Ontological Dependence

Author(s): Kit Fine

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 95 (1995), pp. 269-290
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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 XIV*ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE

by Kit Fine
I
There appearsto be a distinctivelyontological sense in which
one thing may be said to dependupon another.What the one
thing is will dependupon the other thing, upon what it is. It is in
this sense that one is tempted to say that a set depends upon its
membersor thata particularizedfeature,such as a smile, uponthe
particularin which it is found.Forwhatthe set is will dependupon
its members;andwhatthe featureis will dependuponthe particular
thatinstantiatesit.1
Granted that there is an intelligible notion of ontological
dependence,it would appearto be of greatimportanceto the study
of metaphysics.Metaphysicshas two main areas of concern:one
is with the natureof things,with whatthey are;andthe otheris with
the existence of things, with whetherthey are. Considerationsof
dependenceare relevantto both. For centralto the questionof the
natureof any item is the determinationof what it dependsupon;
andif somethingis takento exist, thenso mustanythinguponwhich
it depends.Indeed,it has often been maintainedthatit is only those
things which do not depend upon anythingelse that can properly
be said to exist at all.
The notionis also of importancein servingto define othernotions
of interestto metaphysics.To take but two examples:a substance
may be taken to be anythingthat does not dependupon anything

*Meetingof the AristotelianSociety, held in the SeniorCommonRoom, BirkbeckCollege,

London,on Monday,5th June, 1995 at 8.15 p.m.

1 This paperderives from an earlierpaper 'DependentObjects', thatwas writtenin 1982

but remainedunpublished.Some of the issues raised are discussed at greaterlength in
Fine [1995b]; and no attemptis here made to settle the methodological,as opposed to
the conceptual, issues. I should like to thank Ruth Chang and the members of the
WednesdayGroupat Oxfordfor helpful comments.
270 KITFINE

else or, at least, upon anythingotherthan its parts;and holism, in

one of its many versions, may be takento be the doctrinethatthe
partsof a whole can dependupon the whole itself.
But how is the notionof dependenceitself to be understood?The
idea of what something is, its identity or being, is notoriously
obscure;andthe idea of the being of one thingdependinguponthat
of anotheris doublyobscure.A naturalsuggestionat this pointis to
takethebeingof somethingsimplyto be its existence.Thusin saying
thata setdependsuponits members,ora featureuponits instantiator,
we are taking the existence of the one to depend upon that of the
other. Call this the existential construalof dependence. Another
naturalsuggestionis to take the dependencebetweenthe beings of
the two items, as opposed to the items themselves, to be modal in
character.The being of the one will dependuponthatof the otherin
the sense thatit is necessarythatif the one item has its 'being'then
so does the other.Call this the modalconstrualof dependence.
If we combinethesetwo suggestions,we obtaina naturalaccount
of dependencein termsof modalityandexistence. One thingx will
dependupon anothery just in case it is necessarythaty exists if x
exists (orin the symbolismof modallogic, DL(Ex -- Ey)). Of course,
the resultingaccountis sensitive to the interpretationof necessity;
and it might even be suggested thatthe varioussenses of depend-
ence are to be obtainedby varyingthatinterpretation.Thus when
the necessity is metaphysical,the sense of dependence will be
metaphysical,as requiredhere;and similarlywhen the necessity is
causal or biological or epistemicin character.
Accounts of dependencein modal/existentialterms have had a
long history.Forexample,Aristotlein theMetaphysics(1019a1-4)
takes things to be 'priorand posterior...in respect of natureand
substance'when the priors 'can be withoutthe otherthings, while
the otherscannotbe withoutthem';andtheobviousway to construe
him is by referenceto the notions of existence and modality. Or
again, Husserl (Logical InvestigationIII, ?21, p. 475), proposes a
more elaborate version of the modal/existentialview when he
writes:2

2 Some difficulties in interpretingthis passage are discussed in Fine [1995c], 473. The
generalbearingof what I have to say on the varioushistoricalfiguresthatI mentioncalls
for a muchmore thoroughdiscussionthancan be providedhere.
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 271

A contentof the species A isfounded upon a contentof the species

B if an A can by its essence (i.e. legally, in virtue of its specific
nature)not exist unless a B also exists.
In morerecenttimes, the modal/existentialaccounthas takenover,
and it is rare to find an account given in any other terms. For
example, in the entry under 'dependence' in the Handbook of
Metaphysics and Ontology [1991], Peter Simons takes something
to be 'ontologically dependenton something else when the first
cannot exist unless the second exists'; and similar accounts are
takenfor grantedby Moravcsik[1965], p. 107, by Tlumak[1983],
and by many others.
However, these accounts, naturalas they seem, are subject to
gravedifficulties.ConsiderSocratesandthe set whose sole member
is Socrates.Then,necessarily,if Socratesexists so does the set. But
we do not wantto say, on thataccount,thatSocratesdependsupon
the set, thatwhat Socratesis dependsupon whatthe set is. Indeed,
we are inclined to say the opposite, that the set depends upon its
member. Similar examples can be constructedwithout resort to
abstractobjects.Forconsidertheexistenceof Socrates.Wemaytake
this to be a state of affairs that, of necessity, exists just in case
Socratesdoes. But we do not wantto say, on thataccount,thatwhat
Socratesis dependsupon the stateof his existence.
A differentkind of difficulty arises from the case in which the
'dependee' y is a necessary existent. Consider Socrates and the
number 2, for example. Given that 2 necessarily exists, it is
necessarily the case that 2 exists if Socratesdoes. But we do not
want to say, on that account, that Socrates depends upon 2, that
what he is depends upon what the number2 is; and similarlyfor
almost any othernecessaryexistent in place of the number2.
These difficultiesareespeciallydisturbingin the light of the fact
thatsome philosophers(such as the Wittgensteinof the Tractatus)
have wantedto maintainthatthe simple substancesof the worldare
necessaryexistents;for the accountwouldimmediatelyrendertheir
positionuntenable.Giventhatthe substancesnecessarilyexist, they
depend upon one anotherand hence cannotbe simple substances.
Similarly, the view that the simple substances are world-bound,
each existing in just one possible world, would also be excluded,
since it would requireany two simple substancesfrom the same
world to dependupon one another.
272 KITFINE

