Intemational Journal of Disaster Rsk Reducsion 63 (2021) 102428, Contents lists available nt ScienceDirect International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction ELSEVIER. journal homepage: ww elsevier comllocateider Exploring the gap between policy and action in Disaster Risk Reduction: A case study from India A. Ogra”’, A. Donovan”, G. Adamson", K.R. Viswanathan, M. Budimir® {depwnen of Seely, K's Colige Lodo. *bipronn of oope Cn of Coe, UK “brs ka Cig ne al Ast Cog eyed DR tons sac ‘The weston fom a responses paregn fo an antipatve, prevention bsedappronch remains» su boxn chatengein Distr Risk Reduction CORR) Whit she Unite Nations fice for Disaster Rik Reduction CUONDAR) ns voce he ate site the nenatonal Decade fr Natal Diss Reuevo in the 190s, — sunny cots have bre slow to moe Ra a response focused appreae oa preventative oe, neato tens Policy guidelines have suecesily informed the national DRR policies in varus counties were, thei —— Faber wansaon don to the regional ae focal Level fl of complex pti challenges, exacerbated In Tee nuny tes by an ncemsed quency of disses. nds paper we explore the caso India sing te xanple oases management. Tough analysis ofthe evolton of lane isk goverance ding east to decals in two hilly regions ~ Dating inthe Himalayas ad the Nig the Western Ghats ~ we emonsae rae while the national goverment appeas to have made consierable flrs ro move i ine with the UNDRR approaches, the eventual outue of tse eft atte reload loa eel Is lage an in {xen improvement on the exiting DRR apres and nota patein si in undetstanding ad essing tisasier isk We argue tha overcoming these ses equiesatetvenes oa sitvated undead o Sasers an insnins othe lal feel, an ot meting aparnt gaps berween policy and action es fancinal Ghallenges ro be overcome wih ew since fom national eve 1. Introduction instiutionalised with the introduction of the Hyogo Framework for Acton in 2005, and in 2015 with the Sendai Framework for Disaster A conceptual shife towards anticipatory management of disasters, bea i the mid-19708, as the eulmsnation ofa change in comprehen: sion of disasters from ‘ats of God’ to social phenomena [1,2] Before this, Point, the international effort was largely reactive, instituionalised through bodies suc as the United Nations Disaster Relief Office, created in 1971 to promote the ‘sdy, prevention, control, and prediction of natural disasters’ (3; emphasis added). This eoneeptualization of di sosters as ‘natural’ underwent a slow transition through the Interna ‘onal Decede for Navural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) daring the 1990 notably within the Vokohioma strategy fora Safer World (1994) (4) ~ ‘and subsequently the UN Inemnstional Stetegy for Disaster Reduction CUNISDR) in 2000, renamed in 2019 as the UNDRR. A shifc in feds towards viewing disasters as social and the inereasing emphasis placed ‘on disaster preparedness (as opposed (0 responsiveness) was further * Conesponding author mat addres sh ogra kel a. (A. gr. spa do. org/10.2016 js. 2001.102428 Risk Reduction with its four action priorities related to understanding and strengthening disaster governance 10 manage disaster risk, and “Building Back Better’ in recovery rehabilitation and reconstruction {5} ‘The current UN terminology regards Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) as “the poliey objective of disaster risk management, with disaster risk ‘management being the application of DRR strategies co prevent, reduce and manage disaster risk [6] Echoing these shifts within the UN, India underwent a major shift in lus approach towards diststers in 2005 with the introduetion of the Disaster Management Act (referred as ‘the Ae from here on) 17,8]10), like many countries in the ml 2000s {10-12}. Nationally, major di sasters such as the earthquakes of Uttarkashi (1991), Latur (199) and CChamoli (1999), the Assam floods (1998), and the Orrsa Super Cyclone (1999), pressed home the need to rethink the state of disaster Received 22 November 2020; Received in vevised form 25 une 2021; Accepted 25 June 2021 ‘Availabe online 29 June 2021 7212-4200/ 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ld. This san open acces article under the CC BY license ip /eteativecommonsorg/lenses/by/4.00.A Opa eeak ‘management inthe county (5,1-15]. A High Powered Committee on dlisester management was constituted by the Central Government in 1999 to develop Indias holistic approach towards ‘natural disasters, Inter extended to secommodace ‘man-made disasters’. The report of the ‘committee was submitted in 2001, the year of the Gujarat Bhu) earth ‘quake, an the Bill made into an Act in 2008 following the Indian Oceaa, ‘Tsunami (2004) [15,14]. The Act was followed by the National Policy on Disaster Management (2009) [16] (hereafter called ‘the Policy’) ~ ded by the Hyogo Framework (2005-2015) ~ and the National Disaster Management Plan (the Plan’, introduced in 2016 and revised in 2019 (17,18), based on the Sendai Framework [19]. Research exploring the extent co which the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks are being implemented in developing countries has argued "hat, beyond the formal commitment to the declarations and high-level meetings, compliance with the commitments remain problematic (20-25), Sinilar arguments have been made in indian media regarding the efficacy of the Act, Poliey and Plan, following several devastating foods between 2013 and 2020 (24,{25). In thls paper we explote tls apparent lack of ‘eompliance” with the Aet, through interviews with officials, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and first responders Involved in landslide risk management in two mountainous disrets in India: the Nilgiris and Darjeeling. We argue that, whilst the 2004 tsunan may have precipitated the publication of the Ae, it can Viewed as a ‘rteal juneture in DRR in India (26). Rather, sh policy approaches af the national level have made few meaning ‘changes © DRR ‘onthe ground’, due to institutional inertia and a falure to understand the situated context within which disaster management Institutions operate at the local level. A ehiange in focus towards inte grating national-Ievel management with a Docton-ap, situated approael to disaster management in India is instond the paradigm shift that is require. Jl, Appraising the act In the following section we review existing iterature on disaster _governance in India since the Act. Mich ofthis literature tends to ascss the Acts effectiveness in terms of new institutions that have been created since its