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Luke Rickert

Chinese History
April 29, 1999

The Causes of the War 1840-1842:


Was the "Opium War" actually about opium?

The cause of the Opium War is a problem in history which scholars seem

to love arguing about, unfortunately they often miss the bigger picture while

defending their personal theories. The war did not happen because of any single

incident or even as the result of a specific trade, such as opium. It was due to a

variety of factors, which may be reduced only so far as to say that they resulted

from conflicting cultural and economic interests of two developed,1 arrogant and

greatly different empires. The British and the Chinese had little in common, the

former was rapidly developing, strong, and expanding and based on international

overseas trade while the latter was conservative, isolated, corrupt, and declining.

Of all the factors contributing to the war, opium trade has been the most

appealing to scholars and the newspaper writers of the time, yet opium was

really little more than the result of the cultural and economic battle that started

well before the armed conflict. The causes fall into two rough categories, cultural

tension and economics; yet even these can hardly said to be completely

separable. The Opium War was the result of great and incompatible cultural

differences and economic competition between the British and the Chinese, and

not, as the name "Opium War" implies, caused by opium independent of the rest

of the politico-economic environment.

Cultural conflict is the first area of consideration for this paper. Although

all of the various issues are to some extent cultural in nature, some are more so

1
It is not development in the economic sense, but rather cultural aspects of
development to which I am referring.
2

than others. The status and equality of nations, the inability to adequately

communicate and greatly differing ideas of criminal justice are considerably less

economic than such issues as trade imbalances which will be considered in later

sections. One important aspect to understanding this conflict is that these two

empires were distinctly different in many ways. "Chinese and English values,

stemming from totally different traditions, could hardly have made a sharper

contrast. This was obvious in government structure, law and ideas of justice,

social organization, economic thought, political institutions -- indeed, in every

facet of human activity." 2 One of the ways these differences manifested

themselves was through the British traders' and other foreigners' perceptions that

the Chinese considered themselves superior to everyone else. If there was in

fact anything they held in common, it would have to be that all parties involved

thought that the others were uncivilized. This is nicely demonstrated in the

conflicts over the kowtow.3 The British emissaries to the Emperor refused to

bow lower to the emperor than they would to their own king. Although it is

doubtful they fully comprehended the cultural context of this ritual, it was

sufficient for them to see that they were not being treated as equals. If the name

of the war were to be chosen purely on symbolic merit alone, it would be more

appropriate to call it the "Kowtow War" than the “Opium War” as the kowtow

represents the source of the conflict better than does using the word "opium". At

the time of the war even John Quincy Adams, the then president of The United

States saw the actual antagonism underlying the war. "'The Cause of war is the

Kowtow: - the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China, that she will hold

2
Chang, Hsin-pao. COMMISSIONER LIN AND THE OPIUM WAR,
(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964) 9.
3
A traditional Chinese symbolic bowing extremely low and striking of ones
head on the ground 3 times which demonstrates the submission and
subservience of the person bowing.
3

commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal

reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of relation between lord

and vassal.'"4 Although he clearly does not hold the Chinese in very high

regard, he does get to the root of the issue. That it was the clash of cultures and

not just opium trade that brought about the war. If the British had actually thought

that the only thing inhibiting their ability to fully exploit the Chinese market and

keeping them from being respected was the kowtow, they surely would have had

no problem banging their heads on the floor. Yet the real issue lies in the second

portion of Adam's quote. Not only did the Chinese attempt to force the British

and other foreigners to kowtow to the emperor, but they treated them in much the

same way as they had treating the "barbarians" in the surrounding areas for

millennia.
In accordance with the Confucian concept of interstate relations,
China's contacts with her nomad neighbors in the north and small
states to the south were regulated by a master-tributary framework.
China needed nothing from her neighbors; the emperor
compassionately permitted barbarian tributary missions to visit
Peking so that they could benefit from direct contact with the source
of civilization and share China's abundant wealth. 5

