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THE BOIOTIANS: BETWEEN ETHNOS AND KOINA

Albert Schachter
McGill University

In Herodotus’ account of the events at Plataia in 519, the Thebans were advised by
the Corinthians to leave those of the Boiotians, who were unwilling to throw their
lot in with the Boiotoi, alone (ἐ ν Θηβαίους Βοιωτ ν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς
Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν: 6.108). Here we have, explicitly stated, the clear distinction be-
tween ‘Boiotoi’ as an ἔθνος, ‘a people’, and ‘Boiotoi’ as a political entity.
It is the object of this paper to investigate the differences between the Boiotoi
as a people — an ἔθνος — and the Boiotoi as a state, with a view to seeing how
they interacted with each other and with others, and how these relationships altered
over time. The unique aspect of Boiotia is that the evidence available makes it pos-
sible to do a diachronical survey virtually from one end of antiquity to the other.

I. THE ETHNOS1

We can begin by asking who the Boiotoi were. The obvious answer, that they were
the people who lived in the territory known as Boiotia, and who spoke a dialect of
Greek peculiar to themselves, is true enough, but only up to a point. The population
of Boiotia was made up of several elements and the limits of the territory fluctuated
over time, as a result of which there were times when not all so-called “Boiotians”
spoke in the Boiotian dialect.
The Boiotian ethnos was made up of several distinct groups of people. First,
there were the Boiotoi proper, who had migrated from the North and settled first at
Koroneia where they set up a sanctuary of their chief deity, Athena Itonia. Adjoin-
ing them were the so-called Minyans, who also came from the North, and were
based at Orchomenos; their territory covered the western and northern fringes of
the Kopaic basin. Their chief god was Zeus. In addition, there were groups who had
migrated from other places: the East, the Argolid; and a pocket of people in the

1 The earliest surviving reference to the Boiotian ethnos, in the sense of a ‘Boiotian people’ is
Pindar’s statement in one of his dithyrambs that ἦν ὅτε σύας Βοιώτιον ἔθνος ἔνεπον –– Fr. 83
– ‘there was a time when they called the Boiotian people ‘pigs’’. In the inscription which cel-
ebrates the victory of the Athenians over the Boiotoi and Chalkidians in 506 BCE, the defeated
enemies are identified as ἔθνεα Βοιοτõν καὶ Χαλκιδέον: CEG 1.179 (IG I3.501). Here, however,
ἔθνος does not mean ‘a people’; on the contrary, it carries the word’s original meaning of an
‘organized group’, such as a swarm of insects, or a band of men: the expression therefore means
the ‘armies of the Boiotoi and of the Chalkidians’.
66 Albert Schachter

south-eastern part of the region’s territory who were ethnically linked to the Eretri-
ans across the Euboian Strait.
Underlying all of these groups were the descendants of the Bronze Age popu-
lation. It is unlikely that the mass of population, the lower classes and slaves, van-
ished when the Mycenaean palace régimes collapsed. They had no alternative but
to stay where they were. These people may very well have formed the largest single
element in the population of what came to be known as Boiotia. Traces of their
presence survived into the Hellenic period in their place names, the gods they wor-
shipped, and no doubt the language they spoke.2 Their communities, leaderless and
isolated, were forced to develop independently in their own relatively small territo-
ries. Unity returned with the introduction of new ruling elites, whom we know as
the Minyai and the Boiotoi. They were in a sense the Normans or Vikings of the
Greek Dark Age, relatively small groups of people in search of some place to live,
who took advantage of the disorganized state of affairs they found.
The territory which we know as Boiotia was limited on the southwest by the
Gulf of Corinth, on the northeast by the Euboian Strait. To the west, the territory of
the so-called ‘Minyans’ of Orchomenos was squeezed in between the Phokians and
the Boiotoi proper. It was open to contact, and by the same token vulnerable to
pressure from both sides. Fitting the Orchomenians into Boiotia was a recurring
problem.
In the south, Kithairon and Parnes formed a natural boundary, but one which
was disputed until at least late in the sixth century. In the case of the Skourta Plain,
a no-man’s land was agreed upon formally by the Boiotians, Athenians, and Corin-
thians: all of these people used this plain as an upland pasture. In the southeast were
the Oropians and their territory, who had close ties with the Eretrians across the
Euboian Strait with whom they shared at the least a common dialect.3
Finally, in the north, the northern coastal fringes of the Kopais were always
Boiotian, but the regions beyond Hyettos and Kopai were for most of antiquity Lo-
krian, but occasionally part of Boiotia in a political sense. The Boiotian dialect
probably developed on the spot from the form of Greek spoken during the Bronze
Age, with an admixture of North-West Greek elements, which together gave it its
special characteristics.4
In sum, the Boiotian ἔθνος was a combination of peoples who inhabited the
same space, and who by and large spoke the same language.

II. THE BEGINNINGS OF A STATE

One might be permitted to think that, with a more or less clearly defined territory
and a distinctive dialect shared by almost all the inhabitants, it would have been a