introduction, Studies have identified the operational ‘surges faced Dy these new institutions stich 8 lack of funds avaliable to them, and duplication of efforts and hierarchieal conficts between diffrent agencies, Gupta [14], for instance, traces the journey of disaster management governance in tadia and argues that “the Indian, dlsester management policy is geared to make a paradiga: change from. response and calamity relief to disaster prevention, preparation and tniigation’ (pp.58 59), However, he goes on to argue the need for “a 1ajor ant of institutional setups, laws an poliey implementation tools inthe backdrop of success failure yardstcks ofthe major disasters in the recent pas’, indicating the need to address issues of ‘overlapping au thority, lack of adequate staffing and elarity around fund distribution’ (149 (2.49). Pande and Pande (271 argue that states are claiming funds under disaster headings, for activities which they should be funding on their own, thus no following central government's guidelines properly ‘This paper was published immediately after the introduction ofthe Act (2005) and mentions the iastiutions established by it as « promising ‘spect of disaster management in Indi. More recent works such as Pal ‘and Tarun [2] applaud the Act for ‘heralding paradigm shifcin disaster ‘management from post event to one of pre-event prevention, mitigation ‘and preparedness’ (p-75) but focus only on disaster response mecha nisms, without addressing how changes in institutional function might have bronght about this paradigm shit "te we follow the UNDRR defition of landslides asa vaietyof process that result inthe downward and outward movement of lope forming ates Including eek, sol, artical lo a combination ofthese. The materials may rove by fling, toppling sliding, spreading, ot flowing merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 ‘The key trend shown by much ofthis literature isto appreciate the ‘Act, Policy a Plan for their intentions, and presen isses identified in ther inuplementation as Functional challenges which need to be Bxed; tha i, sues in implementation that can be overcome with time and With some minor changes to disister governance atthe local level (see Iso [29-31]. The continued presence of institutions created at the national, state and district level is used ro argue that a paradigm sift has been achieved for disaster management in India, without a crtical analysis oftheir 4isynetionalty and the exaet nature of any changes since the Act. This framing tends to underplay che cultural, politcal, Doureaueratic, and epistemic context within which the Aet was ito duced, Here, some reviews of the Act inthe legal studies Iterature are stronger beeause they question the real strength of tls legislaion in the ndian bureaueratie context (5,52,9s]. Thatta tal. (9); for example, argue that s lk of proper interagency co ordination prevents imple entation of the changes introduced by te Act. Similaly, Carter and Pozaray [5] ~ comparing the National Disaster Management Author Ines in three counsries (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) ~ argue that theres @ need to lik national level agencies widh local NGOS, not only for response but also during the preparatory and mitigation phase (that Is, before a disaster This paper takes these points further, to argu that the institutional strenireintrodiced by the Act eannot be assessed independently ofthe political, bureanerate, and, importantly, episteniie context in whieh cis expected to operate. This paper utilises framevrorks from geography, Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the DRR literature to explore this gap between policy and action, Using the example of landslide managemtent in «wo distriets ~ Darjeeling fn the nortesst Himalayas (West Bengal) aad the Nigiri in the Western Ghats CTamil Nad) ~ we explore recent shifts in DRR in India at the loeal level. The feld work in these two study districts was eartied out over a period of 3 months spread across January 2018 ane February 2020, a 35 interviews were conducted during this period. These interviews were analysed using thematic analysis along witha desk based review ofthe Policy and Plan documents. Through this fe argue that India has not undergone @ ‘paradigm shift’ in its approach towards disasters; rather, it has seen & patchy and incremental improvement in its existing response based ‘ipproael and has not yet niade a transition towards prevention aad anticipation. The language of substantial change i used at national level, but the local institutional reality is deeply rooted in dhe inti tional context informed by the response-oriented ‘natural’ conceptual zation of disasters. This argument has Important implications for ‘managing expectations fons the At, Policy and Pan, which remain very high despite the well dacumented shortcomings. It also shows, more Widely the challenges of enforcing change purely from & national level DRR: policy changes cannot necessarily overcome the institutional Inertia of local goverament, whieh requires a deeper cultural and epistemic shift in managing disaster risk a dhe local level. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework of the study section 9 shares in detail the methodological approaches used and section provides # review of the Policy, Plan, andthe Act to highlight tensions in the institutional structure for disaster management atthe national level ost the intzaduetion of the Act. These arguments are supported Dy it terviews carried out for this study with disaster management officals ‘and NGOs operating a the national level, Seeton 5 focuses specially fn the disaster governance in the two study azeas (Darjeeling aud the Nilsrs), providing detsils about the institutional stricture of disaster ‘management atthe loel level. This setion derives from interviews and participant observation gathered during three mont of fieldwork in the to study ateas, and documentary analysis of State and Distret Disaster Management Plans. In section 6 we analyse the observations from the national level (shared in section +) and Toes Teve (shared in section 5) tei together with the theoretical framework ofthe study Lastly, in section / we share the concluding remarks.A Opa eeak 2. Theoretical framework This paper explores why India continues to struggle with disasters despite she shift in instiutional focus at the national level. At hear, the Issue is the stragle in translating the intent of international poliey discourse into action on the ground ~ a widely recognised problem in DAR [36,97]. The