender Equality, tried to find ways to
improve their situation. Finally, on 26 April 2006, the Korean government announced
plans for a comprehensive policy for the social integration of foreign wives and their
families. The ‘Grand Plan’ was produced in a national meeting with President Roh Moo-
hyun and 14 branches of governmental administration. As a result, the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family (MGEF) became the leading department for coordinating policies for
international marriage families and their children. It was a much welcomed
announcement. In this section, I will deal with how and why the central government
began to intervene in these issues and why the Ministry of Gender Equality, instead of the
Ministry of Justice, became the leading department in coordinating the Grand Plan.

Background
Both locally and internationally, a number of problems have arisen from international
marriage. For example, human trafficking by international marriage agencies and the
plight of foreign wives in Korea have become a social problem. In Cambodia, for example,
a Korean man seeking a potential foreign bride was arrested on the suspicion of being a
trafficker (Joongang Newspaper, 15 February 2005). In January 2005, the Philippine
Embassy in Korea issued an urgent warning to Filipino women ‘to be extra wary, or avoid
applying for arranged marriages to Koreans’ (Korea Times, 5 July 2005). Vietnamese
women’s associations criticized a Korean newspaper report on 21 April 2006 entitled
‘Vietnamese women wish to come to Korea, Land of Dreams’, which included a
photograph of a group of Korean men interviewing Vietnamese women as prospective
wives. The women were standing in a line with number tags (Joongang Newspaper,
27 April 2006, 29 April 2006).8 In Korea, several women’s associations, female migrant
support NGOs and the foreign wives’ self-help organizations have criticized the
matchmaking process and advertisement of international marriage agencies, such as
‘Bride Guarantee’, which means that the agency will replace the bride with another if she
runs away. A ‘Law to Regulate Marriage Agencies’ was submitted to the National
Assembly on 1 February 2005. Since then and prior to that several government
administrations have tried to improve the situation for foreign brides in Korea. However,
all of these administrations have always worked independently until the ‘Grand Plan’.
First, the Ministry of Justice has tried to stabilize foreign spouses’ resident status,
allowing them to seek employment since 2002. Then it also mitigated the situation of
foreign divorced brides, reducing the documentary evidence needed to prove that their
Korean husband was responsible for their divorce. In addition, since 2005, it allowed them
to apply for denizenship.
Second, since November 2002, the Ministry of Gender Equality has provided an
interpretation service for migrant women who need professional counseling and protection
from sex trafficking, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The service, which is provided
through a women’s hotline, is available in English, Russian, Japanese, and Chinese.
The Ministry of Gender Equality began to provide this service for foreign wives in 2005,
after Amore-Pacific Corporation donated 200 million Korean Won (about US$200,000)9
in order to assist foreign wives. The Ministry of Gender Equality took over child care and
family services from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health in June 2004. In June
116 H.-K. Lee

2005, the Ministry of Gender Equality changed its name to the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family, to expand its services further.
Third, 16 congressmen and members of the Committee of Social Welfare within the
National Assembly, most representing rural constituencies, submitted a law in February
2005 proposing the regulation of marriage agencies. Consequently, based on the findings
of a nationwide survey (Seol et al. 2005), the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health
planned to integrate poor foreign wives and their families into the social security program
from 1 January 2007.

