3 2022 CIVIL LAW - PREWEEKxLMT

SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
RGCT - Bar Operations Center
PRE-WEEK
LAST MINUTE TIPS
CIVIL LAW
CIVIL LAW Subject Members
Joanna Gracia Sarah C. Barcena
Oliver Owen F. Pagdilao
Lexanne O. Garcia
Detlef A. Adanza John Eric A. Espiritu
Subject Chair Steffi Arantxa R. Gianan
Sherry Jane B. Pagay
Jerrane Mae B. Tambis Joanna Marie M. Jose
Assistant Subject Chair Janeian Ishvel C. Labudahon
Manuel Maharlika T. Sales III
Aleksi G. Bolos Hannah Angelica C. Makilan
Subject Electronic Data Processing Rudeemae F. Jovenes
Cedrick C. Cabaluna
Gil Harvey S. Escarcha Isabela Sofia R. Eleazar
Zhaira Diamond M. Fortes Arabella Jianna T. Divino
Geanette V. Catacutan Patricia Nicole C. Ty
Maria Josella C. Aviso Ma. Angelika C. Alvarado
Charisma Lorraine T. Chan Julia Iona I. Balanag
Mary Joy Ann B. Dela Cruz Christine Deah A. Casidsid
Aubrey Joyce B. Razon Karla Marie C. Santos
Abygail A. Tolentino Kreizel Mae D. Bojero
Ray Chen S. Bahinting Patrick Karlo D. Cabañero
Subject Head Mary Bianca M. Parolan
Camille Lyela A. Regala
EDITORS
Rochelle S. Enrile
Chairperson for Academics
Academics Core Members

Mia Carmina Buencamino
Yzzabel Danganan
Ray Robin Ravelas
Jerenel Rendon
William Paul Sale
Gabrielle Anne S. Endona

Vice-Chairperson for
Electronic Data Processing
Electronic Data Processing

Committee Core Members
Micah P. Calip
Roemma Kara G. Palo
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CIVIL LAW
PART I
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE
Effect and Application of Laws 6
Human Relations 6
II. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Persons 7
Marriage 9
Legal Separation 11
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife 11
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife 11
Family Home 13
Paternity and Filiation 14
Adoption 15
Support 17
Parental Authority 18
Emancipation 18
Retroactivity of the Family Code 19
III. SUCCESSION
General Provisions 19
Testamentary Succession 20
Legal and Intestate Succession 19
Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession 32
IV. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Obligations 34
Contracts 37
Natural Obligations 41
Estoppel 41
Trusts 42
Quasi-Contracts 42
V. SALES
Nature and Form 43
Capacity to Buy or Sell 44
Effects of the Contract when the Thing Sold has been Lost 44
Obligations of Vendor 44
Obligations of Vendee 46
Breach of Contract 46
Extinguishment 47
Assignment of Credits 48
VI. LEASE
Rights and Obligations of the Lessor 49
Rights and Obligations of the Lessee 50
VII. PARTNERSHIP 50
Obligations of the Partners 52
Dissolution and Winding Up 53
Limited Partnership
VIII. AGENCY 54
Nature, Form and Kinds 55
Obligations of the Agent 56
Obligations of the Principal 57
Modes of Extinguishment
IX. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (PART I)

Loan 58
Deposit 60
Guaranty and Suretyship 61
Quasi-Contracts 62
X. TORTS AND DAMAGES

Torts 69
Proximate Cause 69
Negligence 69
Damages 71
PART II
I. PROPERTY
Classification of Property 74
Ownership 75
Co-ownership 76
Possession 76
Usufruct 77
Easements 78
Nuisance 80
Modes of Acquiring Ownership 81
Quieting of Title 84
Actions to Recover Property 84
II. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (PART II)

Personal Property Securities (RA 11057) 85
Real Estate Mortgage 86
III. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Torrens System; General Principles 87
Regalian Doctrine 87
Original Registration 88
Certificate of Title 90
Subsequent Registration 90
Non-registrable Properties 92
Dealings with Unregistered Land 92
Assurance Fund 92
Cadastral System of Registration (Act No. 2259, as amended) 93
Registration through Administrative Proceedings (CA 141, as amended) 94
Reconstitution of Titles 94
IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

Demand and Authorization Letters 95
Simple Contracts 96
Complaint 99
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 103

CIVIL LAW
PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE TIPS
PART I
Preliminary Title
Effect and Application of Laws
Under RA 8291 or the “The GSIS Act of 1997,” the employer is mandated to remit the share of the
employer and share of the employee directly to the GSIS within the first 10 days of the calendar month
following the month to which the contributions apply. In view thereof, GSIS issued Resolutions
additionally obligating member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency includes the government
share in the budget, deducts the employee share, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them;
and that the GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. These Resolutions were not published in
a newspaper of general circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register. Are the Resolutions valid?
No, the policies are invalid for lack of publication. The requirements of publication and filing must be strictly
complied with, as these were designed to safeguard against abuses on the part of lawmakers and to guarantee the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. The resolutions cannot be viewed simply as a construction of RA 8291, as they substantially increase
the burden of GSIS members with additional obligations imposed. When an administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law (Manila Public Schools Teachers’ Association v. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, October 2, 2017).
Note: The publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public
of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its
supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement (Cojuangco Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No.
180705, November 27, 2012).
Discuss the nationality principle.

Under the nationality principle, Philippine Laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens when it comes to their
“family rights and duties . . . status, condition and legal capacity” even if they do not reside in the Philippines. In
the same manner, the Philippines respects the national personal laws of aliens and defers to them when it comes
to succession issues and “the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions.” (Gaspi v. Pacis-Trinidad, G.R. No.
229010, November 23, 2020).
Human Relations
Discuss the principle of unjust enrichment.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. For the
principle of unjust enrichment pursuant to Article 22 of the Civil Code to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another (Yon Mitori International Industries
v. Union Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 225538; October 14, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Distinguish Arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.

Art. 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable
tort. It describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Art.
20 or Art. 21. Art. 20, to be actionable, requires a violation of law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the
act have been willful or negligent. Art. 21 only concerns with lawful acts that are contrary to morals, good customs,
and public policy, thus injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law. It requires
San Beda University College of Law 6 RGCT - Bar Operations Center 2022
CIVIL LAW
that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the outcome. In cases
under Art. 21, the legal issues revolve around whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part
of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care required in Art.
19 (St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LMV Construction Corp., G.R. No. 217426, December 04, 2017).
B was the owner of a housing unit. The rights and interests over the same were transferred to X. For
four (4) years, X’s use of the water connection in the name of B was never questioned nor perturbed
until 1999 when, without notice, the water connection of X was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Water District to complain, a certain P told X that she was delinquent for three (3) months. P later told
her that it was at the instance of B that the water line was cut off. X paid the delinquent bill but the
Water District did not immediately reconnect the water line. Has the principle of abuse of rights under
Art. 19 of the Civil Code been violated resulting in damages under Art. 20?
Yes, Art. 19 has been violated resulting in damages under Art. 20. The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in
Art. 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. B’s acts which violated the
aforementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having X’s water supply disconnected, coupled with
her failure to warn or at least notify X of such intention. On the part of the Water District, it is their failure to give
prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect X’s water supply despite
the latter’s settlement of their delinquent account. Thus, X is entitled to moral damages based on the provisions
of Art. 2219, in connection with Arts. 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code (Ardiente v. Sps. Javier, G.R. No. 161921,
July 17, 2013).
Persons And Family Relations
Persons
Distinguish juridical capacity and capacity to act.
Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act
As to Definition
Fitness to be the subject of legal relations (CIVIL Power to do acts with legal effects (CIVIL CODE, Art.
CODE, Art. 37) 37)
As to Acquisition
Inherent in every natural person, and acquired upon Not inherent. It is acquired through the fulfilment of
birth specific legal events/activities
As to Loss
It is lost only through death (in natural person) It may be lost through death and other means or
circumstances
As to Limitation
It cannot be limited or restricted It may be limited or restricted (CIVIL CODE, Art. 38,
and 39)
In relation to the other
Can exist without capacity to act Exists always with juridical capacity
CIVIL LAW
R donated Php1,000,000.00 to the unborn child of his pregnant girlfriend, which she accepted on
behalf of the unborn child. After seven (7) months of pregnancy, the fetus was born and baptized as X.
However, X died 20 hours after birth. R sought to recover the Php1,000,000.00. Is R entitled to recover?
No. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born
if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb (CIVIL CODE, Art. 41). X
is still considered born because he has an intra-uterine life of not less than seven (7) months. Thus, the conceived
child, X, shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it (CIVIL CODE, Art. 40).
Is a legitimate child entitled to use the surname of the mother?

Yes. Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State’s declared policy to ensure the fundamental
equality of women and men before the law, a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as
a last name. The provision states that legitimate children shall “principally” use the surname of the father, but
“principally” does not mean “exclusively.” (Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020).

What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed or corrected without a judicial order?
Entries in a civil register may be changed or corrected without a judicial order with respect to clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it
is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general (RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172,
Sec 1).
Y registered the birth of their illegitimate children without the knowledge and signature of X, his
partner and the mother of the said children. X filed a petition for the cancellation of said birth
certificates on the ground that she had not consented to the registration. Rule on the petition.
The petition for the cancellation of the birth certificates must be granted. Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the
Civil Registry Law, states that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. Thus, it is
mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective
of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by
the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. The mother
must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and
custody of the illegitimate child (In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of Yuhares
Jan Barcelote Tinitigan v. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017).
Is a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code allowed?
No. Arts. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, thus, an action brought exclusively to
declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a
court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor
any status to be established. A court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Arts. 390 and 391 would
be unnecessary as the presumption in the said articles is already established by law (Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R.
No. 230751, April 25, 2018).
X was just seventy-four (74) years old when he disappeared. To this day, eight (8) years later, he is still
not yet found. Can he be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession?
No. After an absence of seven (7) years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten (10) years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-
five years (75), an absence of five (5) years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 390). The five (5)-year rule does not apply because X did not disappear after the age of seventy-five
(75) years, since he was only seventy-four (74) years old at the time he disappeared.
R and L got married. L asked R’s permission to go to Manila for a vacation. For the first three (3) months,
L constantly communicated with R through cellphone. Thereafter, the communication between spouses
R and L ceased altogether. R got information that L was already cohabiting with another man and
would no longer be coming back out of shame. R made several attempts to look for L in various places.
CIVIL LAW
After almost ten (10) years of trying to know about the whereabouts of L from their relatives, R filed a
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death. Should the petition for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death be allowed?
No, the petition for Declaration of Presumptive death should not be allowed. The essential requisites for a
declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage are:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
To be able to comply with the requirement “well-founded belief” that the absentee is dead, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). As to the third requisite, R
failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of the search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have
gone. R also failed to identify which of L’s relatives he had communicated with, and disclose what he learned from
these communications. R also never sought the help of the authorities to locate L in the course of her ten (10)-year
disappearance (Republic v. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Does the reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage’s termination?
No. A close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance
of the absent or presumptively dead spouse is subject to several conditions:
1. The non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio;
2. Recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn
statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
3. Due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
4. The fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No.
187061, October 8, 2014).
Marriage
Discuss the effect of absence, defect or irregularity of the requisites of marriage.

The Family Code provides that marriages lacking any essential or formal requisite are void ab initio (with the
exception of marriages solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages where either or both
parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so), that marriages attended
by a defective essential requisite are voidable, and that marriages attended by an irregularity as to formal requisites
are valid, subject to the potential criminal, civil, or administrative liability of those responsible for the irregularity
(Ado-an-Morimoto v. Morimoto, G.R. No. 247576, March 15, 2021)
What are the requisites of marriage?

The essential requisites of marriage are:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer (FAMILY CODE, Art. 2).
The formal requisites of marriage are:

1. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for marriages exempt from the license requirement;
and
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
CIVIL LAW
presence of not less than two (2) witnesses of legal age (FAMILY CODE, Art. 3).
P was married to T. T was shot by P, resulting in her death. Less than two (2) years after, P and N got
married without any marriage license. P and N executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five (5) years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. P
and T’s children sought to declare the nullity of marriage of P and N, on the ground of absence of a
marriage license. Did the cohabitation of P and N satisfy the requirement under the Family Code to be
exempt from procuring a valid marriage license?
No. The five (5)-year period under Art. 34 of the Family Code should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five (5) years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
five (5)-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five (5) years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse (Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000).
C, a Filipina, married N, a South Korean. After their marriage turned sour, they filed for divorce by
mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed, C filed a Petition for the Judicial
Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. The Republic contended that the divorce decree in question cannot
be recognized in this jurisdiction since it was obtained by mutual agreement, and this fact precludes the
application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, since the language of the provision requires that the
divorce decree be obtained solely by the foreign spouse. Is the contention correct?
No. It is neither required that the divorce decree should be by a judicial decree (Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, G.R. No.
199515, June 25, 2018) nor is it necessary that the divorce decree be obtained solely by the foreign spouse to be
recognized in this jurisdiction. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (1)
there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The second element only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding (Galapon v. Republic, G.R. No.
243722; January 22, 2020, Caguioa Case).
M and J were sweethearts but ended after some time. J dated someone else. By March, M and J reconciled
after J insisted no one touched her. In April, J was one month pregnant which made M doubtful if he
was the father. J ensured M that he was the only one she had sexual intercourse with. Three years
after, M and J got married. Years after, M took a DNA test which showed he is not the father of their
child. This prompted M to file an annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of M was
obtained by fraud in relation to the concealment of J of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband. Will the annulment of marriage prosper?
No. The concealed pregnancy, which vitiates consent, must have existed at the time of the marriage. Thus, if the
wife had previous relations with other men and as a consequence of which she became pregnant or bore a child
previously, the concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the marriage if at the time the marriage was
celebrated the wife was not pregnant. It is the concealment of the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time of
marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. In this case, the child was already almost three years old
when M and J got married. As J was not pregnant at the time of the marriage, any purported fraud she may have
committed to induce Melvin to marry her cannot be considered the fraudulent concealment contemplated under
Article 46 (2) (Republic v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021, Caguioa Case).
Is an expert opinion required for a declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity?
No. So long as the totality of evidence sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity of one or both of the
spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity
nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. The spouse’s personality structure must
make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital
obligations. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted
marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse
(Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021).
CIVIL LAW
LEGAL SEPARATION
W and L have been married for more than 20 years when L filed a complaint for legal separation on the
ground of repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against her and their children. One day,
W hit L on different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her, and asked her to leave the house, which she
did. W contends that L abandoned the family, thus, the complaint for legal separation should be denied
because they have both given grounds for legal separation. Is the contention of W correct?
No. L’s act did not constitute abandonment; so the petition for legal separation should be granted. Following
Article 56 (4) of the Family Code, when both parties have given ground for legal separation, the petition for the
same should be denied. However, as a ground for legal separation, the abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year. The act of L of leaving the house due to
W’s abusive conduct does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the aforementioned provision (Ong v.
Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006).
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
Can courts enforce the obligation of the husband and wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support pursuant to Art. 68 of the Family Code?
No. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. The sanction therefore is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order” to enforce consortium (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ilusorio v.
Ilusorio-Bildner, G.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001). Except for support, the personal obligations of spouses cannot
be enforced by court action.
What are the rights and obligations of the spouses?

The rights and obligations between husband and wife are:
1. Essential marital obligations:
a. Live together which includes consortium (cohabitation) and copulation (sexual intercourse) (Art. 68,
FAMILY CODE);
b. Observe mutual love, respect, fidelity (Art. 68, FAMILY CODE); and
c. Render mutual help and support (Art. 68, FAMILY CODE);
d. Fix the family domicile (Art. 69, FAMILY CODE);
e. Jointly support the family (Art. 70, FAMILY CODE);
f. Manage the household (Art. 71, FAMILY CODE);
g. Not to neglect duties, or commit acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor, or injury to the family
(Art. 72, FAMILY CODE); and
h. Either spouse may practice any legitimate profession/business, even without the consent of the other
(Art. 73, FAMILY CODE). The other spouse may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds.
2. Other obligations of spouses include:

a. Exercise the duties and enjoy the rights of parents (Art. 209, FAMILY CODE);
b. Answer for civil liability arising from injuries caused by children below 21 (Art. 2180, par. 2, CIVIL
CODE; and RA 6809); and
c. Exercise parental authority over children’s property (Art. 225, FAMILY CODE).
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
Can a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced enter into a marriage
settlement?
Yes, provided that a guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party to the marriage settlement. For
the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
CIVIL LAW
competent court to be made a party thereto (FAMILY CODE, Art. 79).
What are donations propter nuptias?

Donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one OR both of the future spouses (FAMILY CODE, Art. 82).
H and W donated to each other one-fifth of their present property in their marriage settlements, which
provided for a regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Is the entire donation valid?
Yes, the entire donation is valid. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community
of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void. While the regime agreed upon is one other than the absolute
community of property, there was no excess over the one-fifth threshold (FAMILY CODE, Art. 82).
Spouses H and W agreed upon a property regime of absolute community property, with the exception
that community property shall exclude all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, and that their property relations would commence from the time a child is
born. They married in 2001. Is the entire agreement valid?
No. The stipulation that their property relations would commence from the time a child is born is void. The
stipulation that community property shall exclude all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage is valid. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the
precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the
community regime at any other time shall be void. Unless otherwise provided in the Chapter on the System of
Absolute Community of the Family Code or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of
all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter (CIVIL
CODE, Arts. 88, and 91).
Does separation from bed and board at the time of the supposed sale of a conjugal property exempt the
disposition by the spouse from the requirement of obtaining the other spouse’s consent?
No, the fact that the husband and wife were separated from bed and board (a mensa et thoro) at the time of the
supposed sale of the conjugal property by one of the spouses to a third person did not exempt the disposition from
the requirement of obtaining the other spouse’s consent under Article 116 of the Family Code (Spouses Anastacio,
Sr. v. Heirs of Coloma, G.R. No. 224572; August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Is it necessary to prove that the property was acquired with conjugal funds in order for the presumption
that all properties acquired during the marriage to apply?
No. It is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Once the condition sine qua
non that the property was acquired during the marriage is established, then the presumption that all properties
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal, remains until the contrary is proved (Spouses Anastacio, Sr. v.
Heirs of Coloma, G.R. No. 224572; August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the effects of alienations or encumbrances by one spouse without the consent of the other under
the Civil Code, and under the Family Code.
Art. 166, when read in relation to Art. 173 of the Civil Code, leads to the inescapable conclusion that a contract
disposing or encumbering conjugal real property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. Arts.
96 and 124 of Family Code now expressly declares that alienations or encumbrances of community or conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse are null and void However, there is a special nature of these void
transactions under the Family Code, as this can become binding contracts upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the continuing offers are withdrawn by either or both spouses (Spouses Cueno
v. Spouses Bautista, G.R. No. 246445; March 2, 2021, Caguioa Case).
The late T had married twice and begot children from the first marriage with A (Heirs of T). The first
marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, while the second marriage with B
took place during its effectivity. After the death of A, and while married to B, T entered into a contract
of sale with the late C wherein he sold the property in his first marriage without the consent of the
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second wife. Is the sale valid?

Yes, the sale is valid, but only insofar as his undivided share is concerned. Under Article 130 of the Family Code,
a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without liquidating the conjugal partnership
property. Under said regime, each spouse owns the property which he or she brings to the marriage or which he or
she may acquire during the marriage by onerous or gratuitous title. Furthermore, Article 145 of the Family Code
states that each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without
need of the consent of the other. As far as the subject conjugal property is concerned, one-half undivided interest
therein pertained to T as his conjugal share, and the other half, which was A’s share, pertained to her legal heirs.
Thus, the subject property was co-owned by T and the legal heirs. Pending liquidation of the co-owned property,
the alienations of the parties or co-owners must be considered limited to their respective undivided interests, and
cannot involve any particular property or physical part of it. Thus, he could have disposed of this without the need
of anyone’s consent, not even from the spouse (Heirs of Caburnay v. Heirs of Sison, G.R. No. 230934; December 2,
2020, Caguioa Case).
Can a husband dispose his share in the property under special co-ownership created by virtue of Article
147 of the Family Code without the consent of the wife?
No, the disposition is void. In an ordinary co-ownership, a co-owner may validly alienate or encumber his
undivided share in the common property without the consent of the other co-owners. However, in the special
co-ownership between parties living together as husband and wife, Article 147 creates an exception, such that as
long as the cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition inter vivos of such undivided share can
be validly made by one party without the consent of the other. This prohibition against a spouse to donate any
absolute community property or conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other spouse equally
applies to common-law relations or cohabitations of a man and a woman without a valid marriage or under a void
marriage (Perez, Jr. v. Perez-Senerpida, G.R. No. 233365; March 24, 2021, Caguioa Case).
Is it necessary that there be proof of actual contribution by both live-in partners who are incapacitated
to marry each other before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution?
Yes. A reading of Article 148 of the Family Code readily shows that there must be proof of “actual joint contribution”
by both live-in partners who are incapacitated to marry each other before the property becomes co-owned by them
in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of
proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first.
Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004).
Family Home
Is a minor entitled to the continued use and non-partition of a family home despite the death of the
head of the family who constituted the same?
Yes, provided the following requisites concur:
1. The relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
2. They live in the family home, and
3. They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family (Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829,
November 20, 2006).
Note: Art. 154 provides that the beneficiaries of a family home are:
1. The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
2. Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support.
Do the beneficiaries of the family home include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home?
Yes. The term “descendants” under Art. 154 of the Family Code contemplates all descendants of the person or
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persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren
and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos (Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006).
Paternity and Filiation
What are the grounds to impugn the legitimacy of a child?

Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a. The physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b. The fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
c. Serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
2. That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance of children conceived as a result of artificial insemination; or
3. That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence (FAMILY
CODE, Art. 166, and 164).
H and W have been married for twenty (20) years without children. Desirous to have a baby, they
consulted Dr. Z, a prominent medical specialist on human fertility. He advised W to undergo artificial
insemination. It was found that H’s sperm count was inadequate to induce pregnancy. Hence, the couple
looked for a willing donor. A, the brother of H, readily consented to donate his sperm. After a series of
test, A’s sperm was medically introduced into W’s ovary. She became pregnant and 9 months later, gave
birth to a baby boy, named J. Is J the legitimate son of H?
Yes, provided the following are present:
1. The artificial insemination has been authorized or ratified by the spouses in a written instrument executed
and signed by them before the birth of the child; and
2. The written instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child
(FAMILY CODE, Art. 164, par. 2).
What are the instances when the right to file an action to claim legitimate filiation under Art. 173 of the
Family Code passes to the child’s heirs?
The only three instances when the right to file an action to claim legitimate filiation under Art. 173 of the Family
Code passes to the child’s heirs are:
1. When the child dies during minority;
2. When the child dies in a state of insanity; or
3. When the child dies after the commencement of the action (Bernardo v. Fernando, G.R. Nos. 211034 &
211076; November 18, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the rules with respect to a signature in private handwritten instruments acknowledging filiation?
The rules with respect to a signature in private handwritten instruments acknowledging filiation are as follows:
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence (Dela Cruz v. Garcia, G.R. No.
177728, July 31, 2009).
W, X and Y all claimed to be children of the late A, who left properties in the possession of her legitimate
daughter Z. Upon the death of A, they (W, X and Y) filed for judicial partition of the properties
before the RTC, arguing that during A’s lifetime, A acknowledged all of them as her children directly,
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continuously, spontaneously, and without concealment, and that in the absence of any record of birth
in the civil register, filiation may be established on admission of filiation in a public or handwritten
document. Will their petition prosper?
No, the petition will not prosper. Any action seeking to prove filiation sought under the second paragraph of Art.
172 of the Family Code must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. After the death of a putative
parent, the Family Code provides that the person seeking to establish illegitimate filiation must present either a
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. Thus,
after A’s death, W, X and Y could no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate
filiation to A (Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017).
When may illegitimate children use the surname of their father?

Illegitimate children may use the surname of their father:
1. If their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or
2. When an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 176).
Note: Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children
(Grande vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).
A has a child named C who was born from a previous relationship. A then met B and during their
relationship, A bore two more children namely, D and E. To legalize their relationship, A and B married
and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including C, was amended to change their civil
status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. A and B’s relationship turned sour, lived separately
and thereafter, A filed against B a claim for support of C. Will the case prosper?
Yes, the case will prosper because B is estopped from claiming that C is not his child. While C is not B’s biological
child, he was legitimated under the latter’s name. Like D and E, C is entitled to receive support from B. Art.
178 states that “legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.” Since B is not C’s
biological father, it was improper to have C legitimated after the celebration of B and A’s marriage. B voluntarily
but falsely acknowledged C as his son. Art. 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. The principle of estoppel now bars B from making an assertion contrary to his previous
representations. C remains to be B’s son, and pursuant to Art. 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to
the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support (BBB v. AAA, G.R. No.
193225, February 9, 2015).
Note: This is without prejudice to the filing of a direct action to impugn the legitimacy of C.
Adoption
Note: The 2022 Bar Examination Civil Law Syllabus does not include RA 11642, otherwise known as the
Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, which was signed into law on January 6,
2022, and took effect on January 28, 2022 – beyond the 2022 Bar Exam coverage period. The said law amended
RA 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act) and repealed RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act).
Domestic Adoption (RA 8552)
J and R are married and have a daughter. However, they were living separately due to incompatibility
issues. J filed a petition for adoption of A and B alleging that they were his illegitimate children with L.
The petition was granted. R, together with her daughter, filed a petition for annulment of the decision
approving the adoption as they were not given notice by the trial court of the adoption. Will R’s
petition prosper?
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Yes, R’s petition will prosper. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The
law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. In this case, in the absence of any decree of legal separation
or annulment, J and R remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For J to be eligible to adopt A
and B, R must first signify her consent to the adoption (Castro v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014).
Note: The same rule applies under RA 11642.
Who may be adopted under RA 8552?

The following may be adopted under RA 8552:
1. A child who has been certified by the DSWD as legally available for adoption. The certification shall be,
for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic adoption
proceeding, as provided in RA 8552;
2. Legitimate child of the other spouse;
3. Illegitimate child of a qualified adopter to improve the child’s status;
4. A person of legal age, who, prior to the adoption, has been consistently considered by the adopter as his/
her own child since minority;
5. Child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; and
6. Child whose biological or adoptive parents have died provided that no proceedings shall be initiated within
6 months from the time of death of said parents (RA 8552, Sec. 8; RA 9523, Secs. 8 and 11).
Note: Under RA 11642, the following may be adopted:

1. Any child who has been issued a Certificate Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption;
2. The legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse;
3. An illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve status of legitimacy;
4. A Filipino of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by
the adopters as their own child for a period of at least three (3) years;
5. A foster child;
6. A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded;
7. A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated
within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents; or
8. A relative of the adopter.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name?
Yes, the illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use the surname of her natural mother as the
middle name. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. Being a
legitimate child by virtue of adoption, it follows that the adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of his/her father
and mother (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005).
May the adopted person ask for the rescission of the adoption?
Yes, the adopted person can ask for rescission of adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of
the DSWD if a minor or if over 18 years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopters:
1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter/s despite having undergone counseling;
2. Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3. Sexual assault or violence; or
4. Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations (RA 8552, Sec. 19).
Note: The same rule should apply under RA 11642. While RA 8552 uses the term “sexual assault” and RA 11642
uses the term “sexual abuse,” sexual assault may fall under failure to comply with parental obligations.
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Inter-country Adoption (RA 8043)
When may a child be matched to a foreign adoptive family?

No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it can be satisfactorily shown that the child cannot
be adopted locally (RA 8043, Sec. 11).
Who may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child?

An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a
Filipino child if he/she:
1. Is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at
the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse
of such parent;
2. If married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
3. Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country;
4. Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
6. Is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example
to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
7. Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions
of this Act;
8. Comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government
maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national
laws; and
9. Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws (RA 8043, Sec. 9).
Note: Where both adopters are Americans/aliens who have resided in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous
years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, their petition for adoption may be brought under RA 8552,
Sec. 7(b) and not RA 8043 (Sps. Lee v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019).
Who may be adopted under RA 8043?

A child who has been certified by the DSWD as legally available for adoption. The certification shall be, for all
intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in an inter-country adoption proceeding
as provided in RA 8043 (RA 9523, Secs. 8 and 11).
Support
May an action for support resolve an issue of paternity?

Yes, an action for support may resolve an ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought
before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial
intervention to do so. Filiation proceedings need not be separately instituted first to ascertain the minor child’s
paternity before a complaint for support could be filed. The direct filing of an action for support, where the issue
of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved (Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017).
A and B were married and were blessed with three (3) children. The relationship went sour and A
decided to leave the conjugal home taking their children with her. Subsequently, A filed a petition
claiming support from B. However, B only claims to be able to afford P6,000 in support, which is
insufficient. The trial court decided in favor of A and ruled that B’s parents will be jointly responsible
for the support of A and B’s children. Is the trial court’s decision correct?
Yes, the decision of the trial court is correct. Following Art. 199 of the Family Code, grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. In this case, the support B can provide is clearly insufficient, hence his parents can be held jointly
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liable. Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of
the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee’s lifetime.
Also, while parental authority and the correlative parental rights pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only
upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support (Spouses Lim v. Lim, G.R. No.
163209, October 30, 2009).
Parental Authority
During an enrolment campaign conducted by the students in SM School, some high school students
boarded a jeep owned by V, driven by J who is a minor. J drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result, the jeep turned turtle. Student S died as a result of the accident. The parents of S filed a case
against the school. During the trial, the evidence points the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep as the cause of the accident. Is the school liable?
No, the school is not liable. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for the damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, to be
liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury. In this case, the school cannot be held liable because the accident was not shown to be due to the negligence
of the school but rather the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The negligence of the school was
only a remote cause of the accident (St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002).
Note: The special parental authority and responsibility under Article 218 of the Family Code applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the
school or its teachers (Id.).
On 10 December 1981, spouses S and F filed a petition to adopt A, a minor. During the pendency of
the petition for adoption, spouses S and F went to the US. On 20 October 1982, A shot J with an air
rifle which resulted to the latter’s death. The parents of J filed a civil complaint for damages against
the natural parents of A, spouses V and C, with whom A was living with at the time of the incident.
The petition for adoption was granted on 18 November 1982. The natural parents of A, spouses V and
C, contend that they are free of parental authority for A’s conduct, because by virtue of the decree of
adoption in favor of the spouses S and F, the parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
latter which would cover the time A had shot J. Is the contention of spouses V and C tenable?
No, the contention of spouses V and C is untenable. Art. 221 of the Family Code requires that the child, doer of
the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage.
Moreover, the parental authority is not properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, spouses S and F, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. The retroactive effect may not
be given so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had
no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. In the instant case, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in spouses S and F so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable (Tamargo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992).
Emancipation
When does majority commence and what is the effect thereof?

Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen (18) years (FAMILY CODE, as amended
by RA 6809, Art. 234).
What is the effect of the attainment of majority?

Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over
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the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. Contracting marriage, however, shall require parental
consent until the age of 21. Furthermore, nothing in the Family Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty
or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below 21 years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code (FAMILY CODE Arts. 234 and 236, as amended by RA
6809).
Retroactivity of the Family Code
Should the Family Code be given retroactive effect?

Yes. The Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws (Art. 256, FAMILY CODE).
Succession
General Provisions
The Heirs of Y filed a complaint for the “return” of the ownership and possession of Lots 1 and 2
against A, B and C. During the pendency of said case, A sold Lots 1-A, 1-B (divisions of Lot 1) to S.
A died thereafter. The Court, finding that S was a buyer in good faith, declared that the Heirs of Y
should recover the actual value of the land because the sale executed between A and S was without court
approval. The Heirs of A now contend that the liability arising from the sale should be the sole liability
of A’s estate since they did not inherit the particular property involved in the case. Is the contention
correct?
No, the contention is not correct as the liability should still be shouldered by the heirs. Art. 774 of the Civil Code
provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law. Art. 776 further provides that the inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. Even if Heirs of A did not inherit the property
involved herein, by legal fiction the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father’s hereditary
estate, and that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It
must, however, be made clear that they are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance (Alvarez v. IAC,
G.R. No. L-68053, May 7, 1990).
When are the rights of succession transmitted?

The rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of
the Civil Code. The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent’s death — the transmission
by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or
partition, or distribution (Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, Caguioa Case).
By virtue of A’s will, i.e., Huling Habilin, R inherited a parcel of land (subject property) as the designated
devisee. R sold her interest over the subject property in favor of the Sps. I and C, who then proceeded
to take physical possession of the subject property. Subsequently, the Probate Court approved probate
of the Huling Habilin and issued a Certificate of Allowance. There is no showing that, in the pendency
of the settlement of the Estate of A, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an
order in anticipation of a final distribution. Later, Sps. I and C received a demand letter requiring them
to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it to the Heirs of R.
a. Is there a legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after the death of the
decedent?
No, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after the death of the decedent.
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and,
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therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in
the inheritance, “and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.” A sale made by a legal
or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance does not interfere with the administration of the estate. In this
case, upon the death of A, R became the absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory
condition that upon settlement of A’s Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive (Spouses Salitico v.
Heirs of Felix, G.R. No. 240199; April 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
b. Can the transferee in this case already compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the
specific property in his/her name?
No, the transferee in this case cannot yet compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the specific
property in his/her name. Reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with Sections 91 and of PD 1529 and
Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/
her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by
the testate or intestate court must first be had. Here, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between R and
the Sps. I and C, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT in favor of
the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an
order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to
cancel OCT and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the Sps. I and C (Spouses Salitico v. Heirs of Felix, G.R.
No. 240199; April 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Testamentary Succession
What are the formalities of a will?

a. Common Formalities
1. It must be in writing; and
2. It must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
b. Notarial Will (SAMPAA)

1. Subscription – Subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by testator’s name written by some
other person in his presence and by his express direction;
2. Attested and subscribed by 3 or more credible Witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another;
3. Marginal signature –All of the pages are signed, except the last, on the left margin by:
i. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name; and
ii. The instrumental witness;
4. Page numbering – All the pages are numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page;
5. Attestation clause executed by the witnesses showing:
i. The number of pages used;
ii. The fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof or caused some other person to write his
name under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses; and
iii. That the instrumental witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all the pages in the presence of the
testator and of one another
6. Acknowledgment – Properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the said witnesses
c. Holographic Will
1. It must be entirely written by the hand of the testator himself;
2. It must be entirely dated by the hand of the testator himself; and
3. It must be signed by the hand of the testator himself.
d. Special Cases
1. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he
shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents
thereof.
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2. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and
again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
Related Jurisprudence on Formalities of Notarial Wills
Executed Will Status Reason
Subscription
Will subscribed by the Valid The requirement of the statute that the will shall be “signed” is
thumbmark of the testator satisfied not only the customary written signature but also by
the testator’s or testatrix’ thumbmark (Dolar v. Diancin, G.R.
No. L-33365, December 20, 1930)
Will subscribed by two Valid If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of
different persons: first the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then
name by the testator while certainly the writing of a portion or all of the testator’s name
surname by another person ought to be accepted as a clear indication of his/her intention
to execute the will, as in this case where the name and surname
have been written by different persons (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca
Kuan, G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914).
Marginal Signatures
Will consists only of two Valid In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be
pages: signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in
the presence of each other, the law evidently has for its object
1st page contains the to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing
dispositions of the the testator’s dispositions. But when these dispositions are
testator, duly signed by her wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the
representative (in the name testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin
and under the direction of of said sheet would be completely purposeless (Abangan v.
the testator) and the three Abangan, G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919).
witnesses
2nd page contains only the

attestation clause duly
signed by the three witnesses
Neither page is signed on

the left-hand margin by the
testator
Marginal signatures Valid Art. 805 which requires that every page, except the last, must be
appeared on the right signed at the left margin is complied with even if done on the
instead of left right margin. This is because the mode of signing adopted every
page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded
from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would
have been protected by being signed in the left margin (Avera v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 15566, September 14, 1921).
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Page Numbering
Will paged with Arabic Valid While the law requires that the will must be paged with letters,
numerals and not letters paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, is within the
spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters (Nayve
v. Mojal, G.R. No. L-21755, December 29, 1924).
Will consists of only two Valid The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by
pages, but the 1st sheet is the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the
not paged in either letters or contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence,
Arabic numerals the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the
attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding
page. As page two contains only the two lines above mentioned,
the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures
of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be
taken for other than page one (Lopez v. Liboro G.R. No. L-1787,
August 27, 1948).
ATTESTATION BY WITNESSES
Will signed by the witness Void An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act
on the left-hand margin but of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the
no signatures appear after bottom thereof negatives their participation (Cagro v. Cagro,
the attestation clause G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953).
The will was signed in this Valid The testator and the witnesses need not actually see each other
manner: signing. It is sufficient that they were in such position that
they could have seen each other sign if they choose to do so,
The three witnesses and the and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so
testator were all together (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 1641, January 19, 1906). This is
when the testator signed the called the test of presence.
will. Afterwards, Witness A
signed, again in the presence
of all. Witness B also signed
in the same manner. At that
moment Witness A being in
a hurry to leave, took his hat
and left the room. As he was
leaving the house Witness C
took the pen in his hand and
put himself in position to
sign the will as a witness, but
did not sign in the presence
of Witness A
ATTESTATION CLAUSE
The attestation clause Valid If the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used,
failed to state the number the will is not valid unless the number of pages is stated in the
of pages but the number will itself or in the acknowledgment (Taboada v. Rosal, G.R.
of pages is mentioned in No. L-36033, November 5, 1982).
the acknowledgement or in
other parts of the will
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The attestation clause failed Void That the will actually consists of 8 pages including its
to state the number of pages acknowledgment, such discrepancy cannot be explained by
but there is a statement mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation
in the Acknowledgment of evidence aliunde (In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate
portion that it “consists of of the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez Richard B.
7 pages including the page Lopez v. Lopez et.al., G.R. No. 189984, November,12, 2012).
on which the ratification
and acknowledgment are
written”.
The will actually consists

of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment.
The attestation clause failed Void Failure to state or specifically declare that the witnesses had
to state that the witnesses witnessed the due execution of a will, there being no possible
had witnessed the due way to prove such by the face of the will, is fatal to the validity
execution of a will of the latter (Caneda v. CA, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993).
The attestation clause failed Valid Failure to state the number of witnesses may be established
to state the number of by the number of signatures in the will itself (Testate Estate of
witnesses Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The notary public signed Void The notary public cannot be a third instrumental witness
the will himself as the third since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed
instrumental witness and the will. The act of acknowledgement means admission or
acknowledged the same assent, and before means in front or preceding in space ahead
of. Consequently, he cannot admit his having signed the will
before himself, since he cannot split his personality into two
and the inconsistency of his duties as a lawyer and his personal
act (Cruz v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973).
The will was notarized Void A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts within
outside the territorial his territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
jurisdiction of the notary commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial
public act, hence not a competent officer (Guerrero v. Bihis, G.R. No.
174144, April 17, 2007).
Is it sufficient that the signature of the testator is merely a cross?

No. If the signature is only a mere cross, without any proof that it is the usual signature of the testator or at least
one of the ways by which he signed his name, it is not a sufficient signature, because a mere cross cannot and does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark (Garcia v. Lacuesta, G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951).
In a petition for probate of a will, oppositor A moved for the dismissal of the petition alleging that the
will is void for non-compliance with the formalities required by the law, particularly, the last page of
the will which contained only the Acknowledgment that was not signed by any of the instrumental
witnesses and by the testator. He also alleges that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages
in the will, although admittedly it is in the acknowledgment. Are the grounds for dismissal tenable?
No, the grounds for dismissal are not tenable. The signature on the last page which does not contain testamentary
disposition is not essential for the validity of the will. When Art. 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to
subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary
disposition ends. In this case, the last page of the will contained only the Acknowledgment. Hence, the last page
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of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
Also, in Taboada v. Rosal, the probate of a will was allowed notwithstanding that the number of pages was stated
not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite
the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. Consequently, the
motion for dismissal must be denied (Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018).
A, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained unmarried and devoted
all her time to taking care of her nephew and two (2) nieces: B, C and D. She wrote a will giving all her
properties remaining upon her death to the three (3) of them. The will was admitted to probate during
her lifetime. Later, she decided to make a new will giving all her remaining properties only to the two (2)
girls, C and D. She then tore up the previously probated will. The second will was presented for probate
only after her death. However, the probate court found the second will to be void for failure to comply
with formal requirements. (2018 Bar)
a. Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply?

Yes, the doctrine will apply. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies if a testator revokes a will with a
present intention of making a new one immediately and as a substitute, and the new one is not made, or, if made,
fails of effect for any reason, it will be presumed that the testator preferred the old will to intestacy, and the old
one will be admitted to probate in the absence of evidence overcoming the presumption, provided its contents
can be ascertained. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will
(Testate Estate of the Deceased Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951). Here: 1) the first will for the
nephew and nieces was revoked by tearing, 2) a new will was made, and 3) the new will failed to comply with formal
requirements which makes it invalid. Hence, the doctrine falls squarely on the facts.
b. Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid but both C and D renounce
their inheritance?
No, my answer will not be the same. The doctrine will not apply anymore. For the doctrine to apply, a substitute
will must be intended to be made but is actually not made, or, if made, fails of effect for any reason. It must be
noted that in Art. 841 of the Civil Code, a will is still valid even though it should not contain an institution of an
heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not
accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. Here, the will was valid according to the formalities
prescribed by the law but the heirs did not accept the inheritance.
In a petition for probate of a will filed by M, the testator named and appointed M as his sole and
only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to W
by whom he had two legitimate children, A and B, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with M as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952,
the testator and M married. The testator devised some properties to his forced heirs, his legal wife and
his children. While his entire estate and the free portion thereof to M. The RTC, while declaring the
will validly drawn as to formalities, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of M and invalidated it. Did the court act in excess of its jurisdiction?
No, in this case, the court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will. As a general rule, the testator’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
that should be presented for the resolution of the court for probate proceedings. However, when on the face of
the will, it is invalid as when separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous, then it could pass upon that issue. Here, the very wordings of the will invalidate
the provisions because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage (Nepomuceno v. CA, G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985).
Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special proceeding a
prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement of ownership rights
given by the law of succession?
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No. No judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property
of the deceased. Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the
determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare
the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration
of their status as such (Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, Caguioa Case).
A died in 1962, single and without descendants. Surviving were her parents, X and Y and siblings, B, C,
D, E and F. F then filed a petition for probate of the will of A which instituted her as universal heir of
the deceased. X and Y opposed the petition on the ground that X and Y who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution
is void. The court then declared that the will is invalid. Is the will valid?
No, the will is invalid. Under Art. 854 of the Civil Code, the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. The will herein is invalid because the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without
any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. While
Art. 854 merely nullifies “the institution of heir” and declares that legacies and devises are valid, there must be, in
addition to such institution of universal heir, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart
and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Considering that the will in this case solely provides for the
institution of F as universal heir, and nothing more, the entire will is null (Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445,
June 23, 1966).
A, single, named his sister B in his will as a devisee of a parcel of land which he owned. The will imposed
upon B the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it, upon her death, to her illegitimate
daughter C who was then only one year old. A later died, leaving behind his D mother, B and C.
a. Is the condition imposed upon B, to preserve the property and to transmit it upon her death to C,
valid?
Yes, it is valid. Art. 863 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the imposition of an obligation to preserve and
transmit the property by the first heir to a second heir shall be valid, provided that substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second
heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. In the instant case, the daughter C is admittedly one degree
from B, and it is also implied from the facts that B and C were both living at the time of the death of the testator.
Hence, the condition is valid.
b. If C predeceases B, who inherits the property?

The heirs of C inherit the property. In a fideicommissary substitution, the second heir inherits not from the first
heir but from the testator (Perez v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 31703, February 13, 1930). This means that his right is
not dependent on the first heir, but upon the death of the testator. As provided in Art. 866 of the Civil Code, the
second heir shall acquire a right to the succession from the time of the testator’s death, even though he should die
before the fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass to his heirs. Consequently, even if C predeceases the first
heir B, her right shall devolve upon her legal heirs.
c. If B predeceases A, can C inherit the property directly from Raymond? (2008 Bar)
Yes, C can inherit the property. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first and the second heirs inherit from the
testator, hence, both should be qualified to inherit from the testator at the time of his death. It has been consistently
held that the fideicommissarius is entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since she is to inherit from
the latter and not from the fiduciary (Perez v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930). Since the
fiduciary already died, the fideicommissarius is now entitled to full enjoyment of the property inherited from A.
Is the substitute always subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted heir
when the testator has not expressly provided the contrary?
No. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted heir, unless the
testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the heir
instituted (CIVIL CODE, Art. 875). Thus, when the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the
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heir instituted, the substitute shall not be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted
heir.
What is the effect of a disposición captatoria?

Any disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make some provision in his will in favor of the testator
or of any other person shall be void (CIVIL CODE, Art. 875).
Discuss the effect of a modal institution.

The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge
imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which
has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security
for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together
with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation (CIVIL CODE, Art. 882). A modal
institution is one which imposes on the legatee or devisee a prestation (Applying the case of Camarines Sur Teachers
and Employees Association, Inc. v. Province of Camarines Sur, G.R. No. 199666, October 7, 2019, Caguioa Case)
When must the condition imposed on an instituted heir be fulfilled?

The rules on the fulfillment of such condition are as follows:
1. Any purely potestative condition imposed upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as soon as he learns of
the testator’s death, except when the condition, already complied with, cannot be fulfilled again (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 876);
2. If the potestative condition imposed upon the heir is negative, or consists in not doing, the heir, legatee or
devisee acquires his right as a matter of course without any limitation other than not doing or not giving
something. However, in order that such heir, legatee or devisee shall not perform or give that which is
prohibited, he is required to give a bond or security known as “caucion muciana” (CIVIL CODE, Art.
879); or
3. If the condition is casual or mixed, it shall be sufficient if it happens or be fulfilled at any time before or after
the death of the testator, unless he has provided otherwise. Should it have existed or should it have been
fulfilled at the time the will was executed and the testator was unaware thereof, it shall be deemed complied
with. If he had knowledge thereof, the condition shall be considered fulfilled only when it is of such nature
that it can no longer exist or be complied with again (CIVIL CODE, Art. 877).
What is a legitime?
Legitime is that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs (CIVIL CODE, Art. 886).
Who are the persons involved in reserva troncal?

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
2. The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
3. The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation
of law; and
4. The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the
(linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor (Mendoza v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013).
P and D had four (4) children: A, E (married to L), O and V. A1 and A2 are children of A while V1 and
V2 are children of V. After the death of P and D, their three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated to E.
After the death of E, the properties passed to his surviving spouse L, and daughter G. After L’s death, her
share went to G. Thereafter, G died intestate without any issue. After G’s death, J (L’s sister), adjudicated
unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of L and G. Hence, the children of A and V
claim that the properties should have been reserved by J in their behalf and must now revert back to
them, applying Art. 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. Decide.
There is no reserva troncal in this case. Art. 891 of the Civil Code provides that the ascendant who inherits from
his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
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of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. Properties
in dispute were owned by E (ascendant). After his death, G (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance. The person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/
reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. J, however, is not G’s ascendant; rather, she is G’s collateral relative.
Further, the children of A and V cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of G from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is
the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom
the property last revolved by descent. It is G in this case. The children of A and V are G’s fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins, and are not reservees or reservatarios. Therefore, while it may appear that the properties
are reservable in character, the children of A and V cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because J, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Art. 891 of and second, because
the children of A and V are not G’s relatives within the third degree (Mendoza v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 176422,
March 20, 2013).
A, B, and C were the surviving heirs of the late P who died intestate. Before his death, P had properties
in Rizal which was almost 50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential and agricultural
purposes, and another property in Romblon. A allegedly discovered that through manipulation and
misrepresentation, respondents D (son of deceased C) and C were able to secure two (2) free patents
over two lots in Romblon. As a consequence, A instituted a petition for Cancellation and Recall of the
Free Patent Applications and Reconveyance. She claimed that there was preterition by virtue of the
Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate confirming partition executed by P years prior
to his death, and that the disputed two lots pertained to P’s inheritance, he had only three legal heirs
and he left A with no share in the two lots. Was A preterited?
No. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of a compulsory heir in the direct line or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heir
nor expressly disinherited. In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted.
Perfecto left no will. Under Article 854, the presence of a will is necessary. A could not have been totally excluded
in the inheritance of P even if she was not allegedly given any share in the disputed two lots. If Araceli’s share
in the inheritance of P as claimed by her was indeed impaired, she could have instituted an action for partition
or a settlement of estate proceedings instead of her complaint for cancellation of free patent and reconveyance
(Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197; January 10, 2018, Caguioa Case).
P, widower, has three daughters A, B and C. He executes a will disinheriting A because she married a man
he did not like, and instituting daughters B and C as his heirs to his entire estate of Php1,000,000.00.
Upon P’s death, how should his estate be divided? (2000 Bar)
The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother (CIVIL CODE, Art. 888). In conjunction with this, Art. 918 of the Civil Code provides that
disinheritance which is not one of those set forth in the Civil Code shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as
it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be
valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. In this case, marrying a man the father does not like is not a
ground for disinheritance provided under Art. 919. The estate shall then be divided as follows:
1. Legitime – Php500,000.00 for A, B and C.
2. Free portion – since the legitime of A was satisfied, the free portion shall belong to B and C which is
Php500,000.00.
What is the effect of ineffective or imperfect disinheritance?

In cases where there is no cause expressly stated; the cause was denied by the heir concerned and not proved by
the instituted heir (no true cause); the cause was not given in the law (no legal cause); or there was subsequent
reconciliation between the offended and offender, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent
as will not impair the legitime (CIVIL CODE, Art. 918). Otherwise steted, in disinheritance, the nullity is limited
to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived (Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R.
No. L-23445, June 23, 1966). Thus, the institution remains valid, but must be reduced insofar as the legitime has
been impaired.
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J died rich. Prior to his death, however, he executed a will. In the said will, he disinherited his son, R,
based on the following acts:
1. He disdained his honor in front of the members of the family;
2. Besmirched his honor and reputation in the business community as he refused to settle his loan
with a bank where he was a valuable client; and
3. Stole his business from him.
a. Do the acts constitute a valid ground for disinheritance?

Yes. Under Article 919 of the Civil Code, one of the grounds for disinheritance is the maltreatment of the testator
by word or deed, by the child or descendant. In the case at bar, the incidents mentioned in the will, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment by R to J (Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. nos. 140371-72, November 27,
2006). Therefore, the acts constitute maltreatment, a valid ground for disinheritance.
b. Do the children of the disinherited person have the right to represent the latter?
The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights
of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or
administration of the property which constitutes the legitime (CIVIL CODE, Art. 923).
c. What are the effects of a subsequent reconciliation?

A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made (CIVIL CODE, Art. 922).
GT and RT died testate. They were survived by their children namely: A, B, C, D, E, and his four
grandchildren from F. F died after his mother’s death but before his father’s death and was survived by
his four children from his marriage with X, namely GA, GB, GC, and GD. At the time of his death, F’s
marriage with his wife had been annulled. Thereafter, F allegedly married Y. Is Y entitled to a share in
GT and RT’s respective estates?
Yes, but only with respect to GT’s estate. Y would inherit from F pursuant to Article 887(3) and part of his estate
would be his share in the estate of her mother, GT. On the other hand, Y could not inherit from the estate of RT
because F, predeceased RT, his father, and the children of F would succeed by right of representation from their
grandfather pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Y is not related by blood, but only by affinity, to
RT (Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
What are the instances wherein legacies and devises are revoked by operation of law?
The instances wherein legacies and devises are revoked by operation of law are as follows:
1. If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain either the form or
the denomination it had;
2. If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being
understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of
nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have
been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
3. If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death without the heir’s
fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing
bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind.
4. The legacy of a credit against a third person or the remission or release of a debt of the legatee shall lapse
if the testator, after having made it, should bring an action against the debtor for the payment of his debt,
even if such payment should not have been effected at the time of his death (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 935, 936
and 957).
Decedent A died on April 26, 1997, leaving a will dated February 8, 1997. The will was admitted to
probate. In the will, a three-door apartment, which includes two apartment units, were devised to A’s
four grandchildren. Prior to his death, on November 15, 1996, A executed a Real Estate Mortgage
covering the apartment Unit 1 in favor of Spouses E, and on February 21, 1997, and A executed a deed
of Sale of Real Estate on Installment (SREI) covering the other apartment Unit 2 also in favor of Spouses
E. However, the SREI never attained obligatory force or did not become binding by virtue of the non-
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payment of the purchase price as stipulated. Determine the provisional effects of the transactions made
by A.
The provisional effects would be that: A’s estate is obliged to pay the debt in connection with the mortgage of
Unit 1, while SREI revoked de facto the devise of Unit. Under Article 934 of the Civil Code, if the testator should
bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable debt before the execution of the will,
the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary intention appears. Hence, Since A devised in his will Unit
1, which had been mortgaged prior to the execution of his will, his estate is obliged to pay the debt. Pursuant to
Article 957, one of the instances of revocation de facto of a legacy or devise is the alienation by the testator by any
title of the thing bequeathed subsequent to the execution of the will. There might be here an intention on the part
of A to alienate through the SREI Unit 2 subsequent to the execution of his will although it subsequently became
inefficacious, or without obligatory force, by reason of the nonfulfillment of the positive suspensive condition of
full payment of the purchase price (Estipona v. Estate of Aquino, G.R. No. 207407 (Resolution), September 29, 2021,
Caguioa Case) NOTE: This case was promulgated beyond the June 30, 2021 cut-off .
Note: The probate court may pass upon the title and ownership thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title and ownership (Estipona
v. Estate of Aquino, G.R. No. 207407 (Resolution), September 29, 2021, Caguioa Case) NOTE: This case was
promulgated beyond the June 30, 2021 cut-off.
Legal and Intestate Succession
When does intestate succession take place?

According to Article 960 of the Civil Code, Legal or intestate succession takes place:
1. If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
2. When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In
such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not
disposed;
3. If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the
heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
4. When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in the Civil Code.
E, an overseas Filipino worker, saved Php10,000,000.00 in his savings account intended for business.
After arriving home, E was hit by a bus. He left behind his widowed mother, his common-law wife, and
their twin sons. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives and no other properties except the money in
his savings account. Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from him and how much should each receive?
The mother and twin sons are entitled to inherit from E. If legitimate ascendants are left, the twin sons shall divide
the inheritance with them taking one-half of the estate (CIVIL CODE, Art. 991). Thus, the widowed mother gets
Php5,000,000.00 while the twin sons shall receive Php2,500,000.00 each. The common-law wife cannot inherit
from him because when the law speaks of “widow or widower” in Art. 887 as a compulsory heir, the law refers to
a legitimate spouse.
Same facts as above except that E is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers,
and one nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother). Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from
him and how much should each receive?
Having died intestate, the heirs with the corresponding share are as follows: the wife will receive Php5,000,000.00;
the three (3) full-blood brothers will receive P1,000, 000.00 each; the nephew will receive Php1,000, 000.00 by
right of representation; and the two (2) half-brothers will receive Php500,000.00 each. Should brothers and sisters
or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1001). The wife will receive half of
the intestate estate, while the siblings or their respective representatives, will inherit the other half to be divided
among them equally. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the
half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1006).
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A and B are C’s brothers. J is the child of A, and K is the child of B, while X is the child of J. C died
without leaving a will. A, B, and J have predeceased C. Will X inherit from the estate of C? If yes, how
much?
No, X will not inherit from the estate of C. The rule on proximity under Article 962 of the Civil Code provides
that “the relative nearest in degree to the decedent exclude the more distant ones”. Here, K, the niece of C, excludes
X. Hence, X, being a distant relative of C, cannot inherit from his estate.
Can a widow succeed by right of representation from her father-in-law?

The surviving spouse cannot inherit from the estate of her father-in-law because her husband predeceased the said
father-in-law. The children of the deceased would succeed by right of representation from their grandfather (the
said father-in-law) pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the surviving spouse is not related by
blood, but only by affinity, to the said father-in-law (Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103; August 27, 2020, Caguioa
Case).
V had two (2) legitimate children— R and D. D has three (3) children. Meanwhile, R had a relationship
with L, who was also single and had the legal capacity to marry. L became pregnant and gave birth to JR.
After the birth of JR, his father, R, died. Later, V died without a will. JR filed a motion to be declared
an heir of the deceased, but D opposed on the ground that JR is an illegitimate child. JR countered
that Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the
laws. He argued that Article 992 created an absurdity and committed an injustice because while the
illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child cannot. Decide the case and explain.
I will deny the motion of JR to be declared as an heir of the deceased, JR, being an illegitimate child of the deceased
legitimate son, R, cannot inherit intestate from the deceased, V, because of the iron curtain rule under Article 992
of the Civil Code which provides that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. JR cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of the equal protection clause because equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 101 Phil. 1155). The
clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Note: In Aquino v. Aquino (G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, December 7, 2021), the SC ruled that when a
nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent’s estate, Article 982 of
the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the
“grandchildren and other descendants” granted the right of representation. The SC abandoned the presumption
that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile
environment perpetrated by the marital family. This will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of
representation to their parent’s share in her grandparent’s legitime. NOTE: This case was promulgated beyond
the June 30, 2021 cut-off.
What is the order of intestate succession?

The order of intestate succession is as follows:
1. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line (CIVIL CODE, Art. 975).
2. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit
from him to the exclusion of collateral relatives (CIVIL CODE, Art. 985).
3. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased (CIVIL CODE, Art. 988).
4. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice
to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001 (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 995).
5. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 1003).
6. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections, the
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State shall inherit the whole estate (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1011).
A was previously married to B in 1990. They begot 2 children: C and D. In 2010, B died. Subsequently,
A married X and they also begot 2 children: Y and Z. A died in 2018. C and D then executed an
extrajudicial settlement on the properties of A. Is the extrajudicial settlement valid?
No, the extrajudicial settlement is not valid. Art 879 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children and
their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages. Art. 980 provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance into equal shares. Upon the death of A, her children and second
husband acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate. In
the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, all the heirs of A should have participated. Considering
that Y and Z were admittedly excluded, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity (Neri v. Heirs of Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012).
F had three (3) legitimate children: A, B, and C. B has one (1) legitimate child X. C has two (2) legitimate
children: Y and Z. F and A rode together in a car and perished together at the same time in a vehicular
accident. F and A died, each of them leaving substantial estates in intestacy. (2008 Bar)
a. Who are the intestate heirs of F? What are their respective fractional shares?
Since B and C are the only heirs left, they shall have 1/2 each, dividing by 2 the whole estate. The intestate heirs of F
are B and C. Art. 43 of the Civil Code states that if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called
to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove
the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to the other. Here, F and A presumably died at the same time. Hence, no transmission of rights
can be made between them. Consequently, A will not qualify as an heir. The children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares (CIVIL CODE, Art. 980).
b. Who are the intestate heirs of A? What are their respective fractional shares?
B and C exclude X, Y and Z and they shall inherit the whole estate dividing between them the entirety into 1/2
each. Since Art. 43 applies as discussed above, F does not qualify to be an intestate heir. Consequently, the rule
on preference between the lines applies and the next in the order of succession would be the collateral relatives, B
and C. Art. 1003 of the Civil Code provides that if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Art. 962 states that in
every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation
when it properly takes place.
c. If B and C both predeceased F, who are F’s intestate heirs? What are their respective fractional shares?
Do they inherit in their own right or by representation?
X inherits the share of B which is 1/2 while Y and Z will divide the inheritance of C, which is also 1/2, hence,
they will be getting 1/4 each. They inherit by the right of representation. Under Art. 982 of the Civil Code, the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have
died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
d. If B and C both repudiated their shares in the estate of F who are F’s intestate heirs? What are their
respective fractional shares? Do they inherit in their own right or by representation?
The heirs are X, Y and Z, inheriting in their own right. They will divide the whole estate among themselves,
apportioning 1/3 to each heir. Under Art. 969 of the Civil Code, if the inheritance should be repudiated by the
nearest relative, should there be one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be
several, those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the person or persons
repudiating the inheritance.
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Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
What rules govern in cases involving right of representation or right of accretion?

