History and Theory

Author(s): Gareth Stedman Jones

Source: History Workshop, No. 8 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 198-202
Published by: Oxford University Press
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198 History Workshop
This letter isn't in lieu of a more detailed
'reply' and I hope it won't be read as an
evasionor climbdown. So perhapsI should
say that I remain convincedthat the basic
argumentis correct:thatwe shouldlookat our
besthistoricalpracticeswitha theoreticaland
epistemological eye(aswellas a willcultivated
by a knowledgeof presentneeds),drawingon
the strengthsand realcompetencesof a more
'theoretical'generation. This self-criticism
does showweaknessesin our practice.At the
same time, most of the replies, though very
partisan,provide some importantwarnings
against some possible developmentsout of
this argument,besidesmakingsome import-
ant pointsin theirown right.I'd like to come
backto thatif I can, reappearing,not obliter-
ated, severalissueslater. For the moment, 1
wasworriedby theimmediatedirectionof the
debate. Those who disbelievein 'structures'
mightpondera case whichhas somethingin
common with a more general experience-
the way thingswhich you producereturnto
you in quite unrecognisableforms.
Yoursinfraternalstruggle,
RichardJohnson
CentreforContemporary CulturalStudies,
Birmingham.
PS. The other thing I didn't like about my
articlewas the murderouslittle man on the
mastheadwho is engaged,surely,in class not
comradelystruggles.
HISTORY AND THEORY
DearHistoryWorkshop- I found a depress-
ing uniformityof tone and content in the
repliesof KeithMcClelland,GavinWilliams
andTimPutnamto RichardJohnson'sarticle
on Socialist Humanist History. Only Tim
Mason made any attemptto develop a con-
trasting assessment of the significance of
Thompson's work as a historian. To the
others, what Johnson actually had to say
about Thompsonand Genovese as marxist
historians, seemed irrelevant, not to say
impertinent.Putnameven assertsthat, irres-
pective of whether Johnson was right or
wrong in his reading of Thompson and
Genovese, 'we are being led away from the
sortof theoreticalwork... whichoughtto be
an importantprojectfor socialisthistorians'.
McClellandand Williamsfocus almostsolely
upon whether Johnson was engaged in a
legitimateexercise.Giventhe responsehe has
evoked, Johnson might just as well have
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copied down chunksof Althusserand left it
at that.
One neednot acceptJohnson'spositionto
see that it has been caricatured.His stated
intentionwasto arguethattherewasa shift in
emphasiswithinthe Britishmarxisthistorical
traditionbetweenStudiesin the Development
of Capitalismand TheMakingof the English
WorkingClass(surely,a not very controver-
sialjudgement),that certainconceptsderived
fromAlthussercould be usefulin identifying
characteristicemphasesand absencesin the
workof Thompsonand Genovese,but lastly
that Althusserianismcould not dispose of
some of the strengthsof socialist humanist
history,and that it has provedlargelyincap-
ableof generatinga bodyof historicalworkof
comparablequality.Now, it may be that it is
impossibleto reconcilethe two traditionsin
the way that Johnsonattemptsto do. But at
leastwe shouldbe clearthat this is his inten-
tion. His initialplea was 'againstevasionand
against that kind of "polemic" which
amounts to wholesale and dogmatic dis-
missal'. Clearly, from the subsequent
response,he waswastinghis breath.Williams
makes no distinctionbetween Johnson and
Althusser,whileMcClellandtreatsJohnson's
tribute to the strengthsof Thompson and
Genovese'swork'asan astonishingandrather
disarmingadmission'.Johnson'scriticsrefuse
to confrontthe substanceof Johnson'sargu-
ment. Theyrefuseto considerhis assessment
of the strengthsand limitationsof socialist
humanismas a formof historicalwritingin its
own terms. Instead, they redefine Marx so
that the problemdisappearsand by abolish-
ing theeconomicas a separableobjectfor the
purposeof analysis,theydemonstrateto their
own satisfactionthat Johnson's position is
reallyonly economismin new dress,with the
furtherveiled hint that that is anothername
for Stalinism.