The ‘Grand Plan’ of 26 April 2006

According to the ‘Grand Plan’ of 26 April 2006, the Ministry of Gender Equality and
Family became the leading and major coordinating department, and other ministries
including the Ministry of Justice, Labor, Social Welfare and Health and local and central
government departments had to participate in the ‘Grand Plan’ (Table 2).
The vision of the ‘Grand Plan’ is ‘a social integration of foreign wives and an
attainment of a multicultural society’. The major policies are sevenfold: (1) regulation of
international marriage agencies and protection of foreign wives before entry into Korea;
(2) support for victims of domestic violence; (3) support and orientation for newly arrived
foreign wives, such as offering Korean language and culture classes; (4) support for
children of international marriages in schools; (5) providing social welfare to foreign
wives; (6) raising social awareness of multicultural issues; and (7) making a
comprehensive support system to attain the goals (Table 2).
Of all these proposed innovations, two were directed at Korean people and their
attitude towards international marriage couples and their children. By introducing the
fourth policy, the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development plans to
revise and correct contents in school textbooks that bear implications of racial
discrimination. It plans to introduce special programs for biracial children, including dual
language programs. Furthermore, it seeks to prevent racism. Regarding the sixth policy,
the government will try to raise social awareness and move towards becoming a successful
multicultural society. Since ‘mixed blood’ or ‘biracial’ implies racial discrimination, the
government will replace these terms with more politically correct terminology. Moreover,
it is considering the implementation of a law banning prejudice against children from
international marriages and children of immigrants.

Factors influencing governmental change

Although some NGOs supporting female migrants feel that the ‘Grand Plan’ was a sudden
change (Han, G.Y., 2006b, p. 3), it is an outcome of several internal and external factors.
The external factors are the racial struggles in France and the Korean visit of Hines Ward,
a Korean American football star. First, the government wants to prevent a ‘racial uprising’
similar to the racial riot in France in November 2005. Second, after the news that a Korean
American football star, Hines Ward, who was born in Seoul to a Korean mother and
African American father, had become a sporting hero by leading his team to victory in the
Super Bowl and the MVP in February 2006, the ‘race’ issue was brought forth. This raised
public awareness of children of international marriages.10 A ‘law to support multicultural
children and their families’ was submitted to the National Assembly on 6 April 2006.
In addition, the government wants to prevent any diplomatic struggle due to the human
rights violation of foreign wives.11 However, were it not for the internal factor, these
external factors would have been meaningless.
Table 2. Major policies of the ‘Grand Plan’ of April 2006.
Major policies Management Cooperation
1. Regulation of international marriage agencies & protection of foreign
wives before entry to Korea
(1) Control of illegal process by marriage agencies MJ NPA
(2) Legislation to regulate marriage agencies MSWH
(3) Regulation of trafficking in international marriages MJ MFAT/MGEF/NPA
(4) Standardization of marriage visa and process MJ NFAT
(5) Establish national cooperation system MFAT
(6) Provision of information for foreign wives MGEF MSWH/MFAT
2. Support for victims of domestic violence
(1) Make it difficult for Korean husband to withdraw identification MJ
guarantees for his foreign wife

Citizenship Studies
(2) Make it easy for foreign wives to prove their grounds for
divorce (for example, domestic violence)
(3) Simplifying the application process for Korean citizenship
for divorce foreign wives who have legitimate reasons for divorce
(4) Offering Korean citizenship or denizenship to children and
their mother of unregistered international marriages abroad
(5) Protection and support for victims of domestic violence MGEF MJ
3. Support and orientation for newly arrived foreign wives
(1) Providing useful information to newly arrived foreign wives MGEF MJ/MGAHA/MIC/local govt.
(2) Support for adaptation and settlement MCT/MEHRD/MAF
4. Support for children of international marriages in schools
(1) Establishing multicultural education and give support to MEHRD
children experiencing prejudice
(2) Offering welfare and counseling services MSWH MEHRD
5. Providing social welfare to foreign wives
(1) Support to meet minimum living costs & health care MSWH MGEF
(2) Support for child care MGEF/MAF
(3) Providing job information ML

117
 118
Table 2 – continued

Major policies Management Cooperation

6. Raising social awareness of multicultural issues

(1) Publicizing governmental policies MGEF/MJ
(2) Promoting a pro-multicultural environment MCT MEHRD/MGAHA/local govt.
(3) Educating civic servants on multicultural issues CSC/MGEF/Justice All admin. local govt.
(4) Educating social welfare and health care personnel MSWH/MGAHA/MEHRD/MAF
7. Making a comprehensive support system
(1) Conducting surveys of international marriage families and children MGEF GAHA/MEHRD