Nor is there any obvious way in which the account might be

modifiedso as to avoid the difficulties.We cannotimposea general
ban upon the dependee being a necessary existent; for in certain
cases, as with the dependenceof singleton2 uponthe number2, we
want the dependeeto be a necessaryexistent. And it does not help
to insist that the existence of the dependentitem relevantlyimply
the existence of the dependee in the sense of relevance logic; for
the requirednotion of relevance cannotbe understoodapartfrom
the notionof dependencethatis in question.Thereis nothingin the
logic of the judgements that Socrates exists and that singleton
Socratesexists thatmakesthe implicationmorerelevantin the one
directionthatin the other.
Indeed, it might be argued that no modal characterizationof
dependencecould conceivablybe correct.Forit wouldappearto be
possible that two philosopherscould agree on all of the relevant
modal facts and yet disagree on the relationshipsof dependence.
They might agree, for example, that persons and minds were
distinct,thatthe one could only exist with the other,and so on; and
yet one might think of persons as embodied minds and hence as
dependentupon minds, while the other might think of minds as
abstractionsfrompersonsandhence as dependentuponpersons.
Where has the modal\existentialaccount gone wrong? As we
have seen, the account may be regardedas the product of two
assumptions:one is thatthe beingof anobjectoritem,its beingwhat
it is, is to be identifiedwith its existence; and the other is thatthe
dependencebetweenthebeingof thedependentandof thedependee
item is to be explained in modal terms. We shall eventually find
reasonsto rejectboththese assumptions.But, for the moment,let us
acceptthe first;the being of an objectconsists in its existence. The
difficulty then lies with the second assumption:the necessary
connectionbetween the two existences is too loose to do justice to
the facts of dependence.
To overcome this difficulty, I suggest that we substitutethe
notion of essence for that of necessity. The relevant connection
between the existence of x and of y is not thatit be necessarythat
x exist only if y does but thatit be an essentialpropertyof x thatit
exist only if y does. The necessity of the conditional'x exists only
if y does' shouldbe appropriatelytiedto the natureof the dependent
 ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE 273

item x. We thereby obtain what might be called the essentialisti

existential account of dependence.
Now for many philosophersthere would be no significantdif-
ference between the essentialistand modal accounts.For them, an
object essentiallyhas a certainpropertyjust in case it is necessary
thatitexistsonlyif ithasthatproperty.Undersucha wayof construing
essence, the two accountsof dependencewouldthencoincide.
However,in my paper'Essence andModality',I arguedagainst
the modal construalof essence and proposed,in its place, a con-
ception of essence as a form of definition. Under this alternative
conception,each item would give rise to its own sphereof truths,
the truthsthathadtheirsourcein the identityof the item in question.
Thusthe properexpressionof the claim thatx essentially0's would
not be thatit is necessarythatx 0's if it exists, for some amorphous
notionof necessity,butthatit is truein virtueof the identityof x that
it 0's, or that it 0's if x exists.
Let us follow the notationof my paper 'The Logic of Essence'
anduse Oxforthe indexedmodality'it is truein virtueof theidentity
of x that'. Then the presentproposalis that the dependenceof x
upon y should be defined by Lx(Ex -> Ey); and the previous
proposal, that dependence be defined as O(Ex -* Ey), can be
obtainedfrom the presentone by takingthe locutionDxA (it is true
in virtue of x that A) to be equivalent to O(Ex -> A) (or, alter-
natively, to DA). Thus, when viewed in this light, the errorin the
modal/existentialaccountconsists in adoptingthe modalconstrual
of essence; and, indeed, most of the presentargumentsagainstthe
modalaccountof dependenceare simplythe analoguesof previous
argumentsagainst the modal account of essence in 'Essence and
Modality'.
Althoughthe form of words 'it is truein virtueof the identityof
x' mightappearto suggestananalysisof theoperatorintothenotions
of the identityof an object andof a propositionbeing truein virtue
of the identityof anobject,I do not wish to suggestsuchananalysis.
The notation should be taken to indicate an unanalyzedrelation
betweenanobjectanda proposition.Thuswe shouldunderstandthe
identityor being of the objectin termsof the propositionsrendered
trueby its identityratherthanthe otherway round.
If the alternativeconceptionof essence is accepted,thenall of the
previousdifficultiesforthemodalaccountof dependencedisappear.
274 KIT FINE