It is not my intentionto defend Johnson
furtheragainstmisrepresentations. He is quite
capable of defendinghimself. Nor is it my
intentionto engageat lengthwiththedetailsof
his argument.But I am sympatheticto the
politicalspiritof hisprojectandit is thisthatI
wantto defend,whileholdingratherdifferent
positions in this debate from his own. For
instance,I do not thinkit possibleto combine
historicalworkwitha fullyfledgedAlthusser-
ian theoryof knowledgein its originalform,
as Johnsonseemsto want to do. Althusser's
position in Reading Capital derives from
Spinoza, for whom, like other 17th century
rationalists,mathematicsprovidesthe para-
digmaticformof knowledge.On this basis, it
is possible to constructa strictly internalist
 Readers' Letters
methodof proof, basedupon a purelylogical
sequence.Althusser'sown definitionof posi-
tivism can be applied against himself: ie a
theoryof knowledgederivedfromone formof
humanknowledgeis illegitimatelyprojected
onto another.Theproceduresof mathematics
are peculiareven in relation to the natural
sciences,let alonethedomainof the historical
and the social. Theory- or to use a less
loadedterm - explanation,is not the sameas
the objectit purportsto explain,even though
thatobjectis only accessibleto thoughtin the
variousformsof its representation.It is true
we neverget to a pure real, but that we are
always dealingwith representationsof that
real-just as a jury never has immediate
access to what happened,but can only deal
withconflictingevidenceaboutwhatis alleged
to havehappened.But becausethis evidence,
theserepresentations areby definitionnot the
same as the event itself, this does not mean
thattheyaretherebyannihilatedby beingsub-
sumedin a theoryproducedto explainthem.
Therangeof phenomenawhichcouldbe made
the object of a theoryare infinite. It is quite
true that it is the historianwho elevatescer-
tain types of phenomenato the status of
historicalfactsie objectspertinentto a theory.
BIutsuchobjectsdo not lose theirautonomous
characterin history any more than other
branchesof knowledgeie facts do not simply
become categories.In their original pheno-
menalform, they remainobjects of alterna-
tivepossibletheorisation.Theoryin historyas
in naturalsciencesalways has a provisional
status,andits poweris no greaterthanwhatit
can successfullyexplain.
To rejectAlthusser'sstrictlyinternalistdis-
course of proof, however, should not lead
historiansto supposethathis contributioncan
thereafterbe ignored. However forced in
some cases his readingof Marx may have
been,his stressupontherigorouscharacterof
theoreticalpropositionsin historicalmaterial-
ismwaswhollyvaluablewhenit firstappeared.
Indeedevenhis mostvitriolicopponentshave
unconsciouslyabsorbedsome of his initial
clarifications;his distinctionbetweena social
formationand a mode of production, for
instance. McClellandand even Thompson
himselfin thePovertyof Theoryuse the term,
social formation. But before Althusser's
work, the termsimplydid not exist exceptin
Marx'sownwork.Marxistsusedto talkabout
capitalismor capitalistsociety with a much
vaguernotionof whatwas being referredto.
We may disagreewith Althusser'sformula-
tionsaboutthe definitionof socialformation
and mode of productionand the distinction
between them, but we have an infinitely
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199
clearer notion of what we are disagreeing
about. In otherwords,Althusseris ultimately
less importantfor how he read Capital, than
for thefactthathe forcedus to readCapital in
a more analyticallyrigorousway.
Oneexampleof the gainsregisteredby this
greater theoreticalawareness(but not one
which owes anything to a specifically
Althusserianview), could have beeii made
moreof by Johnsonhimselfin his critiqueof
Thompson'streatmentof 'exploitation'.The
backgroundto Thompson'sdiscussionwas
the 'standardof livingcontroversy'whichhad
beenrestartedby Hobsbawmin the 1950s.So
far as this debate involved a confrontation
betweenMarxistsand non-Marxists,what is
most noticeableaboutit now, is how domina-
ted it was by a non-marxistframeworkof
questioning.The questionsfocussedon real
wage and consumption data. But such
information-even wereit possibleto reach
consensuson an adequatestatisticalseries-
wouldbe meaninglesson its own, in termsof
Marxist categories as they are set out in
Capital. Wages alone tell us nothing about
changes in the rate of exploitation- the
changingproportionbetweennecessaryand
surpluslabour.Realwageswould have to be
placedin relationto changinghoursof work
and changingratesof productivityper hour.