This attitude of cultural superiority, although historically legitimate, was both

rapidly aging and diametrically opposed to the ideas of the British traders. They

convinced that everyone else in the world needed whatever it was they had to

sell, and they were not the types who would keep turning the other cheek when

they felt insulted. As the Chinese were soon to find out, there was a significant

difference between British naval power and all but a few of their historic

neighbors. With the exception of a few rare leaders such as the Mongols had in

the 13th century, the surrounding minorities did not have the military power, size

4
Chung, Tan, China and the Brave New World, (Durham NC: Carolina
Academic Press, 1978) 1. a quote from John Quincy Adams
5
Chang 2.
4

nor organization to launch a successful challenge to the Chinese concept of

superiority. As is seen in more modern history, this idea does not die, until well

into the Republican Period. Among the available sources on the Opium War,

even the Chinese authors characterize Qing China as an arrogant and

conservative cultural empire. "Owing to China's geographical isolation from any

power which could rival her size, wealth, and cultural accomplishments, ever

since the Han and Tang dynasties Chinese bureaucrats were firmly convinced of

their national superiority." 6

Not only did the Chinese see themselves as the literal center of the world,

but they also failed to understand the reality of the situation as the world rapidly

changed about their festering empire. They did not comprehend, or at least

would not admit, how greatly the Western world had developed its technological

and manufacturing over the proceeding centuries. "On the eve of the Opium

War, no high-ranking Chinese official had any conception of the way in which

improvements in shipbuilding, artillery, and navigation had increased the strength

of the European powers. In fact few, if any, had any inkling that England was not

just another Siam."7 This sets China up on a dangerous path, they still thought

they were the top of the world, yet the truth was quite the opposite. Their

arrogance about to bring them into conflict with the world's greatest military

power who also happened to be the primary trading force in China. So by

interfering with the traders, they ended with much more than they had bargained

for in terms of a military response. It can clearly be seen therefore, that the

potential for conflict over the issues of the diplomatic status of foreigners were

significant and separate from the issues of opium trade. It seems doubtful that

the Chinese would have acted as they did if they had actually understood the

6
Chang 2.
7
Chang 10.
5

military threat posed by the British. For all of the they antiquated ways, the rulers

of late Qing China were not stupid, had they understood the situation better they

would have probably found another way which would retaining the status quo in

relations.

Yet it should be remembered that this tension over cultural disagreements

did not result in war during the first centuries of European contact. The fact that

the first war occurred in 1839 can be understood by looking at how the contact

and relations changed during the decade preceding that year. One factor was

that the East India Company lost their long-standing monopoly status from the

British government in 1833.8 The demonopolization both increased contact and

deregulated the traders thereby creating greater opportunity for conflict. With the

end of the monopoly the pressure for expanded trade from the manufactures and

independent traders increased markedly. "The Industrial Revolution

predetermined the vast British commercial expansion, which brought traders with

growing frequency and persistence to China's shores."9 By the time the East

India Company lost its monopoly in 1833 it had become relatively conservative.

"The East India Company was more tolerant of Chinese feeling than London

was, out of fear that existing trade privileges might be jeopardized. After the

company lost its monopoly, however, Britain stepped up her struggle for

diplomatic equality."10 It was not only the independent traders, but also the

British home government who had been restrained by the East India Company

monopoly. Once the monopoly was gone it is little wonder that it took less than 7

years for war to come the region.

In addition to concrete cultural differences and conflicting economic

8
Chung 10.
9
Chang 13.
10
Chang 12.
6

interests, the issue of language should not be overlooked as an attributing factor

to the build-up of tensions leading to the war. It is fair to say that neither side

could understand the language of the other to a full level of proficiency.11

Considering the important role language plays in culture, and particularly in the

facilitation of cross-cultural understanding, it does not come as much of a

surprise that language might have posed serious obstacles to harmonious

relations. Also considering that the Chinese definition of civilized people largely

depends on their ability to write and understand the Chinese language.12 The

very limited skills of the British would not have demanded much respect. Quite

aside form definitions of civilization, if there was no clear understanding of the

languages, would it not be much more difficult for the various parties to trust each

other.

