The Separation of Mathematics

from Reality in Scientific

and Educational Discourse

Uwe Schürmann

Abstract This contribution aims to illustrate that the separation between mathe-
matics and reality is an outcome of several shifts in historic mathematics discourse.
Therefore, Foucault’s method of problematisation and Deleuze’s distinction between
axiomatic and problematic formalisation in mathematics are used to emphasize these
shifts. Afterwards, a special attention is paid to mathematics teaching in German
history. Here, it will be considered how reality was treated in the mathematics
classroom due to the socio-political circumstances at a particular time.

Keywords Deleuze
Foucault
Frege
Kant
Mathematics education

Reality Separation

Introduction

To analyse the separation of mathematics and reality against the background of

historic and current discourses, the method of choice is the problematisation, a
concept that Foucault describes in his late works and which combines his methods
archaeology and genealogy (Dits et Écrits: IV/350, Koopman, 2014). While
archaeology is related to the question how particular utterances became possible, a
genealogy asks for the connection between a discourse and political power. Both
methodological strands focus on the relations between knowledge, subjectification
and power in a discourse. Foucault’s genealogy is an analysis that will clarify the
strategies of power as well as which forms of subjectification and which specific
form of thinking are responsible for the expansion of a discourse. The starting point
is a current question. Here the question might be: why is mathematics separated
from reality?
Given the large number of publications in which applications and modelling are
defined as interplays between mathematics and reality one may speak of a

U. Schürmann (&)
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Fliednerstraße 21, Münster 48149, Germany
e-mail: schuermann.uwe@uni-muenster.de

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 241

P. Ernest (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Education Today,
ICME-13 Monographs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77760-3_15
242 U. Schürmann

distinction that arranges the modelling discourse. With a glance at the history of
mathematics it is evident that this is not a necessary distinction because of its logic,
rather it is a historically developed distinction. There had been distinct opinions
about the ontological status of mathematics and in particular about the question
whether numbers and geometrical objects belong to the world or exist somewhere
outside of it. For the late Pythagoreans it seemed to be clear that the entire structure
of the world (cosmos) follows a numerical order. In contrast, the Platonic ontology
that distinguishes an empirically accessible world and a world of ideas seems to
justify the separation of mathematics and reality (Plato, 2000: 514a–517a).
According to Foucault ‘knowledge’ is not an outcome of rational subjects, but
discursive structures prior to any kind of subjectivity lead to accepted knowledge in
a particular epoch. That implies that different epochs are characterized by different
types of knowledge regimes which Foucault calls ‘episteme’. In “the Order of
Things” (Foucault, 2002) his aim is to describe the different epistemes of the
Renaissance, the classical epoch and modern era. The Episteme of modernity is
characterized by two aspects: primarily by the search for origins and ultimate
justifications and secondly by the role of man for all kinds of knowledge. Since the
human being forms the transcendental basis of all knowledge in the modern epoch
and is entirely dependent on the empirical realities of his times, the human being
was going to be an empirical-transcendental doublet. It is the subject and object of
knowledge at the same time. For human sciences in general and didactics in par-
ticular this way of thinking will be of fundamental importance. For mathematics the
modern conception of knowledge has far-reaching consequences, too. To some
extend, binding knowledge to the human cognition means to undermine the claim
of absolute truth within mathematics.
Below, a shift in mathematical discourse, from Kant to Frege to Hilbert, which
moved mathematics more and more away from reality will be traced. It is illustrated
that shifts in mathematical discourse led to the separation of mathematics from
reality, a powerful narrative which was not even harmed by Russell or Gödel and is
now fundamental to the discourse on modelling in the classroom. Against this
background, i.e. the tension between the claim of absolute truth within mathematics
and the episteme of modernity, firstly the importance of Kant’s “Critique of Pure
Reason” (1787) will be highlighted in a nutshell. Secondly, Frege’s logicism and
Hilbert’s formalism will be discussed in the context of Foucault’s modern episteme.