H.-K. Lee
(2) Build more centers to support international marriage families Local govt.
(3) Providing translation, counseling, education, and voluntary services MGEF/MSWH
(4) Build a network between central and local governments MGEF
Source: Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion (2005).
MGEF: Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.
MJ: Ministry of Justice.
MSWH: Ministry of Social Welfare and Health.
MCT: Ministry of Culture & Tourism.
MEHRD: Ministry of Education & Human Resource Development.
ML: Ministry of Labor.
MGAHA: Ministry of Government Administration & Home Affairs.
MAF: Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry.
MFAT: Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade.
MIC: Ministry of Information & Communication.
NPA: National Police Agency.
CSC: Civil Service Commission.
 Citizenship Studies 119

The major internal factor is the need for a more systematic immigration policy to
handle foreigners in Korea. Since Korea has had migrant workers for almost 20 years, and
the number of migrants has now become significant,12 the groups have diversified and
some of them began to settle down and the Korean government has to deal with migrant
issues in a more systematic way. International marriages mitigated (and sped up) the
immigration policy shift from a restrictive to a relaxed one.
When President Roh took office, he announced 12 steps his government would take to
improve Korea. One of these steps was the elimination of prejudice against minorities such
as foreigners, irregular workers and the disabled and discrimination based on gender and
education. As a result, the notorious ‘industrial trainee program’ was changed to the
‘employment permit program’ in 2004. Due to a decreasing birth rate and an aging
population, an immigration policy which guarantees a steady supply of foreign migrant
labor had to be introduced. The government wanted a more systematic immigration policy,
but instead of focusing on labor migration, the focus was on integrating international
marriage families into Korean society. This was a strategic move to elicit sympathy from
the Korean people and to reduce the opposition from Korea’s business leaders and the
unemployed. By highlighting the misery of some foreign wives, the government was able
to get the people to ratify its proposals by utilizing the public’s collective guilt which was
already at peak levels due to the emergence of NFL athlete Hines Ward.
Shifting from a restrictive to a relaxed immigration policy is possible because of the
strong NGO-led social movements which have exposed the mistreatment of migrant
workers in general and foreign wives in particular (Lee 2003). However, in this paper,
I want to highlight the perspective and characteristics of the current government itself and
the hidden interests of several ministries within the cabinet.
First, current president Roh Moo-hyun and many members of his cabinet were leading
civil activists in pro-human rights movements. The president himself comes from an
underprivileged background, and is very sympathetic to minorities’ issues. Although the
president and his cabinet have been criticized for their economic policies, they have
improved the human rights situation in Korea.
Second, the Grand Plan made a shift from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of
Gender Equality and Family to take responsibility for international marriages in Korea.
On the one hand, as a small department within the Ministry of Justice, the immigration
bureau tried to expand its department by highlighting the increasing number of migrants
and foreign wives. On the other hand, as a recently established ministry, the Ministry of
Gender Equality has been trying to gain more power, budget and importance within the
cabinet. The Ministry of Gender Equality has taken advantage of recent demographic
restructuring to expand its remit. As the low fertility rate in Korea has become a serious
social problem and as it is interpreted as a ‘women’s rebellion’ in Korea, the Ministry
of Gender Equality is required to undertake more responsibilities.13 When it took over
child care and family services from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health, it also took
their huge budget of 600 billion Korean Won (about 590 million US dollars) for its child
care program and 25 billion Korean Won (about 24 million US dollars) for its family
program in 2005. This 1400% increase in budget was greatly significant, instantly
transforming Gender Equality and Family into one of the most important and powerful
ministries within the government. It can utilize the family program budget to operate
several projects to assist foreign wives and their families. Therefore, the Ministry of
Gender and Family gained the upper hand over the Ministry of Justice in terms of increased
power within the government, although the latter can also expand its personnel (or
department) to a certain extent.
120 H.-K. Lee