2 Schachter 2016a, 3–21. See too Schachter 1996a and 2000.


3 The Skourta Plain: Schachter 2016a, 91–94.
4 Vottéro 2006.
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 67

simple matter for the Boiotian ἔθνος to transform itself into a single viable political
state. But it was not.
There are no doubt several reasons why this was so, but for me one stands out.
Unlike the successful unitary states of Athens and Sparta, Boiotia was full of small,
independent poleis, at least four of which — Thebes, Orchomenos, Thespiai, Plataia
— had their own circle of dependent communities. There were internal tensions,
and outsiders regularly played upon the basic instability of the Boiotian state by
supporting separatist interests in Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos. The will to
unite under the leadership of a single polis — in this case, Thebes — was not strong.
As mentioned above, the migrations of the so-called Dark Age saw the arrival of
two tribes from central Thessaly, whom we know as Boiotoi and Minyans. They
appear in the record first in the Homeric Catalogue of Ships, at the time of whose
composition they were still split into groups – the first under five chieftains, the
second under two. Together they would eventually provide the seven regions into
which Boiotia was later divided. There is no overall leader in the Catalogue, and
no obvious contender for the position, although Hypothebai, like the sanctuary of
Onchestos, gets a line to itself.
One of the major components in the Boiotian mosaic, the Minyans of Orchome-
nos, were hemmed in by their neighbours on all sides. The Boiotoi themselves were
based, as we know — but not from Homer — at the sanctuary of Athena Itonia at
Koroneia. They had room to expand, eastwards and southwards, and they did so. It
was inevitable that the Minyans would one day wish to break out of the strict bound-
aries which constrained them. There are signs that this happened during the first
half of the sixth century, but any further expansion was blocked by the ambitions
of a relatively new player: Thebes. Hellenic Thebes had begun to take shape in the
eighth century: its founding population — it is one of the few poleis in mainland
Greece to have a foundation legend (two, in fact), in much the same way as an
ἀποικία – was made up of local peoples from the original townsite and surrounding
countryside, and migrants from other parts of Greece, notably the Argolid, and from
Asia Minor. These were the so-called Spartoi, the ‘Sown Men’, or rather the people
of diverse origins. The polis of Thebes, beginning as Hypothebai (the town below
Thebai) and focussed on the adjacent sanctuaries of Apollo Ismenios and Herakles,
had, by the middle of the sixth century, extended its influence over eastern Boiotia.
Either at the same time or during the third quarter of the sixth century, it arrived at
some sort of rapprochement with the Thespians, whom they protected at the siege
of Keressos. From there their ambitions spread to the Kopais where they collided
with the Orchomenians, who were at the time the principal power in the area. The
result was a defeat for Orchomenos and the absorption of the cities of the Kopais
into the Theban sphere of influence. Their subsequent attempt to bring the Plataians
into line failed, as we all know, in 519, and the southern boundary of Boiotia was
effectively fixed at the Asopos.5

5 The developments outlined here are dealt with in Schachter 2014 and Schachter 2016a, chapters
1 to 4 and 11.
68 Albert Schachter

I have already alluded to Herodotus’ account of the events of 519 BCE. The
theme is reprised by Thucydides, who has the Thebans trace their problems with
the Plataians back to the time when, after having secured the rest of Boiotia and
subsequently done the same for Plataia and other regions from which they had
driven out ‘peoples who did not belong here’ (ξυμμεικτοὺς ἀνθρώπους), they found
that the Plataians had gone back on their word and were now refusing to submit to
their leadership.6 Although neither historian was a witness to the events of 519, the
gist of what they report – that it was the Thebans who were the prime movers in
creating a Boiotian state out of the Boiotian people, and that they were the leaders
of that state – is supported by inscriptions, which show that the Boiotoi possessed a
formally constituted government, as opposed to being a collective based on ethnic
identity.
Three inscriptions from about the end of the sixth century or early in the fifth
record dedications at Thebes by citizens of other Boiotian poleis to Apollo, who is
identified twice as Hismenios. Apollo Hismenios was the chief god of the Theban
polis: a dedication made to him by the people of other poleis may legitimately be
regarded as an act of homage to the Thebans. To this degree it is fair to say that
their fellow Boiotians regarded the Thebans as their leaders.
Collectively, the Boiotoi made dedications at the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoieus,
to Athena Pronaia, and at the sanctuary of the Hero Ptoios of Akraiphia. Although
these were small objects, the decision to have them made and dedicated will have
been made by a body competent and empowered to do so, and moreover, one with
a treasury, however small, at its disposal. From the same period, two texts found at
Delphi refer to what seems to have been either an alliance or the settlement of a
dispute with Lokris and one of its poleis. Here too the Boiotoi were acting with
powers which one would normally associate with a formally constituted and recog-
nized government. And once again, as in the case of the dedications at the Ptoion,
the very existence of the dedications to which these texts refer requires an agency
which had the right and the resources to decide to make them and then to do it.7
An inscription found at the Theban Herakleion dated to the first half of the fifth
century and published by Vassilis Aravantinos is dated by a boiotarch (A – – –
βοιοταρχίοντος). Until the discovery of this text, the only reference to boiotarchs
before the foundation of the first federation after the Battle of Koroneia was the
report by Herodotus (9.15.1) that, in 479, “the boiotarchs sent for the inhabitants of
the land around the Asopos” (οἱ γὰρ βοιωτάρχαι μετεπέμψαντο τοὺς προσχώρους
τ ν Ἀσωπίων) who guided Mardonios and his army back to Boiotia from northern
Attica. Some have taken this as an anachronism, but the inscription from Thebes
makes it clear that there can be no doubt that the office of boiotarch existed during

