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Transit Security Preparedness
TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
TCRP SYNTHESIS 146

Transit Security
Preparedness
A Synthesis of Transit Practice
Patricia Bye
Ernest R. Frazier, Sr.
Countermeasures Assessment & Security Experts, LLC
New Castle, DE
Subject Areas
Public Transportation • Passenger Transportation • Security and Emergencies
Research sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration in cooperation with the Transit Development Corporation
2020
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TCRP SYNTHESIS 146
The nation’s growth and the need to meet mobility, environmental, Project J-7, Topic SA-48
and energy objectives place demands on public transit systems. Cur- ISSN 1073-4880
rent systems, some of which are old and in need of upgrading, must ISBN 978-0-309-48124-3
expand service area, increase service frequency, and improve efficiency
© 2020 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
to serve these demands. Research is necessary to solve operating prob-
lems, adapt appropriate new technologies from other industries, and
introduce innovations into the transit industry. The Transit Coopera-
tive Research Program (TCRP) serves as one of the principal means by COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
which the transit industry can develop innovative near-term solutions Authors herein are responsible for the authenticity of their materials and for obtaining
to meet demands placed on it. written permissions from publishers or persons who own the copyright to any previously
The need for TCRP was originally identified in TRB Special Report published or copyrighted material used herein.
213—Research for Public Transit: New Directions, published in 1987 Cooperative Research Programs (CRP) grants permission to reproduce material in this
and based on a study sponsored by the Urban Mass Transportation publication for classroom and not-for-profit purposes. Permission is given with the
Administration—now the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). A understanding that none of the material will be used to imply TRB, AASHTO, FAA, FHWA,
FTA, GHSA, NHTSA, or TDC endorsement of a particular product, method, or practice.
report by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA),
It is expected that those reproducing the material in this document for educational and
Transportation 2000, also recognized the need for local, problem- not-for-profit uses will give appropriate acknowledgment of the source of any reprinted or
solving research. TCRP, modeled after the successful National Coop- reproduced material. For other uses of the material, request permission from CRP.
erative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), undertakes research
and other technical activities in response to the needs of transit ser-
vice providers. The scope of TCRP includes various transit research
NOTICE
fields including planning, service configuration, equipment, facilities,
operations, human resources, maintenance, policy, and administrative The report was reviewed by the technical panel and accepted for publication according to
procedures established and overseen by the Transportation Research Board and approved
practices.
by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
TCRP was established under FTA sponsorship in July 1992. Proposed
by the U.S. Department of Transportation, TCRP was authorized as The opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this report are those of the
researchers who performed the research and are not necessarily those of the Transporta-
part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 tion Research Board; the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; or
(ISTEA). On May 13, 1992, a memorandum agreement outlining TCRP the program sponsors.
operating procedures was executed by the three cooperating organi-
The Transportation Research Board; the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
zations: FTA; the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; and the sponsors of the Transit Cooperative Research Program do not endorse
Medicine, acting through the Transportation Research Board (TRB); products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because
and the Transit Development Corporation, Inc. (TDC), a nonprofit they are considered essential to the object of the report.
educational and research organization established by APTA. TDC is
responsible for forming the independent governing board, designated
as the TCRP Oversight and Project Selection (TOPS) Commission.
Research problem statements for TCRP are solicited periodically but
may be submitted to TRB by anyone at any time. It is the responsibility
of the TOPS Commission to formulate the research program by identi-
fying the highest priority projects. As part of the evaluation, the TOPS
Commission defines funding levels and expected products.
Once selected, each project is assigned to an expert panel appointed
by TRB. The panels prepare project statements (requests for propos-
als), select contractors, and provide technical guidance and counsel
throughout the life of the project. The process for developing research
problem statements and selecting research agencies has been used by
TRB in managing cooperative research programs since 1962. As in
other TRB activities, TCRP project panels serve voluntarily without
compensation.
Because research cannot have the desired effect if products fail to
reach the intended audience, special emphasis is placed on disseminat-
ing TCRP results to the intended users of the research: transit agen-
cies, service providers, and suppliers. TRB provides a series of research Published reports of the
reports, syntheses of transit practice, and other supporting material TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
developed by TCRP research. APTA will arrange for workshops, train-
are available from
ing aids, field visits, and other activities to ensure that results are imple-
mented by urban and rural transit industry practitioners. Transportation Research Board
Business Office
TCRP provides a forum where transit agencies can cooperatively 500 Fifth Street, NW
address common operational problems. TCRP results support and Washington, DC 20001
complement other ongoing transit research and training programs.
and can be ordered through the Internet by going to
http://www.national-academies.org
and then searching for TRB
Printed in the United States of America

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governmental institution to advise the nation on issues related to science and technology. Members are elected by their peers for
outstanding contributions to research. Dr. Marcia McNutt is president.
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The mission of the Transportation Research Board is to provide leadership in transportation improvements and innovation through
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Learn more about the Transportation Research Board at www.TRB.org.

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS
CRP STAFF FOR TCRP SYNTHESIS 146

Christopher J. Hedges, Director, Cooperative Research Programs
Lori L. Sundstrom, Deputy Director, Cooperative Research Programs
Gwen Chisholm Smith, Manager, Transit Cooperative Research Program
Mariela Garcia-Colberg, Senior Program Officer
Sheila A. Moore, Program Associate
Eileen P. Delaney, Director of Publications
Natalie Barnes, Associate Director of Publications
TCRP PROJECT J-7 PANEL

Brad J. Miller, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, St. Petersburg, FL (Chair)
Mallory R. Avis, City of Battle Creek, Battle Creek, MI
Mark Donaghy, Greater Dayton RTA, Dayton, OH
Michael Ford, Regional Transportation District, Denver, CO
Christian Kent, Consultant, Virginia Beach, VA
Ronald Kilcoyne, TMD, Walnut Creek, CA
Jeanne Krieg, Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority, Antioch, CA
Elizabeth Presutti, Des Moines Area Regional Transit Authority, IA
Robert H. Prince, Jr., FOOT PRINCE, Jacksonville, FL
Jarrett W. Stoltzfus, Proterra, City of Industry, CA
David Wilcock, Vanasse Hangen Brustlin, Inc., Boston, MA
Faith Hall, FTA Liaison
Arthur Guzzetti, APTA Liaison
William Terry, NTI Liaison
TOPIC SA-48 PANEL

Jeanne Krieg, Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority, Antioch, CA
Harold Levitt, Retired from PANYNJ, Old Bridge, NJ
Mike Meader, Regional Transportation District, Denver, CO
Ronald A. Pavlik, Jr., Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washington, DC
Dominick V. Pellegrin, Metro Transit, Minneapolis, MN
James D. Spiller, Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Dallas, TX
Christopher Trucillo, NJ Transit Police Department, Newark, NJ
Brian Windle, Metra Police Department, Chicago, IL
Sung-suk Violet Yu, John Jay College – CUNY, New York, NY
Kevin Montgomery, FTA Liaison
Polly L. Hanson, APTA Liaison
Brian L. Sherlock, ATU Liaison

ABOUT THE TCRP SYNTHESIS PROGRAM

Transit administrators, engineers, and researchers often face problems for which information
already exists, either in documented form or as undocumented experience and practice. This infor-
mation may be fragmented, scattered, and unevaluated. As a consequence, full knowledge of what
has been learned about a problem may not be brought to bear on its solution. Costly research findings
may go unused, valuable experience may be overlooked, and due consideration may not be given to
recommended practices for solving or alleviating the problem.
There is information on nearly every subject of concern to the transit industry. Much of it derives
from research or from the work of practitioners faced with problems in their day-to-day work. To
provide a systematic means for assembling and evaluating such useful information and to make it
available to the entire transit community, the Transit Cooperative Research Program Oversight and
Project Selection (TOPS) Committee authorized the Transportation Research Board to undertake
a continuing study. This study, TCRP Project J-7, “Synthesis of Information Related to Transit
Problems,” searches out and synthesizes useful knowledge from all available sources and prepares
concise, documented reports on specific topics. Reports from this endeavor constitute a TCRP report
series, Synthesis of Transit Practice.
This synthesis series reports on current knowledge and practice, in a compact format, without the
detailed directions usually found in handbooks or design manuals. Each report in the series provides
a compendium of the best knowledge available on those measures found to be the most successful
in resolving specific problems.
FOREWORD
By Mariela Garcia-Colberg
Staff Officer
Transportation Research Board
Every transit agency should ensure that they have effective practices in place to protect employees,
passengers, and infrastructure from security events. These security practices should include processes
to deter, respond to, and fully recover from events when they occur.
The objective of this synthesis is to communicate the importance of system security, regardless of
the size of the system, and to identify current practices, their effectiveness, and security measures that
transit systems can use. This synthesis will assist transit agencies with the development and evaluation of
their transit security programs.
A literature review was carried out, and detailed survey responses were gathered from 43 of the
100 transit agencies contacted that had implemented measures to improve transit security. An analysis
of the state of the practice is provided, emphasizing lessons learned, current practices, challenges,
and gaps in information. Five case examples of notable security preparedness practices were also
developed.
Patricia Bye and Ernest R. Frazier, Sr., from Countermeasures Assessment & Security Experts,
LLC, collected and synthesized the information and wrote the report under the guidance of a panel
of experts in the subject area. The members of the topic panel are acknowledged on page iv. This
synthesis is an immediately useful document that records the practices that were acceptable within
the limitations of the knowledge available at the time of its preparation. As progress in research and
practice continues, new knowledge will be added to that now at hand.


CONTENTS
1 Summary
4 Chapter 1 Introduction
4 Project Background and Objectives
4 Technical Approach to Project
6 Chapter 2 Security Preparedness

6 Definition of Preparedness
7 Importance of Security Preparedness
8 Roles in Security Preparedness
12 Chapter 3 Preparedness Strategy and Approaches:

Literature Review
12 Risk Management
14 Security Incidents and Causes
16 Security Plans
17 Key Elements of Transit Security
45 Chapter 4 Survey Results

45 Transit Security Preparedness
46 Incidents and Causes
48 Technology
48 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
49 Cybersecurity
49 Use of Visible, Unpredictable Deterrence: Security Presence
51 Training
51 Preparedness Drills and Exercises
53 Awareness Campaigns for Public and Transit Employees
55 Chapter 5 Case Examples

55 Planned Special Events: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit and
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
59 Approaches to Address Homelessness: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
65 Training and Exercises: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
Drills and Exercises Training Program: Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority
67 Security Committees: King County Metro Transit Department
69 Federal Emergency Management Agency Transit Security Grant Programs
75 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

75 Conclusions
76 Future Research

77 Appendix A Glossary
84 Appendix B List of Participating Transit Agencies
86 Appendix C Survey Questionnaire
99 Appendix D Survey Results
123 References and Further Resources
132 Endnotes

SUMMARY
The objective of TCRP Synthesis Project J-07/Topic SA-48, “Transit Security Pre-
paredness: Current Practices,” was to identify current practices transit systems can use to
enhance their security measures and to identify opportunities to apply security technology
applications used in other industries to the transit environment. This synthesis gathers
information on current practices and security measures through a literature review,
a survey, and spotlights/case examples with a particular focus on employee and customer
awareness; security presence; partnerships with stakeholders, both internal and external;
and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).
Federal agencies such as DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
FTA, and the FRA play a role in transit security preparedness. National organizations such as
APTA provide information, recommended practices, and information-sharing opportunities.
Local agencies such as the local police and social service agencies also play an important role in
security preparedness.
Security affects many aspects of a transit system—employees, passengers, agency morale
and reputation, and the community—and comprises a broad array of laws, technology,
and procedures. APTA Transit Security Fundamentals: Security Operations for Public Transit
(APTA 2013e) identifies the key elements of transit system security preparedness:
• Protection of assets;
• Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence;
• Targeted training for key staff;
• Preparedness drills and exercises; and
• Awareness campaigns for public and transit employees.
Security measures can range from policing, personnel, and training, to technology, infor-
mation management, policy, and legislation. When an agency selects and implements secu-
rity measures, a variety of institutional, legal, and budgetary constraints are considered.
Even though there are many similarities in operations and functions between larger and
smaller transit agencies, one size does not fit all in the context of security preparedness.
A security preparedness strategy is dependent on the risks to the transit system. Agencies
must consider the costs, time to implement, training requirements, and ease of use of each
strategy, as well as the interplay between multiple countermeasures and deployment strategies
implemented.
An effective preparedness strategy today is a comprehensive strategy, one that is multi
faceted and layered, taking into account the benefits of systematic security approaches
deployed jointly or in tandem. It includes the following:
• Policies, plans and protocols that specifically describe the agency’s approaches and are
integrated into the daily business of the agency;
1

• Security staffing decisions that can be difficult, since adding personnel is often the most
costly operating expenditure that an agency will face;
• Technology that requires technical staff, cybersecurity resilience, a proactive approach to
additions/upgrades, and willingness to address the issues, such as privacy and civil rights,
that can arise; and
• Training for employees, contractors, and partners that covers all aspects of an agency’s
security strategy and provides actionable information to better handle emergencies and
security events.
Sixty percent of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents rate their agency’s
efforts to address their major security challenges as somewhat or very successful. However,
only 25% say they have implemented any security risk reduction program that they consider
to be exceptional or exemplary. Particular issues of concern to the respondent agencies were
• Assaults. Almost 85% of the agencies experienced assaults against passengers in the past
year, and 75% experienced assaults against operators in the same period.
• Fare evasion. Almost 92% of the survey participants experience incidents of fare evasion,
with 35% of the agencies having more than 100 incidents in the past year.
• Trespassing. Three-quarters (75%) of the transit agency respondents experienced tres-
passing incidents in the previous year, and more than 25% had more than 100 trespassing
incidents in the previous year.
• Quality of life issues. All of the transit agency respondents experienced disorderly
persons/conduct and drunkenness/liquor law violations in the previous year. More
than 60% of the transit agency respondents experienced eating/drinking/loud music
infractions in the previous year.
• Homelessness/vagrancy. Almost 85% of the Transit Security Preparedness agency respon-
dents experienced homeless/vagrancy incidents in the previous year, with 32% having
more than 100 incidents of each in the previous year.
A security preparedness strategy is dependent on the unique operational parameters of
the transit agency. However, this study found that there are common themes in all effective
security preparedness approaches.
• Information sharing is essential. Sharing and collaboration with federal agencies and
other transit agencies for intelligence provide critical information on current and poten-
tial future risks and what can be done to reduce those risks, through both lessons learned
and examples of effective implementation practices. Threat and criminal trending can be
accessed through these partnerships, allowing a data-based approach for security.
• Collaboration and cooperation are also essential. Federal and state agencies can provide
resources, audits, and access to security programs that support system security.
• Partnering with local law enforcement needs to be part of every transit agency’s secu-
rity program, even if not contracted for or part of formal agreements. Because all transit
agencies operate within one or more jurisdictions, positive working relationships and
collaboration with all jurisdictions in the transit service area are necessary to support
agency security.
• Engagement of employees and of passengers and public is important. Employees are
the “eyes and ears” of the agency and often essential participants in agency security–
related initiatives. The riding public also are “eyes and ears” for the agency. Both the
riding and the nonriding public influence the perception of the security of the agency
and play a major role in influencing the community and political support for the security
preparedness program an agency can implement.
Suggestions for further study include research to support transit agency approaches that
address new or evolving issues. TCRP research projects are already planned to address fare

Summary 3
evasion and trespassing. Research into effective approaches to address quality of life issues
would be beneficial for transit agencies. Research into new technology would also be valu-
able. Many transit agencies are using, or planning to use, smartphone apps. Although many
agencies are purchasing apps from the same vendors or apps that have similar capabilities,
there are differences in what the apps can do and the approaches that are taken by the agency
in the use of the app. Research into the different approaches that transit agencies are taking
with smartphone apps will support the transit community in identifying what the essential
features of the apps are and how to effectively implement apps to achieve the goals of the
transit agency.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Project Background and Objectives

The objective of TCRP Synthesis Project J-7/Topic SA-48, “Transit Security Preparedness:
Current Practices” was to identify current practices transit systems can use to enhance their
security measures and to identify opportunities to apply security technology applications used
in other industries to the transit environment.
Public transportation systems have many challenges in transporting passengers and employees
in a safe and secure manner every day. With an open infrastructure susceptible to both terrorist
and criminal security incidents, public transportation agencies need effective security practices
in place to protect employees, passengers, and infrastructure; deter and respond to events; effec-
tively facilitate continuity of operations; and fully recover from events.
This synthesis gathers information of current practices and security measures with a particu-
lar focus on
• Employee and customer awareness, including methods that allow both employees and transit
riders to report suspicious activities.
• Security presence, such as police, employees, messaging, and technology.
• Partnerships with stakeholders, both internal and external, including first responders, munic-
ipalities, and utilities.
• Crime prevention through environmental design.
Even though there are many similarities in operations and functions between larger and
smaller transit agencies, one size does not fit all in the context of security. Larger agencies have
more resources available to address security preparedness. Small or medium-sized transit agen-
cies in particular lack actionable processes and solution sets specifically designed for agencies
with more limited resources. This study distills the best of transit agency security practices
and approaches to date and presents fundamental definitions, rationales, and scalable security
guidance that can be deployed with reasonable effort to yield maximum return on time and
investment for all sizes of transit systems.
Technical Approach to Project

The study approach used a literature review, a survey of transit agencies, and in-depth case
examples to accomplish the project objective. A focused search and review of recent domestic
and international research on transit security preparedness was done, with a focus on employee
and customer awareness initiatives; security presence practices; partnerships, internal and
external, with stakeholders; and crime prevention through environmental design approaches
(CPTED). The analysis of the material reviewed considered the applicability, conclusiveness,

Introduction 5
and usefulness of the information. As part of the literature review, the current practices of
transportation agencies in meeting their security preparedness responsibilities and require-
ments were collected on the basis of available information.
Sources for the literature review include Google, Google Scholar, and the Transportation
Research International Documentation database—composed of the Transportation Research
Information Services database and the International Transport Research Documentation
database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Joint Transport
Research Centre—as the initial search engines for the online search of relevant research and
resources. The team looked at both U.S. and non-U.S. results as part of the literature review.
Transportation-specific sources included the published research reports from the NCHRP
and TCRP programs; FHWA, FTA, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and other
federal agencies; APTA; and other transportation-related organizations.
The study team conducted a survey with selected follow-up interviews to acquire a current
understanding of existing security practices at transit agencies. The survey was distributed to
transit agencies through an electronic survey tool. Periodic email reminders were sent out to
nonrespondents to the survey, and when necessary, selected transit agencies were contacted by
phone or in person to encourage participation in the survey.
The results of the literature review and survey, along with additional outreach, were used to
identify candidate organizations for case examples. The team sought out interesting illustrations
of effective practices as well as identifiable shortcomings that have emerged. The study team
used selection criteria that included effectiveness and overall impact in terms of reduction in
risk to the agency and its transportation systems, transferability of the technology or approach
to other transit agencies, mix of agency size and location, and overall relevance toward meeting
the project objectives.
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the synthesis, providing the project background and objec-
tives, the technical approach to the project, and an overview of the report’s organization.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of security preparedness, including definitions and the roles
of the transit agency and federal, state, local, and other agencies in preparedness.
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the literature review findings and contains the major
elements of an effective transit security preparedness program as well as an overview of security
preparedness practices in transit agencies.
Chapter 4 contains the results of the transit agency survey conducted as part of this project.
Chapter 5 provides a series of in-depth case examples of selected practices and approaches.
Chapter 6 presents conclusions based on the synthesis investigations and suggestions for
further study.
References and a bibliography are included at the end of the report, along with a series of
appendices that include a glossary, a list of transit agencies that participated in the survey, the
survey questionnaire, and the detailed survey results.

CHAPTER 2
Security Preparedness
Definition of Preparedness
“Preparedness,” according to the National Incident Management System (NIMS), is “a con-
tinuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking
corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response” (Center
of Excellence for Homeland Security-Emergency Management 2019). The Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (FEMA 2010) states that
preparedness is the “process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for
a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering
capabilities when needed for an incident.”
APTA defines “all-hazard preparedness” as “an integrated planning and capability building
for safety, security and emergency management to optimize and continuously improve the use
of resources and the management of risks from hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and adverse
events or incidents for transit agencies” (APTA 2013c).
In the context of security, preparedness means to prepare for incidents that inevitably
occur—the policies put in place, and the approaches and actions taken to anticipate and mini-
mize the impacts of events. More specifically, security preparedness involves:
• Preventing incidents within the control and responsibility of transit system—approaches
taken either to ensure that incidents do not occur or to reduce the likelihood of an occurrence.
• Protecting passengers, transit agency personnel, and critical assets at all times—actions taken
before, during, and after an incident.
• Mitigating consequences or losses and their effects attributable to an occurrence—actions
taken to reduce probability and severity of consequences to humans and transit agency assets.
• Responding to situations and events that do occur—actions taken in reaction to events.
• Recovering from incidents—actions taken to restore service and get things back to normal
as quickly as possible.
Presidential Policy Directive 8 described the nation’s approach to national preparedness and
established the National Preparedness Goal: “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security 2011).
The National Preparedness System identified core capabilities necessary to achieve that goal
across five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, as sum-
marized in Figure 1.
A security preparedness strategy is dependent on both the threats and hazards of transit sys-
tems and the unique operational parameters of the transit agency. Because threats and hazards

Security Preparedness 7
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery

Intelligence and Information Sharing Risk Assessment Infrastructure Systems
Interdiction and Access control Threats and On-scene security, protection, and law
disruption hazards enforcement
identification
Screening, search, Physical protection Long-term Operational
and detection measures vulnerability communications
reduction
Risk management Situational
awareness
Cybersecurity
Figure 1. Preparedness capabilities summary chart.
to transit systems evolve, security approaches need to evolve to address the new challenges. The
security preparedness approach that periodically reassesses measures chosen for implementa-
tion to evaluate their effectiveness and recognizes new risks and challenges to reduce risks will
best accomplish the security level required to accomplish the agencies’ goals and meet customers’
expectations.
An effective preparedness strategy today is a comprehensive strategy, one that is multi-
faceted (i.e., policies/procedures, people, and technology) and layered (i.e., systematic security
approaches deployed jointly or in tandem). As pointed out in Making the Nation Safer (National
Research Council 2004) and still relevant today, security methods and techniques that are “dual
use, adaptable and opportunistic” are optimal in the diverse and dynamic transportation sector.
Importance of Security Preparedness

Security affects many aspects of a transit system. Similar to safety, it affects ridership and the
use of the system, with the resultant revenue and economic impact. Despite its overall safety
and security, according to research studies, many people consider public transit dangerous,
and so are reluctant to use it or support its expansion in their community (Ferrell, Mathur, and
Mendoza 2008; Kennedy 2008). TCRP Synthesis 80: Transit Security Update (Nakanishi 2009)
found that within transit systems, both serious and minor crimes affect passenger perceptions
of security: “Serious crimes are exaggerated by the media and intensify passenger fears. Minor
offenses and disorder are also disconcerting to passengers and provoke the perception that the
transit agency is not in control of its transit system.”
The majority of people who use public transit in the United States are women. They account
for 55% of overall ridership across the country, according to a 2007 survey from APTA. In some
places, the proportion of women riders is even higher. Compared with men, women take more
trips per day, but travel shorter distances. Women are more likely to travel during off-peak hours
and less likely to travel after dark. When new transit options are available, women are less likely
than men to take transit (specifically trains or buses) because of concerns for personal safety.
Issues such as litter, graffiti, poor lighting along pathways, isolated transit stops, and unstaffed
stations are main factors women use to determine whether they will take transit (Yavuz and
Welch 2010). Although men are more often crime victims on public transport than are women
(Morgan and Smith 2006), women are more fearful of transit crime than men. Addressing the
security concerns of women can have a significant effect on transit system use and revenue.
The security of a transit system affects its employees. Employees, especially drivers and
operators, can experience potential physical and psychological injury and increased job stress.
Morale can be affected, resulting in increased turnover and additional training costs. A transit
agency can face economic loss attributable to lost work time, damaged employee morale and

productivity, increased worker’s compensation payments, medical expenses, and possible law-
suits and liability costs.
The security of a transit system affects the reputation of the agency. Public and political
leaders expect a transit agency to have plans and take actions to prevent or minimize disrup-
tions and to respond quickly when necessary. Transit accidents and assaults tend to receive
significant media coverage (Martin 2011). A fatal transit crash or transit terrorist attack often
produces national and international media coverage. The media and the entertainment industry
have exaggerated the dangers of public transportation systems (Nakanishi 2009) even though
accidents and assaults are infrequent. As Benjamin Franklin said in Poor Richard’s Almanack,
“It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it.”
Security has political repercussions. When something major happens on a transit system,
political leaders look to the agency leadership. A commitment to security preparedness is evi-
dence that an agency has made its best efforts, within available resources, to prevent and protect,
and quickly respond to events when they occur. Being able to demonstrate that an agency was
prepared, that it had assessed vulnerabilities and potential problems and took actions to address
them, can reduce political consequences.
Taking a proactive approach to security preparedness can save money, reduce concerns of the
public and the politicians, and bolster an agency’s reputation.
Roles in Security Preparedness

Federal agencies such as DHS, FEMA, the FTA, and the FRA play a role in transit security.
DHS/TSA Role
The TSA, as part of DHS, is charged with identifying critical assets, infrastructure, and sys-
tems and their vulnerabilities and with assisting bus and public transportation authorities in
addressing their security programs. The TSA works with mass transit and passenger rail systems
to ensure the safety and security of mass transit and passenger rail and provides transit security
training courses and materials, such as employee pocket guides and other training media.
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement Program

The TSA Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program was developed
to increase domain awareness, enhance prevention and protection capabilities, and further
response preparedness of transit systems nationwide. A voluntary BASE review of a transit sys-
tem evaluates 17 categories of security and emergency preparedness action items that were iden-
tified as fundamentals for a sound transit security program. The review includes topics such as
an agency’s security plan, security training, drills/exercise programs, public outreach efforts, and
background check programs. BASE assessments are performed by the Transportation Security
Inspectors–Surface Division of the TSA. These assessments allow agencies to track their progress
against security goals. Transit agencies that achieve a certain score on the assessment are awarded
a Gold Standard Award by the TSA.
TSA Test Beds

TSA’s Intermodal Division, working in conjunction with the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate, provides security technology recommendations and solutions for surface and
aviation transportation venues by evaluating existing security technologies and developing
requirements for new technologies. For example, the TSA, working with New Jersey Transit,

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), Amtrak, and the Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transit Authority (LA Metro), assessed the effectiveness of technolo-
gies designed to address threats associated with person- and vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices.
Working with transit agencies, the TSA helps technology manufacturers develop their
products to better meet the security needs of agencies and helps by serving as a technology
surrogate for smaller agencies that cannot afford or support expensive technology development
and assessments. The TSA has formal agreements with leading and higher-risk transit agencies
to serve as test beds for promising technology. The New Jersey Transit Police Department was
the TSA’s first test bed partner and continues to work with the TSA on assessing various tech-
nologies to address their security needs. As of 2018, there were ongoing test beds with five of the
10 highest-risk mass transit and passenger rail venues.
Public Transit Homeland Security Information Network

The Public Transit Homeland Security Information Network (PT-HSIN) public transit sub-
portal on DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was established as a primary
mechanism for sharing security-related information with public transit agencies. HSIN is a user-
driven, web-based, information-sharing platform for sensitive but unclassified information. Fed-
eral, state, local, territorial, tribal, international, and private-sector homeland security partners
use HSIN to manage operations, events, exercises, natural disasters, and incidents. HSIN provides
secure dissemination and sharing capabilities for homeland security alerts, reports, and products.
PT-HSIN is the main source of intelligence information for smaller transit agencies.
DHS Preparedness Grants

The federal government’s approach to distributing funds through preparedness grants has
evolved over time. DHS/FEMA preparedness grants are issued for priority focus areas based on
the national risk profile. For example, in 2019, there were four priority areas:
1. Enhancing the protection of soft targets/crowded places;
2. Enhancing weapons of mass destruction and improvised explosive device (IED) prevention,
detection, response, and recovery capabilities;
3. Enhancing cybersecurity; and
4. Addressing emergent threats, such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
DHS/FEMA also recognizes several enduring security needs as a second tier of priorities for
the transportation grants:
• Effective planning,
• Training and awareness campaigns,
• Equipment and capital projects, and
• Exercises.
In addition, the DHS preparedness grant guidance currently focuses on the nation’s highest-
risk areas, including urban areas that face the most significant threats. The Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) is designed to enhance regional preparedness and capabilities by funding
31 high-threat, high-density urban areas. Dedicated funding is provided for law enforcement
and terrorism prevention throughout the country.
The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) and the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program
(IBSGP) are preparedness grant programs that directly support transportation infrastructure
security activities. The TSGP provides funds to owners and operators of transit systems to pro-
tect and increase the resilience of critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling
public from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, and to increase resilience

of transit systems. Eligible transit agencies are determined on the basis of daily unlinked pas-
senger trips (ridership) and transit systems that serve historically eligible UASI-designated urban
areas. Similarly, the IBSGP provides funds to owners and operators of intercity bus systems
located within the UASI-eligible urban areas to protect critical surface transportation infra-
structure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism and to increase the resilience of transit
infrastructure. As noted by DHS, these grants play an important role in the implementation of
the National Preparedness System by supporting the building, sustainment, and delivery of core
capabilities essential to achieving the national preparedness goal of a secure and resilient nation.
Current preparedness grant programs can be found on the DHS/FEMA website.
Recipients receiving Homeland Security Grant Program funding are required to implement
the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The use of NIMS aids in ensuring a unified
approach across all mission areas. NIMS created a national standard system for federal, state, tribal,
and local governments to work together to prepare for, and respond to, incidents affecting lives and
property. It presents and integrates accepted practices proven effective over the years into a com-
prehensive framework for use by incident management organizations in an all-hazards context.
FTA Role
The FTA is involved in policy development, oversight, and data collection, along with hazard
investigation and risk analysis. The agency collects and analyzes data and coordinates informa-
tion sharing among transit agencies.
Transit Advisory Committee for Safety

The FTA Transit Advisory Committee for Safety (TRACS) provides information, advice, and
recommendations on transit safety and other issues as determined by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation and the FTA Administrator. TRACS consists of 15 voting members who serve for a 2-year
term. The full committee meets at least twice a year. The committee has been tasked by the FTA
“to review emerging technology and recommend public transportation innovations” that support
public transportation focus areas identified by the FTA. Current focus areas of TRACS include tres-
passes and suicide fatality prevention, employee assault prevention, and emergency preparedness.
FTA Grants
The FTA oversees thousands of grants provided to states, tribes, and local public agencies
to support public transportation. Recent grant programs have included operator assault and
human trafficking grant programs. In 2019, the FTA issued a solicitation for proposals under the
Department of Transportation’s Public Transportation Innovation Program to identify inno-
vative solutions to reduce or eliminate human trafficking occurring on transit systems, protect
transit operators from the risk of assault, and reduce crime on public transit vehicles and in
facilities. Available funding was set at $2 million in research funds, with 25 awards expected. FTA
grantees have a responsibility to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements associated
with the management of federally assisted grants.
National Organizations’ Role

American Public Transportation Association
APTA assists members by ensuring that best practices and industry standards are developed
and shared through its peer review program and committees in collaboration and coordina-
tion with federal partners and other stakeholders. APTA provides a number of security and
emergency management programs, such as the Security Standards Program, to help ensure that
transit agencies are successful in maintaining and improving the security of their employees,
infrastructure, and customers.

Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center

The Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC) collects,
analyzes, and disseminates alerts and incident reports to its membership and shares security
information among transit and railroad industry personnel, local and state law enforcement
agencies, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The center, in collaboration with
APTA, the Association of American Railroads, and the TSA, disseminate awareness reports on
potential vulnerabilities, threats, and risks to security. The Transit and Rail Intelligence Aware-
ness Daily Report provides PT-ISAC participants with a quick, easy-to-read synopsis in three
fundamental areas—suspicious activities, terrorism and counterterrorism analysis, and general
security awareness—with access to more in-depth detail through embedded links to supporting
reports. The PT-ISAC also offers cyber daily reports as well as other critical reports.
Local Role
Local and regional agencies play an important role in transit security preparedness. Agencies
depend on obtaining assistance from local area police and first responders. Social service and
nonprofit agencies provide essential assistance in addressing major problems such as how to
handle the homeless in transit and provide public education/customer awareness programs.
Transit Agency Roles

Leadership Role
Transit agency leadership plays a unique role in security preparedness. Through active and
visible support for security preparedness efforts, leadership “sets the tone” for the agency.
Agency leadership sets mission priorities and makes the organizational risk decisions such as
agency risk tolerance and agency-wide risk decisions. The leadership ensures agency-wide coor-
dination of security plans and provides oversight and review through governance and agency
policies. The leadership also maintains the “attention span” for preparedness through a persis-
tent focus on awareness and training and preparedness funding.
Employee Role
Transit agency employees play a critical role in security preparedness. Because of their varied
responsibilities and work locations, employees are often the first to notice or learn about
suspicious activity or objects and are best positioned to recognize threats or security concerns.
An employee’s presence alone can deter unlawful acts.
Because of their continued presence in and on agency properties and assets, employees are
uniquely positioned to identify issues, problems, and deviations from what is usual. Employee
input on security concerns can include providing ideas on how to improve policies and procedures
and recognizing what effect any changes made will have on the operations of the transit agency.
Agency frontline and mid-management-level employees can serve as security coordinators
and as participants in security committees. These advisory groups and committees focus on:
• Deploying a broad-based, system-wide security preparedness process that identifies, tracks,
and responds to all security threats, vulnerabilities, and occurrences.
• Maintaining a workplace where security incidents are routinely reported and every staff and
operating department contributes to security preparedness improvements.
• Promoting security awareness and security preparedness throughout the organization.

CHAPTER 3
Preparedness Strategy and

Approaches: Literature Review
A comprehensive security preparedness approach includes

• Policies, plans, and protocols that specifically describe the agency’s approaches and are inte-
grated into the daily business of the agency.
• Security staffing decisions that recognize the safety and security needs of the specific transit
system, the expectations of customers, and the political environment.
• Protection measures and technology that addresses the security of the transit system, either
directly or indirectly.
• Training for employees, contractors, and partners to cover all aspects of an agency’s security
strategy and provide actionable information to better handle emergencies and security events.
A security preparedness strategy can be designed only after a risk assessment has been per-
formed and a comprehensive security plan has been designed. Security preparedness requires
transit agencies to determine which security issues faced by the agency are most critical. Until
these have been completed, it is difficult to make good decisions about security strategies. By
analyzing the threats, the agency can identify what countermeasures to use to reduce the vulner-
abilities associated with those threats.
To be eligible for TSGP grants, transit agencies must have developed or updated their security
plan based on a security assessment. The security assessment must have been conducted within
the 3 years before receiving a TSGP award.
Risk Management
DHS/FEMA defines risk as the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an inci-
dent, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences”
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security Risk Steering Committee 2010). In terms of security,
there are two main categories of risk that transportation agencies face—physical and cyber.
Security risk is typically considered to be “threat based,” as opposed to “hazard based,” although
in terms of “all hazards,” the words “threat” and “hazard” are considered interchangeable.
Risk management, in the context of physical and cybersecurity, consists of the range
of activities that a transportation agency can undertake to resolve identified security risks
(Frazier et al. 2009). Risk assessment is a systematic process through which assets are identified
and evaluated, credible threats to those assets are enumerated, applicable vulnerabilities are
documented, potential effects or consequences of a loss event are described, and a qualitative or
quantitative analysis of resulting risks is produced.
Risk assessment is a function of frequency, or likelihood and probability, and analysis of
consequences. A threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) identifies the sources and types of
12

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 13
threats and the vulnerabilities within a transit agency’s system. A TVA helps decision-makers
evaluate risks, identify priorities, and select solutions.
DHS defines the component parts of a risk assessment as follows:
• Threat assessment is “a systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or potential terrorist
threats to a jurisdiction and its target assets” (National Research Council 2010). Importantly,
in the context of terrorism, in the absence of threat there is no actual risk of loss or injury. But
transportation agencies typically consider threat more broadly to include threats of criminal
activity as well as terrorist activity. Threat definition has two areas of focus, the first toward
threat scenarios based on real events or perceived exposures, and the second toward identifi-
cation of likely adversaries, tactics, and capabilities.
• Vulnerability assessment is “the identification of weaknesses in physical structures, personnel
protection systems, processes, or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists” (General
Accounting Office 2001). Such weaknesses can occur in facility characteristics, equipment
properties, personnel behavior, locations of people and equipment, or operational and per-
sonnel practices.
• Consequence assessment is an analysis of the immediate, short- and long-term effects an event
or event combination has on an asset. It is an estimate of the amount of loss or damage that
can be expected.
For both physical and cyber systems security, risk reduction consists of the assessment of
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (TVC analysis) of an event or series of events in an
effort to reduce or mitigate losses associated with their occurrence. The National Preparedness
System considers the core capabilities of Risk Assessment and Threats and Hazards Identifica-
tion as part of the mitigation mission.
The FTA adopted safety management systems (SMSs) as the basis for the National Public
Transportation Safety Program as part the MAP-21 requirements in 2015. An SMS is a formal,
top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risks and assuring the effectiveness
of safety risk mitigations. An SMS includes a focus on hazard identification across the organiza-
tion. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for managing risks and hazards.
The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan Final Rule, effective on July 19, 2019, requires
certain operators of public transportation systems that receive federal funds to develop safety
plans that include the processes and procedures necessary for implementing an SMS.
Hazard identification and analysis are the first two steps in the safety risk management pro-
cess, intended to identify and address hazards before they escalate into incidents or accidents.
They also provide a foundation for the risk evaluation and mitigation activities that follow.
Organizations conduct risk assessments to determine risks that are common to the organiza-
tion’s core missions and business functions, mission and business processes, mission and busi-
ness segments, common infrastructure and support services, or information systems.
There are numerous different approaches and techniques for conducting risk assessments
in the transportation sector. Some of the more frequently used methodologies include the
Analytical Risk Methodology (ARM), the DHS Terrorism Risk Analysis Methodology (DHS-
TRAM), the Maritime Sector Risk Analysis Methodology (MSRAM), and the Criticality, Acces-
sibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability (CARVER) method. ARM and
DHS-TRAM are approved by DHS/FEMA grant programs.
In addition, there are self-directed vulnerability assessment methods and checklists available
from various organizations, including DHS, the Department of Energy, and the FBI. As previ-
ously noted, the TSA provides direct assistance to transit agencies through the BASE program
and through corporate security review programs.

NCHRP Research Report 930: Security 101: A Physical Security and Cybersecurity Primer for Trans-
portation Agencies (Frazier, Western, et al., forthcoming) discusses risk management and provides
information on security assessments in more detail. Because today’s transportation systems inte-
grate cyber and physical components, cyber risks are increasing and include the risk of a cyber
incident affecting not only data but the control systems of the physical infrastructure operated by
transportation agencies. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication
800-30 (Stoneburner et al. 2002) summarizes the steps associated with cyber risk assessment.
Security Incidents and Causes

This section provides an overview of the incidents and causes of most concern to transit
agencies, based on surveys of transit agencies carried out as part of previous TCRP projects and
other research.
Terrorism
Terrorism in its current form emerged in the late 1960s. The volume of terrorist attacks has
increased dramatically since 1970, although much of this increase reflects better reporting and
the fact that terrorism has become increasingly routine and terrorists have escalated their vio-
lence, with the resulting higher levels of lethality adding to public alarm. Terrorist motives have
changed over time, and targets and methods have evolved.
Nakanishi (2009) found that transit agencies’ reports of suspicious activities, persons, and
items increased in the immediate period after September 11, 2001 (9/11), and then diminished
and plateaued in the 2005–2006 time period. According to Jenkins (2017), “Continued terrorist
interest in transportation targets was demonstrated in the March 2016 bombing of the metro
in Brussels, in which 13 people died; the July 2016 knife and axe attack on train passengers in
Wuerzberg, Germany, in which four persons were injured; and the discovery in October 2016
of an improvised explosive device on a London Underground train.” Frazier (2015) found that
homeland security- or terrorism-related threats rarely occur on smaller systems.
The alarming growth in the use of vehicles—rented, stolen, or easily available large motor
vehicles—as ramming instruments in direct attacks on pedestrians and similar gatherings of
persons is an emerging terrorism threat.
Crimes and Assaults

Nakanishi (2009) analyzed transit crime trends for the 2002–2006 period and found that
serious crimes were infrequent compared with minor crimes. Theft was the most common and
most persistent serious crime found, accounting for 50% to 60% of the serious offenses for every
year in the period. Theft remains an issue for transit agencies, according to Frazier (2015), but
it has been surpassed by assaults on passengers and operators, trespassing, and drug offenses. In
addition, the smaller the system, the less probable it is for the agency to experience significant
levels of crime or disorder.
Operator Assault
Assaults against transit workers and operators are a significant concern in the transit industry.
In addition to causing injuries and increased levels of stress for the operators, assaults cause fear
and a perception of lack of safety for the public, transit passengers, and transit workers. The
TRACs Safety Focus Areas 20191 notes that “both the rate and number of transit worker assaults
continue to increase.” Figure 2 provides assault figures over time.

Source: FTA 2019.
Figure 2. Assault injuries over time.
The National Transit Database (NTD) defines assault as “an unlawful attack by one person
on another.” Assaults are categorized within NTD as personal security events, which are secu-
rity events that occur to individuals on transit property. The NTD definition does not provide
a complete representation of all types of assaults. Countermeasures Assessment and Security
Experts, LLC, and Transportation Resource Associates, Inc. (2017) found verbal threats or
intimidation are the most common form of transit workplace violence, with spitting being the
next most problematic.
TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (Nakanishi and
Fleming 2011) defined assault more broadly as “overt physical and verbal acts of aggression by a
passenger that interfere with the mission of a transit operator—to complete his or her scheduled
run safely—and that adversely affect the safety of the operator and customers.”
Fare Evasion
Nakanishi (2009) found that the most frequent of the less serious offenses was fare evasion,
which accounted for more than 90% of less serious offenses for every year in the period addressed
in the survey. Fare evasion, as defined in the NTD, is “the unlawful use of transit facilities by
riding without paying the applicable fare.” Frazier (2015) found that fare evasion continues to
be a significant problem with transit agencies. Fare evasion and fare theft are reported as major
security problems at many transit systems.

Community activists have argued that punishments for fare evasion—often three-figure
fines and a criminal record—do not fit the crime and that they disproportionately target low-
income people of color. Some cities and some transit agencies, in response, have begun to
decriminalize fare evasion.
Trespassing
Frazier (2015) found that trespassing is a significant problem with transit agencies.
The details of what constitutes criminal trespass vary greatly by state and even local jurisdic-
tion. Likewise, the authority and process of enforcing trespassing rules and regulations vary
across transit agencies.
Quality of Life
Quality of life issues are those behaviors or actions that disturb or disrupt riders and the
public and increase their sense of discomfort and fear even though they may not be physically
threatened. Quality of life issues include concerns about food, drink, language, clothing, and
animals on transit vehicles or at stations; behavior such as panhandling, loitering, disorderly
conduct, “manspreading,”2 loud music or noise; and others. The presence of quality of life issues
may create the perception that a transit system is not safe. For a transit agency, addressing quality
of life issues may divert resources from other security issues.
Frazier (2015) found that quality of life issues such as disorderly persons and infractions
regarding eating/drinking and loud music were issues of concern with most transit systems.
Homeless
Boyle (2016) reported that individuals struggling with homelessness often use public transit
vehicles or facilities as shelters from weather conditions and as safe places. A survey conducted
as part of that synthesis found that 91% of responding agencies perceive people who are expe-
riencing homelessness as either a minor or a major issue, with larger agencies more likely to
characterize homelessness as a major issue.
Security Plans
A security plan is a written document that contains information about an organization’s
security policies, procedures and countermeasures. The security plan directs personnel toward
prevention and mitigation of security incidents by integrating approaches that have proved
effective into the operating environment.
According to the APTA Recommended Practice on Security Planning for Public Transit (APTA
2013a), the plan needs to include a concise statement of purpose and clear instructions about
agency security requirements. The stated objectives of the security plan need to be attainable and
easily understood. The plan needs to identify intended users and their assignments, responsibili-
ties, and authorities to act pursuant to the plan’s direction.
TCRP Report 86, Volume 10: Hazard and Security Plan Workshop: Instructor Guide (AECOM
et al. 2006) provides an overview of the transportation security planning process. The document
also presents a template for hazard and security plan development. The template is designed to help
transportation programs and transit agencies implement four core planning development functions:
• Establishing priorities,
• Organizing roles and responsibilities,
• Selecting countermeasures and strategies, and
• Maintaining the plan.

With resource constraints it is difficult, if not impossible, to do all that could be done to
protect all transit assets at all times. Therefore, establishing priorities is critical. The results of a
risk assessment can assist in this prioritization. For cyber assets, the APTA Recommended Prac-
tice Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments, Part II (APTA
2013d) suggests another method to assist in prioritization based on security zone classifications.
By identifying the different zones, ranging from external zones (the most public systems that
include communications with the public, vendors, and others) through enterprise, operationally
critical, fire/life-safety, and the most critical—safety-critical security (external with a focus on the
most critical safety and security zones), it is possible to put more focus on the most critical zones.
The FTA Safety and Security Certification Handbook (FTA 2002) supports the efforts of the
transit industry to achieve continuous improvement in safety and security performance and
has been used as a resource for developing transit security plans. The handbook provides a
guide “for establishing a certification program to address safety and security that identifies
the key activities; incorporates safety and security more fully into transit projects; highlights
resources necessary to develop and implement a certification program for safety and security;
and provides tools and sample forms to promote implementation of the safety and security
certification process.”
Creating a sound security plan is often as much a management issue as it is a technical one.
It involves motivating and educating managers and employees to understand the need for
security and their role in developing and implementing an effective and workable security
process. By undertaking the development of a comprehensive security plan, based on the
analysis obtained in the agency’s vulnerability assessment, an agency can be assured that it is
prepared and that security is integrated into its daily business, according to Frazier, Western,
et al. (forthcoming).
Key Elements of Transit Security

APTA (2013e) identified the key elements of transit system security:
• Protection of assets;
• Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence;
• Targeted training for key staff;
• Preparedness drills and exercises; and
• Awareness campaigns for public and transit employees.
The following sections provide an overview of each of these key elements in terms of security
preparedness.
Protection of Assets
Assets to be protected at transit agencies include physical assets (e.g., infrastructure and vehi-
cles), cyber assets (e.g., communications and data), and human assets (employees, passengers,
community). The following sections discuss the protection of assets in the context of transit
security preparedness using the framework of the National Preparedness System core capabili-
ties for prevention and protection (see Figure 3).
Intelligence and Information Sharing

Local, regional, and national intelligence and information sharing is a critical aspect of secu-
rity preparedness. Through collaboration and coordination, transit agencies are better able to
understand current threats and become aware of emerging threats and how best to address
those threats.

Prevention Protection
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Interdiction and Disruption Access Control
Screening, Search, and Detection Physical Protection Measures
Risk Management
Cybersecurity
Figure 3. Preparedness System core capabilities for

prevention and protection.
Intelligence- and information-sharing partnerships are common to most transit agencies.

Security information is shared among transit and railroad industry personnel, local and state
law enforcement agencies, DHS, and the FBI via the Surface Transportation and Public Transit
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. The centers, in collaboration with APTA, the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, and the TSA, also disseminate awareness reports on potential
vulnerabilities, threats, and risks to security. The TSA also conducts transit policing and security
peer advisor group monthly conference calls.
Current practice throughout the industry includes participating in local Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) groups and the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center,
collaborating with other transit agency police and security programs, and staying involved with
the APTA security program. The JTTF is a partnership among various federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies. According to the FBI website, the 175 JTTFs in cities around the
country are “one-stop shopping for information regarding terrorist activities.” In addition to
collecting and sharing information, JTTFs investigate terrorism, provide security for special
events, conduct training, and respond to threats and incidents.
State and local governments, supported by federal investments from DHS, the Department
of Justice, Health and Human Services, and other federal agencies, established the National
Network of Fusion Centers (79 state and major urban area fusion centers) that collaborate and
share information with partners from all levels of government and the private sector, as well as
other field-based information-sharing partners. These fusion centers identify, collect, analyze,
and share information based on unique sources of information within their jurisdictions and
maintain partnerships with local communities that cannot be replicated by federal agencies.
Fusion centers participate in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative,
which enables them to receive and analyze suspicious activity reporting and ensure the sharing
of SAR with the FBI’s JTTFs for further investigation.
Spotlight: New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center

The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) is responsible for
maintaining statewide situational awareness for response to current and future
security issues in the state. The ROIC collects, analyzes, and disseminates criminal
intelligence and other information to support the efforts of law enforcement
and public safety agencies in New Jersey. ROIC analysts produce intelligence and
information products based on requests from homeland security stakeholders in
the state, in response to specific events with consequences to the state’s security
and on a regular schedule such as a monthly bulletin that describes all the events
in the coming month that require a unique public safety response.

Interdiction and Disruption

Interdiction is both the action of prohibiting and the action of intercepting and preventing. In
terms of protective measures, this is largely influencing how the criminal or offender interprets
the risk of apprehension or personal loss. For example, “caught on camera” can have a tremen-
dous deterrent effect. Posted signs and public address announcements stating that the offenders
will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law can serve as a reminder that actions can result in
serious legal consequences.
Most public transportation agencies have developed written codes of conduct for passengers
that define expected behavior to control the safety, security, and quality of life of people while
using the transit system. These are typically posted on system vehicles, stops, platforms, and
transit facilities. The codes can be backed by a civil penalty or arrest where state or local laws or
ordinances are in place, or through warning, citation, removal, and banning as part of transit
agency regulations. They are enforced by transit security, transit police, or specific security staff,
such as code compliance inspectors.
Most agencies have rules about smoking, alcohol, and drug use; food and drink restric-
tions; loud music and noises; and disruptive or unsafe behavior in their codes of conduct.
Other rules included are agency specific, based on common issues experienced by the transit
agency.
Disruption is to “delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards”
according to the National Preparedness System (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2015).
Transit agencies typically use a visible security presence that includes random counterterrorism
measures such as deploying surge teams (mobile teams of uniformed officers who flood a given
area) or conducting random screening of passengers and inspection of their carry-on items to
deter possible attacks (APTA 2011a). These security measures can create uncertainty in the plan-
ning processes used by potential terrorists.
Live video viewing of closed-circuit television (CCTV) from platforms, stations, and passen-
ger vehicles can be a cost-effective crime deterrence approach by providing a security presence
without the cost of security patrols. Employee and customer awareness programs also play a
role. These are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. Intelligence sharing, previously
discussed, plays a role in interdiction and disruption.
Spotlight: New York and New Jersey Memorandum of Understanding

In September 2014, the governors of New York and New Jersey signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to coordinate intelligence gathering
and information sharing to defend their residents and bi-state transit infra-
structures against acts of terrorism. The bi-state agreement, substantially
increasing security at transportation hubs and critical infrastructure in the
metropolitan area, was effective immediately. Over the 100 days after the
signing of the MOU, a surge in law enforcement and military personnel jointly
engaged in counterterrorism operations by increasing visibility, inspections,
and surveillance on and at trains and train stations, airports, landmarks, and
bridges and tunnels. Additionally, New York and New Jersey participated in a
joint emergency exercise and continue to evaluate methods for increased
intelligence and emergency coordination.

Screening, Search, and Detection

Passenger security inspections (PSIs) are suspicionless inspections of transit passengers by
transit security or staff that can deter and detect terrorist activity. PSIs include manual, visual,
and technology-based inspections; canine inspections; and behavioral assessments.
According to Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, et al. (2007), to be
legally permissible, PSIs have to be justified under established exceptions to the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. They need to apply to all passengers or be done
on an objectively random basis. When individualized suspicion exists, inspections are subject
to normal policing procedures. Legal and other issues need to be carefully considered by transit
agencies before implementation of passenger screening.
In contrast, dogs are one of the best tools available to screen passengers and their bags for
explosives, primarily because dogs can move easily through crowds and can be moved quickly
from one location to another. Dogs are also an important complement to explosives detection
technologies that may be too cumbersome, less mobile, and more costly to use. Agencies have
reported that the presence of canine or K-9 units in the field have been shown to deter many
types of criminal activity. K-9 teams, with their unobtrusiveness and adaptability, are a viable
approach for broad-based implementation.
In terms of technology, screening and detection equipment that does not affect operations,
cause customer delays, or require a large number of personnel is highly desirable. Portable and
handheld technologies are seen as being more amenable to transit use.
Emerging Technology: Portable Scanning Technology. The TSA has been testing por-
table scanning technology, using the portable devices to secure large-scale events such as the
Super Bowl and the pope’s visit to the United States in 2015. The TSA tested the technology at
New York City’s Penn Station and Washington, D.C.’s Union Station before clearing it for transit
agencies to purchase. The technology is designed to detect both metallic and nonmetallic threats
by identifying items that block the naturally occurring emissions given off by a person’s body.
The technology screens for weapons that have the potential to create mass casualties. The
technology scans can capture images as far as 40 feet away.
Some transit systems are interested in the new TSA technology. A few, such as LA Metro, are
pursuing testing and potential use in the future. For many agencies the cost is prohibitive, and
it is not currently under consideration.
Detection Countermeasures. In terms of detection, there is an array of different security

countermeasures to defend the organization’s assets, including line of sight observation, video
surveillance, motion detection, or other intrusion detection technologies. Intrusion detection
alarm systems are an important countermeasure. They work as a force multiplier that allows for
the more efficient use of staffing by reducing the number of security personnel required to patrol
or monitor a protected area, according to Frazier et al. (2009). The versatility of alarm systems
also facilitates their use as a substitute for other security countermeasures that are not viable
because of safety concerns or operational requirements. They can be used as a supplemental
security measure capable of adding an additional layer of security to protect critical assets.
Video Surveillance and CCTV. Schulz and Gilbert (2011) found that video surveillance sys-
tems are in widespread use on buses, trains, and stations. TCRP Synthesis 123: Onboard Camera
Applications for Buses (Thomson, Matos, and Previdi 2016) explores the technologies, research,
and opportunities for use on buses. It also provides examples of how surveillance systems are
used to improve operations, safety, security, training, and customer satisfaction.