knowledges that feed into the production of inter national policy and United Nations frameworks ean be integrated into national: Ievel policy, but aetioning these ideas in local contests remains a Key challenge; these Knowledges are generie and not speifie ~ and they often do not speak into local realities, cultures and communities (08), This issue is noc unique to DRR — its also being strongly felt in the related flelds of sustainable development and climate change research. In these fields this gap is often referred to as scale discordance Seale discordance is defined as the mismatch occurring wen avail able scientific information, or other formal knowledges, does not reflect, the unigue context of the environmental conditions and/or the _geographic scale for decision-making [39]. Ths concept has been used fo understand the struggles in introducing internationally/globally ‘cnsitited knowledges into locally situated contexts [0]. Far example, ‘commenting on the difference in global and local perspectives and the attempts at using one (global) to guide the other (local) in climate ‘change context, STS scholar Shella Jasanoff [1] argues that a homog cenising global understanding ‘detaches global fact feom local value, projecting anew, rotalising image ofthe world asiti, without regard for the layered investments that societies have made in the wotlds as they wish them ¢o be. It therefore destabilses kuowledge at che same tinue tha I seeks co stabilise it” (p.236). Building on this, Mike Hulme [12] argues thar having detached decontextualized facts (a global perspec tive) without the corresponding meaning (local perspective) fils 0 do justice to the challenges faced in lived everyday life at a local level, and tay even be of ess use in problem solving/poicy making in comparison to the local tools. Tim Ingold [43] argues that the distinction between the global and local perspective isnot one of hierarchical degree but one ‘of kind, The locel perspective is one of engagement with the world in ‘which we live, whereas the global stems from a detached, disinterested ‘and decontextualized observation ofthe world [43] Comprehending and capturing the ‘local perspective’ as being different in kind - and not just a narrowly focused interpretation ofthe ‘global’ requites a theoretiel framework that provides the scope to conceptualise perspectives outside ofthe ‘global’ local” divide, viewing these as context specific. Here we uilise STS scholar Donna Haraveny’s (iA) eoncept of situated knowledges as fruitfal lens through which co understand sole discordance in DIR poliey an practice. Haraviny see this concept ro question the authority of scence as « bory of knowledge. Science, according to Haraway, with its decontextuaized worldview, lls authority by being placeless (no sited in any specific contexd. ‘She instead cals for stating seience by recontextualising it alongside ‘other bodies of knowledge to let areal interconnected view ofthe world emerge In this study oe use situated knowledges to understand how the polices, institional, and bureaucratic context of particular region ‘ss well as the worldviews, valies and knowledges of the popalaco ‘who live there — guide the way thar disasters are managed inthe region, ‘and henee shape the interpretation of national and international poliey ‘guidelines (which themselves reflect their places of origin, whether ‘capital ety or Geneva for example). As such, the paper makes a larger ‘argument abonst the problenatie inherent i reducing internationally ‘econimended policy guidelines into locally situated specific contexts, We argue that translating the paradigm shifts recommended by these ‘guidelines ito action on the ground requires unpacking the positional perspectives of the exiting paradigms. Attempts at Implementing globally informed poliey goals without the acknowledgement of the situated positional perspective, and the corresponding epistemic values, lead to gaps in policy and actions. merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 3. Methodology: about this study This study builds on the institutional mapping of disaster manage ‘ment in Indi earied out for the LANDSLIP (Landslide mlt-hazard risk assessment, preparedness, and ently warning in South Asi: integrating meteorology, landscape, and society) project. LANDSLIP isa UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and Foreign, Commonvvealth and Development Office (FCDO) funded project which aimsto produce a Landslide Early Waring System fortwo sty sites in Indi the Nigiris Distiet in the Tamil Nadu State of Sou India and Darjeeling Diseet (with Ease Sikkim, not included here) in West Bengal State of Eastern nda Fig. 1 shows the two study sites ou the map of India. Both study distress are highly susceprible to Tandslde risk, exusing major disrup: tion during monsoon seasons through danage ro infrastructure and property and oceasionally lost lives. Multiple demand: oriented studies ‘on landslides have already been carried out in both the study areas [45-40]. However, these works focus on landslide asa hazard and donot egge withthe instictional structure available to adress landslide isk tthe wo regions, Both the sty sites are hill districts in sates with primarily plain fazeas, with heavy econoaue reliance on tourism and tea plantations. Darjeeling District and the adjoining Kalimpong District that separated from Darjeeling in 2017 — are unique within West Bengal due to their geography and eulture, being Himalayan distret in a state dominated by plains, and populated by communities of Nepali heritage. Commu nities here have been denianding a separate state of Gorkhaland for over three decades, due to their cultural differences fromthe majority Bengali population of West Benge. This deniand has resulted in violent prorsts ton several oceasions (1986-1988, 2017). Over tne these protests have facilitated a tripartite agreement between central government, state government and locel political parties, resulting in the formation of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), a semi-autonomous body responsible for the development initiatives of the Hill communities {50-59]. The GTA isa relatively unique form of local governance whieh does not report to the district administration but works alongside i, reporting directly to state authorities. ‘The Nigiris Districts on of only handful of hilly districts in Tamil, ‘Nadu. auch of the population identifies with one of soveral tribal groups in the region, yet most ofthe population speaks Tamil, tn contrast with Darjeeling, therefore, the