Therefore, the ‘Grand Plan’ represents two important shifts. The first shift is from a
policy for ‘immigration’ to a ‘population’ policy. The second shift is from a policy for
‘women’ to a ‘family’ policy. The first shift has been welcomed and viewed positively in
the sense that it represents a shift from the policy focusing on ‘them’ to one that focuses on
‘us’. It is comprehensive in that it covers the whole process of adaptation of international
marriage families and their children, including policies that include the stage before their
entrance into Korea to the later stages of their residence in Korea.
However, the second shift calls for more careful attention because the overemphasis on
‘family’ may highlight their roles as ‘wives’ and ‘daughter-in-laws’ instead of their more
important role as ‘independent human beings’. On the one hand, attention to this issue is
evident from the change in name of the Ministry of Gender to the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family after it took the budget increase. On the other hand, this can be
interpreted as a strategy to step over the threshold of a ‘patriarchal’ society to a more
‘gender equal’ society. It is true that Korean people can accept the ‘Grand Plan’ for the
sake of ‘family’ rather than for ‘women’. However, the overemphasis on ‘family’ may
become a barrier to the gender balanced family life and the empowerment of foreign wives.
The Grand Plan successfully exposed the homogenous Korean society to the notion of
‘multiculturalism’ and welcoming and integrating foreigners into Korean society.
However, the exact meaning of a multicultural society is still unclear and the ‘Grand Plan’
tends to lead to the assimilation of foreigners rather than their integration into society
while still maintaining their own cultural identity.
Another flaw in the implementation of the ‘Grand Plan’ was that it instituted in the
public’s mind a feeling of superiority over other Asian cultures. Koreans were encouraged
to be benevolent to their ‘less fortunate’ neighbors. Because the government led this trend,
we can refer to it as ‘multiculturalism from above’. While I welcome the much-needed
discussion and debate now taking place on the issues, I fear that no real change has
occurred and that ‘multiculturalism’ is just a passing trend that is fashionable at the
moment without having brought about a real change in the public’s mind.

Conclusion
The government policy towards international marriages in Korea can be viewed from three
perspectives; the ‘mail-order bride’, as ‘labor migration’, and ‘gendered geography’. First,
the public as well as the governmental concern began from the MOB phenomenon
characteristics that (1) Korean men brought their brides from less developed countries,
(2) a significant number of these marriages were arranged by commercialized marriage
agencies or brokers, and (3) the Korean men paid most expenses essential to a marriage
and/or paid some money to the brides’ families. These MOB characteristics were believed
to lead to human rights violations such as domestic, economic, social and cultural
violence. Therefore, the government began to take action. After some attempts to support
the social adjustment of foreign wives in Korea, the government announced the ‘Grand
Plan’ in April 2006.
I welcomed the ‘Grand Plan’, but worried about the government’s and media’s
emphasis on MOB characteristics. For example, although the majority of foreign wives are
Josunjok, the government highlights the incidences of international marriages involving
Southeast Asian women, while downplaying those involving Josunjok women, in order to
attract more public compassion. While this approach has helped to arouse sympathy from
the Korean public towards foreign wives, I worry that they are inadvertently creating a
caste of second-class citizens in Korea.
 Citizenship Studies 121

