CASE OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE

CASE

1. Alvarez vs. IAC Succession of obligation Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.

2. Gevero vs. IAC sale before partition of prop The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with
- requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate
3. Locsin vs. CA - No children The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death,
- relatives heirs and do not vest in his heirs until such time
- Issue
Whether or not the nephews and
nieces of Doña Catalina, are entitled
to inherit the properties which she
had already disposed of more than
ten (10) years before her death.

4. Lorenzo vs. An appeal from a decision of the “ if death is the generating source from which the power of the state impose
Posadas lower court dismissing a action inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon death of the decedent, succession
commenced by plaintiff in his takes place and the right of the state to tax vests instantly, the tax should be
capacity as trustee of the estate of measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of decedent’s death.
Thomas hanley, for the refund of
estate tax of deceased paid under
protest.
5.
6. Uson vs. Del Nebreda died, survived by his widow The new right recognized by the new civil code in favor of illegitimate children of
Rosario maria uson and 4 illegitmate deceased
children. Plaintiff contends that she is
entitled to all of the said property-
sole heir.

7. NHA vs. Almeida Francisca executed a Deed of Self
Adjudication claiming that she is the
only remaining relative of Margarita
and to be the exclusive legal heir.
Deed of Self Adjudication was based
on a Sinumpaang Salaysay
executed by Margarita wherein she
stated that Francisca will continue
paying for the NHA. It was also
stated that the Sinumpaang Salysay
shall take effect upon death of
Margarita. Issue: Is Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Margarita
Herrera her last will?
8. Conde vs. Abaya Transmissible rights and obligations
Yes, Sinumpaang Salaysay’s effectivity commences at the time of death of the
author of the instrument. Hence in such period, all the interest of the person should
cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transfer
to her heirs by virtue of a will or by operation of law, as provided in Article 774 of
the Civil Code.
Since Obligation is transmissible, Margarita’s obligation to pay to the NHA as
stated in contract to sell became transmissible at the time of her death either by
will or operation of law.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects
superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgement as a natural child. And
it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights
which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms part of
the component rights of his inheritance.

The right of action for the acknowledgement of a natural child is, in principle and
without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
9. Riggs vs. Riggs The sufficiency of the attestation by As most men can see, vision is the usual and safest test of presence, but it is not
the witness to the will and codicil of the only test. A man may take note of the presence of another by the other senses
the testator whose sight was such as hearing or touch.
unimpaired, but he could only look
upward as he was incapable of
turning his head as to see what took
place at his side.

10. Jaboneta vs. Test of presence The true test of presence of the testator and the witness in the execution of a will
Gustilo is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have
What test shall we apply in order to seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
determine whether or not the
 witnesses signed the will “in the
presence of the testator and one
another?”
11. Nera vs. Rimando Whether one of the subscribing
witness was present in the small
room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and other
subscribing witnesses attached their
signatures, or whether at the time he
was outside, some eight or ten feet
away, in a large room connecting
with the smaller room by a doorway,
across which was hung a curtain
which made it impossible for one in
the outside room to see the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses
in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument.
12. Icasiano vs. Marginal signatures
Icasiano
13. In re Will of The attestation clause of the will is
Andrada incorporated in the will itself,
constituting the last paragraph
thereof; and its defect consists in the
fact that it does not state the number
of sheets or pages upon which the
will is written.
W/N the defect in the attestation
clause goes into the very essence of
the will itself, and therefore, it should
be disallowed.
14. Cagro vs. Cagro Appellants contend that the will is
fatally defective, because
attestation clause is not signed by
the attesting witnesses. There is no
question that the signatures of the
three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin.
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of the
inscription of each signature.
The court reiterated the doctrine in the case of Jaboneta vs. Castillo in the test of
presence.
The true test of presence of the testator and the witness in the execution of a will
is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have
seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of the
inscription of each signature.
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is
not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
The defect in the attesting clause is fatal.
The law plainly says that the attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, to safeguard the document from the possibility of the interpolation of
additional pages or the omission of some of the pages actually used. Requirement
affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with
therefore it must be considered material.
Appellants are correct.
its
The attestation clause is ‘a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will’ required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be
admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a
 subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.

15. Cruz vs. Villasor The will was attested and subscribed The last will and testament in question was not executed in ac- cordance with law.
by at least three credible witnesses The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered
in the presence of the testator and of as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his
each other, considering that the having signed the will.
three attesting witnesses must
appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the same. As the third
witness is the notary public himself,
petitioner argues that the result is
that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.

16. Cuevas vs. Attestation made by the testator and The attestation clause referred to substantially complies with its requirements. The
Achacoso not the instrumental witnesses only apparent anomaly is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental witness. This apparent anomaly, however,
is not serious nor substantial, as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that
right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three
instrumental witnesses.
17. Dichoso vs. According to the contestant, the when the attestation clause states that the testatrix ‘has published unto us the
Gorostiza attestation clause is fatally defective foregoing will consisting of two pages as her last will and testament, and has
because it fails to state that the signed the same,’ the word ‘same’ signifies the foregoing will consisting of two
testatrix signed every page of the will pages, which necessarily implies the signing by the testatrix of the will and every
as required by law. page thereof.