We are not requiredto say that Socrates depends upon singleton

Socrates,or uponthe stateof Socrates'existing or uponthe number
2, for thereis nothingin his natureor identitythatdemandsthathe
exist only if the singletonor the stateor the numberexist.
All the same, the presentaccount is still not satisfactory.For it
is subjectto a variantof the difficultiesraisedabove. Considerthe
case of an object x, such as the Meinongianroundsquare,which
by its naturedoes not exist; and let y be any objectwhatever.Then
it mayplausiblybe maintainedthatthe objectx, by its nature,cannot
exist unless the otherobject y exists; for given that -,Ex logically
implies Ex -* Ey, [x--Ex will imply OL(Ex-4 Ey). But we do not
want to say that such an impossible object depends upon every
object whatever.
Or again, it might be maintainedthat the property of being
identical to Socrates, that what the property is, depends upon
Socratesand also that the propertyessentially,and hence necess-
arily, exists. One can then hardly maintainthat the propertyis
somethingthat,by its nature,cannotexist withoutSocrates.For,in
thatcase, Socrateswould likewise necessarilyexist.
It is importantto bearin mind,in regardto these somewhatexotic
examples, that their force does not rest upon acceptingthe modal
views upon which they depend.One mightnot acceptthatthereare
any impossibleobjectsor thatsingularpropertiesnecessarilyexist.
But still, the legitimacyof an accountof dependenceshouldnot be
made to rest upon the adoptionof one modal view as opposed to
any other,no matterhow reasonableit might be.
The present examples highlight a problem that besets any
existentialaccountof dependence,whetherit be modal or essent-
ialist in form.For it does not seem rightto identifythe 'being'of an
object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect,
existence is too weak;for thereis moreto what an objectis thanits
mereexistence. In anotherrespect,existence is too strong;for what
an object is, its nature,need not include existence as a part.In the
essentialist/existentialaccount,the missing strengthis recoveredby
importinginto the connectionof dependencebetweenthe being of
the two objects whatproperlybelongs to the being itself. But, even
so, the difficultiesover the inclusionof existence still remain.
Once we are armed with the notion of essence, however, the
unwarrantedreferenceto existence can be avoided,and a betterfit
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 275

with our informalunderstandingof the notion of dependencecan

therebybe achieved. For we may take x to dependupon y if y is a
constituentof a propositionthatis truein virtueof the identityof x
or, alternatively,if y is a constituentof an essential propertyof x.
Thus for the purposesof achieving fit, we may identify the being
or essence of x with the collection of propositionsthat are true in
virtue of its identity (or with the correspondingcollection of
essential properties).The being of an object, as opposed to the
object itself, will then dependupon anotherobject in the sense of
involving that other object; it will appear as a constituentof a
componentpropositionor property.

II

Just as we can think of a collection of sentences as providing a

nominal definition of a term, so we can think of a collection of
propositions as providing a real definition of an object (the
definitionsneed not, in either case, be individuating);andjust as
we can distinguish, in a nominal definition, between the term
definedandthe termsby which it is defined,so we can distinguish,
in a real definition,between the object defined and the objects by
which it is defined. The notion of one object depending upon
anotheris thereforethe real counterpartto the nominal notion of
one termbeing definablein termsof another.
It is this analogy with definitionthat makes it so naturalto talk
of understandingin connectionwith dependence.We understanda
defined term (what it means) through the terms by which it is
defined. Similarly, we understanda defined object (what it is)
throughthe objects upon which it depends.But we can acceptthis
connection, of course, without assuming that the account of
dependencein termsof understandingis somehowmorebasic than
the accountin termsof essence.
The definitional approach to dependence has also not been
withoutits advocates.The idea of definitionalpriority,the priority
of the defining items to those defined, is mooted in Book VI.4 of
Aristotle's Topics;and it is clear from his writingsthat Aristotle
wishes to apply the idea to real as well as to nominal definition.
Thuswhen he claims in the Metaphysics,1028a35, 'andin account
also this [substance]is primary,for in the accountof each thingthe
276 KITFINE

account of its substance must be present', it is the primacy of

substance, not of the terms for substance, that is taken to be
established.A similaridealies behindthe rationalists'notionof one
thing being conceived throughanother.This relation, moreover,
was regardedas a form of ontological dependence.Thus in com-
mentingon Spinoza's Ethics, Leibniz writes, 'But it seems thatby
"somethingpriorto anotherthingby nature"he meansthatthrough
which the otherthing is conceived' (Loemkeredition, p. 197).
Our own version of the definitional approach rests on two
assumptions. The first is that propositions and properties may
intelligibly be said to contain objects as constituents.This is an
assumptionwhich, for betteror worse, I shalljust accept, although
withoutany definitecommitmentas to whatthe objectualstructure
of propositionsor propertiesmightbe.
The second assumptionis that the notion of essence should be
taken to be constitutiveratherthan consequentialin character.A
propertybelongs to the constitutiveessence of an object if it is not
had in virtue of being a logical consequence of some more basic
essential properties;and a propertymight be said to belong to the
consequentialessence of an object if it is a logical consequenceof
propertiesthatbelong to the constitutiveessence (a similaraccount
couldbe given forthecase in whichtheessence is conceivedin terms
of propositions rather than properties). Thus the property of
containing Socrates as a member will presumablybe part of the
constitutiveessence of singletonSocrates,whereasthe propertyof
containingsome memberor anotherwill presumablyonly be part
of its consequentialessence.
If essence is takenin the consequentialsense, thenthe proposed
definitionof dependencewill be quite useless. For the propertyof
being the same or distinctfrom any given objecty is a logical con-
sequence of any set of propositions and so will belong to the
consequentialessence of any object x. But since y is a constituent
of thatproperty(at least underan orthodoxconceptionof constit-
uency),it follows thatx dependsupony. Thusanyobjectwill depend
uponany other.
This difficulty is removed if essence is takenin the constitutive
sense. But then we face the problemof distinguishingbetween the
constitutiveand consequentialsenses. And this seems hardto do.
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 277