Changingratesof productivityarenot merely
an economist'sabstraction.Theyare likelyto
meanthatpeoplearehavingto workharderin
eachhour,andthis is not merelya qualitative
question.Itseffectscanbe measuredin indus-
trial disease and death rates, the rate of
industrialaccidents,changesin the numberof
people dying from diseases engenderedby
prematureexhaustionetc. It is quite possible
for thesamepeopleto be enjoyinglargerwage
packetseven in 'real terms'in the same way
that boilers need more fuel to run at higher
temperatures. Thepointis that the additional
quantity of fuel necessitatedis more than
compensated by the increase in output
achieved.Now, the point about Thompson's
interventioninto this debate,was that it did
not movethediscussionawayfromwagerates
towardsa more marxistpresentationof the
problem,but ratherinto an incommensurable
qualitativesphere,which would be immune
from Gradgrind-likeattack: 'by 1840 most
people were "better off" than their fore-
runnershad been fifty yearsbefore, but they
had suffered and continued to suffer this
slightimprovementas a catastrophicexperi-
ence'. If thispropositionwereliterallytrue,it
would be nonsensical, not least from
Thompson'sown position. For if we are to
accorda privilegedstatusto people'sexperi-
200
ence, it is paradoxical, to say the least, to
concede that in objective measurable terms,
that experience was by and large false. The
point I wish to make, is that if Thompson had
cast the problem in more rigorous marxist
terms, the apparent paradox between 'quality
of life' and standard of living could have been
overcome. I have no wish to berate Edward
Thompson for not doing everything in his
book. It is quite understandable, given the
political and intellectual climate in which the
book appeared, that it should have been
written in the way that it was. It was, and
remains a magnificent achievement. But now,
15 years later, when we are examining that
work as a contribution to marxist history, it is
proper and indeed necessary to look, not only
at its strengths, but also at its limitations. This
is what Richard Johnson has done. Critics
may understandably be irritated by Johnson's
claim to 'a privileged vantage point', but it
does not excuse them from confronting his
actual arguments. What I therefore find
alarming is precisely the tone of 'wholesale
and dogmatic dismissal' which has informed
the subsequent debate, and it is upon this
'debate' rather than Johnson's original contri-
bution that I would like now to comment.
In particulAr, I should like to comment
upon the way in which this debate's use of
Marx makes Johnson's questions disappear.
Ip the face of the continually debased currency
of arbitrary assertion of what Marx really
meant, I believe that historical scholarship can
reconstitute the context of Marx's theory, how
it came to address certain questions, why it
ignored others, the types of theory and politics
it was attempting to combat and why it
thought it urgent to do so, the pre-existing
work it took for granted and so on. Such
research will not remove the possibility of
variant interpretations. But it can at least
establish a firm limit to the range of plausible
variation. Scholarship can establish that
Marx's propositions are not infinitely plastic,
and that they cannot be torn out of context at
will and made the basis of any philosophy of
one's choosing. The point of saying this is not
to juxtapose scholarship in some academic
sense to a political understanding of Marx
(though I speak as an interested party, since
my own research is concerned precisely with
the historical context of the beginnings of
historical materialism). My purpose is quite
the contrary - it is to de-theologise Marx. By
this I do not only mean to say that Marx was
not God, to show that he lived in a determinate
time and place, that he was often wrong and
that his intellectual effort produced not a
system of total or absolute knowledge, but the
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History Workshop
beginnings of something much more valuable
-a materialist theory of history, from which
he was able to construct a specific theory of
the capitalist mode of production. I also mean
de-theologise in a more literal Feuerbachian
sense. That is to say, that the one area in which
I think the notion of alienation retains an
explanatory-descriptive value is the area to
which it was originally applied by Feuerbach
-to religion and speculative philosophy. At
its most basic level, the mechanism of aliena-
tion is quite simple: it is a psychic compulsion
to project one's own most prized feelings or
thoughts onto another evanescent being (God)
and to make oneself the mere instrument of
that being's purposes. Such a phenomenon is
no less observable today than it was in Feuer-
bach's time, and nowhere more so, unfortu-
nately, than in Marxist debate. Just as it used to
be more authoritative to state that that God
thought something, rather than that you
thought something, so in the Marxist tradi-
tion, it is a well tried tactic to project one's
own thoughts onto Marx. Marx thereby
becomes the evanescent God of theology, and
it is against this arbitrary and ingrained habit
of attributing to Marx whatever political or
theoretical programme one is engaged in, to
treat him-in Feuerbach's terms-as an
empty subject to whom one can attribute an
infinite number of predicates, that I wish to
protest. If we have to have a religion, let it be
socialism (it is after all, difficult to be a social-
ist without some element of faith, hope or
moral conviction). But let us not make a
religious Godhead out of Marx, who had his
own determinate thoughts, as we have ours. It
is more honest and -in the present political
situation - more fruitful to admit the pater-
nity of one's own thoughts, than to play a
pseudo-scholarly game which perpetuates the
alienated belief that Marx has been the infal-
lible guide in any political or intellectual
judgement one may wish to make. Edward
Thompson in The Poverty of Theory, how-
ever great my disagreement with large parts of
that book, has at least the honesty and inte-
grity to admit his thoughts are his own, to
disagree with Marx when he is conscious of
difference and even to judge him harshly when
he senses incompatibility (the question of
'values', for example). This marks a healthy
contrast to the critics of Johnson.
