51. Artemio Endaya v. Atty. Wilfredo Oca AC No.

3967, 3 September 2003

FACTS: Atty. Oca was assigned by the PAO in Batangas City to handle the unlawful detainer
case where Artemio Endaya and his spouse were defendants. During the preliminary
conference of the case, Oca already appeared as counsel for the spouses and his first act was
to move for the amendment of the answer previously filed by his clients. His motion was denied
by the judge and was ordered to submit affidavits and position papers within 10 days from
receipt of the order.

Oca failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper but the judge dismissed the case
on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interest. The losing party appealed
the case to the RTC and again, Oca failed to file the memoranda that the court ordered the
parties to file. This resulted in the reversal of the earlier decision made by the lower court.

Endaya complained to Oca about the adverse decision but the latter denied receiving a copy
thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant found out that
respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.

RECOMMENDATION/S of Appropriate Bodies Office of the Bar Confidant: Oca was negligent in
handing the case and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for ONE
MONTH.

IBP: Commissioner Fernandez concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant.

IBP Board of Governors: They adopted the report of Commissioner Fernandez in their
Resolution.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS OR BODIES (IF ANY) In re: Unlawful Detainer case
against Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador
Hernandez

MCTC: Case dismissed because the plaintiffs (Hornilla et al.) were not the real parties-ininterest

RTC: Decision reversed, RTC held that plaintiffs were the co-owners of the property in dispute
and as such are parties-in-interest.

ISSUE: WON Oca neglected his duties as a lawyer when he stubbornly failed to comply with
court orders in the submission of pleadings

RULING: Yes. The lawyer has a duty to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Once a
lawyer takes on a client's case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. Whatever the
lawyer's reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or
defending it. Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client
relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the
court.

Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client. Oca was
directed by the MCTC to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and appeal
memorandum by the RTC. He obviously had no choice but to comply. However, he did not do
so. The Court believes such acts show lack of diligence and commitment and evinces absence
of respect for the authority of this Court and the other courts involved. The above acts
constituted negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the CPR.

PENALTY IMPOSED IN DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Suspension from the practice of law for 2
months from notice

DOCTRINE: When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and
the public, he engages in conduct, which is both unethical and unprofessional.
51. ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.
A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003

FACTS: The complainant sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City for his
unlawful detainer civil case filed against him and his wife. The respondent was assigned to handle the
case. When the court, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days
from receipt of the order, respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be
gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that only the plaintiffs
submitted their affidavits and position papers. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest.

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision and the RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.
Once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in its Decision
dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the
court to consider the case as submitted for decision.
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the co-owners of
the property in dispute and as such are parties-in-interest. It also found that the verbal lease agreement
was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month
upon proper notice to the defendants. It also made a finding that defendants incurred rentals in arrears.

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present administrative
complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required
pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Respondent denies that he committed
professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the original counsel of
complainant and his spouse. He further avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of
court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that a non-lawyer
prepared the answer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he
asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was denied. He adds that he agreed to file
the position paper for the complainant upon the latters undertaking to provide him with the documents
which support the position that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had
reneged on his promise, he claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper, as it
would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal
with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-
MCTC-T to the complainant

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

RULING: Yes, the court ruled that the facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents
failure to live up to his duties as lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the practice of law. At
various stages of unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in his performance of his duty as a
counsel.

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12-A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides that (A)
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it.[46] However,
respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992.
Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to
complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.

On top of all these is respondent’s employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office, which is tasked
to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in
the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Against
this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional
obligations. Lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence
required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
52. Simon Paz v. Atty. Pepito Sanchez A.C. no. 6125, Sept. 19, 2006

FACTS: In his complaint dated 23 July 2003, complainant stated that sometime in 1995,
complainant and his partners, Alfredo Uyecio and Petronila Catap, engaged the services of
respondent to assist them purchase, as well as document the purchase, of several parcels of
land from tenant-... farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also tasked to defend complainant's
claim on the properties against the claim of a certain George Lizares ("Lizares").

The complaint arose because respondent, allegedly after the termination of his services in May
2000, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Board ("DARAB case") in
behalf of one Isidro Dizon ("Dizon") for annulment of Transfer Certificate Title No. 420127-R

("TCT No. 420127-R") in the name of complainant and his partners. [1] Complainant explained
that Dizon's property, covered by Emancipation Patent No. 00708554/Transfer Certificate Title
No. 25214 ("TCT No. 25214"), was among those properties purchased by... complainant with
respondent's assistance.

omplainant alleged that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he

represented Dizon in a case involving the same properties and transactions in which he
previously acted as complainant's counsel. Complainant... added that respondent filed the
DARAB case with "malicious machination" because respondent used complainant's old address
to serve the complaint and summons, enabling respondent to obtain a judgment by default in
Dizon's favor.

