Reviews

War in History
Book Reviews 17(2) 251–270
© The Author(s), 2010
Reprints and permission: http://www.
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermission.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0968344509357001
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Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550. By Yuval Noah Harari. Boydell.
2007. xii + 224 pp. £45.00 boards. ISBN 1 84383 292 5.

Reviewed by: Andrew Ayton, University of Hull

Yuval Noah Harari’s most recent contribution to War in History, ‘Military Memoirs: A
Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era’ (XIV, 2007,
pp. 289–309), demonstrated a willingness to set aside conventional historical period-
ization in order to engage with the longue durée of military history. To embark upon
the comparative investigation of the conduct of war, the mentalities that drove it,
and the sources that illuminate it, and to do so with reference to an extended period, is
to venture into a challenging interpretative arena in which potential hazards abound. It
is, for example, all too easy to slip into the pitfall of anachronistic judgement. New and
exciting research opportunities will be opened up, perhaps the most notable being
the possibility of distinguishing what is truly distinctive about the military practices
of particular periods from what may be termed the ‘constants’ of warfare. But, in
the event, the ‘distinctive’ and the ‘timeless’ are likely to be interwoven in subtle and
unexpected ways.
Take, for example, Dr Harari’s study of the conduct and role of inland special oper-
ations. These are defined as combat operations that, through the ‘employment of uncon-
ventional and covert methods of fighting’, enable small, precisely directed forces ‘to
produce a disproportionate strategic or political impact’ (p. 1). Harari argues that, far
from being an invention of the twentieth century, special operations were an important
feature of medieval warfare, though the forms that they took during the Middle Ages nec-
essarily reflected the military imperatives of that period. The novelty in his interpretation
arises not from the discovery of such operations in medieval warfare. They have been
commented upon often enough by historians, though it may well be that their signifi-
cance has been underestimated. Rather it is that Harari regards them as a branch of mili-
tary practice that is distinguishable from ‘regular’ warfare, a distinction that was as
evident to contemporaries as it should be to us.
But can medieval special operations be so readily identified? One difficulty is that,
with the possible exception of the Nizari assassins of the Middle East, there were no
medieval equivalents to modern ‘special forces’. Another arises from the fact that, as

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252 War in History 17(2)

the character of war changed in the twentieth century, so too did the relationship
between special operations and ‘regular’ forms of military effort. The special oper-
ations of recent times, influenced by the industrial basis of modern warfare and the
availability of reliable explosives, have often involved targets and methods of neutral-
izing them that did not exist in the medieval world. The raid that damaged the heavy
water plant at Rjukan in Telemark in 1943 has no medieval or early modern parallel. It
is also immediately recognizable as a special operation. By contrast, during the Middle
Ages, strikes on ‘infrastructure’ targets (such as the mill of Auriol in 1536, the last of
Harari’s case studies) were far less common than covert operations tasked with the
capture (or defence) of fortified towns and castles. So central to medieval warfare were
fortified places, and so preferable was seizure by stealth to the prospect of a protracted
and costly siege, that it is hardly surprising that guile and trickery were employed
against them so often. What this means is that, in the medieval context, special oper-
ations were very much part of the mainstream of warfare. Add to this the complexity
of events that could unfold around contested fortified places, including sorties and
relief operations, and it can be seen that it will not always be easy to distinguish
between special operations and regular warfare.
Although it is necessary to register such reservations, there is nevertheless some
merit in the proposition that, judged in terms of targets selected, economy of effort, and
significance of outcomes, special operations are both identifiable in medieval warfare
and, in some respects at least, comparable with their modern counterparts. The case is
made in the ‘analytical overview’ with which this book opens and in the six case studies
that, in the remaining chapters, illustrate the various forms that medieval special oper-
ations could take. It is at this point that an academic reviewer should mention that the
book has been written with a ‘non-professional’ readership in mind. This explains the
author’s heavy reliance on narrative, not only in the case studies but also in the opening,
theoretical chapter. Assuredly, the case studies have been well selected. Perceptive
touches of interpretation (as, for example, in the account of the abortive French attempt to
recapture Calais in 1350) will no doubt engage the attention of the informed reader. And
yet it is likely that specialists will also regret that quite so much space has been devoted
to narrative, for the analytical sections of the book highlight important issues that might
have been explored more fully.
Notably, Harari argues that greater recognition of the importance of special oper-
ations would enhance our understanding of siege warfare in particular and the con-
duct of war in general. Perhaps so, but the proposition might have been tested by
taking a close, systematic look at a well-documented medieval war in order to assess
the relative importance of special and regular operations. A second theme that would
have benefited from extended development is the tension that Harari identifies
between, on the one hand, the chivalric ideal of honourable conduct and, on the
other, the practical realities of warfare, which might demand resort to the trickery
and foul-play that were so often features of special operations. This, indeed, is pre-
cisely the kind of theme that should be explored in that rewarding if challenging
interpretative arena in which the characteristics of medieval warfare are compared
with those associated with later centuries.

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