For how and where are we to drawthe line between what is basic
to the essence and whatis derived?
The intelligibilityof the consequentialistconception,by contrast,
does not rest upon accepting the distinction between basic and
derivedproperties.Wehave explainedit in theseterms.Butit seems
reasonableto suppose that we could have a more direct under-
standingof the consequentialconception,one thatis closed under
logical consequence (the operationof admittingall logical con-
sequences) and yet does not rest upon presupposingthat some
propertiesin the essence are more basic than others;none of the
propositionsin the essence will be takento be privileged,despitethe
variouslogical relationshipsthat hold among them. It is therefore
preferable,in the interests of conceptual economy, to see if the
notion of dependence can be explained in consequentialterms,
withoutappealto an underlyingconstitutiveconception.
To this end, we need an independentway of distinguishing
between those objects thatenter into the consequentialessence as
a resultof logical closure and those thatenter in 'theirown right',
i.e. by way of the constitutiveessence. But this is readilydone. For
when an objectentersthroughlogical closure,it can be 'generalized
away'. Thus althoughit is partof the consequentialistessence of
Socrates that 2 = 2, it is also partof his consequentialistessence
thatevery objectwhateveris self-identical.3Thisthereforesuggests
thatthe dependeeobjects are those thatcannotbe generalizedout
of the consequentialistessence.
We may be moreprecise. Let P(y) be a propositioncontaininga
constituenty. So P(y), for y = Socrates, might be taken to be the
propositionthat Socratesis identicalto Socrates.Let the general-
izationof P(y) be the propositionthatP(v) holds for all objects v.
So, in our example, the generalizationof the proposition that
Socratesis identicalto Socratesis the propositionthatfor all v, v is
identicalto v (note thatall occurrencesof the constituentSocrates
mustbe removedin orderto obtaintheresultinggeneralization).Let
us now say thatan objecty can be generalizedout of a.collectionC
of propositionsif C containsthe generalizationof a propositionP(y)

3 The quantifierherecan and,indeed, shouldbe takento rangeover every possible object.

In this way, we can be assuredof the truthof the BarcanprincipleOxVvA -* Vv OLxA.
278 KITFINE

wheneverit containsthepropositionP(y) itself. Theproposalis then

thatx dependsupony just in case y cannotbe generalizedoutof the
consequentialistessence of x or, in other words,just in case some
propositionP(y) belongs to the essence withoutits generalization
belongingto the essence.
Assuming the correctness of the constitutive account, the
consequentialistaccount may be justified in the following way.
Without serious loss in generality,we may take the constitutive
essence of the objectx to be given by a single propositionP; andwe
may take its consequentialessence to be given by a collection of
propositionsC. Suppose thaty is not a constituentof P. Since any
propositionQ(y) of C is a logical consequenceof P, so is VvQ(v)
and hence y can be generalized out. Now suppose that y is a
constituentof P,whichwe may writein the formP(y), andthatit can
be generalizedout of C. ThenP(y) logically implies VvP(v), which
logically implies P(z) for any objectz. In this case, it is muchmore
plausibleto supposethattheconstitutiveessence is given by VvP(v)
ratherthanby P(y). For the choice of y in the specificationof the
essence is completelyarbitrary: we couldhaveusedanyotherobject
z in placeof y andhave obtaineda logically equivalentspecification
of the essence. Wecould,of course,havelet theconstitutiveessence
consist of all of the propositionsP(z), but only at a huge cost in
redundancy;for each object, there would be a corresponding
logically equivalent proposition in the essence. Thus the only
reasonablealternativeis to place the universalpropositionin the
constitutive essence and to let the instances belong to the con-
sequentialessence.
The above argumentfor the consequentialistaccount depends
upon assumingthatthe constitutiveaccountis correct.However,it
might have some weight even for a consequentialistwho was not
preparedto acceptthe constitutiveconception.For surelyhe would
accept that if the constitutive conception was coherent then the
constitutiveaccountwas correctandthatif the constitutiveaccount
was correctthen so was the consequentialistaccount.But thenany
reasonfor rejectingthe consequentialistaccountwould have to be
a reason for rejecting the intelligibility of the constitutive con-
ception;andit is hardto see whatsuch a reasoncould be.
In any case, there is an independentway of justifying the con-
sequentialistaccount.Letus say thattwo collectionsof propositions
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 279