Second, international marriage increased due to the lack of availability of visas for
unskilled workers in Korea. Because of restrictive immigration policies in place until
2004, and a recent massive deportation of undocumented workers to their home countries,
international marriages became the easiest route to entering and residing in Korea. In May
2006, or about one month after the announcement of the Grand Plan, the government
outlined the new direction of its immigration policy, which will incorporate all immigrants
under one all-encompassing umbrella framework. The government’s position has shifted
from viewing migrants as ‘one time labor’ to ‘our neighbor’. Until now, different issues
regarding foreigners visiting and staying in Korea have been dealt with separately, under
the authority of different government offices, including the ministries of justice, labor,
social welfare and health, and gender equality and family. In order to improve the living
standards of all foreigners in Korea the government set up a committee under the Prime
Minister’s Office that will coordinate the policies of different government ministries.
I also welcome this new shift towards a comprehensive and relaxed immigration policy,
which will support all kinds of foreigners, such as foreign investors, migrant workers,
students, spouses, and refugees. The separate policy towards international marriages cannot
deal with the issues without a systematic immigration policy due to the ‘balloon effect’.
Finally, the Korean government seems to utilize the ‘Grand Plan’ for foreign wives to
mitigate the above immigration policy shift by appealing to a strongly patriarchal society.
However, it is interesting to see how the gendered geography within international marriage
affects ‘patriarchal’ Korean society. Although the foreign brides have some difficulties in
the earlier stages of their adjustment to Korea, most of them will recover the ‘power
geometry’ in a matter of time. The recent increase in the divorce rates of international
marriage couples could be a sign of this development. In my opinion, future policies must
address gender inequality instead of focusing on family issues, otherwise social problems
involving international marriage couples will persist.
In summary, marriage migration to South Korea has challenged the concept of a
‘homogeneous’ and ‘patriarchal’ Korean society. By experiencing social and political
trials and errors during the 1990s, Korean society is attempting to evolve towards
becoming a successful multicultural society. The ‘Grand Plan’ of 26 April 2006 is a
stepping stone towards this.

Notes
1. For more information, see Lee (2005a).
2. The figures were provided by a clergyman in the Unification Church in Chungnam on 29 July
2004.
3. There had been no age limit for Korean Chinese to visit their relatives in South Korea until
1992, when the Korean government set a minimum age limit of 60 years old, then decreased it
to 55 in 1994 and 45 in 2002 (Lee 2002, pp. 179– 183).
4. According to the memorandum of understanding that has operated since 1996 for the
prevention of fake marriages, if Korean and Chinese were willing to marry, they had to pass
various complicated procedures: the person concerned must be unmarried, marriage
authentication ! marriage registration in China ! marriage authentication of China !
marriage registration in Korea ! visa application for the Chinese spouse, and so on.
However, this international memorandum of understanding between Korea and China was
abolished on 1 July 2003, therefore enabling people to register marriage at the institution
related to census registration in both countries, and receive marriage visa from the counsel of
the Korean Ambassador to China (The Hankyoreh, 20 June 2003).
5. International marriage families were excluded from the social security program in two ways:
first, foreigners could not be recipients of the social security benefits; and second,
international marriage families were excluded from the program because a foreign spouse’s
122 H.-K. Lee

earnings were included in the numerator but she (or he) was not included in the denominator
when the local authorities calculated the relative earnings per person in that household.
6. Until December 2002, it was prohibited for migrant workers to work in the service industry.
Since 2002, the Korean government began to allow ethnic Koreans to work in certain service
sectors including domestic work.
7. Similar cases can be found in Freeman (2005).
8. The Korean newspaper sent a letter of apology to the Vietnamese Women’s Alliance on
11 May 2006 (Joongang Newspaper, 14 May 2006).
9. US$1 ¼ 1028 Korean Won in June 2005.
10. Hines Ward announced a plan to establish a foundation for multicultural children in South
Korea on 29 May 2006. The foundation will be named ‘Hines Ward Helping Hands Korea’
and will be independently operated by Pearl S. International, a non-profit organization
assisting multicultural children (Korea Times, 29 May 2006).
11. A Filipino woman died as a result of domestic violence (Chosun Ilbo, 25 March 2003).
Several suits involving notorious commercial marriage agencies are in the courts (Chosun
Ilbo, 19 December 2006).
12. In 2005, out of 800,000 foreigners who had resided in Korea for more than three months, there
were 150,000 ethnic Koreans (majority are Josunjok), 170,000 documented workers and
180,000 undocumented workers.
13. The total fertility rate was 1.16 in 2004 and 1.08 in 2005.

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