The rules that govern in cases involving right of representation or right of accretion are as follows:
1. In testamentary succession:
a. Legitime
i. In case of predecease of an heir, there is representation if there are children or descendants; if
none, the others inherit in their own right according to intestate succession;
ii. In case of incapacity, results are the same as in predecease;
iii. In case of disinheritance, results are the same as in predecease;
iv. In case of repudiation by an heir, the others inherit in their own right according to intestate
succession.
b. Disposable free portion
i. Accretion takes place when requisites in Art. 1016 of the Civil Code are present; but if such
requisites are not present, the others inherit in their own right according to intestate succession.
Note: Art. 1016 provides: In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary
succession, it shall be necessary: (1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or
to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and (2) That one of the persons thus called die before the
testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
2. In intestate succession:
a. In case of predecease, there is representation if there are children or descendants; if none, the others
inherit in their own right.
b. In case of incapacity, results are the same as in predecease.
c. In case of repudiation, there is always accretion.
A Filipino couple, Mr. and Mrs. BM Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claire’s orphanage in
New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they have none of their very own.
However, BM, Jr., died in an accident at sea, followed to the grave a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr.
Each left a sizable estate consisting of bank deposits, lands and buildings in Manila.
a. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.?

As to BM, Jr., YV can inherit. According to Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent. Our domestic law, particularly the Domestic Adoption Act (RA 8552) provides that
in legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern. Hence, by express provision of the law, YV can inherit.
b. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Sr.?

As to BM, Sr. however, there is a difference since RA 8552 states that there are only reciprocal rights of succession.
Under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does
not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for
by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a
consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter (Teotico v. Del Val, G.R.
No. L-18753, March 26, 1965). Hence, YV cannot inherit from BM, Sr.
Note: Sec. 41 of RA 11642, otherwise known as the Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child
Care Act, provides that the legitimate filiation that is created between the adopter and adoptee shall be extended to
the adopter’s parents, adopter’s legitimate siblings, and legitimate descendants.
Based on the June 30, 2021 cut-off, the Civil Law Syllabus for the 2022 Bar Examination does not cover
RA 11642, which was signed into law on January 6, 2022, and took effect on January 28, 2022. The said
law amended RA 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act) and repealed RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act).
The Civil Law Syllabus expressly mentioned RA 8043 and RA 8552.
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Distinguish acceptance from repudiation.
Acceptance Repudiation
As to How it is Made
May be made expressly or tacitly. Made in a public or authentic instrument, or by

petition presented to the court having jurisdiction
over the testamentary or intestate proceeding (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1051).
As to who will Invoke in Place of Minors & Incapacitated
(e.g. deaf-mute who cannot read and write, under civil interdiction)
Guardian or legal representative (CIVIL CODE, Art. Guardian or legal representative with judicial
1044, par. 2). authorization (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1044, par. 2).
As to who will Invoke in Place of the Beneficiary who is the Poor
Person designated by the testator to determine the Beneficiaries themselves once they are determined
beneficiaries and to distribute the property. In default, (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1044, par. 3).
the executor (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1044, par. 3).
As to who will Invoke in Place of the Beneficiary who is a
Corporation, Association, Institution, or Entity
Legal representative (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1045). Legal representative with judicial authorization
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 1045).
As to who will Invoke in Place of the Deaf-mutes who cannot Read and Write
Shall be accepted by their guardians (CIVIL CODE, Guardians may repudiate with judicial approval
Art. 1048). (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1048).
As to Legal effect
Acceptance involves the confirmation of transmission Repudiation renders such transmission ineffective and
of successional rights is equivalent to an act of disposition and alienation
T, the testator has 2 sons, A and B. A has 2 children, X and Y. On March 6, 2016, T was involved in a
vehicular accident which led to his death. During a drinking session between the 2 brothers, A verbally
told B that he is repudiating his share in their Father’s estate. Thereafter A died on Oct 8, 2016 due to
cardiac arrest. A’s children, X and Y now claims for their father’s share in T’s estate, with B opposing
their claim stating that A has already repudiated his share in T’s estate. Can X and Y validly claim A’s
inheritance even after the latter’s repudiation?
Yes, X and Y can validly claim A’s inheritance. For repudiation to be valid it must be written in a public or authentic
instrument, or in a petition to the court which has jurisdiction over the testate or intestate proceeding (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1051). In the case at hand, since the repudiation of A’s share was done verbally, it cannot be considered
as a valid repudiation. In cases where an heir dies prior to accepting or repudiating properly his inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1053). Therefore, A’s share in the estate of T shall be
transmitted to his heirs, X and Y.
Can a testator institute a stranger as heir through a partition inter vivos without a will?
No. If there is no will of the testator, the designation in the partition inter vivos shall be in accordance with the laws
of intestacy. Said partition shall be valid so long as it does not impair the legitime of the co-heirs. Thus, should the
testator institute a stranger as heir, he cannot make a partition inter vivos without making a designation by a valid
will because the stranger cannot inherit by the laws of intestacy (Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197; January 10,
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A, B and C are the legitimate children of X. Unknown to them, X had an illegitimate child D. A, B and
C obtained a partition of the estate of X. Are A, B and C obliged to pay D for his share?
Yes. Under Art. 1104 of the Civil Code, a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not
be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but
the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. In this case,
A, B, and C did not know the existence of D, hence there is no fraud or bad faith on their part, but still, they are
obliged to pay for D’s share in the partition.
If a partition included an illegitimate child of the deceased who turned out to be not as such, will the
entire partition be void?
No. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1105).
Spouses J and E left their six (6) children, A B C D E and F a 219 sqm. lot. Upon the demise of the
spouses, the estate was not settled in accordance with the procedure in the Rules of Court. A sold a
portion of the property to X. Supposing thereafter, an unnotarized extrajudicial settlement of the
estate was made among the heirs becoming the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to
X. Is the act of A in selling a portion of the co-owned property deemed as a partition?
Yes, the act of A is deemed as a partition. Art. 1082 of the Civil Code provides that every act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. By this provision, it appears that when a
co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to “put an end to indivision among
his co-heirs.” Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing
his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect, A expressed her intention to terminate the
co-owner by selling her share to X. Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention to physically divide the property (Alejandrino v. CA, G.R. No. 114151, September 17, 1998).
Obligations and Contracts
Obligations
Is the list of sources of obligation provided in Art. 1157 of the Civil Code exclusive?
Yes. An obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right granted to another, must be rooted in at least
one of the five sources in Art. 1157 (i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts) (Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc. vs. Campos, G.R. No. 138814. April 16, 2009).
What are the essential elements of an obligation?

The obligation is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz:
1. The vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by the various sources of
obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts);
2. The object which is the prestation or conduct, required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and
3. The subject-persons who, viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the
passive (obligor) subjects (The Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines, Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 167519, January
14, 2015).
Discuss the concept of default or mora.

Default or mora, which is a kind of voluntary breach of an obligation, signifies the idea of delay in the fulfillment
of an obligation with respect to time. In positive obligations, like an obligation to give, the obligor or debtor incurs
in delay from the time the obligee or creditor demands from him the fulfillment of the obligation. Demand may be
judicial — if the creditor files a complaint against the debtor for the fulfillment of the obligation — or extrajudicial
— if the creditor demands from the debtor the fulfillment of the obligation either orally or in writing. Whether
the demand is judicial or extrajudicial, if the obligor or debtor fails to fulfill or perform his obligations, he is in
mora solvendi, and, thus, liable for damages (Pineda v. De Vega, G.R. No. 233774; April 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
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What are the instances when demand is not necessary to constitute the debtor in default? (SLU-P)
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute the debtor in default, namely:
1. When there is an express Stipulation to that effect;
2. Where the Law so provides;
3. Where demand would be Useless; and
4. When the Period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation
(i.e., time is of the essence) (Rivera v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 184458 & 184472, January 14, 2015).
What are the elements that must concur to constitute a fortuitous event?
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
obligations must be independent of human will;
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid;
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal
manner; and
4. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss (Metro Concast
Steel Corp. v. Allied Bank Corp., G.R. No. 177921 (Resolution), December 4, 2013).
In a contract of sale, M agreed to sell and deliver five (5) sets of Simplex Model XL movie projector to
C. The Contract of Sale provides that in the event of failure by C to pay any installment of the agreed
purchase price when such is already due, the latter shall be liable to pay 14% interest. C obligated
himself to make: (a) a down payment of 30% upon the signing of the contract; (b) a second payment
of 40% upon full and complete delivery of all the items, provided the complete delivery is effected on
or before January 15, 1998; and (c) the balance of 30% after the complete installation, dry run/testing
and satisfactory operations of all the units/sets installed. M was only able to deliver four (4) sets of
Simplex Model XL 35mm movie projectors, and the fifth set delivered was a Century brand projector.
C was forced to accept the Century brand in time for the opening of the movie house. When C engaged
the services of a third party to complete the installation of the projectors delivered, there was still no
complete installation because the fifth Simplex Model XL unit was never delivered and installed. Is M
entitled to an award of stipulated interest for the supposed delay on the part of C in the payment of
the remaining balance of the contract price?
No, M is not entitled to an award of stipulated interest for the supposed delay on the part of C. C being justified in
withholding the payment of the balance on account of the several breaches of contract committed by M, it cannot
be said that C was in delay. In a reciprocal obligation, the performance of one is conditioned on the simultaneous
fulfillment of the other obligation. Here, C did not find the delivery, installation, and operation of the movie
projector systems satisfactory on account of M’s failure to deliver the fifth Simplex XL movie projector, the failure
of M to ensure the complete installation of the movie projector systems, and M’s delivery of defective components.
However, legal interest shall accrue from the finality of the Decision until full payment (Chua Ping Hian v. Manas,
G.R. No. 198867, October 16, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the concept of an alternative obligation.

In an alternative obligation, there is more than one object, and the fulfillment of one is sufficient, determined by
the choice of the debtor who generally has the right of election. The right of election is extinguished when the party
who may exercise that option categorically and unequivocally makes his or her choice known. The choice of the
debtor must also be communicated to the creditor who must receive notice of it (Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v.
Lim, G.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014).
In 2000, IJ Corp., as lessor, and C Corp., as lessee, entered into a lease contract for a period of three (3)
years over a portion of a warehouse building. In 2001, C Corp. requested for the pre-termination of the
lease effective on the same date, which IJ Corp. rejected on the ground that the pre-termination of the
lease contract was not stipulated therein. C Corp. argued that by virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil
Code, it was released from its obligation from the lease contract. It explained that the consideration
thereof had become so difficult due to the global and regional economic crisis that had plagued the
economy. Is C Corp.’s act of treating the lease contract terminated correct?
No. Article 1267 of the Civil Code applies only to obligations to do and not to obligations to give. An obligation
CIVIL LAW
“to do” includes all kinds of work or service; while an obligation “to give” is a prestation which consists in the
delivery of a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for
its simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner. The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in
a contract of lease falls within the prestation “to give”. Considering that C Corp.’s obligation of paying rent is
not an obligation to do, it could not rightfully invoke Article 1267. Even so, its position is still without merit as
financial struggles due to an economic crisis is not enough reason for the courts to grant reprieve from contractual
obligations (Iloilo Jar Corporation v. Comglasco Corporation, G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017).
What is a reciprocal obligation?

A reciprocal obligation has been defined as that “where each of the parties is a promissee of a prestation and
promises another in return as a counterpart of equivalent of the other. The most salient feature of this obligation
is reciprocity.” (Chua Ping Hian v. Manas, G.R. No. 198867, October 16, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the requisites for the demandability of the penal clause?
The requisites for the demandability of the penal clause are:
1. That the total non-fulfillment of the obligation or the defective fulfillment is chargeable to the fault of the
debtor; and
2. That the penalty may be enforced in accordance with the provisions of law (D.M. Ragasa Enterprises, Inc.
v. Banco De Oro, Inc., G.R. No. 190512; June 20, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Note: When an obligation or a contract contains a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance with or breach of the principal obligation (D.M.
Ragasa Enterprises, Inc. v. Banco De Oro, Inc., G.R. No. 190512; June 20, 2018, Caguioa Case).
What are the requisites for legal compensation to take place?

Under Article 1279 of the Civil Code, for legal compensation to take place, the following requisites must concur:
1. That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of
the other;
2. That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind,
and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
3. That the two debts be due;
4. That they be liquidated and demandable; and
5. That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor (Philippine Trust Co. v. Spouses Roxas, G.R. No. 171897, October
14, 2015).
Note: When all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of
law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware
of the compensation (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1290).
Is the conversion of the peso-denominated loan into a US dollar denominated loan tantamount to
extinctive novation?
With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly
recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, adds other obligations not incompatible with the old
ones, or the new contract merely supplements the old one. While Article 1215 of the Civil Code provides that
novation, compensation or remission of the debt, made by any of the solidary creditors or with any of the solidary
debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, the novation contemplated therein is a total or extinctive novation of
the old obligation. At most, the changes introduced by the conversion of the loan obligation amount merely to
modificatory novation, which results from the alteration of the terms and conditions of an obligation without
altering its essence. At best, the conversion is an implied or tacit, partial, modificatory novation. There was merely
a change in the method of payment (Yujuico v. Far East Bank and Trust Co. G.R. No. 186196, August 15, 2018,
Caguioa Case).
Contracts
G Inc. received from MRT an invitation to bid for the complete concrete works of the Podium. G
Inc. submitted their bid and won. MRT issued a Letter of Award and Notice to Proceed to G Inc.,
which was signed and accepted by the latter. However, due to restructuring of the project, G Inc. was
unable to proceed with the project as it was suspended. A second notice was given to G Inc. based on
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the redesigned plan which was accepted and signed by G Inc. A third notice was again issued but was
not accepted by G Inc. A fourth notice was again issued which was qualifiedly accepted by G Inc. MRT
treated the qualified acceptance as a new offer and rejected the same. MRT manifested its intent to award
the project to another company. G Inc. acknowledged MRT’s intent and notified MRT of its claims
for reimbursement for costs, losses, and charges, and damages it had incurred due to the suspension
orders and the consequences of its award to another. G Inc. filed a notice of claim against MRT before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission which awarded to the former monetary claims
amounting to Php53M. MRT argued that G Inc. is not entitled to said monetary award as the contract
was not perfected. Is MRT correct?
No, MRT is not correct. There was a perfected contract. There are three (3) stages in a contract: (1) negotiation
which refers to the time the parties agree on its terms and conditions; (2) perfection which occurs when there is
a meeting of the minds of the parties such that there is a concurrence of offer and acceptance, and all essential
elements of the contract are present; and (3) consummation which covers the period when the parties perform
their obligations in the contract until it is finished or extinguished. To determine when the contract was perfected,
the acceptance of the offer must be unqualified, unconditional, and made known to the offeror. Here, there is
a perfected contract between MRT and G Inc. MRT has already awarded the contract to G Inc., and G Inc.’s
acceptance of the award was communicated to MRT before MRT rescinded the contract. Thus, there is already
mutual consent on the object of the contract and its consideration, and an absolute acceptance of the offer (Metro
Rail Transit Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018).
C, who was only a Grade 6 graduate and not capable of understanding English, was approached by
her nephew, R, who told her that he obtained a loan from L Bank in order to purchase the property
previously owned by his parents. R needed to borrow C’s owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of
title over another property (subject property) because he was advised by L Bank to borrow the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title and submit the same to the bank so that the loan would push through. All
she understood was that, in lending the title to R, she would merely provide a “garantiya” as regards
R’s loan with L Bank, and not a collateral. Without R’s knowledge and consent, L Bank successfully
convinced C to sign a Promissory Note for a P270,000.00 loan and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property for P1,440,000.00. Are the Promissory Note and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
valid and binding contracts?
No, the Promissory Note and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage are not valid and binding contracts. There can be
no contract unless all of the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation which is established. When one of
the elements is wanting, no contract can be perfected. Where the contracting parties do not agree as to the subject
matter of the contract, consent is absent, making the contract null and void. Here, the contract of loan (i.e., the
Promissory Note) and its accessory contract (i.e., Real Estate Mortgage) were entered into without the consent of
C and were absolutely simulated by L Bank, making the same void ab initio. L Bank openly misrepresented the
very substance, tenor, and purpose of these documents, taking advantage of C’s lack of education and failure to
understand English. C had no intention at all to borrow or mortgage the subject property (Catapang v. Lipa Bank,
G.R. No. 240645, January 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
To obtain a loan, B asked to borrow from Spouses X and Y (both high school graduates) their owner’s
copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering a parcel of land owned by the latter to be used
as security. The spouses acceded, on the condition that B should not sell the subject property. B promised
to give them P300,000 out of the P1M loan proceeds. The spouses discovered later that B became the
owner of one-half portion of the subject property by virtue of a supposed deed of sale in her favor. The
spouses argued that they were induced to sign the deed without being given the opportunity to read its
contents — believing that the document they were signing was a mere authorization to obtain a bank
loan. According to X, the document was “folded” when she affixed her signature thereon. On the other
hand, Y added that at the time he signed the same, it was “dark.” Spouses X and Y filed a Complaint for
annulment of deed of sale and recovery of duplicate original copy of title, with damages, against B.
Will the action prosper?
No, the action will not prosper. By signing the contract, the parties are presumed to know its contents. If a person
cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable persons to read and explain it to him,
before he signs it, and his failure to obtain a reading and explanation of it will estop him from avoiding it on the
ground that he was ignorant of its contents. Nothing in the facts herein prevented the spouses from discovering the
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true nature of the document. Being high school graduates and thus literate, they were not completely precluded
from reading the contents thereof. Their failure to thus observe the care and circumspect expected of them
precludes the courts from lending a helping hand, and so they must bear the consequences flowing from their own
negligence (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 200383, March 19, 2018).
L and J were close friends. In 1991, L and J bought a lot. Five (5) years later, they constructed a house
thereon. In 2004, it appears that J executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) in favor of L, which
contains: “FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of Php400,000.00, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged and confessed.” The TCT in the name of J was cancelled and a new TCT was issued
in the name of L. Spouses R and N, the parents of the late J, filed a complaint for a Declaration of
Nullity of the DAS, alleging among others that the DAS involved no actual monetary consideration,
and that their daughter, the late J, acquired the subject property, that L had no work or income and
was dependent to J. Can the DAS be considered as proof that the sale of the property is supported by
sufficient consideration?
Yes. DAS is itself the proof that the sale of the property is supported by sufficient consideration. Article 1354
of the Civil Code provides: “Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary.” Also, Rule 131, Section 3(r) of the Rules of Court provides for the
presumption of consideration inherent in every contract stating, “that there was a sufficient consideration for a
contract.” A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration (Mendoza v. Spouses Palugod, G.R.
No. 220517, June 20, 2018, Caguioa Case).
What are the requisites for an action for reformation of instrument to prosper?
There must be a concurrence of the following requisites for an action for reformation of instrument to prosper:
1. There must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract;
2. The instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and
3. The failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident (Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. Multi-Realty Development Corp., G.R. No.
185530, April 18, 2018).
A and M entered into two (2) Franchise Agreements wherein M shall operate two (2) of A’s water
refilling stations under the franchise of A. Section IV-5 of the Agreement provides that in the event
of termination, the franchisee agrees that he shall not in any way operate a water vending business
within two (2) kilometers of the terminated site for a period of two (2) years from termination. When
the Franchise Agreements were no longer renewed by the parties, M continued to operate under its
own name. Thus, A filed a complaint against M. M argues that Section IV-5 only applies to situations
wherein the Franchise Agreement has been cancelled for reasons other than the mere expiration of the
agreement. Is the contention of M correct?
No, the contention of M is incorrect. According to Article 1370 of the Civil Code, if the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control. Further, under Article 1374, the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing
to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. Here, the word termination
includes the expiration of the said agreements. The literal, express, and plain meaning of the word termination is
end of existence or conclusion. Also, there is no provision under the Franchise Agreements which expressly limits,
restricts, or confines the grounds of termination. If the intent of Section IV-5 is to protect the interests, name, and
goodwill of A’s brand, then it would not make sense to restrict the two-year prohibition clause found therein only
to cases wherein the parties cancelled or pre-terminated the agreements (Makati Water, Inc. v. Agua Vida Systems,
Inc., G.R. No. 205604, June 26, 2019, Caguioa Case).
After F met V, F purchased a condominium unit, the naked title of which was named after V’s holding
company. Before F and V’s wedding, they executed an Ante-Nuptial Agreement (drafted through F’s
counsel) stating that they will be governed by complete separation of properties, and that neither of
them shall acquire any interest over the properties of each other. Several years after their wedding, V
died and the unit was transferred to R, V’s daughter from a previous marriage. F filed a complaint for
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of sale, and damages, asserting his right over the unit. F alleges that
he really intended to take out from the Ante-Nuptial Agreement properties given to V but registered
in the name of the holding company. Did F waive his rights over the unit through the execution of the
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Ante-Nuptial Agreement?
Yes. It is elementary that any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must
be read against the party who drafted it. If F really intended to take out from the coverage of the Ante-Nuptial
Agreement properties that were given to V but registered in the name of her holding company, he could have easily
included a provision to that effect in the agreement to eradicate any ambiguity and misinterpretation. Here, the
one who drafted the Agreement was F, through his counsel, so he should have clearly indicated therein that the
properties given to V which were registered in the name of the holding company are excluded from the complete
separation of property (Francisco Delgado v. GQ Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 241774, September 25, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Can rescission be maintained if a person has other legal means to obtain reparation for damage suffered?
No. Under Article 1383 of the Civil Code, the action for rescission is a subsidiary one, and cannot thus be instituted
except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same (G. Holdings,
Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, Caguioa Case)
What is the prescriptive period of an action for rescission?

Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provides that, “The action to claim rescission must be commenced within
four years.” Since this provision of law is silent as to when the prescriptive period would commence, the general
rule, i.e., from the moment the cause of action accrues, therefore, applies (Khe Hong Cheng v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 144169, March 28, 2001).
What are the voidable contracts?

The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting
parties:
1. Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
2. Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1390)
X Co. is a domestic corporation, whose controlling interest is owned by A. Y Co., on the other hand,
is also a domestic corporation, allegedly owned by B. X Co. allegedly sold its shares of common stock
in C Bank to Y Co. The shares of common stock in C Bank are part of the sequestered properties that
were allegedly illegally amassed by B during the twenty-year reign of the former President Ferdinand
Marcos. According to X Co., the shares were obtained by Y Co. through fraud and that at the time,
the composition of the Board of Directors were mere dummies of Marcos. Such being the case, their
acquisition is either voidable or void or unenforceable. Is the acquisition void, voidable, or unenforceable?
The acquisition is voidable. Art. 1390 provides that a contract is voidable where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. These contracts are not void ab initio since voidable or annullable
contracts are existent, valid, and binding, although they can be annulled because of want of capacity or the vitiated
consent of one of the parties. In this case, the mere allegation of X Co. that the persons who composed the Board
of Directors of Y Co. that approved the contract were mere dummies of Marcos does not make the said contract
void. If that allegation of vitiated consent were true so as to incapacitate the Board from giving its consent freely,
the defect only renders the contract voidable (First Philippine Holding Corporation v. Trans Middle East Equities
Inc., G.R. No. 179505, December 4, 2009).
A owns a land situated in Paranaque that adjoins a public thoroughfare. B owns a land which is farther
than the thorough fare and had no access thereto. Thus, on July 1, 2022, A and B orally agreed for
Php50,000.00, payable on December 31, 2031, that A shall not construct anything that will obstruct B’s
egress within five (5) years from January 1, 2023. Is the contract enforceable?
Yes. Article 1403 of the Civil Code provides that an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof must be in writing, otherwise the same is unenforceable. Here, A will already be obligated
not to construct anything which will obstruct B’s egress starting January 1, 2023, which is less than a year from the
time that A and B entered into the oral contract on July 1, 2022.
A owns a land situated in Paranaque. On July 1, 2022, A and B orally entered into a contract of sale
where A bound himself to transfer ownership of his land to B on December 31, 2022, and for B to pay
on November 1, 2022. Is the contract enforceable?
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No. Under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property or of an interest therein
must be reduced in writing to be enforceable. The Statute of Frauds mentioned under Article 1403 only applies
to executory contracts which have not been consummated partially or completely. Here, notwithstanding the fact
that the obligation is to be completely consummated on December 31, 2022, which is less than a year from July 1,
2022, the object of the contract is a real property. Hence, the oral sale of A’s land is unenforceable.
The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Municipality A passed several resolutions to implement a Redevelopment
Plan to develop the Public Plaza A. To finance the Phase II of the said plan, the SB authorized the
mayor to obtain loans from Land Bank and mortgage a lot located in the plaza as collateral. It further
authorized the assignment of a portion of the internal revenue allotment of the municipality and the
monthly income from the proposed project. The Phase II involves the construction of a commercial
center inside the plaza. Some residents of the municipality objected to such construction claiming that
they were highly irregular, violative of law, and detrimental to public interest, and will result to wanton
desecration of the said historical and public park. X, a resident, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a
complaint against the implicated public officers and Land Bank assailing the validity of the loan on the
ground that the plaza used as collateral thereof is property of public domain and therefore beyond the
commerce of men. Will the action prosper?
Yes, the action will prosper. The loan used to fund Phase II for the construction of a commercial center in the
plaza is void. Art. 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights or obligations or any
juridical relations. The conversion of the plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s
nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the
object of appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking. Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind the subject loans which is to fund
the commercialization of the plaza pursuant to the redevelopment plan, they are considered as ultra vires thus,
rendering them void and in effect, nonbinding on the Municipality (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran,
G.R. No.191667, April 17, 2013).
C Electric Corp. supplied power to F Inc. When F Inc. defaulted in payment, C Electric Corp. filed a
collection suit against F Inc. Notices of levy and sale upon the personal and real properties of F Inc.
were eventually issued. Thereafter, G Holdings filed a case seeking nullification of the levy on execution
and auction sale. G Holdings averred that it owns some levied properties as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment executed by F Inc. in its favor. C Electric Corp. contends that the said Deed was absolutely
simulated since it was made to defraud C Electric Corp. as the creditor, and hence, rescissible. Is the
Deed of Assignment rescissible?
No, the Deed of Assignment is void, not rescissible. Void or inexistent contracts are those which produce no legal
effect and are considered inexistent from the very beginning because of certain imperfections while rescissible
contracts are valid until rescinded. These two defective contracts are distinct from each other and belong to two
mutually exclusive groups. Here, there was complete lack of intention on the part of F Inc. to divest ownership
and control over all of its properties, equipment, and facilities in spite of the wording in the Deed of Assignment
in favor of G Holdings. The Deed of Assignment was just a sham. It cannot be rescinded because the Deed of
Assignment is an absolutely simulated contract, which is void (G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Company, Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, Caguioa Case).
What is the distinction between inexistent contracts and void ones as to their effects?
Inexistent contracts produce no legal effect whatsoever. In case of void contracts where the nullity proceeds from
the illegality of the cause of object, when executed (and not merely executory) they have the effect of barring any
action by the guilty to recover what he has already given under the contract in accordance with the in pari delicto
principle (G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27,
What is simulation?
Simulation is the declaration of a fictitious intent manifested deliberately and in accordance with the agreement of
the parties in order to produce for the purpose of deceiving others the appearance of a transaction which does not
exist or which is different from their true agreement (Agbayani v. Lupa Realty Holding Corp., G.R. No. 201193,
June 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
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What are the requisites of simulation?

Simulation requires the following:
1. A deliberate declaration contrary to the will of the parties;
2. Agreement of the parties to the apparently valid act; and
3. The purpose is to deceive or to hide from third persons although it is not necessary that the purpose be
illicit or for purposes of fraud (Agbayani v. Lupa Realty Holding Corp., G.R. No. 201193, June 10, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Natural Obligations
Discuss the concept of natural obligations.

Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action
to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what
has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1423).
Can the debtor demand the return of the amount paid if he made the payment after the right of the
creditor to file an action upon it has prescribed?
No. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily
performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1423).
X filed a complaint against Y praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 2020 and 2021. X admits
that Y is not under any legal duty to give such bonus, and merely asks that the Christmas bonus be given
to them since it is a moral obligation of Y. Can the court order the performance of giving such bonus?
No, the court cannot order the performance of giving such bonus. Under, Art 1423 of the Civil Code, an element
of natural obligation, before it can be cognizable by the court, is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly,
retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. Here there has been no voluntary
performance, thus, the court cannot order the performance (Ansay v. The Board of Directors of the National Dev.
Co., G.R. No. L-13667, April 29, 1960).
Estoppel
What is estoppel in pais?

Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought
to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and
such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts (Spouses Modomo v. Spouses Layug, G.R. No. 197722, August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the requisites of estoppel in pais?