The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2005-78 dated 12 March 2005
adopting, with modification,[10] Commissioner San Juan's Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against representing conflicting... interests.

IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: disbarment complaint filed by Simon D. Paz ("complainant") against Atty. Pepito A.
Sanchez ("respondent") for representing conflicting interests

RULING:

On Respondent's Violation of the Prohibition against Representing Conflicting Interests

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts." Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of... one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.[15] The
proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same... action or in an unrelated action.

By respondent's own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizon's behalf against
complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondent's clients at that time.

The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that he represented conflicting
interests. Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his
"duty and responsibility' to file the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation... of TCT
No. 25214 and its subsequent transfer in complainant's name.[18] Respondent stated that he
"will forever be bothered by his conscience" if he did not file the case.[19] However, good faith
and honest intentions do not excuse the... violation of this prohibition.[20] In representing both
complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited himself from representing
Dizon against... complainant in the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of interest.

In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the... action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take
advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession... will suffer by the loss thereof.[

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez GUILTY of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS
respondent from the practice of law for ONE YEAR and WARNS respondent that the...
commission of a similar act in the future will merit a more severe penalty.

Principles:

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts." Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of... one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.[15] The
proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same... action or in an unrelated action.

In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the... action as well as the
strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the
fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession... will suffer by the
loss thereof.

52. Simon Paz v. Atty. Pepito Sanchez A.C. no. 6125, Sept. 19, 2006

FACTS: Paz and his partners engaged the services of Atty. Sanchez to assist them in the purchase and
documentation of such purchase of several parcels of land from tenant farmers in
Pampanga as well as defend Paz’s claim on the properties against the claim of George Lizares.

On May 2000 after the termination of their lawyer-client relationship, Sanchez filed a complaint before the
DARAB on behalf of Isidro Dizon for annulment of TCT No. 420127-R in the name of Paz and his
partners. Paz then explained that the subject property was among the properties purchased by them with
Sanchez’s ssistance. Later on June 23, 2003, Sanchez filed a civil case against Paz and Sycamore
Venture Corp. before the RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga for annulment of TCT No. 483629-R while the
DARAB case was pending. With that, Paz filed the administrative complaint alleging conflict of interests
and use of malicious
machination in the filing of the DARAB CASE.

RECOMMENDATION/S of Appropriate Bodies IBP: Comm. San Juan found Sanchez guilty of
violating the prohibition against representing conflicting interests.

IBP Board of Governors: Adopted findings of Comm. San Juan and recommended imposition
of ONE YEAR SUSPENSION from the practice of law as a penalty.

ISSUE: WON Sanchez represented conflicting interests when he later represented Isidro Dizon
in the DARAB Case

RULING: Yes. Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. The Court noted that
by Sanchez’s own admission, Paz and Dizon were both his clients at the time when he filed the DARAB
case on behalf of Dizon. Likewise, Sanchez did not specifically deny that he represendted conflicting
interests, that he merely offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his “duty and
responsibility” to file the case.

Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse the violation of this prohibition. In representing both
complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. In the eyes of the Court, Sanchez should have inhibited himself from
representing Dizon against Paz in theDARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of interest.

PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Suspension from the practice of law for ONE
YEAR and a warning that commission of a similar act in the future will merit a more severe penalty

DOCTRINE: Conflict of interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action; Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse any violation of the
prohibition.
53. Gamilla, et al. v Mariño, Jr., AC No. 4763, 20 March 2003

FACTS: This disbarment case emanated from an intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen (17)
years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and double dealing
in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty.
Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for
distribution among faculty members of the university.