are logically equivalent if the propositions of each collection

logically imply the propositionsof the other;and let us now take a
definitionof the objectx to be any collection of propositionslogic-
ally equivalentto theconsequentialistessence of x. Differentobjects
will figurein differentdefinitionsof the sameobject.Butthe objects
upon which a given object depends, accordingto the present ac-
count,arethose which mustfigurein anyof the logically equivalent
definitionsof the object.They will, in this sense, be ineliminable.
It is worthnotingthatnothinglike the presentform of definition
could reasonablybe adoptedunder a modal construalof essence.
Forwe wouldthenobtainthe view thatx dependsuponyjust in case
y cannotbe generalizedoutof thenecessarypropertiesof x (orthose
thatare conditionallynecessaryupon the existence of x). But then
every objectwould dependupon every other.For given thatx and
y aredistinct,it is a necessarypropertyof x to be distinctfromy (or
to be distinctfromy if x exists). But the y herecannotbe generalized
out, since it is not a necessarypropertyof x to be distinctfromevery
object whatever. This difficulty does not arise under our own
non-modalconstrualof essence, since we cannotin generalassert,
where x is distinctfromy, thatx is essentiallydistinctfrom y.
By adoptingthe presentdefinition,we may free the accountof
dependence from existential bias and thereby circumvent the
difficultiesover impossibleobjects.For althoughit is truein virtue
of the identity of the round squarethat it exists only if Socrates
exists, it is also truein virtueof the identityof the roundsquarethat
it exists only if everythingexists; the referenceto Socratescan be
generalizedout. The impossibilityof an objectwill thereforecreate
no special reason for supposing that it will depend upon every
object whatever.
It is instructiveto comparethe presentexistentiallyneutralac-
countof dependencewith the previousexistentiallybiasedaccount
(as L1,(Ex-4 Ey)). That every dependentobject accordingto the
neutralaccountis dependentaccordingto the biased accountis a
substantive,though plausible, thesis. What is maintainedis that,
given that one object is ineliminably involved in the nature of
another,then it is not compatiblewith the natureof the second that
it shouldexist withoutthe first. Given, for example,thatit is in the
natureof singletonSocratesto containSocrates,thenit mustfollow
fromthe natureof the singletonthatit cannotexist withoutSocrates.
280 KITFINE

We thereforehave a form of actualism.If the object exists then so

mustall of the objectsinvolved in its essence; it mustbe possible to
say what the object is without reference to what does not exist.
Moreover, the fact that the existence of the object implies the
existenceof each particularobjectinvolvedin its essence mustitself
be partof the essence of the object.4
The converse, that every dependent object according to the
biased accountis dependentaccordingto the neutralaccount,may
be argued for on the basis of certain plausible assumptions.For
suppose that the object x cannot, by its nature,exist without the
object y existing, but that y can be generalizedout of the essence
of x. Thenit follows thatx cannot,by its nature,exist withoutevery
possible object existing. Given that x itself is a possible object, it
follows that it must be possible for every possible object to exist.
But this is highly implausible; it does not seem possible, for
example, that the state of something's being red at a given time
could co-exist with the state of its being green at thattime.5
If it is grantedthatevery objectis metaphysicallypossible, then
the existentiallybiased accountmay well be extensionallycorrect.
But, all the same, it is the existentiallyneutralaccountthat should
be regardedas morefundamental.For the correctnessof the biased
accountrestsuponthe adoptionof certainsubstantivemetaphysical
assumptions.Shouldthese be given up, it is the neutralratherthan
the biased accountthatshouldbe retained.

III

I wish now to consider some variants on our basic notion of

dependence.These mostly arisefromretainingthe presentform of
definition but attaching a somewhat different sense to the
essentialistoperator.

4 Descartes expresses a similarprinciplein the Sixth Meditation(p. 190 of the Haldane\

Ross edition) when he writes 'which [faculties]cannotbe conceived... apartfrom some
substanceto which they are attached,and consequentlycannotexist withoutit'.

5 Let us show how the critical part of the reasoning might be formalized within the
symbolismof 'The Logic of Essence'. Supposethat x existentiallydependsupon y, i.e.
Ox(Ex -* Ey). Then we wish to show --, [xVy(Ex -- Ey). So suppose otherwise, i.e.
OLxVy(Ex -* Ey). Grantedthatx is metaphysicallypossible, its existence is compatible
withthe natureof all objects,i.e. OvEx.ButElvVy(Ex-* Ey);andso by modalreasoning,
OvVyEy,i.e. it is metaphysicallypossible thatevery possible object exist.
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 281

We may draw a distinctionbetween the immediateand mediate

essence of an item. It is of the immediatenature,or essence, of
singletonSocratesto containSocratesandof the immediatenature
of Socrates to be a man, but it is only of the mediate natureof
singleton Socratesto contain somethingthat is a man. In general,
the mediate natureof an object will be subject to chaining: the
natureof any object (ineliminably)involved in its naturewill also
be in its nature.The immediatenature,by contrast,will includeonly
whathas a directbearingon the object,excludingwhatderivesfrom
the natureof the otherobjects.
The presentdistinctionbetween mediate and immediatenature
cuts across the previous distinctionbetween consequentialistand
constitutiveessence. The constitutiveessence of an object, strictly
conceived, is its immediate constitutive essence. Given the im-
mediateconstitutiveessence, we may successively chain to obtain
the mediate constitutive essence. Or we may close under con-
sequence to obtain the immediateconsequentialistnotion. Or we
maybothchainandclose underconsequence(in thatorder)to obtain
the mediateconsequentialistconception.
Correspondingto thedistinctionbetweenimmediateandmediate
essence is a distinctionbetween immediateand mediate depend-
ence. Thusassumingthe essentialistnotionsto be consequentialist,
one object will immediately depend upon another if it is
ineliminablyinvolvedin its immediateessence, andit will mediately
dependupon the otherif it is ineliminablyinvolved in its mediate
essence.ThussingletonsingletonSocrateswill immediatelydepend
upon singleton Socrates but will only mediately depend upon
Socrates.
It is this idea, thatthe essence of an objectmightbe mediate,that
explainswhy we are inclinedto say, in case x dependsupony, that
what x is will depend, not just upon y, but upon what y is. For in
this case, the essence of x will literallyincorporatethe essence of
y. All those propositionsthat are true in virtue of the natureof y
will be truein virtueof the natureof x.
Mediate dependence can be defined in terms of immediate
dependence;for the one can simply be obtainedby chaining the
other.However,it does not seem to be possibleto define immediate
in terms of mediate dependence.We certainly cannot say that x
immediatelydependsupony if x mediatelydependsupony andfor
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no z, distinctfrom x and y, does x mediatelydependupon z and z