The attestation clause is legally

sufficient.
18. Merza vs. Porras ATTESTATION CLAUSE - The “Our presence” is enough. In consonance with the principle of liberal
opponent objected that this clause interpretation, adhered to in numerous later decisions of this Court and affirmed
did not state that the testatrix and and translated into enactment in the new Civil Code (Art. 809), we are
the witnesses had signed each and constrained to hold that the attestation clause under consideration is sufficient
every page of the will or that she and valid.
had signed the instrument in the
presence of the witnesses. “in our
presence” = allegedly does not
include testatrix
19. Gan vs. Yap The will itself was not presented, but
the petitioner tried to establish its
due execution and contents by the
testimony of witnesses, who
declared that they had seen the will
and had read its contents. Whether
or not holographic will which is lost
or destroyed may be admitted to
probate upon the testimony of
witnesses regarding its due
execution and contents
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall be required. However, the oppositor may
present other witnesses who also know the testator’s handwriting, or some expert
witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the
deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the
hand of the deceased. And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may
use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will
submitted to it has indeed been written by the
testator.Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition,
and of assessing the evidence are not available.

20. Azoala vs. Singson holographic will of the late Fortunata since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce
S. Vda. de Yance was denied on the more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
ground that under Art. 811 of the contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not
Civil Code, the proponent must be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
present three witnesses who could identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied
declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being
contested; and that the lone witness
presented did not prove sufficiently
that the will was written in the
handwriting of said
testatrix

21. Gonzales vs. CA Petitioner contends that competency that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest
and credibility of a witness are not and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to
synonymous terms and that one be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the
may be a competent witness and instrumental witnesses, must be competent and their testimonies must be credible
yet not a credible one. Therefore, before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.
since there is no evidence on record
to show that the three witnesses are
credible, such as the fact that they
are of good standing in the
community and are reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, such fact is
fatal.
22. Vda. De Molo vs. the will of 1939 contains a
Molo revocatory clause expressly
revoking of will of 1918. The
oppositors contend, among others,
that the will of 1918 cannot be given
effect because there is a
presumption that the testator, after
executing the will of 1939, and with
full knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in said will,
deliberately destroyed and revoked
the original of the will of 1918.
23. Rosario Guevara Facts: Rosario Guevarra is claiming
vs. Ernesto her Legitime as the natural daughter
Guevara of the deceased. The will, which she
kept hidden, was presented to the
court not for the purpose of probate
but for proving her relation to the
deceased. She claims that she is
entitled to inherit via intestate
succession since the will was not
probated. She adds that those
mentioned in the will are not entitled
to the inheritance.
24. Ernesto Guevarra Facts: Ernesto Guevarra claims that
VS Rosario the petition for probate is barred by
Guevarra the statute of limitations considering
that the testator died on September
27, 1933, and that the petition was
filed twelve years later, or, to be
exact, on October 5, 1945.
25. Mercado vs. Facts: Sixteen months after the
Santos allowance of the will, a complaint for
forgery of the probated will was
instituted by the brothers and sisters
of the deceased against the
petitioner. The latter moved to
dismiss claiming that the will alleged
Dependent Relaetive Revocation - where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the effi cacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and
dependent upon the effi cacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails
and the original will remains in full force
Held: if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to
make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the
court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not
disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.
Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public
policy.
Held: In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the
Court below failed to notice that its doctrine was destructive of the right of
testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to control his property
within the legal limits.
the statute of limitations has no application to probate of wills.
Held: The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court
has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of
first instance when that court refuses to grant relief.
 to have been forged had already After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and
been probated and that the order of unappealable, and after the period fixed by law has expired, the law as an
allowance is conclusive as to its due expression of the legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
execution.

26. Gallanosa vs.
Arcangel Facts: A will was probated and
approved.
In 1952, the testator’s legal heirs
instituted an action for the recovery
of the 61 parcels of land on the
ground of acquisitive prescription.
The action was dismissed
In 1967, said legal heirs instituted
another action in the same court
against the testamentary heirs for the
“annulment” of the will and the
recovery of the 61 parcels of land,
alleging that the Gallanosa spouses
caused the execution of the will
through fraud and deceit.
Held: Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court has expired, a
final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for
annulling the judgment is four
years from the discovery of the fraud

Upon motion of defendants, the court

dismissed the action. Plaintiffs fi led
a motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Judge granted it and set
aside the order of dismissal. From
this order of dismissal, defendants
went up to the Supreme Court

27. Macam vs. Facts: The will was admitted to

Gatmaitan probate without any opposition, but Held: The fact a will has been probated, the order allowing the same having
with regard to the codicil, however, become final and executory, is not a bar to the presentation and probate of a
an opposition to its probate was filed. codicil although its existence was known at the time of the probate of the will;