CCTV can be a powerful tool for transit agencies when its design, technology, and implementa-
tion matches the intended use. A number of studies carried out in the United Kingdom, which prob-
ably has the highest number of cameras per capita of any nation, conclude that CCTV does make a
modest but significant contribution to crime reduction. It appears to have some deterrent effect in
specific areas, such as enclosed environments, public transport, and, most of all, parking lots.
Video systems do not provide any form of denial of attack or delay in response to aggressor
tactics or actions, according to Frazier et al. (2009). CCTV systems are passive countermeasures.
They deter through an increase in the perceived risk of capture or belief in the successful inter-
diction and prevention of an attack. In recognition of this, for effective deployment of CCTV,
the system must be visible or announced through signage to provide knowledge of the presence
of the system. In addition, potential aggressors must believe that the CCTV system will indeed
prevent or reduce the likelihood of success.
The problem of monitoring thousands of cameras has been eased by the development of ana-
lytics built into the software. Alarms on perimeters or at portals immediately bring images from
those cameras onto the display panel. Cameras can be programmed to watch for movement
where there is supposed to be none, or the absence of movement (e.g., abandoned packages)
where there is supposed to be some. As the analytics improve, cameras become smarter and can
train themselves to identify patterns and report anomalies. The most recent systems embed the
analytical capability in the camera itself, making it, in effect, a computer with a lens.
CCTV also facilitates rapid analysis of situations and interventions. For example, the deploy-
ment of CCTV cameras in Japan has proved extremely helpful in identifying and apprehending
criminals. It becomes less effective when an agency attempts to use a CCTV system for transit
security when it was originally installed for operational purposes only. For this reason, it is
important for an agency to clearly define how it intends to use CCTV before it identifies which
best practices apply. CCTV can be used for a single purpose or multiple purposes, such as opera-
tional, responsive, investigative, monitoring, or deterrence. When used for security, CCTV is
often paired with other technologies such as radio communications, silent alarms, and covert
microphones to create an effective security system.
CCTV serves a second, almost equally important, role as a security tool capable of greatly
improving the performance and responsiveness of intrusion detection systems, including
alarm and access control. By adding video surveillance to these systems an agency can remotely
monitor and assess security conditions during a security incident. In fact, currently available
advanced video surveillance technologies can further expand the effectiveness of video monitor-
ing. Switches that permit operators to select between video images, multiplexers that facilitate
simultaneous viewing, and new video analytic capabilities in use can aid operators by directing
their attention to priority images. Technology, such as facial recognition software (discussed
in a subsequent section) and thermal imaging systems, can further increase the value of video
surveillance.
In 2011, APTA updated its report The Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital
High-Speed Networks and Trainlines for Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems (APTA 2011b),
which was originally published in 2007 as a part of its Information Technology (IT) Standards
Program Recommended Practice series. This document is a valuable technical resource that
covers the selection and use of cameras for CCTV at stations as well as on buses or train cars.
Legal and Other Issues
The widespread use of such video surveillance systems has generated numerous legal issues,
which are discussed in TCRP Legal Research Digest 52: Legal Implications of Video Surveillance on
Transit Systems (Thomas 2018). Among the issues included are safety issues associated with use,

public access to surveillance video, and retention policies regarding video. This digest explores
federal and state laws to address these issues, along with the current practices employed by tran-
sit agencies to comply with those laws.
To address these issues, a transit agency that uses CCTV must establish with whom camera data
will be shared. CCTV access needs to be shared with the appropriate law enforcement agency that
works in conjunction with the transit agency security office. It is important that there be command
and control over who has access to recorded and live video, and a privacy policy must be considered
for managing the use of images and sounds recorded by the system. Live video viewing from plat-
forms, stations, and passenger vehicles can be a cost-effective customer service and crime deterrence
tool by providing a security presence without the cost and randomness of security patrols. A transit
agency must have a policy for video viewing, hard-copy sharing, and retention. Video for police
investigations demands a strict chain of custody to ensure the integrity of any prosecution.
Agencies must be proactive with proper education, reference material, ethical vendors, and
technology staff. Agencies must also keep up with future additions and technology updates to the
system. Nonproprietary equipment, warranties, and service agreements also need to be looked
at closely to keep the CCTV system reliable and up to date. APTA’s Recommended Practice for
use in transit-related CCTV systems covers camera specifications, system design, recording,
transmission and storage (APTA 2011b).
Spotlight: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

and Atlanta Police Department CCTV MOU
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), which owns more than
1,200 surveillance cameras, decided to share its cameras with the Atlanta Police
Department’s (APD) Video Integration Center—a facility that ties together thou-
sands of public and private cameras across the city. Although it required a “lot of
legal wrangling” to conclude the MOU that MARTA entered into with the APD to
share its camera assets with the city, MARTA recognized that it enabled an incredible
amount of interagency cooperation. For example, if a crime happens downtown
and police see the potential perpetrator walking toward the MARTA rail station,
Atlanta police can now pull up the transit system’s cameras to aid them in tracking
and apprehending the suspect. The reverse is also true of a crime that happens on
MARTA property when officers need to track a suspect using the city’s cameras.
Spotlight: Sacramento Regional Transit District “Voice of God”

In December 2017, the Sacramento Regional Transit District (SacRT) implemented
a public address (PA) system as a security enhancement tool and to improve
customer service. The SacRT security staff members remotely monitor the surveil-
lance cameras from the Security Operations Center in downtown Sacramento.
When passengers violate basic station rules such as no smoking or drinking
alcohol, SacRT security staff members use the PA system to communicate with
the rule breaker. For example, they issue a simple and direct statement such as:
“Excuse me, to the man wearing a red baseball cap, there is no smoking allowed
at the light rail station. Please extinguish the cigarette immediately.” If passen-
gers do not acquiesce, a sworn officer or transit agent will be dispatched to the
station to issue a citation. The PA sends a loud and clear message that stations
are under constant surveillance, and the rules are being enforced.

Audio/Video Recording. The ability to record sight and sound comes standard on most
new bus fleets bought by city and state transit agencies. Some transit agencies use this capability
to record video and audio. For example, the Maryland Transit Administration has been record-
ing sound and video since 2013 in the name of safety and customer service. Other agencies,
such as the Connecticut Transportation Department, have not turned on the microphones,
determining that the risk of violating riders’ privacy outweighs the benefit of collecting audio.
In addition, issues have arisen with drivers over the use of audio recording. For example, in
Nevada, bus drivers came to a standoff with the Washoe County Regional Transportation Com-
mission in Reno over the use of the microphones. The local union representing the drivers,
Teamsters Local 533, filed suit claiming that the use of microphones violated a collective bar-
gaining agreement in place.
Spotlight: Maryland Transit Administration Audio/Video Recording

Starting in 2013, the Maryland Transit Administration has been recording sound,
as well as video, on its buses in the name of safety and customer service. When
passengers board a public bus in Maryland, their conversations may be recorded.
The recording is justified by transit and law enforcement officials as an investiga-
tive tool to help prosecute crimes and as a way to check the quality of driver and
customer service. The agency does not believe listening devices are intrusive or in
violation of riders’ privacy. The audio recordings have been essential in prosecut-
ing about a half-dozen criminal cases over 3 years.
Emerging Technology: Video/Facial Recognition. Video analytics tools and facial recogni-
tion technology are beginning to play a more significant role in transit security. Security infor-
mation management systems, originally designed to monitor physical alarms and fixed sensors,
can be enhanced to include video analytics. The analytics tools can detect out-of-the-ordinary
activity picked up by video surveillance cameras and alert security personnel in real time when
a potential threat occurs, such as someone entering a rail station through an exit-only door or a
person leaving behind a backpack on a train platform. The software also helps address a major
challenge in the use of surveillance technology: constant monitoring of the video images.
An armed robber was caught in 2013 and later convicted after police used facial recognition
software to identify him in video images captured by Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) surveil-
lance cameras. This was Chicago’s first conviction of a crime suspect whose identity was deter-
mined in part by facial recognition software.
Some larger agencies use, or are considering using, facial recognition technology as a tool in
their security arsenal. CTA was awarded a $5.4 million TSA grant to integrate its surveillance
program together with facial recognition software. The Regional Transportation District–Denver
(RTD) is piloting a new type of software that uses next-generation, real-time video analytics
to locate and track a specific individual, sometimes in a matter of seconds. The software goes
beyond what existing facial-recognition technology can currently do.
Legal and Other Issues
Privacy and civil rights concerns have been raised about the use of facial recognition software.
The technology has also been criticized for its potential to reinforce police bias. Researchers
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that, overall, the software returned worse

results (i.e., false matches) for women and darker-skinned individuals. The American Civil
Liberties Union ran a test of facial recognition software and found it misidentified 28 black
members of Congress as criminals.
In May 2019, San Francisco supervisors voted to ban the use of facial recognition software by
police and other city departments. With the move, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to
outlaw the technology. In June 2019, Somerville, Massachusetts, and Oakland, California, did
the same. Other cities may follow in the future.
Access Control
Access control involves maintaining secure access to physical and cyber assets and asso-
ciated facilities; limiting access to authorized users, processes, or devices; and allowing only
authorized activities and transactions. Access control measures are designed to ensure that
only authorized individuals enter a transit facility or premises, or, for cyber assets, that only
authorized users have access to agency cyber systems or networks. Cybersecurity access control
cannot be easily separated from physical security. Inadequate physical security can put cyber
assets in jeopardy. Physical damage can compromise cyber assets.
Common access control measures in use at transit agencies include signs, fences, key con-
trols and locks, and electronic access control devices. NCHRP Research Report 930: Security 101:
A Physical Security and Cybersecurity Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier, Western, et al.,
forthcoming) provides detailed information on these access control measures.
Physical Protection Measures

Physical protection measures are measures that protect personnel and property from damage
or harm. APTA Recommended Practice Physical Security for Public Transit (APTA 2013b) pro-
vides basic physical security strategy background information and an overview and descriptions
of the applicability of physical security. Elements include target-hardening components such
as security lighting; fencing and gates; exterior doors; industrial doors; windows and glazing;
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning; mail rooms; utility openings and culverts; perimeter
roads; lock and key control; standoff distance; and clear zones.
The APTA Security Standards Program offers a series of documents that address aspects of
physical security in more detail. The series includes
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-001-10 “Security Lighting for Transit Passenger Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-002-10 “Security Lighting for Nonrevenue Transit Passenger Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-003-10 “Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-004-10 “Chain Link, Mesh, or Woven Metal Fencing Systems to Control
Access to Transit Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-005-10 “Gates to Control Access to Transit Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-006-10 “Ornamental Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit
Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-007-10 “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for Transit
Facilities.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-008-10 “Bus Stop Design and Placement Security Considerations.”
• APTA IT-CCTV-RP-001-11 “Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV).”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-009-12 “Anti-Vehicle Barriers for Public Transit.”
• APTA SS-SIS-RP-10-12 “Security Program Considerations for Public Transit.”
NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 14: Security 101: A Physical Secu-
rity Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier et al. 2009) provides an in–depth summary of
physical security countermeasures and approaches, such as access control, perimeter security,

alarm and intrusion detection systems, lighting, and surveillance systems and monitoring.
A forthcoming update to Security 101 (Frazier, Western, et al., forthcoming) addresses both
physical and cybersecurity.
TCRP Research Report 193: Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit
Operators (Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, and Transportation
Resource Associates, Inc. 2017) includes a countermeasures catalog that lists countermeasures
that are available to protect transit operators from assaults, some of which also may be
effective for other security issues.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. CPTED (pronounced sep-ted) is a

crime prevention philosophy based on the theory that proper design and the effective use of
the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, as well as
provide an improvement in the quality of life. CPTED takes advantage of opportunities for
natural access control, surveillance, and territorial reinforcement. The goal is to create safe
places through limited access to properties, good surveillance, and a sense of ownership and
responsibility.
Before 9/11, public surface transportation operators gave little attention to CPTED, but a
TCRP survey conducted in 2005 indicated that 80% of operators believe that CPTED could
play a useful role. Nakanishi (2009) found that 30 of 33 responding transit agencies indicated a
moderate to high investment in CPTED. In 2010, APTA published a Recommended Practice,
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) for Transit Facilities (APTA 2010) to
provide guidance on use of CPTED in transit agencies. It includes a checklist for determining
which principles may be applicable to a specific transit agency.
Research on Effectiveness. There is limited research considering CPTED for transit facilities
(Cozens et al. 2002; Cozens et al. 2003a; Cozens et al. 2003b; Cozens et al. 2004). In addition, the
approaches taken in the studies done were qualitative. Given these limitations, evaluations of
lighting, fencing, design changes to improve surveillance, electronic access control, road closures/
street changes, and target removal or modification did find positive effects on crime reduction.
A review of CPTED case examples found that CPTED typically reduces crime. The design
quality of the public transit facilities is one of the major factors cited by the studies to reduce
crime and heighten the perception of safety. The design quality includes various measures to
enhance surveillance, control offenders’ intrusions, restrict illegitimate access to the station area,
and provide for routine maintenance and permitted activities.
Studies on the design of train stations found that reducing the number of entrances and exits,
widening staircases, closing off areas behind staircases and passageways, locating surveillance
booths to overlook fare entry points and the platform level, increasing surveillance by other
passengers or passers-by, allowing passengers wider lines of sight, providing wide platforms,
installing see-through fencing on the periphery of the station, locating waiting rooms closer to
retailers, putting in corner mirrors, eliminating nooks, and improving lighting were effective.
(Falanga 1989; Felson et al. 1990; Felson et al. 1996).
Agency Practices. Nakanishi (2009) found agencies used CPTED strategies such as enhanc-
ing visibility of passenger terminals and rail stations by using bright lighting and mirrors, elimi-
nating hiding places such as dark corners, eliminating unnecessary columns, and strategically
placing vendors such as newsstands. New train station construction in the United States and
Europe features open spaces that facilitate surveillance, reduces the effects of explosions, and
eliminates sources of shrapnel. Newer rail cars are designed with CPTED principles to enhance
visibility within the train cars.

Spotlight: Dallas Area Rapid Transit CPTED Practices

Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) designs and assesses the transit agency’s facilities
in coordination with DART police using CPTED practices. The police department’s
Office of Emergency Management and the Transit Planning Department refer to
DART CPTED guidelines to determine appropriate lighting levels and locations,
develop safe sight lines through facilities, and minimize hiding places and other
site design elements that may lead to unsafe situations. All police sergeants are
trained and certified as CPTED inspectors and regularly inspect DART park-and-
ride facilities to ensure continued application of CPTED practices.
Every 3 years, facilities are reviewed and given new CPTED plans. Facilities are
checked annually by sergeants via a CPTED inspection report checklist that was
designed in house. Annual inspection reports and a memorandum documenting
the findings and suggested mitigations are shared with DART’s maintenance and
transportation departments so that issues can be corrected as needed.
Spotlight: Edmonton Light Rail Transit Stations CPTED Study

Brown (2013) conducted a study to determine how the city of Edmonton,
Alberta, could better address women’s safety in suburban stations through
expanding their existing design guidelines to incorporate CPTED guidelines.
The findings emphasized the importance of natural surveillance and territorial
definition (maintenance and defensibility of space) in creating feelings of safety
in transit users. In particular, the study recommended the following:
• Emphasize transparency in station design. Natural surveillance is strongly

emphasized in the CPTED literature as one of the key elements in reducing both
crime and the fear of crime. The use of glass at Century Park station greatly
improved levels of natural surveillance and contributed to feelings of security.
• Install real-time displays of train arrival and other information at all Light Rail
Transit (LRT) stations. This is a relatively inexpensive yet highly visible way to
improve feelings of security and satisfaction among LRT passengers.
• Carry out regular and adequate maintenance and repair of all LRT stations,
particularly those in less central locations. Disrepair, poor maintenance, and
signs of vandalism can have a greater effect on passengers in more isolated
stations in noncentral areas. Clean stations in good condition can contribute
greatly to feelings of security even in isolated areas, as they indicate that due
care and attention are being paid to these spaces.
Use of Visible, Unpredictable Deterrence. APTA (2013a) notes that visible, random, and
unpredictable security patrols have proved to be very successful in deterring attacks and for
instilling confidence in the riding public. These security patrols can range from the targeted
deployments of specialized teams to the day-to-day operations of transit agency security person-
nel and local police.
Staffing is one of the important factors for improving safety, according to transit passengers
(Uzzel et al. 2003). Station staff members were found to be very effective in increasing the per-
ception of safety and cited in research (Smith 2008, Vilalta 2011) as an important factor for
passengers.

Spotlight: Random, Visible Deployments

TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are “targeted and
customized deployments of department personnel and assets with varying capa-
bilities to provide a visible presence” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2012). VIPR teams screen passengers, look for suspicious behavior, and act as a
visible deterrent for potential terrorist acts. VIPR teams often include transporta-
tion security officers, surface transportation security inspectors, canine detection
teams, explosives detection specialists, behavior detection officers, and federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers. As an example, RTD makes use of the
DHS VIPR teams, which regularly patrol, sometimes with a canine team, trains
and stations to increase a security presence.
Maryland Transit Authority Police Force Operation ZEUS exercises involve an

unannounced large show of force, conducting security sweeps and emergency
drills to target-harden the transit system and help guard against terrorism and
criminal activity. Operation ZEUS exercises are commonly done in conjunction
with other agencies, such as TSA, the Amtrak Police Department, and local police.
Officers can be rapidly deployed in significant numbers at any time to any place.
In response to the growing threat of random attacks, officials in London

launched a program called “Project Servator” in 2014. The program consists
of policing tactics involving a highly visible but unpredictable police presence,
behavioral detection techniques, and random checks to deter and detect criminal
and terrorist activity and to reassure the general public.
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Employee Station Teams are teams of BART
employees who are trained in advance to staff trains and stations while wearing
high-visibility vests to provide an additional layer of visibility. These teams are
deployed temporarily at times of greatest need.
Deployment Strategies
The deployment of security personnel is ideally based on a detailed analysis of safety and
security needs of the specific transit system. Through identification of various risks that exist in
the transit system, followed by evaluations of risk mitigation strategies, security personnel can
be deployed to implement these strategies. Along with risk, there are other considerations to be
taken into account, such as total ridership by line or by station, crime within a certain distance
of a line or station, location of a station itself (for example, near a hospital, a tourist attraction,
a large business, a historical landmark, etc.), and political or customer input.
Other external factors also affect security personnel decisions, such as the availability of
public safety response personnel in the operating area, what users or customers expect to see in
terms of security, or whether other organizations in the industry use security personnel. Internal
factors such as the agency’s history of deploying security forces or whether the organizational
culture is tolerant of security restrictions will also have a bearing.
TCRP Web-Only Document 15: Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and
Security Personnel (Schulz et al. 1997) includes more than 25 different deployment security strat-
egies and functions. The contractor’s final report for the guidelines includes examples of police
deployment programs at some of the larger transit agencies in the United States. Although the

information is somewhat dated, the activities referenced remain consistent with transit policing
problems and issues today. In fact, many of the programs, or similar approaches to those listed,
continue to be used.
The FTA’s Security Manpower Planning Model (SMPM; Blake and Uccardi 2008) is a tool
available to small and medium-sized transit agencies to assist in making staffing and deployment
decisions. SMPM is an easy-to-use “what if” spreadsheet workbook available online.
Because one ideal model does not exist, each transit system needs to develop policing strategy
based on risk, staffing, and a deployment analysis influenced “by historical precedence and the
political environment at any given time” (BCA Watson Rice LLP et al. 2015). The goal is an
appropriate deployment consistent with the agency’s operational strategies and with the local
community policing strategy.
Security Personnel Types and Roles

There are a variety of types of security presence used at transit agencies, ranging from sworn
security officers to nonsworn ticket checkers, each playing a different role in security. At one
end of the available options is the deployment of unarmed, part-time security officers with no
arrest authority. At the other end is the fielding of a full-time, armed police department with
powers of arrest. Where the agency falls along this spectrum will affect the capabilities of not just
the security labor force but also the performance and effectiveness of all other integrated system
security countermeasures.
Security officers provide visible deterrence and can observe and report any unlawful activ-
ity to law enforcement. To be effective, security officers need to be empowered with some sort
of enforcement authority—which typically requires administrative action (legislation, board
approval, union negotiations, etc.). Transit agencies in the United States use both sworn police
and nonsworn security, and often a combination of both to provide needed security presence:
• Sworn or certified law enforcement officers have the authority to detain or arrest.
• Nonsworn, civilian personnel can perform some of the security duties, such as fare inspection
work, but they cannot detain or arrest, so they cannot be responsible for responding to law
enforcement incidents. It is important for nonsworn personnel to be trained in a manner that
clearly indicates the limits of their authority to avoid liability issues.
Few large systems utilize only a nonsworn security unit to provide their system policing. More
frequently, transit agencies use nonsworn security to address temporary or short-term security
needs, such as for large events, new asset acquisition, or other changes while a permanent solu-
tion is still being considered.
For most permanent security solutions, the more common choice is a combination force
that provides a solid transit police presence supplemented by a security force. This combination
optimizes the strength of both options. The police force can be allocated where their expertise
and training will provide the most benefit, while the security unit provides presence and feed-
back throughout the system at a lower cost.
An in-house transit police department is used by several transportation agencies in the
United States, including the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in
Washington, D.C., Metro Transit in Minneapolis–Saint Paul, the Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity (MTA) in New York and New Jersey, and Port Authority in Pittsburgh. This model is espe-
cially effective on systems that traverse multiple jurisdictions, as it allows for consistent policing
across a system. An in-house transit police force allows complete control by the transit agency
over policing the system and has the capacity for good coverage, as there are no competing loyal-
ties, such as transit agency versus local law enforcement priorities. The agency can define police

policies and processes that completely fit the agency’s goals and objectives. There are challenges
with this model, as it is costly, legislation may be required to be recognized as law enforce-
ment, and it takes time to develop the capacity and the relationships with other law enforce-
ment jurisdictions and security entities to make it effective. Other challenges include attracting
and maintaining officers in a competitive market. Smaller transit police forces may be challenged
to provide a competitive job market environment, keep officers trained, and allow for growth
opportunities. Few small and medium-sized transit agencies use this approach because of need
and cost. This model is most often found in large transit systems that require a large security staff.
Specialized units such as tactical teams, explosive detection teams, and others exist at some
transit agencies. For example, many transit agencies use security detection dogs or K-9 teams.
Other special units at some transit agencies include ticket checkers, bicycle officers, and
others. The Sacramento Regional Transit District (SaRT) uses an in-house staff of transit
agents that provides coverage of trains and stations for both fare inspection and staff
coverage. Metro Vancouver Transit Police launched a bike patrol program to provide high-
visibility patrols around the hubs and generate dialogue with individuals and groups in the
surrounding community.
Spotlight: Metro Vancouver Neighborhood Transit Police Officers

Metro Vancouver Neighborhood Police Officers (NPOs) engage the local communi-
ties around their respective hub stations, both in person and with the assistance
of social media. Community outreach events provide the opportunity for the NPO
team to educate members of the public on the many safety features available
to them when using public transit. Attendance is often done in partnership with
community groups, local government representatives, and jurisdictional police
partners. Key messages communicated at the events include the See Something,
Say Something campaign and the Metro text reporting service, which can be
used to discreetly communicate incident details. In addition to attending commu-
nity events in person, each of the NPOs is active in using social media; all are on
Twitter and some are also on Instagram.
Spotlight: CTA Transit Rider Interaction Program Pilot

The Transit Rider Interaction Program pilot, an outgrowth of CTA Rules of Conduct,
is an effort by the CTA police department to further enforce rules on the CTA
and create a comfortable and safe environment for customers. The pilot, which
launched in March 2017, included uniformed officers at various rail station plat-
forms. Officers boarded arriving trains, both to serve as a deterrent to crime and
to respond to any incidents or inquiries from customers. The effort did not affect
service and was designed to increase visibility and awareness of ongoing safety
and security efforts on the system.
Contracting Security Staff

Contracting for security staff, sworn or nonsworn, is a current practice for many transit and
rail properties. The contracted model is used to take advantage of cost savings for security/
policing, to reduce agency liability, or both. Transit agencies contract with existing local law
enforcement jurisdictions to provide services, typically under an MOU. Depending on the
number of jurisdictions involved in the alignment or system, agencies may utilize a single entity

or multiple entities joined together to provide transit policing services. There are multiple transit
agencies that employ this model: Caltrain contracts with the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office;
TriMet contracts with approximately 15 Portland-area law enforcement agencies.
A challenge with contracted policing is developing the coordination or command structure,
as well as developing and managing the contractual details to ensure appropriate dedication
and response to the transit system. Processes need to address whether and how the home law
enforcement agency can temporarily “recall” or “borrow back” the seconded staff members in
times of need, so that the transit system is not left without coverage. Success with this model
is contingent upon good contract management to keep the transit priorities and expectations
clearly communicated and agreed upon by all parties. If these conditions do not exist, the con-
tracted model will not produce the results needed and may become burdensome and ineffective.
In Minneapolis, the transit system began with a contracted model, but developed an in-house
transit police when the contracted service did not provide the needed coverage.
One of the critical considerations surrounding contracted policing is the nature of the
agreements with local law enforcement. Small and medium-sized agencies depend to a much
higher degree on obtaining assistance from local area police and occasionally contract secu-
rity forces. Local law enforcement officers have the responsibility to provide basic services to
transit agencies within their jurisdictions consistent with service provided to others within their
jurisdictions.
When working with local law enforcement, research has found that it is important for transit
agencies to
• Understand what basic services can be provided.
• Establish agreements that define what will be done. MOUs or contracts can define how law
enforcement augments and improves the security of the transit system—for example, the
response to incidents on the system, since local law officers may be first responders.
The contract or MOU must provide the basis for the provision of coordinated, adequate, and
appropriate services. Without an adequate contract that has appropriate controls in place, secu-
rity may be controlled by others, with as little or as much coverage provided as those entities deem
necessary. There may be little or no control to match the coverage with security considerations,
policing services may or may not match the customer environment or provide for operational
concerns, and officers responding to events may not have training that would allow for safe
response on the system.
Agencies with contracted law enforcement advise that strong, collaborative contracts that
provide clear expectations, roles, and responsibilities provide the best outcome for the transit
agency.
Emerging Technology: Body Cameras

Body-worn cameras are small video cameras—typically attached to an officer’s clothing,
helmet, or sunglasses—that can capture, from an officer’s point of view, video and audio record-
ings of activities and critical incidents such as officer-involved shootings. Body cameras for secu-
rity personnel are an emerging technology intended to aid incident investigations, clarify police
testimony, and deter corrupt practices. Body cameras can potentially help ensure that security
personnel behave professionally and without escalating security events, aid in investigations and
police testimony when concerns about an event are raised, and deter police officers or offenders
from uncompliant behavior due to the threat of their actions being recorded on camera.
The effectiveness of body cameras was evaluated by the Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF). With support from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, PERF conducted research (Miller et al. 2014) on the use of body-worn cameras
through surveys and interviews with police departments nationwide.
Among the police executives whose departments use body-worn cameras, there was an over-
all perception that the cameras provide a useful tool for law enforcement. For these agencies,
the perceived benefits that body-worn cameras offer—capturing a video recording of critical
incidents and encounters with the public, strengthening police accountability, and providing a
valuable new type of evidence—largely outweighed the potential drawbacks.
However, the PERF study found that the use of body-worn cameras can have significant
implications in terms of privacy and community relationships, internal departmental affairs
(as a result of potential concerns for frontline officers), the expectations that cameras create in
terms of court proceedings and officer credibility, and the financial considerations that purchasing
and supporting cameras present.
To mitigate privacy and community concerns, the PERF study recommended engaging the
community before rolling out camera programs and factoring privacy considerations into deci-
sions about when to record, where and how long to store data, and how to respond to public
requests for video footage. To address officer concerns, the PERF study recommends efforts by
agency leaders to engage officers on the topic, explain the goals and benefits of the initiative,
and address any concerns officers may have. In addition, creating an implementation team that
includes representatives from across the department can help strengthen program legitimacy
and ease implementation.
A study conducted with the British police force found the odds of use of force were cut in half
when body cameras are present (Henstock and Ariel 2017). However, another study released in
the same year found a nonstatistically relevant difference in use of force and civilian complaints
when body cameras are present versus not present (Yokum et al. 2017).
Similarly to other security technology, body cameras are not a “silver bullet” and therefore
must not be deployed in isolation but as part of a layered, multipronged approach to transit
security and security technology.
Targeted Training for Key Staff