For the principle of estoppel in pais to apply, there must be:
1. Conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey
the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert;
2. Intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other
party; and
3. Knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts (Spouses Modomo v. Spouses Layug, G.R. No. 197722,
August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Can laches bar the government from instituting a reversion case?

Yes. The general rule is that when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding simply to assert its
own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation. However,
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innocent purchasers for value are afforded the right to raise the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in their
defense against the government to avoid injustice to them (Republic v. Sundiam, G.R. No. 236381, August 27,
2020, Caguioa Case)
Trusts
What is the trust pursuit rule?

The trust pursuit rule is a fundamental principle in agency that where certain property entrusted to an agent and
impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal is wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the property in
the hands of a third person and the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover it so long as the property
can be traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened. This principle is actually one of trusts, since
the wrongful conversion gives rise to a constructive trust which pursues the property, its product or proceeds, and
permits the beneficiary to recover the property or obtain damages for the wrongful conversion of the property. It
applies when a constructive or resulting trust has once affixed itself to property in a certain state or form (Estate of
Cabacungan v. Laigo, G.R. No. 175073, August 15, 2011).
Distinguish express trusts and implied trusts.

While express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, implied trusts come into being by
operation of law. Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of the intent or which are super induced on the transaction by operation of law as matters
of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993).
Distinguish resulting trusts and constructive trusts.

A resulting trust is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties, the intention of which is found in the nature of the transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument
of conveyance. On the other hand, a constructive trust is one not created by words either expressly or impliedly, but
by construction of equity to satisfy the demands of justice. A constructive trust does not emanate from, or generate
a fiduciary relation (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993).
Can a trustee acquire the property held in trust through prescription?

Yes. The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and
unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive
implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily,
repudiation of the said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period (Vda. de Esconde
v. CA, G.R. No. 103635, February 1, 1996; Sotto v. Teves, G.R. No. L-38018, October 31, 1978).
Note: Adverse possession by a trustee with respect to the cestui que trust requires the concurrence of the following
circumstances: (a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust; (b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust and (c) that
the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive Vda. de Esconde v. CA, G.R. No. 103635, February 1, 1996;
Sotto v. Teves, G.R. No. L-38018, October 31, 1978).
Quasi-Contracts
What is the basis of a quasi-contract?

Generally, it may be said that a quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by
equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Examples of these principles are: (1) it is presumed that a person
agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; or
(3) one must do unto others what he would want others to do unto him under the same circumstances (Padcom
Condominium Corp. v. Ortigas Center Association, Inc., G.R. No. 146807, May 9, 2002).
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What are the requisites of solutio indebiti?

To establish the application of solutio indebiti, two conditions must concur:
1. A payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor who has no duty to pay, and
the person who received the payment, and
2. The payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause (Domestic Petroleum
Retailer Corp. v. Manila International Airport Authority, G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019, Caguioa
Case).
Discuss the principle of negotiorum gestio.

Under the principle of negotiorum gestio, whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is
in a position to do so. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: (1) When the property or
business is not neglected or abandoned; (2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 2144).
Sales
Nature and Form
What is a contract of sale?

By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver
a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent (CIVIL CODE, Art.
1458). It must evince the consent on the part of the seller to transfer and deliver and on the part of the buyer to pay
(Spouses Edrada v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 154413, August 31, 2005).
What are the elements of a valid contract of sale? (SPC)

The elements of a valid contract of sale are:
1. Determinate Subject matter;
2. Price certain in money or its equivalent; and
3. Consent or meeting of the minds (Spouses Gaspar vs. Disini, G.R. No. 239644, February 3, 2021, August
9, 2017, Caguioa Case)
Is the seller’s ownership of the thing sold an element in the perfection of the contract of sale?
No. At the perfection stage, the seller’s ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the
contract of sale. Therefore, it is not required that, at the perfection stage, the seller be the owner of the thing sold or
even that such subject matter of the sale exists at that point in time (Heirs of Villeza v. Aliangan, G.R. Nos. 244667-
69; December 2, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Does the subsequent execution of a formal deed of sale negate the perfection of the parties’ oral contract
of sale which had already taken place?
No. The subsequent execution of a formal deed of sale does not negate the perfection of the parties’ oral contract
of sale which had already taken place upon the meeting of the parties’ minds as to the subject of the transaction and
its purchase price. It bears emphasizing that a formal document is not necessary for the sale transaction to acquire
binding effect (Spouses Beltran v. Spouses Cangayda, G.R. No. 225033, August 15, 2018, Caguioa Case).
What is a contract to sell?

A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite its delivery to the prospective buyer, commits to sell the property
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon full payment of the purchase price (Agustin v. De Vera, G.R. No. 233455;
April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Distinguish a contract of sale from a contract to sell.

In a contract of sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell,
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by agreement, the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In
a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price (Agustin v.
De Vera, G.R. No. 233455; April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
In a contract to sell, if the sale does not happen without the seller’s fault, should the earnest money paid
be returned by the seller?
No, the earnest money should not be returned. In a contract to sell, the payment of earnest money represents
the seller’s opportunity cost of holding in abeyance the search for other buyers or better deals. Earnest money,
therefore, is paid for the seller’s benefit. It is part of the purchase price while at the same time proof of commitment
by the potential buyer. Absent proof of a clear agreement to the contrary, it should be forfeited if the sale does not
happen without the seller’s fault. The potential buyer bears the burden of proving that the earnest money was
intended other than as part of the purchase price and to be forfeited if the sale does not occur without the seller’s
fault (Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018).
Capacity to Buy or Sell
In a case pending before the Supreme Court, the party litigant sold one of the properties in litis pendentia
to her lawyer’s son. By reason of the purchase, a complainant instituted a disbarment complaint against
the lawyer for violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code for having acquired an interest in the land
involved in a litigation in which a lawyer had taken part in by reason of his profession. The lawyer
admitted the purchase but maintained that he did not violate the said article as he had absolutely no
interest in the property purchased by his son; and that the proscription in the said article does not
extend to the relatives of the enumerated persons mentioned therein. Is the contention of the lawyer
correct?
Yes, the lawyer’s contention is correct. As worded, Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code covers only (1) justices; (2) judges;
(3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of court; (5) other officers and employees connected with the administration
of justice; and (6) lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or extended to include relatives of the lawyer, in
this case, the son of the lawyer. If the members of the immediate family or relatives of the lawyer laboring under
disqualification is to be included within the purview of the law, it would in effect be amending the law. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (Santos v. Arrojando, A.C. No. 8502, June 27, 2018).
Effects of the Contract when the Thing Sold has been Lost
What are the effects of the contract when the thing sold has been lost at the time of the perfection of
the contract?
If at the time the contract of sale is perfected, the thing which is the object of the contract has been entirely lost,
the contract shall be without any effect. But if the thing should have been lost in part only, the vendee may choose
between withdrawing from the contract and demanding the remaining part, paying its price in proportion to the
total sum agreed upon (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1493).
Obligations of Vendor
A is the owner of Lot A in Albay. Her attorney-in-fact, B entered into a contract with X for the sale of
the property. B showed X the metes and bounds of the property and represented that Lot A has an area
of more or less 6,200 sq. m. per the tax declaration covering it. They executed a deed of absolute sale
over the property in X’s favor. The deed described the property, as: “A parcel of land Lot A, situated
at Albay, with an area of 6,200 sq. meters more or less.” Subsequently, X caused the property to be
surveyed and discovered that Lot A has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of the
property, B allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. This was opposed by X
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who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the sale. Is X entitled to the excess of 5,800 sq. m.?
No, X is not entitled to the excess. This is a sale in lump sum. In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally
obligated to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater
or smaller than that recited in the deed (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1542). However, in case there is conflict between the
area actually covered by the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so
only when the excess or deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable. The difference herein is too
substantial to be considered reasonable. Declaring X as the owner of the whole area on the premise that this is the
actual area included in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery of almost twice the area stated in the deeds
of sale. A vendee of a land when it is sold in gross or with the description ‘more or less’ does not thereby ipso facto
take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of ‘more or less’ or similar words in designating quantity covers only a
reasonable excess or deficiency (Arcaina v. Ingram, G.R. No. 196444, February 15, 2017).
An advertisement was placed by UB Bank for public auction of a condominium unit with an area of
95 sq.m. Thinking that it was sufficient and spacious enough and after inspecting the unit, PB decided
to register for the sale and bid on the unit. He eventually won the bid and entered into a Contract to
Sell with UB Bank. A few years after, while constructing 2 additional bedrooms, PB discovered that
the floor area was just about 70 sq.m, not 95 sq.m. as advertised by UB Bank. He asked for a rescission
of the Contract to Sell, along with a refund of the amounts he had paid. UB Bank later on informed
PB that the unit, according to the appraisers, was confirmed to be 95 square meters, inclusive of the
terrace and the common areas surrounding it. Not satisfied, PB filed for a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract and Damages.
a. Will PB’s action prosper?

Yes, the action will prosper. The significance of the unit’s area as a determining cause of the Contract to Sell is
readily discernible. A seller is generally responsible for warranty against hidden defects of the thing sold. Art. 1566,
par. 2 of the Civil Code states that the seller’s liability for hidden defects shall be inapplicable if there is a stipulation
made to the contrary. However, a mere stipulation does not suffice. To be fully absolved of liability, Art. 1566, par.
2 also requires a seller to be unaware of the hidden defects in the thing sold. UB Bank admits that the only way the
unit’s area could have amounted to 95 square meters was if some areas for common use were added to its interior
space. As there is fraud on the part of UB Bank, as it orchestrated a situation rife for defrauding buyers of the
advertised unit, the Contract to Sell must be annulled, and PB be refunded all the amounts he paid (Poole-Blunden
v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205838, November 29, 2017).
b. Is Art. 1542 of the Civil Code on sale for a lump sum applicable?
No, Art. 1542 is not applicable. Here, PB does not seek a reduction of the purchase price. He seeks judicial relief
to have the entirety of his purchase annulled, his consent having been fraudulently obtained. While it is true that
PB did not buy the unit on a per-square-meter basis, it remains that what he bought was a condominium unit. A
condominium unit’s bounds are reckoned by “the interior surfaces of its perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows
and doors,” excluding common areas. Thus, when PB agreed to purchase the unit at a lump-sum price, he never
consented to including common areas as part of his purchase (Id.).
Discuss the concept of delivery.

The law provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him in any of the ways specified in Arts. 1497 to 1501 of the Civil Code. The word “delivered” should not be
taken restrictively to mean transfer of actual physical possession of the property. The law recognizes two principal
modes of delivery, to wit:
1. Actual delivery consists in placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the vendee.
2. Legal or constructive delivery, on the other hand, may be had through any of the following ways: the
execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale; symbolical tradition such as the delivery of the keys
of the place where the movable sold is being kept; traditio longa manu or by mere consent or agreement
if the movable sold cannot yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of the sale; traditio
brevi manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the sale; and traditio constitutum
possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the property in a different capacity (Tamayao v.
Lacambra, G.R. No. 244232; November 3, 2020, Caguioa Case).
What is a purchaser in good faith or innocent purchaser for value?
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A purchaser in good faith or innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price
for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person’s claim on or interest in it (Heirs of
Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081; June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Note: A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession
of another is a buyer in bad faith (Id., Caguioa Case).
Obligations of Vendee
When is the buyer deemed to have accepted the goods sold? (AIR)
The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods
1. When he intimates to the seller that he has Accepted them, or
2. When the goods have been delivered to him, and he does any act in relation to them which is Inconsistent
with the ownership of the seller, or
3. When, after the lapse of a reasonable time, he Retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has
rejected them (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1585).
Is the buyer bound to return goods delivered to him by the seller when he refuses to accept them?
Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to accept them, having the right so
to do, he is not bound to return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he notifies the seller that he refuses to accept
them (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1587).
Breach of Contract
Does the non-payment of the entire purchase price, despite repeated assurances to pay the same,
constitute a substantial and fundamental breach?
Yes. The non-payment of the entire purchase price, despite repeated assurances to pay the same clearly constitutes a
substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement (Nuñez
v. Moises-Palma, G.R. No. 224466; March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the remedies of the unpaid seller, after ownership of the real property not covered by RA
6552 or the Maceda Law, has been vested to the buyer?
The remedies of the unpaid seller, after ownership of the real property not covered by the Maceda Law, has been
vested to the buyer, are:
1. To compel specific performance by filing an action against the buyer for the agreed purchase price; or
2. To rescind or resolve the contract of sale either judicially or by a notarial act; and
3. In either (1) or (2), to recover damages for the breach of the contract (Nuñez v. Moises-Palma, G.R. No.
224466; March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the nature of the remedies provided for in Act No. 4122 or the Recto Law.
The three (3) remedies provided for in the Recto Law are alternative and not cumulative; the exercise of one would
preclude the other remedies. Consequently, should the vendee-mortgagor default in the payment of two or more
of the agreed installments, the vendor-mortgagee has the option to avail of any of these three (3) remedies: either to
exact fulfillment of the obligation, to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased chattel, if one
was constituted (Spouses De la Cruz v. Asian Consumer and Industrial Finance Corp., G.R. No. 94828, September
18, 1992).
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What are the four conditions under Section 4 of the Maceda Law that should be met before the seller
may cancel the contract:
The four conditions under Section 4 of the Maceda Law that should be met before the seller may cancel the
contract:
1. The defaulting buyer has paid less than two (2) years of installments;
2. The seller must give such defaulting buyer a sixty (60)-day grace period, reckoned from the date the
installment became due;
3. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the said grace period, the seller must give
the buyer a notice of cancellation and/or a demand for rescission by notarial act; and
4. The seller may actually cancel the contract only after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the buyer’s receipt
of the said notice of cancellation and/or demand for rescission by notarial act (Integrated Credit and
Corporate Services v. Cabreza, G.R. No. 203420, February 15, 2021).
Extinguishment
A is an agent authorized to sell ten (10) parcels of land. He offered to sell these to National Housing
Authority (NHA) for a housing project. NHA approved the acquisition of the said lands with a total
purchase price of Php25,000,000.00. The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, covering the subject
lands. However, only seven (7) of the ten (10) lands were paid by NHA because according to the DENR,
the remaining lands were located at an active landslide area. NHA issued a resolution rescinding the sale
of the remaining three (3) parcels of land. Does the issued resolution have any legal basis?
Yes. The resolution rescinding the sale was based on the negation of the cause arising from the realization that the
lands, which were the object of the sale, were not suitable for housing. Ordinarily, a party’s motives for entering
into the contract do not affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the cause, the motive may
be regarded as the cause. In this case, it is clear that NHA would not have entered into the contract were the lands
not suitable for housing. The quality of the land was an implied condition for the NHA to enter into the contract.
On the part of the NHA, therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a party to the sale. The finding of DENR
is a sufficient basis for the cancellation of the sale, thus, the realization of the mistake as regards the quality of the
land resulted in the negation of the motive/cause, rendering the contract inexistent pursuant to Art. 1318 of the
Civil Code (Uy v. CA, G.R. No. 120465, September 9, 1999).
Discuss the concept of a pacto de retro sale.

In a sale with right to repurchase (pacto de retro), the title and ownership of the property sold are immediately
vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor within the stipulated period.
The right of repurchase agreed upon is one of conventional redemption governed by Article 1601, in relation
to Article 1616, of the Civil Code. This right is separate and distinct from the legal redemption granted to co-
owners under Article 1620 of the Civil Code. More importantly, the right to repurchase is separate from the title
or ownership over the property subject of the sale with pacto de retro.
As a rule, the right to repurchase under Article 1601 may only be exercised by the vendor, or his successors. If so
exercised, the ownership of the property reverts back to the vendor or his successor. On the other hand, if a third
person redeems the property on behalf of the vendor, he or she does not become owner of the property redeemed,
but only acquires a lien over the property for the amount advanced for its repurchase. As such, the third person’s
right merely consists of the right to be reimbursed for the price paid to the vendee (Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque, G.R.
No. 196733, November 21, 2018).
What is an equitable mortgage?

An equitable mortgage is defined as one which although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security
for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law (Spouses Sy vs. De Vera-Navarro, G.R. No. 239088,
April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the essential requisites of an equitable mortgage?

The essential requisites of an equitable mortgage are:
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1. That the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and
2. That their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage (Spouses Sy vs. De Vera-Navarro,
G.R. No. 239088, April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
J was one of the co-owners of a parcel of land and a four-story building which has a market value of
more than Php40,000,000.00. J, in representation of his co-owners, borrowed Php3,720,000.00 from
L, secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over the subject property. After the execution of the
Mortgage Contract, L asked J to execute an undated Deed of Absolute Sale with a stated consideration
in the amount of Php5,000,000.00 for the purpose of providing additional security for the loan. J
remains to be in possession of the subject property despite purportedly selling the latter to L. Then, J
was subsequently informed that the ownership of the subject property had been transferred to L. Do
the facts of the case constitute that an equitable mortgage has been executed?
Yes, the facts of the case constitute that an equitable mortgage has been executed. The supposed vendor of the
subject property, J, remains to be in possession of the subject property despite purportedly selling the latter to L. It
is unlikely for a supposed buyer to desist from taking possession over property which he/she has already purchased.
The purchase price of the purported sale indicated in the undated Deed of Absolute Sale is inadequate. L retained
for herself the supposed purchase price. No consideration was paid at all for the supposed contract of sale. The
real intention of the parties is for the purported contract of sale to merely secure the payment of their debt. With
the Deed of Sale being null and void, it is in fact an equitable mortgage (Spouses Sy vs. De Vera-Navarro, G.R. No.
239088, April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Are the periods for redemption under Article 1606 of the Civil Code applicable to an equitable mortgage?
No. If the transaction is an equitable mortgage and not a sale with right of repurchase, there is no “redemption”
or “repurchase” to speak of and the periods provided under Article 1606 do not apply. Instead, the prescriptive
period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. In other words, a party has 10 years from the time
the cause of action accrued to file the appropriate action (Saclolo v. Marquito, G.R. No. 229243; June 26, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Assignment of Credits
Does the mere assignment of credit automatically produce effect against third persons?
No. An assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in
a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real
property (CIVIL CODE, Art 1625).
A, a representative of SS Ltd., approached Y for credit accommodation. A requested N, thru Y, to grant

SS. Ltd. discounting privileges which N had with BA Corp. Y acquiesced. Following the discounting
process agreed upon, N thru Y endorsed the SS Ltd.’s post-dated check in favor of BA Corp. Thereafter,
BA Corp issued a check payable to N which endorsed it in favor of SS Ltd. SS Ltd. then made use of
and/or negotiated the check. Accompanying the exchange of checks was a Deed of Assignment executed
by N in favor of BA Corp. with the conformity of SS Ltd. Under the said Deed, the subject of the
discounting was the aforementioned check. At the back thereof and of every deed of assignment was
the Continuing Suretyship Agreement, whereby A unconditionally guaranteed to BA Corp. the full,
faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of N. The check however was
dishonored. A substitute check was given but was likewise dishonored. Despite repeated demands, N
and A failed to settle the obligation with BA Corp., prompting the latter to file an action in court. Is N,
as assignor liable to BA Corp as its assignee for the dishonored checks?
Yes, the assignor is liable to its assignee for its dishonored checks. An assignment of credit is the process of
transferring the right of the assignor to the assignee, who would then be allowed to proceed against the debtor.
According to Art. 1628 of the Civil Code, the assignor-vendor warrants both the credit itself and the person of
the debtor, if so stipulated, as in the case here. Indeed, the assignor-vendor is liable for the invalidity of whatever
he assigned to the assignee-vendee. Here, the check merely evidenced the credit which was actually assigned to
BA Corp. N failed to realize that for as long as the credit remains outstanding, it shall continue to be liable to BA
Corp. as its assignor. The dishonor of an assigned check simply stresses its liability and the failure to give a notice of
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dishonor will not discharge it from such liability. This is because the cause of action stems from the breach of the
warranties embodied in the Deed of Assignment, and not from the dishonoring of the check alone (Nyco Sales v.
BA Finance, G.R. No. 71694, August 16, 1991).
Lease
General Provisions
What is a contract of lease of things?

In a contract of lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing
for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninety-
nine (99) years shall be valid (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1643).
What is a contract of lease of work or service?

In a contract of lease of work or service, one of the parties binds himself to execute a piece of work or to render
to the other some service for a price certain, but the relation of principal and agent does not exist between them
Can consumable goods be the subject matter of a contract of lease?

Yes, consumable goods can be the subject matter of a contract of lease when they are merely to be exhibited or
when they are accessory to an industrial establishment (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1645).
Can the lease agreement pass onto the heirs upon the death of the lessee?
Yes, the lease can pass onto the heirs upon the death of the lessee. The lease agreement is not a right that is personal
in character, as to be extinguished upon the death of the lessee. Hence, the right is transmissible to the heirs (Heirs
of Dimaculangan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68021, February 20, 1989).
Is an express stipulation allowing the lessee to sublet the thing leased required before he can do so?
No. When in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased,
in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor
Rights and Obligations of the Lessor
A and B entered into a lease contract over a plantation owned by A. B complained of being pestered by
squatters who claimed portions of the land as their own property. When B defaulted in his monthly
payments, A filed a complaint for damages. B asserted that A committed breach of contract for his
failure to maintain him in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased premises, which entitled
him to suspend payment of rentals. Is B entitled to suspension of payment?
No, B is not entitled to suspension of payment. B had not been disturbed in his legal possession of the property so
as to suspend payment pursuant to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code. When he was being pestered and harassed by the
squatters, he had all the right to sue the intruders who had disturbed his physical possession as provided for in Art.
1664. Hence, Mr. B had no valid reason to suspend the payment of rentals under Art. 1658 (Chua Tee Dee vs. CA,
G.R. No. 135721, May 27, 2004).
R advertised a house and lot for sale. Spouses A and B were interested but did not have enough money,
thus they offered to rent the property while they raise the funds to buy the house. R agreed. The spouses
consistently paid rent but started to fall behind sometime thereafter. Realizing that Spouses A and B
had no intention of purchasing, R wrote to inform them that he had decided to terminate the lease
agreement and in the same letter demanded that the spouses vacate the property. The spouses refused to
vacate and pay the rentals, thus, R caused the disconnection of the electrical service over the property.
Spouses A and B invoke their right to suspend the payment of rent after R caused the temporary
disconnection of electrical service after the lease had already expired. Are Spouses A and B correct?
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No, spouses A and B are incorrect. The failure to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the property leased contemplated under Art. 1658 of the Civil Code does not contemplate all acts of disturbance.
Lessees may suspend the payment of rent only if their legal, and not physical, possession is disrupted. In this case,
while the disconnection of electrical service over the leased premises was not just an act of physical disturbance but
one that is meant to remove the lessees from the leased premises and disturb their legal possession as lessees, they
cannot invoke the right accorded by Art. 1658, because the lease had already expired when R requested for the
temporary disconnection of electrical service. R demanded the spouses to vacate and instead of surrendering the
premises, the spouses unlawfully withheld possession of the property and continued to stay thereat. At that point,
R was no longer obligated to maintain Spouses A and B in the “peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract.” (Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018).
Rights and Obligations of the Lessee
Upon the expiration of the lease contract, A, the landowner, asked B, the lessee, to vacate the premises
and remove his improvements, B asked for reimbursement of the ornamental and useful expenses,
contending that he is a builder in good faith. What are the rights and obligations of B regarding the
reimbursement of ornamental and useful expenses?
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall
pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain
them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1678).
B leased a lot to E subject to a stipulation “effective until replaced by another agreement and until
such time that the parcel of land is sold.” The lease contract further obliged E (1) to expressly include
a 60-day pre-termination clause in his third-party subleasing agreements to ensure that the property
be always available for sale, and (2) to furnish B with copies of the subleasing agreements. Using the
contract of lease, E entered into various subleases with third parties. E also constructed some concrete
structures on the subject lot. Sometime after, B, without stating any grounds, filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, unilaterally rescinding the lease of contract. Is B’s act justified?
No, B’s act is not justified. The demand did not indicate that E breached the lease contract. There was no demand
for him to pay rent or comply with any of his obligations under the lease. Instead, it merely informs him that B
had unilaterally terminated the lease and demands the surrender of the property. Also, none of the circumstances
which allow a lessor to judicially and summarily eject the lessee for any of the following causes under Art. 1673
of the Civil Code is present in this case (Quesada v. Bonanza Restaurants, G.R. No. 207500, November 14, 2016).
When can the purchaser in a sale with the right of redemption make use of the power to eject the lessee?
The purchaser in a sale with the right of redemption can make use of the power to eject the lessee only after the end
of the period for the redemption (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1677).
Partnership
General Provisions
What is a contract of partnership?

By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to
a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form
a partnership for the exercise of a profession (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1767).
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A group of lawyers signed an Articles of Partnership forming the SAFA Law Office (SAFA), which
thereafter entered into a Contract of Lease with PNB for a period of three (3) years. In 2001, the
contract expired but SAFA continued to occupy the premises without paying its monthly rentals. PNB
demands for SAFA to pay its outstanding rental obligations. S, in his capacity as managing partner of
SAFA, filed a complaint for accounting and/or recomputation of unpaid rentals. PNB filed a motion
praying that S be ordered to amend anew his complaint to include SAFA as principal plaintiff. S filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting that SAFA is only a relationship or association of lawyers in the practice of
law and a single proprietorship on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed by
the partners of the firm. The MOU provides:
xxx That partners REA, FLF and ADA shall not in any way be liable for any loss or liability that may
be incurred by the law firm in the course of its operation;
xxx That all remaining assets upon dissolution shall accrue exclusively to S and all liabilities shall be
solely for his account. xxx
Is SAFA a partnership?
Yes, SAFA is a partnership. Absent evidence of an earlier agreement, SAFA was constituted as a partnership at
the time its partners signed the Articles of Partnership, wherein they bound themselves to establish a partnership
for the practice of law, contribute capital and industry for the purpose, and receive compensation and benefits in
the course of its operation. While the MOU evinces the parties’ intention to entirely shift any liability that may
be incurred by SAFA in the course of its operation to S, who shall also receive all the remaining assets of the firm
upon its dissolution, this does not convert SAFA into a sole proprietorship. SAFA was manifestly established as a
partnership based on the Articles of Partnership. The MOU reinforces this fact. It did not change the nature of
the organization of SAFA but only excused the industrial partners from liability (Saludo v. PNB, G.R. No. 193138,
August 20, 2018).
A partner cannot demand the return of his share (contribution) during the existence of a partnership.
Do you agree? (2012 Bar)
Yes, I agree. A partner is not entitled to the return of his contribution to the capital of the partnership, but only to
the net profits from the partnership business during the life of the partnership. As held in Villareal v. Ramirez,
(G. R. No. 144214, July 14, 2003), a share in a partnership can be returned only after the completion of the latter’s
dissolution, liquidation and winding up of the business. However, if he is a limited partner, he may ask for the
return of his contributions as provided in Arts. 1856 and 1857 of the Civil Code.
Is an oral partnership valid? (2009 Bar)

Yes, an oral partnership is valid. A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property
or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary, and an inventory shall
be made and signed by the parties and attached to the public instrument (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1771 and 1773).
Obligations of the Partners
Can an industrial partner, and a capitalist partner, engage in a business other than that of the
partnership?
An industrial partner cannot engage in business for himself, unless the partnership expressly permits him to do
so; and if he should do so, the capitalist partners may either exclude him from the firm or avail themselves of the
benefits which he may have obtained in violation of this provision, with a right to damages in either case (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1789).
The capitalist partners cannot engage for their own account in any operation which is of the kind of business in
which the partnership is engaged, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Any capitalist partner violating this
prohibition shall bring the common funds any profits accruing to him from his transactions, and shall personally
bear the losses (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1808).
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A, B, and C were partners, the first one being an industrial partner. During the first year of operation,
the firm made a profit of Php3,000,000.00. During the second year, a loss of Php1,500,000.00 was
sustained. Thus, the net profit for the two (2) years of operation was only Php1,500,000.00. In the
Articles of Partnership it was stipulated that A, the industrial partner would get 1/3 of the profits, but
would not participate in the losses.
a. Is the stipulation valid? Why?
Yes, the stipulation is valid. The law exempts the industrial partner from losses. In the absence of stipulation, the
share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to what they may have contributed, but the
industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1797).
b. How much will A be entitled to receive?

A will get only 1/3 of Php1,500,000.00, the net profit and not 1/3 of Php3,000,000.00. While it is true that he
does not share in the losses, this only means that he will not share in the net losses. It is understood that he shares in
the losses insofar as these can be accommodated in the profits (Criado v. Hermanos, G.R. No. L-12371, March 23,
1918). The rule that the industrial partner is not liable for losses refers to distribution of losses among the partners
themselves in the settlement of partnership affairs and does not apply to partnership obligations in favor of third
persons (La Compañia Maritima v. Muñoz, G.R. No. L-3704, December 12, 1907).
What are the property rights of a partner? (SIM)

The property rights of a partner are:
1. His rights in Specific partnership property;
2. His Interest in the partnership; and
3. His right to participate in the Management (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1810).
What is the nature of the liability of the partners for partnership contracts entered into in its name
and for its account?
The nature of the liability is pro rata. All partners, including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their
property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted, for the contracts which may be entered into in
the name and for the account of the partnership, under its signature and by a person authorized to act for the
partnership (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1816).
C and G, as partners, mortgaged to M two (2) lots, including the improvements thereon, all belonging
to the partnership, to secure the payment of a loan. The partnership failed to pay the loan. The mortgage
was foreclosed and the properties were sold at a public auction to M. Before the expiration of the one-
year period of redemption, C, on his own behalf, redeemed the properties with his private funds. The
sheriff issued the corresponding certificate of redemption in favor of C. Did C become the absolute
owner of the property by reason of the redemption he effected?
No, C did not become the absolute owner of the property upon making the redemption. A partner is an agent of the
partnership as provided in Art. 1818 of the Civil Code. Article 1807 further provides that every partner becomes a
trustee for his co-partner with regard to any benefits or profits derived from his act as partner. Consequently, when
C redeemed the properties in question, he became a trustee and held the same in trust for his co-partner G, subject
to his right to demand from the latter his contribution to the amount of redemption. Hence, C did not become the
absolute owner of the redeemed property (Catalan v. Gatchalian, G.R. No. L-11648, April 22, 1959).
Dissolution and Winding Up
Is the partnership terminated upon dissolution?