On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mario accusing him
of
(a) compromising their entitlements underthe 1986 collective bargaining agreement without the
knowledge, consent or ratification of the union members, and worse, for only P2,000,000.00 when they
could have received more than P9,000,000.00;

(b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00 received by him and other officers and directors in the UST
Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement;

(c) lack of transparency in the administration and distribution of the remaining balance of the
P42,000,000.00 package under the 1992 memorandum of agreement;

(d) refusal to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members although the
amount was denominated as attorneys fees. Complainants asserted that respondent violated Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of Canon 1; Rule 15.08 of Canon 15; Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16; and Rule
20.04 of Canon 20, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro: found the complaint meritorious and suspended
respondent Atty. Mario from the practice of law until such time that the required detailed accounting of the
questioned remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during his incumbency as President and
Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the IBP

IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved the report of IBP Commissioner. In the meantime, the
Regional Director found merit in the two (2) complaints before the BLR and ordered the expulsion of
respondent and the other officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of
their failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the
management of UST, and their collection of exorbitant and illegal attorneys fees amounting to
P4,200,000.00.

On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal set aside the Order of the Regional
Director. It found that the balance of the P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union
had been fully and adequately accounted for by respondent and the other officers and directors of the
union. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the other officers and
directors of the union to distribute the attorneys fees of P4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to
immediately hold the elections for union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their respective
terms of office.

On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. The Decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763,
where the case is allegedly still pending resolution.

On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board of Governors adopting and
approving the Report which recommended the lifting of Atty. Marios suspension from law practice since
he had sufficiently accounted for the funds in question.

ISSUES: (1) WON respondent failed to avoid conflict of interests;

(2) Whether respondent violated Canon 15 of the CPR.

RULING:
(1) YES. In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr. in the
manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and the
P4,200,000.00 attorney’s fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that the
Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the
funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of agreements with the management of
UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for
the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and
interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when
he obtained the attorney’s fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances
justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union. As one of the sixteen (16) union officers
and directors seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal,
respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent
lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict
of interest among lawyers is “whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance thereof.”

In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position
where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.

(2) YES. Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or
demanding the inexplicable attorney’s fees, his actions were not transparent enough to allow the
bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently.

Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to
“observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” Lawyers are
vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-
oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest. As indispensable part of the system of administering
justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics—a duty
more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the
practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and
candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyer’s vocation
is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.

PENALTY: Responded is reprimanded for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punishment
will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act.

GAMILLA v MARIÑO
FACTS: Atty Marino, Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of
economic benefits amounting toP35 Milllion. The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired
in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989, the faculty members of UST
went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of 16 officers and
directors of the UST Faculty Union including Atty Marino, Jr.The Sec of Labor prescribed the
retroactivity of the collective bargaining agreement to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union
also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment to settle backwages. The important
fact in this case is that Atty, Marino, as president, negotiated with UST as union attorney, even
though he was an interested party since he was one of the officers who were dismissed (conflict
of interests)

ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded?

RULING: YES
RATIO: 1.Atty Marino failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the
compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union atty and
interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and
thereafter, when he obtained the attys fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the
circumstances justifying such clain to the members of the UST FacultyUnion.2. As one of the 16
union officers and directors seeking compensation from the UST for their illegal dismissal, Atty.
Marino was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as
concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise
agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is ―whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an atty from the full= discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. In
the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an atty to put himself in a position
where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.3.
Atty Marino. Both as lawyer and president of the union was dutybound to protect and advance
the interest of the union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was
jeopardized when his personal interest complicated the negotiation process and eventually
resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him at
the expense of the other faculty members. He also ought to have disclosed his interest (which
he only did only years after the consummation of his share.
54. Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v Paz, 95 SCRA 24

FACTS: The Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLACU) filed a disbarment case against
Atty. David Paz. The complainant charged respondent with malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, gross immoral conduct and/or disloyalty to the RP.

In the course of the investigation then being conducted by the “Charlie Division” of the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, otherwise known as the PARGO,
on the complaint of Dr. Irineo P. Sia for antigraft against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta of
Pasay City, the respondent, David D.C. Paz, was then PARGO’s Legal Officer and Chief
Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid “Charlie Division”.

The respondent enlisted the help of Dr. Irineo P. Sia and Atty. Galileo P.Brion in the gathering of
evidence which included PLACU’s copies of the records of Civil Case No. 72967 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled “Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et al.”
Respondent also administered oaths to some persons who had given written statements before
the PARGO investigators. Later on, after respondent had resigned from the PARGO sometime
in January 1970 and on the basis of the investigation conducted by the PARGO on the
aforementioned antigraft complaint of Dr. Sia, the PARGO’s successor, the Complaints and
Investigation Office (CIO) filed an antigraft charge and another charge for technical malversation
both against Pablo Cuneta and others with the Pasay City Fiscal’s Office. On November 13 and
23, 1970, during the preliminary investigation by the Pasay City Fiscal’s Office, the respondent
entered his appearance, participated and orally argued therein as one of the counsels of Pablo
Cuneta.