The court ordered the dismissal of the failure of the oppositor to the probate of a codicil to file opposition to the
the petition for the probate of the probate of the will having knowledge of such proceeding, does not constitute an
codicil as well as of the opposition abandonment of a right, nor does it deprive her of the right to oppose the probate
thereto on the ground that since the of said codicil.
allowance of the will had already
 become final and executory, it was
too late to consider the codicil.
28. Coso vs. Testator, married man, had illicit
Fernandez relations with Lopez. In his will, a
sum of money is given to Lopez.
Oppositor claims that the will is
invalid because it was procured by
undue influence.
29. Aznar vs. Duncan Chrisensen died leaving a will,
declaring that he has no living
descendant or ascendant except a
natural daughter Lucy Duncan, and
that bequeathing the amount of
3,600 php to Helen Garcia. The court
declared that Garcia was a natural
child of the testator.
30. Neri vs. Akutin Testator in his will left all his property
to the children of his second
marriage with preterition of the
children by his first marriage.
31. Nuguid vs. Nuguid Rosario died, single, w\o
descendants. Surfing her were her
legitimate parents and 6 brothers
and sisters. In her will, she left all of
her properties to a sister Remedios,
omitting her parents entirely. When
the will was presented for probate,
the parents opposed.he probate
court dismissed the petition holding
that the will is a comp,tee nullify and
will perforce create total intestacy.
32. Crisologo vs. Leona Singson died leaving one half
Singson of a big parcel of land subject to the
condition that upon Consolacion’s
death, whether before or after the
testatrix. One half of the property
shall be delivered to Evaristo,
Manuel and Dionisio or their heirs.
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Lopez, it does
not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his
own.
Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate
a will.
There is no preterition in this case. It is true that there is a total omission of Garcia
n the will, and apparently the rule regarding preterition should be applied. But then,
we must consider the fact that a donation inter vivos is actually given to a
compulsory heir as an advance on his inheritance. That is why in the partition of
the estate of the donor upon the his death, it must be collated and be charged
against the legitimate of such compulsory heir.
Doctrine:The Supreme Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared total
intestacy. See art. 854.
Doctrine: The case is for the probate of will. The court's area of inquiry is limited-
to an examination of and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. Said court
at this stage of the proceeding is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will.
There is a preterition.
Fideicommisary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly either
by giving it such name or by imposing the first heir the absolute obligation to deliver
the inheritance to the second heir.
The testamentary clause under consideration does not call the institution a
fideicommissary substitution nor does it contain a clear statement that
Consolacion enjoys only usufructuary right the naked ownership being vested in
the brothers of the testatrix. Therefore, it only establishes a common substitution.
  E, M, D contend that
Consolacion’s right is only
usufructuary and therefore canno
demand partition of the property.
33. Santos vs.  Maxima Santos Vda. De Blas
Buenaventura died. Her will contained a “no
contest and forfeiture” clause.
Flora Blas de Buenaventura
opposed said will.
34. Villaflor-Villanueva Nicolas Villaflor died left the use and
vs. Juico possession of certain properties to
his wife while alive subject to
condition that she does not remarry
otherwise properties passs to
grandniece Leonor Villaflor.
 Leonor is entitled to the
properties.
35. Edroso vs. Sablan Marcelina Edroso applied for 
registration of the disputed lands.
Paternal uncles of the
deceased opposed it on the
grounds that the lands are
reservable.
36. Chua vs. CFI of
Negros Occidental
 Opposition was made in good faith.
 Floras act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her cases
contributed to the speedy probation of the will.
Since the the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the
defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora’s evidence. Through the
withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix’s wish that her disposition of her
properties under the will be carried out.
 The plain intent of the testator was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or
life tenure in the properties, subject to the further condition that if she
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her lifetime.
 If the testator had intended to impose as sole condition to non-remarriage of
his widow, the words “use and possession while she lives” would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her lifetime.
The ascendant acquires the property with a condition subsequent, to wit:
whether or not there exist, at the time of his death relatives within the third
degree of the descendant in the line whence the property proceeds.
- If such relatives exist – they acquire ownership of the property at the death
of the ascendant.
- If they do not exist – the ascendant can’t freely dispose thereof.
Since the possessor of property subject the conditions subsequent can
alienate and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the property
required by law to be reserved. The acquirer will therefore receive a limited
and revocable right.
 The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does
not give anything in return.
 The transmission of the property in question to JuanitoFrias Chua of the
second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means
of hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
 The obligation of paying Standard Oil Co. is imposed not personally by the
deceased Joe Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the
court.
  As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of
pure generosity, it is gratuitous.
37. Florentino vs. Apolinio II + ----- *Severina +  The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same
Florentino | | as a reservatorio of the reservableproperty is not among the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such a property came.
Apolinio III + Mercedes  Relatives from the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatorios.
 Heirs of Apolinio III are claiming
that they have a reservable right
38. Padura vs. Agustin Padura contracted 2  Reservatorios nephews of the full blood are entitled to a share twice as large
Baldovino marriages as that of the others.
1st wife – one child, Manuel The ReservaTroncal merely determines the group of relatives (Reservatorios) to
. 2nd – Benita wife and 2 children. whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to
the property should be decided by the applicable rules ordinary intestate
 Grandchildren of both marriages succession.
claim property