No. On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is
completed (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1829).
A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the restaurant had
gone past break-even stage and started to garner considerable profits, C died. A and B continued the
business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact opened a branch of the restaurant, incurring
obligations in the process. Creditors started demanding for the payment of their obligations.
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a. Who are liable for the settlement of the partnership’s obligations?

Only the two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. The use by the person or partnership continuing the business
of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 1840). The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable only for the obligations of the partnership
incurred while he was a partner (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1835).
b. What are the creditors’ recourse/s? (2010 Bar)

The creditors of the new partnership can file an action for the collection of sum of money against the partnership
and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted, the creditors may go after the private properties of A and B
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 1816). The creditors of the partnership shall be preferred as regards the partnership property
M and R executed their Articles of Co-Partnership called EDE with only the two (2) of them as
partners. Because of the difficulties encountered, M and R decided to avail of the services of P as
industrial partner. Thus, M, R, and P executed their Articles of Co-Partnership under the same firm
name EDE. Aside from the slight difference in the purpose of the second partnership which is to hold
and secure renewal of timber license instead of to secure the license as in the first partnership and the
term of the second partnership is fixed to thirty (30) years, everything else is the same. Thereafter,
the second partnership was dissolved by common consent and M and R bought the interest of P. The
partnership was then continued by M and R. However, R took funds from the partnership more than
his contribution. Thus, in a letter, M notified R that he dissolved the partnership. Can M unilaterally
dissolve the partnership?
Yes, M can unilaterally dissolve the partnership. As there are only two parties when M notified R that he dissolved
the partnership, it is in effect a notice of withdrawal. Under Art. 1830, par. 2 of the Civil Code, even if there
is a specified term, one partner can cause its dissolution by expressly withdrawing even before the expiration of
the period, with or without justifiable cause. Of course, if the cause is not justified or no cause was given, the
withdrawing partner is liable for damages but in no case can he be compelled to remain in the firm. With his
withdrawal, the number of members is decreased, hence, the dissolution (Rojas v. Maglana, G.R. No. 30616,
December 10, 1990).
What is a charging order?

A charging order is a judgment secured by a creditor subjecting the interest of the debtor-partner in the partnership.
By virtue of the charging order, any amount or portion thereof which the partnership would otherwise pay to the
debtor-partner should instead be given to the judgment creditor. This remedy is, however, without prejudice to the
preferred rights of partnership creditors under Art. 1827 of the Civil Code. It means that the claims of partnership
creditors must be satisfied first before the separate creditors of the partners can be paid out of the interest charged
(CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1839 (8), and 1814).
Limited Partnership
What is a limited partnership?

A limited partnership is one formed by two or more persons under the provisions of the following article, having as
members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1843).
Can a limited partner contribute services?

No. The contributions of a limited partner may be cash or property, but not services (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1845).
Can a limited partner be held liable for partnership obligations?

The general rule is that limited partners are only liable up to their capital contribution and as such, they shall not
be bound by the obligations of the partnership (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1843). However, a limited partner whose
surname appears in a partnership name contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 1846 is liable
as a general partner to partnership creditors who extend credit to the partnership without actual knowledge that
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he is not a general partner (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1846). Moreover, a limited partner shall become liable as a general
partner if, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the
business (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1848).
Agency
Nature, Form and Kinds
What are the essential elements of an agency? (CORS)

The essential elements of agency are:
1. There is Consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship;
2. The Object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
3. The agents acts as a Representative and not for himself, and
4. The agent acts within the Scope of his authority (Rallos vs Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, G.R.
No. L-24332, January 31, 1978).
When is a special power of attorney necessary for the acts of an agent to be valid?
(PNC-LPGS-GLOW-IRRD)
Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
1. To make such Payments as are not usually considered as acts of administration;
2. To effect Novations which put an end to obligations already in existence at the time the agency was
constituted;
3. To Compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to
waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired;
4. To Lease any real property to another person for more than one year;
5. To bind the principal in a contract of Partnership;
6. To obligate the principal as a Guarantor or surety;
7. To bind the principal to render some Service without compensation;
8. To make Gifts, except customary ones for charity or those made to employees in the business managed by
the agent;
9. To Loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgent and indispensable for the preservation of the
things which are under administration;
10. To enter into any contract by which the Ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either
gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;
11. To Waive any obligation gratuitously;
12. To accept or repudiate an Inheritance;
13. To Ratify or recognize obligations contracted before the agency; and
14. To create or convey Real rights over immovable property;
15. Any other act of strict Dominion (CIVIL CODE, 1878).
A regularly purchased sugar from B evidenced by several Shipping Lists/Delivery receipts issued by
the latter. A subsequently sold one of its rights evidenced by a receipt to C for Php15,000,000.00. C
wrote to B informing the latter that it was authorized by A to withdraw the sugar covered by such
receipt. Enclosed in the letter was a copy of the receipt and a letter of authority from A authorizing
C to withdraw for and in its behalf the sugar covered by said receipt in the total quantity of 25,000
bags. A then issued checks payable to B covering 50,000 bags which included those under C’s receipt. C
was able to withdraw 2,000 before B refused to allow further withdrawals. B stated that A had already
withdrawn all the bags covered by the cleared checks the latter previously issued. It had also reasoned
that C only represented A in its transactions with B. Is C considered an agent of A?
No, C is not an agent A. It is clear from Art. 1868 of the Civil Code that the basis of agency is representation. On
the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from
his words or actions, and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act
on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency. One factor, which most clearly distinguishes
agency from other legal concepts, is control; one person – the agent – agrees to act under the control or direction
of another – the principal. Indeed, the very word “agency” has come to connote control by the principal. Here,
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it appears that C was a buyer and not an agent of A. C was not subject to A’s control, thus, not an agent of A
(Victorias Millings Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117356, June 19, 2000).
A foreign manufacturer of computers and a Philippine distributor entered into a contract whereby the
distributor agreed to order 1,000 units of the manufacturer’s computers every month and to resell them
in the Philippines at the manufacturer’s suggested prices plus 10%. All unsold units at the end of the
year shall be bought back by the manufacturer at the same price they were ordered. The manufacturer
shall hold the distributor free and harmless from any claim for defects in the units. Is the agreement one
for sale or agency? (2000 Bar)
The contract is one of agency, not sale. In an agency, the principal retains ownership and control over the property
and the agent merely acts on the principal’s behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of the objectives for
which the agency was established. On the other hand, the contract is a sale if the parties intended that the delivery
of the property will effect a relinquishment of title, control and ownership in such a way that the recipient may do
with the property as he pleases. The primordial differentiating consideration between the two (2) contracts is the
transfer of ownership or title over the property subject of the contract. Here, the notion of sale is negated by terms
of the contract. Since the foreign manufacturer retained ownership of the goods, even as it delivered possession
unto the dealer/distributor for resale to customers, the price and terms of which were subject to the manufacturer’s
control, thus, the relationship between the manufacturer and the distributor is one of agency (Sps. Fernando v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 188288, January 16, 2012).
Obligations of the Agent
What are the general obligations of an agent? (CDF)

The general obligations of an agent are:
1. To Carry out the agency which he has accepted;
2. To answer for the Damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer; and
3. To Finish the business already begun on the death of the principal, should delay entail any danger (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1884).
X appoints Y as his agent to sell his products in Cebu City. Can Y appoint a subagent and if he does,
what are the effects of such appointment? (1999 Bar)
Yes, the agent may appoint a substitute or subagent if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so, but
he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute: (1) when he was not given the power to appoint one; (2)
when he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person appointed was notoriously
incompetent or insolvent. All acts of the substitute appointed against the prohibition of the principal shall be void
Broker A was granted authority by B to sell his lot for Php1,000.00 per sq. m. A is entitled to 5%
commission on the total price in case the property is sold. C was later introduced to A as a prospective
buyer of the lot. Negotiations ensued between the parties that resulted in B agreeing to C’s price offer of
Php500 per sq. m. C subsequently gave A Php100,000.00 as gift for successfully persuading B to accept
his offer to purchase the lot at a lower price. A did not disclose such matter to B.
a. Is A entitled to his commission?

No, A is not entitled to his commission. The law imposes upon the agent the absolute obligation to make a full
disclosure or complete account to his principal of all his transactions and other material facts relevant to the
agency, so much so that the law as amended does not countenance any stipulation exempting the agent from
such an obligation and considers such an exemption as void. The duty of an agent is likened to that of a trustee.
A’s acceptance of a substantial monetary gift corrupted his duty to serve the interests only of his principal and
undermined his loyalty to his principal. As a necessary consequence of such breach of trust, A must forfeit his
right to the commission and must return the part of the commission he received from his principal (Domingo v.
Domingo, G.R. No. L-30573, October 29, 1971).
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b. Supposing A acted only as a middleman, does he have the same duty as the agent to render accounts?
No. The duty embodied in Art. 1891 of the Civil Code will not apply if the agent or broker acted only as a
middleman with the task of merely bringing together the vendor and vendee, who themselves thereafter will
negotiate on the terms and conditions of the transaction (Domingo v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30573, October 29,
1971).
When may an agent sue or be sued in his own name? (UPO)

An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements
concur:
1. The agent acted for the benefit of an Undisclosed principal; and
2. The transaction did not involve the Property of the principal
3. The agent acted in his Own name during the transaction (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1883; V-Gent, Inc. v.
Morning Star Travel And Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015).
Note: When these elements are present, the agent becomes bound as if the transaction were its own (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1883)
Obligations of the Principal
What are the obligations of the principal? (CARPI)

The obligations of the principal to the agent are:
1. To Comply with all the obligations which the agent may have contracted in his name and within the scope
of his authority (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1910);
2. To Advance, should the agent so request, sums necessary for the execution of the agency (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 1912, par 1);
3. To Reimburse the agent for all advances made by him, provided the agent is free from fault (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 1912, par 2);
4. To Pay the agent the compensation agreed upon or the reasonable value of the latter’s services (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1875); and
5. To Indemnify the agent for all the damages which the execution of the agency may have caused the latter
without fault or negligence on his part (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1913).
R, an Acting Manager of C Bank, persuaded T to open an account and to place her money in some high
interest rate mechanism, to which T agreed. R would then deliver to her the interest earned while she
handed her passbook for updating. Later, R offered to sign-up T to a back-to-back scheme where the
bank is authorized by depositors to use their deposits and invest the same in business ventures that yield
high interest. T agreed and signed the documents without reading them and invested Php1,800,000.00
to C Bank. R later failed to remit to T the interest as scheduled. R refused to return the investment
despite demands from T. Thus, T filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. Is C Bank solidarily
liable with R?
Yes, C Bank is solidarily liable with R. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily
liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1911).
A banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is made in the course of its
business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority even though, in the particular case, the agent is
secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person, for his
own ultimate benefit. In the case, R as branch manager was “clothed” and “held out” as having the power to enter
into the subject agreements with T. The existence of apparent or implied authority estopped C Bank from denying
R’s authority, thus, as the employer, C Bank is solidarily liable to T for damages caused by the acts of R (Citystate
Savings Bank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 227990, March 7, 2018).
RDC is a domestic corporation engaged in renting out real estate. S, as president of RDC, took out a
loan from X secured by a real estate mortgage over RDC’s property. To prove her authority to execute the
mortgage contracts in RDC’s behalf, S presented a Board Resolution. However, RDC failed to pay its
loan. Thus, X initiated foreclosure proceedings on the real estate mortgage. To prevent the foreclosure,
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RDC filed a complaint to annul the real estate mortgages alleging that RDC’s former President S (who
was removed after the execution of the mortgage contracts) did not have sufficient proof of authority
to bind RDC. Do the acts of S in obtaining the loan and securing it by a real estate mortgage over
RDC’s property bind the latter?
Yes, the acts of S bind RDC. The doctrine of apparent authority, which is based on the principle of estoppel,
provides that even if no actual authority has been conferred on an agent, her acts, as long as they are within her
apparent scope of authority, bind the principal. As the former president of RDC, it was within S’s scope of
authority to act for and enter into contracts in RDC’s behalf. X could not be faulted for continuing to transact
with S because RDC clothed her with apparent authority (Calubad v. Ricarcen Development Corp., G.R. No.
202364, August 30, 2017)
Modes of Extinguishment
What are the modes of extinguishment of an agency? (EDWARD)

An agency is extinguished by:
1. By the Expiration of the period for which the agency was constituted;
2. By the Death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent;
3. By the Withdrawal of the agent;
4. By the Accomplishment of the object or purpose of the agency;
5. By its Revocation; and
6. By the Dissolution of the firm or corporation which entrusted or accepted the agency (CIVIL CODE, Art.
1919)
A lawyer was given an authority by means of a Special Power of Attorney by his client to sell a parcel of
land for the amount of Php3,000,000.00. Since the client owed the lawyer Php1,000,000.00 in attorney’s
fees in a prior case he handled, the client agreed that if the property is sold, the lawyer was entitled to
get 5% agent’s fee plus Php1,000,000.00 as payment for his unpaid attorney’s fees. The client, however,
subsequently found a buyer of his own who was willing to buy the property for a higher amount. Can
the client unilaterally rescind the authority he gave in favor of his lawyer? (2015 Bar)
No, because the agency in the present case is coupled with interest. A contract of agency is revocable at will, except
if it was established for the common benefit of the agent and the principal (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1920, and 1927).
An agency is deemed as one coupled with an interest where it is established for the mutual benefit of the principal
and of the agent. The agent’s interest must be in the subject matter of the power conferred and not merely an
interest in the exercise of the power because it entitles him to compensation (Lim v. Saban, G.R. No. 163720,
December 16, 2004) In this case, the interest of the lawyer is not merely limited to his commission for the sale of the
property but extends to his right to collect his unpaid professional fees. Hence, it is not revocable at will.
A entered into a financing agreement with B in order to finance the former’s imports. A also granted
B Special Power of Attorney (SPA) which authorized the latter to represent A and engage in business
transactions. A was later surprised by a service of an alias writ of execution to enforce judgment
obtained by XYZ Bank against him despite having submitted already an amortization plan to settle his
account. He learned that the execution has been produced due to a derogatory information received by
XYZ Bank from B. A also learned of the several acts of disloyalty done by B. These caused A to revoke
the SPA previously given to B. May the principal validly revoke an agency coupled with interest?
Yes, the principal may validly revoke an agency even if coupled with interest. The power of attorney can be made
irrevocable by contract only in the sense that the principal may not recall it at his pleasure; but coupled with
interest or not, the authority certainly can be revoked for a just cause, such as when the attorney-in-fact betrays
the interest of the principal, as what happened in this case. The irrevocability of the power of attorney may not be
used to shield the perpetration of acts in bad faith, breach of confidence, or betrayal of trust, by the agent for that
would amount to holding that a power coupled with an interest authorizes the agent to commit frauds against the
principal (Coleongco v. Claparols, G.R. No. L-18616, March 31, 1964).
CMS is a forest concessionaire engaged in the logging business, while D is engaged in the business of
exporting and selling logs and lumber. In 1957, CMS and D entered into a contract of agency whereby
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the former appointed the latter as its exclusive export and sales agent for all logs that the former may
produce, for a period of five (5) years. About six (6) months prior to the expiration of the agreement,
CMS discovered that D had used S as agent, representative or liaison officer in selling CMS’s logs in
Japan. After this discovery, CMS sold and shipped logs directly to several firms in Japan without the aid
or intervention of D. Does the act of CMS in selling its logs constitute revocation of agency?
Yes, the act of CMS constitutes an implied revocation of the contract of agency. The principal may revoke a
contract of agency at will, and such revocation may be express, or implied, and may be availed of even if the period
fixed in the contract of agency has not yet expired. As the principal has this absolute right to revoke the agency,
the agent cannot object thereto; neither may he claim damages arising from such revocation, unless it is shown
that such was done to evade the payment of agent’s commission. Art. 1924 of the Civil Code provides that the
agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third
persons. Here, CMS appointed D as its agent for the sale of its logs to Japanese firms. Yet, during the existence
of the contract of agency, CMS sold its logs directly to several Japanese firms (CMS Logging, Inc. v CA, G.R. No.
L-41420, July 10, 1992).
In 1930, P authorized A to sell a particular lot. This authority to sell was annotated on the original
certificate of the title of the lot. In 1934, P died. In 1939, P’s children sold the land to B. This sale
was not registered. In 1944, A, without knowing the death of P, sold the same lot to C, an innocent
purchaser for value. This sale was duly registered. Is the sale of the same lot to C valid?
Yes, the sale is valid as the death of the principal in this case did not end the authority of the agent. Art. 1931 of the
Civil Code provides that anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any
other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to third persons who may
have contracted with him in good faith. Hence, the sale made by A after the death of P is valid and effective (Buason
v. Panuyas, G.R. No. 11415, May 25, 1959).
Credit Transactions (Part I)
Loan
What is a contract of mutuum?

By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another money or other consumable thing, upon the condition
that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan
or mutuum (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1933).
Distinguish commodatum from mutuum. (2017 Bar)

Commodatum is distinguished from mutuum as follows:
1. As to what must be returned: In mutuum, the debtor shall return to the creditor an equivalent amount of
the subject matter, while in commodatum, the same thing that was delivered should be returned;
2. As to cause: Mutuum may be gratuitous or onerous, while commodatum is gratuitous;
3. As to transmission of ownership: The borrower in mutuum acquires ownership, while in commodatum,
one does not acquire ownership
4. As to object: Mutuum refers to personal property, while commodatum may refer to real and personal
property (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1933, 1937, and 1953).
Can a contract of loan be an “open-ended contract” or a contract with an indefinite period?

No. A period is contemplated in a contract of loan and it cannot be an “open-ended contract” or a contract with an
indefinite period. The distinction between “open-ended contracts” or contracts with indefinite period and “term
contracts” or contracts for a specific period has no legal basis as far as a loan, whether commodatum or mutuum,
is concerned. As provided in Article 1933 of the Civil Code, by the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to
another, either something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in
which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that
the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or
mutuum (Bulatao v. Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
CIVIL LAW
What are the contracts involved in a credit card transaction?

Every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder
and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the
credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the
merchant or business establishment (Bankard, Inc. v. Alarte, G.R. No. 202573, April 19, 2017, citing Pantaleon v.
American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269 (Resolution), August 25, 2010).
What are the two types of interest?

The two types of interest are monetary interest and compensatory interest. Interest as a compensation fixed by the
parties for the use or forbearance of money is referred to as monetary interest, while interest that may be imposed
by law or by courts as penalty for damages is referred to as compensatory interest (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won
Choi, G.R. No. 220826; March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the two conditions required for the payment of monetary interest?
Under Art. 1956 of the Civil Code, the concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary
interest:
1. There was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and
2. The agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing (Philippine Commercial and
International Bank v. William Golangco Construction Corp. G.R. Nos. 195372 & 195375; April 10, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Does the willingness of the parties to enter into a relation involving an unconscionable interest rate
make the stipulated rate valid?
No, because the willingness of the parties to enter into a relation involving an unconscionable interest rate is
inconsequential to the validity of the stipulated rate. The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a
money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant
spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in
law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such
imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals (Bulatao v.
Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What is the legal interest referred to in Article 2209 of the Civil Code?
The legal interest referred to in Article 2209 of the Civil Code is six percent (6%) per annum or as may be fixed by
the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended by PD 116 (Lara’s
Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019).
In what instances is the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas applicable
where there is an absence of stipulated interest?
The prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas applies, in the absence of stipulated
interest, on the following:
1. Loans;
2. Forbearance of any money, goods or credits; and
3. Judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits (Id.).
Note: Under Section 1 of PD 116, the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
applies to “judgments” in the absence of stipulated interest.
When is the reckoning point for compensatory interest when imposed on unliquidated claims?
The reckoning point for compensatory interest, when imposed on unliquidated claims, is set on the date
of the judgment of the court or quasi-judicial body granting the award since it is only at such time when the
amount claimed becomes “liquidated,” that is, determined with reasonable certainty (Philippine Commercial
and International Bank v. William Golangco Construction Corp. G.R. Nos. 195372 & 195375; April 10, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Compensatory interest shall begin to run either:

1. From the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand (where the claim is liquidated or can otherwise be
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established with reasonable certainty); or

2. From the date the judgment of the court or quasi-judicial body is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained) (Philippine Commercial and International
Bank v. William Golangco Construction Corp. G.R. Nos. 195372 & 195375; April 10, 2019, Caguioa
Case).
Deposit
What is a contract of commodatum?

By the contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so that
the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1933)
Are deposits of money in banks and similar institutions, such as savings deposits and current account
deposits, contracts of depositum?
No. Deposits of money in banks and similar institutions, such as savings deposits and current account deposits
are in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum (The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rosales, G.R. No.
183204, January 13, 2014). In fact, fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions
shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1980).
X deposited Php20,000.00 pesos with Y Bank. The money was placed in a box, properly sealed and
marked and identified as X’s property, and such box was found in the vault of the Bank. Subsequently,
the bank was declared insolvent. During the insolvency proceedings, X intervened claiming the
Php20,000.00 deposited does not constitute a part of the assets of the Bank that will be placed in the
possession of the receiver or assignee because he is still the owner.
a. Is X the owner of the money?

Yes, X is the owner of Php20,000. Art. 1962 of the Civil Code provides that deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the
same. Here, the contract that was perfected is a contract of deposit. Consequently, as the purpose of the contract is
for safekeeping, the ownership of the amount placed in the box was not transmitted to the Bank when the deposit
was constituted. Therefore, X can properly claim that the amount cannot constitute a part of the assets of the Bank
that will be placed in possession of the receiver or assignee, because he is still the owner thereof.
b. Suppose in the above problem, the Php20,000 was deposited in the current account of X in Y Bank
and was not placed in a box. Would that make any difference in your answer?
Yes, as this time the contract is a simple loan. Art. 1962 of the Civil Code provides that if the safekeeping of the
thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. There is
a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings
deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations
of the parties (Central Bank of the Phils. v. Citytrust Banking Corp., G.R. No. 141835, February 4, 2009). Thus, X
cannot, in this case, claim ownership over the money deposited.
X dined at a restaurant and entrusted her employer-assigned car at the valet parking service of Y and
a corresponding receipt was given for the car. The car was parked by Y’s valet attendant, however a few
minutes later X noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key was no longer in the box
where valet attendants usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Is Y
considered a depositary of the subject vehicle?
Yes, Y is considered a depositary of the subject vehicle. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it
becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor. A safe parking
space is an added attraction to Y’s restaurant because customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicles are
safely kept, rather than parking them elsewhere at their own risk. X fully expects the security of her car while at Y’s
premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the end of her visit at Y’s restaurant (Triple-V Food Services,
Inc. v. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 160544 (Notice), February 21, 2005)
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Discuss the contractual relation of precarium.

Precarium is a kind of commodatum whereby the bailor may demand the thing loaned at will in the following cases:
1. If neither the duration of the contract nor the use to which the thing loaned should be devoted, has been
stipulated; or
2. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the owner (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1947; Pajuyo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004).
Guaranty and Suretyship
RL Corp bound itself to construct a condominium for DL Corp and appointed AF Inc. as its sub-
contractor. As sub-contractor, AF Inc. secured a Performance Bond from ML Co. Under the terms of
the performance bond, ML Co. bound itself to pay DL Corp upon first demand. Because of the poor
progress of the works, DL Corp demanded liquidation of the performance bond and terminated the
sub-contract agreement with AF Inc. When negotiations between the parties fell through, DL Corp
reiterated its demand for liquidation but ML Co. denied the claim. Thus, DL Corp filed a case against
AF Inc., and ML Co., as surety.
a. Distinguish suretyship from guaranty.

A surety is an insurer of the debt; a guarantor is an insurer of the solvency of the debtor. A suretyship is an
undertaking that the debt shall be paid; a guaranty, an undertaking that the debtor shall pay. A surety binds himself
to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his ability to do so; a guarantor, does not contract that the
principal will pay, but simply that he is able to do so. In other words, a surety undertakes directly for the payment
and is so responsible at once if the principal debtor makes default, while a guarantor contracts to pay if, by the
use of due diligence, the debt cannot be made out of the principal debtor (The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. v.
DMCI-Laing Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 205007, September 16, 2019, Caguioa Case).
b. Is the Performance Bond considered as a contract of surety, making ML Co.’s liability primary?
Yes, the performance bond is considered as a contract of surety. While the contract of surety stands secondary to
the principal obligation, the surety’s liability is direct, primary and absolute, albeit limited to the amount for which
the contract of surety is issued. The surety’s liability attaches the moment a demand for payment is made by the
creditor. It is not necessary that the original debtor first failed to pay before the surety could be made liable. Here,
while the bond in this case is “conditioned” upon first demand, the terms of the agreement unequivocally indicate
that ML Co.’s liability consists of a pure obligation since such liability attaches immediately upon demand.
Accordingly, the requirement of “first demand” in this case should be understood in light of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code, wherein the debtor is deemed to be in delay upon judicial or extrajudicial demand (The Mercantile
Insurance Co., Inc. v. DMCI-Laing Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 205007, September 16, 2019, Caguioa Case).
In 2011, A, together with other banking institutions (Series A Noteholders), entered into a five-year
floating rate note facility agreement with debtor B. To secure payment of the Series A Notes, Z executed
a Guarantee Agreement whereby it itself directly and principally liable without any qualification to the
Series A Noteholders and without the need of any prior recourse to the debtor B. In 2013, Typhoon
Yolly damaged B’s manufacturing facilities so B filed for a petition for rehabilitation. A filed its Notice
of Claim but Z declined to give it due course. A argues that Z expressly waived the benefit of excussion
in the Guarantee Agreement. Is Z liable as a guarantor?
No, Z is liable as a surety. Under a normal contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to
fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. However, the guarantor cannot
be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the
legal remedies against the debtor. This is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion. Conversely, if this benefit of
excussion is waived, the guarantor can be directly compelled by the creditor to pay the entire debt even without the
exhaustion. One of the hallmarks of a contract of guaranty is its subsidiary character — “that the guarantor only
answers if the debtor cannot fulfill his obligation; hence the benefit of excussion in favor of the guarantor.”
Here, Z had expressly renounced the benefit of excussion. In effect, the nature of the guarantee obligation assumed
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by Z under the Guarantee Agreement was transformed into a suretyship. This is because the defining characteristic
that distinguishes a guarantee from a suretyship is that in the latter, the obligor promises to pay the principal’s debt
if the principal will not pay, while in the former, the obligor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the
principal and exhausting all of the principal’s properties, may proceed against the obligor (Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 233850, July 1, 2019, Caguioa
Case)
Discuss the concept of a continuing guaranty.

A continuing guaranty is one that covers all transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within
the description or contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the expiration or termination thereof. Under
Article 2053 of the Civil Code, a guaranty may be given to secure even future debts, the amount of which may
not be known at the time the guaranty is executed. A continuing guaranty is not limited to a single transaction,
but contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time
or until revoked. It is prospective in its operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect to
future transactions within certain limits, and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue, the
guarantor becomes liable (Bank of Commerce v. Spouses Flores, G.R. No. 174006, December 8, 2010).
Discuss the concept of the benefit of division.