mediatelydependupon y. For the set whose membersare Socrates
and singleton Socrates will immediately depend upon Socrates,
even though it immediately depends upon singleton Socrates,
which, in its turn,immediatelydependsupon Socrates.
As with the distinctionbetween constitutiveand consequential
essence, the distinctionbetweenimmediateandmediateessence is
somewhat problematic.Indeed, as we have seen, the notion of
immediate essence merely reflects one aspect of the notion of
constitutiveessence. So just as we couldimaginesomeonewho was
only ready to endorse the consequentialconception of essence,
whetherit be immediateor mediate,so we could imaginesomeone
who was only preparedto endorse the mediatenotion of essence,
whetherit be constitutiveor consequential.Fortunately,for many
purposes in metaphysics,we are only interestedin whether one
thing dependsupon anotherand not in whetherthe dependenceis,
immediateor mediate.Thus the reliance on the more problematic
immediatenotion can often be avoided.
A second relevantvariationin the notionof essence turnson the
question of cycles. It is sometimes thoughtthat there are objects
whose nature can only be understoodin terms of one another.
Considera view, for example, accordingto which the identity of
fictional charactersis to be understoodin terms of the properties
and relationsascribedto them in the story or storiesto which they
belong. On such a view, it might be thoughtthat Bertie Wooster
(from the P. G. Wodehouse novels) could only be understoodin
terms of his relationshipto Jeeves but that, equally, Jeeves could
only be understoodin termsof his relationshipto Bertie Wooster.
Whatdo we say aboutthe natureand dependenceof the objects
involved in such cases? Again, the question is most simply
discussed at the level of constitutiveessence, althoughit may also
be discussedat the level of consequentialistessence withoutappeal
to the constitutivenotion.We have so fartalkedalmostexclusively
of the essential properties of things. But it is natural to suppose, in
the case of such objects as Woosterand Jeeves, thatin additionto
possessing constitutiveessentialpropertiesthey will also enterinto
constitutiveessentialrelationships.Thusnotonly will it be essential
to Wooster to be a witless and well-heeled bachelorand essential
to Jeeves to be a wry and crafty manservant,but also it will be
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 283

essential to both, consideredtogether,that the one is valet to the

other.Thus we will have the counterpart,within the frameworkof
real definition,to the simultaneousdefinitionof two terms.
Giventhatobjectsadmitof simultaneousdefinition,therewill be
two ratherdifferentways of definingthe notionof dependence.On
theone hand,we maysay thatx dependsupony if thereis a definition
of x (andpossibly of otherobjectsas well) in termsof y; and,on the
other hand, we may say that x depends upon y if either x is
simultaneouslydefinedwith the help of y or if thereis a definition
of x in termsof y. In the firstcase, simultaneousdefinitionswill not
give riseto reciprocalortwo-waydependence.Indeed,it is plausible
to suppose, once simultaneousdefinitions are allowed, that no
sequence of definitionswill generatea cycle, with x being defined
in terms of y, y in terms of z, and so on all the way back to x. For
what might otherwise be taken to be definitional cycle can be
construedinsteadas a form of simultaneousdefinition.It therefore
follows that,underthis definition,the relationof dependencewill
likewise be acyclic. Withthe seconddefinition,however,theremay
be cycles; for any simultaneous definition will give rise to a
reciprocaldependenceamongthe objectsdefined.6
Letus henceforthuse the term'prior'for the firstof thesenotions
and reserve the term 'depends' for the second. This distinction
between two kindsof dependencecan also be definedat the purely
consequentialistlevel, butthe matteris complicatedby the fact that
there are two somewhat different ways of passing from the
constitutiveto the consequentialnotionof essence. Let us suppose
thatit is of the constitutiveessence of Jeeves andWoosterthatthe
first be valet to the second. Then underone view, it will be of the
consequentialessence of Jeeves to be valet to Woosterand also of
the consequentialessence of Woosterto have Jeeves as valet.Thus
any constitutive essence of two objects will 'dissolve' into
consequentialessences of each.
Undersucha view it will be a simplematterto recoverthe objects
that were simultaneouslydefined within the constitutiveessence;

6 Thereis also a questionas to whetherwe should allow an object to depend uponitself.

To some extent, this issue is independentof the presentissue concerningcycles. But it
seems most convenient to take the cycle-tolerant relation to be reflexive and the
cycle-intolerantrelationto be irreflexive.
284 KIT FINE