6 Thuc. 3.61.2: Ἡμε ς δὲ αὐτο ς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα τὸ πρ τον ὅτι ἡμ ν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν
ὕστερον τ ς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’αὐτ ς ἃ ξυμμεικτοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες
ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὠσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρ τον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμ ν. (We first fell
out with them for this reason: we settled Plataia later than the rest of Boiotia, as well as other
regions with it, of which we gained possession by driving out alien elements; but the Plataians
refused to be led by us, as had been previously agreed).
7 Schachter 2016a, 56–59.
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 69

the first half of the fifth century BCE, and perhaps even before. Indeed, since the
Boiotians came under the sway of the Athenians in 458, it is probably fair enough
to give that year as a terminus ante quem for the boiotarchy. The boiotarchy existed
before the first federation, and, accordingly, this magistracy testifies to the exist-
ence of a formally constituted Boiotian government.8
It is therefore safe to say that by late in the sixth century most of the ethnic
Boiotoi, with the exclusion of the Plataians, the so-called Minyai, and perhaps peo-
ple of non–Boiotian stock in the Oropia,9 were united politically – as Boiotoi –
under the leadership of the Thebans.
This patching together of a single political entity from diverse components is
reflected in the conversion of two tribal gods, Athena of the Boiotoi and Zeus of the
Minyai, into the national deities of Boiotia, who were worshipped jointly through-
out the region as Athena Itonia and Zeus Karaios. The sanctuary of Athena at Koro-
neia, which contained cult images of both gods, became the national sanctuary and
functioned as such throughout the rest of antiquity. The choice of the sanctuary at
Koroneia over the older and more centrally located sanctuary of Poseidon at Onch-
estos would have made it a constant reminder to the Orchomenians of the suprem-
acy of Thebes in Boiotia. The Thebans did something similar after the Battle of
Leuktra, when they established the Basileia to commemorate their victory and lo-
cated the new sanctuary of Zeus as Basileus on a hilltop just outside Lebadeia. From
here it would be visible not only to the Orchomenians across the way, but also to
anybody who passed by enroute to Delphi.
A later attempt to use a regional god as a national symbol was the elevation of
Hera Teleia, the major deity of southern Boiotia, to pan–Boiotian status, thereby
bringing the Plataians and their neighbours into the Boiotian political mainstream.
The festival known later as Daidala – ‘Dolls’ – which seems previously to have
been limited to the various sub-regions of the Plataiïd, was now expanded to take
in all of the regions of Boiotia – the τέλη – which would henceforward participate
in its celebration. What had originally been a ritual to declare ownership of the
territory of Plataia, stretching from the Asopos to the top of Kithairon, was now to
become a celebration of the possession of all of Boiotia. This may have happened
when the first federation was organized. In the event, Plataia, did not remain long
in this federation: it was destroyed, and the communities along the Parasopia de-
pendent on it were absorbed into Thebes. The festival, however, continued to be
celebrated, but at irregular intervals — more or less whenever it was felt that some
show had to be made of Boiotian unity, as, for example, during the Theban hegem-
ony, then again when the Hellenistic koinon was instituted, and later still, under the
Empire.10
A symptom of the fundamental disunity of the Boiotoi is the fact that there was
no single god who could be identified as truly pan-Boiotian, in the way that Athena

8 Aravantinos 2014b, 199–202; Schachter 2016a, 53.


9 On the possibility of Theban control of the Oropia before the Persian Wars, see Papazarkadas
2014a, 242, 245f and Schachter 2016a, 40 n.19 and 94.
10 See Schachter 2016a, 117f, 143, 184.
70 Albert Schachter

was the patron god of all the Athenians. Athena Itonia and Zeus Karaios were at
home in the northwest quarter of Boiotia, in the region of the Kopais. The poleis of
central and eastern Boiotia had different patron deities: Hera as we have seen at
Plataia, the Parasopia and Thespiai as well; Hermes at Tanagra; Demeter, Dionysos,
and Herakles at Thebes. Most of these were survivals from the Bronze Age.11
The god who was most widely worshipped in Boiotia was Apollo, who might
be said to have represented the interests of the ruling elites in the various poleis.
These people had more in common with each other than with their fellow citizens
of the lower orders. No matter what differences existed among the poleis, there was,
in each one of them, an aristocratic faction with ties of xenia to its opposite numbers
elsewhere. Even in Plataia there were partisans of the Theban cause.

III. THE CHANGING STATE OF THE STATE (TO KOINON, HEGEMONY,


AND KOINON)

It is impossible to tell how things might have played out in Boiotia had it not been
for the traumatic events of the Persian Wars. Would the Thebans have been able to
maintain their hegemony and turn all of Boiotia into what would have been effec-
tively a Greater Thebes, powerful enough to rival Athens and Sparta? It is idle to
speculate; what seems to have happened was that after the Persian Wars Thebes
was no longer the hegemon of the Boiotoi, although in fact the Thebans came out
of it well enough. They regained (or still had) control of the eastern part of Boiotia
by 470 at the latest, and before that one of their number had been victorious at the
Pythian Games of 474. Pindar’s ode celebrating the victory (Pyth. 11)
begins with a roll call of the major heroines/goddesses of Thebes, and ends with a
joint reference to Iolaos of Thebes and Polydeukes of Therapne. It is as if the poet
were announcing the return of the Thebans to the community of the Hellenes.
The Boiotoi were still recognized as a political community: it was as such that
they were penalized at Olympia for an unspecified crime, no doubt connected with
the Persian Wars. Some time later on, the Thespians – ‘and those with them’, that
is, their dependent poleis (Eutresis and Thisbe) – were absolved of the penalty lev-
ied against the Boiotoi as a whole. This must have been because they alone of the
Boiotoi had not medized. The Plataians of course were not politically ‘Boiotoi’ at
the time, but a dependency of the Athenians.12
Boiotian poleis continued to issue coins (if the dates assigned are correct) and
some of the Tanagran issues were identified as ‘Boiotian’ as well as Tanagran. Pre-
sumably there was some sort of regional treasury, which used the Tanagran mint.
This is, incidentally, the earliest Boiotian coinage to be identified as such. It does
not mean that Tanagra was the leader of the state, but merely that its mint provided