Should there be several guarantors of only one debtor and for the same debt, the obligation to answer for the same
is divided among all. The creditor cannot claim from the guarantors except the shares which they are respectively
bound to pay, unless solidarity has been expressly stipulated. The benefit of division against the co-guarantors
ceases in the same cases and for the same reasons as the benefit of excussion against the principal debtor (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 2065).
Quasi-Contracts
D leased from M a parcel of land and a building both located at Pasay City. Thereafter, a Resolution No.
98-30 was passed by M, increasing the rentals paid by its concessionaires and lessees. D protested but
nevertheless paid the increased rentals. The Resolution was eventually nullified by the Supreme Court,
so D then continued paying at the original rental rate. M then required the payment of the balance of
rentals. D, on the other hand, demanded for the refund of its overpayment, and filed a complaint for
collection of sums of money. Does the overpayment of D constitute solutio indebiti?
No. Two conditions must concur in order to establish the application of solutio indebiti: (1) a payment is made
when there exists no binding relation between the payor who has no duty to pay, and the person who received
the payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. It
cannot be said that the overpayment of monthly rentals was made when there existed no binding juridical tie or
relation between the payor and the person who received the payment because there is a binding relation between
D and M. As to the second requirement, D deliberately made the payments in accordance with M’s issuance of the
Resolution, albeit under protest, not due to any mistaken belief, but for the sole reason that the Resolution was
still presumed to be legal before it was nullified (Domestic Petroleum Retailer Corporation v. Manila International
Airport Authority, G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
RT is an account holder of U Bank. RT deposited Php420,000.00 through a check drawn against the
account of A, allegedly the client of RT. Two (2) days later, RT withdrew Php480,000.00 from the said
account, knowing that A’s account had been closed. Later that day, the check was returned to U Bank
as the account against which it was drawn had been closed, so it discovered that RT’s account had been
mistakenly credited. Thus, U Bank demanded from RT the reimbursement of the Php420,000.00 which
had been allegedly credited to RT’s account due to a technical error in the bank’s system. When RT
refused to pay, U Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money. Is RT bound to return the proceeds of the
dishonored check?
Yes, RT is bound to return the proceeds of the dishonored check based on the principle of unjust enrichment
under Article 22 of the Civil Code. For the principle to apply, the following requisites must concur: (i) a person
is unjustly benefited; and (ii) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. In this case, RT
withdrew and utilized the proceeds of the check fully knowing that he was not entitled thereto. Evidently, U Bank
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was under no obligation to effect payment in favor of RT precisely because the check which RT deposited for
collection had been dishonored. Allowing RT to retain the proceeds of the dishonored check, despite not being
entitled thereto, would therefore permit unjust enrichment at U Bank’s expense as the collecting bank (Yon Mitori
International Industries v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225538; October 14, 2020, Caguioa Case)
Torts and Damages
Torts
What are the requisites of quasi-delict? (DNC)

A quasi-delict has the following elements:
1. The Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
2. The act or omission of the defendant supposedly constituting fault or Negligence; and
3. The Causal connection between the act and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, or proximate cause
(VDM Trading, Inc. v. Carungcong, G.R. No. 206709; February 6, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Can an action on quasi-delict be maintained even if there is an existing contractual relation between
the parties?
Yes, an action for quasi-delict may be maintained notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the
parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source
of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
the rules on tort to apply (American Express International v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, October 14, 2005).
Discuss the difference between actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-
delicts.
Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses,
and proof. They generally cannot coexist. Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is presumed negligent
and must prove not being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the complaining party has the burden of proving
the other party’s negligence. If a contracting party’s act that breaches the contract would have given rise to an
extracontractual liability had there been no contract, the contract would be deemed breached by a tort, and the
party may be held liable under Article 2176 and its related provisions. However, if the act complained of would
not give rise to a cause of action for a quasi-delict independent of the contract, then the provisions on quasi-delict
or tort would be inapplicable (Orient Freight International, Inc., v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., Inc., G.R. No.
191937, August 9, 2017).
What are the requisites in order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle? (LBI)
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur:
1. The existence of a Legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in Bad faith; and
3. For the sole Intent of prejudicing or injuring another (Van De Brug v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No.
207004; June 06, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Note: The SC explained that the source of the obligation being espoused under Chapter 2, Human Relations of
the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code (which includes Articles 19, 20, and 21) is quasi-delict (Van De Brug v.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 207004; June 06, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the woman giving herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme to entice her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil
Code not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
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committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy (Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97336, February 19, 1993).
Distinguish Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa Contractual, and Culpa Criminal.

Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual Culpa Criminal
As to legal basis of liability

Fault or negligence resulting in Obligation arises from the breach Existence of a law clearly punishing
damage or injury to another. of the contract because of the the act.
defendant’s failure to exercise due
care in its performance.
As to nature of negligence
Direct, substantive, and Negligence is merely incidental Direct, substantive, and independent.
independent. to the performance of an existing
obligation.
As to necessity of criminal intent
Not necessary Necessary
As to quantum of proof required
Preponderance of evidence (RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section Proof beyond reasonable doubt
1) (Barredo v. Garcia, G.R. No.
L-48006, July 8, 1942).
As to existence of pre-contractual obligation
None Exists None
As to defense of “good father of a family”
A complete and proper defense Exercise of the diligence of a good Not a proper defense.
insofar as parents, guardians, father of a family in the selection
and employers are concerned and supervision of employees is not
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad a complete and proper defense but
Co., G.R. No. L-12191, can mitigate liability for damages
October 14, 1918) (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.,
supra).
As to presumption of negligence
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Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual Culpa Criminal

As a rule, the injured party Presumption of negligence Innocence of the accused is presumed
must prove the negligence immediately attaches by a failure until the contrary is proven.
of the defendant (Cangco v. of a covenant or its tenor (FGU
Manila Insurance Corp. v. G.P. Sarmiento
Railroad Co., supra). Trucking Corp., G.R. No. 141910,
August 6, 2002).
Exceptions under Articles

2184, 2185 and 2188
a. Article 2184 - It is
disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless
driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two (2)
months.
b. Article 2185 - Unless
there is a proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulations.
c. Article 2188 - There
is a prima facie presumption
on the part of the defendant if
the death or injury results from
the possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poisons EXCEPT
when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
As to nature of right violated
Private Right Public Right
As to governing law
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Articles 1170-1174 of the Civil Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. Code.
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Distinguish the persons who are vicariously liable and the defenses that they may raise in order for them not
to be made liable for the negligent acts of another.
Persons for Whose
Persons Vicariously Liable Acts Liability Is Nature of Liability Defenses
Imputed
Parents (Art. 2180, NCC, Acts of their children Direct and Primary 1. The child is not
and Arts. 221 and 236 up to 21 years of who living in their
Family Code) live in their company company.
Note: Article 221 of the (2005 Bar) 2. Exercise of diligence
Family code removes the of a good father of
alternative qualification a family to prevent
between father and mother. damage.
Guardians (Art. 2180, Minors or Direct and Primary Exercise of diligence of a
NCC) incapacitated persons good father of a family to
who are under their prevent damage.
authority and live in
their company
School, Administrators, A child who is: Direct, Principally and 1. The activity is
Teachers, and Individual, 1. A Minor; Solidary Liable (2012 not an authorized
Entity or Institution Bar). activity;
2. Under their
Engaged in Child Care 2. The child is
supervision,
(Art. 218, Family Code) not under their
instruction or Note: The parents,
custody; guardians, or persons supervision,
exercising substitute instruction, or
3. Over which
parental authority are custody;
they exercise
special parental subsidiary liable. 3. Exercise of due
authority (2005 diligence.
Bar)
Note: The
responsibility applies
to authorized activities
inside or outside the
school.
Teachers or Heads of Pupils, students, or Direct, Primary, and 1. The student is not
Establishment of Arts apprentices so long as Solidary in their custody; and
and Trade (Art. 2180, they remain in custody 2. Exercise of due
NCC) – if they are no longer diligence.
minors.
Note: Schools and (For minor children,
Administrators are NOT apply Arts. 218 and
liable. 219 of the Family
Code)
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Persons for Whose

Persons Vicariously Liable Acts Liability Is Nature of Liability Defenses
Imputed
Employers (Art. 2180, Employees and Direct, Primary, and The employee is not
NCC) household helpers Solidary with employee performing his functions
– in the service or, (1997 Bar) or is acting beyond the
on occasion of their scope of his function;
Note: It is NOT necessary
functions or the scope Exercise of due diligence
that they are engaged in any
of their task. (2005 in the selection or
business or industry
Bar) supervision of the
employee (1992, 1997,
and 2003 Bar)
The State (Art. 2180, NCC) Special Agents Direct and Primary The persons who directly
- one who receives a caused the loss is not a
fixed order, foreign special agent – the official
to the exercise of the was performing the task
duties of the official that properly pertains to
him.
A Head of Department of Subordinates that Direct and Primary He did not give a written
Government or Superior he has authorized order.
Public Officer (Sec. 38, by written order
Revised Administrative the specific act or
Code of 1987) misconduct.
Discuss the interplay of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called
registered-owner rule.
In cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen (Caravan Travel and
Tours International, Inc. vs. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631 February 10, 2016).
Note: In cases when the registered-owner rule does not coincide with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code (as
when the registered owner and the employer are not the same person), the registered owner cannot use the
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Art. 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle (Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, G.R. No. 174516; June 20, 2012).
A was scheduled for her third cesarean section. Being cleared after a preoperative physical examination,
she gave birth to a healthy baby boy. Hours after her operation, A complained of headache, chilly
sensation, restlessness, and shortness of breath. As the nurses failed to check on A, A initiated to ask for
oxygen as she was already becoming cyanotic (bluish) for lack of oxygen. The oxygen arrived almost 20
minutes later. It was then found out that she was suffering from pulmonary edema and was subsequently
transferred to the Incentive Care Unit. Since her condition did not improve, she was transferred to
WBC Hospital. Here, she was found to be suffering from Rheumatic Heart Disease which resulted to a
cardiopulmonary arrest and subsequently brain damage. A lost the use of her speech, eyesight, hearing,
and limbs. She was discharged, but still in vegetative state. A case was filed against RBC Hospital along
with its health personnel for negligence on the basis of an expert witness testimony that there was a
delay in the administration of oxygen caused by the delayed response of the nurses in RBC Hospital.
CIVIL LAW
Assuming that the nurses are negligent, can RBC Hospital be held directly liable for the negligence on
the part of the nurses?
Yes, RBC Hospital is liable. Under Art. 2180, an employer like RBC hospital may be held liable for the negligence of
its employees based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The liability of the employer under
this provision is “direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee
or a prior showing of the insolvency of that employee.” The employer may only be relieved of responsibility
upon a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The rule is that once negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the employer to overcome
the presumption of negligence on the latter’s part by proving observance of the required diligence, which in this
case, they failed to do (Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Sps. Capanzana, G.R. No. 189218, March 22, 2017).
Discuss the concept of res ipsa loquitur?

Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant
to meet with an explanation (BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014).
What are the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule?
The requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto, G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012).
What is the “doctrine of last clear chance”?

The doctrine of last clear chance, otherwise known as the doctrine of discovered peril or the humanitarian
doctrine, states that where both parties are negligent in such a way that it would be impossible to determine whose
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, the party who had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid
the accident by the use of proper care but failed to do so is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident (LBC Air Cargo v. CA, G.R. 101683, February 23, 1995).
Note: The “doctrine of last clear chance” is not applicable when:

1. The plaintiff was not negligent, that is, only the defendant was negligent.
2. The party charged (defendant) is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which
any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
3. The incident occurred in an instant and there was no appreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
4. The defendant’s negligence is a concurrent cause and which was still in operation up to the time the injury
was inflicted. In other words, the doctrine cannot be applied in a field of joint tortfeasors and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants who are concurrently negligent.
5. The plaintiff, a passenger, filed an action against a carrier based on contract.
6. The actor, though negligent, was not aware of the danger or risk brought about by a prior fraud or negligent
act. (Aquino, Torts and Damages [2019 ed.], pp. 388 to 389)
Does antecedent negligence of plaintiff always preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant?
No. The antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence (PNR v. Vizcara, G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012).
Discuss the principle of “Damnum Absque Injuria.”

The situations were there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty are often called damnum absque injuria (Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996). The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
CIVIL LAW
and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If
damages result from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria (Bernas v. Estate of Felipe Yu Han
Yat, G.R. Nos. 195908 & 195910, August 15, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Proximate Cause
What is proximate cause?

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Spouses Latonio v.
McGeorge Food Industries, G.R. No. 206184, December 6, 2017).
Is proof of proximate causation necessary in order to prove breach of contract?

No. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created (Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000).
Note: While proximate causation need not be established to prove breach of contract, the moment breach of
contract is established, the plaintiff must also establish the causal connection between the breach and the damage
before he can recover. Proximate causation in breach of contract cases in relation to scope of liability, is in fact
governed by Article 2201 of the Civil Code. (Aquino, Torts and Damages [2019 ed.], pp. 829 to 830)
Spouses M and C accompanied their eight-month-old child D to a birthday party at McDonalds

Restaurant. During the party and as part of the birthday package, McDonald’s presented two (2) mascots
– “Birdie” and “Grimace” - to entertain and dance for the guests. O was the person inside the “Birdie”
mascot suit. Intending to have D’s photo taken with the mascots, C (D’s mother) placed D on a chair in
front of the mascot “Birdie.” The mascot positioned itself behind the child and extended its “wings” to
give a good pose for the camera. After telling the mascot to hold D for a moment as photos were about
to be taken, C released her hold of D. Seconds later, the child fell head first from the chair into the floor.
The Spouses filed a complaint for damages against McDonalds. Is McDonalds the proximate cause for
D’s fall?
No. The negligence of the mother C for placing the child on a chair and expecting a bird mascot to ensure his safety
is the proximate cause of the child’s fall. The cause of D’s fall is traceable to the negligent act of C of leaving him
in the “hands” of O who was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. It is irresponsible for a mother to entrust the safety,
even momentarily, of her eight-month-old child to a mascot, in thick leather suit that had no arms to hold the child
and whose diminished ability to see, hear, feel, and move freely was readily apparent. Releasing her grasp of the
baby without waiting for any indication that the mascot heard and understood her is just plain negligence. Even
if she already informed and told the mascot that she was leaving the baby to his hold she should not have let go of
her grip because as a mother she ought to exercise the commensurate prudence and care taking into consideration
the fact that the mascot could not possibly hold D as the Birdie mascot suit does not even have hands or fingers to
be able to hold or grasp firmly (Spouses Latonio v. McGeorge Food Industries, G.R. No. 206184, December 6, 2017).
Negligence
Define negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations that ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do (Philippine Savings Bank v. Sakata, G.R. No. 229450, June 17, 2020).
What is the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case?
CIVIL LAW
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence (Picart v. Smith, G.R. No.
L-12219, March 15, 1918).
Discuss the concept of standard of conduct.

Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common standard of conduct is
that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person. To determine the diligence which must
be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.
However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person
who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness,
are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act (Francisco v. Chemical Bulk
Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 193577, September 7, 2011).
Discuss the concept of discreet paterfamilias.

The imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law is the standard of conduct generally
adopted by our laws. Pursuant to this, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that (Picart
v. Smith, G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918).
LMV is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. On the
other hand, SM Polyclinic is authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants
for overseas employment. As an LMV applicant, B went to SM Polyclinic for pre-deployment medical
examination. B was found “fit for employment” and was then deployed to Saudi. Unfortunately, when
B underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia about
two (2) months after, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. This resulted
to B’s repatriation to the Philippines. Claiming that SM Polyclinic was reckless in issuing its Medical
Report stating that B is “fit for employment”, LMV filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages
against the former. It averred that it relied on SM Polyclinic’s declaration and incurred expenses as a
consequence. SM Polyclinic argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action as the Medical
Report issued had already expired and that there was no negligence on their part when they release the
report two (2) months before the medical examination in Saudi. Was SM Polyclinic negligent in issuing
the Medical Report?
No, SM Polyclinic cannot be adjudged negligent in the absence of proof. The negligence or fault should be clearly
established, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. Even assuming that B’s diagnosis for HCV was correct,
the fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same
medical state at the time SM Polyclinic issued the Medical Report. It was incumbent upon LWV to show that there
was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was issued, may it be that standard medical procedures were
not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited B’s unfitness for deployment at that
time. There is a reasonable possibility that B became exposed to the HCV only after his medical examination with
SM Polyclinic. B was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after SM Polyclinic’s medical examination and
could have possibly contracted the same only when he arrived thereat. There being no negligence proven by LWV
through credible and admissible evidence, SM Polyclinic cannot be held liable under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
(St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 217426, December 4, 2017).
What are the disputable presumptions of negligence provided under the Civil Code?
The following are the disputable presumptions of negligence provided under the Civil Code:
1. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months (CIVIL CODE, Art. 2184);
2. It is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation (CIVIL CODE, Art. 2185);
3. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results
from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business (CIVIL CODE, Art. 2188); and
CIVIL LAW
4. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1756).
M, the bus driver of DG Bus Inc., collided with the vehicle of BC while traversing the national highway
near a bridge resulting to BC’s death. LC, the wife of BC, alleged that the car was hit by the bus due to
M’s negligence when it tried to swerve to the opposite lane to avoid the pile of boulders on the shoulder
of the road placed by DV Construction making the road narrow. LC further averred that M was over
speeding at the time of the incident. On the other hand, M denied the allegations and claimed that he
was on full stop at the time of the incident. LC filed a case for damages. Will the case prosper?
Yes, the case will prosper. It can be presumed that M was negligent under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was in violation of any traffic regulation.” was actually violating a traffic
rule found in RA 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which provides that “any
person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater or
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other
condition then and there existing.” Considering that the bus was already approaching the bridge, M should have
already slowed down a few meters away from the bridge. He should have stopped farther away from the bridge
because he would have been able to see that BC’s car was already crossing the bridge. An experienced and competent
bus driver would be able to know how to properly react upon seeing another vehicle ahead that is about to exit a
narrow bridge (Cacho v. Manahan, G.R. No. 203081, January 17, 2018).
Damages
Does the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses give rise to a right to recover damages?
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause
of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty (Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996).
Define injury, damage and damages.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered (Spouses Custodio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996).
Discuss the rule on the entitlement of corporations to a claim for damages.

A corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The
only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in its social
humiliation (Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 211533 & 212071; June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the different kinds of damages? (MENTAL) Discuss.

1. Moral Damages.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful
act or omission (Art. 2217, CIVIL CODE).
2. Exemplary or Corrective Damages.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, CIVIL CODE).
CIVIL LAW
3. Nominal Damages.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him (Art. 2221, CIVIL CODE).
4. Temperate or Moderate Damages.

Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with certainty (Art. 2224, CIVIL CODE).
Note: The SC already debunked the notion that temperate damages are appropriate only in those cases in
which pecuniary loss cannot, “by its nature.” Jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate
damages may be awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with
certainty (Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 181683 & 184568, October 7, 2015).
5. Actual Damages.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong (Lim vs. Sps. Mendoza, G.R.
No. 160110, June 18, 2014).
6. Liquidated Damages.
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof
(Art. 2226, CIVIL CODE).
DAMAGES THAT
REASON
CANNOT CO-EXIST
Nominal damages Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of
any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
Actual damages
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown but actual damages must be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Nominal damages In nominal damages, it is recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury
Moral damages
have been or can be shown but in moral damages, it must be shown that plaintiff
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and other
similar injuries.
Nominal damages In nominal damages, it is recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
any kind but in temperate damages, it may be recovered when the court finds that
Temperate damages
some pecuniary loss has been suffered.
Temperate damages Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
and loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty while actual damages must be proved with a reasonable
Actual damages
degree of certainty.
What are the constitutive elements of an award of moral damages?

An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit:
1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and
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4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 (Expert Travel & Tours, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130030; June 25, 1999).
Note: In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted
in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical
injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be
awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa
criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious
acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term “analogous cases,” referred to in Article 2219,
following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law (Expert Travel &
Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130030; June 25, 1999).
May a person claim moral damages for the death of his brother caused by quasi-delict?
No. A person who claims moral damages for the death of his brother caused by quasi-delict, is not entitled to, and
should be awarded, moral damages. Article 2206 of the new Civil Code — which provides that only the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased caused by quasi delict — should be applied (Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
v. Ybañez, G.R. No. L-22183, August 30, 1968).
Note: The SC qualified this rule such that persons exercising substitute parental authority are to be considered
ascendants for the purpose of awarding moral damages. The law forges a relationship between the ward and
the person exercising substitute parental authority such that the death or injury of one results in the damage or
prejudice of the other (Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10,
2016).
R with his two (2) daughters and a friend F, boarded a cargo truck owned by S. F was seated in front,
while R and daughters were at the back of the truck. X was the official truck driver but Y, the chief
diesel mechanic, started driving the truck. Y lost control of the truck and they fell off the wharf. R and
one of his daughters died while the other daughter and F were only injured. R’s wife filed a complaint
for damages against S, X, and Y. F testified that R was the General Manager of her businesses and
earning more or less Php15,000.00. F claimed that she could not present her accounting books to the
court because she had already disposed of them. The RTC ruled in favor of R’s wife. The CA affirmed
the decision but deleted the award of actual damages for R’s loss of earning capacity reasoning that
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the same. Is the CA correct?
No, the CA is not correct in deleting the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity. Nothing in the Rules
of Court requires that only documentary evidence is allowed in civil cases. All that is required is the satisfaction of
the quantum of evidence, that is, preponderance of evidence. In addition, the Civil Code does not prohibit a claim
for loss of earning capacity on the basis that it is not proven by documentary evidence. Testimonial evidence suffices
to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity. There
is no rule disqualifying competent officers of the corporation, as in this case F, from testifying on the compensation
of the deceased (R) as an officer of the same corporation (Torreon v. Aparra, G. R. No. 188493, December 13, 2017).
CIVIL LAW
PART II
Property
Classification of Property
ABC Corporation is a state-owned corporation with the primary purpose of administering the
operations of the Petrochemical Industrial Zone. XYZ Corporation is a private corporation engaged
in the business of transmitting electric power and was granted a franchise to operate under a law.
Pursuant to its franchise, XYZ Corporation sought to expropriate a parcel of land, upon payment of
just compensation, located in the Petrochemical Industrial Zone. The zone was initially part of the
parcel of land of the public domain but its administration and management was subsequently granted
to ABC corporation for the development and operation of petrochemical and related industries.
ABC Corporation contended that such land is a land of the public domain as it is devoted to public use
or purpose that is a matter of national interest and not a private property. Thus, it cannot be a subject of
expropriation. Does the land still form part of public domain, or does it form part of private property?
The land is a patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private property. The mere fact that a parcel of land
is owned by the State or any of its instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion.
Upon the explicit declaration of alienability and disposability, the land ceases to possess the characteristics inherent
in properties of public dominion, namely, that they are outside the commerce of man, cannot be acquired by
prescription, and cannot be registered under the land registration law, and accordingly assume the nature of
patrimonial property of the State, that is property owned by the State in its private capacity (PNOC Alternative
Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936; September 4, 2019, Caguioa Case).
M is a public utility engaged in electric distribution, and its transformers, electric posts, transmission
lines, insulators, and electric meters constitute the physical facilities through which M delivers electricity
to its consumers. May the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters
of M be subject to real property tax?
Yes, the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of M may be subject to real
property tax. As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code (LGC), a special law granting local government units the power to impose real property tax,
then the latter shall prevail. Therefore, for determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property
tax, the definition and requirements under the LGC are controlling. The machinery subject to real property tax
under the LGC “may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to the real property,” and even those
which are “mobile” (Manila Electric Co. v. City Assessor, G.R. No. 166102, August 5, 2015).
Note: The machinery subject to real property tax under the LGC “may or may not be attached, permanently or
temporarily to the real property;” and the physical facilities for production, installations, and appurtenant service
facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or are not permanently attached must (a) be
actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business, or activity; and (b)
by their very nature and purpose, be designed for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial,
industrial, or agricultural purposes. The properties under Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code are
immovables by destination, or “those which are essentially movables, but by the purpose for which they have been
placed in an immovable, partake of the nature of the latter because of the added utility derived therefrom.” These
properties, including machinery, become immobilized if the following requisites concur:
1. They are placed in the tenement by the owner of such tenement;
2. They are destined for use in the industry or work in the tenement; and
3. They tend to directly meet the needs of said industry or works.
The first two requisites are not found anywhere in the LGC (Manila Electric Co. v. City Assessor, G.R. No. 166102,
August 5, 2015).
CIVIL LAW
Ownership
H, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold and treasures at the adjoining
vacant Lot B belong to spouses X and Y, excavated without the consent of the spouses in Lot B where
he succeeded in unearthing gold and precious stones. How will the treasures found by H be divided?
Article 438 of the Civil Code provides that hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other
property on which it is found. Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State
or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser,
he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure. In this case, H, who found the treasure, is a trespasser on the
land of spouses X and Y. Therefore, he shall not be entitled to a share of the hidden treasure.
A is the registered owner of Lot A and adjoining the same was the lot owned by C. A filed an action
to quiet title and to recover possession, claiming that had extended his possession up to the former’s
property. To support his action, he presented an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, a Free Patent Certificate,
a Transfer of Certificate of Title, and tax declarations. C, on the other hand, presented a deed of sale
and several tax declarations in the name of his predecessors-in-interest. However, based on the survey by
the geodetic engineer, it was discovered that C’s deed of sale and tax declarations covered Lot B. Decide.
A’s certificate of title cannot be defeated by the deed of sale and tax declarations presented by C. A certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. As against an array of proof consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not
conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true
and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises (Spouses Alcantara v. Spouses Belen, GR
No. 200204, April 25, 2017).
E and P borrowed P100,000 from T. As security for the loan, E and P mortgaged their land to T.
However, P died in 1989. In 1990, T found out about P’s death when she went on vacation in the
Philippines. Later, E was unable to pay the loan and thus agreed to sell the land to T for P150,000. The
parties executed a deed of sale and release of mortgage in 1992, on which deed appears the signatures
of E, P, and T, whereby the land was sold to T. T constructed a 3-storey building worth P2,000,000 on
the land. E refused to acknowledge the sale, claiming that P’s signature was forged. Hence, T demanded
from E P150,000, the consideration for the land sold, and P2,000,000, for construction cost of the
building. What are the rights of T and E?
Art. 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad
faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith. T is a builder in bad faith. When the deed of sale was
executed in 1992, which contained a signature purportedly of P, she was already aware of P’s death. Despite such
awareness of the defect in their title to the land, T still constructed the building thereon. E is a landowner in bad
faith. E knew of the defect in the execution of the deed of sale from the start but still acquiesced to the construction
of the 3-storey building. Where both the landowner and builder are in good faith, the landowner, in this case, E,
is given two options under Art. 448: (a) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the
buyer (the builder in good faith, in this case, T) the necessary and useful expenses under Arts. 546 and 548; or (b)
he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which
case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent (Delos Santos v. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017).
Spouses P are the registered owners of a certain parcel of land. M, in turn, on the basis of representation
made by D, a complete stranger, that he is the owner of said property, rented the same from him and
thereon, constructed a house. Upon discovery that M built a house on said lot, Spouses P made repeated
demands for him to vacate. M, however, refused to comply. Aggrieved, Spouses P filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against M. In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, M alleged that they
are builders in good faith since they truly believed that the lot belonged to D. Is M considered a builder
in good faith?
M is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his
or her title when he or she introduced improvements on a lot that turns out to be owned by another. In the given
facts, M claims that he believed D when he claimed that the lot belonged to her. Yet, as also stated in the facts, D
was a complete stranger to him. The lack of blood relation should have been enough to put him on guard and
convince him not to rely on her claim of ownership. If M had looked into the ownership of the lot, he would have
easily discovered that it was titled to Spouses P (Padilla v. Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016)
CIVIL LAW
Co-ownership
A and B are co-owners of a parcel of land and of the residential house located thereon. For taxation
purposes, however, the house was declared solely in the name of A. Being the alleged owner of said
house, A demanded B to vacate the same but to no avail. Thus, A instituted an action for ejectment
against B. Will the case prosper?
The case will not prosper. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of
them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising his rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use
and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. In the
given facts, A does not have a cause of action to eject B since, as a co-owner, the latter is also entitled to possess and
enjoy the subject property. If, at all, the remedy of A is to file an action for partition (Anzures v. Spouses Ventanilla,
G.R. No. 222297, July 9, 2018).
Y sold two (2) parcels of land to A, B, C, D and X collectively. The titles were issued to them, hence,
a co-ownership over the properties existed. After 5 years, without the parties having entered into any
subsequent agreement to keep the above-said properties undivided, X filed a case to compel the partition
of such properties. A contended that although the name of X appears in the title of the properties, he
cannot be considered a co-owner since he never contributed to its acquisition and maintenance, nor paid
any taxes due thereon. A also contended X was a cousin of theirs who used to work for them as their
trusted laborer. They even sent him to school and allowed him to construct a house on the condition
that he would pay and reimburse them for all the expenses. Is X a co-owner or a mere trustee of the
subject properties?
X is a co-owner of the subject properties. Even if X did not contribute in the payment of the purchase price of
the subject properties, it does not necessarily mean that he could not become a co-owner of the subject properties
who can compel partition. The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may
it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. In this case, X who derived his title and was granted co-
ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition (Logrosa v. Spouses Azares, G.R. No. 217611; March 27,
Which among the following unconsented sales of property owned in common will the seller be allowed
to deny the validity of the sale?
A. The entire co-owned property;
B. A specific portion of the co-owned property;
C. An undivided portion less than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner;
D. An undivided portion more than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner; and
E. None of the above.
E. None of the above. While Article 493 of the Civil Code may not squarely cover the situations wherein a co-
owner, without the consent of the other co-owners, alienate, assign or mortgage: (1) the entire co-owned property;
(2) a specific portion of the co-owned property; (3) an undivided portion less than the part pertaining to the
disposing co-owner; and (4) an undivided portion more than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner, the
principle of estoppel bars the disposing co-owner from disavowing the sale to the full extent of his undivided or pro-
indiviso share or part in the co-ownership, subject to the outcome of the partition, which, using the terminology
of Article 493, limits the effect of the alienation or mortgage to the portion that may be allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership (Ulay v. Bustamante, G.R. Nos. 231721 & 231722; March 18,
Possession
K bought from M by virtue of a deed of sale a parcel of land in the province harvesting only corn
but paid taxes on the land. Since he is staying and working in the Metro, he only went periodically to
the land to plant and harvest corn to unwind from the stress of his job. He does not reside nor place
a tenant on the land. Neither did he put any sign to show that he is in actual possession of the parcel
of land. J went to the subject land to find out if there are other people residing there or claiming it
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besides the owner. When he found none, J bought the subject parcel of land from M and asked for the
delivery of the title to him, hence he has in his possession the TCT in the name of M. J declared the
subject parcel of land for taxation purposes under his name and placed laborers, built a farmhouse,
fenced the boundaries, and even placed signboards on the land. After K found out, he filed a Complaint
for Forcible Entry against J, claiming that he has the actual and lawful possession of the land. Is K’s
contention correct?
Yes, K has the actual and lawful possession of the land. Under Article 538 of the Civil Code, possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should
a question arise regarding the fact of possession if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession shall be
preferred. K possessed the land longer than J did and pursuant to a sale transaction ahead of the latter. Hence, K
may be said to have been the one in actual and lawful possession of the land (Wong vs. Carpio, G.R. No. L-50264,
October 21, 1991)
How is possession classified under the Civil Code? (OwnCoFa)

Possession under the Civil Code is classified as follows:
1. Possession in one’s Own name or the name of another (CIVIL CODE, Art. 524)
2. Possession in the Concept of owner or possession in the concept of holder (CIVIL CODE, Art. 525); and
3. Possession in good Faith or possession in bad faith (CIVIL CODE, Art. 526).
L owns a parcel of land in a nearby town. Because she cannot always visit the land, N, her sister, asked
for L’s permission to develop and cultivate the land for her business. L acquiesced to N’s request. After a
year, L asked for monthly rental payments from N for the use of her land. N approached you as a lawyer,
asking if she has an obligation to pay L for the use of the subject land. What will be your advice?
As N’s lawyer, I will advise her not to pay L monthly rentals for the use of the subject land. In the absence of proof
of any contractual basis for a person’s possession, the only legal implication is that the possession of the subject
property is by mere tolerance of the owner. Where the possession of the property is by mere tolerance of the owner,
the latter has no obligation to receive any payment from the possessor. Thus, N has no obligation to pay L monthly
rentals (Llobrera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 142882, May 2, 2006).
What are the rights of every possessor? (RPS)

Every possessor, whether in the concept of an owner or in the concept of holder, is given the following rights:
1. The right to be Respected in his possession (CIVIL CODE, Art. 539);
2. The right to be Protected in or restored to said possession by legal means should he be disturbed therein
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 539); and
3. The right to Secure from a competent court in action for forcible entry the proper writ to restore him in
his possession (CIVIL CODE, Art. 428).
Y sold to G a Pajero, which turned out to be a vehicle stolen from the Office of the President. Y delivered
the same to G, who had no knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, in turn possessed the same. Is the
possession of the Pajero by G, acquired in good faith, equivalent to a title?
No. The general rule that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title, does
not apply in cases where the owner of said movable property has been unlawfully deprived of the same, as in this
case where the vehicle subject of the sale had been stolen. Y had no right to transfer the ownership of the subject
Pajero at the time it was delivered to G, as the object of the contract of sale is clearly illicit (Spouses Gaspar v. Disini,
Jr., G.R. No. 239644; February 3, 2021, Caguioa Case).
Usufruct
D was granted a usufruct over the land of O. O eventually constructed a building on said land and
leased such to different tenants. D demanded to collect the rentals of the building from O by virtue of
the usufruct reserved for the former on the land on which the building was erected. Can D collect the
rentals of the building?
No, D cannot collect the rents of the building. The reserved right of usufruct does not include the rentals of the
building subsequently constructed on the vacant lot. However, it does entitle the usufructuary the right to receive
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reasonable rental for the portion of the land occupied by the building. Thus, D cannot collect the rents from the
building, but he is entitled to receive rent for the portion of the land on which the building was erected.
F is the usufructuary under a will of the income of a building. The will provides that F, as usufructuary,
has the power to collect rents, pay at her own cost and expense real taxes, special assessments, insurance
premiums, necessary repairs, and such other acts of administration. G is the naked owner over said
property, with whom E entered into a lease contract with, as lessee. F then instituted an action of
ejectment against E, the tenant, because F needs the premises for her to live in. E argues that F has no
right to eject her from the premises because she has a contract of lease with G, the naked owner, and that
F has no authority at all with respect to leasing the property but only of collecting the rents. Who has
the right to choose the tenant?
F, as the usufructuary, has the right to choose the tenant and administer the property in question. In this case, F has
been made the usufructuary of the income of the property under a will. Subsequently, all the acts of management
and administration such as those to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon were vested in F as
usufructuary. Therefore, F has the right to choose the tenant as a corollary to her right to administer such property
as a usufructuary (Fabie vs. David, G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945).
On January 1, 2020, upon the birth of Spouses C’s daughter R, J, the owner of a parcel of land, granted
Spouses C a usufruct over the property until January 1, 2040 when R would have reached her 20th
birthday. R, however, died on June1, 2030 when she was only 10 years old due to an unidentified blood
disease. J notified Spouses C that the usufruct had been extinguished by the death of R and demanded
that the latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the former. The spouses, still grief-stricken
over the death of their daughter, refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in their
favor would expire only on January 1, 2040 when R would have reached her 20th birthday and that
the death of R before her 20th birthday did not extinguish the usufruct. Whose contention is correct?
Spouses C’s contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the Civil Code, a usufruct granted for the time that may
elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall subsist for the number of years specified even if the third
person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration
of the existence of such person. In the case at bar, there was no express stipulation that the consideration for the
usufruct is the existence of R. Thus, the usufruct is not extinguished and shall subsist until January 1, 2040.
Easements
What are the modes of acquiring easements?