Rather than admit that there may indeed be
a difference between Marx's approach and
that of socialist humanist historians,
McClelland, and Williams (and in this issue,
Simon Clarke), produce a brand new Marx,
who not only voices precisely their own
thoughts, but possesses the additional advant-
 Readers' Letters
age of relegatingJohnson to the limbo of
heterodoxybeforeevenhavingto considerhis
arguments.After Kautsky'sMarx, Lukacs's
Marx, Althusser's Marx- all in their way
ratherpowerful,if to varyingdegreesmythical
beings,we now encountera muchless spirited
creation, the Marx of the British social
historian.
This cardboardconstructthen proceedsto
berateJohnsonin the followingterms: 'It is
quitewrongof you to thinkthat the mode of
productionof materialgoods is in any way to
be distinguishedfrom the production of
culture or indeed the reproductionof life
itself. They all, after all form part of the
totalityof social relations.You are also quite
mistakento imaginethatI accordanyanalyti-
cal primacyto one sphereof relationswithin
thistotalityoveranother.To insistthatpoliti-
cal and culturalrelationsare determinedby
economic relationsis to explain one set of
phenomenaby another.I can't imaginehow
anythingI havewrittencould have led you to
thatextraordinary belief. Further,whenI talk
of relations of production themselves, it
shouldn't be thought that I have some
"restricted" "economistic" definition in
mind. It's simply my way of talking about
classrelations,whichincludeall relationships
of exploitation and authority- landlords
overtenants,capitalistsover workers,police-
men over citizens, it's all part of the same
totality isn't it? Similarlyyou've misunder-
stood me if you think that I have any other
explanationof class strugglethan the experi-
ence and action of those involved.It is these
actionsand experienceswhichestablishclass
relationsand it is these relationsthat consti-
tute the mode of production.So it's quite
absurdto imaginethatwhenI talkof modeof
production, I have in mind an analytical
concept,a structuredesignedto explainclass
struggle.The key to my theoryis that every-
thing is connectedand nothingcan really be
distinguished. Social production is both
objectiveand subjective.Thereis a multipli-
cityof relationsandtheyareall livedin experi-
ence. Objective and subjective are not
separatedmoments, they are alwayspassing
from one to another. Do I suffer from
vertigo?No, of coursenot. You mustget out
of that fetishistic way of thinking- it's a
productof capitalism.It's quitesimple.What
we have, is a multiplicityof humanprojects.
Peoplehaveneeds,lacks,desires.Theyorgan-
ise themselvesor are organisedinto groups
and thesegroupsestablishparticularformsof
relationshipswith each other.Theymaycon-
flict - in capitalismor whatever,and then
they find that the realisationof their inten-
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201
tions may confront them as an alien force. But
they keep on trying; that's why we get class
struggle and that's why we'll get socialism in
the end. I didn't catch your point about
humanism, so I won't comment on it. I'll
simply repeat what I've said many times
before-apparent relations between things
are really social relationships between pro-
ducers. It's all part of the human project, but
capitalism prevents us from seeing it that way.
Lastly, you've got my method quite wrong.
I didn't sit down with some abstract idea in my
head about the antagonistic structure of the
capitalist mode of production or anything like
that. I simply started by reflecting on some-
thing immediately visible and concrete, like a
commodity. From there, simply by a process
of inference tested by empirical checks, I got
back to the underlying capitalist relations of
the early 19th century. I didn't move from
abstract to concrete, but from concrete to
abstract. One of the most important things 1
discovered through my work was that these
relations were not common to all forms of
society, but that they were in fact historically
specific. (J-B Say was quite wrong, you
know!) Such logic as I had to use was always
historical. It is quite untrue to imagine that I
formed some general concept of a mode of
production to enable me to distinguish one
mode of production from another. That
would be ahistorical. Finally let me repeat that
I accord no special place to material produc-
tion. To do so would imply that politics and
culture were in some sense derivative and it
would mistake my idea of relations of produc-
tion, which really includes everything. To
believe that economic, political and cultural
relations can be distinguished is an illusion
generated by capitalism and fostered by
Stalinists and professional economists. In
reality there is only the totality of social
relations. That's what my theory in the end
amounts to.'