11 Schachter 2016a, 9–11.


12 NIO 5; see Schachter 2016a, 59f.
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 71

the facility.13 This could be regarded as a first step to a federation, namely a Boio-
tian government not led by the Thebans.14
But once again events intervened to stop any further development. This time it
was the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta which resulted in Boiotia becoming an
Athenian vassal, or rather a collection of vassals, for ten years.
It is remarkable when one thinks how quickly and how easily Boiotia simply
fell apart after the battle of Oinophyta. This calls to mind Perikles’ remark that the
Boiotians, by fighting with each other, were like holm-oaks, which are the cause of
their own destruction.15 If nothing else, this shows how weak the ties of a common
ethnos really were, at least in this region of Greece.
We know very little of what went happened in Boiotia during the ten years of
Athenian control. There is some evidence that two poleis – Akraiphia and Orchome-
nos – might have become members of the Delian League. Attempts were made,
without great success, to install democratic régimes in various poleis. We do know
that a fair number of disaffected Boiotians, of the aristocratic class, went into exile.
It was they who, gathering at Orchomenos with others of their persuasion from Eu-
boia, Lokris, and elsewhere, caused the Athenians to send out a force under Tol-
mides to restore order. The result was utter defeat for the Athenians at the battle of
Koroneia in 446, and the res\toration of all of Boiotia to the Boiotians.16
The victors set about organizing a Boiotian government in their own image,
which ensured that the franchise rested only with the propertied classes. The con-
stitution as described by the Oxyrhynchos Historian is full of checks and balances
which were intended to ensure that this would be the case. The territory was divided
into eleven μέρη, or to use the appropriate Boiotian term, τέλη, based partly on
population. Each was entitled to one boiotarch and was obliged to contribute troops
and money to the common government. The boiotarchies were allocated in such a
way as to make it hard for any single polis to have undue influence. None of the
larger poleis had more than two boiotarchies. Tanagra, long a dependency of
Thebes, was given a boiotarchy of its own, leaving Thebes with two; while
Chaironeia and Lebadeia, originally dependencies of Orchomenos were, for the
purposes of equitable distribution, removed from Orchomenos and put together
with the other Kopaic poleis to share two boiotarchies in rotation. Clearly this ar-
rangement was the result of compromises among the major players.
It appears to be a fair distribution, but on closer inspection we can detect a bias
on the one hand against Orchomenos, and in favour of Thebes on the other. Leba-
deia and Chaironeia, both carved out of the original territory of the Orchomenians,
were removed from their direct control. At the very least, the arrangement among

13 Schachter 2016a, 61f.


14 That there was some form of pan-Boiotian infrastructure is suggested also by the fact that it
was the Boiotians who fought in the battle of Oinophyta. There is no indication that there were
only Thebans involved on the Boiotian side: Thuc. 1.108: the Athenians marched ἐς Βοιωτούς
and μάχ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες.
15 Arist. Rhetoric 3.4.
16 See Schachter forthcoming, and Schachter 2016a, 71f.
72 Albert Schachter

the Kopais poleis neutralized the potential influence of the Orchomenians. The The-
bans, on the other hand, could count on the Tanagrans regularly, as they could most
of the time on the cities of the Kopais. But what weighted the arrangement in the
Thebans’ favour from the very beginning, and sowed the seeds for the destruction
of the federation, was that the seat of the federal government was placed at Thebes.
Theoretical considerations aside, in practical terms this meant that federal decisions
were most likely to have been influenced by the Thebans, who had the advantage
of already being on hand whenever federal business was transacted. The effects of
this were not lost upon those who later organized the Hellenistic Boiotian koinon.
Still, it was an attempt to create a pan–Boiotian government in which every section
of the country participated.
This situation lasted until the spring of 431, when the Thebans – at the behest
of their friends inside the town – invaded Plataia with the intention of eliminating
the opposition and handing the polis over to the Thebans (τὴν πόλιν Θηβαίοις
προσποι σαι: Thuc. 2.2.2), and allying themselves in accordance with the ancestral
traditions of all the Boiotoi (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τ ν πάντων Βοιωτ ν ξυμμαχε ν: Thuc.
2.2.4). It is assumed by some that Plataia had not been a member of the Boiotian
federation set up in 446, but this is not likely. The constitution of the Boiotians as
described by the Oxyrhynchos Historian had originally allocated two boiotarchies
to Plataia and its dependent towns, but these were now (in 395) in the hands of the
Thebans, who in this way controlled four boiotarchies out of the eleven. There must
have been a time when the Plataiïd belonged to the federation in its own right, and
this can only have been at the outset, from 446 to 431.
From then until the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Thebans were clearly
the dominant power in Boiotia again. It was one of their boiotarchs, Pagondas, who
led the Boiotian forces at the battle of Delion in 424 BCE. A year after this battle,
in which the Thespians had suffered great losses, the Thebans tore down the city
wall of Thespiai, accusing the Thespians of ἀττικισμός. They must have been re-
acting to events inside Thespiai after the battle of Delion. The loss of so many men
of the hoplite class would have weakened the pro-Theban and pro-Spartan elite of
the polis to the point where the pro-Athenian faction felt free to try to take control
of the polis. Tearing down the walls was not so much an act of war against Thespiai
as one of support for the hard-pressed hoplite class. And indeed in the summer of
414 the Thespian δ μος rose up against its rulers. The Thebans came to the rescue
again; some members of the δ μος were arrested, others fled to Athens, and Thes-
piai was once more in the hands of the men of property, friendly to the Thebans,
friendly to the Spartans.
At the end of the Peloponnesian War the Thebans fell out with the Spartans
over the matter of whether or not to destroy Athens. The failure of the Theban lead-
ership to get their way led to their being replaced by a faction not wedded to the
Spartan cause, and gave rise to the situation described by the Oxyrhynchos Histo-
rian. Accordingly there were two factions, one pro–Spartan, and the other accused
of ἀττικισμός. It is probably more correct to regard the latter faction not as pro-
Athenian, but as Theban or Boiotian nationalists. They made use of their Athenian
connections, certainly, but they were not necessarily ‘democratic’ themselves. The
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 73