Nigiris are relatively politeally sable, More ‘importantly unlike Darjeeling district the Nilgiris district is nota border region, and the region does not have the same history of in-migration. ‘The granule Nilgiris Hills are also considerably older than the Hina layas, with slopes that are generally shallower and Inndslides that are less intense, However, the Nigitis receives rainfall in both the south west and north-east monsoon, s0 the landslide season runs almost Darjeeling & Wm cast Sikkim Fig. 1. LANDSUP sudy ste in indie. Figue produced by the LANDSLIP omoxtinn and repteded with persion,A Opa eeak ‘continously from ine to December. The different political, cultural, ‘and geographical contexts of the two study sites therefore provide aa ieresting backdrop for comparing the implementation of the Act, Poliey and Plan. For this study fleld work was carried our mostly a the distit level, and to a limited extent at the state and national level Approximately three months were spent in the field between January 2018 and February 2020 and 85 interviews conducted. sie 1 provides ‘abroad overview of interviewee distribution in the two study areas In edition ro those mentioned in Table 1, three people with expe rience of working with disaster management at the national level were interviewed in Delhi. Four additional people belonging to government ‘organisttions not directly involved in distter management but pro ‘ducing research studies on land and land use were interviewed in the Niles. mterviewes were selected from a desk based review of esaster management plan documents, whieh identified key sctors inthe area “The interviews were conducted under the ethical approval (LRS-16/ 17-487) received from King's College London for the research, and celther written or verbal consent was gathered from each incerviewee ‘The imerviews were semi-structured by design: however, co ensure that all the interviews have common purpose they were given a broad scruetural outline with commonality in question themes. Most of the Interviews were conducted in English with some Hind, the fist la ‘guages of the lend author. Sone interviews in the Nilgiris were con ducted in Tail interviews here were faeiitated by our local research partner, the local NGO Keystone Foundation, and translated into English ‘Additional observational fieldwork was carried out is both research ‘areas, which inched being participant observer in meetings berween, the distri sd block level officers on Disaster Management Plans. tn terviews and policy documents were analysed using thematic analysis, focusing on the themes of how early warnings are generated, dissemi nated and used inthe study areas, the established protocols for disaster management, and how these protocols are interpreted or transite on the ground, 4. Disaster governance at the national level Prior wo the Act, he institutional structure for disasters i dia was ‘entirely response driven, foenssed on relief, rescue, and financial asi tance, Relief and reseue operations were coordinated primarily at the district level by the District Collector/District Magistrate (diffrent names for the same positon: the most senior official in the district administration) and atthe state level by the State Relief Commissioner (SRO, reporting ditcetly to the Chief Seeretary. Ar the national level, disasters were landed by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MA).” Dating large-scale disasters, fisacial assistance for the affected state were ‘administered from the National Calamity Contingeney Funds (NCCR) ‘and Calamity Relief Fund (CRP), following a visit to the afected area by 4 specially commissioned Inter Ministerial Group and answered by & ‘Central Relief Commissioner with the MI, answering to a National (Crises Management Committee (NCMC) [20]. Whilst the basic re sponsibility for undertaking reseve, reli an rehabilitation remained ‘Table 1 Lis of interviewees with Aster management ofclals a expat inthe ro soy areas Respondent Dajecing igi ovniment offcals at /disscv ab donc 7 7 NGO menbers 2 1 2 Befve this by the Union Minis of Astute merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 that ofthe concemed state governments — with the central government primarily providing financial assistance’ ~ the Act inttodueed various ‘evr instittions at the national, state and district levels respectively to drive this shift. Significantly the Act replaced the temporary eommittees formed during a disaster with the following permanent institions 8) AC the national level: National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), National Executive Committee (NEC), National Institue for Disaster Management, Netonal Disaster Response Force. by Ac the sate level: State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) and State Executive Committee along with State Disister Response Force (spre). ©) At the distriet level: com). Distret Distster Management Authority ‘The Policy (2008) and Plan (2016, 2018) were introduced co ope: ationalise the Act. Whilst the Policy was oriented more towards mit sation than preparedness, response, or recovery, the language within the Pla ~ Res atrodced in 2016 and then revised in 2019 ~ suggests nn approach that is primarily preparedness. and response-driven.” The legislation designed co facilitate the implementation ofthe Act therefore already provide an indication thatthe paradigm shift envisaged by the ‘Act has not occurred. Furthermore, whilst the Act asked central gov femument to ser up a National Disaster Response Fund and w National Disaster Mitigation Fund, only the Response Fund has heen created, by Aravving upon the alseady existing NCCF and the CRF. The government has not constituted the National Disaster Mitigation Fund, arguing that ‘ongoing sehentes take ene of mitigation measures, negating the need for fs separnte Fund fori [54 41, Insctrional friron and the amendment ro the act ‘The wenkening of the intended aims of the Act relates partly to conflicts within central government ereated by the institutions that it mandated, Bose [55]; Mathur and Bhattacharya [56]; Bhattacharya (1974), Mathur (57); and Cohen and Raghavulu [55] have argued that the Indian democratic political system ~ much like other eourtries~ is always alert to the opportunities a disaster context offers Political mobilization, and this Is tue of disaster fu particular, the distribution of the NOCF # open to pol with Kumar (59] arguing that resources are directed towards floating ‘artis: political parties that ate likely o make or change affiliations based