The Separation of Mathematics from Reality

For Kant knowledge is entirely bound to the faculty of cognition of man

(Erkenntnisvermögen). He turned the question of the nature of things to the
question of the faculty of cognition. In this respect, Kant’s Copernican revolution
can be understood as a subjectivistic turn. Thus, his thinking is consistent with the
modern episteme. Kant divides propositions into those which are analytic and those
which are synthetic. In analytical propositions something is derived from the
The Separation of Mathematics from Reality in Scientific … 243

intension of a concept (e.g. ‘the bachelor is unmarried’) (Kant, 1787: B10 and
B192). Such propositions are a priori true, so no experience is needed to confirm
them. However, according to Kant these propositions will not broaden our horizon
of understanding. We are only able to derive knowledge which had been part of the
concept already before. In contrast, synthetic propositions are assumed to be
empirical. They predicate something which is not already included in a concept
(e.g. ‘the bachelor is 34 years old’) (Kant, 1787: B11). Such propositions actually
expand our horizon of understanding. However, it cannot be said with certainty
whether they are true because they always depend on experience. But what if there
were propositions which are true prior to any kind of experience and yet enhance
our horizon of understanding? Thus, the question is if there can be synthetic a priori
propositions. Kant concludes that synthetic a priori propositions are possible if the
range of possible experience is related to the pure conceptions of the understanding
(categories) and the pure forms of intuition (space and time). To Kant the propo-
sitions of mathematics are examples of synthetic a priori propositions (Kant, 1787:
B14–B16).
In this respect, mathematical knowledge is subjective as it is linked to man’s
faculty of cognition. Nevertheless, because the categories of understanding and the
pure forms of intuition are shared by all rational beings mathematics possesses
objective validity. From this point, Kant could have been seen as an advocate
within mathematical discourse, an advocate who was able to defend the mathe-
matical claim of absolute truth within the modern episteme. Probably this is one of
the reasons why Kant’s epistemology is of outstanding importance for the mathe-
matical and scientific discourses of that time.
Nevertheless, in the early 19th century, when initial works on non-Euclidean
geometry have been started the question arose whether Kant’s conception of
mathematical propositions had to be reconsidered. If the propositions of Euclidean
geometry are not synthetic a priori propositions, the status of all mathematical
propositions can be questioned. Again, it was asked if mathematical propositions
are synthetic and therefore empirical facts or if they are analytic and therefore a
priori true. To emphasize the ambivalent status of mathematics in the 19th century
Frege’s “Foundation of Arithmetic” (1884) have to be considered. Therein, he tries
to base arithmetic only on logical conclusions, he refers to a variety of well-known
mathematicians and philosophers and he expresses an inner need to save arith-
metic’s truth from any kind of relativism. In one respect, Frege’s thinking is
altogether related to the thinking within the modern episteme: he is searching for
origins and ultimate justifications. At the same time, Frege rejects the conception of
binding truth to the faculty of cognition which came along with the episteme of
modernity. In his foundations the risk of relativizing mathematical truth by modern
thinking is always present. Frege’s approach can be seen as an act of resistance
against this relativism.
So to defend arithmetic from any kind of relativisation, Frege must present
arithmetic as independent from subjectivity and experience. For that reason, he
opposed Kant (Frege, 1884: § 87–91) and Mill (Frege, 1884: § 7). To Mill
propositions of arithmetic are empirical facts. They “are not true by definition; they
244 U. Schürmann