oligarchic constitution was still in force and remained that way until the dissolution
of the Boiotian league by the King’s Peace. The League, led as it was by Thebans,
was now hostile to its erstwhile allies, the Spartans, and moving gradually closer to
the Athenians. It was still ostensibly a federation, issuing its own coinage, although
more and more it was the Thebans who took the lead in Boiotian affairs. There was
disaffection on the part of the Thespians and the Orchomenians, who found them-
selves moving closer to Sparta, but generally it seems that the Thebans were able
to command the loyalty of most Boiotians — a situation which remained more or
less unchanged until the destruction of Thebes in 335.17
Under the terms of the King’s Peace of 386, the Boiotian federation was dis-
solved, and so it remained until the liberation of Thebes at the end of 379. At that
time, the Thebans revived the federation – the κοινόν – but it was a federation in
name only.18 The Thebans kept control of the government of the country, naming
most if not all of the boiotarchs, and negotiating with foreign powers in the name
of all Boiotians. Proxeny decrees were issued in the name of the Boiotoi, but when
it came to serious business it was the Thebans who signed the documents. This will
explain the confusion before the Battle of Leuktra, when the Thebans insisted on
ensuring that when they signed the proposed treaty, they were doing so on behalf
of the Boiotoi. We see this process operate also in a recently published treaty, ac-
cording to which the Histiaians agreed to submit to the military hegemony of the
Thebans, not the Boiotians.19
The common opinion is that the Theban Hegemony ended at the battle of Man-
tineia in 362.20 To be sure, the death of Epameinondas marked a turning-point, for
it deprived Thebes of its most capable leader. But for at least five years after the
battle of Mantineia the Boiotians, that is, the Thebans, were the main land power in
Greece, giving way to Philip of Makedon only after a series of setbacks which were
matched by the steady growth in the powers of the Makedonians and their king.
The Thebans exercised their leadership in Boiotia by a mixture of coercion and
diplomacy. Dissident elements were dealt with by force. The Plataians, who had
been hostile to the Thebans since at least 519, were driven out in 373, their city
destroyed and their lands distributed among Thebans. Plataia no longer existed as a
polis. Orchomenos, which had provided a base for the enemies of Thebes during
the Corinthian War (and was to do the same later during the Third Sacred War), and
remained a centre of the disaffected aristocracy during the Theban Hegemony, was
taken in 364, when at least some of its citizens were put to the sword and their
womenfolk and children enslaved. Orchomenos continued to function as a polis,

17 Schachter 2016a, chapter 7, esp. 115f.


18 See for now Robinson 2011, 56f.
19 Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012. For the period between 431 and 371 in general, see Buck
1994.
20 This opinion owes much to Xenophon, who ended his Hellenika at this point, and to Ephoros,
who stated it explicitly: τελευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου (sc. το Ἐπαμεινώνδου) τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
ἀποβαλε ν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους γευσαμένους αὐτ ς μόνον (FGrH 70 F 119 = Str. 9.2.2 [401])
(For at his death, the Thebans immediately lost the hegemony, having had only a taste of it),
and cf. later in the passage at Str. 9.2.5 (402).
74 Albert Schachter

however, as in 359 an Orchomenian was appointed theōrodokos for an Epidaurian


theōros. It is possible, therefore, that the punishment meted out to the Orchomeni-
ans was limited to members of the faction opposed to the Thebans.21
This must also have been the case with Thespiai. Beyond tearing down the city
walls the Thebans seem to have left the Thespians alone. Probably they supported
the pro-Theban faction there and used them to keep their fellow citizens under con-
trol. And, whatever Isokrates says about the Thebans having obliged the Thespians
to join them, their behaviour cannot have been very oppressive. Thespiai not only
prospered, but maintained its own contacts with the outside world. 22 The Thebans
treated those loyal to them well: it was at this time that the territory of Tanagra was
greatly enlarged by the addition of the tetrakomia and its lands to the north.23 The
defection of the Euboians from Thebes in 357 did not turn the people of Oropos —
which had been ceded to the Thebans in 366 — away from Thebes, and, even after
the battle of Chaironeia, they remained independent, and were handed over to Ath-
ens by Alexander only in 335 (perhaps he suspected that they still had pro–Theban
sympathies). Nor is there any sign at all of disaffection at two other important poleis
of Boiotia, Haliartos and Akraiphia. What we have is silence, but here it speaks
loudly enough. Furthermore, the people of Chaironeia and Lebadeia, even though
they were surrounded by elements hostile to Thebes, also remained loyal through-
out the Third Sacred War (although the Koroneians wavered in their allegiance).24
It seems that the aim of the Theban leadership during this period was to con-
centrate control of external affairs, military matters, and the treasury, in their own
hands. The federal assembly was based at Thebes. Federal documents were dated
by the archon of Thebes, and the coins of Thebes, while not necessarily the only
issue, appear — to judge from the sheer number of coins which have survived —
to have served as a quasi-federal coinage.25 Nevertheless, individual poleis proba-
bly retained control of purely local matters. The relationship of the other poleis to
Thebes is described by the expressions Θηβαίοις συντελε ν or συντελε ν εἰς τὰς
Θήβας, a status held certainly by Thespiai and Tanagra. These were bi-lateral ar-
rangements, whereby a polis consented to merge its affairs with those of the The-
bans, giving up its αὐτονομία, which had been restored by the King’s Peace.26
Συντέλεια is contrasted by Isokrates with the disappearance of the polis of the Pla-
taians, and the absorption of their territory into that of Thebes. In practical terms,