Under Article 620 of the Civil Code, easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten (10)
years. To acquire such easement by prescription, Article 620 states that, the time of possession shall be computed
thus: in positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who may have
made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate; and in negative easements, from the
day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public,
the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. Easement may
be acquired by virtue of title, namely through acts such as: (1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient
estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by the owner of both, under
Article 624 of the Civil Code (Spouses Garcia vs Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019, Caguioa Case).
A is the owner of a parcel of land which was being surrounded by the property of Spouses R. Following
an ocular inspection, it was discovered that a public road fronted A’s property. To reach the same,
however, she needs to traverse other properties and a four-meter-wide irrigation canal. It was likewise
discovered that the owners of the neighboring properties have already constructed their own bridges
to cross said irrigation canal. Claiming that the property of Spouses R is the only adequate and most
convenient outlet from her property to the highway, A filed a complaint for easement of right of way
against Spouses R. Spouses R, on the other hand, argued that the proposed easement would traverse
their fixed improvements. Decide the case.
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A has no right to an easement of right of way. Art. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an
easement of right of way – (1) an immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons; (2) it
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (3) payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded
immovable; (4) the isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; and (5) the proposed easement of
right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Here, there is an adequate outlet from A’s property to the public highway, which is through the irrigation canal.
Although said outlet may be longer and more inconvenient to A, because she will have to construct a bridge over
the irrigation canal, such inconvenience will not justify the imposition of an easement of right of way. Verily, the
convenience of the owner of the dominant estate is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement
right of way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement. Hence, A has no right
to said easement (Reyes v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015).
What are the modes of extinguishing easements? (MPCE RenRed)

The modes of extinguishment of easements are:
1. By Merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
2. By non-use for 10 years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this Period shall be computed from the
day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which
an act contrary to the same took place;
3. When either or both of the estates fall into such Condition that the easement cannot be used; but it shall
revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when
the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of
the preceding number;
4. By the Expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional;
5. By the Renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate; and
6. By the Redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 631)
Distinguish legal easements from voluntary easements.

A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest, while a
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties (CIVIL CODE,
Articles 619 & 634).
Spouses E are residents of a subdivision which is situated at the lower portion of a Village being
constructed at the time. After continuous heavy rains which caused a large volume of water to fall
from the Village to Spouses E’s subdivision, which also directly hit Spouses E’s house, their fence,
furniture, appliances and car were all damaged. Spouses E then filed a complaint for damages against
V, the developer of the Village. Spouses E blamed V for negligently failing to observe DENR Rules and
Regulations, and failing to provide retaining walls and other flood control devices which could have
prevented the softening of the soil and consequent inundation. Is V liable for damages caused by the
burdensome flooding of water caused by the constructions in the Village, which is a higher estate?
Yes, V shall be liable for damages. Article 637 of the Civil Code and Article 50 of the Water Code provides that
the owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the natural flow of water which the lower
estate is obliged to receive. Thus, when the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially
collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation. In the given facts, the construction works done by V gave Spouses E’s obligation, as owners of the
lower estates, more burdensome than what the law contemplated. As lower estates they are only obliged to receive
water naturally flowing from higher estates and such should be free from any human intervention. The bulldozing
and flattening of the hills led to the softening of the soil that could then be easily carried by the current of water
whenever it rained, which E is not anymore obligated to receive. Hence, V shall be liable to pay for damages caused
to the lower estate (Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowners Association Inc., GR No. 180808, August 15,
X is the owner of a lot which is isolated by several surrounding estates, including the lot owned by A. He
needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road. The shortest and most convenient access to
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the nearest public road passes through A’s lot. A objected to the establishment of the easement because
it would cause substantial damage to the 2 houses already standing on his property. A alleged that X has
other right-of-way alternatives, such as the existing wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding X’s lot
on the northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress or egress to the public road.
May X compel A to grant him a right of way?
No, X may not compel A to grant him a right of way. Art. 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement
of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. If these two
criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, the least prejudice criterion must
prevail over the shortest distance criterion. Here, the establishment of a right-of-way through the A’s lot would
cause destruction on the house already standing on the premises. Thus, although this right of-way has the shortest
distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial. An option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit not the shortest distance, is available (Calimoso v. Roullo, G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016).
Spouses G purchased Lot B from Spouses S. At the time of the purchase, a one-storey house was
already constructed thereon. Lot A, the adjoining lot owned by Spouses S, was an idle land without
any improvements until latter started the construction of a two-storey residential house therein.
Spouses G claims that, prior to said construction, they received enough bright and natural light from
their windows but the construction rendered their house dark that they are unable to do their normal
undertakings without switching on their lights. The windows and other openings, were now prevented
from receiving light and view due to the bigger structure built in the wall of Sps. G’s one-storey house
by the Spouses S on Lot A. Spouses G filed a complaint for easement of light, air and view, against
Spouses S asserting that they acquired by title an easement of light and view. Spouses S contended that
the mere presence of windows on the one-storey house does not give rise to an easement by title and
that Sps. Garcia also failed to acquire an easement by prescription because they never alleged that they
made a formal prohibition of the construction of a taller structure on the subject lot. Decide on the case.
I would rule in favor of Spouses G for they have already acquired an easement of light and view with respect to Lot
A owned by the Spouses S. Under Article 624 of the Civil Code, there arises a title to an easement of light and view,
even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign,
such as the existence of a door and windows, continues to remain and subsist. In this case, prior to the purchase
of the subject property by Spouses G, the subject property and its adjoining lot, were both owned by the Spouses
Santos. On the subject property, a one-storey house laden with several windows and openings was built and the
windows and openings remained open. There exists an apparent sign of servitude between two estates. Spouses
S are prohibited from building any structures or improvements that will obstruct the window of the one-storey
house. Thus, Spouses G have acquired an easement of light and view by title despite the lack of any formal notice
or prohibition made upon the owner of the servient estate (Spouses Garcia vs Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 228993,
June 17, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Nuisance
X is a resident of NG Subdivision. His house is located alongside CF Avenue and adjacent to MK Park,
an open space/playground area owned and operated by NG Association (NGA). He also has a personal
access door, which he built through a wall separating his house from the park. This access door, when
unlocked, opens directly into the part. NGA started constructing a kiosk occupying the side of the
park adjacent to the residence of X. Part of the design was a public restroom intended to serve the
needs of park guests and members of NGA. Said restroom was constructed alongside the concrete wall
separating the house of X from the park. X sought the demolition of the kiosk on the ground that
it is a nuisance considering the fact that for a period spanning 33 years, he had an open, continuous,
immediate, and unhampered access to the subdivision park through his side door, which also served as
an exit door in case of any eventuality; that having such access to the park was one of the considerations
why he purchased the lot. Is the restroom constructed by NGA a nuisance per accidens?
No, the restroom is not a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing.
There is nothing in the facts which discloses that X had introduced any evidence, to prove that the restroom
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annoyed his senses, that foul order emanated from it, or that it posed sanitary issues detrimental to his family’s
health (NGA vs Morales, GR No. 222821, August 9, 2017).
Modes of Acquiring Ownership
L Towers is a condominium building located in Makati. L Towers consists of 7 floors with a unit on the
roof deck and two levels above the roof deck, which are called concession 2 and concession 3. M is the
owner of concession 3. M decided to build another unit on top of concession 3, known as concession
4, and commenced building thereon. L Towers sent notice to M that M’s construction of concession 4
was illegal, but M refused to stop construction. Hence, L Towers filed a complaint against M with the
RTC. The RTC held that L Towers must exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure
constructed by M or, should L Towers not choose to appropriate said structure, the parties shall agree
on the terms of lease, applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code. Was the RTC correct in applying Art. 448?
No, the RTC is not correct. The land in this case belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as
a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member in accordance with Sec. 10 of the Condominium Act. The
builder is in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the condominium corporation,
whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act. Here, the provisions of the Civil Code,
a general law, should give way to the Condominium Act, a special law. Thus, Arts. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner
of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium
Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation). Concession 4 should
be demolished at the expense of M for having been illegally constructed in violation of the Master Deed (Leviste
Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, G.R. No. 199353, April 04, 2018).
J and O are childhood best friends. J, having a more affluent lifestyle, remembered how O always
wanted a car of his own and sent him a letter via snail mail, since there was no cell site yet in O’s barrio,
offering him his latest Ford Everest. Two (2) months have passed but there still was no reply from O. J,
thinking that is not interested, offered the same car to U. U immediately said yes and wrote his letter
of acceptance to J, and the latter prepared for the transfer of the car. A few days later, J was killed in a
freak accident. Among the J’s properties was the letter of acceptance from O, mixed together with other
unread letters, which was dated a month before J offered the car to U. Decide who has the rightful
ownership of the car.
U has the right over the car. Even though O’s letter of acceptance, required for donations of personal property
having a value exceeding five thousand pesos (CIVIL CODE, Art. 748), is dated before U’s, such donation to the
former was never perfected. According to Art. 734 of the Civil Code, the donation is perfected the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. J never read O’s letter of acceptance as it was filed together with
other unread messages. Moreover, O does not have any remedy since acceptance must be made during the lifetime
of both the donor and the donee (CIVIL CODE, Art. 746), therefore, J’s donation to him can never be perfected
since the latter already passed away.
A filed a complaint for quieting of title over a parcel of land against B. He alleged that he is the true
and registered owner of the parcel of land after acquiring it through a Deed of Donation executed by
his mother. His mother acquired the same property from C and her co-owner D through a Deed of Sale
dated December 16, 1994 which finds its origin from OCT No. R-578. B, in his defense, alleged that
his title was based on authentic documents while the title of A’s predecessor-in-interest is evidently null
and void ab initio because it was derived from a Deed of Sale which was supposedly signed by vendor
C although she was already dead, having died in 1988. Moreover, the signatory-vendor, D denied that
she ever signed the Deed of Sale which is supposedly that of her husband, E, signifying his conformity
to the sale, is likewise a fake signature of her husband because he was already dead at the time of the
execution of the document having died on June 14, 1980. A argues that he is an innocent holder for
value. Decide.
The concept of an innocent purchaser for value cannot apply to A for the reason that he is a donee acquiring
the property gratuitously by a Deed of Donation and not by purchase. In cases of falsified documents involving
properties such as deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss and agreement of subdivision
with sale, being falsified documents, are null and void, and the TCT issued by virtue of the falsified documents
are also null and void. There is fraud on the transfer of the property from C and D to A’s mother on the basis of
fake signatures considering that the vendor signatories therein are all dead. As such, the deed is considered a forged
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deed and hence null and void. Thus, the title that A’s mother based upon the fraudulent Deed of Sale is null and
void which, therefore, transferred nothing to him by his mother’s Deed of Donation (Gambito v. Bacena, G.R. No.
225929, January 24, 2018).
What are the limitations which are imposed by law upon the extent of property which may be donated
inter vivos?
The limitations are:
1. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves,
in full or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and all of the relatives who, at the time of
the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced in petition of any person attached (CIVIL CODE, Art. 750);
2. No person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 752);
3. Donations cannot comprehend future property (CIVIL CODE, Art. 751); and
4. The right to dispose of some of the things donated, but if he should die without having made use this right,
the property or amount reserved shall belong to the donee (CIVIL CODE, Art. 755).
In 1966, the LGU of the CS donated a portion of a parcel of land to the CASTEA by virtue of the
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which included a condition that the land should only be used for the
construction of a building to house the offices of CASTEA, and that the said property, including its
improvements, should not be sold, mortgaged or encumbered. In 2007, the LGU of the province of
Camarines Sur executed a Deed of Revocation of Donation on the ground that CASTEA violated
the provision of non-encumbrance by leasing a part of the building constructed in the property to
Bodega Glassware. The lease was for a period of 20 years, the rentals of which were given to members
of CASTEA as mutual aid and death benefits. CASTEA contended that the Province of Camarines Sur
has ceased to be the owner of the property because the ownership thereof has already been transferred
to CASTEA by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos it executed. Moreover, CASTEA argues that
there was no violation of the conditions of the Deed of Donation. Did the lease defeat the object of
the Deed of Donation so that it can be considered as a breach to warrant the resolution of said Deed
of Donation?
No. While under Article 764 of the Civil Code, a single violation or non-fulfillment is sufficient to revoke a donation
based on the phrase “any of the conditions,” its application must be circumscribed within the rules on obligations
and contracts wherein substantial and fundamental breach as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement and substantial compliance are given due recognition and importance. In this case, the encumbrance
was not perpetual as it is time-bound to only 20 years, which is not an unreasonable period, the lease did not cover
the entire donated 600-square meter lot and the building that CASTEA constructed, the rentals that were being
collected were being given to members of CASTEA as mutual aid and death benefits, and CASTEA had already
complied with its main prestation, which is the construction of the intended building. In order for the breach
to reach the threshold of substantiality and fundamentality, the breach by should be of a permanent character
as to totally and perpetually deprive CASTEA of the use of the donated lot and the building that it constructed
(Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Association, Inc. v. Province of Camarines Sur, G.R. No. 199666; October
7, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the different modes by which donation inter vivos may be revoked?
The different modes by which donation inter vivos may be revoked are:
1. Supervening birth, survival or adoption of a child (CIVIL CODE, Art. 760);
2. Non-fulfillment of the condition or charge imposed (CIVIL CODE, Art. 764);
3. Acts of ingratitude of the donee (CIVIL CODE, Art. 765); and
4. Inofficious donations (CIVIL CODE, Art. 771).
Distinguish laches and prescription.

Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Laches is different
from and applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of
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permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property
or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription
applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time; laches is not. While a person may not acquire title to the
registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered
owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and
the title thereto, by reason of laches (Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 222614, March 20, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What is the nature of prescription?

Prescription is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights. It is concerned with laps of time
in the manner and under conditions laid down by law namely that the possession should be in the concept of
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary
prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for 30 years without need of title or of good faith (Gesmundo v. CA, G.R. No. 119870, December
23, 1999)
For many years, the Laguna De Bay deposited soil along its bank beside the titled land of J. In time such
deposit reached and area of one thousand square meters. With the permission of J, E cultivated the said
area. Thirty-two (32) years later, a big flood occurred in the river and transferred 1000 square meters to
the opposite bank, beside the land of A. The land transferred is now contested by J and A as riparian
owners and by E who claims ownership by prescription. Who should prevail?
J should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion, belongs by right of accretion to J, the riparian owner
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 457). When the very same area was “transferred” by flood waters to the opposite bank, as
in this case, it became avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by J who has two (2) years to remove it (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 459). E’s claim based on prescription is baseless was by mere tolerance of J and, therefore, did not
adversely affect J’s possession and ownership (CIVIL CODE, Art. 537). Acts of possessory character executed due
to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purpose of acquisitive prescription. Possession by
tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the
period of acquisitive prescription. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitive prescriptive
is yet to be attained (Lamsis v. Sermon Dong-E, G.R. No 173021, October 20, 2010).
How may prescription of actions be interrupted?

The prescription of actions is interrupted when:
1. They are filed before the court;
2. There is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors; and
3. There is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1155)
What is the effect of an interruption of the prescriptive period?

An interruption of the prescriptive period wipes out the period that has elapsed, sets the same running anew, and
creates a fresh period for the filing of an action (Selerio v. Bancasan, G.R. No. 222442; June 23, 2020, Caguioa
Case).
If the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, will the action
for reconveyance be subject to prescription?
No. Where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for
reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription. Prescription
does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature
of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title (Heirs of Tomakin v. Heirs of Navares, G.R. No.
223624; July 17, 2019, Caguioa Case).
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Quieting of Title
O bought a piece of agricultural land in Sorsogon evidenced by a notarized absolute deed of sale. B, his
brother, managed the lot and in exchange, B would deliver the produce of such to O. The real property
tax on the property was paid by O. However, B eventually failed to turn over the produce and failed to
vacate the lot despite repeated demands. Thus, O filed for quieting of title against B. B averred that he
has open, continuous, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the property for fifty (50) years
and thus owns the land thru acquisitive prescription. Decide.
O’s case for quieting of title should prosper. For an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the property which is the subject matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership while equitable title means beneficial ownership. Equitable title is derived
through a valid contract or relation. In this case, O’s title over the lot is derived through a contract of sale as
evidenced by the notarized deed of sale. His ownership is proven not only by the deed of sale in his favor but also
by his exercise of rights (receiving the fruits) and obligations (paying taxes) as owner thereof. (Heirs of Extremadura
v. Extremadura, G.R. No. 211065, June 15, 2016).
Actions to Recover Property
What is a replevin action?

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover
those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods
or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who
has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery
of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property
may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action (Smart Communications, Inc. v.
Astorga, G.R. Nos. 148132, 151079 & 151372, January 28, 2008).
What are the three usual actions to recover possession of real property. Discuss.
The three usual actions to recover possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion)
or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession (possession de facto)
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior
court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure), which
should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the
property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less than a year in cases other
than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court); and
3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action for recovery
of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending
upon the value of the property) (Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, Caguioa
Case).
What are the jurisdictional facts that the plaintiff must allege and prove to sustain an action for
unlawful detainer?
To sustain an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving, by preponderance
of evidence, the following jurisdictional facts:
1. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment (Sarmiento v. Dizon, G.R. No. 235424, February 3, 2021, Caguioa Case).
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X alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land covered by an
Assessment of Real Property and that the payments of realty taxes for these properties were updated.
Sometime in 2019, she discovered that A, B and C unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by
stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon. Y,
her daughter then personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that A, B and C vacate the
premises and remove their structures. A, B and C begged and promised to buy the said properties for
Php 3,500.00 per square meter, but despite giving them time to come up with the amount, they reneged
on their promise to buy them and refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands. X
filed her complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against A, B and C
who contended that they had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith and that X was never in prior possession and had no valid
title over the subject land. What type of suit was filed by X?
The case is an accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from
the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The objective of the
plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership, as in this case. When parties, however,
raise the issue of ownership in accion publiciana, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property. Here, X prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the
properties in dispute and that A, B and C vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that A, B and C unlawfully entered
her properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and knowledge. X primarily wanted to recover
possession of the subject parcels of land from A, B and C (Gabriel Jr. v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2014).
S bought a parcel of land. The adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by another family, but the same is
being used and occupied by T where a house was constructed thereon. It was later found out that T is
encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters. When S asked T to remove the old fence so that she
could construct a new one which will cover the true area of her property, T vehemently refused and
menacingly threatened S that he will take legal action should she remove such fence. A demand letter
was sent to T but she still willfully refused to remove the fence prompting S to file a complaint for
ejectment. What is the nature of the complaint filed by S?
The suit is an accion reivindicatoria because the facts essentially involve a boundary dispute which must be resolved
in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters involved. The complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started. (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995).
Credit Transactions (Part II)
Personal Property Securities (RA 11057)
What is a security interest?

A security interest is a property right in collateral that secures payment or other performance of an obligation,
regardless of whether the parties have denominated it as a security interest, and regardless of the type of asset, the
status of the grantor or secured creditor, or the nature of the secured obligation; including the right of a buyer of
accounts receivable and a lessor under an operating lease for not less than one (1) year (Sec. 3 (j), RA 11057).
Discuss the concept of a security agreement.

A security interest shall be created by a security agreement. A security agreement may provide for the creation of
a security interest in a future property, but the security interest in that property is created only when the grantor
acquires rights in it or the power to encumber it (Sec. 5, RA 11057). A security agreement must be contained in
a written contract signed by the parties. It may consist of one or more writings that, taken together, establish the
intent of the parties to create a security interest. The security agreement shall likewise provide for the language to
be used in agreements and notices (Sec. 6, RA 11057).
How is a security interest perfected? (RPC)

A security interest shall be perfected when it has been created and the secured creditor has taken one of the
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following actions:
1. Registration of a notice with the registry
2. Possession of the collateral by the secured creditor
3. Control of investment property and deposit account (Sec 12, RA 11057).
When is a security interest perfected?

A security interest shall be perfected when it has been created and the secured creditor has taken one of the actions
in accordance with Section 12 (Sec 11, RA 11057)
May a lessor of goods be considered as a secured creditor?

Yes, a lessor of goods may be considered as a secured creditor. A secured creditor is a person that has a security
interest. For the purposes of registration and priority only, it includes a buyer of account receivable and a lessor of
goods under an operating lease for not less than one (1) year (Sec. 3 (i), RA 11057).
Real Estate Mortgage
What are the requisites to a valid contract of mortgage? (SOFR)

The following requisites are essential to the contract of mortgage:
1. That it be constituted to Secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
2. That the mortgagor be the absolute Owner of the thing mortgaged;
3. That the persons constituting the mortgage have the Free disposal of their property, and in the absence
thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose; and
4. That the document in which it appears be Recorded in the Registry of Property. If the instrument is not
recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 2085 and 2125).
What are the elements of pactum commissorium?

The elements for pactum commissorium are as follows:
1. That there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for
the payment of the principal obligation; and
2. That there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or
mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period (Spouses
Pen v. Spouses Julian, G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016).
Note: The mortgagee’s consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged property upon the mortgagor’s mere
failure to pay the obligation is the essence of pactum commissorium (Dacquel v. Spouses Sotelo, G.R. No. 203946,
August 4, 2021)
P leased a residential lot and house in favor of R with a monthly rental rate of P13,500. Thereafter,
R received an information that P mortgaged the subject property to Y and that the same was already
foreclosed with Y as the purchaser. R later on bought the property from Y. It was clear between the parties
that the property was still subject to P’s right of redemption. Meanwhile, P sent a letter demanding R
to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises. Is P still entitled to the rentals of the
subject property?
Yes, P, as mortgagor and owner, is still entitled to the rents, earnings and income of the disputed house and lot.
Under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate
right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. He only becomes an absolute
owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period. Since the demand of rentals was made
at the time the subject property is still subject to the right of redemption of P, the latter still being the owner, is
entitled to the rentals from the lease contract executed with R (Ermitaño v. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436, January 23,
2013).
Is the purchaser of property in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale entitled to the possession of the property
during the redemption period?
Yes. The purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand
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that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the
redemption period therefor. Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession
during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose. The order for a writ of
possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond. No discretion is left to the court (Spouses Marquez v. Spouses Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014).
E entrusted her title over the lot where she is residing to P, her nephew, for safekeeping because of her
poor eyesight. P, a gambler, prepared a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) empowering him to mortgage
the lot. E’s signature was forged. With the help of J who represented herself as E, M Bank granted a
loan to P secured by a mortgage on E’s lot. Due to nonpayment, M Bank foreclosed the mortgage and
was declared the highest bidder. Title was later registered in the name of the bank. When E was notified
that she should vacate the premises, she filed a complaint to nullify the loan with mortgage, the auction
sale and the title of M Bank on the ground that the bank is not a mortgagee in good faith. Decide. (2016
Bar)
The mortgage agreement is null and void as against E, and cannot be enforced against her. While a mortgagee in
good faith and for value is entitled to protection, a bank is not relieved from the duty of exercising the due diligence
required of banking institutions simply because the titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or
lien. Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the conduct of their affairs and expected to
exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered property,
for their business is affected with public interest. In granting the loan, the bank should not have been content
merely with the SPA, considering the presence of circumstances indicating the need for a thorough investigation.
Having been wanting in care and prudence, the bank cannot be deemed to be an innocent mortgagee (Prudential
Bank v. Rapanot, G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017).
Land Titles and Deeds
Torrens System; General Principles
What is the purpose of the Torrens System?

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any question of
legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the time of registration or
which may arise subsequent thereto (Dy v. Aldea, G.R. No. 219500, August 9, 2017).
Does registration under the Torrens system vest ownership?

No. Registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant’s title. It does not vest title where there
is none because registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership (Heirs of De Guzman v. Heirs
of Bandong, G.R. No. 215454, August 9, 2017).
Regalian Doctrine
Discuss the Regalian Doctrine.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Thus, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Republic v.
Herederos, G.R. No. 200863, October 14, 2020).
Are the facts that one acquired a land by sale and that their transferor by succession incontrovertible
proof that that the land is of private dominion or ownership?
No. While both modes are derivative modes of acquiring ownership, they fail to prove the nature or classification
of the land. In the absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption
arising from the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or dominion must be overcome
(Republic v. Spouses Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336; October 17, 2018, Caguioa Case).
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Original Registration
On June 26, 1990, R filed an application for land registration involving a parcel of agricultural land
that he had bought from B identified as Lot 1. During the trial, R alleged and proved that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than thirty (30) years. He also presented as evidence a certification
dated January 12, 1991, citing an Executive Order that on August 11, 1990, agricultural lands of the
public domain, including the subject matter of the application, were declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land. Should the application for land registration be granted?
Yes, the application should be granted. Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, since alienable lands of
the public domain form part of the patrimonial property of the State. The operative act which converts property of
public dominion to patrimonial property is its classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
as this classification precisely serves as the manifestation of the State’s lack of intent to retain the same for some
public use or purpose (Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207, February 15, 2022, Caguioa Case).
How can an applicant clearly establish the existence of a positive act of the government to prove the
alienable and disposable nature of the subject land?
Section 7, RA 11573 now prescribes the nature of proof sufficient to establish the status of land as alienable and
disposable. Hence, at present, the presentation of the approved survey plan bearing a certification signed by a duly
designated DENR geodetic engineer stating that the land subject of the application for registration forms part of
the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain shall be sufficient proof of its classification
as such, provided that the certification bears references to: (i) the relevant issuance (e.g., Forestry Administrative
Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, or Proclamation); and (ii) the LC Map number covering
the subject land. In addition, the DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper authentication
of the certification so presented (Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207, February 15, 2022, Caguioa
Case)
Note: Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., (G.R. No. 213207) was promulgated, and RA 11573 was enacted, beyond
the June 2021 cut-off.
Note: A CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the
property sought to be registered because the only way to prove the classification of the land is through the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the President himself (Buyco v. Republic, G.R. No. 197733;
August 29, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the nature of possession when it is used to acquire property by prescription?