Training is a critical component of security preparedness that provides employees with the
tools necessary to deal with unexpected or emergency situations. The 9/11 Act (Implement-
ing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007)3 established requirements for
security training for employees of public transportation agencies, passenger railroad carriers,
over-the-road bus (OTRB) companies, and higher-risk freight railroads. Acting on the 9/11
Act mandate, the TSA issued regulations requiring security training for public transportation
systems, railroads, and OTRB operations. The federal requirements identify minimum training
requirements for transit agency employees that include training in security threats and aware-
ness and in handling of emergencies and security threats.
It is important for a transit agency’s security plan to outline its training program and
requirements, including qualification, requalification, familiarization, and refresher training
programs, to ensure that employees demonstrate an understanding of and proficiency in the
application of rules, procedures, and equipment (APTA 2014; Frazier et al. 2009). Training
programs need to cover all aspects of an agency’s security strategy, from planning and design to
operations and security awareness. Baseline security awareness training objectives for all transit
employees need to be established and include behavioral awareness, surveillance, response pro-
cedures, and self-protection. Additional training needs to cover how to deal with the various

situations that may arise on systems, especially those that involve individuals with mental ill-
ness or disorderly conduct.
The ASIS International Private Security Officer Selection and Training (PSO) Guideline (ASIS
International 2019) provides a framework for private security officer job descriptions and rec-
ommended minimum selection criteria, as well as an outline for the design and delivery of
private security officer training by employers and other agencies.
Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program

The Transit Safety and Security Program (TSSP) certificate provides a broad-based knowledge
of the safety and security principles applicable to transit system safety, operations, and manage-
ment. The certificate indicates that the individual has the necessary information to develop and
implement system safety, security, and emergency management program plans. Figure 4 identi-
fies the courses in the TSSP. Individuals can choose the rail or bus path, or both.
The FTA issued a rule for the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program
(PTSCTP),4 effective August 2018, that established federal requirements for the certification
and training of State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) personnel and contractors who conduct
safety audits and examinations of rail transit systems, and rail transit agency personnel and
contractors who are directly responsible for safety oversight. The PTSCTP provides a uniform
curriculum for safety training that consists of minimum requirements to enhance the technical
proficiency of rail transit safety personnel. Bus safety personnel and other safety personnel are
encouraged to voluntarily participate in the training program. The courses provided online and
in an e-learning format include the following:
• SMS Awareness;
• SMS Safety Assurance;
• SMS Principles for Transit;
• TSSP courses—Transit Rail (or Bus) System Safety, Effectively Managing Transit Emergen-
cies, Transit Rail Incident Investigation (or Fundamentals of Bus Collision Investigation); and
• SMS for SSO Programs (for SSOA personnel and contractor support personnel only).
Security Training Approaches

Assessment of Surface Transportation Security Training Needs and Delivery Preferences
(Lowrie et al. 2011) identified security training content needs and effective approaches by audi-
ence. The study, conducted through focus groups and interviews with representatives of major
Source: U.S. DOT Transportation Safety Institute 2017.
Figure 4. TSSP certificate courses.

surface transportation or security organizations, identified training content needs that are
summarized in Table 1. The study found retraining and targeted retraining with performance
monitoring were best practices.
In addition, if contracted security staff members, sworn or nonsworn, are used by a transit
agency, specific training needs to be provided to inform them of the transit environment.
NCHRP Research Report 931: A Guide to Emergency Management at State Transportation
Agencies, Second Edition (Frazier, Bye, et al., forthcoming), identifies the following training and
exercise capabilities as minimum capabilities:
• Ensure that employees receive training to prepare them for their roles and that they are able
to practice what they have been taught to increase the effectiveness of the training;
• Incorporate security awareness into existing training, such as in new or existing employee
training, including position-specific training where relevant;
• Keep training, drills, and contact lists up to date; and
• Identify lessons learned through after-action report and incorporate recommendations into
existing plans and procedures.
TCRP Research Report 199: Transit Technical Training Volume 2: Guide to Overcoming Barriers
to Implementing Best and Innovative Training (Cronin et al. 2018) provides best practices,
strategies, and resources to assist with the implementation of effective and innovative training
Table 1. Security training content needs, by audience.
Audience Content Needs
Frontline • Situational assessment of threats and incidents

• Observational skills and reporting dangerous substances,
suspicious packages, and situations
• Appropriately reacting to all threats
• Proper use of security equipment or technology
There was clear concern that training for frontline personnel does
not need to be too in-depth or technical.
Transportation professionals Aside from the same basic security awareness training for frontline
employees, this audience has special high-level training and
education needs in the area of security risk assessment and
management, vulnerability assessment, and planning for resiliency.
Mid- to high-level managers and
executives in operations, This audience may need to understand more clearly the difference
planning, safety, security, between safety and security.
maintenance, and other related
fields.
Contractors and vendors • Similar to frontline employee awareness training

• Reporting suspicious activity
Emergency responders • Transportation system operations, hazards, and vulnerabilities

• Integrated communications and response practices/procedures
• Integrated incident management
Needs for this group will not be much different from those of
frontline employees in terms of emphasis on reporting suspicious
and dangerous activities, but would vary in priority according to
proximity and access to critical infrastructure and operations (for
maintenance workers) and to public areas.
Source: Lowrie et al. 2011.

programs and techniques for frontline employees. The report includes an overview of types of
innovative training strategies, including simulations, gaming, adaptive learning and intelligent
tutoring, transmedia, web-based training, mobile, and social media. Examples of each training
strategy in the transit and nontransit industries are included, as well as potential ways the strategy
could be implemented in the transit industry.
The APTA Recommended Practice Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees (APTA
2012) emphasizes that all transit employees, including contractors, contribute to security by
their very presence and their alertness. Because of their varied responsibilities and work loca-
tions, transit agency employees are often the first to notice or learn about suspicious activity and
are best positioned to recognize threats or security concerns.
Preparedness Drills and Exercises

Well designed and regularly practiced drills and exercises are fundamental to security pre-
paredness. DHS recognizes that exercises are a good way to demonstrate and validate skills
learned in training and to identify gaps in capabilities, in particular by the development and
maintenance of a progressive exercise program consistent with the Homeland Security Exercise
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). TCRP Report 86, Volume 9: Guidelines for Transportation
Emergency Training Exercises (McCormick Taylor, Inc. 2006) and Homeland Security Exercise
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Volume 1: HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program Manage-
ment (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006) provide guidance to assist transportation
agencies in developing drills and exercises in alignment with the National Incident Management
System. The reports describe the process of emergency exercise development, implementation,
and evaluation. In addition, the available literature and materials to support transportation
agencies, such as state departments of transportation, traffic management centers, and public
transportation systems, are described.
The fundamental principles of HSEEP include a focus on capability-based objectives and
exercise priorities informed by risk, leadership of the exercise program and individual exercises
by elected and appointed officials, integration of the whole community where appropriate, and
use of common methodology. The two major categories of exercises described in HSEEP are
discussion-based exercises and operations-based exercises.
• Discussion-based exercises—seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games—are less
costly and time-consuming than operations-based exercises. Discussion-based exercises use a
facilitator to direct discussions. They help familiarize and train participants on, or to develop,
plans, policies, agreements, procedures, and training.
• Operations-based exercises—drills, facilitated exercises, and full-scale exercises—are more
realistic; are conducted in real time; and help assess plans, procedures, personnel, technologies,
and equipment.
The key difference between discussion- and operations-based exercises is size and scope. For
example, a tabletop exercise is a facilitated desktop discussion during which key personnel dis-
cuss scripted hypothetical scenarios in a classroom or other fixed setting. Full-scale exercises,
on the other hand, are multidisciplinary, multiagency field simulations that use role players,
controllers, and other forms of logistical support to actively work through mock hypotheticals
designed to resemble one or more real-life conditions.
Security Operations for Public Transit (APTA 2013e) includes the recommendation that
transit agencies develop meaningful exercises, including covert testing, that test their response
effectiveness and how well they coordinate with first responders. In addition to large regional

drills, transit systems need to also conduct regular, transit-focused drills. It is important that
such drills test response and recovery to both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Train-
ing resources from APTA include Recommended Practice Transit Incident Drill and Exercises
(APTA 2013c).
Scenario development requires careful planning since the effective use of scenario-developed
data sets can help the agency to develop policy and procedures and even make staffing-level
deployment decisions. Scenarios are narratives or timelines and are used in operations-based
exercises and tabletop exercises. Sources of scenarios include DHS’s National Planning Scenarios
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2019) and the Public Transportation System Security and
Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide (FTA 2003). The Mineta Transportation Institute Report
12-08 Exercise Handbook annex (Edwards and Goodrich 2014) includes an example scenario for a
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) failure for a mass transit system.
TCRP Web-Only Document 60/NCHRP Web-Only Document 200: Command-Level Deci-
sion Making for Transit Emergency Managers (Pigora 2013) describes the development and
implementation of the Transit Emergency Response Application (TERA). TERA is a simula-
tion used to respond to and visualize the effect of transportation agency actions in an event
or disaster that may affect normal operations. TERA is a web-based facilitated exercise that is
anticipated to have at least 18 scenarios available. There are roles for transit agencies, depart-
ments of transportation, rail, and airports. Currently, six training scenarios are available with
transit roles:
1. Active shooter,
2. Power outage,
3. Earthquake,
4. Hazardous material,
5. Hurricane, and
6. Flood.
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

The Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) is designed to improve
the intermodal transportation industry’s ability to prepare for and respond to transporta-
tion security incidents by increasing awareness, improving processes, creating partnerships,
and delivering training exercises to mass transit and passenger rail stakeholders. Through
I-STEP, TSA employs multiphased workshops, tabletop exercises, and working groups to inte-
grate mass transit and passenger rail agencies with regional law enforcement and emergency
response partners to expand and enhance coordinated deterrent and incident management
capabilities.
Spotlight: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority Full-Scale Active

Shooter Exercise
The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) recognized the poten-
tial for active shooters on the system and decided to take proactive action by
partnering with the TSA to conduct a full-scale active shooter exercise. The
exercise gave GCRTA employees an understanding of the best actions to under-
take should an active shooter incident occur on the GCRTA system.

TSA I-STEP Active Shooter Training and Exercise

The TSA I-STEP conducted an active shooter training and exercise at a transportation conference in Arizona
in 2016. The training and exercise addressed FEMA’s Prevention, Protection, and Response mission areas—
specifically the Interdiction and Disruption, Physical Protective Measures, and Environmental Response/
Health and Safety core capabilities. The purpose was “to provide insight into how law enforcement may
respond to an active shooter incident (e.g., priorities, capabilities, actions) as well as expectations law
enforcement may have of transportation agency employees and how those employees may be able to assist
them in their response” (TSA Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program 2016). In addition to trans-
portation agency members, participating stakeholders included the DHS Southern Border Joint Task Force–
West, the TSA, the Northwest Fire District, the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, and the Pima County Regional
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team.
The exercise included the following components:
1. A TSA presentation on industry security efforts, ongoing initiatives, and active shooter resources/tools;
2. An active shooter training presented by the Pima County Sheriff’s Office; and
3. A live active shooter drill put on by the Pima County Regional SWAT Team.
More specifically, the training and exercise addressed the following three components:
1. Law enforcement and transportation agency employee actions, considerations, and expectations that could
help prevent, protect against, or mitigate an active shooter situation;
2. Countermeasures and policies that transportation agencies could implement to prevent, protect against,
or mitigate an active shooter situation in/on their facilities/infrastructure; and
3. Methods to protect the health and safety of transportation agency employees facing an active
shooter situation.
Component 1 consisted of presentations on the following topics:
• Ongoing TSA and Industry Security Initiatives,

• Securing Transportation Assets and Operations—Mitigation Strategies for Surface Transportation
Modes, and
• Active Shooter Resources and Tools (www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness).
Component 2 was delivered by the Pima County Sheriff’s Office. The key points emphasized in Component
2 were the mentality of active shooters and their desire to kill as many as possible, and that active shooter
events are unpredictable and dynamic and typically end before the arrival of law enforcement.
Recommended transportation agency personnel actions included
• hat to do prior to an incident—create a flexible plan to reach safety, be aware of the surroundings.
W
• Actions to take if the active shooter is outside the facilities.
• Actions to take if the active shooter is inside the facilities.
• Information to provide 911.
• What to expect and do when police arrive.
• Emergency care tips.
Exercise Drill Scenario
The drill scenario for Component 3 was described as follows: Transportation agency employees are attending a
public hearing on the reconstruction project to address safety and other issues; the potential consequences for

TSA I-STEP Active Shooter Training and Exercise (Continued)

private residential and commercial property and for protected wetlands, waters, and animals has made opposi-
tion strong; threats to disrupt the public hearing have been made.
Live Exercise Drill
The drill proceeded as follows: Exercise observers are placed inside the building. A disgruntled individual
enters the building with an assault rifle and starts firing. Observers are moved outside the building and view
the SWAT team arriving and entering the building. Observers reenter the building and view the actions of the
shooter and SWAT team. The active shooter proceeds from room to room until he reaches the hearing room.
The SWAT team searches for the active shooter. Observers are placed in the hearing room to view the resolu-
tion of the conflict (the SWAT team kills the shooter). Observers are then moved outside to view fire and
EMS responders arrive, evacuate occupants, and treat injuries as the SWAT team provides protection. A final
Q&A session is held with the observers.
Exercise Results/Analysis and Next Steps
For each objective, strengths including best practices and areas for improvement were identified. For the
first objective, a best practice was for transportation agencies to have emergency action plans for active
shooter situations; an area for improvement was that mass transit is a “soft target” for active shooters. For
the second objective, a best practice was awareness that creating chaos can distract the shooter; an area for
improvement was that attendees were uncertain regarding what arms-bearing individuals might do during
an active shooter situation. For the third objective, a best practice was outreach to local law enforcement
agencies, which are typically willing to help provide transportation agencies with active shooter prepared-
ness and training; an area for improvement was that transportation agency employees believed there were
no hiding areas in their facilities. Areas for improvement included root cause analyses and options for
consideration.
Awareness Campaigns for Public and Transit Employees

Today employee and public awareness programs are widely viewed as a core component
of a transit agency’s system security plan. The 9/11 Act recognized that security awareness
training—how to observe, assess and respond to threats and incidents—is an important and
effective part of security preparedness.
Public awareness campaigns in transit have existed for some time. Faced with Irish Repub-
lican Army attacks on public transportation in the 1990s, British authorities sought the assis-
tance of transit staff and passengers in identifying suspicious objects. Signage and repeated
public announcements kept the public alert to the terrorist threat and reminded them to
remain vigilant for abandoned packages and immediately report suspicious activity or arti-
cles to staff.
After 9/11 and a series of attacks on international transit systems, U.S. transit agencies, with
the support of the FTA and DHS/TSA and relevant legislation, implemented awareness training
programs and campaigns. Transit Watch was started in 2002. By 2005, more than 200 agencies
had implemented some form of public awareness materials (Shaw 2011). An updated version of
Transit Watch was released in 2006.

In 2010, DHS licensed the use of the MTA’s “If You See Something, Say Something” slogan
for its anti-terrorism efforts in surface transportation and other key sectors.
Employee Awareness Programs

The APTA Recommended Practice Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees (APTA
2012) emphasized that all transit employees, including contractors, contribute to security by
their very presence and their alertness. The Recommended Practice provides the minimum
guideline for security awareness training for all transit employees, including contract employees,
to strengthen transit system security. The First Observer Plus™ Program5 trains surface trans-
portation professionals (highway, mass transit, over-the-road bus, school bus, trucking, truck
rental, pipelines, parking workers, and transit police) to recognize and assess suspicious activity
and report their observations.
NCHRP Report 793: Incorporating Transportation Security Awareness into Routine State DOT
Operations and Training (Frazier et. al. 2014) included the core components of an effective secu-
rity employee awareness program:
• Communicating general messages—promoting security awareness with such messages as
“Security begins with you!” and “Be alert and be aware—you are the eyes, ears, and mouths
of the DOT.”
• Knowing the risks—informing employees about the risks within the agency and the poten-
tial consequences. Messages can include a general overview of the risks to transportation
agency systems, as well as specific, job-related messages—for example, alerting maintenance
employees about the risks involving vehicles, equipment, and facilities.
• Recognizing and observing security risks—providing practical tips on how to detect and
identify potential security risks—for example, “Note suspicious activities and objects and
report things that do not seem right” and “Know your coworkers, your community, and your
work environment. Be aware of unusual changes in your surroundings.”
• Reporting a security threat—clarify ways to respond to and report a security threat. Specify
the contact, how to contact, and what information to provide. Posters, employee handouts,
and wallet cards are effective ways to communicate the reporting guidelines throughout
the agency.
Public Awareness Programs

Transit agencies around the world have conducted courtesy-focused public awareness
campaigns for almost as long as security-related campaigns. The CTA launched a “Don’t Be
Jack” campaign in 2002—referring to Jack, an inconsiderate rider—to encourage riders to be
more considerate of other passengers. The New York MTA made national news with its 2014
campaign against manspreading. Since the launch of the initial awareness programs focused
on terrorism and safety, transit agencies have implemented programs focused on other issues
such as enforcing their codes of conduct, encouraging courteous customer behavior, and
preventing sexual harassment and human trafficking.
Engaging Transit Riders in Public Awareness Programs (Haider and Martinez 2014) identified
strategies and tactics to engage transit riders in public security awareness programs by conduct-
ing interviews with transit agency representatives, analyzing transit rider survey data, and
hosting transit rider focus groups.
To resonate with transit riders, public awareness campaign messages need to communicate
the following:
• What to look for—The research clearly indicates the importance of educating transit riders
on what could be considered suspicious.

• What to do when they see it—Straightforward and simple directions (i.e., call or text a certain
number, inform a transit employee, etc.) regarding what to do when a suspicious activity or
package is spotted are critical. To better promote the Metro Vancouver text reporting service
in 2017, the agency printed new See Something, Say Something posters and refreshed its
contact cards. To complement the campaign, a former shop at the Broadway-Commercial
SkyTrain station was converted into a Metro Vancouver Transit Police suboffice for officers
working in the hub. The kiosk was periodically opened for pop-up events and to distribute
information to passengers.
• What’s in it for them—The research found that riders responded to the message that “we’re
all in this together.” Recognizing this, it is important to stress the idea that reporting a suspi-
cious activity or package is for self-preservation, as well as the safety of others.
• Not to hesitate—Public awareness campaigns need to be responsive to the natural behavior of
riders to “second guess” their instincts as to whether a certain situation is suspicious. London
Metropolitan Police launched a security awareness campaign in February 2012 that included
radio advertisements, posters, and flyers with the tag line “It’s probably nothing but . . .” and
encouraged the public to give specially trained police officers the opportunity to be the judge.
The Rural Transit Assistance Program (RTAP) developed a marketing toolkit, Strategies for
Building Awareness, Image, and Support6 that includes effective methods for promoting aware-
ness, image, and support using both nonpaid communications channels and paid advertising.
It includes the basics of social media and the other national RTAP resources.
Evaluation of Effectiveness
There is little formal evaluation of transit security awareness programs. Efforts to assess
whether the messages are reaching transit riders and to identify obstacles to participation have
been limited. A Mineta Transportation Institute study (Edwards, Haas, and Rohlich 2010)
attempted to explore the effectiveness of transit security awareness campaigns in the San
Francisco Bay Area. However, researchers found that none of the agencies interviewed actively
sought to measure the effectiveness of their security awareness efforts.
Jenkins and Butterworth (2018) found that enlisting the public in security does work. Using
the Mineta Transportation Institute database, researchers looked at worldwide patterns in
attacks aimed against buses, trains, and passenger ferries and found that in 300 incidents, alert
citizens, passengers, or staff have prevented just under 9% of incidents by notifying authorities
of suspicious objects.
Other research findings indicate that existing security awareness campaigns were reaching
transit riders. However, additional strategies could be implemented to enhance the effect of
campaign materials, remove obstacles to reporting, and build positive relationships between an
agency and all its customers (Haider et al. 2011). In a 2012 study conducted at the MTA, more
than 70% of transit riders attributed their increased awareness of how to respond if they see
something suspicious to posters and signs they had seen while riding transit and other informa-
tion provided at MTA locations (Greenberg et al. 2012).
Feedback from the focus groups indicated that transit riders’ daily experiences dealing with
the transit system, individual employees, and other riders had the most significant effect on their
likelihood to report suspicious activity. For the most part, these experiences varied by rider-
ship patterns such as mode, frequency, and time of day rather than race, age, gender, etc. This
research revealed the reasons why people cannot or do not make reports. They include
• Lack of trust in the transit agency and its employees,
• A reluctance to report something that could be nothing,
• Anticipated inconvenience, and
• Communication challenges.

If riders believe an agency and its employees are concerned for their welfare and are trying
to meet their needs, they are more likely to respond to requests for support and cooperation.
Planning and implementing public awareness activities in isolation from other agency issues and
operations limits their potential to effect real change.
Evidence on the effectiveness of etiquette-related campaigns is mixed. Some transit advocates
and officials say they can at least raise awareness, even if they can’t fix the worst behavior. The
MTA “manspreading” campaign turned something people grumbled about privately into a topic
of widespread discussion. Others, such as the Toronto Transit Commission, have not found
courtesy campaigns to be very effective. Most agree that courtesy campaigns are not effective if
they are not enforced by staff or the public.
Spotlight: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

Look Up. Speak Up.
The Philadelphia Regional Transit Partners wanted to raise awareness of the role
commuters can play in keeping transit systems safe through a program funded
by a multiphase grant from the Department of Homeland Security. A public
awareness campaign was created that would raise transit safety awareness,
educate riders on what constitutes suspicious activity, and provide them with
the tools necessary to report suspicious activity on regional transit systems.
The campaign included
• A compelling message—The “Look Up. Speak Up.” slogan was created to

provide a clear call to action that spurs transit riders to stay vigilant.
• An abbreviated calling code—#1776 was established for instant reporting of
suspicious activity. Calls to #1776 went to the 24/7 staffed transit desk at the
Delaware Valley Intelligence Center.
• A campaign landing page—www.lookupspeakup.com was launched to offer
consumers tips for identifying suspicious activity as well as a way to email
about potential threats. A Facebook page and a Twitter account were
also set up to further engage transit riders and regional residents in the
program.
• Radio, billboards, signage, print, and digital display were added to the
campaign to reach the diverse target audiences.
In 2015–2016, additional phases were implemented. Law enforcement testi-

monials were added to the messaging. The website was expanded to include
a #1776 app download section along with a media center with a series of edu-
cational video vignettes that visually showcased potential suspicious activity
categories using law officers. An SMS text-to-tip program was launched in the
spring of 2016.
As a result of the campaign, more than 2,000 tips were submitted, and the
#1776 app had more than 1,000 app downloads across all platforms (Apple,
Amazon, and Google Play) in 2015. A November 2015 survey showed that since
the campaign launch there has been a steady increase in the public’s awareness
and likelihood of reporting suspicious activity.

Spotlight: MTA, NJ Transit, and Amtrak Joint Program

The MTA, NJ Transit, and Amtrak launched a public safety campaign, “Let’s
Travel Safely, Together” in 2015, offering safety tips for customers traveling
through New York City’s Penn Station. The campaign includes posters, videos,
handout maps, public address announcements, and advertisements using the
animated green and red “bubble people” already made famous in courtesy
campaigns on New York City subways and buses, the Long Island Rail Road,
and the Metro-North Railroad.
Officials were in Penn Station from 7:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. on the day of the
launch to draw attention to the message and to distribute foldout maps
with floor plans of Penn Station. With many first-time customers traveling
through Penn Station to partake in holiday shopping and related activities,
a security awareness message accompanied the station safety tips. Customers
were reminded that if they “See Something”—any suspicious activity on
platforms or trains—to “Say Something.” Customers were told to call
1-888-NYC-SAFE or visit one of the several police posts located within Penn
Station. Handouts were distributed highlighting the post locations of security
personnel, making it easy for even infrequent travelers to know where to
find assistance.
Spotlight: The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

LA Metro realized that dealing with bad rider behavior is one reason people say
they don’t use the system. For the “Metro Manners” campaign, LA Metro used
original characters, “Rude Dude” and “Super Kind,” in fun, lighthearted music
videos, outdoor ads, and social media postings, to draw attention to the most
pervasive etiquette problems on the system. The “Metro Manners” campaign
videos have been viewed more than 5 million times across YouTube, Facebook,
Instagram and Twitter, including more than 1.5 million views by likely riders.
Sentiment analysis by LA Metro has shown a universally positive response, with
more than 78% of social reaction characterized as “joyous,” encouraging an
ongoing conversation about rider behavior.

Spotlight: Golden Gate Bridge District “Respect Your Ride”

The Golden Gate Bridge District rolled out a colorful code of conduct
campaign, “Respect Your Ride,” to ensure safety for all transit cus-
tomers and to remind customers of appropriate behavior when riding
the buses and ferries. The campaign used humor and playful images
to communicate the rights and expectations of passengers and pro-
vided an improved means for passengers to communicate with the
district in the event of an incident.
Spotlight: WMATA “STOP Harassment”

WMATA launched a public awareness campaign to STOP harassment, with ads running in D.C. Metro stations
in conjunction with Sexual Assault Awareness Month and Stop Street Harassment Week in 2019. The ads,
developed in partnership with Stop Street Harassment and Collective Action for Safe Spaces, empowered
riders to report and intervene if they witness or experience an incident of harassment. The campaign features
the message “You can help STOP harassment” with four simple strategies that spell out STOP—Sidetrack,
Tell, Observe, and Postpone. WMATA developed a variety of tools to provide a safe, convenient way to report
incidents of harassment. Customers can text Metro Transit Police at MyMTPD or call 202-962-2121, tell a
WMATA employee, or go to wmata.com/harassment.
The latest campaign was part of an ongoing effort that began in 2012 to raise awareness and combat sexual
harassment in the transit system. In a 2018 report, Understanding Sexual Harassment on Public Transportation,
WMATA found that familiarity with the campaign increased the likelihood of reporting incidents of harassment
(WMATA 2018).

Technology: Mobile Applications

A recent technology in use for transit security is mobile software applications (apps) that
allow passengers to use their mobile devices—phone, tablet, or watch—to safely get involved
and easily interact with the transit agency to report an issue to transit agency authorities such
as suspicious activity, people, or objects; disruptive behavior; and safety or maintenance issues.
The apps are designed in an easy-to-use format that makes it easier for passengers to report
their concerns in real time. The software helps them determine their location when reporting an
incident and allows them to quickly send information and often photos to the agency security.
A common app used by many transit agencies in the United States and Canada allows
transit riders to instantly report safety or security concerns. App users can click a button to either
directly contact transit security personnel or discreetly submit a report with photo or video,
a description of the potentially threatening situation, and GPS coordinates. Reports may also be
submitted anonymously through the app, and the app automatically disables the camera flash
when in use so as not to draw undue attention to the rider. Security personnel can follow up on
a report immediately and directly.
Spotlight: LYNX See & Say App

The LYNX See & Say app allows customers to initiate a real-time, two-way com-
munication through the mobile application to 911 (using their phones) or to
communicate with LYNX Security by sending a report through the app or a text
(407-449-7550). A 5-second video or photos can be attached to a report to pro-
vide a better understanding of the situation. Customers will be able to submit
the report with their location and contact information, or they can choose to
submit anonymously. Users are still encouraged to use the “Call 911” button to
report immediate emergency concerns. Once the report is submitted, LYNX can
provide updates back to the customer on the status of their report. Incoming
reports will be monitored 24 hours a day. Another feature allows LYNX to send
out advisories and “be on the lookout” alerts.
Report categories available in the app have been limited to safety and security
concerns. The list includes, but is not limited to, the following:
• Assault or fighting,
• Comments,
• Damage to LYNX bus shelters or bus stops,
• Disruptive behavior,
• Graffiti or vandalism,
• Other,
• Suspicious activity,
• Theft,
• Unattended bag or package,
• Unsafe operation of a LYNX vehicle, and
• Unsafe waiting area.
Most apps in use are for passengers on the transit system. Some transit systems are reaching
into the community and partnering with existing app software companies to promote interac-
tion between those who live in close proximity to transit system lines, stations, and bus terminals.