The lack of mutual understanding was further aggravated by the


language barrier. No educated Chinese knew even a smattering of
English. . . .The English were slightly better prepared to deal with
the Chinese language. Robert Morrison, the first Protestant
missionary to China, studied Chinese most assiduously, even
though foreigners were forbidden to learn it. He had difficulty in
engaging tutors and had to go about the task surreptitiously.13

Not only was it difficult for foreigners to learn Chinese, but there was an official

ban on any Chinese person teaching their language to foreigners. To put it

mildly this did not advance the mutual understanding of the two cultures, nor did

it help to resolve any of their differences through nonviolent means.

Yet another issue of cultural conflict, for the British anyway, was their

dissatisfaction with the Chinese methods and ideas of enforcing their laws on

11
Chang 11.
12
At this point I can't find a specific quote to support this, although from
my previous courses including McKhann's Tibeto-Burman anthropology course
from the spring of 1997 I can make this statement without any doubt as to its
truthfulness.
13
Chang 10-11.
7

foreigners. Although the British would surly have refused extraterrestrial rights to

a Chinese citizen in London, there was a great deal of tension resulting from a

number of criminal cases over the years of trade at Canton. "The jurisdiction

problem involved sovereignty and, like the issue of diplomatic equality, could not

be solved short of drastic measures."14 Given the nature of sailors and their

propensity to drink, their drunken carousing opened up another area of conflict,

that of jurisdiction over foreigners. Given the substantial differences between the

two systems, the British were rarely happy with the outcomes of the Chinese

judicial system. "The law considers them [the accused] guilty until they can

prove themselves innocent. This difference in tradition led to dispute whenever a

foreigner was involved in a criminal case, particularly in the case of a

homicide."15 The case of the Lady Hughes is an example of such an occasion

which added to the poor feelings between the British and the Chinese. "In

November 1784, when she [the Lady Hughes] fired a salute for some guests who

had dined on board, a Chinese was killed and two others were wounded in the

mandarin's boat alongside. Under strong Chinese pressure, the unfortunate

gunner was eventually given up to the Chinese authorities for execution."16 This

issue of conflicting legal beliefs and the fact that the Chinese insisted in

prosecuting the foreigners at all added greatly to the conflict. "The problem of

jurisdiction over crimes committed on Chinese soil resulted in a series of crises

between 1784 and 1842. Aside from opium, China's demand for the murderer of

Lin Wei-hsi was the most decisive factor in bringing about the conflicts in 1839.”17

The crises such as these helped to create tension and a climate ripe for war.

This again is an area of the conflict, which has little to do with opium. Most of the

14
Chang 13.
15
Chang 12.
16
Chang 12.
17
Chang 13.
8

cases that are reported in the available sources are those of drunken sailors on

shore, and not the opium traders who were usually able to bribe or in some other

way avoid legal trouble.

Cultural factors were not the only important causes of the war, issue of

trade were also important in bringing war to China. Some of these issues,

particularly silver shortages and out-flow are connected to events far outside of

China. Independent developments in the Americas to London created situations,

which were solved with the introduction of the opium trade. The importance of

the tea trade to the British home government was also not insubstantial to their

entering the war.

Silver is perhaps the most important and intertwined issue in this conflict.

A shortage of silver motivated the British to start their search for other

commodities which the Chinese would actually buy; once they had succeeded in

establishing the opium trade, the out-flow of silver from China forced the Chinese

to take action against opium and the British there by creating the occasion for, if

not the actual cause of the war. When the United States of America in the forth

quarter of the eighteenth century along with Spain grew to control of the

Americas, the British were unable to buy silver to use their tea trade with China.18

