HAYA DELA TORRE CASE (COLOMBIA V.

PERU)
Decided by : International court of Justice
Decided on: 13 June 1951
Citation: I.C.J Report (1951)
The fact of the case is as follows :

A political leader named Victor Raul Haya Dela Torre was accused of having
instigated a military rebellion. He was Peruvian national and was granted asylum
in the Colombian Embassy at Lima on 3 rd January 1949. The granting of the said
asylum was a subject of a dispute between Peru and Colombia. Both the parties
agreed to refer the case to the International Court of Justice. According to the Pan-
American Havana Convention on Asylum (1928), subject to certain conditions,
asylum can be granted in a foreign embassy to a political offender who was a
national of the territorial state.

The question in dispute was whether Colombia as the state granting asylum, was
entitled to unilaterally to qualify the offence committed by the refugee in a manner
binding on the territorial state that is to decide whether it was the political offence
or common crime. The court was also asked to decide whether the territorial state
was also bound to afford the necessary guarantee to enable refugee to leave the
country in safety.

On 20th November 1950 the judgement was passed in which the court answered
both these question in negative but at the same time specified that Peru had not
ap[proved that Haya da la Torre was a common criminal. Finally, the court found
in the favour of the counter claim submitted by Peru that Haya de la Torre had
been granted asylum in violation of Havana convention. On the same day after the
delivery of the judgement Colombia filed a request for interpretation seeking a
reply to the question whether the judgement implied an obligation to surrender the
refugee to the Peruvian authorities. The court declared the request inadmissible.
 THE CASE OF THE S.S. LOTUS
Judgement by: Permanent Court of Justice
Decided on : 7th September 1927
Citation: S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7)
This is a leading case which has focused on the criminal jurisdiction in
international law

The fact of the case is as follows:

A Turkish ship named Bozkurt collided with the French ship S.S.Lotus. in
consequences of this collision certain Turkish national died. After the collision the
French ship S.S.Lotus reached the Turkish port, Constantinople. The TURKISH
Government arrested the French nationals and the officers of the ship and started
criminal proceedings against them in accordance with the Turkish law. They were
held guilty and convicted by the court. The French Government lodged a strong
protest against this. Thereupon the Government of France and Turkey agreed to
refer this matter to the Permanent Court of international Justice.

The issue in the following case was:

Whether Turkey violate international law when Turkey court exercised jurisdiction
over a crime committed by a French national, outside Turkey ?

The permanent court of international justice held that Turkey did not have any
right to try on French nationals but later the court discovered that although France
had the jurisdiction because of their flag aviated on the ship, international law did
not give France complete jurisdiction and authority in this case and held that turkey
was absolutely right in its laws when they filed a suit against France and did not
act against the international laws.

The Permanent Court of International Justice Propounded the following principles

in this connection
 Firstly, through it is true that in all system of law the principle of the
territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true that all or
nearly all of this system of law extended their action to offences committed outside
the territory of the state which adopts them and do so in ways which vary from
state to state. The territoriality by criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute
principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial
sovereignty.

Secondly, there is no rule of international law in regard to collision cases

to the effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
sate whose flag is flown.
 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE
Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands
Judgement by: International Court of Justice
Decided on : 20 February 1969
The fact of the case are as follows:

Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the
equidistance principle. An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary
proved difficult because Denmark and Netherlands wanted this prolongation to
take place based on the equidistance principle whereas Germany was of the view
that, together, these two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her.
Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in her
losing out on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the
length of its North Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles and rules
of international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to
decide if the principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either
through treaty law or customary international law.

The question before the court was whether Germany under a legal obligation to
accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle, contained in Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a customary
international law rule or on the basis of the Geneva Convention?

The court pronounced the judgement and held that The use of the equidistance
method had not crystallised into customary law and the method was not obligatory
for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea related to the present proceedings.

The Court held that the existence of a situation of estoppel would have allowed

Article 6 to become binding on Germany – but held that Germany’s action did not
support an argument for estoppel. The Court also held that the mere fact that
Germany may not have specifically objected to the equidistance principle as
contained in Article 6, is not sufficient to state that the principle is now binding
upon it.

The Court held that the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not
form a part of existing or emerging customary international law at the time of
drafting the Convention. The Court supported this finding based on (1) the
hesitation expressed by the drafters of the Convention, the International Law
Commission, on the inclusion of Article 6 into the Convention and (2) the fact that
reservations to Article 6 was permissible under the Convention.