for they will be the ones thatappearin one another'sconsequential

essence. Accordingly,we may say, as before, thatx dependsupon
y iff y is ineliminablyinvolved in the essence of x (considerednow
on its own). Giventhiscycle-tolerantnotionof dependence,priority,
can then be defined as the non-reciprocalcase.
However, under an alternative view, the transition from an
essential relationshipto the correspondingessential attributions
will be opposed. Thus given thatit is of the constitutiveessence of
Jeeves and Wooster that the first be valet to the second, it cannot;
be inferredeither that it is of the consequentialessence of Jeeves
to be valet to Woosteror of the consequentialessence of Wooster
to have Jeeves as valet. And, in general, the acyclic characterof
essence will be preservedunderthe passageto the consequentialist
notion.
The previous way of defining reciprocal dependence cannot
thereforebe adopted;for no two objects will ever both appearin
the essence of the other.Nor can we say, as when the constitutive
notion of essence was at hand, that two objects depend upon one
anotherwhen they are simultaneouslydefined, i.e. enter into an
essentialrelationship.For undera consequentialistconception,any
objectswhateverwill enterinto an essentialrelationship.It will be
of the essence of SocratesandPlato,for example,thatthey areboth
men (the relationhere being one that holds between two objects
when both are men); for this will follow from Socrates'essentially
being a man and from Plato's essentiallybeing a man.
Somehow we must distinguishbetweenthose essentialrelation-
ships that arise from a simultaneousdefinition and those that do
not.But this is readilydone.Forit is plausibleto supposethat,when
thereis a simultaneousdefinitionof two objects, this definitionis
not a logical consequenceof their separatedefinitions;objects are
not needlessly defined simultaneously.Let us thereforesay thatan
essentialrelationshipbetweentwo or more objectsis irreducibleif
it is not a logical consequence of the essential propertiesof the
objects considered separately or of the essential relationships
amongdisjointpropersubsetsof the objects.Two objectsmay then
be taken to be reciprocally dependent, under the present
consequentialistconception,just in case they standin an irreducible
essential relationship,either togetheror in partnershipwith other
objects.
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 285

The final variationin the notionof essence is the most important

and concerns the possibility of the same object having alternative
definitions.Considera particularconcretesphere.Then one might
wish to define the type, sphere,as the shape of the token sphere.
But there is nothing special in this definition about the particular
token sphere;any othertoken spherecould be used in its place. Or
considera complexproperty,suchas the propertyof notbeing wise.
We might define this to be the resultof abstractingthe constituent
Socratesfrom the propositionthat Socratesis not wise. But again,
there is nothing special about Socrates in this regard:Plato or
Aristotleor any otherobject could have done in his place.
In both these cases, thereare alternativedefinitionsof the same
object or item. Thus our initialidea thatthereis a single definition
of any object must be replacedby the idea thatthereis a family of
such definitions.Given thatthis is so, we shall need to distinguish
betweenanobjectdefinitivelybeing a certainway andits essentially
being a certainway. An object essentiallyhas a certainpropertyif
its havingthatpropertyfollows fromevery definitionof the object,
while an objectwill definitivelyhave a given propertyif its having
thatpropertyfollows from some definitionof the object. Thus the
type, sphere,will definitivelybe the shapeof any token sphereand
it will essentiallybe the shape of some or othertoken sphere.
Indeed, strictly speaking, we will not merely have alternative
definitionsof a single item but alternativesystems of definitions;
for the choice of a definitionfor one item may exclude the choice
of a definition for another item. So, for example, perhaps the
conceptodd can be definedas the negationof the concepteven and
the concept even as the negationof the concept odd. However, we
do not, on pain of circularity,want to adoptboth definitions.Thus
one system will include the one definition while anothersystem
will includethe other.
Correspondingto the definitive and essentialist conceptionsof
an object's naturearetwo notionsof dependence.We may say that
anobjectweaklydependsuponanotherif it is ineliminablyinvolved
in one of its definitions;andwe may say thatit is stronglydepends
uponthe otherif it is ineliminablyinvolved in all of its definitions.
In the first case, the given object can be defined in terms of the
other;and in the second case, it must be defined in terms of the
other. Thus while singleton Socrates will strongly depend upon
286 KITFINE

Socrates,the type, sphere, will only weakly depend upon each of

the token spheres.
Similar distinctions can be drawn within the semantic and
epistemologicalrealms.Thuswe may distinguishbetweencases in
which one termcan andcases in which it mustbe definedby means
of another;and we many distinguish between cases in which a
propositioncan and cases in which it must be justified in termsof
another.
There is a huge formaldifferencebetween the weak and strong
notionsof dependenceor priority.The notionof weak prioritymay
not even be antisymmetric.For as is illustratedby the case of the
concepts of being odd and even, two items may each be weakly
prior to the other. (Such a case is, of course, to be distinguished
from the case in which the two items are simultaneouslydefined.
They are then dependent,perhapseven stronglydependent,upon
one another,but not weakly prior).Properlyspeaking,the idea of
a single dependencyor priorityrelationshouldgive way to the idea
of a family of such relations, each relation correspondingto a
system of definitions. It is this whole family that should then be
taken to depict the structureof dependence; and it is only the
particularmembersof the family thatcan reasonablybe expected
to be transitiveor asymmetric.
But formal differencesremaineven when we comparea repre-
sentativerelationof weakprioritywiththerelationof strongpriority.
For it is plausible to suppose that strongpriorityis not subject to
infiniteregress.We cannothave x2priorto xi, x3priorto x2,andso
on ad infinitum;andsimilarlyfor the semanticandepistemological
cases. Any obligatory definitional or justificatory demand must
terminate.Onthe otherhand,thereis no reasonwhy a weakrelation
of priority should not be subject to infinite regress. Consider a
universe of indefinitely divisible matter,for example. Then any
quantityof matterx, can be defined in terms of two component
quantitiesx2 and Y2;similarly,x2 can be defined in two further
componentsx3 and y3;and so on, ad infinitum.Thus x2 is weakly
priorto xl, x3to x2,and so on ad infinitum.Similarly,it may be that
every propositionfrom a certainclass can be justified in terms of
another proposition from the class, even though it is not necessary
to justify it in termsof some otherproposition.
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 287