Spotlight: New Jersey Transit Neighborhood Social Network Partnership

The New Jersey Transit Police Department partnered with a global private social network for neighborhoods
in an effort to help increase active “eyes and ears’’ surrounding the agency’s infrastructure. The New Jersey
Transit Police Department is not able to access residents’ network information or content on the social
network. This partnership is intended to help decrease rail line crime and accidents and promote interaction
between those who live in close proximity to NJ Transit rail and light rail lines and stations and bus terminals
and the New Jersey Transit Police Department.
The New Jersey Transit Police Department can geo-target residents who live within a 1-mile radius of rail and
light rail lines and stations, as well as bus terminals, and use the social network to
• Inform nearby residents of criminal activity such as theft and vandalism.

• Educate residents on how to report suspicious activity.
• Provide educational information on how to teach children about the dangers of railroad tracks.
• Increase the number of residents who interact with New Jersey Transit Police officers who patrol nearby
stations and terminals.
The New Jersey Transit Police Department conducted a pilot test of the platform for neighborhoods along the
Hudson-Bergen Light Rail and Morris & Essex stations. Feedback indicated that neighbors were overwhelmingly
in favor of the partnership.
Some transit agencies are providing another option to report suspicious or unwanted
behavior—texting. Agencies have found that people may not call or get involved, but they will
send a text.
Spotlight: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit “Text for Safety”

Metro Transit customers can now discreetly report suspicious or
unwanted behavior through text messages. Using the “Text for
Safety” feature, customers are put in direct contact with trained
Metro Transit staff members who can respond by text and send
transit police if needed.
The service was introduced so individuals can seek help even

if they don’t feel safe making a phone call. It is expected to be
especially useful in harassment situations. The Text for Safety
service also benefits individuals who are deaf, blind, or hard of
hearing. Translation services for multiple languages will also be
available through the service.

CHAPTER 4
Survey Results
The study team conducted a survey of transit agencies to gain a current understanding of
existing security practices at transit agencies. An electronic survey was sent to 100 potential
respondents from both urban and rural transit agencies. In addition to the largest 50 agencies,
smaller agencies serving rural and suburban areas were included as well. Periodic email remind-
ers were sent out to survey nonrespondents, and when necessary, selected transit agencies were
contacted by phone, or in person during transportation meetings and events, to encourage
participation in the survey. Responses were received from 43 transit agencies (a response rate
of 43%).
The survey results were compiled and analyzed to gain an overview of security preparedness
practices in transit agencies. Survey summary results are provided in this section of the report.
More detailed survey results are available in Appendix D.

Fifty percent of the Transit Security Preparedness survey participants rate their level of
engagement in security as “high” or as part of the core mission of the agency. High engage-
ment includes dedicated resources to implement programs or sustained initiatives for
security preparedness, security awareness, and reporting. Thirty-five percent of the agency
respondents rate their level as “medium” engagement, which includes security awareness
materials, training, and providing resources as required to support security initiatives.
Almost all of the agencies (94%) have established policies and procedures for managing
security incidents.
Sixty percent of Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents rate their agency efforts
to address their major security challenges as “somewhat” or “very” successful. However, only
25% say they have implemented any security risk reduction program that they consider to be
exceptional or exemplary.
In the past 5 years, agency respondents have made major changes in the following areas:
• Employee training (almost 80% of the agencies),

• Technology (more than 70% of the agencies),
• Customer outreach and education (almost 60% of the agencies), and
• Security staff (almost 55% of the agencies).
Other major changes within the last 5 years include the establishment of passenger codes of
conduct and formalization of or updates to system security plans.
45

Incidents and Causes

This section provides an overview of the incidents and causes of most concern to transit
agencies, based on the survey of transit agencies conducted as part of this synthesis. The Transit
Security Preparedness survey participants were asked the number of events in the previous year
or over the past 3 years.
Terrorism
Synthesis 80 (Nakanishi 2009) found that transit agencies reported that reports of suspicious
activities, persons, and items increased in the immediate period after 9/11, then diminished and
plateaued in the 2005–2006 time period. TCRP Report 180: Policing and Security Practices for
Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems (Frazier 2015) found that homeland security- or
terrorism-related threats rarely occur on smaller systems. The survey results are consistent with
these previous findings. More than 75% of the transit agencies respondents in the Transit Security
Preparedness survey had either one or no bomb threats in the past 3 years. Fifteen percent of the
agencies received between two and nine bomb threats in the past 3 years. The survey did not
include questions about other types of terrorist incidents, such as vehicle ramming incidents.
Crimes and Assaults

The Transit Security Preparedness survey participants listed trespassing and assaults on pas-
sengers and operators, along with drug offenses and fare evasion, as major concerns.
Almost 85% of the agencies experienced assaults against passengers or operators in the past
year, with 12% experiencing more than 100 passenger assaults in that time; 75% experienced
assaults against operators in the past year, with most experiencing from 1 to 30 incidents in
that time.
Assaults against transit workers and operators are a significant concern in the transit industry.
The following Figure 5 shows the types of techniques that the Transit Security Preparedness
survey respondents use to address or mitigate assaults on operators and passengers. Most agen-
cies (around 70% of respondents) use the presence of security forces and the establishment/
enforcement of passenger codes of conduct to address the issue. Another common technique (also
indicated by around 70% of respondents) is training on verbal techniques to diffuse situations.
Most (almost 92%) of the Transit Security Preparedness survey participants experience inci-
dents of fare evasion, with 35% of the agencies having more than 100 incidents in the past year.
Twenty-one percent of the agencies use fare checkers on a regular basis.
Trespassing
The Transit Security Preparedness survey found trespassing to be the most significant crime
listed by the responding agencies. Seventy five percent of the transit agency respondents expe-
rienced trespassing incidents in the previous year, and more than 25% had more than 100 tres-
passing incidents in the previous year.
Quality of Life
The Transit Security Preparedness survey found that quality of life issues were a concern for
most transit agencies. Disorderly persons/conduct and infractions involving eating/drinking/
loud music and drunkenness/liquor law violations are listed by the responding agencies as the
most common concerns.
All (100%) of the transit agency respondents experienced disorderly persons/conduct
and drunkenness/liquor law violations in the previous year, and almost 35% had more than

Survey Results 47

Figure 5. Techniques used to address assault.
100 incidents of each in the previous year. More than 60% of the transit agency respondents
experienced eating/drinking/loud music infractions in the previous year, and almost 20% had
more than 100 incidents of each in the previous year.
Public transportation agencies have developed written codes of conduct that address quality
of life issues and establish policies and rules prohibiting certain types of conduct. The Transit
Security Preparedness survey found that 85% of the transit agency respondents had a passenger
code of conduct. Two-thirds of the agencies (67%) posted the code of conduct on the agency
website and on agency property. About a third (30%) of the agencies posted the code in stations
and on vehicles. Twice as many agencies (24%) posted the code of conduct only on agency
vehicles than posted it only in stations (12% of agencies).
Homelessness
Almost 85% of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents experienced homeless/
vagrancy incidents in the previous year, with 32% having more than 100 incidents of each
in the previous year. About 20% of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents
have established agreements with local nonprofit agencies, mental health agencies, and
health and human services to help with their disruptive customers and the specific problems
encountered.
Human Trafficking
Fifteen percent of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents experienced at least
one human trafficking incident. Only 6% of agencies have experienced two or more incidents.
Almost half of the agencies (45%) collaborate with law enforcement on countermeasures
to address human trafficking and 15% collaborate with an ad hoc or special task force to
address the issue. Almost a quarter (24%) of the agencies have had special training on human

Table 2. Technology use at transit agencies.

Technology Agencies currently using Agencies planning to
(%) use (%)
CCTV with recorded images 88 0
Intelligent video 15 17
Body-worn cameras 22 8
Facial recognition 3 8
Electronic inspection of persons/baggage 6 –
Drones 12 0
Smartphone apps 28 22
trafficking. Twelve percent of the respondents issue public service announcements on human

trafficking awareness.
Technology
Half of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents are currently making what they
consider to be “high” investments in technology. Almost three-quarters (72%) have made major
changes in their agency’s technology in the past 5 years.
Technology currently in place and planned for future implementation is shown in Table 2.
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Only 42% of the Transit Security Preparedness survey agencies have reviewed or assessed
their facilities based on CPTED principles in the last 3 years. A little more than a quarter (27%)
of the agencies have trained and certified CPTED inspectors on staff or available as contractors,
which may partially account for the lack of regular assessments being done. More than 12% of
the agencies plan to make security investments in CPTED in the future.
Figure 6 shows the frequency of CPTED studies for agency facilities in the responding
agencies. Most of the agencies that conduct reviews do them every 2 to 5 years, with slightly more
than half of those occurring every 2 to 3 years.

Figure 6. Frequency of CPTED facility studies.

Survey Results 49
Cybersecurity
Sixty-five percent of agency respondents have encountered cybersecurity challenges. In the
past 3 years, almost 40% of respondent agencies have experienced a cyber breach. One-quarter
of those breaches were in the administrative systems, and 7% were in the agency website or
enterprise data system. Others involved email phishing and a breach in a vendor’s website.
Other issues related to cybersecurity and technology encountered by the agencies include
• Privacy issues (45%),
• Civil rights/profiling issues (15%), and
• Other issues such as cost or maintenance (25%).
Use of Visible, Unpredictable Deterrence:

Security Presence
The Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents use a variety of types of security forces,
as shown in Figure 7. More than half of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents
(60%) have contract security forces. Almost a third (30%) of the agencies use local law enforce-
ment for general patrol. Twenty-one percent have a dedicated transit police department, and
15% have an in-house security force. More than 12% of the agencies use contract local law
enforcement as a dedicated security presence or off-duty part-time police.
Almost half of the agencies (49%) have security staffing levels of between one and 25 people,
while almost a quarter have more than 100 people on their staffs. For those agencies without a

Figure 7. Types of security forces.

dedicated transit force, agencies use a contract security force (39%) or the local police general
patrol (36%).
Twenty-eight percent of the agencies use undercover or plainclothes officers, and 21% of the
agencies have fare checkers. More than 30% use K-9 dogs to perform canine inspections for
explosives; 9% use dogs for narcotics inspections.
Forty-four percent of the agencies conduct random sweeps with their security forces.
Partnerships
Three-quarters (75%) of the Transit Security Preparedness survey respondents have formal
cooperative relationships (e.g., MOUs) with external agencies/entities. Those external agencies
include local law enforcement (97% of the respondents have MOUs in place), first responders,
social service and community agencies, and utilities. Figure 8 provides respondent details on
the specific partners. The “Other” category includes other law enforcement—the FBI, the
JTTF, or the state police; private entities such as nursing homes and extended-stay facilities;
and informal MOUs with other regional transit partners. The coordination and collaboration
established by these agreements provide intelligence information sharing, joint planning and
emergency response, joint exercises and drills, and additional capabilities to address transit
agency issues.
A number of effective practices were highlighted in the survey responses. One agency partici-
pates in a regional surface transportation security committee that meets quarterly at the Joint
Regional Information Center to share transit security information with federal, state, and local
police and works well. Another does intelligence sharing through the state, county, and major
city fusion centers, which does not require an MOU. Another agency has an officer assigned full
time to the JTTF, which promotes good communications.

Figure 8. Transit agency partnerships.

Survey Results 51
Agencies have MOUs and mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement and fire depart-
ments across the region, especially to handle major unplanned events. For some, local law
enforcement reviews policies, provides recommendations and assistance, and participates in
drills. One agency has an intergovernmental agreement with local law enforcement that provides
the agency with direct access to a police officer, greatly enhancing security presence and reducing
response time.
Many agencies say they have a great relationship with the local law enforcement. Effective col-
laboration and cooperation have led to many benefits for both parties. There is a coordinated
sharing of criminal and threat information. As noted by one respondent, “We have access to their
network for locating and limiting access by individuals who have been identified as potential risks.”
Agencies coordinate with the local emergency operations center (EOC) through a multi-
agency MOU or with an EMS task force. Some work with Homeland Security and hold evacu-
ation drills, for example, for the elderly. Others cooperate on security awareness training and
disaster recovery.
Some agencies establish agreements with local nonprofit agencies, mental health agencies, and
health and human services. One agency noted in particular, “They help in some capacity with
our disruptive customers that go through the banning process because of some misconduct.”
For others, social service organizations provide information based on the city or property closely
aligned with the specific problems encountered. These relationships, according to a respondent,
“All work extremely well.”
Training
Most of the Transit Security Preparedness survey agencies (55% to 60%) provide formal secu-
rity training to all of their employees, including contract security forces.
The Transit Security Preparedness survey found that more than 80% of agencies had provided
security awareness training in the past 3 years. Seventy-six percent of agencies provide refresher
training courses in security awareness to transit police, security staff, and employees. Fifty percent of
the agencies provide refresher training every year, and 20% provide refresher training every 2 years.
Other training provided, according to the Transit Security Preparedness survey results,
includes
• Immediate emergency response (58% of agencies),
• National Incident Management System (50% of agencies),
• Behavior recognition (30% of agencies), and
• Management of transit emergencies (30% of agencies).
Preparedness Drills and Exercises

More than two-thirds of agencies (66%) hold field exercises and drills, both inter- and intra-
agency, and half of the agencies hold exercises and workshops. Figure 9 shows the frequency of
the field exercises, drills, and workshops.
Both interagency and intra-agency field exercises occur at about the same frequency, every 1
to 2 years. If there is any difference, it is that intra-agency exercises occur slightly less frequently
than interagency exercises.
Simulations and tabletop exercises are held less frequently than other exercises, drills, or
workshops.


Figure 9. Frequency of field exercises, drills, and workshops.

Survey Results 53
Table 3. Transit use of national awareness programs.

Awareness Program Agencies Aware of Agencies That Use
Program (%) Program (%)
See Something, Say Something 94 82
First Observer 42 30
Awareness Campaigns for Public and Transit Employees

The Transit Security Preparedness survey found that today most transit agencies are aware
of and use national awareness programs such as See Something, Say Something and the First
Observer programs, as shown in Table 3. More than 80% use the See Something, Say Some-
thing awareness program. More than 90% of the agencies receive suspicious activity and objects
reports from both employees and passengers.
Fifteen percent of the agencies have developed or used other security awareness programs,
including programs for sexual harassment and for human trafficking; programs targeted at
schoolchildren; one for the Citizens Police Academy; and “marketing blitzes at stations, pam-
phlets, community outreach at stations, schools, Agency Web Site, YouTube.”
Agencies rate the effectiveness of employee awareness programs higher than that of passenger
programs. Almost 60% of the agencies rate employee awareness programs as somewhat or very
successful, versus 30% for passenger awareness programs.
For most agencies, both employees and passengers report the same types of suspicious activity,
objects, or persons, with the exception of probing for vulnerabilities. Vandalism, suspicious or
unattended packages, and disruptive behavior are reported more frequently by employees than
passengers.
Reporting mechanisms cited in the survey responses were different for employees and pas-
sengers. Figures 10 and 11 display the types of reporting mechanisms cited for each, and the
percentage of agencies that responded to the survey. “Other” mechanisms cited for employee

Figure 10. Employee reporting mechanisms.


Figure 11. Passenger reporting mechanisms.
programs include using the transit agency app and calling 911; for passengers, “Other” mecha-
nisms included contacting the driver and using the agency website for reports.
Twenty-eight percent of the survey respondents are currently using apps to report an issue
such as suspicious activity, people, or objects; disruptive behavior; or safety or maintenance
issues. Twenty-two percent plan to do so in the future.
Most agencies (more than 60%) notify state or local authorities of reported suspicious activity,
people, or objects. Almost a third (30%) notify the Transportation Security Operations Center
(TSOC) about the report. Fewer than a quarter of the agencies (15% to 20%) notify DHS, the
FBI, or the FTA about the reports.

CHAPTER 5
Case Examples
The synthesis literature review, survey results, and input from the review panel identified
transit agencies that provide examples of notable security preparedness practices. The case
examples included in this section were developed through interviews with agency representa-
tives, reports identified in the literature review, and information obtained from media and other
public sources of information. The five case examples are as follows:
1. Planned Special Events: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit and Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority;
2. Approaches to Address Homelessness: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit and Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority;
3. Training and Exercises: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Drills and
Exercises Training Program and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
4. Security Committees: King County Metro Transit Department; and
5. Federal Emergency Management Agency Transit Security Grant Programs.
Planned Special Events: Minneapolis–Saint Paul

Metro Transit and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority
A planned special event is a public activity with a scheduled time, location, and duration that
may affect the normal operation of the surface transportation system because of increased travel
demand or reduced capacity attributed to event staging. Special events range from very large
events, such as the Olympics or the Super Bowl, to very small events such as a local community
parade. They include sporting events, conventions, concerts, and seasonal festivals.
The DHS secretary, acting as representative for the president, can designate major federal
government events (such as presidential inaugurations) or public events that are considered
to be nationally significant (such as political conventions and major sporting events, such as
the Super Bowl) as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The NSSE designation is typi-
cally determined by the anticipated attendance by U.S. officials and foreign dignitaries, the size
of the event, and the significance of the event. When an event is designated an NSSE, the U.S.
Secret Service becomes the lead agency in developing, exercising, and implementing security
operations.
New Jersey Transit was commended by the U.S. Secret Service for its successful execution
of its security plan for the 2004 Republican National Convention, held at Madison Square
Garden in New York City. During the convention, transit police, assisted by the New Jersey
State Police and other New Jersey law enforcement agencies, inspected every New York–bound
train every day of the convention. Other security measures put in place included aerial patrols
55

of railroad infrastructure, K-9 patrols of stations and rail yards, and electronic monitoring of
bridges and tunnels. To reduce congestion, one-third of New York–bound trains were rerouted
to Hoboken, New Jersey, where extra customer service representatives were deployed to help
customers reach their destinations. Customers told the media their experience “exceeded their
expectations.”
After the Philadelphia Phillies’ World Series parade in 2008, public transit and roadways
were overwhelmed in certain locations. Having learned from that event, the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority was prepared for a subsequent papal visit and the 2019
Super Bowl parade. A defined quantity of 1-day passes, based on the volume the system could
handle, was sold for suburban rail lines for both Pope Francis’s visit and the Super Bowl parade.
Trains were put on a special schedule to shuttle passengers as quickly and safely as possible.
Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit: Super Bowl LII (2018)

Metro Transit operates one of the largest public transportation systems in the country, span-
ning both Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The agency provides an integrated network of buses, light
rail, and commuter trains. The Metro Blue Line travels between Mall of America and Target
Field. The Red Line provides bus rapid transit between Apple Valley and Mall of America. The
Green Line travels between downtown Minneapolis and downtown Saint Paul.
Super Bowl LII was held at the U.S. Bank Stadium in Minneapolis on February 4, 2018.
Super Bowl festivities began on Friday, January 26, and continued through game day, Sunday,
February 4. Transit use was expected to be substantial—“the most transit-reliant Super Bowl
ever played,” according to Metro Transit—because the stadium is in the heart of downtown.
Metro Transit began planning for the event in 2016 and spent more than a year crafting
its Super Bowl plans. Planning security started with learning the lessons from other cities and
transit agencies that have hosted the Super Bowl. The experiences of Santa Clara and Houston
helped Metro Transit understand “what game day looks like [and] what post-game looks like.”
The agency also learned that the Super Bowl is more than game day; it is a “10-day event that
descends into celebration across the region.” The scope of the event and number of visitors
would require Metro Transit to “prepare our system for something unlike any other major event
that we’ve hosted” (Pyzyk 2018).
Metro Transit worked closely with other municipal departments and organizations within
the Twin Cities to plan for the event. “Dozens of committee meetings and planning groups”
helped plan how to provide a “safe and fun atmosphere” in a manner that worked for everybody
(Pyzyk 2018).
Coordinated planning occurred across jurisdictions and disciplines and included DHS, the
National Football League (NFL) and NFL Host Committee, the city of Minneapolis, U.S. Bank
Stadium, the Minnesota Department of Transportation, and other advisory groups. Three
tabletop exercises and two functional exercises identified likely challenges and contingencies.
Contingency planning was critical, because Metro Transit experienced almost every contingency
identified during the Super Bowl—a winter weather event, a system power failure, a light rail
vehicle failure, and protests that blocked Metro Transit light rail trains.
The largest security detail ever deployed in Minnesota—and in Super Bowl history up to that
time—was put in place in coordination with Homeland Security and regional law enforcement
partners. The force included hundreds of officers from 60 police departments across the state,
40 federal agencies and related offices, 400 members of the Minnesota National Guard, and
private contractors. Metro Transit Police had an “army of police” stationed along rail lines to
provide security. The department expected the Super Bowl–related security costs to be repaid

Case Examples 57
from security grants. The Metro Transit Police Department received a Gold Award for Rail
Security from APTA for its Super Bowl efforts.
A “secure perimeter” around the stadium that began on February 2 resulted in road closures
and the use of a temporary transit station in place of the usual Mall of America transit station.
Additional Metro Transit bus drivers and supervisors were put on regular service lines to address
service delays and other issues attributable to the road closures and congestion.
Metro sequestered the rail lines, creating the “bubble” to provide direct service to the game
from two satellite starting points—the Metro Transit Blue Line station at Mall of America and
the Green Line station at Stadium Village. Game ticket holders used a Metro Transit electronic
ticket on their smartphones. The fans went through security, a 4-step security check similar
to that used for boarding flights, at these two locations, which reduced potential wait times at
the stadium. It also allowed for screening, and queuing for screening, to be done inside, out of
the likely frigid Minnesota February weather. From there, the fans boarded light rail cars that
carried them directly into the secure zone of the stadium. Trains did not stop or open their doors
along the route.
The travel route and all of the trains being used for the service to the stadium underwent
pre–game day security screenings, and received final checks on Sunday, game day morning,
along with train operators and other transit agency staff.
When U.S. Bank Stadium opened in 2016, Metro Transit riders found long lines, slow trains,
and jammed cars after the first two events at the new stadium. Metro Transit put the many
lessons learned about crowd dispersal since then to use for the Super Bowl. Metro Transit had
trains parked inside the tightly secured perimeter, ready for when the game was over. When one
train left, another immediately pulled into the station to load and depart. The goal was to clear the
crowd within 90 minutes after the game ended. Buses were ready for fans who chose to leave the
game early.
Employees at the Metro Transit Rail Control Center watched the movement of every train and
were ready to respond to breakdowns or other issues.
Metro Transit and the City of Minneapolis worked together on special service routing plans
during the event. Replacement buses were run all day, because most of the Blue Line and a por-
tion of the Green Line were reserved for Super Bowl fans. The rides on the replacement buses
were free to make up for the inconvenience of monopolizing the light rail system for Super Bowl
activity. Special express bus trips were offered to and from downtown Minneapolis from area
park-and-rides. An effort was made to maximize fleet availability, with buses on standby to be
pressed into service if needed. Tailored transit pricing with three fare options was offered for fans
attending the Super Bowl festivities, with purchases available only through the Metro Transit
app. Metro Transit Ambassadors were in force along the rail lines and replacement bus routes
to provide assistance.
Transit customer and fan information—road closings, increased transit options, parking
spaces, and traffic routes available—were posted on the NFL Host Committee “Know Before
You Go” website, and a dedicated Super Bowl information page was posted on the Metro Transit
website. Rider alerts were posted on social media.
Nearly 6.4 million rides were provided in January, including more than 1 million Green Line
rides; nearly 823,000 Blue Line rides; and close to 67,000 Northstar rides. Nearly 210,000 addi-
tional rides were taken during the more than a week’s worth of Super Bowl events, leading the
Green and Blue lines and the Northstar Commuter Rail Line to their highest-ever January rider-
ship totals. Metro Transit found that ridership was boosted in part because of the extra service
that was offered during Super Bowl festivities. More than 17,500 rides were provided to and from

downtown Minneapolis from area park-and-rides where special express bus trips were offered.
Fares collected during the 10-day period offset the cost of the extra service that was provided.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority:

Super Bowl LIII (2019)
The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), one of the top 10 transpor-
tation agencies in the United States, operates a bus and rapid transit system in the Atlanta
metropolitan area. The system has 101 bus routes covering 1,439 miles of road, and 48 miles of
rail track with 38 train stations.
MARTA provided rail service from the venues that held the major events surrounding the
Super Bowl, along with service directly to the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.
Similar to Metro Transit, MARTA began planning 2 years before the event. MARTA had
previous experience in providing service during earlier Super Bowls, along with other sports
championship events and other NSSEs, such as the 1996 Olympics, but planning still began by
visiting the most recent Super Bowl host cities—Houston and Minneapolis—to learn from their
experiences, as was done by Metro Transit.
Frequent meetings were held with the federal, local, and law enforcement representatives and
other stakeholders to determine MARTA’s Super Bowl plan. The existing relationships with
other transportation providers, local and national police agencies, local municipalities, and
public safety agencies helped MARTA gain assistance in the effort.
MARTA centralized the planning initiatives under a lead program manager who collected all
departmental plans into a single playbook that identified the key roles and responsibilities, the
forecasted physical and human resource needs, and the resource allocation for critical locations
within the system. An extensive threat vulnerability or weaknesses assessment of the infrastruc-
ture was conducted that included locating all ingress/egress points that could be used to gain
access to the MARTA system and enter the Super Bowl “hot zone.” MARTA analyzed the secu-
rity and stability of the train control and SCADA systems.
Detailed service planning began a year before the event for the full event duration—the 10 days
of pre-event festivities, game day, and the departure of game fans, similar again to Metro Transit.
MARTA realized that the plan had to be flexible to accommodate changes in event schedules and
crowd sizes and also took into account regular riders and how they would be affected. Reinforced
by the Metro Transit experience, MARTA considered every possible service interruption sce-
nario. MARTA held numerous tabletop exercises, as Minneapolis had done, with the assistance
of almost 30 public safety agencies, to prepare contingency plans for every scenario. On the
evening before Super Bowl Sunday, there was a trespasser on the tracks at a MARTA rail station
and several small fires on adjacent CSX tracks at another. Both incidents were handled quickly
with minimal rail service disruption.
Every large event in the year leading up to the Super Bowl was treated as a “dry run” to learn
and fine-tune the plan. In addition, MARTA planned and executed the “region’s largest emer-
gency preparedness exercise” in October 2018 (MARTA 2018). The full-scale event included
theatrical explosions, smoke, and actors to realistically produce scenarios for practicing how to
handle a terrorist attack during the Super Bowl—an active shooter on a train who had taken
hostages. The exercise helped to demonstrate MARTA’s capabilities and assisted in identifying
any gaps. The FBI, the TSA, and the Atlanta police were part of the exercise.
MARTA included all employees in the 10-day operational period plan. For example, the exist-
ing Transit Ambassador program was expanded to include members of the agency administra-
tive staff, who received customer service training, among those who were positioned in rail

Case Examples 59
stations to provide customer service to riders. The agency recognized that the initiative needed
to come in the form of a policy or a procedure to make it an agency priority. The redeployed staff
on the front lines was an overwhelming success, according to MARTA.
During Super Bowl weekend, 500 sworn officers with the MARTA Police Department and
other agencies patrolled the entire rail system. MARTA reached out to other transit agencies to
provide police support and crowd control for key slots on platforms, at station entrances, and in
parking lots to reduce staff fatigue. The uniform patrol was supplemented by the Special Opera-
tions Response Team and K-9 teams trained in explosive detection. Other training conducted
in preparation for the event included crowd control training, active shooter training, hazardous
device awareness, and sex trafficking detection training.
For the entire event, MARTA ran a demand-based rail service during peak ridership
periods to clear platforms quickly. Trains were staged at end-of-line stations and in pocket tracks
to quickly accommodate growing crowds. From January 30 to February 5, MARTA provided
24-hour continuous rail service.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Plan and exercise the plans. Pre-planning, planning, training, dry runs, and even live runs are
important for planned special events.
Recognize the full duration of the event period in planning. Most events become multiday
events, even without hosted pre-event or post-event activities: visitors may be traveling to and
from the events on the days before or after the event.
Remember the regular customers. Metro Transit learned from both Santa Clara and Houston
that transit authorities need to do as much as possible for loyal customers. As one senior execu-
tive noted, “Our regular customers are the people who allow us to keep operating day in and
day out.”
Keep public transportation moving. Crowd management and metering is vital to provide a
safe, positive rider experience. Communicate with customers so they know what to expect and
to avoid customer dissatisfaction.
Approaches to Address Homelessness: San Francisco

Bay Area Rapid Transit and Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Individuals and families struggling with homelessness often use public transit as shelters, or
as alternatives to shelter, and as safe places. These individuals and families sometimes sleep on
trains and buses, form encampments on transit property, and use public transit to move from
location to location. Most transit agencies—rural and urban—consider homelessness an issue;
larger agencies often characterize it as a major issue.
The presence of those experiencing homelessness on transit affects the customer experience.
Passengers may find that those experiencing homelessness who are sleeping on vehicles and in
stations may limit access to seats, restrooms, or elevators. Surveys have found that people will
stop taking public transit out of concerns over cleanliness and safety, which they attribute to the
presence of those experiencing homelessness on the system (Boyle 2016).
Transit agencies take many approaches to address issues related to homelessness to improve
the ridership experience and to maintain public safety. Agencies recognize that solutions for
addressing issues related to homelessness need to include supportive services to be effective.