21 On the fate of Plataia and Orchomenos, see the summaries in Hansen 2004, 449–451.216 (Pla-
taia) and 446–448.213 (Orchomenos).
22 See Hansen 2004, 457f.222, and Schachter 1996b, 120–122.
23 Schachter 2016a, chapter 6, passim, 114f.
24 Schachter 2016a, 115 and notes 5–6 (Oropos), note 7 (Chaironeia and Lebadeia), note 8 (Koro-
neia).
25 See Hepworth 1998 and Schachter 2016b.
26 Θηβαίοις συντελε ν: Isocr. 14 (Plataiikos) 8; συντελε ν εἰς τὰς Θήβας: idem 9, and Hell. Oxy.
= FGrH 66 fr. 1.265 (referring to an earlier occasion). Diod. Sic. 12.41, 15.38–39, 50, 70.
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 75

συντέλεια means that the polis in question had ceded to Thebes its right to conduct
foreign policy, in times of both peace and war.27
Outside Boiotia, the Thebans followed more or less the same procedure. They
made separate alliances with individual states, the terms of which seem to have
varied from case to case. The Achaians and Histiaians, for example, accepted the
Thebans as their leaders. The Phokians on the other hand undertook only a mutual
defence pact, which did not oblige them to follow the Thebans wherever they led.28
The Thebans’ alliance with Athens in 378 was also a special arrangement, or so it
would seem from the despatch of a delegation to Thebes, who were to persuade the
Thebans ὅ [τ]ι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν, ‘of whatever good thing they can’. Aside from
these cases, the terms of engagement remain hidden, although one may guess that
most of the alliances with Peloponnesian states were based on mutual defence in
the event of invasion. The Theban network of alliances extended from Akarnania
to Byzantion, and from Thessaly to the Peloponnese. It was never a full-scale league
in the manner of the Second Athenian League, for example. The nature of Theban
involvement with their allies can be seen in the inscription which lists contributions
to the Boiotian war effort in the middle of the Third Sacred War: the money came
not as a fixed tribute, but as individual donations from two poleis in Akarnania,
Byzantion, and from a Boiotian proxenos of Tenedos.29
Although the Thebans were able to collect a large number of allies on a one-to-
one basis, they were not able to impose their leadership over the other Hellenes as
a whole. When, in 366, they tried to organize a general peace, nobody took them
seriously and the enterprise foundered. The Thebans lacked the will, the ability, the
prestige, or all of these, to impose themselves. And in truth, Theban policy outside
Boiotia was defensive rather than aggressive. They had no ambitions other than to
protect their position and their territory. They sought to neutralize their enemies by
helping their allies, and engaged themselves abroad primarily in police actions.
Even their disastrous foray against Phokis, which set off the Third Sacred War, may
be seen in this light.

IV. A REAL ΚΟΙΝΌΝ

All of this came to an end with the destruction of Thebes in 335. The removal of
the Thebans from the scene left the way open for the creation of a true confederacy,

27 Συντελε ν εἰς Θήβας: see Isokrates 14 (Plataikos), 9. See too Bakhuizen 1994, and Gonzalez
2006, 34–38, and on Thebes and Boiotia in the Classical period in general, Hammond 2000.
The occasional appearance abroad in official contexts of a polis-ethnic shows that the individ-
ual poleis were not swallowed up into a single state: IG IV2.1.94/95 theorodokoi from Thebes,
Thespiai, Koroneia, Orchomenos, Lebadeia; for the date (mid-fourth century BCE) see Sève
1993, 207. IG XII.3. 542. 6.25: a Lebadeian proxenos of Karthaia (mid-fourth century).
28 Xen. Hell. 7.5.4–8.
29 Achaians: Xen. Hell. 7.1.42. Histiaia: Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012. Phokians: Xen.
Hell. 7.5. 4–8. Athens: Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 92–105 no.22 ll. 72–75). Contributions for
the Sacred War: Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 268–271 no. 57.
76 Albert Schachter

the only Boiotian κοινόν which deserves this definition. Care was taken to ensure
that no single polis had undue influence. Individual poleis retained a great deal of
autonomy but ceded interstate relations with each other and with external powers
to the central, Boiotian, government. The seat of this government was at Onchestos,
near the sanctuary of Poseidon at the southeast corner of the Kopais. The founda-
tions of the federal capital buildings have been found just west of the pass. The
symbolic importance of locating the federal capital in neutral territory, which be-
longed to no individual polis, cannot be overestimated. It is a principle which still
operates today in several countries.30
The Boiotians of the Hellenistic koinon were divided into regions as before,
seven of them, some comprising one polis, others grouping several small ones to-
gether. On the occasions when the koinon was expanded to include poleis from
outside Boiotia proper (East Lokris, Oropos, Megara, Aigosthena), an eighth region
was created. Each provided representatives to the federal government, some to
serve as magistrates, others to be what we would call civil servants. Over all of
these, but with no power other than to date the activities of his year, was the federal
archon, whose name, as a symbol of his neutrality, was not accompanied by an
ethnikon. The occasional extension of the koinon beyond the normal boundaries of
‘Boiotia’ shows that by this time at least, ethnicity was not a primary characteristic
of being ‘Boiotian’: what mattered more was political expediency.31
This state of affairs lasted until early in the second century BCE, when meetings
of the koinon came to be held, not at Onchestos any more, but at Thebes. This could
have reflected a shift in the balance of power towards the direction of the Thebans.32