on benefits. Das and Jha (60lhighlight one such notable int dence, related to provisions of ditional central assistance to Orissa (ow Osa) in Hhe wake ofthe super cyclone oF 1999. AC his ine the Eleventh Finance Commission explicitly noted thar the centre's reluc tance to declare the Orissa super-eyelone as a national ealamity and provide adequate assistance may have had a political motivation with the centre and state controled by different poet partes. The Ac was therefore introduced in a context where relief finds were apparently nen t political maniplation, ‘The new institutional strcture proposed by the Act was introduced parlly to circumvent these issues, through the establishment of 3 These wete based on the recommendation of the Finance Commision of India, a constitutionally mandated body at the central lve, responsible for ‘lating the state of fnnnces of the union and sate governments along with laying dow the puneples determining te dsuibution of faanctal assistance ftom he conte othe states, “he Pliy asin ttl ale objectives of which ive are mitigation focused, ‘wo aimed at improving preparedness and one each for response and recovery However, as we move on tothe Plan, which was designed co wala dese objectives ito actionable suatgles on the ground, we find the crm “liga Hon? used nly four tines as opposed to the frm espouse’ which gues 339 times toot the PanA Opa eeak permanent NDMA, chaired by the Prime Minister and administered by & hine member board of nominated experts from the field of disaster ranagenent.” As per the Act, one ofthese nine members was to become the Vie-Chair, who would have the status of Cabinet Minister, nd the ‘other eight members were to have the Minister-of State status (Act 2005). This new status for the NDMA created a hierarchical struggle between elected Cabinet Ministers and the nominated Board members of the NDMA." A national level DRR advisor shared that there was clear bbureaueratie and politcal inertia esistng the change introduced by the ‘Actin the institutional hierarey for isaster management, For him this ‘was evident in the strugles they feed to get the basie administrative work done throug MHA, which was the sole authority for addressing disasters prior to the Act. These everyday struggles were, according (0 hin, elaraeteristie of the existing system's reluctance co let a strong NDMA emerge.” Additionally, under the previous sytem, the Cabinet Seretary that headed the NMC would report directly to Cabinet Ministers Inthe new ‘order, the Cabinet Secretary aso headed the NEC, which was to assist, the NDMA in its actions, effectively meaning that the Cabinet Secretary ‘would be reporting ta to bodies the Ministry of Home Affairs and the NDMA, This eveated the potential for substantial bureaucratic and po- litical stalemate” A special task force was constituted by the MHA in 2013 to address these hierarchical mismatches, reporting that the “functioning of institutional entices ereated under the Act at all levels ‘were being reportedly constrained by alack of clarity on the roles as well, 4s by stretural anomalies, dearth of human resources and inadequate infrastructure" [29] (p.n). The response to this was to portion out the roles between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the NDMA, withthe INDMA responsible forthe formation aac implementation of poliies ‘relating to prevention, mitigation and preparedness, and coordination of ‘disaster response with the states conducted by Ministry of Home AF fairs. This therefore insttuionalised the separation of mitigation and prevention mexsures from preparedness and response. ‘Based on the recommendations ofthis special task foree, the Act was ‘aniended in 2013, The amendnient was followed by downgrading the status ofthe Vice-Chair of the NDMA fron Cabinet Minster co Cabinet Secretary aud the status of other members from Minister of State to Secretary. The total number of members were reduced from wie (0 four/five. With this amendment, the Vice-Chair became subordinate to the Cabinet Ministers, This dovingrading received considerable media coverage and was seen as a systematic weakening of an established Institution [61-65}. Online research revealed no further Viee Chair appointments since the amendment, posibly indicating an attempt to ‘avoid nny further power confiets between the Cabinet Secretary and the Vice-Chaie of the NDMA, 4.2, Summary In summary of the above, Fg. 2 shows the current operatonsl hi erarchy for disaster management in india a the national level. This di ‘agram has been developed on the back of communication pathways dlagram given inthe Plan (2019). Ir should be noted thatthe pathways (arrows) we present here are ot identical to that presented in the Plan; rather it as been modified based on information gathered from the Inerviews. The diagram provided in che Plan represents sides inst tutional parhvvay for coordination, decision making and communica: tion; it does nor highlight any chain of command. Conversely, ig. 2 highlights the chain of command (with orange-colouted arrows) and some of the additional pathways of communication (grey coloured lines). Ie shows the disaster management institutional structure to be = tnervew with national Level disaster sesponse expest 1, January 2018 © tnteview with national level DRR advisor expeit 2, January 2018 7 anterview with national level DRR advisor expest 2, January 2018 ® tnterview with acon level disse respense expe 3, Jaany 2018, merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 top-down inits approach, as has been argued previously in the literature (66,671. The NDMA, looking after mitigation, is subordinate to the MHA, which manages disaster response. This is indicative of the pref ference given to response over mitigation within the new instiutionsl struetire at the national level. Additionally, we see that the crises committee ~ which had been representative of response-oriented approach towards disasters before the introduction of the Act ~ has Continued to comand the DM institutional structure even after the Introduction of the Act, especially during a disaster event. 