Public transit agencies are establishing or joining community partnerships to provide services
and outreach programs to address issues related to homelessness.
Bay Area Rapid Transit

Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) is a rail transit provider in the San Francisco Bay Area, strad-
dling four Northern California counties. The system connects the San Francisco Peninsula with
Berkeley, Oakland, Fremont, Walnut Creek, Dublin/Pleasanton, and other cities in the East Bay.
There are 121 miles of track, with 48 stations comprising surface, elevated, and subway stations
in almost equal numbers. Four of the stations are a combination of BART and Muni Metro
stations in downtown San Francisco, and one station is a combination of BART and Caltrain
in Millbrae. In 2018, BART provided 120.6 million total trips, with an average of more than
414,000 trips on weekdays.
BART takes a district-wide approach to addressing the homeless in all four counties, an
approach that consists of the following three strategies:
• Engage + Support: Develop partnerships with support agencies and connect homeless to
services;
• Engineer + Maintain: Secure and harden system to reduce homeless access and increase main-
tenance and cleaning to improve facilities; and
• Enforce + Monitor: Utilize ordinances, citations, arrests, and stay-away orders when necessary.
BART developed tailored strategies for stations, trackway, yards, and remnant parcels, as illus-
trated in Figure 12.
Engage and Support Initiatives

The BART Police Department uses an engage-identify-connect model to assist those expe-
riencing homelessness. The department implemented a crisis intervention team (CIT) led by a
CIT coordinator and established a multidisciplinary forensic team (MDFT) to provide a support
system for assisting those experiencing homelessness. In addition, the CIT and MDFT provide
a peer support system for law enforcement officers. MDFT is a voluntary coalition of Alameda
County law enforcement agencies, Alameda County Behavioral Health Care, and allied service
providers who collaboratively assist individuals with mental illness, substance abuse, and other
disorders and who are at high risk of involuntary hospitalization or who are arrested for behaviors
and activities related to their disabilities. The MDFT identifies individuals who have multiple
contacts with law enforcement (“high calls for service”) and are likely to have psychiatric issues.
The San Francisco Homeless Outreach Team (SFHOT), a partnership with the San Francisco
Municipal Transportation Agency and the Department of Homelessness and Supportive Hous-
ing, was initially launched in downtown San Francisco stations and then expanded to Contra
Costa County in 2019. Each SFHOT team has two outreach workers assigned to a station to make
contact with the homeless and connect them to housing, mental health care, or drug addiction
treatment services.
Engineer and Maintain Initiatives

To address cleanliness concerns, BART assigned dedicated cleaners at stations and put more
resources at the worst stations. A Structures and System Service partnership was established to
address platform-level filth and odors. Monthly meetings are conducted with station agents,
cleaners, and BART police to develop relationships and establish a “station community.”
The Pit Stop program was created in partnership with San Francisco Public Works to
provide clean and safe public toilets for BART customers and noncustomers. Pit Stop also

Source: BART Quality of Life Presentation, APTA Sustainability + Multimodal Planning Conference, July 2018.
Figure 12. BART homeless targeted strategies.

provides used-needle receptacles and dog waste stations. Handouts were developed for customers
and noncustomers to inform them of the Pit Stop facilities, and signage was put on the system
elevators.
Enforcement and Monitor Initiatives

BART and the San Francisco police increased their presence at subway stations and at street-
level entrances to disrupt undesirable behavior. Classical music was broadcast through speakers
at stations to discourage noncustomers from settling in at stations.
An elevator attendants program was established to monitor and discourage undesirable eleva-
tor activities. Attendants greet customers at the street and platform elevators at the Civic Center
and Powell Street stations daily from 5:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. After a successful 6-month pilot, the
program was fully implemented in 2018 and then extended into 2019.
The LEAD (Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion) program was begun in 2017 to address
low-level drug offenders in the Tenderloin area. The program provides access to social services
through expanded partnerships with the Department of Public Health, the Salvation Army,
Syringe Access Services, and the Felton Institute.
BART Lessons Learned

Leadership is a critical element. Executive leadership commitment is important. If address-
ing homelessness is among the board- or executive-level strategic directives, it becomes easier
to get the resources necessary to pilot potential programs, increase the security presence, and
maintain the partnerships necessary to be successful. Departmental leadership commitment
is important too. At BART, the Transit Police Department leader implements and follows
through on CIT coordination and outreach, and encourages other law enforcement agencies
to participate.
Training is important, especially integrated training across agencies and departments.
BART recognized that the lack of training in dealing with difficult and challenged individuals
was a major problem in its interactions with people who are homeless. Crisis intervention train-
ing is provided for all law enforcement personnel at BART, including dispatch, community
service officers, and administrative personnel. Mental health first aid is also offered to other
agency professionals such as station agents, train operators, system service workers, trainers,
and administrative personnel. BART found that integrating the training across agencies and
departments is important and effective, because operations personnel and police work together
to address homelessness challenges.
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

LA Metro is an agency that operates public transportation in the Los Angeles metropolitan
area, one of the country’s largest, most populous counties. More than 9.6 million people live or
work within the system’s 1,479-square-mile service area. The system has 165 bus routes covering
1,439 miles of road and six LA Metro rail lines (four light rail, two subway) on 98 miles of rail
track with 93 stations.
In Los Angeles County, those experiencing homelessness and their families use LA Metro for
transportation and take shelter in Metro rail, buses, stops, and other properties.
While ridership and safety are critical to Metro, the agency recognizes that those experiencing
homelessness are in need of resources, services, and support. Metro’s approach to homelessness
on transit is to coordinate and partner with those who have direct experience with those experi-
encing homelessness and the related delivery system.

Case Examples 63
In 2016, LA Metro formed the Homeless Task Force and launched a homeless strategic plan-
ning process with involvement from community and other stakeholders. A comprehensive
survey of Metro employees (with 1,100 respondents) provided feedback on their experiences
with homelessness in Metro’s transit system. Community engagement sessions, interviews with
individual stakeholders, and focus groups involving people who have experienced homelessness
were conducted. These efforts led to the development of the Metro Transit Homeless Action
Plan, which “focused on enhancing ridership by improving the experience of passengers daily
through implementing a coordinated and comprehensive outreach and engagement plan that
will be dedicated to the homeless individuals throughout Metro’s Transit system.”
Participants in the planning process included Metro staff, the Los Angeles Homeless Services
Authority, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, the City of Los Angeles,
Los Angeles County, law enforcement, city prosecutors, homeless outreach providers, elected
officials, and the faith-based community.
The action plan is summarized in Figure 13. LA Metro’s Transit Homeless Action Plan
received APTA’s 2017 Rail Safety & Security Gold Award.
The action plan included an investment in transit homeless outreach teams specifically
assigned to Metro, along with partnership and coordination with Los Angeles County and the
City of Los Angeles to ensure that those experiencing homelessness and their families are con-
nected to the resources and services they need.
In October 2016, the task force received $1.2 million to create special outreach teams—city,
county, community (C3) teams—to respond exclusively to homelessness on Metro as a pilot
program. LA Metro contracted with the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services
and a homeless support organization, People Assisting the Homeless, to conduct the pilot. Two
Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro Transit Homeless Action Plan, February 2017.
Figure 13. LA Metro Homeless Action Plan.

outreach teams of medical and mental health providers, substance abuse counselors, and former
homeless—now advocates—from various county, city, and community groups, began reaching
out in targeted locations, such as the Red Line, during the peak hours of 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday. At the conclusion of Metro’s 1-year pilot, the teams had interacted with
around 1,500 individuals.
Because of the pilot’s success, Metro approved a $4.9 million extension to keep the teams on
Metro lines, including during off-peak hours through May 2021. The initial two teams were
expanded to eight teams system wide. Additional outreach with C3 teams led by Metro staff at
other Metro lines and encampments is conducted in partnership with the LA County Sheriff
Mental Evaluation Team (MET) and the LA Police Department Homeless Outreach and Pro
active Engagement (HOPE) Team.
LA Metro has also established a collaboration with Los Angeles County Measure H Strategies,
which provides homeless outreach staff for government properties. These staff members are
shared among Metro, parks, libraries, beaches, and harbors throughout Los Angeles County.
In addition to the expansion of outreach, Metro is working with service providers to create
new shelters that can be accessible 24 hours a day to reduce the use of the trains, buses, and
stations as shelters. The agency wants to partner with local homeless shelters and services to have
a network that is near transit locations.
In 2018, a Metro director and a Los Angeles County supervisor proposed mobile restrooms,
complete with shower facilities, at certain Metro stations. At the time of the proposal, LA Metro
had only one public restroom in the entire 93-station system. A feasibility study was approved
by the board. The Department of Public Works, the Department of Public Health, and the Los
Angeles County Office of Homeless Initiatives and other county organizations were involved
in the process. At the time, Los Angeles had a mobile public shower pilot initiative under way,
the County Mobile Showers Program, that provides mobile restrooms with shower facilities.
Since 2017, LA Metro has doubled its police presence on all six rail lines and bus routes to
increase passenger safety and address security and homelessness. The agency goal is to get those
experiencing homelessness into housing, not just remove them from the trains and buses.
LA Metro Lessons Learned

Understand the homeless population. Critical to Metro’s success in responding to transit
homelessness is a better understanding of those experiencing homelessness in and around the
transit system. The homeless population has a diverse set of experiences and needs. Gaining
a deeper understanding of their needs allows an agency to better target resources, coordinate
resources and services, and improve transit outreach and engagement approaches.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Coordination and partnerships is essential to effectively addressing safety and security issues
related to homelessness on the transit system. Transit agencies, together with local government
agencies, agencies serving those experiencing homelessness, and other stakeholders, can better
leverage and coordinate services and create opportunities to align strategies.
While ridership concerns and safety are critical to a public transportation system, transit
agencies have to recognize homelessness-related needs for services and support. It is impor-
tant to recognize the tradeoffs being made when homeless initiatives are being planned, before
they are put in place.
Criminalizing people for experiencing homelessness does little to solve the problem and
victimizes already vulnerable individuals. LA Metro realized that it “cannot arrest our way out of

Case Examples 65
the problem” (Scauzillo 2018) and chose to address the issue in “a socially responsible and caring
manner” (LA Metro 2019). Agencies need to understand legal rights of those who are experienc-
ing homelessness and ensure that those rights are not infringed by security programs put in place.
Incorporating success measures and performance standards is important. The LA Metro
Homeless Action Plan included a quality assurance guide with a system to measure progress
and act as a template for evaluation of the action plan. Results are reviewed and reported on a
quarterly basis to ensure accountability. Outreach evaluations are conducted on a regular basis,
including measuring whether the homeless population on the system is increasing or decreas-
ing. As of June 2019, 4,800 individuals experiencing homelessness were contacted by a C3 team,
with about 1,200 linked to permanent housing solutions and 88 permanently housed.
Communication to employees, customers, and transit service area communities, espe-
cially education of staff and agency riders, is important. To ensure that their passengers knew
LA Metro was trying to make their experience “the most positive possible,” the agency con-
ducted an awareness campaign to improve communication and educate passengers and staff
about the homeless population encountered and observed.
Training and Exercises: Homeland Security Exercise

and Evaluation Program Drills and Exercises
Training Program: Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority
The WMATA Transit Police Department has long been using DHS’s HSEEP to further
efforts to ensure the safety and security of transit system users. HSEEP was originally developed
by the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness. It is a four-part, detailed how-to guide for con-
ducting and evaluating emergency preparedness training.
• HSEEP Volume I: Overview and Doctrine provides requirements and guidance for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a homeland security exercise program.
• HSEEP Volume II: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement offers a proven methodology for
evaluating homeland security exercises and implementing improvement programs.
• HSEEP Volume III: Exercise Program Management and Exercise Planning Process helps plan-
ners establish an exercise program and outlines a standardized design, development, conduct,
and evaluation process adaptable to any type of exercise.
• HSEEP Volume IV: Sample Exercise Documents and Formats provides sample exercise materi-
als referenced in HSEEP Volumes I through III. These materials are available via a secure
web-based portal.
WMATA’s use of HSEEP is highlighted in the deployment of the drills and exercise training
program in conjunction with the largest expansion in route miles ever undertaken in WMATA’s
44-year history. The Silver Line expansion is adding transit station stops and route miles to the
system in two phases. Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project Phase 1 was completed in July 2014.
Phase II, currently under construction, is scheduled for completion in 2020. In total, the two
phases of the expansion project will add 22 route miles and six stations to the system.
During Phase I, the Metro Transit Police Department conducted a series of exercises, includ-
ing four tabletop exercises and two full-scale exercises:
• Silver Line Full-Scale Exercise—Active Shooter, IED-VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device),
• Silver Line Full-Scale Exercise—Aerial Structure Evacuation,
• Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Power 1,
• Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Power 2,

• Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Bus Bridge, and

• Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Elevator/Escalator.
Incredibly, WMATA was able to conduct two full-scale exercises within a single month, a feat
that depicts the effectiveness of the agency’s HSEEP deployment.
HSEEP supports WMATA’s interaction with the many jurisdictions through which the transit
service operates. An attendee roster maintained by the agency for its Phase I Silver Line safety
and security initiatives listed participation by the following agencies:
• Metropolitan Police Department
• Fairfax County Police Department, Fire and Rescue Department, and Office of Emergency
Management
• Virginia State Police
• Virginia Department of Transportation
When HSEEP was originally designed, the main goal of the program was to address the dif-
ference between “all hazards” emergency response requirements and the threats to public safety
from terrorism involving the use of chemical, biological, nuclear, or explosive weapons or cyber
or agricultural hostility. Since that time, the HSEEP program has been expanded to cover all
manner of events, including the more recent threats of vehicle ramming and an active shooter,
as illustrated in the WMATA HSEEP initiative.
HSEEP Elements
The component parts of the HSEEP program include
• Situation manuals,
• Exercise lists and rosters,
• Exercise descriptions and objectives,
• Controller/evaluator handbook,
• After-action reports and hot washes,
• Exercise series agenda,
• Training lesson plan and roster,
• Emergency operations manual, and
• Improvement plan matrix.
WMATA’s development and use of situation manuals and after-action reports (AARs) in
particular are consistent with leading industry practices.
Situation Manuals
Typically, well-constructed situation manuals (SitMans) describe (1) the role of the
participants—player, observer, or facilitator; (2) the top three issues or areas that need improve-
ment; (3) action steps that need to be considered; and (4) policies, plans, and procedures that
need to be reviewed, revised, or developed. The training is technical and must be aimed at
improving skills. The fundamental design seeks to move the learner from training to real-life
application as quickly as possible.
WMATA’s SitMan reports consist of the following sections:
• Exercise name,
• Exercise date,
• Scope,
• Mission areas,
• Core capabilities,

Case Examples 67
• Objectives,
• Threat or hazard,
• Scenario,
• Participating organizations,
• Points of contact, and
• Exercise director and support team.
After Action Reports and Hot Washes

The AAR is the tool used to provide feedback to the participating individuals and jurisdictions
on their performance during the exercise. The AAR summarizes what happens and analyzes the
performance of the tasks identified through the planning process.
WMATA’s AAR format facilitates the exchange of important information between exercise
participants that is then used for the development of response plans and mutual aid. The AAR
includes the following sections:
• Executive summary,
• Exercise overview,
• Exercise goals and objectives,
• Exercise synopsis,
• Analysis of mission outcomes,
• Analysis of critical task performance, and
• Conclusion.
Conclusion
WMATA has developed a drills and exercise training program that effectively adopts the stan-
dards and guidance of the NIMS preparedness cycle. HSEEP is uniquely capable of supporting
this. Action words associated with the cycle include training, equipping, planning, exercising,
mitigating, and evaluating.
By training and interacting directly with area first responders, WMATA has improved the
familiarity, the emergency response, and the emergency management of its operations. By con-
ducting a continued and consistent deployment of an HSEEP-compliant training program in
conjunction with the major expansion of the Metro system, WMATA has leveraged the full
capabilities of the surrounding communities to ensure the safety and security of its riders.
Security Committees: King County Metro

Transit Department
Transit agencies have safety and security review committees to oversee the safety and security
efforts of the agency. The committees discuss ongoing safety and security concerns and help to
resolve issues identified.
The King County Metro Transit Department (King County Metro) is the public transit
authority of King County, Washington, which includes the city of Seattle. King County Metro
is the region’s largest bus network, which operates Sound Transit’s regional express bus ser-
vice, Link light rail in King County, water taxis, and the Seattle Streetcar. The agency provides
400,000 rides per weekday.
King County Metro first established a security committee (SC) in the 1980s, primarily to
address the issue of operator assaults. Led by the operation manager, the committee members
were selected by the manager and the union president. Today, each operating base of Metro

has its own security committee, led by the base operating chief. Today the transit agency
advertises for members and potential participants—drivers and other agency employees—
selected from those who express interest by submitting interest letters. Along with the base
chief, law enforcement (a sheriff’s office representative), drivers and representatives, and
representatives from other sections who are stakeholders, such as operators who take calls,
attend the meeting.
The security committees typically meet once a month or every other month, dependent on
resources available to attend the meeting. Though a major problem in the past, the resource issue
has improved over time. One of the challenges of the King County Metro SC approach is that
there are many security committee meetings taking place, including those for the service base
committees and the state safety committee. The agency is considering merging the state SC and
the agency SC to reduce the time demand on participants.
The SC discusses security incidents and issues and approaches to address or resolve those
issues. The way each SC approaches its activities depends on the base chief leading the commit-
tee. All SCs review all incident reports for the base service. Some SCs will ride with operators who
are having a number of issues to better understand the situations and to provide recommenda-
tions. The King County Metro Safety Section uses a hazard log to document and track safety
issues that come up. The security committees are discussing creating a similar log, a security log,
to track security issues.
To address security issues, an optimal security committee is focused and project driven—the
SC selects what is important for the committee to work on and then finds the resources to do it.
For example, a sticker to place in vehicles with information on what operators need to do in a
hazard emergency was developed and found to be an effective tool, and ways to improve it are
now being considered. Some King County Metro security committees have developed informa-
tion guides for drivers and operators, on such topics as how to prepare incident reports and
where to get answers to questions.
The SC also addressed improving the communication between the operators in the control
center and the communication coordinators who received the operators’ calls about security
issues. Operators needed to be more comfortable calling the coordinators with issues and to
understand what information the communication coordinators needed to have. The SC helped
operators understand how the system is set up to work and how to transmit the urgency of situ-
ations. This allowed coordinators to get better information to police dispatchers. Overall, the
initiative increased the willingness of operators to make calls and improved the timeliness and
effectiveness of the response to the call.
Other King County Metro SC success stories were
• Including a height measurement marker on vehicle stanchions to assist operators in more
accurately estimating the heights of passengers involved in incidents.
• Developing a seminar for operators to train them to write more effective incident reports to
better help transit police.
• Establishing a night focus group that brings together full-time operators working nights and
security stakeholders. The stakeholders give presentations for an hour or so on issues relevant to
operators, and then leave. For the rest of the session, the operators interact with more seasoned
operators for tips and mentoring to aid in dealing with issues experienced by the night operators.
• Developing a “Security Tips for Operators” pamphlet, a security incident standard operating
procedure on how to react to different types of scenarios. The pamphlet was designed for new
operators and distributed by the SC, but it is now included in the operator’s manual given
to all new hires. Recently the tips pamphlet was updated to include sexual assault and sexual
harassment situations.

Case Examples 69
King County Metro has an unusual asset on its security committees, an operations security
liaison in the Transit Security and Emergency Management Department with a background in
law and justice who also was a driver in transit. In addition, before joining King County, the
liaison had worked as victim’s advocate with the Seattle police department for a number of years.
Recognizing the important of courts, the liaison works to makes sure the operators understand
the courts’ authority and why operators need to show up in court when incidents demand. The
operators, in turn, appreciate the liaison’s advocacy for the operators in court cases.
It is unlikely that there are many people with a background similar to that of the King County
liaison. Suggestions on what skills and qualifications are important include the following:
• A person with a well-rounded, multidisciplined education is ideal. Look for bachelor’s
programs in the social sciences or pre-law education, with some college if not a completed
degree.
• Driver or operator experience is crucial.
• The individual must have participated in committee work at the driver level—for example,
as shop steward or as a volunteer working with operator committees.
• Previous involvement in security may not be germane: the current liaison’s background is in
law and justice.
• The ability to work across all sections of the agency is critical, as is a willingness to learn how
all the different sections work together to provide service.
• Extensive writing experience is ideal. It is important to be able to communicate well.
Lessons Learned
• Successful security committees are active in contacting operators on a regular basis. This
frequent contact keeps issues forward, and is a reminder that this is something the operators
need to pay attention to. Provide a “constant barrage” of “good” information—tips, mentoring,
effective approaches to take, etc., and avoid “harping on the negative.”
• Pay attention to security incident reports submitted, and follow up. Following up is impor-
tant because it reinforces that is worthwhile to fill out a report. The King County liaison estab-
lished a process to make sure all incident reports were read and were followed up.
• Encourage operators who are participating in the SC to talk to the other operators about
what would help improve security, such as the importance of writing incident reports.
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Transit Security Grant Programs
Transit agencies throughout the United States are familiar with the
Department of Homeland Security preparedness grant program. Managed
“While FEMA plays an essential
through FEMA, DHS’s $50 billion program includes funding specifically
role in achieving this vision of a
authorized for transit through the TSGP. The TSGP has provided more
prepared and resilient Nation,
than $2.1 billion in preparedness grant funding to transit agencies since
meaningful improvements will
2002.
occur only when we work in
DHS’s current strategic priorities for the preparedness grant program and concert across Federal departments
the TSGP are contained in the FEMA 2018–2022 Strategic Plan. Built upon and agencies, as well as with lead-
the experiences of 16 years of engagement with transit agencies, along with ers from state, local, tribal, and
an ever-broadening array of threat types, incidents, and disasters, the TSGP territorial governments, non-
supports the DHS FEMA goals to governmental organizations, and
the private sector” (FEMA 2018b).
• Build a culture of preparedness. FEMA defines “resilience” as the back-
bone of emergency management and identifies preparedness as the most

successful way to achieve disaster resiliency. A “Culture of Preparedness is a national effort

to be ready for the worst disasters at the individual, family, community, state, local, tribal,
territorial, and Federal levels” (FEMA 2018b).
• Ready the nation for catastrophic disasters. The collective readiness of FEMA and its part-
ners is considered critical for ensuring that response and recovery missions are appropriately
executed and successful.
• Reduce the complexity of FEMA. A modernization and simplification of processes and infor-
mation to increase the capabilities of all citizens to effectively participate in national emer-
gency preparedness actions and initiatives.
FEMA’s approach to the goals is to emphasize partnership with state and local authorities.
Building the most successful preparedness system requires federal support, state management,
and local execution. FEMA considers each of the goals to be a major undertaking that can be
accomplished only through the engagement of the entire community.
FY 2019 Transit Security Grant Program Overview

The TSGP is one of the DHS/FEMA grant programs that directly support transportation
infrastructure security activities, as appropriated by the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2019, Public Law 116-6, and authorized by Section 1406 of the Imple-
menting Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53 (codified
at 6 U.S.C. § 1135). The FY 2019 TSGP provides funds to owners and operators of transit
systems (which include intracity buses, commuter buses, ferries, and all forms of passenger
rail) to protect and increase the resilience of critical surface transportation infrastructure and
the traveling public from acts of terrorism.7
Funding
In FY 2019, the funds available under the TSGP grant program total $88 million. FY 2019
funds are awarded to support the creation of sustainable, risk-based efforts to protect criti-
cal surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, major
disasters, and other emergencies.
Eligibility
Eligible transit agencies are determined on the basis of daily unlinked passenger trips (rider-
ship) and transit systems that serve historically eligible UASI-designated urban areas. Certain
ferry systems are eligible to participate in the FY 2019 TSGP. Ferry systems that elect to partici-
pate under the FY 2019 TSGP are not considered for funding under the FY 2019 Port Security
Grant Program (PSGP). Likewise, any ferry system that elects to participate in the FY 2019 PSGP
is not considered for funding under the FY 2019 TSGP.
Funding Guidelines
The FY 2019 TSGP focuses on operational activities, operational packages, and capital proj-
ects, including the Top Transit Asset List and critical infrastructure vulnerability remediation.
The period of performance for the TSGP is 3 months.
Application Process and Evaluation Criteria

TSGP applications are reviewed by federal representatives from FEMA and other DHS agency
partners. Panelists review applications and, where possible, score applications independently
before joint panel deliberations. During panel sessions, panelists discuss projects and agree on
individual final scores and comments, and recommend funding levels. The panel provides fund-
ing recommendations to an executive committee made up of FEMA and TSA leadership. This

Case Examples 71
committee makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reviews the
recommendations and makes final award decisions.
Grants Management Toolkit—Promising Practices

Grantees from state and local agencies, including state administrative agencies, UASI, port
security agencies, and transit security agencies that have previously used the preparedness grant
program and TSGP have consented to the sharing of promising practices. These promising prac-
tices are available on the FEMA website (https://www.fema.gov/grants-management-toolkit).8
The information is posted by category, linked to the FEMA Grant Business Process Chart, also
called the grant life cycle. In Table 4, the grant life cycle is depicted along with references to some
of the promising practices associated with the individual categories.
Preparedness Grant Case Examples

This section provides summaries of selected security investments and improvements of state
and local agency grantees9 funded through the DHS Preparedness Program.10
Table 4. Promising practices by grant life cycle category.