With a bit of a stretch, the Boston Tea Party could be called the actual cause of

the Opium War.19 The cause of the shortage is not actually that important, the

real issue is that there was no available supply for the British Empire to acquire

silver and therefore they experienced a distinct shortage of the commodity. "In

1781 no silver remittances had reached India for two years, and the opium

18
Beeching 24.
19
Admittedly the Boston Tea party was definitely not the cause of the
American revolution, but like the Opium War, as symbolic reflection of the
underlying conflicts between the two groups and a rather entertaining prospect to
put forward.
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production of two years remained unsold. The situation was critical; the solution

obvious."20 The British discovered that selling an addictive, compact and high

profit commodity such as opium is a great way to improve their trade imbalances,

sure they eventually figured out that they could sell much more opium than they

were buying back in tea, but at the beginning anyway, it was an attempt to make

their trade deficit smaller. The trade situation before opium was distinctly

unfavorable for the British. The Chinese were not much interested in British

manufactured goods thus forcing the British East India Company to use silver,

when it was available, for the bulk of its transactions. "For nearly two centuries --

until opium shipments by private traders assumed importance -- the balance of

trade was always unfavorable to the British. Nine tenths of the stock of each ship

sailing to Canton consisted of bullion"21 Whatever other faults the British East

India company may have had (and they have plenty of them) they were quite

clearly aware that such a level of trade imbalance did not make good business

sense; so they institutionalized the opium trade to create a counter current of

silver out of China. This institutionalization was manifested in the Country Trade,

where "independent" traders who carried, among other things opium from India

to China and southeastern Asia in a triangle trade with exotic goods and British

manufactured goods.22 Once the opium had been exchanged for silver, it

conveniently was sold to the Company in Canton. "The funds derived from this

trade were paid to the company treasury at Canton in return for bills of exchange

on London, and between 1775 and 1795 the company could already count on

this source for over a third of its funds."23 This method for altering the balance of

20
Beeching, Jack. The Chinese Opium Wars, Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich,
New York and London. 1975, 24.
21Chang 4.
22
Beeching 26 and Fay 17-18. (full bib later)
23
Chang 4.
10

trade was quite successful but the drawbacks for China were significant.

Although there is no sign that the inhumanity of the trade, either economically or

morally was a concern to the traders. Despite the high-minded talk of free trade

and open markets, the British were, like most successful businessmen,

concerned only with their personal profit. "'Particularly the English, in whom the

love of humanity never prevails over the love of gain.'"24 In the British case their

lack of a desirable trading commodity caused them to turn to opium, yet as will

be discussed latter opium was not central to the conflict between the parties.

It should be mentioned that although they certainly supported, and

facilitated the Opium trade in China, the Company was not officially involved.

"Following the prohibition edict of 1796, the company refrained from taking a

direct part in the opium trade, but the Select committee did everything possible to

assist the private traders." 25 This policy was intended clearly to enable them to

claim no involvement as they paid for their tea with silver pulled from China with

opium sales. The irony of the situation is strong, the British traders, hoping to

improve their trade balance with China, embarked on a path that would result in a

disastrous reversal of the situation. While the commodity of trade was opium, it

was economics or more exactly silver, that caused the problems. Had their

been another commodity that the Chinese would have bought at the same rate

the problems would be the very similar. For a while, from about 1800 to the

1830's, there were extensive efforts on the part of American traders to sell seal

pelts, something the Chinese were interested in buying. By 1812 there were

1730000 pelts sold, but the traders and hunters decimated the populations and

by 1830 there were only 6000 sold in China.26 Clearly if the supply of seals had

24
Fay, Peter Ward. The Opium War: 1840-1842, (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1975) 333.
25
Chang 18.
26
Beeching 20.
11

been as sustainable as that of opium, a very similar economic situation, although

without the same health problems as opium, would probably have developed.

One of the motivations for the British government to continue the opium

trade, and therefore take the military action necessary to ensure that it could

continue, aside from the tea lobby, was the portion of their revenues which came

directly from the tea trade. "By 1830, before Indian tea began to be grown

commercially in Assam, the Company was selling thirty million pounds' weight of

China tea annually, at a net profit of £1000000 and at one time the tea tax

provided a tenth of the British government's entire revenue."27 The Tea tax was

surly only part of their interest; they must have taken a cut from the other

connected industries around the empire.