Correspondingto these two notions of dependence are two

notions of substance.There are substancesin the sense of objects
thatneed not be defined in terms of others-they are not strongly
posteriorto anythingelse; and thereare substancesin the sense of
objects that cannot be defined in terms of others-they are not
weakly posterior to anything else. Obligatory definition must
terminatein substancesof the first sort but not necessarilyof the
second sort; and, similarly,obligatoryjustificationwill terminate
in propositionsthatarebasic in the sense of not standingin need of
justification, though not necessarily basic in the sense of being
incapableof justification.
IV
I wantfinally to discuss the questionof genericdependence.I have
so far only discussed the relationshipof dependencebetween one
object and another. Thus we may talk of singleton Socrates
dependingupon Socratesor of a particulartype, such as a sphere,
dependingupona particulartokenof thattype. But it is commonto
make general statementsof dependence.Thus we may say that a
set dependsupon its membersor thata type dependsupon a token
of that type. But what should we understandby these general
claims?
Some of them may be explainedin terms of the corresponding
particularclaims. Thus to say thata set dependsupon its members
is to say that,for each set x and membery, x dependsupon y. But
what is it for a type to dependupon one of its tokens?The claim is
universalon the left:one is sayingthateachtypeis such as to depend
upon one of its tokens. But what is it for a given type to depend
upon one of its tokens?
One mightalso interpretthis claim as universalon the right.Thus
in sayingthata given typedependsuponone of its tokens,one might
be sayingthatit dependsuponany one of its tokens.The underlying
notion of dependence must then, of course, be weak ratherthan
strong.Each type can be defined in termsof any one of its tokens,
thoughit need not be so defined.
However, the claim is more naturallytakento be disjunctiveor
indefinitein its meaning:the type dependsupon one of its tokens,
but not upon any particularone of its tokens. But how are we to
understandthe indefinitereading?
288 KIT FINE

A naturalsuggestion is to revertto the existentialinterpretation

of dependencyclaims. To say thatthe type t dependsupon one of
its tokens is to say that it is essential to the type that it not exist
withoutone of its tokens. Moregenerally,we wish to say when an
object dependsupon an F, where F is a predicateof some sort (in
the given case, it is the predicate 'is a token of the type t'). The
proposalis then thatx will dependupon an F if it is truein virtue
of the identity of x that x cannot exist without an F (in symbols,
Ox(Ex -4 3yFy)).
This proposalis a generalizationof ourearlierexistentialaccount
of dependence. For consider the special case in which F is the
predicate'is identicalto y'. Then to say thatx dependsupon an F,
accordingto the presentaccount, is to say that x depends upon y
accordingto the previous account. We might add that the modal
construalof the essentialistoperatorwill be as inadequatein this
case as it was before. For it is presumablytruethata token cannot
exist withouta type of that token existing. But we do not want to
say, on thataccount,thata tokenalso dependsuponone of its types.
Again, somethingis lost in movingto the existentialformulation,
even if we do not adopt a modal construal of the essentialist
operator.For the thoughtbehind the claim of dependencyis that
what the type is will depend upon the tokens, or upon what they
are. But the notion of identitythatis here in play can be divorced
from thatof existence.
Imagine a view according to which an existent type could be
understoodby referenceto a possible, thoughnon-existent,token.
An existent shape, for example, could be defined by means of a
merelypossible token of thatshape. On such a view, we could say
thata type dependedupona possible token,but we would not want
to say thatthe type couldnot exist withouta token.Orlet us imagine
that a Platonic view of types was combined with a plenitudinous
view of theirnature.The identityof the types was explainedwithout
referenceto the tokens but the natureof each type was such as to
require the existence of the tokens. Then there would be the
proposedformof existentialdependenceof a type upona tokenbut
not the requiredform of dependence.
We may decouple the notions of dependenceand existence in
this case by appealto the idea of alternativesystems of definition.
To say thatthe object x dependsupon an F is to say thatan F will
 ONTOLOGICALDEPENDENCE 289

be ineliminablyinvolved in any definition of x. Thus a type will

dependupon a token of that type since any definitionof the type
will involve a token. Just as before, the definitionis an extension
of a previousparticularistaccount,but of the strongratherthanthe
weak notion.For considerthe special case in which F is trueof the
object y alone. Then x will depend upon an F, underthe present
neutralaccount,just in case x stronglydependsupon the object y
underthe previousneutralaccount.
In contrastto the particularistcase, it is no longer true that the
existentiallybiased and neutralaccountscoincide. For the neutral
accountis extensionalon the right:if x dependsupon an F, then it
dependsupona G, whereG is anypredicateco-extensivewithF.On
theotherhand,thebiasedaccountis notextensionalon theright.For
a type t may dependupon one of its tokens (i.e. upon an F, where F
is the predicate'is a tokenof t') even thoughit does notdependupon
one of the tokens y1,Y2,...of the type (i.e. upon a G, whereG is the
predicate'is one of y1, Y2,...'),since the existence of the type need
not requirethe existence of those particulartokens.
However, let us modify the neutralaccount of dependenceby
requiringnot merely that an F be ineliminably involved in any
definitionof x but thatit be essential to x thatan F be so involved.
Thenit may with some plausibilitybe claimedthatthe two accounts
coincide. But the proof of coincidence gives rise to a new con-
sideration.For suppose that the essence of an object requiresan
indefiniteexistentialcommitment,to the existence of an F rather
thanof a particularobject y. Then it is requiredthatany definition
of the object must be in terms of a particularF. Cases like that of
the plenitudinousplatonistmust thereforebe rejected.The nature
of anobjectcan only requirethe existenceof a certainkindof object
if somethingof thatkind is requiredfor the objectto be defined.

Dept of Philosophy
UCLA
405 HilgardAvenue
Los Angeles
California90024-1451
USA
290 KITFINE

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