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned
with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in
the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation
of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of
by the public or the people in the neighborhood (Republic v. Northern Cement Corp., G.R. No. 200256; April 11,
Is it mandatory on the part of the land registration court to require the parties to submit a subdivision
plan?
No. It merely is discretionary on the part of the land registration court to require the parties to submit a subdivision
plan duly approved by the appropriate government agency. Regardless of how the said court exercises its discretion,
the burden remains with the oppositor or adverse claimant to convince by preponderance of evidence the land
registration court that there is an overlapping of boundaries (Fil-Estate Management, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No.
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192393; March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while he was still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements
for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Yes, the foreign national may apply for registration. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether the purchaser is no longer Filipino citizen at the time they purchased
or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that he was formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate
of Sec. 8, Art. XII of the Constitution (Republic v. CA and Lapiña, G.R. No. 108998, August 24, 1994).
S, before leaving for the US, entrusted to his uncle, T, an application for registration, under the Land
Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod. A year later, S returned to the Philippines and
discovered that T registered the land and obtained an Original Certificate of Title over the property in
his (T’s) name. T then sold the land to C, an innocent purchaser for value. S, 7 years after discovery, filed
an action for reconveyance of the parcel of land against C.
a. Will S’s action prosper?

No. An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration in favor
of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree.
Once the one-year period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved
applicant certain remedial measures, these are designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the property
and not necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he had allowed by inaction to be vested in another person
(Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro, G.R. No. 112905, February 3, 2000).
b. What are the remedies available to S?

If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available.
If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund (Heirs of Lopez v. De
Castro, G.R. No. 112905, February 3, 2000).
Can the error or mistake of the DAR in selling territorial waters and lands of the public domain be
invoked against the government?
The State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents with regard to property of
the public domain. A void title does not enjoy indefeasibility under the Torrens system. Since the predecessors-in-
interest had no right over the subject lots to transfer to successor-in-interest, the latter cannot be deprived of a right,
even if it involves property, which does not exist (Belizario v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 231001; March 24, 2021, Caguioa Case).
Who is an “innocent purchaser for value”?

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. Under Section 32
of P.D. 1529, the definition of an innocent purchaser for value has been expanded to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value (Heirs of Macalalad v. Rural Bank of Pola, Inc., G.R. No. 200899,
June 20, 2018)
Can laches bar the government from instituting a reversion case?

Yes, laches can bar the government from instituting a reversion case. The general rule is that when the government
is the real party in interest, and is proceeding simply to assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can
be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation. However, innocent purchasers for value are afforded the right
to raise the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in their defense against the government to avoid injustice to
them (G.R. No. 236381; August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
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Can the State still file a complaint for reversion based solely on Section 118 of CA 141?
No. Under RA 11231, the restriction on the conveyance, transfer or disposition of the patented land within five
years from and after the issuance of the patent pursuant to Section 118 of CA 141 has been removed. The removal
of the restrictions imposed under Sections 118, 119 and 121 of CA 141 was given retroactive effect under Section
4 of RA 11231 (Republic v. Tanduay Lumber, Inc., G.R. No. 223822; October 16, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Certificate of Title
Distinguish a “certificate of title” from “title.”

Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the
foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. A certificate
of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself (Castillo v. Escutin,
G.R. 171056, March 13, 2009).
Do tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership prevail over a certificate of title?
Tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title, which is a
presumptive proof of ownership (Quinol v. Inocencio, G.R. No. 213517; April 10, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Title to a property in Cavite had been subdivided and later on transferred to National Housing
Authority (NHA), with the latter subdividing and offering the same to the public. Spouses A and B,
alleging that their parents were the registered owners of the subject property, which land was covered
by TCT No. T-9943 on September 7, 1956, and which title was then reconstituted and a replacement
title issued on March 23, 1962, sent demand letters for NHA to recall the subdivision scheme plan it
submitted to the Register of Deeds (RD) for registration. As the demand went unheeded, Spouses A
and B filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against NHA. NHA on the other
hand, based their claims on derivative titles (reconstituted TCT No. (T-8237) RT 3909) dating back to
February 21, 1960. Between the NHA and Spouses A and B, whose claim should prosper?
The claim of Spouses A and B should prosper. Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering
the same parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties and, in
case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding title under
the prior certificate is entitled to the property as against the person who relies on the second certificate. Here, the
title of the Spouses, on its face, shows that it was a transfer from the parent title, TCT No. T-8237. On the other
hand, it is not clear from the records where the reconstituted TCT No. (T-8237) RT 3909, upon which NHA
traces its title, was sourced from (National Housing Authority v. Laurito, G.R. No. 191657, July 31, 2017).
Discuss the Mirror Doctrine.

The mirror doctrine provides that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness
of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property (Dy v. Aldea, G.R. No. 219500, August 9, 2017).
Subsequent Registration
What are the situations when a petition for surrender of withheld duplicate certificate of title may be
availed of pursuant to Section 107 of PD 1529?
Section 107 of PD 1529 contemplates only two situations when a petition for surrender of withheld duplicate
certificate of title may be availed of. These are:
1. Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests
the title of the registered owner against his consent, and
2. Where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to
surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title (Privatization and Management Office v. Quesada, G.R.
No. 224507; September 20, 2017, Caguioa Case).
What is a voluntary instrument?
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A voluntary instrument is a willful act of the registered owner of the land to be affected by registration (Autocorp
Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553 September 8, 2004).
How is a voluntary instrument registered to effect a conveyance of the property?

For the registration of a voluntary instrument, it is necessary not only to register the deed, instrument or assignment,
mortgage, or lease in the entry book of the register of deeds, but a memorandum thereof must also be made on the
owner’s duplicate and on its original. The mere entry by the register of deeds in the entry or diary book, without
the presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title for corresponding annotation of the conveyance, does
not have the effect of a conveyance of the property (Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553 September
8, 2004).
In 1991, G and V purchased from Spouses O and C a parcel of land, covered by a TCT issued in
the latter’s name. The owner’s duplicate title of Spouses O and C was surrendered to them upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated (1991 DOAS). Petitioners were successful in having the
1991 DOAS duly annotated on the TCT, but they were not able to cause the transfer of the Torrens title
in their name since they lacked the DAR clearance. When G and V resumed processing the TCTs to their
names, they discovered that the lot had been consolidated by MLI with other adjoining lots sub-divided
into smaller lots covered by several new TCTs. This is a result of the following purported transactions:
(1) in 1996, Spouses O and C sold the parcel of land to DAA Realty; and (2) in 2005, DAA Realty sold
the parcel of land to MLI. Were Petitioners deemed to have been constructively notified of the issuance
of DAA Realty’s TCT?
No, G and V cannot be deemed to have been constructively notified of the issuance of DAA Realty’s TCT. A
Torrens title issued without prior presentation and cancellation of the existing owner’s duplicate title does not bind
the property to which it pertains. The title so issued does not produce the effects of a Torrens title contemplated
under PD 1529, including the effects of constructive notice. It is literally a scrap of paper. Since the owner’s
duplicate title never left their possession, DAA Realty’s Torrens title was necessarily issued in violation of Section
53 of PD 1529 which sets forth the requirements for registration of voluntary instruments affecting registered
land. In fact, both DAA Realty and MLI may be deemed to have been constructively notified of the 1991 DOAS,
as it was duly annotated on Spouses O and C’s TCT (Gatmaytan v. Misibis Land, Inc., G.R. No. 222166; June 10,
What is an involuntary instrument?

An involuntary instrument is one pertaining to a transaction affecting lands in which the registered owner’s
cooperation is not needed and which transaction may even be done against his will (Autocorp Group v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157553 September 8, 2004).
Does the law require the presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title for the registration of
an involuntary instrument?
No. The law considers the annotation of such instrument upon the entry book as sufficient to affect the real estate
to which it relates. As the registration of an involuntary instrument is contrary to the interest of the registered
owner or will affect him adversely, it is but natural that he will not willingly present or produce his duplicate
certificate or at least delay the production as long as possible (Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553
September 8, 2004).
Discuss the nature of an adverse claim.

A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent’s ownership over the tenanted
lot. It is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established
in court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending
in court (Acap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995).
In what cases may a litigant avail himself of the notice of lis pendens?
A litigant may avail himself of the notice of lis pendens in any of the following case:
1. An action to recover possession of real estate;
2. An action to quiet title thereto;
3. An action to remove clouds thereon;
4. An action for partition; and
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5. Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation
thereof or the building thereon (Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. South Rich Acres, Inc., G.R. Nos. 202384 &
202397, May 4, 2021).
What are the elements that must be present to annotate a notice of lis pendens?
To annotate a notice of lis pendens, the following elements must be present:
1. The property must be of such character as to be subject to the rule;
2. The court must have jurisdiction both over the person and the res; and
3. The property or res involved must be sufficiently described in the pleadings (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997).
Non-registrable Properties
Discuss the rule with respect to non-registrable properties.

The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment therein may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State
which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations (Republic v. Heirs of Paus,
G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Is testimonial evidence on the physical layout of the subject land conclusive on the classification of the
subject land as alienable agricultural land?
No. It is the official proclamation releasing the land classified as public forest and to form part of disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain that is definitive. Without the official declaration, the “unclassified public
forest land” legal classification remains. More so, unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, it remains inalienable land of the public domain (Republic v. Saromo, G.R. No. 189803; March 14, 2018,
Caguioa Case).
Dealings with Unregistered Land
Can a sale of an unregistered land be valid?

Yes, it is valid between parties. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land
not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument
shall have been recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies (PD, Sec.
113).
A sold a piece of unregistered land to C who immediately took possession and improved the same while
registration proceedings under the Torrens System was still pending. The deed of sale was not registered.
Subsequently, the same land was sold at public auction to satisfy a debt of A to S, the judgment creditor.
The notice of levy, the certificate of sale and the sheriff ’s certificate of final sale were registered before
the Register of Deeds. Who has the better right to the land, C or S?
C has the better right to the land. While, Article 1544 of the Civil Code, registration in good faith prevails over
possession in the event of a doubt sale by the vendor of the same piece of land to different vendees, said article is
of no application to the case at bar, even if S, the later vendee, was ignorant of the prior sale made by his judgment
debtor in favor of C. The reason is that the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only steps
into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of the time
the property was levied upon (Carumba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27587, February 18, 1970).
Assurance Fund
Discuss the purpose of the assurance fund.
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The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate
is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. It is intended to safeguard the rights of prejudiced parties
rightfully entitled to an interest in land but shut off from obtaining titles thereto. As suppletory to the registration
of titles, pecuniary compensation by way of damages was provided for in certain cases for persons who had lost
their property. For this purpose, an assurance fund was created. However, the assurance fund was not intended
to block any right which a person might have against another for the loss of his land. Damages were not to be
recoverable from the assurance fund when they could be recovered from the person who caused the loss (Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental v. Anglo, Sr., G.R. No. 171804, August 5, 2015).
What are the requisites to bring an action for compensation against the assurance fund?
The requisites to bring an action for compensation against the assurance fund are the following:
1. The individual must sustain loss or damage, or the individual is deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein.
2. The individual must not be negligent.
3. The loss, damage, or deprivation is the consequence of either (a) fraudulent registration under the Torrens
system after the land’s original registration, and the loss, damage, or deprivation must not be caused by
breach of trust, or (b) any error, omission, mistake, or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any
entry or memorandum in the registration book, and the loss, damage, or deprivation must not be caused
by mistakes in the resurvey or subdivision of registered land.
4. The individual must be barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein.”
5. The claim must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring such action
first occurred (Spouses Stilianopoulos v. Register of Deeds for Legazpi City, G.R. No. 224678, July 3, 2018).
Is the constructive notice rule on registration applicable in cases involving a claim against the Assurance
Fund?
No. Prescription, for purposes of determining the right to bring an action against the Assurance Fund, should be
reckoned from the moment the innocent purchaser for value registers his or her title and upon actual knowledge
thereof of the original title holder/claimant. It bears to note that the registration of the innocent purchaser for
value’s title is a prerequisite for a claim against the Assurance Fund on the ground of fraud to proceed, while
actual knowledge of the registration is tantamount to the discovery of the fraud. The actual title holder cannot
be deprived of his or her rights twice — first, by fraudulent registration of the title in the name of the usurper and
second, by operation of the constructive notice rule upon registration of the title in the name of the innocent
purchaser for value (Spouses Stilianopoulos v. Register of Deeds for Legazpi City, G.R. No. 224678, July 3, 2018).
Cadastral System of Registration (Act No. 2259, as amended)
Discuss the concept of a Cadastral System.

Under the Cadastral System, titles for all the land within a stated area are adjudicated, regardless of whether people
living within the area desire to have titles issued, pursuant to the Government’s initiative. An offspring of the
Torrens System, the Cadastral System, established by Act No. 2259, aims to serve public interest by requiring titles
to any lands be settled and adjudicated, and by decreeing land titles to be final, irrevocable, and indisputable (Javier
v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 233821, June 14, 2021).
Discuss the process of cadastral proceedings.

The government, through the Director of Lands, initiates a cadastral case by filing a petition compelling all
claimants of lands within a stated area to litigate against one another, in order to settle as much as possible all
disputes over land and to remove all clouds over land titles. Notice of the filing of the petition is published in the
Official Gazette compelling all claimants to present their answers so as not to lose their right to own their property.
After conflicting claims are presented during trial, the court adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants
and orders the issuance of the decree of registration, which becomes the basis for the issuance of a certificate of title
upon finality of the decision (Javier v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 233821, June 14, 2021).
Does the present owner have the burden to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable
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land in a case for reversion?

No. In a reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the
property in transferor’s title because it was of public dominion – that the land subject thereof was classified as
forest land at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the defendant was issued. To reiterate, there is no burden
on the present owner to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is
reasonable to presume that transferor, from whom the present owner derives her title, had already established that
the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it (Republic
v. Heirs of Cabrera, G.R. No. 218418, November 8, 2017, Caguioa Case)
Registration through Administrative Proceedings (CA 141, as amended)
F owned a parcel of lot in Maddela, Quirino. His heirs had been cultivating the subject property
personally and through their tenants. The heirs also declared the subject property as their own for
taxation purposes and had paid realty taxes thereon. In fact, nephew of F, C, started tilling the subject
property as a tenant of the heirs of Feliciano as early as 1966. The heirs of F, upon trying to pay tax
arrears on the subject property, discovered that the Sps. S purchased the subject property from I, who
acquired the same through a homestead patent. Thus, the heirs of F filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Ownership, Cancellation of Title, Annulment of Sale, Reinstatement of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages (Complaint) against the Sps. S, and I. Is the title of I void?
Yes, because the subject property was acquired by I through a fraudulently issued homestead patent. Under the
Public Land Act, the certificate shall issue only when the applicant shall prove that he has resided continuously
for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same, and
has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application. Here, I has never
possessed, much more continuously cultivated, the subject property. Further, it was the heirs of F who had been
continuously paying real estate taxes on the subject property. It is clear from the undisputed facts that Isabel failed
to comply with any of the conditions imposed under the Public Land Act for the granting of a certificate of title
pursuant to a homestead patent application (Heirs of Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081; June 19,
The original grantee of a homestead patent was V who subsequently transferred the subject property to
spouses C and L. In turn, the spouses were the ones who sold the subject property to CR Corp. and R.
Is CRC eligible to acquire the subject property?
Yes. Under Section 121 of CA 141, a corporation may acquire land granted under the free patent or homestead
only if it was with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and the land
will be used solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way.
Nevertheless, Section 121 pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from a grantee. In this case, CR
Corp. did not acquire the subject property from the original grantee (Republic v. Capital Resources Corp., G.R. No.
217210; November 7, 2016, Caguioa Case).
Reconstitution of Titles
Should the successors-in-interest of the registered owners of the subject property be considered
interested parties that should be notified of the petition for reconstitution proceedings?
Yes. Being the registered owners of the subject property, as heirs, whose rights are now transferred by succession,
should have been given sufficient opportunity to be heard in the petition for reconstitution proceedings. When
an owner’s duplicate certificate of title is lost or destroyed, a person who is a transferee of the ownership over the
property, who is not necessarily the registered owner, may also file the petition for reconstitution. In this situation,
the registered owner must also be duly notified of the proceedings. By his or her very status as registered owner, the
latter is an interested party in the petition for reconstitution case. The registered owner will be in the best position
to account for the whereabouts of the owner’s duplicate certificate (Heirs of Spouses Ramirez v. Abon, G.R. No.
222916; July 24, 2019, Caguioa Case).
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Is reconstitution synonymous with the issuance of title?

No. Reconstitution is not and should not be made synonymous to the issuance of title. When reconstituting, a
new title is not thereby issued; rather, the title alleged to have been previously issued but is now lost or destroyed,
is merely reproduced to reflect the way it was before (National Housing Authority v. Laurito, G.R. No. 191657,
July 31, 2017).
Practical Exercises
Demand and Authorization Letters
Draft a demand letter ordering the lessee to vacate the leased premises.
November 16, 2022
MS. MARIA CLARA

#22, Perdices St., Brgy. Tinago,
Dumaguete City
Re: Demand to Vacate
Ms. Clara:
We are writing on behalf of our client, PEDRO REYES (“Mr. Reyes”), the owner of the property located at
#22, Perdices St., Brgy. Tinago, Dumaguete City (“Subject Property”) that you presently occupy.
As you are aware, Mr. Reyes leased to you the Subject Property for a period of one (1) year or from 11 November
2021 to 11 November 2022. To date, you still have not vacated the Subject Property despite being fully cognizant
that the term of the lease would not be extended or renewed.
Hence, FORMAL DEMAND is hereby made upon you to vacate the Subject Property within five (5) days
from receipt of this letter. Should you fail to heed this just and lawful demand, we will be constrained to file
the necessary legal actions against you, without further notice.
We trust that you will give this matter your prompt and preferential attention.
Sincerely,
(sgd.) ATTY. ANA DELA CRUZ
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Draft an authorization letter.
November 9, 2022
Dear Sir/Madam,
I, JOSE SANTOS, single, with residence at #20, F. Lacaya St., Brgy. Biasong, Dipolog City and who is
presently based in Metro Manila due to the nature of my work, do hereby authorize PEDRO REYES, my
cousin, of legal age, and with residence at #22, Lobing-Ogis, Galas, Dipolog City to demand the collection
of the loan of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) due and demandable from ANA DELA
CRUZ, as evidenced by a non-negotiable promissory note dated November 9, 2021, and to receive the amount
indicated in the said note.
(sgd.) JOSE SANTOS
(sgd.) PEDRO REYES November 9, 2022
ATTACHMENTS
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Simple Contracts
Draft a contract of sale of personal property.
CONTRACT OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This CONTRACT OF SALE, made and executed this November 16, 2022, by and between:
JOSE SANTOS, of legal age, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at #20, Ybiernas St., Brgy. San
Felix, Iloilo City, hereinafter referred to as the “SELLER”;
-AND-
MARIA CLARA of legal age, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at #22, Perdices St., Brgy.
Tinago, Dumaguete City, hereinafter referred to as the “BUYER”.
WITNESSETH;
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the absolute and registered owner of a Pair of Football Boots, more particularly
described as follows:
BRAND: Nike
MODEL: Tiempo Legend 6 “Andrea Pirlo” Special Edition
YEAR MODEL: 2016
SERIAL NUMBER: 21/1,500
WHEREAS, the BUYER has bought and the SELLER has sold the above-mentioned property;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total sum of Twenty-One Thousand Pesos
(Php21,000.00), which the SELLER hereby acknowledged to have received from the BUYER, the SELLER
agrees to TRANSFER AND CONVEY by way of absolute sale to the BUYER the said Pair of Football Boots.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of November 2022, in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines.
(sgd.) JOSE SANTOS (sgd.) MARIA CLARA

Seller Buyer
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) PEDRO REYES (sgd.) ANA DELA CRUZ

Witness Witness
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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Draft a contract of simple loan.
CONTRACT OF LOAN
This CONTRACT OF LOAN, made and executed this November 14, 2022, by and between:
Felix, Iloilo City, hereinafter referred to as the “BORROWER”;
-AND-
MARIA CLARA of legal age, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at #22, Perdices St., Brgy.
Tinago, Dumaguete City, hereinafter referred to as the “LENDER”.
WITNESSETH;
The LENDER herein agrees to loan to the BORROWER the sum of One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00),
and payable within the period of two (2) years from the execution of this contract, under the following terms
and conditions:
Interest. The BORROWER agrees to pay an interest with a fixed amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php200,000.00). The interest shall be payable within the period of two (2) years from the execution of this
contract, and shall be payable together with the principal amount.
Evidence. The contract of loan shall be also evidenced by a negotiable promissory note which shall be payable
to bearer conforming to the formalities required under Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
Dumaguete, Philippines.

Borrower Lender

Witness Witness
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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Draft a contract of agency.
CONTRACT OF AGENCY
This CONTRACT OF AGENCY, made and executed this November 9, 2022, by and between:
Felix, Iloilo City, hereinafter referred to as the “PRINCIPAL”;
-AND-
MARIA CLARA, of legal age, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at #22, Perdices St., Brgy.
Tinago, Dumaguete City, hereinafter referred to as the “AGENT”.
WITNESSETH;
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL is engaged in the business of selling computer sets, accessories and components
in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL intends to appoint an AGENT in order to take advantage of the various business
opportunities by expanding his business in the island of Negros, in the Visayas;
NOW THEREFORE, the PRINCIPAL hereby appoints, delegates and authorizes the AGENT to sell and
market computer sets, accessories and components of the PRINCIPAL in wholesale as well as any and all acts
that would enable the AGENT to transact business for and in behalf of the PRINCIPAL, and the AGENT by
these presents hereby accepts the assignment, for and in consideration of a commission of two percent (2%) of
the AGENT’s total quarterly sales,.
Iloilo, Philippines.

Principal Agent

Witness Witness
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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Complaint
Draft a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 22
ILOILO CITY
JOSE SANTOS, Civil Case No. _________

Plaintiff FOR: COLLECTION OF
SUM OF MONEY WITH
DAMAGES
- versus -
MARIA CLARA,
Defendant
x---------------------x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff JOSE SANTOS (“Plaintiff”), by counsel, respectfully states:
PARTIES
1. The Plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of #20, Ybiernas St., Brgy. San Felix, Iloilo City.
Plaintiff is represented by the undersigned counsel, ATTY. ANA DELA CRUZ, with office address at #21,
General Luna St., Brgy. Inday, Iloilo City where pleadings, motions, notices, orders, and processes of this
Honorable Court may be served.
2. Defendant MARIA CLARA (“Defendant”) is likewise of legal age, single, and a resident of #22, Perdices
St., Brgy. Tinago, Dumaguete City, where she may be served with summons and other processes of this
Honorable Court.
II
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLAINT
3. On August 15, 2021, the Defendant borrowed from the Plaintiff a sum of money amounting to Five Million
Pesos (Php5,000,000.00), payable on August 15, 2022. A copy of the Promissory Note is attached hereto as
Annex “A” and is made an integral part hereof.
4. Defendant, however, failed to tender payment to the Plaintiff on the said maturity date. Hence, the Plaintiff,
through the Letters that he served on the Defendant on August 15, 2022, September 15, 2022 and October 15,
2022, formally demanded the Defendant to pay the amount of indebtedness represented by the Promissory
Note as well as the legal interest thereon. Copies of the Demand Letters dated August 15, 2022, September
15, 2022 and October 15, 2022 are respectively attached hereto as Annexes “B”, “C”, and “D” and are made
integral parts hereof.
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5. Despite these repeated demands, the Defendant, has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to pay the
Plaintiff. This clearly evinces the Defendant’s grievous intention to evade and renege his legally binding
obligation to the Plaintiff.
6. Article 1953 of the Civil Code clearly imposes upon a person who receives a loan of money the correlative duty
to pay the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality. Verily, this constitutes more than sufficient
justification for the Defendant to be ordered to pay the amount of Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00),
which represents the loan proceeds that the Defendant received. In addition, Defendant should also be
ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest that the law imposes for his delay in payment.
7. The Defendant’s gross and evident bad faith in evading his legally binding obligation to the Plaintiff has
caused the latter to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety. Thus, judgment should be
rendered ordering the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
8. In view of the Defendant’s wrongful and continued refusal to pay her indebtedness, Plaintiff was compelled
to engage the services of counsel and incur litigation expenses to defend his rights and interests. Therefore,
judgment should be rendered holding Defendant liable to pay the amount of at least FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php50,000.00) as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Copies of the Contract for Legal Services,
Statements of Account and Official Receipts are respectively attached hereto as Annexes “E”, “F”, and “G”.
III
TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
9. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, Petitioner respectfully manifests his intention to present
the following witnesses, whose Judicial Affidavits are attached to this Complaint, with the summary of their
testimonies:
a. Plaintiff, who will testify, among others, that: (1) With evident bad faith, the Defendant has failed and
refused, and still fails and refuses to pay the loan represented by the Promissory Note and its corresponding legal
interest; (2) The Defendant’s gross and evident bad faith in evading his legally binding obligation to the Plaintiff
has caused the latter to suffer to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety; and (3) In view of the
Defendant’s wrongful and continued refusal to pay his indebtedness, Plaintiff was compelled to engage the services
of counsel and incur litigation expenses to defend his rights and interests.
b. Pedro Reyes, who will testify, among others, that: (1) He accompanied the Plaintiff when the latter
served on the Defendant the demand letters referred to in this Complaint; and (2) The Defendant’s gross and
evident bad faith in evading his legally binding obligation to the Plaintiff has caused the latter to suffer to suffer
mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety.
10. Plaintiff also manifests his intention to present all documentary evidence attached to this Complaint.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff JOSE SANTOS respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to render judgment
directing the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff:
a. FIVE MILLION PESOS (Php5,000,000.00), which represents the indebtedness reflected in the
Promissory Note, and the corresponding legal interest;
b. At least FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), as moral damages; and
c. At least FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
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Other relief, as may be deemed just or equitable, are likewise respectfully prayed for.
Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22, 2022.
ATTY. ANA DELA CRUZ

Counsel for the Plaintiff
#21, General Luna St., Brgy. Inday, Iloilo City
Tel No.: ______________
Email Address: _______________
PTR No.: _______________
IBP No.: _______________
Roll No.: _______________
MCLE Comp. No.: _______________
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

CITY OF ILOILO ) S.S.
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
I, JOSE SANTOS, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of #20, Ybiernas St., Brgy. San Felix, Iloilo City under
oath do hereby depose and state that:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the case entitled JOSE SANTOS vs. MARIA CLARA;
2. I have caused the preparation of this complaint;
3. I have read the contents of this complaint;
4. I have not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; and
5. If I should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, I shall report
that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of November 2022.
JOSE SANTOS
Affiant
JURAT
CIVIL LAW
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CA Court of Appeals
CENRO Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
DAR Department of Agrarian Reform
DENR Department of Environment and Natural Resources
FC Family Code
GSIS Government Service Insurance System
OCT Original Certificate of Title
PD Presidential Decree No.
PENRO Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
RA Republic Act No.
RD Registry of Deeds
RTC Regional Trial Court
SC Supreme Court
TCT Transfer Certificate of Title

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SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

Academics Core Members

Gabrielle Anne S. Endona

Electronic Data Processing

II. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

IV. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

IX. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (PART I)

X. TORTS AND DAMAGES

II. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (PART II)

III. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 103

Effect and Application of Laws

Discuss the nationality principle.

Discuss the principle of unjust enrichment.

Distinguish Arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.

Persons And Family Relations

Distinguish juridical capacity and capacity to act.

Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act

In relation to the other

Is a legitimate child entitled to use the surname of the mother?

Discuss the effect of absence, defect or irregularity of the requisites of marriage.

What are the requisites of marriage?

The formal requisites of marriage are:

Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

What are the rights and obligations of the spouses?

2. Other obligations of spouses include:

Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

competent court to be made a party thereto (FAMILY CODE, Art. 79).

What are donations propter nuptias?

second wife. Is the sale valid?

Paternity and Filiation

What are the grounds to impugn the legitimacy of a child?

When may illegitimate children use the surname of their father?

Domestic Adoption (RA 8552)

Note: The same rule applies under RA 11642.

Who may be adopted under RA 8552?

Note: Under RA 11642, the following may be adopted:

Inter-country Adoption (RA 8043)

When may a child be matched to a foreign adoptive family?

Who may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child?

Who may be adopted under RA 8043?

May an action for support resolve an issue of paternity?

When does majority commence and what is the effect thereof?

What is the effect of the attainment of majority?

Retroactivity of the Family Code

Should the Family Code be given retroactive effect?

When are the rights of succession transmitted?

What are the formalities of a will?

b. Notarial Will (SAMPAA)

Related Jurisprudence on Formalities of Notarial Wills

Executed Will Status Reason

2nd page contains only the

Neither page is signed on

Executed Will Status Reason

Executed Will Status Reason

The will actually consists

Is it sufficient that the signature of the testator is merely a cross?

a. Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply?

b. If C predeceases B, who inherits the property?

What is the effect of a disposición captatoria?

Discuss the effect of a modal institution.

When must the condition imposed on an instituted heir be fulfilled?

Who are the persons involved in reserva troncal?

What is the effect of ineffective or imperfect disinheritance?

a. Do the acts constitute a valid ground for disinheritance?