5. Disaster governance at the local and regional level This section outlines changes to disester management in the Niles, rnd Darjeeling districts since the introduction of the Act, Polley and Plan, The section focusses specifically on a) the institutional stractare for DRR in these so smdy areas, including financial resources available for DRR; and b) the state and disaster management plas. 5.1. Nils istrict 5.1.1 Insiutionalsrucre for DRI 5.1.1, At the state lee. fn Tamil Nadu, disaster management cones lunder the Commissionetate of Revenue Administration, Disaster Man agement and Mitigation, within the Revenue Deparment. The commissioner ofthis Commissionerate i also the State Relief Commis: sioner (SRC), The chain of command remains largely wnchinged since before the introduction of the Act, with the SRC overseeing reli ap: erations throughout the state, and incidence information and relief requirement provided by District Collectors, who also head the disaster management operations atthe district level." The institutional structure for disaster management ontlined in the Tansil Nad State Disaster Managemient Plan (8) is as follows: the government has constitited ‘Tamil Nadu State Dsester Management Authority (TN SDMA), recently renaned as Tanil Nadu Disaster Risk Reduction Agency (TN-DRRA). ‘The TN-SDMA/TN-DRRA works under the chalemianship of the Chiet Minister. 4 State Emergeney Operation Centre (SEOC) fanetions under the command of the SRC to disseminate eerly wamnings and alers received from che Indian Meteorological Department, Central Water Commission, Indian National Genre for Ocean Information Services, snd other agencies to district administration, However, the TN-SDMA was officially consticuted in Noveniber 2013 almost eight years after the intradiction ofthe Act (69. ‘The Act mandates state governments (0 create a State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF), District Disaster Response Fund (DDRF), State Disaster Mitigation Fund (SDMF) and Distiet Disastor Mitigation Fund (DDMF) (Act, 2005), mirroring the creation of the same financtal structure a€ the national level. The purpose of the SDRF is for state sgovernients to mest the expenditure of providing immediate relief to the vietins (NDMA website). This is constituted jointly by Government of india andthe State Government, in the ratio of 75:25 (68). Based on the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission, central government transfered CRF funds to SDRF and the CRF ceased to exist son March 31, 2010 [70]. This indicates thatthe CRF his merely been renamed, and the same funds are being sed for respouse measures ‘under a different nanie. The TN-SDMP further states tha che remaining three funds (SDMF, DDRF and DDMF) have not yet heen constinuted, With no clear timeline for when they will be constituted. The TN-SDMP instead suggests that certain flexible funds available under other cen rally sponsored schemes ean be potentially directed towards mitigation find DRR aetivites, This demonstrates both the persistence of the inst tutional structure that existed prior to the Act and continued focus > toterview wit sate lve senior DR offic, Tani Nad September 2018,A Opa eeak merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 ‘National Disaster Management Instutional Mechanism ‘Security (€C3) Cabinet Commitiezon ]qf National Crisis Management Committee (NMC) [eel —S (Overall coordination Ministry of Home fairs (MHA) Designated Nodal Ministries {isester Speci) ‘National Disaster Management Authority (NOMA) ‘Armed Forces National Disaster | [National instute and Central Response orce | | ofbisaster ‘tate Govts/ Union Tertories (UTS) eee (woe een (cory (iors) Fig. 2. National level dsster managetentlastzutonal aetwork withthe cain of command highlighted. Orange ariowsteptesent the cla of command and sey ants additonal pathways of communication primarily on disaster response 5.112 At the district level The Plan identifies the DDMA, constituted under the Chairmanship of the Distiet Collectors, as the planning, ‘coordinating and implementing body atthe district level. The DMA in the Nilgiris operates through the Revenue Administration, which in ‘eludes three Revenue Divisions and six Revenue Talks", The Distict, Collector i «kingpin for all administrative matters at the district level, ‘assisted by the District Revenve Officer and the Personal Assistant (General) who are also members of DDMA. Each Revenue Division is headed by a Revenie Divisional Officer and ench taluk fs headed by a ‘Tehsilar, Pig. 8 diagrammatically represents three Revenue Divisions ‘and the corresponding Revenive Taluk in the Nii Interviewees atthe state and district-level identified following sig nificant changes in disaster management since the Act ‘regular meetings with the fist responders’ team; + the introduetion of an emergency helpline number for people to cal; «greater interdepartmental co-ordination; ‘awareness programmes; and « prepared evaetiation centres and information dissemination throagh the SE0¢. A senior oficial in the district administration spoke to us about aa ‘effetive coordination mechanism introduced up t the foes comm level. The interviewee emphasised the importance of interdepartmental zonal teams formed under the leadership ofthe Revenue Authority, with team members drawn from police, fine services, rural developanent, forest, agricultural and other departments. Each team monitors five to seven vnerable areas, aided by frst responders at the ground level. ‘The TN-SDMP identifies these frst responders as community members atthe grassroot level, who are enrolled as able-bodied volunteers with 7 Taluk is sub-district level adoninisteative unit 1 erview with distuet evel senor off, the Nighi, September 2018 skills of swimming and climbing. First responders are reported to play @ key role in raising awareness, providing ineidence information (0 the tuthorites and fist nid to che victims before offical help arsives (TN- SDMP, 2019). A sub-district oficial discussed the ehain of information from the Distiet Revetste Officer to fist responders: ‘We select ton volunteers from each of the vulnerable arens between the age of 25-35 years. These are young people and ean help In rescue operations. Before south-west and north-east monsoon, we Condict mectings with them. We ask them to share any incidence report on the number 1077. We already have 22 such groups in our taluk. We also work with other line departments BDOs, Highways, Public Water Works aad JCB owners, We also do traning and awareness programmes with school sudents and our sta. We shane the energency miner widely so anyone can call, We have also, prepared one hundred and three schools which can be turned into shelters for evacuation, When we receive any weather warning fom istrict office, we pass it onto zonal officers.” Our fieldwork, however, highlighted a lack of communication be ‘oveen government authorities and first responders, Contacting frst re sponders directly proved difficult, as