are, in Kantian terms, synthetic. But that implies, for Mill, against Kant, that they
are a posteriori, inductive rather than a priori” (Wilson, 2016). Frege rejects this
view on numbers, and he rejects Kant’s view on arithmetic as well. To Frege
arithmetical propositions are analytic. But how to deal with Kant’s problem that
analytic propositions do not enhance our cognition horizon? Unlike Kant his aim
was to show that analytic propositions can enhance our cognition horizon. On
conclusions derived from analytical propositions he writes, “The truth is that they
are contained in the definitions, but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as
beams are contained in a house” (Frege, 1884: § 88). The metaphor of propositions
seen as plants growing from a seed illustrates the way axiomatic mathematicians
would think about their own work. Here, every mathematical truth must already be
contained in axioms. Nevertheless, new proven propositions widen the field of
mathematical knowledge. Also another contemporary view on mathematical
thinking, indicated by the upcoming human sciences, was heavily opposed by
Frege. On the question whether numbers originate in human psychologic conditions
he writes, “For number is no whit more an object of psychology or a product of
mental processes than, let us say, the North Sea is” (Frege, 1884: § 26). Frege
treated numbers as objects. Of course, they are not physical objects or derived from
physical objects but objects established by mental processes.
At this point, Frege’s considerations mark an intermediate stage in mathematical
discourse. On the one hand, he is deeply convinced that arithmetical propositions
are analytic. He rejects any kind of relation between arithmetical truth and human
cognition and he also rejects the view that arithmetical objects have their origin in
real world experience. His work signifies a shift, a shift turning mathematics, here
arithmetic, away from reality, from mental processes and real world experience. On
the other hand, he denies a pure formal interpretation of mathematical propositions.
So it was not an absolute shift, Frege proposed. To understand his objections
against a pure formal interpretation of mathematical propositions, one should have a
look at his distinction between ‘sense’ (Sinn) and ‘reference’ (Bedeutung) of proper
names, and ‘thoughts’ and ‘truth values’ of propositions (Frege, 1892). To Frege
geometrical propositions are not only treating truth values but thoughts as well
(Frege, 1903, 1905). From that point of view, terms used in propositions do make
sense if they are related to an (also immaterial) object in a specific context. It seems
that there is still a string between mathematics and reality.
This intermediate stage had been left and the string between mathematics and
reality had been cut off when Hilbert published the “Foundations of Geometry” in
1899, a formal axiomatic system of geometry. Hilbert does not define objects like
points and lines in respect to their geometrical content but in certain mutual rela-
tions. “The complete and exact description of these relations follows as a conse-
quence of the axioms of geometry”, Hilbert says (Hilbert, 1899: 2). In addition to
this formal conception of axioms as a description of relations between unspecified
things, Hilbert’s aim is to prove the relative consistency of geometry. Here, rela-
tively denotes that geometry is led back to a different mathematical axiom system
whose consistency is required. Hilbert’s proof deals with analytic geometry as a
The Separation of Mathematics from Reality in Scientific … 245

model of Euclidian geometry. So his axiomatic system of geometry is consistent if

the axioms of real numbers are consistent.
To Frege things are entirely different. He turns decidedly against Hilbert’s for-
mal conception of geometry, where geometrical objects do not mediate a sense, and
expresses doubts on Hilbert’s evidence for consistency. To assert the relative
consistency of an axiomatic system based on formal similarities of two systems is
considered as inadequate by Frege. He objected that by a purely formal conception
of axioms thoughts would not be expressed. As we know, Hilbert’s conception of
consistency prevailed in mathematical discourse. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy it says, “Hilbert is clearly the winner in this debate, in the sense that
roughly his conception of consistency is what one means today by consistency in
the context of formal theories” (Blanchette, 2014). Hilbert did not address Frege’s
view on consistency anymore and expanded his projects from the early 20th century
initially to the arithmetic, Hilbert’s second problem (Hilbert, 1900), and then to all
mathematical subareas from 1920. In Hilbert’s formalistic program the consistency
of each mathematical domain should be ensured by placing it on a formalistic
axiomatic foundation. As we know, Frege’s project came to an end due to Russell’s
antinomy (1902), and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems gave the evidence that
Hilbert’s formalistic program, an outcome of his second problem, was not
accomplishable (Smith, 2007). Nevertheless, these results did not harm the narra-
tive of separation of mathematics and reality.
While this narrative of separation is very present in mathematics discourse, there
is a minor strand in mathematics history which can be highlighted against the
background of so-called ‘major mathematics’. Deleuze’s concepts of problematic
and axiomatic formalisation in mathematics history (Deleuze, 1994; Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987) can be used here. Problematic formalisation is a minor strand in
history of mathematics or, as Deleuze calls it, a “nomad” science. The axiomatic
way of formalisation is the major strand or as Deleuze calls it the “royal” science in
history of mathematics.
Nomadic mathematics, according to Deleuze and Guattari, disrupted the regime of axio-
matic through its emphasis on the event-nature of mathematics. In particular, nomadic
mathematics attended to the accidents that condition the mathematical event or encounter,
while the axiomatic attended to the deduction of properties from an essence of fundamental
origin. (de Freitas, 2013: 583)