Grant Life Examples of Promising Practices Agency
Cycle Category
Funding Grants Manuals/Policies and Procedures (Programmatic and Alaska, South
acquisition Financial) Carolina, West
Virginia, Alabama,
Illinois, Kentucky
Program Position Descriptions—e.g., Grant Program Manager Delaware, Alabama,
establishment (Program Coordinator II)/Homeland Security Planner I/ Maryland, South
(Program Coordinator I), Senior Accountant Carolina
(Accountant/Fiscal Analyst III)/Program Coordinator II,
Accounting Technician (Accountant/Fiscal Analyst II),
Administrative Specialist II
Application Homeland Security Grant Program application (blank Arizona, Kentucky
workbook), Peer Reviewer Information Sheet
Amendments Project Modification Request Form and Instruction Sheet Arizona
Monitoring Compliance Monitoring Program Protocol Wisconsin
Compliance Field Visit/Technical Assistance Form
Award Special Conditions and Reporting Requirements for Sub- Massachusetts,
Recipients, Conditional Grant Award, South Carolina,
Port Security Grant Program Letter Templates, Oregon
Sub-Award Agreement Transmittal Letter Template,
Sub-Award Notification Letter Template,
Sub-Grantee Award Agreement Template
Reporting GMTA Fundamentals of Grants Management—Acronym FEMA, Illinois,
List, Policy Statement Regarding Food and/or Beverages New Jersey
Provided for Homeland Security Training/Exercise
Sessions, Electronic Grants Management Systems,
Homeland Security & Preparedness Grants Tracking System
(GTS) Summary Presentation
Closeouts Equipment/Project Request Form Pittsburgh,
Equipment Request Transmittal/Tracking Form Vermont, Oregon,
State Administrative Agency Asset List Template Hawaii
Requirements for Grant Closeout
Property and Equipment Inventory Report Instructions
Jurisdiction Grant Closeout Review Checklist
Manual Grant Closeout Checklist
Grant Closeout Form Letters
Non-Compliant Closeout Form Letter
Cost Share Register
Sub-Grantee Closeout Acknowledgement Letter Template
Property Control Record
Reportable Equipment Inventory Report
Equipment Inventory Reporting Policy

California
Virtual Port System: The Port of Long Beach (POLB) is the second busiest port in the
United States, with more than $180 billion in trade moving through the port annually and
covering 3,500 acres of land and 4,600 acres of water. To enhance port security opera-
tions, the POLB developed Virtual Port, a customized mapping and monitoring platform
that integrates real-time data from multiple sources. It provides situational awareness
of port operations and facilitates rapid incident response across multiple agencies and
jurisdictions.
California Common Operating Picture for Threat Awareness: Developed through the Statewide
Risk Management Program in collaboration with the California Governor’s Office of Emer-
gency Services and eight California UASI regions, the California Common Operating Picture
for Threat Awareness addresses the statewide need for storing and sharing critical infrastructure
information and enhances situational threat awareness.
County of San Diego Cyber Disruption Response Team: In 2013, the County of San Diego Office
of Emergency Services (San Diego OES) convened cybersecurity, law enforcement, and emer-
gency management subject matter experts to establish a regional Cyber Disruption Response
Team (CDRT). The CDRT is responsible for managing the region’s response to cyber disrup-
tions, as defined in the San Diego OES’s cyber disruption response plans. In a 2015 full-scale
cybersecurity exercise, the CDRT successfully responded to a cyber disruption that affected
regional power infrastructure.
Colorado
Terrorism Liaison Officer Program and the Community Awareness Program: Through the
Terrorism Liaison Officer Program and the Community Awareness Program, the Colorado
Information Analysis Center trains local law enforcement officers, private-sector partners, and
the general public to recognize and report terrorism-related information.
Regional Explosives Unit Protecting Police Officers: The South Central Regional Explosives Unit
responds to hundreds of explosive-related calls in 33 Colorado counties each year, including for
IEDs, active shooters, booby-trapped drug facilities, and suspicious packages.
Florida
All-Hazard Incident Management Teams: All-Hazard Incident Management Teams (AHIMTs)
provide situational awareness and support to the State Emergency Response Team and the state
coordinating officer. The Florida Department of Emergency Management deployed all six
AHIMTs at least once in response to Hurricane Irma. Before Hurricane Irma, Florida used grant
funds in 2015 to develop the All-Hazards Incident Management Qualification Program, which
helps to ensure both that resources are allocated efficiently and that emergency responders are
supported effectively during an incident.
Operation Heat Shield: The Operation Heat Shield full-scale exercises were conducted in
response to the threat of complex, coordinated terrorist attacks at unique venues such as stadi-
ums and airports.
WebEOC: The Florida Department of Emergency Management (FDEM) used Emergency
Management Performance Grant funds to expand its WebEOC crisis management system,
a shared, statewide communication software platform that can implement standard emergency
management processes to maintain a common operating picture during large-scale events.
FDEM tested WebEOC integration during the 2018 hurricane exercise, which was based on
a Hurricane Irma–type scenario. Exercise participants used WebEOC to create and update

Case Examples 73
missions, train new employees, and test the execution of emergency operations procedures
consistent with the hurricane scenario.
Louisiana
Greater Lafourche Port Commission Uses Grants to Integrate Maritime Domain Awareness: The
Greater Lafourche Port Commission created an integrated Maritime Domain Awareness System
to protect against threats to the port and to assist in emergency response operations.
Maine
Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) Training Program: In 2014,
the police department in Brewer, Maine, used State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funds to
establish the MACTAC training program to enhance regional response to complex coordinated
terrorist attacks and active shooter events.
Michigan
Unmanned Aircraft System: Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) technology enhances Michigan’s
abilities to conduct real-time assessments during an incident and collect detailed post-incident
information for recovery activities. The Michigan State Police purchased the UAS with $162,000
in Homeland Security Grant Program funds and have used the UAS during real-world incidents,
exercises, and trainings.
Michigan Cyber Initiatives: Michigan’s emergency managers and state officials are build-
ing public-private partnerships and using grant funding to enhance the state’s cyber response
capabilities.
Minnesota
Statewide Security Monitoring Initiative: Recognizing the vulnerability of government infor-
mation technology networks to threats from malicious actors, MNIT, the state’s IT agency,
created the Statewide Security Monitoring Initiative to increase IT network security for counties
and cities across Minnesota.
Montana
Situation Analyst Montana (SAM): In 2013, Montana Disaster and Emergency Services and
the Montana Fire Wardens Association invested SHSP funds to develop SAM, a web-based
platform that enables emergency managers and public health, fire, and law enforcement stake-
holders to access a common operating picture of ongoing statewide incidents in real time. This
project addressed a capability gap in maintaining operational coordination of wildfire response
efforts.
New York City

Bio Isolation Transfer Cards: Following the March 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD)
in West Africa, New York City agencies began developing plans and protocols for handling
potential EVD cases. As part of this effort, the New York City Fire Department collaborated with
city hospitals and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to develop Bio
Isolation Transfer cards, documents embodying standard operating procedures for safely trans-
porting and handing off individuals suspected of having contracted EVD (known as “persons
under investigation”).
New York City Community Outreach Teams: When the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention confirmed the first-ever case of EVD in the United States, New York City quickly acted

to educate the public about EVD and its associated risks. In support of this effort, the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene deployed community outreach teams to distrib-
ute informational materials and engage the public in discussions about EVD.
Active Monitoring System and Call Center: New York City began monitoring individuals
returning from countries affected by EVD in the fall of 2014 in response to a directive from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Using almost $1.7 million in Public Health
Emergency Preparedness funds (including the EVD supplemental) and $3.5 million in UASI
funds, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene quickly adapted existing
structures to stand up an active monitoring system.
Ohio
Mass Casualty Deployment: Informed by lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bomb-
ing in 2013, Cuyahoga County invested SHSP funding to create more than 100 deployable mass
casualty supply kits. Cuyahoga County deployed these kits in support of the 2016 Republican
National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio.
Washington
Northwest Regional Aviation Unit—Protecting the Puget Sound: The Seattle UASI established
Northwest Regional Aviation (NWRA), an aviation consortium that protects the Puget Sound
area from terrorism and responds to large-scale disasters. NWRA saved 12 survivors during the
first 3 hours of the Snohomish County mudslide on March 22, 2014.
Regional Collaboration—Interoperable Communications in Eastern Washington: Since 2004,
Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 has prioritized investments in interoperable
radio communications for all first responders, regardless of discipline. Regional partners col-
laborated to establish an interoperable communications system with increased coverage that has
improved incident response across all levels of government for the region.
Conclusion
The TSGP presents a viable method for transit agencies to take advantage of federal funding
to improve the security of public transit systems. The TSGP process is a mature one that has
been improved over time.
Using the program effectively requires transit systems to comply with grant application
requirements and deadlines. Agencies of all sizes can qualify, although preference over the years
has been given to funding projects at larger, more complex urban area transit systems whose
operations are inherently riskier from a security and terrorism threat standpoint.

CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Suggestions

for Future Research
Conclusions
An effective security preparedness approach means that a transit agency is prepared for the
expected and the unexpected. Security planning, coupled with risk management that includes
risk assessments conducted on a timely basis, helps an agency be prepared for the expected.
Staying aware of trends and emerging risks can assist with the unexpected. Because threats and
hazards to transit systems evolve, the security approaches need to evolve with the risks to reduce
the number of incidents and to mitigate the consequences of any incidents that do occur. Engag-
ing in a continuous improvement program can greatly enhance the overall preparedness of the
agency.
A comprehensive preparedness strategy—one that is multifaceted (i.e., it includes policies
and procedures, people, and technology) and layered (i.e., its systematic security approaches
are deployed jointly or in tandem)—provides the flexibility needed for both anticipated and
unanticipated incidents.
Transit agencies today recognize the need for a multifaceted and layered security approach
and the need to meet new challenges and obstacles with updated technology, tools, and person-
nel deployment strategies. Because of the realities of limited resources, agencies have to focus
on utility and cost-effectiveness. Agencies consider the costs, time to implementation, training
requirements, and ease of use as well as a variety of institutional, legal, and budgetary constraints.
A security preparedness strategy is dependent on the unique operational parameters of the
transit agency. Even though there are many similarities in operations and functions between
larger and smaller transit agencies, one size does not fit all in the context of security. However,
this study found that there are common themes in all effective security preparedness approaches:
• Information sharing is essential. Sharing and collaboration with federal agencies and other
transit agencies for intelligence provide critical information on current and potential future
risks and what can be done to reduce those risks, through both lessons learned and examples
of effective implementation practices. Threat and criminal trending can be accessed through
these partnerships, allowing a data-based approach for security.
• Collaboration and cooperation are also essential. Federal and state agencies can provide
resources, audits, and access to security programs that support system security. Even though
the TSA’s major focus is terrorism, the TSA programs for transit systems can help a transit
agency achieve its own security objectives as well.
• Partnering with local law enforcement needs to be part of every transit agency’s security
program, even if not contracted for or part of formal agreements. All transit agencies operate
within and travel through one or more jurisdictions, so it is important that positive work-
ing relationships are established with the law enforcement jurisdictions in which an agency
75

operates. Collaboration and regular meetings establish and reinforce positive relationships
around a common goal.
• Engagement of employees and of passengers and the public is important. The security of
a transit system has an effect on employees, both directly through potential physical and
psychological injury and indirectly through morale and job stress. Employees are best posi-
tioned to have a major effect on security, because they are the “eyes and ears” of the agency.
Planning and implementing security preparedness strategies cannot be done in isolation from
other agency issues and operations, and employees know best what the potential issues are
and what issues must be taken into account. The perceived security of a transit agency affects
the ridership levels and affects the passengers on the system. Transit riders’ experiences with
the transit system, its employees, and other riders affect their likelihood of reporting suspi-
cious activity. If riders believe an agency and its employees are concerned about them and are
trying to meet their needs, they will be more willing to support and cooperate with security
preparedness initiatives.
Future Research
Research would assist with supporting transit agency approaches to new or evolving issues.
TCRP research projects are already planned to address fare evasion and trespassing. Research
into effective approaches to address quality of life issues would be beneficial for transit agen-
cies. Many agencies use a code of conduct as a means to deal with passenger behavior and other
quality of life issues. TCRP Legal Research Digest J-5: Codes of Conduct on Transit Vehicles and
Property: Legal Issues (Frazier and Bye, forthcoming) explores the legal issues of agency codes of
conduct, but research into successful agency approaches for specific issues and effective enforce-
ment practices would be valuable. Particularly valuable would be research on the approaches
and processes agencies have in place to implement and enforce banning and exclusions, the bar-
ring or suspending of service to individuals for code of conduct or other violations.
There is a continuing need for transit cybersecurity research. The modes and methods used to
gain access to cyber systems evolve as new vulnerabilities are identified. The types of cyber events
to be concerned about are changing as the criminal and political players in the world change.
Effective cybersecurity practices are essential for a safe and secure transit agency.
Research into new technology would also be valuable. Many transit agencies are using, or
are planning to use, smartphone apps. Although many agencies are purchasing apps from the
same vendors or apps that have similar capabilities, there are differences in what the apps can
do and the approaches that are taken by an agency in the use of an app. Research into the differ-
ent approaches that transit agencies are taking with smartphone apps would support the transit
community in identifying what the essential features of the apps are and how to effectively
implement apps to achieve the goals of the transit agency.

APPENDIX A
Glossary
Access Control
Maintaining secure access to physical and cyber assets and associated facilities, limiting it to
authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized activities and transactions.
Active Shooter
An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated
area, typically through the use of firearms.
Analytical Risk Methodology (ARM)
The ARM methodology is a systematic approach to risk management that consists of the col-
lection and evaluation of accurate and detailed information regarding the nature and value of
the assets, the degree of a specific type of threat and the extent of the related vulnerabilities,
identification and evaluation of risks and cost—a benefit analysis of countermeasures to mitigate
specific, selected risks.
Assault (1)
An unlawful attack by one person on another.
Assault (2)
Overt physical and verbal acts of aggression by a passenger that interfere with the mission of
a transit operator—to complete his or her scheduled run safely—and that adversely affect the
safety of the operator and customers. (Nakanishi and Fleming 2011)
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
TSA BASE program was developed to increase domain awareness, enhance prevention and
protection capabilities and further response preparedness of transit systems nationwide.
A voluntary BASE review of a transit system evaluates 17 categories of security and emergency
preparedness action items that were identified as fundamentals for a sound transit security pro-
gram. The review includes topics such as an agency’s security plan, security training, drills/
exercise programs, public outreach efforts and background check programs. BASE assessments
are performed by the Transportation Security Inspectors–Surface Division of the TSA.
Body Camera or Body-Worn Camera
Small video cameras—typically attached to an officer’s clothing, helmet, or sunglasses—that
can capture, from an officer’s point of view, video and audio recordings of activities and critical
incidents such as officer-involved shootings.
CARVER (Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability)
CARVER is a system to identify and rank specific targets in risk/vulnerability assessments
by calculating the value of a given potential target and the ease with which such a target could be
neutralized. A CARVER matrix can indicate “high-risk” targets that require additional security
assets allotted to them.
77

CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television)

A TV system in which signals are not publicly distributed but are monitored, primarily for surveil-
lance and security purposes.
Consequence Analysis
The estimation of the effect of potential hazardous events. (Blanchard 2008)
Consequence Assessment
An analysis of the immediate, short-, and long-term effects an event or event combination has
on an asset.
Consequence Management
Measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship or suffering caused by emergencies. These
include measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and
provide emergency relief to afflicted entities. (Frazier et al. 2009)
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)
A crime prevention philosophy based on the theory that proper design and effective use of
the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, as well as an
improvement in the quality of life. CPTED strategies include enhancing visibility and sight lines
by the use of lighting and landscaping, access control and defining clear boundaries; eliminating
hiding places such as dark corners; and strategically designing gathering areas to support positive
activity and natural surveillance.
Cybersecurity
The activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications
systems and the information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against
damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation. Strategy, policy, and standards regard-
ing the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompass[ing] the full range of threat reduc-
tion, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency,
and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assur-
ance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the secu-
rity and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure. (Countermeasures
Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, and Western Management and Consulting LLC 2016)
Disruption
To delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats or hazards.
Emergency Management
The broad class of agencies or people involved in the practice of managing emergencies and
other incidents of all kinds.
Exercises
An activity requiring the performance, integration, and coordination of response activities by
several individuals and teams. Exercises (except for tabletop exercises) normally involve mobi-
lization of personnel and resources. As noted in HSEEP Volume I, an exercise is carried out
to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance. It can also be used to test and validate
policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements; clarify and train
personnel in roles and responsibilities; improve interagency coordination and communica-
tions; identify gaps in resources; improve individual performance; and identify opportunities
for improvement. (Nakanishi and Auza 2015)
Facial Recognition
A biometric software application capable of uniquely identifying or verifying a person by com-
paring and analyzing patterns based on the person’s facial contours.

Glossary 79
Fare Evasion
The unlawful use of transit facilities by riding without paying the applicable fare. (National
Transit Database)
First Responder
Refers to those individuals who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for protecting
and preserving life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response
providers as defined in Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well
as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support
personnel (such as equipment operators) who provide immediate support services during pre-
vention, response, and recovery operations.
Fusion Center
Centers that integrate various streams of information and intelligence, including that flow-
ing from the federal government; state/territorial, tribal, and local governments; and the
private sector, providing a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure,
and communities that can be developed and translated into protective (e.g., preventative or
responsive) actions. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent man-made (terrorist) attacks
and to respond to natural disasters and man-made threats quickly and efficiently should they
occur.
Hazard Identification
The identification of a hazard of concern during a risk assessment. Part of the first of four steps
of THIRA (Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment). (FEMA 2018a)
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a user-driven, web-based, information-
sharing platform for sensitive but unclassified information. Federal, state, local, territorial, tribal,
international, and private sector homeland security partners use HSIN to manage operations,
events, exercises, natural disasters, and incidents. HSIN provides secure dissemination and
sharing capabilities for homeland security alerts, reports, and products.
Incident
An occurrence or event, natural or man-made, that requires a response to protect life or property.
Incidents, for example, can include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist
threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear acci-
dents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-
related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an
emergency response.
Incident Command System (ICS)
A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for
the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands
of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the
combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating
within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources
during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large
and complex incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public
and private, to organize field-level incident management operations.
Infrastructure Protection
Securing critical infrastructure from all hazards by managing risk and enhancing resilience
through collaboration with the critical infrastructure community. [Modified from the Mission
of the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection]

Interdiction
Interdiction is the action of prohibiting and the action of intercepting and preventing.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is a partnership between various federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. There are 175 JTTFs in cities around the country. JTTFs collect and share
information, investigate terrorism, provide security for special events, conduct training, and
respond to threats and incidents.
Manspreading
Manspreading is the practice whereby a man, especially one traveling on public transportation,
adopts a sitting position with his legs wide apart, in such a way as to encroach on an adjacent
seat or seats.
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM)
A computer-assisted tool to analyze risks, primarily in the maritime sector.
Mission Area (National Preparedness Goal)
The National Preparedness Goal identified five mission areas in which it groups the 32 core
capabilities (the distinct critical elements needed to achieve the goal): Prevention, Protection,
Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.
Mitigation (National Preparedness Goal)
The Mitigation mission area comprises the capabilities necessary to reduce the loss of life and
property by lessening the impact of disasters.
Mobile Applications (Apps)
A mobile app or mobile application is a computer program or software application designed to
run on a mobile device such as a phone, tablet or watch.
National Incident Management System (NIMS)
National standard system for federal, state, tribal, and local governments to work together to
prepare for, and respond to, incidents affecting lives and property. NIMS presents and integrates
accepted practices proven effective over the years into a comprehensive framework for use by
incident management organizations in an all-hazards context.
National Preparedness System
The National Preparedness System outlines an organized process for everyone in the whole
community to move forward with their preparedness activities and achieve the National Pre-
paredness Goal. The National Preparedness System has six parts: Identifying and Assessing Risk,
Estimating Capability Requirements, Building and Sustaining Capabilities, Planning to Deliver
Capabilities, Validating Capabilities, and Review and Updating.
Physical Security
The part of security concerned with measures/concepts designed to safeguard personnel; to pre-
vent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, materiel, and documents; and to safeguard
them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (Frazier et al. 2009)
Prepared
Subjected to a special process or treatment.
Preparedness
The quality or state of being prepared.
Prevention (National Preparedness Goal)
The Prevention mission area comprises the capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent or stop a
threatened or actual act of terrorism. It is focused on ensuring we are optimally prepared to
prevent an imminent terrorist attack within the United States.

Glossary 81
Protection (National Preparedness Goal)

The Protection mission area houses the capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against
acts of terrorism and man-made or natural disasters.
Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)
TSA program that provides security consultations to owners and operators of critical infrastruc-
ture elements.
Public Awareness Campaign
A comprehensive communications and educational effort that includes multiple components
(messaging, outreach, media relations, community relations, budget, etc.) to help reach a
specific goal.
Public Transit Homeland Security Information Network (PT-HSIN)
Public transit sub-portal on DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network that was estab-
lished as a primary mechanism for sharing security-related information with public transit
agencies.
Quality of Life Issues
Behaviors or actions that disturb or disrupt riders and the public and increase their sense of
discomfort and fear even though they may not be physically threatened. Quality of life issues
include regulating food, drink, language, clothing, and animals; behavior such as panhandling,
loitering, disorderly conduct, and manspreading; and loud music or noise.
Resilience
The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from and more successfully adapt to adverse
events.
Response (National Preparedness Goal)
The Response mission area comprises the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property
and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.
Recovery (National Preparedness Goal)
The Recovery mission area comprises the core capabilities necessary to assist communities
affected by an incident to recover effectively.
Risk
Potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as
determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. (U.S. Department of Home-
land Security Risk Steering Committee 2010)
Risk Assessment (1)
A systematic process whereby assets are identified and valuated, credible threats to those assets
are enumerated, applicable vulnerabilities are documented, potential impacts or consequences
of a loss event are described, and a qualitative or quantitative analysis of resulting risks is pro-
duced. Risks are generally reported in order of priority or severity and attached to some descrip-
tion of a level of risk. (Frazier et al. 2009)
Risk Assessment (2)
A comprehensive study of a transit agency to identify components most vulnerable to criminal
activity, including acts of terrorism and quasi-terrorism, and to assess the impact of such activity
on passengers, employees, and the agency. (Frazier et al. 2009)
Risk Management (1)
The process of selecting and implementing security countermeasures to achieve an acceptable
level of risk. (Frazier et al. 2009)

Risk Management (2)

The process of measuring or assessing risk and then developing strategies to manage the risk.
Involves a prioritization process through which risks with the greatest adverse consequences
and greatest probability of occurring are handled first, and risks with lower probability of occur-
rence and lower loss are handled later if at all. Requires balancing risks with a high probability of
occurrence but lower loss against risks with high loss but lower probability. (Frazier et al. 2009)
Security Awareness
The capability of identifying, reporting, and reacting to suspicious activity and security incidents
(Frazier et al. 2009). Establishing a security mindset of awareness in all employees can increase
an agency’s security effectiveness. Security awareness is the cornerstone of a security culture. In
a security culture, security is an integral part of the daily routine. The importance of security to
daily work is understood by all employees, and each one takes responsibility to know the secu-
rity risks that exist and the corresponding, appropriate measures to address potential and actual
security issues. (Frazier et al. 2014)
Security Countermeasures
Actions that can be taken to avoid or mitigate security threats, the cornerstones of which are
detect, deter, deny, and defend.
Security Plan
A security plan is a written document that contains information about an organization’s security
policies, procedures and countermeasures.
Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management (TRAM)
The Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management toolkit is a software-based method for per-
forming terrorism-related relative risk analysis primarily in the transportation sector. It helps
owner-operators and other SMEs identify their most critical assets, the threats and likelihood
of certain classes of attacks against those assets, the vulnerability of those assets to attack, the
likelihood that a given attack scenario would succeed, and the ultimate impacts of the total loss
of the assets on the agency’s mission. TRAM also helps to identify options for risk management
and assists with cost-benefit analyses.
Training
Training is the delivery of new information. There are many training delivery methods: field
crew meetings, just-in-time training (JITT), interjurisdictional and interagency training and
exercises, joint training, asynchronous training, train-the-trainer, planned events and incidents,
discussion-based and operations-based exercises, classroom training, online training with live
instructors, and computer simulations. (Nakanishi and Auza 2015)
Threat Assessment
A systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or potential terrorist threats to a jurisdiction
and its target assets.
Transit Advisory Committee for Safety (TRACS)
The FTA Transit Advisory Committee for Safety (TRACS) provides information, advice, and
recommendations on transit safety and other issues as determined by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation and the FTA Administrator. TRACS consists of 15 voting members for a 2-year term. The
full committee meets at least twice a year.
TVC Analysis
Assessment of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences for purposes of risk reduction.
Unified Command (UC)
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when
incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members

Glossary 83
of the UC, often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines participating in the UC,
to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan (IAP).
Vehicle Ramming
A form of attack in which a perpetrator deliberately rams a vehicle into a building, a crowd of
people, or another vehicle.
Vulnerability Assessment (1)
The identification of weaknesses in physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes,
or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists. (DHS)
Vulnerability Assessment (2)
Systematic examination of a critical infrastructure, the interconnected systems on which it relies,
its information, or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security
deficiencies, evaluate security alternatives, and verify the adequacy of such measures after imple-
mentation. A systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and/or quantitative techniques
are applied to arrive at an effectiveness level for a safeguards and security system to protect
specific targets from specific adversaries and their acts. In general, determining the vulnerability
of a critical asset is the least difficult area of risk assessment. Both quantifiable and qualitative
analysis can be performed to measure the current vulnerability status of the asset, as well as
the effect of ongoing risk management improvements. Similarly, the return on investment of
future actions can be forecast with some level of certainty. Vulnerability assessment considers
the likeliness of a given scenario occurring by chance or intention. [Vulnerability assessment]
also postulates susceptibility and resultant damage. (Frazier et al. 2009)

APPENDIX B
List of Participating
Transit Agencies
Capital District Transportation Authority (CDTA), Albany, New York

Ann Arbor Area Transportation Authority, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Belle Urban–Racine, Wisconsin
Capital Metro, Austin, Texas
Central Ohio Transit Authority (COTA), Columbus, Ohio
City of Las Cruces–Roadrunner Transit, Las Cruces, New Mexico
Clare County Transit, Clare County, Michigan
Cobb County DOT–Transit Division, Marietta, Georgia
CT Transit, Hartford, Connecticut
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), Dallas, Texas
Duluth Transit Authority, Duluth, Minnesota
Golden Empire Transit District, Bakersfield, California
Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, Peoria, Illinois
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART), Tampa, Florida
Hub City Transit/City Of Hattiesburg, Hattiesburg, Mississippi
Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Jacksonville, Florida
Long Beach Transit, Long Beach, California
Manchester Transit Authority, Manchester, New Hampshire
McDonald Transit Associates, Inc./Citilink, Fort Wayne, Indiana
Metro Transit (Bi-State Development Agency), St. Louis, Missouri
Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority, Tulsa, Oklahoma
Municipality of Anchorage, Public Transportation Department, Anchorage, Alaska
Nashville Metro Transit Authority, Nashville, Tennessee
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Buffalo, New York
Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Salem-Keizer Transit (Cherriots), Salem, Oregon
San Diego Metropolitan Transit System, San Diego, California
San Joaquin Regional Transit District, Stockton, California
Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, San Jose, California
Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority, Topeka, Kansas
Transit Authority of River City (TARC), Louisville, Kentucky
Waukesha Metro Transit, Waukesha, Wisconsin
Canadian Transit Agencies

Translink–Metro Vancouver
Metro Vancouver
84

List of Participating Transit Agencies 85
Panel Member Agencies

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Tri Delta Transit
Minneapolis Metro Transit
NJ Transit
Regional Transportation District, Denver, Colorado
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), Dallas, Texas

APPENDIX C
Survey Questionnaire
A. Agency Information
Agency Name: _______________________________________________________________________
Agency Address: _____________________________________________________________________
Name of Employee: ___________________________________________________________________
Job Title: ___________________________________________________________________________
Contact telephone/cell phone number: __________________________________________________
Email address: _______________________________________________________________________
1. Select the FTA region you are located in. If you are not a US transit agency, please select Other.
Region 1 Region 6
Region 2 Region 7
Region 3 Region 8
Region 4 Region 9
Region 5 Region 10
Other (e.g., non-US). Please describe.
2. What are the annual passenger miles of your agency?