While in subsequent hearings thereof, the respondent no longer appeared as counsel for
Cuneta, it was only after his appearance had been questioned by Atty. Brion. Petitioner argues
that there was then a relationship of attorney and client between respondent and the
government and that for having appeared twice, participated and orally argued as counsel for
Pablo Cuneta during the preliminary investigation of the charges for antigraft and technical
malversation filed by the CIO, successor of PARGO, against said Pablo Cuneta and others
before the Pasay City Fiscal’s Office, the respondent violated Section 6 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics and Section 20 (e) of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent Paz alleged that 1) he did not participate in the investigation of the Cuneta antigraft
case except to swear the witnesses; 2) that it is true that respondent Paz appeared among a
battery of lawyers for Mayor Cuneta but when his appearance was questioned by Atty. Brion, it
was withdrawn; 3) and that the antigraft case against Mayor Cuneta was finally dismissed.

ISSUE: WON Paz is guilty of charge of representing clients with conflicting interests.

RULING: YES. The evidence has duly established that the respondent, David D.C. Paz, as PARGO’s
Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor and head of the “Charlie Division”, took part in the investigation of the
antigraft case against exMayor Cuneta by administering oaths to witnesses and gathering evidence. He
acquired knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the antigraft case. The respondent
obtained confidential information and learned of the evidence of the PARGO against exMayor Cuneta.
There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and client between the respondent David D.C. Paz and
the PARGO.

It is also a fact that at the early stages of the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of
Pasay of the antigraft case against exMayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent appeared as counsel for said
Cuneta. This is the same antigraft case investigated by the PARGO when the respondent was head of the
“Charlie Division” thereof. That the respondent later withdrew his appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of
no moment. He had already violated the Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20 (e) of Rule 138,Revised
Rules of Court which provides:

“Sec.20. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney:x x x x(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client’s business except from him or with his knowledge and approval. The
respondent has displayed a lack of concern for his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given
to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him
from appearing as counsel for the other side.

PENALTY: Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 2 months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more drastically.

55. FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, A.C. No. 7298 [Formerly CBD
Case No. 05-1565], June 25, 2007

FACTS: In this administrative complaint, the respondent lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which
threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows:

“BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In
addition to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).”

ISSUE: WON respondent lawyer liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

RULING: YES. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to
his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01
commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer’s client.

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he
threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he
would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of
laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in
the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation
against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for
the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it
is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to
expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very
serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent’s disbarment from the
practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution.” While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated
for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing
the offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an
act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a
lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable
by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and
that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file
the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his
client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he
so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said
violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually
done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal.
Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and
to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a
specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even
contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s
claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to
yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a
private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged
nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the
latter compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too
severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his
overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

DECISION: The Supreme Court found the respondent lawyer liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was meted out the penalty of reprimand with the stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

55. Peña v Aparicio, AC No. 7298, 25 June 2007

FACTS: Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case
before NLRC. Complainant Pena of MOF Company (Subic). received a notice from the Conciliation and
Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent,
submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal
dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant sent notices to Hufana for the
latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent
wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained a
threat to the company.

Believing that the letter deviated from ethical standards, complainant filed an complaint with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP. Respondent claimed that Atty. Jocson, complainant's counsel,
played part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him and he pointed out
that the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the
issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter.

RECOMMENDATION: CBD-IBP: Complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with the
requirement on certificate against non-forum shopping and recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent.

IBP Board: IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation.
Respondent filed MR claiming counterclaim against complainant. Complainant filed this Petition for
Review regarding the dismissal of his case against respondent.

ISSUE: WON IBP erred when it dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and
without ruling on the merits

RULING: Yes. IBP erred in dismissing the disbarment case due to lack of certificate of non
forum shopping.
The rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the
pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum
shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of
their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue
inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts.

It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of
conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are
either "taken by the SC motu proprio, or by (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person. Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum
shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease.

With respect to the violation of Atty. Aparicio, Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening
letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical. Canon 19 of the
CPR states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding
legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end,
his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client. In the case at bar,
respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages

PENALTY IMPOSED: REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

DOCTRINE: Lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client
56. Jose A. Rivera v Atty. Napoleon Corral, AC No. 3548, 04 July 2002

FACTS: Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was
received by Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty.
Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date
February 23 to February 29 without the court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral
later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received the decision on
February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).