V. FROM ΚΟΙΝΌΝ TO ΚΟΙΝΌΝ

Towards the end of the 170s, possibly in 173, the Boiotian koinon formed an alli-
ance with King Perseus of Makedon.33 In 17234 the Romans sent a delegation to
Greece, whose leaders let it be known that, in Boiotia, they would deal only with
individual poleis, and openly spurned the advances of Ismenias, head of the koinon,
who had offered to put the whole of the country at the disposal of Rome.35 In short,
the Romans no longer recognized the koinon as the legitimate representative of the
Boiotians; in this they were aided and abetted by those Boiotians who had been
opposed to the koinon’s pro–Makedonian policy. The result of this was that the
federal government simply disappeared from the scene. The Romans were very
pleased with themselves for having brought about the collapse of the koinon at

30 On the site, see Schachter 1986, 208, 220f.


31 On the Hellenistic koinon in general, see Roesch 1965. On the districts (τέλη) see Corsten 1999,
27–60 and Knoepfler 2001 (one of several articles dealing with this subject). For an overview
see Beck and Ganter 2015.
32 Roesch 1982, 275–282.
33 Mackil 2013, 135.
34 For the date see Wiemer 2004, 36f.
35 Polyb. 27.1.
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 77

arm’s length, as it were, and with no armed intervention.36 Not all Boiotians were
happy with the outcome, and it took a few months to bring the people of Koroneia,
Thisbe, and Haliartos to heel. Matters were sealed by the siege and destruction of
Haliartos in 171, whose territory was allotted to the Athenians in 167, and the sup-
pression of anti–Roman elements in Koroneia and Thisbe.37 Dissident elements
were still active in Thebes, however, and it was not until 146 that the Romans man-
aged to settle matters there.38
What happened in 172/171 was not a formal ‘dissolution’. The Romans took
advantage of what, in an earlier day, would have been called stasis to bring about
the collapse of the koinon by favouring one of the two sides, the pro–Roman one,
over the pro–Makedonian elected government. Formal dissolution was ratified,
more or less in retrospect, by Mummius in 146.39
It is not easy to reconstruct what went on in Boiotia between the collapse of the
koinon in 172/171 and the emergence of a κοινὸν Βοιωτ ν known to be in existence
by the third quarter of the first century BCE. The evidence is sparse and open to a
variety of interpretations.40 It is widely believed that the koinon was revived at
some time after 172/171, although there is disagreement about the date, duration,
and even the number, of revivals. However, I would suggest it is more likely that,
just as there was no formal dissolution of the koinon in 172/171, so there may never
have been a conscious/formal ‘revival’ before the formation of the last κοινὸν
Βοιωτ ν.41
Although the central authority and its institutions ceased to exist in 172/171,
the poleis and τέλη and the people who comprised them were still very much pre-
sent. It was in some respects similar to what happened when the palatial govern-
ments collapsed at the end of the Myceanean period, except that after 172/171 those
throughout Boiotia who had supported the Romans and were now, because of their
loyalty to Rome, the men in authority, formed a network of ‘poleis’ which can be
seen in the operation of two festivals, the Delia and the Basileia. It is to be sure by
no means a full-blown federation, but, as far as these two festivals are concerned,
the ‘poleis’ behaved very much like a pan–Boiotian government. They passed de-
crees, issued laws, had a civil service of sorts, and a central treasury; moreover, in
the case of the Basileia at least, they had the power to require member states to help
pay for the festivals.42

36 Livy 42.47.
37 Excellent summary of events in Mackil 2013, 135–137.
38 The story in outline in Paus. 7.14.6–16.9. Cf. Polyb. 39.4–6 and Livy Epitome 52.
39 Paus. 7.16.9.
40 Repeated attempts to clarify the situation, most recently by Denis Knoepfler and Christel
Mueller, have made much progress, but we are still a long way from certainty. See Mueller
2014 and Knoepfler 2015, 448–450 (no. 449) for recent assessments. See too Mackil 2013, 136
n. 276.
41 I hope to deal with this matter at a later date.
42 The apologia of Damon son of Ariston of Orchomenos, agonothete of the Delia (SEG 57.452;
cf. Bull. épigr. 2010.311, late second century BCE) refers to payments required ἐκ το νόμου
(ll. 19–20 and 21: the original editors of the inscription –– Brélaz, Andreiomenou, and Ducrey
78 Albert Schachter

The formal creation of the last version of the κοινὸν Βοιωτ ν, whenever it hap-
pened, would have been based on this existing system. The earliest reference to this
koinon, dated 33 or 32 BCE, is a dedication in Athens of (a statue of?) the proquaes-
tor M. Junius Silanus, as their benefactor, by τὸ κοινὸν Βοιωτ ν | Εὐβοέων Λοκρ ̣ν
| Φωκέων Δωριέων.43 It can be assumed that at least some of the individual compo-
nents of this central Greek global association were already in existence by this time.
The koinon was based at the ancestral federal sanctuary of the Boiotoi, that of
Athena Itonia at Koroneia. Its governing body was the college of naopoioi, whose
secretary fulfilled the rôle of agonothetēs of the Pamboiotia, and was the de facto
archon of the association.44 It must have been this body which organized the occa-
sional celebrations of the Daidala: from Pausanias’ account of this festival it is clear
that the division of the territory into τέλη as well as πόλεις was still maintained. As
in the latter years of the Hellenistic koinon and afterwards, membership was not
restricted to poleis or individuals of Boiotia proper. Boiotarchs reappear on the
scene, but now they came not only from old Boiotia, but also from Megara, Phokis,