shown by the relatively low rhumbets of interviews were able 10 arrange. In some eases, we found thar first responders were either not aware of their status or were merely told about i without much briefing. One ofthe comnion characteristics ofthe few fist responders we could reach was that they were local daily wage workers, This meant that many responders bad not attended training, a8 one frst responder mentioned: 1 id once receive the training. Tc inluded activities like swimming nd helping clear an area. However, not everyone can afford to 30 for these traings because we are daly wage workers. To attend these training, we have to miss our day's work. Only those who are keen to learn these skills would volunteer.” tnrerview with block-Jevel senior offical, the Nilgiis, September 2018, 2 eve with fist esponde, the Nig September 2018,A Opa eeak merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 District Collector I District Revenue Officer (ORO) Revenue DWisional Offer (RDO) | | Revenue Divisional officer (ROO) | | Revenue Divisional Officer (ROO) Cooncor Udagat/ Ooty (Gualue) Udogai/ Ooty | [ Kundah Taluk ] [ GudalurTatuk || PandaturTatuk | | Kotagir'Tatuk | | Coonoor Talk Taluk Tehsiléar | | Tensiidar Tebsildar Tehsidar Tebsildar Tehsldar Fig. 3. The adminisuative hierarchy a sists level in the Nis ‘The funetioning ofthe response-based system thus depends on the willingness of community members 10 forego pay, and it appears to ‘epresent an outdated allocation system that does nor consider current ‘itcmstanees. The iniportance of interdepartmental co-ordination was, however, apparently better understood. A sub-district offical from the ‘department of Distriet Rural Development Authority (DRDA) ~ whieh ‘supports the Revenue Department in relief work mentioned that all his Depity Officers ate part ofthe interdepartmental zonal teams, and all the teams have WhatsApp groups. The alerts received from the district ‘ave shaved immediately through these groups. Before monsoons, these teams inspect thelr respective areas and eennify any’ trees likely to fall ‘due to monsoon winds. Block offices are ins more supportive role co the Reventte Administration for disaster management.” 5.1.2. State and disc dsaster management plan ‘The disconnect between intemational poliy and local-level disaster, ranageent in the Nils is apparent within TN-SDMPand the Nigiis Distiet Disaster Management Plan (NDDMP). Both of these were @ ‘requirement of the Act, yet both follow exactly the same format as the national level Plan, demoastrative of the perfunctory nature of the plans. In particular, the disjunct with international discourse is repre sented in the way that the plans use the terms “hrzara, ‘vulnerability ‘and "sk assessment’. These terms have speeifc meanings within the UNDRR and specific relationships (risk as a function of hezard,expo- sure, aud vullerability). This eonceptualization closely informs aca demic research work on disisions and vulnerability (72-79). 1 the inemational discourse is percolating downvratds, as is intended, this nomenclature showld therefore be reflected inthe plas. Section 2 of the TN-SDMP deals specifically with hazard, vulnera bitty and risk assessment. Whils the nse ofthe tema hazard reflects its use by the UNDRR — being used exclusively i relation tothe physical trigger event like a eyelonic storm and landslide ~ there is a lack of ‘conceptual catty about the difference berween vulnerability and risk For instance, the TN-SDMP mentions that ‘dhe identification, assess ment, and mapping of the [disaster] risks ate undertaken using the legacy data and geomorphological characters of the sate™(63](p.22). “The NDDMP also ilises legacy ata about disaster evens toidentify the ‘vulnerable areas, conflating vulnerability with hazard. In both plans, ‘vulnerability is understood through the source and cause of the hazard, details of the relief mensure available if the hazard is triggered, and maintenance actions tsken duting the previous year co rednee the Impact. Vulnerability assessment in dhe NDDMP, and risk assessment in "TN-SDMP, are essentially demarcating the areas where disasters (land slides) have previously been reported. Analysis of ‘vulnerability’ therefore includes broad details about the hazard and status of relief measures available, and not the differentiated capacties of the in dividuals and che communities in an area in the face of the disaster, erview with block level senior offi, che Nits, September 2018, contrary to UNDRR definitions. Hence, although the terms wulnerability, hazard and risk have percolated into the State Disaster Management Plans (SDMP) and District Disaster Management Plans (DMB), these ace used in way that reflects response-oriented approach that does not consider the social detertinants of vulnerability 5.1.8 Summary Since the introduetion ofthe Act, the existing srictare for disaster rmanagentent in the Nilgnis atthe distriet and sub-district level has been reassembled in ways that improve the government authorities” response efficiency. Interzonal teams, WhatsApp groups and interde- peermental meetings before and duving monsoons are valved. similarly, the distier government has also earied out awareness activities under the guidance of specific central government agencies. However, a gap in ‘communieation with fist responders indicates that the nature of inter ction with citizens —in te context of disaster management —has largely remiined the sane. Ths observation is significant in che Niles the distrce has done some exemplary work with etizens in banning single tse plastic in the region and has a history of effective participatory practices [74-77]. However, in the case of distster management, the focus on interdepartmental coordination ~ producing disaster manage ‘ment plans, establishing emergeney communication centres such a the SEOC and DEOC ~ while lacking, government-cizen coordination, highlights chat the implementation of the Act is heavily top-down. Disaster management overall in che distet fs focused on achieving the agendas ser by the contre ané the stare, without being ate specific capacities of the district or allowing the district to ial strengths in innovative ways, 5.2, Darjeeling District 5.2.1. Instttional structure 5.2.1.1, State level Unlike Tamil Nadu, West Beagal has a separate department for disaster management, the West Beugal Disester Mas agement and Civil Defence Department. The department eatries on al the Work assigned ro the SDMA inthe state, without subscribing to the name. The department has been in existence since 1992 and was rechristened from “Department fr Relief and Rehabilitation’ to"Disaster Management and Civil Defence Department” in 2006 after the intro Acton ofthe Aet (West Bengal State Website), with the operation ofthe department remaining largely the same. For financial resources, West Bengal also depends en NCCF and CRF grants from the centre, which have now been renamed as National Disaster Response Fund and State Disaster Response Fund respectively. 