While the British East India Company's early trade imbalances may have

been an inconvenience, the massive outflow of silver from China was probably

the single most significant motivation for the Chinese to take actions against the

foreigners and the opium trade. So yes, opium was important in this aspect of

the conflict, but it was only an instrument of trade, there could certainly have

been war without the existence of the opium trade.28 By removing vast

quantities of silver from circulation the foreign traders caused a multitude of

injuries to the people and government of China. It caused the devaluation of the

common currency (copper cash) by doing so greatly effective increased taxes,

which were paid in silver. "Taxation thus became a heavier burden on the

peasants back but with no advantage whatever to the Imperial Treasury - and

discontented peasants would in the long run represent yet another serious threat

to the dynasty."29 Raising taxes, officially or not, is a great way to create social

27
Beeching 29.
28
Chang ix.
29
Beeching 43.
12

unrest and rebellion, not something the Manchu rulers could afford in their

already weakening state of control.30 The foreign traders were not concerned

with this situation, some in fact saw it as a way to weaken the China and create

more opportunity for exploitation. “. . . The Chinese Courier pointed out with a

certain vindictiveness in 1833, 'perhaps nothing could contribute more readily to

the final reduction of the Chinese to reasonable terms with foreigners than this

steady, non-ceasing impoverishment of the country by the abstraction of the

circulating medium.'"31 Although they did not care about the damage, the

foreigners did understand that the Chinese could not tolerate the situation

forever. "Captain Bethune wrote. . . the explanation was simple -- and well known

to everybody. The Chinese hated losing silver! 'I don't think they care two pence

about the immorality of using opium.'"32 The rate at which silver was leaving the

country was astounding. "Between 1829 and 1840 a sum of just over seven

million silver dollars had entered China, but the much larger sum of fifty-six

million silver dollars had been sucked out."33 The economic damage and the

effects that the elevated taxes would have on the people were probably the major

motivator for the Chinese, but there was also concern over the effects of the

opium itself.

The Chinese rulers also recognized the potential damage widespread

opium addiction could pose to the people of the empire. The emperor Tao-kuang

was particularly concerned with the situation. "He not only pointed out the serious

effect of opium on 'the national economy as well as the livelihood of the people',

but also called upon his countrymen give a fitting reply to the external challenge:

'if we don't exert our utmost efforts to prohibit it, how can the evil come to any

30
Chang 15.
31
Beeching 43.
32
Fay 185.
33
Beeching 43.
13

end?' he asked. 34 The exact magnitude of the problem is not clear, but there

were reports of substantial use among the bureaucracy and military. In

Kwangtung and Fukien the army units were full of addicts.35 So in this case, that

of motivating the Chinese to act, opium does play an undeniable and important

role, yet this is just one of the many causes, overall the effects were relatively

minor.

Although a full and complete consideration of all the causes and factors

which combined to bring about the war would be beyond any realistic paper, or

book for that matter, this paper has hopefully at least brushed the surface of the

major issues and provided ample evidence that opium was not the exclusive

cause of the war. The Opium War was a conflict between the aggressive and

strong British Empire and the government of China in Canton and the capital,

Peking. The engagement of these two Cultural and economics powers, because

of their particular attitudes, ignorance and arrogance, could never have

permanently avoided conflict forever, with or without the existence of opium

trade. This War, the "Opium War," the "Sino-British War of 1839", the “Kowtow

War” or whatever name it deserves is a greatly important mark in the history of

China. It begins the modern era of unequal treaties and exploitation by the West

and Japan. The increased western influences, which followed, contributed

greatly to the social unrest and rebellions, which characterized the final seven

decades of Imperial Chinese history. The outcome of this war and the many

Sino-Western conflicts which would follow created a inferior relationship between

China and the world powers. It represents the beginning of the end of the

classical system of Chinese rule that had functioned, more or less successfully,

for millennia. China failed to change along with the rest of the world and as the

34
Chung 180.
35
Chung 180.
14

result was greatly abused and exploited by the stronger less scrupulous

countries around the world.

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