The difference between axiomatic and problematic approaches in mathematics

can be found at several points in history of mathematics. Three of them are going to
be considered below. Firstly, the ancient Greek Euclidean geometry could be seen
in contrast to Archimedes’ geometry. The following example might illustrate this.
While Euclid defines a straight line as a static object (a line which lies evenly with
the points on itself), Archimedes characterizes the straight line as the shortest
distance between two points. Archimedes’ way of thinking is not focused on an
essence of a straight line but on solving the problem how to connect two points on a
plane. Here many solutions might be possible (curves, loops, etc.) and the straight
line is the shortest solution above all others. The Euclidean geometry which goes
246 U. Schürmann

from axioms to theorems and the Archimedean geometry which goes from prob-
lems to solutions can be contrasted to each other in other aspects as well. To
Archimedes the circle is an outcome of a continuous process of rounding, the
square is the result of the process of quadrature, etc. (Smith, 2006: 148). As we
know, Euclidean geometry, the axiomatic way of thinking, prevailed in history of
mathematics. It became the major geometry.
Secondly, by the turn of 17th century the tension between axiomatic and
problematic geometry had shifted to a more general tension between geometry itself
on the one side and algebra and arithmetic on the other side. Here, Fermat’s and
Descartes’s analytic geometry shifted geometry to arithmetic relations which could
be expressed in algebraic equations. This kind of geometry stood in opposition to a
Desargues’ projective geometry like where no algebra had to be used at all (Smith,
2006: 149). Since then arithmetisation became a parent trend in geometry and in
other mathematics’ disciplines; and resulted, for example, in Hilbert’s geometry
where the consistency of axioms is derived from the axioms of real numbers. By
this means the process of arithmetisation within mathematics is related to a second
parent trend, i.e. the axiomatization. It is tried to trace back as many areas of
mathematics as possible to an ideal origin, i.e. an assumed essence of numbers.
Thirdly and finally, in the late 19th century an additional shift took place when
the calculus was formulated in the epsilon-delta criterion by Weierstrass. In its
origins, the calculus was an ideal example of problematic mathematics. The dif-
ferential calculus dealt with the problem how to determine a tangent line to a point
of a given curve. For Newton the calculus referred to a dynamic and infinite
geometric process. That means that analysis was very different compared to
arithmetic. While analysis was about the infinite geometrical processes, arithmetic
dealt with discrete numbers. By the epsilon-delta method dynamic processes were
reformulated in a static way. Of course, the calculus can still be interpreted in a
dynamic way; yet it is not necessary anymore. By the epsilon-delta criterion, the
calculus only refers to the axioms of real numbers (Smith, 2006: 152).
So, what does the distinction between axiomatic and problematic mathematics
tells us about the separation between mathematics and reality? First of all, it seems
that on the problematic side there is no need to separate mathematics from reality.
On this minor side mathematics deals with (real-world) problems, e.g. Desargues’s
projective geometry was used in optics and the calculus already solved physical
problems long before the epsilon-delta criterion was invented. In contrast, due to
predominance of the major side there is an ongoing shift from problems to axioms,
from intuitive geometry to arithmetic and algebra, and from the infinite and
dynamic to the finite and static. All that can be seen as way to separate mathematics
from reality. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that even the axiomatic
attempts could not separate mathematics from reality completely. Additionally,
positive outcomes of axiomatic mathematics influenced reality or at least our view
on reality. The non-Euclidean geometry is to some extent the result of a pure
axiomatic problem. Here, the question was, if Euclid’s parallel postulate is in fact a
theorem that can be derived from the rest of Euclid’s axioms/postulates. Then, the
non-Euclidean geometry provided many tools to Einstein’s theory of relativity.
The Separation of Mathematics from Reality in Scientific … 247