Less than 100K 501K - 750K
101K - 250K Over 750K
251K - 500K Unsure
3. What types of vehicles and transit services does your agency provide?
o Buses
o Trains
o Commuter Rail
o Para Transports
o Subways
o Light Rail
o Other, Please Specify:
86

Survey Questionnaire 87
4. How may buses does your agency have in its system?

o Under 100 buses
o 100 – 499 buses
o 500 – 999 buses
o 1000+ buses
B. Incidents and Causes: Nature of Security Incidents

Please characterize the following as major challenges, minor challenges or not an issue at your transit
agency.
5. Incidents involving unruly, disorderly or aggressive behavior (Please indicate all types of occurrences
that apply. Use the last calendar year, e.g., 2018, as your basis for the number of incidents. )
None Number of incidents1 - 30 Number of incidents 31 - 50 Number of incidents 51 - 99 Number of incidents greater than 100
Disorderly Persons/Conduct
Homeless/Vagrancy
Drunkenness/Liquor Law Violations
Smoking/Eating/Littering/Loud Music
Graffiti/Vandalism
Fare Evasion
Trespassing
6. Crimes Against Passengers (Please indicate all types of occurrences that apply. Use the year 2018 as
your basis for the number of incidents.)
None Number of incidents1 - 30 Number of incidents 31 - 50 Number of incidents 51 - 99 Number of incidents greater than 100
Theft by pickpocketing
Theft by “snatch and grab”
Theft from vehicles
Drug offenses
Sex offenses
7. Assaults and Crimes Against Agency Property (Please indicate all types of occurrences that apply. Use
the year 2018 as your basis for the number of incidents.)
Number of incidents1 - 30 Number of incidents 31 - 50 Number of incidents 51 - 99 Number of incidents greater than 100
Assaults against Passengers
Assaults against Operators
Rape incidents
Robbery
Homicides
Trespassing
Agency Property
Burglaries of Agency Property
Arson directed towards agency property

8. How many bomb threats has your agency experienced in the past 3 years?
o None
o 1
o 2-4
o 5-9
o 10+
o N/A
9. How does your agency respond to bomb threats directed towards agency property? Please select all
used by your agency.
Y N P l a n n e d
TSA sponsored K-9s

MOUs with local law enforcement
10. In the past 3 years, has your agency experienced a cybersecurity breach or other incident affecting
your transportation operations systems or enterprise data systems (e.g., virus, Phishing, DDOS,
ransomware, etc.)?
o Yes
o No
11. How many major cybersecurity incidents have you experienced in the past 3 years?
o 1
o 2-4
o 5-9
o 10+
o N/A
12. Which type of system(s) was breached? Select all that apply.
Train Control System
SCADA System
Signaling system
Traffic Management System
Traveler Information System
Communications/Messaging System
Fare Collection System
Enterprise Data System
Administrative System
Financial System
Agency Website
Don’t know
Other (please specify.)

C. Human Traf�icking Practices

Human trafficking is defined as the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of involuntary servitude,
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Human traffickers in the United States utilize transportation systems
to transport men, women, and children for forced labor and/or sex commerce.
The following questions will help us understand how your agency is addressing human trafficking.
13. What is your agency’s level of engagement in addressing human trafficking?

o Core Mission – combatting human trafficking is an explicit part of your agency’s mission
o High – E.g., dedicated resources to implement a human trafficking strategy and/or sustained
contribution to a human trafficking task force run by government or the private sector
o Medium – E.g., some tailored awareness materials, training, communications and/or providing
resources to an ad hoc law enforcement-led, anti-human trafficking initiative (e.g., sex
trafficking countermeasures during a major event, e.g., national convention or sports event)
o Low – E.g., support to law enforcement investigations as needed and/or compliance with laws
requiring anti-human trafficking posters
o None
14. Has your agency experienced any incidents of human trafficking?

o Yes
o No
15 How many incidents have you experienced in the past 3 years?

o 1
o 2-4
o 5-9
o 10+
o N/A
16. How does your organization handle human trafficking? Select all that apply.
Special training on labor or sex trafficking
Collaboration with ad hoc/event-specific task force on labor or sex trafficking
Collaboration with law enforcement on labor or sex trafficking countermeasures
Public Service Announcements on Human Trafficking
Do not know
Other (please specify)
D. Security Practices
17. What is your agency’s level of engagement in terms of security programs, security awareness and
reporting?
o Core Mission – Security is an explicit part of your agency’s mission
o High – E.g., dedicated resources to implement security programs and/or sustained initiatives for
security preparedness, security awareness and reporting

o Medium – E.g., agency security awareness materials, training, communications and/or providing
resources as required to support security initiatives
o Low – E.g., support to security efforts as needed and/or in compliance with laws or regulations
o None
18. In which areas has your agency made major changes, if any, in overall security and security practices
in last five years? Check all that apply.
Technology
Security Staff
Employee Training
Customer Outreach and Education
None
Other, Please Specify:
19. What major security staffing changes, if any, have been made at your agency in last five years?
Check all that apply.
Contracted out security
Brought contracted out security in-house
Established MOU’s with LEAs
Increased/decreased police or security staffing
None
20. In which area(s) is your agency made currently making security-related investments? Please rate the
investments “high,” “medium,” “low,” “none,” or “planned.”
o Technology ______
o Security Staff ______
o Employee Training ______
o Customer Outreach and Education ______
o Design (CPTED)/Situational Crime Prevention ______
o Other (please specify)
E. Policy and Procedures

21. Does your agency have established policies and procedures for managing security incidents?
o Yes
o No
22. Does you agency have a Customer Code of Conduct?

o Yes
o No

23. Is the Customer/Passenger Code of Conduct posted on your agency website and/or agency
property?
o Yes, both
o On agency property only
o On agency website only
o No
24. If the Customer/Passenger Code of Conduct is posted on agency property, where is it posted?
o On transit vehicles
o In stations
o Both on vehicles and in stations
o N/A
F. Customer Awareness Programs
25. Are you aware of the “See Something-Say Something” program?

o Yes
o No
26. Does your agency participate in the “See Something-Say Something” program?
o Yes
o No
27. Are you aware of the “First Observer” program?

o Yes
o No
28. Does your agency participate in the ”First Observer” program?

o Yes
o No
29. Is your agency receiving reports of suspicious activity from passengers or employees?
o Yes, from both passengers and employees
o Employees only
o Passengers only
o No

30. Has you agency developed or utilized any other employee or customer security awareness
program(s), e.g., program for specific customers such as school children or targeted at specific behavior
such as assaults or sexual harassment?
o Yes
o No
31. How would you rate the effectiveness of the customer awareness programs used in your agency?
o Very successful
o Somewhat successful
o Neutral
o Somewhat unsuccessful
o Very unsuccessful
o N/A
32. How would you rate the effectiveness of the employee awareness programs used in your agency?
o Very successful
o Neutral
o Very unsuccessful
o N/A
33. What type of suspicious objects, people, activity, or behavior is being reported by your passengers
and/or employees? Check all that apply.
Type Passengers Employees Both

Suspicious Packages Or Unattended Packages
Suspicious Activity
Suspicious Persons
Disruptive Behavior
Theft
Vandalism
Probing For Vulnerabilities
Other, Please Describe
34. How do employees report suspicious activities, objects or people? Check all that apply.
Call specific phone number
Call local law enforcement
Contact TSOC
Contact supervisor

35. What reporting mechanism does your agency use for customers to report suspicious activities,
objects or people? (Check all that apply)
Transit Agency App (integrated App with other transit services)
Reporting App (separate from agency App)
Texting
Phone Number
Cell phone specific phone number, e.g., #1776
36. Does your agency report employee and customer identified suspicious activity to federal or state
agencies?
o Yes
o No
37. Please identify the reporting agency or agencies that are notified of suspicious activity or objects.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Transit Administration (FTA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
State Authorities or Local Authorities
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
N/A
G. Security Presence
38. What type(s) of security forces does your agency utilize? Check all that apply.
Dedicated Transit Police Department
In-House Security Force
Contract Security
Off-Duty Part-time Police
Local Law Enforcement– General Patrol
Local Enforcement – Dedicated Patrol
Contract Local Enforcement - Dedicated
None
39. What is the staffing level of the security force used by your agency?
o 1 to 25 people
o 26 to 50 people
o 51-75 people
o 75 to 100 people
o Over 100 people
o N/A

40. If you do not have a dedicated transit police force, how do you provide security? Check all that
apply.
Local Law Enforcement - general patrol
Local Law Enforcement - dedicated patrol
Off duty part-time Law Enforcement
Contract security force
N/A
41. What types of Surveillance and Inspections does your agency regularly? Check all that apply.
CCTVs (images not recorded)
CCTVs (images are recorded)
Intelligent Video
Facial Recognition
Fare Checkers
Canine Inspections – explosives
Canine Inspections – narcotics
Undercover/Plainclothes Officers
Behavioral Assessment by Transit Staff
Behavioral Assessment by Security Staff
Manual/Visual Inspections of Persons/Baggage
Electronic Inspections of Persons/Baggage
Random Sweeps
42. Which of the following techniques are used to address and mitigate assaults on employees and
passengers (committed by passengers or the general public), or to reduce and/or prevent
confrontations? Please check all that apply.
Presence of Security or Transit Personnel
Verbal Techniques (e.g., verbal judo/transactional analysis)
Nonverbal Techniques (e.g., body language)
Restraining Techniques
Passenger Codes of Conduct
Community Policing
H. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
43. Has your agency reviewed or assessed your facilities based on Crime Prevention through
Environmental Design (CPTED) principles within the last 3 years?
o Yes
o No

44. Does your agency have trained and certified CPTED inspectors on staff or available as contractors?
o Yes
o No
45. What is the frequency of the CPTED Studies for Agency facilities?
o Every year
o Every 2-3 years
o Every 3-5 years
o Longer than 5 years
o N/A
I. Operational Strategies
46. What types of operational strategies are utilized at your agency to improve security?
Limiting station access (hours/access points)
Rerouting buses away from high-profile targets
Strategic location of bus stops
Modifying hours of service
Modifying pre-trip inspections
Fleet management/vehicle tracking
Modification of dispatcher responsibilities
Parking lot, vehicle flow/ placement reconfiguration
None
o Other, Please Specify:
J. New Technologies
47. Has your agency implemented, or is planning to implement, any of the following technologies for
security?
Yes No Planning to Implement

Smartphone “Transit Watch” applications
UAS or Drones
Body Worn Cameras
Video analytics tools
Facial recognition technology
48. Have you encountered any of the following challenges in your agency use of the technology?
Cybersecurity concerns
Privacy issues
Civil rights issues such as racial profiling

K. Partnerships: Coordination and Collaboration
49. Please indicate whether your agency has formal cooperative relationships (e.g., MOUs) with other
units or agencies. Check all that apply.
Within Agency
External Agencies/Entities
Intelligence Sharing
Other, Please specify.
50. Who are your partners in these collaborative efforts? Check all that apply.
Local Law Enforcement
Medical/Emergency rescue services
Social service agencies
Non-profit agencies
Utilities
51. Please describe the nature of these efforts. How do they work?
L. Training and Exercises
52. What training courses has your agency provide to your police, security staff (whether in house or
contracted out), and employees within the past 3 years? Please check all that apply.
Security Awareness
Behavior Recognition
Immediate Emergency Response
National Incident Management System
Management of Transit Emergencies
Table-top Exercises
Drills
Functional Exercises
Full Scale Exercises
53. Are refresher training courses offered to your police, security staff (whether in house or contracted
out), and employees? Please check all that apply.
o Yes
o No

54. Please specify have frequently the refresher courses are offered.
o Every year
o Every 2 years
o Every 3 years
o More than 3 years
o N/A
55. What refresher training courses are offered to your police, security staff (whether in house or
contracted out), and employees? Please check all that apply.
Security Awareness
Behavior Recognition
Immediate Emergency Response
National Incident Management System
Management of Transit Emergencies
56. Does the Agency provide formal security training to employees? Please select all the categories of
employees that apply.
Yes No N/A
Front-line Employees
Station Managers
Administrative and Support Staff
Maintenance Workers
Mid-Level Management
Senior Management
Operations Control Center Staff
Law Enforcement Officers
Security Guards
57. Please specify how often your agency holds the following drills, exercises, simulations or tabletop
exercises/workshops:
0/year 1–2/year 3–4/year >5/year
Field Exercises/Drills, Interagency
Field Exercises/Drills, Intra-agency
Simulations or Tabletops
Exercises/Workshops
Other, Please specify including frequency.

M. Exceptional Programs
58. How would you rate your agency in its efforts to address the major security challenges your agency
encounters?
o Very successful
o Neutral
o Very unsuccessful
59. Has your agency implemented any security risk reduction program(s) that you consider exceptional
or exemplary?
o Yes
o No
60. Are you willing to share information about your program with other transit agencies?
o Yes
o No
If yes, please provide contact information (name, email address, phone number, transit agency, and
title/position at agency).
THANK YOU

APPENDIX D
Survey Results
Note: Some survey results are omitted from this appendix.
Agency Characteristics
A1. Select the FTA region you are located in by choosing region (1-10). If you are not a US transit agency,
please select Other.

A2. What are the annual passenger miles of your agency?

99

A3. What types of vehicles and transit services does your agency provide? Check all that apply.

A4. How many buses does your agency have in its system?


Survey Results 101
Types of Security Incidents
B1: Incidents involving unruly, disorderly or aggressive behavior (Please indicate all types of occurrences
that apply. Use the last calendar year, e.g., 2018, as your basis for the number of incidents.)

B2. Crimes Against Passengers (Please indicate all types of occurrences that apply. Use the year 2018 as
your basis for the number of incidents.)


B3. Assaults and Crimes against Agency Property (Please indicate all types of occurrences that apply. Use
the year 2018 as your basis for the number of incidents.)

Bomb Threats
B4. How many bomb threats has your agency experienced in the past 3 years?


Survey Results 103
B5. How does your agency respond to bomb threats directed towards agency property? Please select all
used by your agency.

Cybersecurity
B6. In the past 3 years, has your agency experienced a cybersecurity breach or other incident affecting
your transportation operations systems or enterprise data systems (e.g., virus, Phishing, DDOS,
ransomware, etc.)?

B7. How many major cybersecurity incidents has your agency experienced in the past 3 years?


B8. Which type of system(s) was breached? Select all that apply.


Survey Results 105
Security Preparedness
D1. What is your agency’s level of engagement in terms of security programs, security awareness and
reporting?

D2. In which areas has your agency made major changes, if any, in overall security and security practices
in last five years? Check all that apply.


D3. What major security staffing changes, if any, have been made at your agency in last five years?

D4. In which area(s) is your agency made currently making security-related investments? Please rate the
level of investments as “high,” “medium,” “low,” “none,” or ”planned.”


Survey Results 107
E1. Does your agency have established policies and
procedures for managing security incidents?

Codes of Conduct
E2. Does your agency have a Customer or
Passenger Code of Conduct?

E3. Is the Customer/Passenger Code of Conduct posted on your agency website and/or agency
property?

E4. If the Customer/Passenger Code of Conduct is posted on agency property, where is it posted?


Security Awareness Programs
F1. Are you aware of the “See Something-Say Something” program?

F2. Does your agency participate in the “See Something-Say Something” program?

F3. Are you aware of the “First Observer” program?

F4. Does your agency participate in the ”First Observer” program?


Survey Results 109
F5. Is your agency receiving reports of suspicious activity from passengers or employees?

F6. How would you rate the effectiveness of the customer awareness programs used in your agency?

F7. How would you rate the effectiveness of your employee awareness programs used in your agency?


F8. What type of suspicious objects, people, activity, or behavior is being reported by your passengers
and/or employees? Check all that apply.

F9. How do employees report suspicious activities, objects or people? Check all that apply.


Survey Results 111
F10. What reporting mechanism does your agency use for customers to report suspicious activities,
objects or people? Check all that apply.

F11. Does your agency report employee and customer identified suspicious activity to federal or state
agencies?

F12. Please identify the reporting agency or agencies that are notified of suspicious activity or objects.


Security Presence
G1. What type(s) of security forces does your agency utilize? Check all that apply.

G2. What is the staffing level of the security force used by your agency?


Survey Results 113
G3. If you do not have a dedicated transit police force, how do you provide security? Check all
that apply.


G4. What types of Surveillance and Inspections does your agency utilize regularly? Check all
that apply.


Survey Results 115
G5. Which of the following techniques are used to address and mitigate assaults on employees
and passengers (committed by passengers or the general public), or to reduce and/or prevent
confrontations? Please check all that apply.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
H1. Has your agency reviewed or assessed your facilities based on Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) principles within the last 3 years?

H2. Does your agency have trained and certified CPTED inspectors on staff or available as contractors?


H3. What is the frequency of the CPTED Studies for Agency facilities?

Use of Technology
J1. Has your agency implemented, or is planning to implement, any of the following technologies for
security?


Survey Results 117
J2. Have you encountered any of the following challenges in your agency’s use of the technology? Check
all that apply.

Cooperation and Collaboration
K1. Please indicate whether your agency has formal cooperative relationships (e.g., MOUs) with other
units or agencies. Check all that apply.


K2. Who are your partners in these collaborative efforts? Check all that apply.

Training
L1. What training courses has your agency provide to your police, security staff (whether in house or
contracted out), and employees within the past 3 years? Please check all that apply.


Survey Results 119
L2. Are refresher training courses offered to your police, security staff (whether in house or contracted
out), and employees?

L3. Please specify how frequently the refresher courses are offered?


L4. What refresher training courses are offered to your police, security staff (whether in house or
contracted out), and employees? Please check all that apply.


Survey Results 121
L5. Does the Agency provide formal security training to employees? Please select all the categories of
employees that apply.


L6. Please specify how often your agency holds the following drills, exercises, simulations or tabletop
exercises/workshops.

M1. How would you rate your agency in its efforts to address the major security challenges your agency
encounters?


References and Further Resources
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Transportation Security: Volume 10, Hazard and Security Plan Workshop: Instructor Guide. Transportation
Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C.
American Planning Association. 2013. Community CPTED Quicknotes.
APTA. 2010. Recommended Practice: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for Transit Facilities.
SS-SIS-RP-007-10. Approved June 24, 2010.
APTA. 2011a. Recommended Practice: Random Counterterrorism Measures on Transit Systems. APTA SS-SRM-
RP-006-11.
APTA. 2011b. Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital High-Speed Networks and Trainlines for
Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems. APTA IT-RP-001-07 V1.2. Published June 2011.
APTA. 2012. Recommended Practice: Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees. APTA SS-SRM-
RP-005-12. Published March, 2012.
APTA. 2013a. Recommended Practice: Physical Security for Public Transit. APTA SS-SIS-RP-013-13. Approved
March 26, 2013.
APTA. 2013b. Recommended Practice: Security Planning for Public Transit. APTA SS-SIS-RP-11-13. Approved
March 26, 2013.
APTA. 2013c. Recommended Practice: Transit Incident Drill and Exercises. APTA-SS-SEM-S-004-09.
APTA. 2013d. Recommended Practice: Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environ-
ments, Part II. APTA SS-CCS-RP-002-13. Published June 28, 2013.
APTA. 2013e. Transit Security Fundamentals: Security Operations for Public Transit. APTA SS-SIS-RP-012-13.
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APTA. 2014. Standard for Training of Rail Operating Employees. APTA Rail Transit Operating Practices Working
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BCA Watson Rice LLP, Strategic Policy Partnership, LLC, and MacMillan, P. 2015. Review of Metro Law
Enforcement and Security Options. Office of the Inspector General, Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, CA.
Billings, S. B., Leland, S., and Swindell, D. 2011. The Effects of the Announcement and Opening of Light Rail
Transit Stations on Neighborhood Crime. Journal of Urban Affairs, 33(5), 549–566.
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A Synthesis of Transit Practice. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington,
D.C.
Breitenbach, S. 2016. Seen and Heard: Bus Surveillance Stirs Controversy. USA Today, March 24, 2016.
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University, Kingston, ON.
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APTA Security Documents and Recommended Practices

APTA Security Documents
APTA Number Title

APTA-BTS-BO-RP-001-07 Recommended Practice for Transit Bus Operator Training
APTA-BTS-BO-RP-002-07 Recommended Practice for Transit Supervisor Training
APTA IT-RP-001-07 V1.2 The Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital High Speed Train-lines and
Networks for use in Transit related CCTV Systems
APTA SS-SRM-RP-001-09 Recommended Practice for the Development and Implementation of a Security and
Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP)
APTA SS-SRM-RP-003-09 Recommended Practice Conducting Nonrevenue Vehicle Security Inspections
APTA SS-SEM-RP-004-09 General Guidance on Transit Incident Drills and Exercises
APTA-SS-SRM-RP-009-09 Recommended Practice Identifying Suspicious Behavior in Mass Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-001-10 Security Lighting for Transit Passenger Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-002-10 Security Lighting for Nonrevenue Transit Passenger Facilities
APTA-SS-SRM-WP-002-10 White Paper on Random Inspections of Carry-On Items in Transit Systems
APTA SS-SIS-RP-003-10 Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-004-10 Chain Link, Mesh, or Woven Metal Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-005-10 Gates to Control Access to Transit Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-006-10 Ornamental Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-007-10 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design for Transit Facilities
APTA SS-SIS-RP-008-10 Bus Stops Design and Placement Security Considerations
APTA IT-CCTV-RP-001-11 Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital High-Speed Networks and
Trainlines for Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems. Recommended Practice. +
APTA-SS-SRM-RP-006-11 Random Counterterrorism Measures on Transit Systems
APTA-SS-SRM-RP-007-12 Recognizing and Responding to Unattended Packages, Objects and Baggage
APTA SS-SIS-RP-009-12 Anti-Vehicle Barriers for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-S-010-13 Security Considerations for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-012-13 Security Operations for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-11-13 Security Planning for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-013-13 Physical Security for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-15-13 Equipment and Technology for Public Transit
APTA-SS-SEM-S-004-09 Transit Incident Drill and Exercises
APTA SS_SIS_RP_012-13 APTA Transit Security Fundamentals: Security Operations for Public Transit
APTA-SS-SRM-RP-005-12 Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees

APTA Security-Related Documents by Category

Control and Communications Security
APTA-SS-CCS-RP-001-10
Securing Control and Communications Systems in Transit Environments Part 1
APTA-SS-CCS-RP-002-13
Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments Part 2
APTA-SS-CCS-WP-003-15
Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments, Part IIIa
APTA SS-CCS-RP-004-16
Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments Part IIIb
Enterprise Cybersecurity
APTA SS-ECS-RP-001-14
Cybersecurity Considerations for Public Transit
Infrastructure & Systems Security

APTA-SS-SIS-RP-001-10
Security Lighting for Transit Passenger Facilities
Security Lighting for Nonrevenue Transit Facilities
Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities
Chain Link, Mesh, or Woven Metal Fencing Systems to Control Access
Gates to Control Access to Revenue and Nonrevenue Transit Facilities
Ornamental Fencing Systems to Control Access at Transit Facilities
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
Bus Stop Design and Placement Security Considerations
Anti-Vehicle Barriers For Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-S-010-13
Security Considerations for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-RP-11-13
Security Planning for Public Transit
Security Operations for Public Transit

Physical Security for Public Transit
APTA SS-SIS-WP-014-13
Trash and Recycling Receptacles for Transit Facilities
Equipment and Technology
Tunnel Security for Public Transit
APTA-SS-SRM-RP-001-09
Development and Implementation of a Security and Emergency Preparedness
Plan (SEPP)
APTA-SS-SRM-WP-002-10
Random Inspections of Carry-On Items in Transit Systems
APTA SS-SRM-RP-003-09
Conducting Nonrevenue Vehicle Security Inspections
Conducting Background Investigations
Security Awareness Training
Random Counterterrorism Measures on Transit Systems
Recognizing and Responding to Unattended Packages, Objects and Baggage
Identifying Suspicious Behavior in Mass Transit
Conducting Revenue Vehicle Security Inspections
Security Emergency Management

APTA-SS-SEM-S-001-08
Continuity of Operations Plan
APTA SS-SEM-RP-002-08
First Responder Familiarization of Transit Systems
Security & Emergency Management Aspects of Special Event Service
Transit Incident Drills and Exercises
Developing a Contagious Virus Response Plan
Shelter of Transit Vehicles and Nonrevenue Equipment During Emergencies

APTA-SS-SEM-RP-007-09
Creating an Alternate or Backup OCC
Safe Mail and Package Handling
Emergency Communication Strategies for Transit Agencies
Participating in Mutual Aid
APTA-SS-SEM-WP-013-10
Operational Strategies for Emergency Smoke Ventilation in Tunnel

Endnotes
1. Available on the FTA TRACS website.

2. “Manspreading” is the practice whereby a man, especially one traveling on public transportation, adopts a
sitting position with his legs wide apart in such a way as to encroach on an adjacent seat or seats.
3. Public Law 110-53; August 3 2007.
4. 49 C.F.R. Part 672.
5. Available online at www.tsa.gov/firstobserver.
6. Found online at http://nationalrtap.org/marketingtoolkit/How-To-Guide-for-Marketing-Transit/Strategies-
for-Marketing-Public-Transit/Strategies-for-Building-Awareness-Image-and-Support.
7. FEMA website. Accessed on 8/30/19.
10. No specific transit agency case examples were identified. The representative examples are provided for
consideration.
132

Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications:

A4A Airlines for America
AAAE American Association of Airport Executives
AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America
ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATA American Trucking Associations
CTAA Community Transportation Association of America
CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (2015)
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers
MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials
NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program
NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users (2005)
TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program
TDC Transit Development Corporation
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998)
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S. DOT United States Department of Transportation

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500 Fifth Street, NW
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD
ISBN 978-0-309-48124-3
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Transit Security Preparedness (2020)

FIND RELATED TITLES SUGGESTED CITATION

TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

TCRP SYNTHESIS 146

A Synthesis of Transit Practice

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TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TCRP SYNTHESIS 146

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Learn more about the Transportation Research Board at www.TRB.org.

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COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS

CRP STAFF FOR TCRP SYNTHESIS 146

TCRP PROJECT J-7 PANEL

TOPIC SA-48 PANEL

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ABOUT THE TCRP SYNTHESIS PROGRAM

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6 Chapter 2 Security Preparedness

12 Chapter 3 Preparedness Strategy and Approaches:

45 Chapter 4 Survey Results

55 Chapter 5 Case Examples

75 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

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Transit Security Preparedness

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2 Transit Security Preparedness

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Project Background and Objectives

Technical Approach to Project

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Security Preparedness 7

Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery

Figure 1. Preparedness capabilities summary chart.

Importance of Security Preparedness

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8 Transit Security Preparedness

Roles in Security Preparedness

Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement Program

TSA Test Beds

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Security Preparedness 9

Public Transit Homeland Security Information Network

DHS Preparedness Grants

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10 Transit Security Preparedness

Transit Advisory Committee for Safety

National Organizations’ Role

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Security Preparedness 11

Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Transit Agency Roles

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Preparedness Strategy and

A comprehensive security preparedness approach includes

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Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 13

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12 Chapter 3 Preparedness Strategy and Approaches:

• Emphasize transparency in station design. Natural surveillance is strongly