2007, 287 –– suggest that this was a law of Tanagra, but concede that ‘la participation des cités
béotiennes à l’élaboration de ce réglement est cependant probable compte tenu du rôle que
celles-ci jouent dans l’organisation du concours’). Mention is also made of a decree by the
poleis (ll. 26–27: καθὼς ἔδοξε τα ς πόλε|[σι] and of an under-secretary (ll. 20–21: Εὐκλείδηι̣
ὑπογραμμ[α|τε ]: it is the view of the editors that this functionary, who was paid for his services,
‘n’est pas un magistrat . . . La présence d’un sous-secrétaire, dont le titre sert à montrer l’infé-
riorité hiérarchique par rapport à un magistrat, n’implique pas qu’un secrétaire de plein droit
ait participé à l’organisation des Delia’ [p. 295 n. 184]. I find it difficult to agree with this: if
there is an undersecretary, then there must be a secretary under whom he is ranked).
The inscription dealing with the Basileia is not published in its entirety in any single source
(the most complete version of the text is given by Manieri 2009, 156–163, Leb. 11, who omits
lines 1–28 of part C. These lines are to be found in Vollgraff 1901, 375–378 no. 20, and Hol-
leaux 1938, 131–142). The document probably dates to ca. 58–55 BCE (the years of exile of
Ptolemy XII, whose chariot won the race ἅρματι τελείωι, ll. 18–19), and comprises the end of
an athletic/hippic victors’ list (A 1–19), the apologia of Xenarchos son of Sokrates of Hyettos,
agonothete of the Basileia (A 20–37), the partial list delegates from poleis (B 1–39: from
Anthedon, Akraiphia, Boumelitaia, Larymna, Kopai, Plataia), partial inventory of phialai de-
posited by a succession of agonothetes (C 1–28), and a complaint by Xenarchos against his
predecessor for his failure to present his accounts (C 29–71). The document refers to (1) con-
tributions required from the poleis (A 23–24: they are waived by Xenarchos [ἀφ κα δὲ τἀς
πόλεις τὴν γινομένην | αὐτ ν εἰς τὸν ἀγ να εἰσφορὰν π σαν]), (2) an under-secretary (A 26),
(3) decrees (A 28), (4) a common treasury at the sanctuary of Zeus Basileus (A 29–31; cf. C 1–
28 [the inventory] and A 21: income from the rental of the stadion and its environs), (5) active
participation by the poleis (B; C 39 and 44–47: they send ἐγκριταί), (6) laws (A 35–37, C 36),
and τέλη (C 36–37).
43 IG II2.4114. For the date, see Geagan 2011, 225f no. H413.
44 IG VII.2871, ll. 2–4 (γραμματεύοντος τ ν ναοποι ν | Μνασάρχου το Χαρίτωνος, το δὲ
αὐτο | [κ]αὶ ἐπιμελητο τ ς πανηγύρεως). Fragments of other victors’ lists: IG VII.1764,
Pritchett 1969, 88B. See Schachter 1981, 124–126 (slightly out of date, but not entirely without
merit).
The Boiotians: Between ethnos and koina 79

Naryka, possibly even Karystos.45 An individual magistrate could hold office in,
and any member polis could belong to, more than one koinon.46
Despite its grand titles and pious references to the Boiotian ἔθνος,47 this koinon
was little more than a club which offered occasions for the elite to intermingle. It
was a body with few if any powers: it could not even prevail upon its own member
communities to take part in the delegation to the Emperor in 37 CE,48 although it is
hard to imagine it being unable to require contributions to the cost of producing the
Pamboiotia, for example, and the simple upkeep of the sanctuary at Koroneia. It
almost certainly had no political standing. The Romans, as they had done since
172/171, dealt with individual poleis directly. Such matters as the engineering pro-
jects in the Kopais, and settling disputes between neighbouring poleis were referred
to the source of real power, the Emperor and his officials. In the same vein, when
men had to be recruited in a time of crisis, the Romans negotiated directly with
individual poleis, as happened in Thespiai.49 The only instance where Boiotia is
mentioned as an official entity is in the case of the έπίτροπος Βοιωτίας, the imperial
freedman who looked after the emperor’s personal interests in the region.50 For the
individual ‘Boiotian’, what conferred real status — as it did throughout the Empire
— was not belonging to an ethnos or other regional community; it was, rather, the
possession of Roman citizenship.
To sum up: the Boiotian ethnos was not monolithic, but was from the start an
amalgam of different peoples who lived in the same space and spoke the same form
of Greek. Welding them into a political state was not easy. It did not come about
because the Boiotians wanted it, but because the Thebans did. And, until the crea-
tion of the Roman province of Achaia the single factor dominating internal politics
in Boiotia was whether or not the Thebans could impose themselves on their Boio-
tian neighbours. Other Greek states, notably Athens and Sparta, exploited the basic
disunity of the Boiotians, in order to ensure that they did not pose a serious threat
to their own interests. Later, after the destruction of Thebes, the Boiotians were
able to set up a true confederacy. By this time, however, Boiotia was a backwater
within a backwater. Later still, when Boiotia was a minor administrative unit of the
province of Achaia, the regional elite revived for one last time the Boiotian koinon,
but this was a body possessed neither of political power nor territorial integrity nor
a common ethnicity. And as far as the last of these is concerned, almost from the
beginning being ethnically Boiotian did not make a community a member of the
Boiotian state, nor was it a requirement for membership.

45 IG VII.106 (Megara), IG IX.1.218 (Phokis), SEG 51.641 (Naryka). For a possible boiotarch
from Karystos, see Schachter 2016, 143, n.22 (on p. 144). See too Knoepfler 2012.
46 See for example IG VII.3426, IG IX.1.218, SEG 51.641.
47 See IG VII.2711 passim.
48 IG VII.2711 passim.
49 Works in the Kopais, and the settlement of inter-polis disputes: Oliver 1989, 253–273. Raising
troops from Thespiai: IThesp 37.
50 Ἐπίτροπος Βοιωτίας: FD 3.4.445: P. Aelius Myron, freedman of the Emperor (PIR2 A.224).

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