5.2.12. Diswict level The department appoints disaster management officers to assist administrators at each level of administration (see Fig. 2). A distriet-levet disaster management official described Sub-A Opa eeak District District Magistrate (OM) ‘Additional District Magistrate (ADM) Dfficer-in-Change Disaster Management (O/C OM) District Disaster Management Officer (DMO) Disaster Management Professional (MP) ‘Sub-Division Sub-Division Officer (SD0) Sub-Division Disaster Management Officer (SD0MO) Ss Block Block Development Officer (800) Block Disaster Management Officer (BDMO} S Village Vilage officer (vO) 4, Adninstation at sub suit level in Daveeling along with cone sponding disaster mtnagenentofcers Divisional Officers and Block Development Oficers (BDOs) as signif ‘ant administative positions reporting to the District Magistrate.” However, our fieldwork observations revealed that Distet Disaster Management Officer, Sub Divisional Disaster Management Officer and Block Disaster Management Officer to be prinarilyclerieel obs, focused ‘on compiling Calamity Assessment Reports,” the Darjeeling Distict Disaster Management Plan and distribution of relief material. Furr more, a acute shortage inthe workforce sas expressed by ou re spondents.” For example, » block-tevel official commented on the shortage of workforce in te Block disaster management department: {Lam a one-man amy. Officially, am assigned two support staff and eon, bur no one Is recruited in thee position. So, Tend up doing, everything. At block evel we create Calamity Assessment Reports ‘This sot official record of loss suffered during the disasters, Apart from allthis 1 also get requests ftom colleagues at GTA to Took at some of compensation claims for house damage which they cannot verity because they don’t have qualified engineers.” As in the ilps, in Darjeeling as wel, the DRE and DOME are yet to be created [78] (pp.74-75). This is despite recent calls by the Fi teenth Finance Commission forthe cretion of these funds atthe state ‘and district level (79) (pp.235-238) Also, much like the Nilgiris, Dnijeeling distriee depends om ongoing projects for indirect mitigation benefits, rather thon having a clear instttonal fets om disaster mit. ‘gation 78}. S23. The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), The GTA constitute a small par of disaster management, limited to approval of House Building Grants for ehabilitation (7](p.75). They do not have aetve role in relief and rescue operations. Commenting onthe GA's tole in lsnster managemient, an official in the Disaster Management Division at the GTA mentioned: % lterview with disuletlovel asaster manegement offal, Dajeling, Samay 2018. ° Calamity Assesrient Report is detailed necount of los of ie and property "/Sh Snot geed/plil eee 1, Cece 29 Bach 202). ar Man, Dies magenta celle date ng, 8 Febrany te ndsopter i dae le, BO? (Receed 29 Mach ban. ‘TSDMP Tan Nady ste Gsstes management ple. olin tse imonitor e/a er 2010/05 TabaNd0Siah sherpa Oa even Departmen, Governeat of Tani Na, fe oer ues 48, ‘value ae 38 Never ant March R21, pe osc mga Towing cnnet ptt, 2018 Site dune espn fd onl ses responce st 98 Sperber pf nd ctnnnge Cn SORE DBSpNO ogi pa, 20 (Gece 29 October 2020 ‘A hnkabor, Pos lapping dss wulperbity in ni sing erate rary proce, Geomain, Ne Haars Rs 7 (1) (2010) 308-325, pe focog/ 10.1000 9475705 20146970 Winer, Power, Coie aod Viterbi: A Cave Seay in Dicer, bamanagement South nda, Roedg, 201, SBN 978193516 1. vital. Karmakar, 8 Gos, sarod compreheste Ia we ‘cal winecebly antes igh lr insence saya cna Eterm fer Let 15 (1) (202) 014003: tps iossnce ose ari 100 SU/T7ae oe stat (Renard 1 Mar 2021) “Tine of nia, Oot shows the wy for pst ee 2019, 1 December, ‘eed tinimecon ey eotmbatareoty sos he wa fa se ee 019k 67810970. 2018, (Bee 31 Beh 2021. {RC TLE, Ooty wa the it nnd nae» plas babe ew the form ede ta bug sce, 19 Jan, pe stesesucam by ooh Yous he farina tocar Patton hse how the tom made ea {geste 21360 bon, 2018 (Aeesed 29 Mah 2021. “The Hindu Bun on lasts in he aes sates 10 September 2019 Pein com nee Cb ont Pps aceon /e9374235ce, 2098, 1 March 2021 ‘Te Minds Plane um the Mpeg in we yas, 2 December, bape cm/ ne n/Cmbatt/ fant 8h gs dst ngnic nth hee yen e30132721 ee, 2018 (aecemed 6 ebnsy 000) Daeciog aie ser management pan (2029.21), Ava t/a eco g in natientan/9020/0 a4 paG9120:21 SA0DARIEELINGNID! isi G00 pecan on 29 Bach 2020). XV Bnncecemnion ep government of ai, Arabi ip /Sacomin EnmemsioncortuOre sure onsen Ty 20a 206, Aceened a Beh 2020, “The Teleaph Landslide sn cl ste In Mk, 2 Nae) uahincon tates eng Tne ici al Sh mB 152407, 2018 (eee 6 Ocoee 2019) easter lnasemsnt Divinity of tome Aue (MHA, Mindi icin Reson Fund [oline) Aalbers iting fan 1 200, hese 6 agus 212), ‘ase, Resting common-base laser rik angemnt, Eon. Boauds 101) Zon) 42°82, i eo 10.8758 has 2011 00% IRD. Cae, 1. Gala tegratng Knowledge nd actin in inst i ‘eduction he conten of prlprymspoing ees 1) (201 10-109, rps 10an/h479 476.2011 010853 Hew The it of clay in edna age Inexpreatoas of easy Hoa the viewpoint of human ecology 1 198) 5-9, tah 104524" Winer, P Haiie, PM, Balbie,T Canao,L Dav A Rik Peoples Valea ad Dis Payhagy Pra 2004, SEN 4A States, Scott The ques fot Nolin duct fo sustoube Aeelpeem, nvm. Ede Rex 8 1) (2002) 3-40, rg 10.1080/ Ge Ademicg AL! Hanford Rabin Reshikig the pen ero Nortel ows in climate change sapiton eseare,Cntl Enon Change 48 (2018) 195-205, eon /sourg 101016) lose. 201712003. IB Stevenon Tensions a wanton in poly dour ents © Aeontrtanned EESD debate Enon Ee Ren 12-4) (206) 277-290, per ng ts canenroanne irre? Iteration Jounal of Dinar Risk Science (1) (2010) 1-5, oso 10100715753 0060088 7.A Opa eeak merce Juma of Dear Rut Redon 69 (2021) 102628 [PU ERs, Kd Cot, Governance inte Seti: a nay shad? Dit hr. (991 Dion K: Bors E Raa, Reser on polit fats isk gveane: Manag’ in 4.27 (2018) 298291, hr a1 1108 bP Oe 2017 ‘where ae tee Bede Fe. Govern 6 (4) 2020) 4-289. ton cota inde 2016/07 lain deser management woh (eee 38 (92) 56. Gat, oss nie on, Dian 43 (208) 57-817, 9/0. November 2020) seg/t0a1as0.1523.