While this example might exemplify how an axiomatic problem led to a different
view on reality, another filed of examples illustrates how reality itself is changed by
axiomatic mathematics. At a glance, it can be seen that computer technology, based
on axiomatic mathematics that Hilbert would have had appreciated, is changing our
reality day by day. The examples that could be mentioned here are numerous. So, it
seems that even between axiomatic mathematics and reality there is no gap which
cannot be closed. More likely, the structure of the relationship between axiomatic
formalisation and reality is similar to an ancient Greek tragedy. Like Oedipus who
ran away from his parents trying to avoid the fulfilment of the prophecy, axiomatic
mathematicians tried to avoid any confusion of mathematics by reality. However,
for this means they are faced with reality even more, like Oedipus who made the
prophecy really happen just when he tried to avoid it.

Reality in Mathematics Classrooms

Hitherto, some shifts which led to the separation between mathematics and reality
in scientific discourse have been exemplified. The Foucauldian perspective illus-
trated the tendency of formalisation in mathematics discourse as a way of reacting
to the modern episteme which binds all knowledge to the conditions of human ratio.
By Deleuze’s distinction between axiomatic and problematic formalisation in
mathematics’ history the possibility was given to think about the relation between
mathematics and reality in a more complex way. However, the separation between
mathematics and reality not only plays an important role in scientific discourse on
mathematics, but also in educational research and in mathematics school curricula.
Unsurprisingly, the role which reality plays in school mathematics had changed
several times in history. Against the background of mathematics teaching in
Germany, some of these changes are going to be outlined in regard to particular
socio-political circumstances.
For Foucault’s studies of power relations, the term dispositif (also translated as
apparatus) is of crucial importance. With this term Foucault gets a close look at the
varied connections between discursive and non-discursive practices. He says:
What I’m trying to pick out with this term [dispositif, US] is, firstly, a thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regula-
tory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral
and philanthropic propositions–in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the
elements of the apparatus. The apparatus [i.e. the dispositif, US] itself is the system of
relations that can be established between these elements. […]
I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ [i.e. the dispositif, US] a sort of – shall we say –
formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to
an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been,
for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an
essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix
for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, sexual
illness and neurosis. (Foucault, 1977: 194–195)
248 U. Schürmann

The network between the elements which are crucial for the educational dis-
course should be defined as the ‘education dispositif’. With the concept of the
education dispositif the ever-changing role of reality in the mathematics classroom
can be analysed in regard to the multiple relations between pedagogic and scientific
discourses, urgent needs of economy and political circumstances in a particular
period of time. For the modelling discourse that means that you have to explore
why mathematics sometimes was taught as a tool to solve real world problems, and
sometimes as a pure formalistic science. For this purpose some crucial changes in
the history of German mathematics classrooms are going to be outlined now.
Due to the structured school system in German countries, the goals of mathe-
matics teaching may differ depending on the particular type of school, and so the
relation between mathematics teaching and reality may vary from time to time and
from school-type to school-type. For example, in the 19th century, goals of
mathematics teaching in humanistic secondary schools (Gymnasium) were very
different from those of the elementary schools (Volksschule). While elementary
school tried to prepare students for labour and so mathematics was taught using
realistic tasks, applications were nearly totally replaced by the training of logical
thinking in mathematics classroom in secondary schools. Nevertheless, at the
beginning of the 20th century, the will to change teaching of mathematics even in
secondary schools was expressed. The growing industries’ demand was to get well
educated students suitable for engineer professions. Prussia politics’ demand was to
compete with other industrial countries. So, these demands resulted in the Meran
syllabus initiated by Felix Klein who had already attempted to connect mathe-
matics, mathematics teaching and industry on university level. What can be seen
here is a shift in discourse on teaching mathematics as an outcome of the education
dispositive, even if it is not that clear how successful the implementation of the
Meran syllabus really was (Kaiser-Messmer, 1986: 31–42).
In any case, school curricula and mathematical discourse changed during the
times of National Socialism. At this time, Hilbert’s formalism has been defamed as
“Jewish mathematics” by several mathematicians. These mathematicians begun to
publish their works in the journal “German Mathematics” (Vahlen, 1936) whereby
they tried to establish a racially founded typology of scientific research and a return
to intuition in mathematics. So, in Nazi Germany the fundamental dispute between
mathematics formalists and intuitionists was resumed and forcibly decided in
favour of the latter. Teaching mathematics was highly characterized by racism, too.
That means application tasks which were intended to educate students within the
meaning of National Socialist ideology made their way into the classroom. The
following task illustrates that:
On average, the annual expense of the state for a mentally disordered person are 776 RM;
costs for a deaf or a blind person are about 615 RM, a cripple costs 600 RM. In closed
institutions there are: 167,000 mental, 8300 deaf and blind persons, 20,600 cripples. How
many millions of RMs do these infirm people cost annually? (Bewersdorff & Sturhann,
1936: 111, translated by US)