To forestall obvious criticism, I will admit
at once that this is a caricature of what
Williams, McClelland and Putnam have to
say. Nevertheless, virtually every sentence,
with the exception of my occasional gasps of
astonishment is taken from them. To call this
Marxism demands a real effort of imagina-
tion. This Marxism is clearly an over-reaction
to structuralism, which takes the form of
degutting Marx of any structuralist moment
whatever. If Althusser can only see fleshless
skeletons, the answer surely cannot lie in
producing a boneless alternative. Proponents
of this extraordinary cocktail are at liberty to
add further ingredients if they want to. But it
must be said that by this standard of judge-
202 History Workshop

ment, not only Johnson, but Marxas well is
incorrigiblyeconomistic.To producea textual
refutation of this interpretationof Marx
would be tedious and superfluous.I would
simplysuggestthat readerslook at the texts
themselves- includingthose whichWilliams
has placedon the index,as belongingto some
undesirable'orthodoxmarxism'.
All the contributors to the debate on
Socialist Humanism- both Johnson, and
McClelland,Williamsand Putnam-are all
understandablyanxious to distance them-
selves from vulgar marxism, from econo-
mism. But the point I would wish to make is
that economismis not some arbitrarydevia-
tion from Marxism,introducedby Kautsky,
Stalinor whoeverelse on whomone maywish
'to pin the convict'sbadge'. It is there from
the very start, from the GermanIdeology
onwards.From 1848, Marxand Engelswere
awareof the problem,like so manyMarxists
since. But it is a vain endeavourto imagine
thattheyovercamethe problem,thatthe solu-
tion is there, if only you readthe text in the
correctway.Theydidnotresolvetheproblem,
anymorethanwe have. Bothsocialisthuman-
ismandAlthusserianism representattemptsto
transcendeconomism,but both do so only at
prohibitive cost - in Althusser's case to
virtuallydetach mode of production from
class struggle, in the case of socialist
humanism, to retain class struggle at the
expenseof Marx'sachievementin theanalysis
of mode of production.Neither solution is
satisfactory,nor can it be said that Johnson's
attemptto reconcilethe two really succeeds.
But at least his effort is a positive one. One
thingis clear.We shallnevermakeprogressif
socialistsand marxistsshout across at each
other in a generaliseddialogue of the deaf.
Since Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production and
The Poverty of Theory, the tone of debate has
fallento theworststandardsof the Cold War.
The realdifficultiesare totally obscured.We
areenjoinedto thinkin manicheanterms.We
are commandedto make our choice. If we
make the wrong choice, we are not simply
mistaken, we are either evil or imbecilic.
Eitherwe find ourselvesbrandedwith abject
empiricismand classifiedamong the educa-
tionallysub-normal,or we are liable to find
ourselves,by a curiousprocessof backwards
teleology,to have been the real architectsof
theGulagarchipelago.If we don't rallyto one
positionor another,we are eitherincorrigibly
eclecticor morallycontaminated.
Let us refuse this choice. Let us resist the
temptationto join the Gadareneswine who
arehurtlingin one directionor another.If we
wish to develop historical materialismand
confront its very real problems,there is no
placefor thesemoralabsolutes.The vocabu-
lary of anathema, heresy and inquisition
should not be the terms in which socialists
addresseachother. Nor is theremuchchance
of politicalor theoreticaladvance,whilethey
continueto do so. Let us therefore,disagree
withRichardJohnson'sargumentsif we wish
to, but let us confrontthe realissuesinvolved
and not hide self-righteouslybehind the
masquesof fake marxisms.
Gareth Stedman Jones
History Workshop Journal

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
DEPARTMENTOF EXTRA-MURALSTUDIES
HISTORY COURSES 1978-80
During this session the Department of Extra-Mural
Studies is introducing a new range of coures leading to
the Certificate and Diploma in History. A choice of
subjects from the Medieval to the Modern period and
concerned with British and European History will be
available at a number of locations. The Department also
offers a variety of one-year courses on topics which
include genealogy, palaeography and Local History.
For details apply to Miss E. M. Clancy, Department of
Extra-MuralStudies, 26 Russell Square, London WC1B
5DQ, or see copies of New Horizons in your local
library.

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