(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with
particularly by personally and manually changing entries in the court’s record without the Court’s
prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar much
more so because in so doing he was found to have been motivated by the desire of suppressing
the truth.

(6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS", among other
things he stated that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case at issue.

In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the paper
prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction was initiated and done in the presence and
with the approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court employees. According to respondent,
the correction was made because of typographical error he committed. He denied that Annaliza
Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is his secretary.

RECOMMENDATION/S of IBP: respondent guilty as charged and recommended his

suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and respondent did not appear.
Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6, 1994 hearing.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1.] the complaint filed is not verified;
2.] in the hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to appear; 3.] unless complainant
appears personally, be sworn to and questioned personally under oath, the complaint is
defective; 4.] the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a form of harassment; 5.] in view
of the repeated failure of complainant to appear and be sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely
hearsay.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the
decision of the court without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

RULING: No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was
made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal
was
filed within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice
of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty.
Corral altered the date he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to make it
appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty.
Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.

In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction introduced by
respondent was made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court into believing that the
notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil Case
No. 17473 was duly received by a certain Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent, on
February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on March 13, 1990 which was clearly
out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date when he
allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing that
there was no February 29, 1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the date again to
February 28, 1990 by means of a "reply to Plaintiff’s Manifestation".

The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondent’s claim that the correction
was made in the presence of the Clerk of Court and other court employees was denied by Nilda
P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who declared that the
alteration was surreptitiously made and would have been left unnoticed were it not for the timely
discovery thereof.14

The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully supported by the evidence.
However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed of respondent.

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.15 A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.16

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended form his office as attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.]
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.] conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; 5.] violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6.] willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court; and 7.] willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a penalty as disbarment, the
inherent power of the Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be
exercised because it can not be denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a
lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.17

The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain terms that: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that
"a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
improper advantage in any case or proceeding."

By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed,
respondent committed an act of dishonesty. Under pertinent rules,22 dishonesty constitutes
grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case,23 imposed a one-year suspension on
respondent therein for inserting in the records of the case a certification of non-forum shopping
and making it appear that the same was already part of such records at the time the complaint
was filed. A one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v. Atty.
Rolando Javier24 for deceiving his client into believing that he filed the petition on time when in
fact it was filed on a much later date. It should be stressed that brazenly resorting to such a
legal subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings toward his client is not only
a disgraceful indictment on respondent’s moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a
lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar. Such misconduct warrants a
similar penalty for the Court can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair
name of an honorable profession.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
57. ANA F. RETUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ, Respondent., AC No.
1388, 28 March 1980

FACTS: Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor children, filed a claim for workmen's
compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the employer of her husband who died in
1968. Retuya won in that case where it included P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Gorduiz. The
employer appealed and proposed to compromise the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-
half of the total award. Ana accepted the proposal. The employer paid the reduced award.

Ana sent to the employer the receipt and release signed by her with a letter wherein she
explained that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the motion to dismiss the claim bec. he wanted
twenty percent of the award as his atty's fees. After she had cashed the check, she was not
able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee. unexpectedly, she was served with a warrant of arrest.
It turned out that Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had misappropriated his
attorney's fees and that he had demanded payment from her but, she refused to make payment.

She filed a motion to quash. She explained that she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz bec.
He was demanding one-third of the award: that when she did not accede to his demand, he
lowered his claim to P800, and that she bargained for P600 but he refused to accept that
amount. Ana averred that the estafa case was filed just to harass her. The court denied the
motion to quash and granted the motion of Atty. Gorduiz requiring Ana to produce a copy of the
decision awarding her workmen's compensation for her husband's death.

The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty. Gorduiz the sum of
P500 as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted. Retuya asked for the disbarment or
suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and disbarment case against Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor
General. The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte to investigate the
case against Gorduiz.

Recommendation of Fiscal’s Office: recommended the dismissal of the case The Solicitor
General disagreeing with that recommendation, filed in this Court against Gorduiz a complaint
wherein he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months

ISSUE/S: WON there is justification for suspending the respondent.

RULING: Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the
supposed misappropriation of his attorney's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had
swindled him and, therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's
oath, he had filed a suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her.

Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that "controversies with clients
concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his
self- respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits
with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."

PENALTY IMPOSED: Suspension for a period of six months counted from notice of this
decision