Numerous of those tasks can be found in mathematics textbooks of these times.

The Separation of Mathematics from Reality in Scientific … 249

A third moment, when the formation of the education dispositif can be seen at a
glance is the reaction to the so-called Sputnik shock. The launch of the first artificial
satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 was followed by several educational policy
responses in Europe and the US. Due to the Sputnik shock, the formalistic ‘new
math’ found its way into textbooks and curricula. To get an impression, even
primary school children were confronted with set theory. It is worth to note that
teaching formalistic mathematics was promoted by university mathematicians.
Oriented to Hilbert’s formalism mainly French authors formed the group which is
known as the pseudonym Nicolas Bourbaki. Their textbooks “Elements of
Mathematics”, developed since 1934 (Bourbaki, 1939), serves to illustrate the main
content of (axiomatic) mathematics in a stringent structure. Here, all applied
mathematics was excluded or rejected as unessential.
Intuition-free, purely formal mathematics in the classroom had soon proved to be
problematic. So, only a few years later the introduced reforms have been undone.
Since then, proposals have been made how to involve more applications into
teaching mathematics. In this case, the discussion also focused on the nature of
applications in mathematics teaching. Criticism was expressed that application tasks
often use contexts only to illustrate a pre-given pure mathematical content. In
contrast, modelling tasks are promoted because they provide openness and take
reality more seriously. Also due to the unsatisfactory results of German pupils in the
first PISA surveys, the so-called PISA shock, mathematical modelling is justified by
several authors (Blum et al., 2004: 47) and was implemented in German mathe-
matics curricula. Again, relations between different fields of power and knowledge
—politics, media, research on mathematics teaching, and economy—have led to
changes in mathematics curricula. In both cases, Sputnik and PISA, we can clearly
see an assumed or actual urgent need as an opportunity to implement certain
education policies.

Final Remarks

In this contribution Foucault’s method of problematisation and Deleuze’s concepts

of axiomatic and problematic mathematics were used to illustrate that the distinc-
tion between mathematics and reality is not self-evident but an outcome of the
mathematics discourse. By linking different levels of discourse (mathematics,
education, politics) some of the connections between power and mathematical
knowledge have been disclosed. It was outlined how mathematical endeavours in
teaching and science follow economical and political imperatives, e.g. Felix Klein’s
attempt to connect research, education to the demands of economy, or Nazi ide-
ology introduced into the mathematics classroom by means of applied mathematical
tasks. It has been illustrated that the image of apparently impersonal mathematics is
the result of shifts in mathematics discourse.
250 U. Schürmann

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Uwe Schürmann teaches mathematics and philosophy at a secondary school in Dortmund,

Germany. He also works at the Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science at University of
Münster where he is a member of a team for designing nationwide comparison tests for
mathematics. His research interests include historical, philosophical and sociological issues in the
teaching of mathematics, and more widely, in mathematics education.