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NASA - Lessons Learned - Prototyping Does Not Guarantee Success During Build-Up of Flight-Configuration Hardware
NASA - Lessons Learned - Prototyping Does Not Guarantee Success During Build-Up of Flight-Configuration Hardware
오전 10:31 Llis
Subject
Prototyping does not guarantee success during build-up of flight-configuration hardware
Abstract
None
Driving Event
The Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) pilot-operated valve (POV) controls the flow of hypergolic liquid
propellants, nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) and monomethylhydrazine (fuel), to the Space Shuttle Orbiter attitude
control thrusters. The POV has experienced numerous in-flight and ground turnaround failures, including leakage
and failure to open upon command. Corrosion in the oxidizer valves and seal extrusion in the fuel valves have
been linked to most of these failures. The desire to mitigate corrosion and seal extrusion led to an effort to
develop a redesigned POV (RPOV) pilot seat assembly.
To streamline RPOV seat assembly fabrication, prototype seat assemblies were built using a hot-forming
procedure. The hot-forming fixture is shown in Figure 1.
[D] (https://llis.nasa.gov/llis_lib/txt/1009896main_1036-1.txt)
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Success during valve-level testing of prototype RPOV seat assemblies gave early confidence in the RPOV
design concept and assembly techniques. Based on this success, flight-configuration RPOV seat assemblies
were then fabricated. Unfortunately, seal-related problems not revealed by prototyping hampered attempts to
fabricate viable flight-configuration RPOV pilot seat assemblies.
There were three instances where reduced level of design rigor during prototyping contributed to the difficulties
during fabrication of flight-configuration hardware:
1. It is suspected that the two-piece retainer and tiny screws used for securing the retainer to the seat
inadvertently increased the mechanical compliance of the seal cavity. This minimized seal squeeze and
mechanical deformation that ultimately produced micro-cracking and recession of the seal in flight-
configuration hardware.
2. The convenient use of uncontrolled PTFE bar stock for the prototype seals, instead of using a carefully
researched PTFE grade based on consultation with materials and processing experts, delayed optimum
material selection.
3. A lack of precise strain rate control during prototype hot-forming trials, along with a design change to the
prototype hot-forming fixture to accommodate the planned retainer weld, contributed to a lack of process
repeatability.
Lesson(s) Learned
Without careful consideration, 'minor' design changes to hardware and associated assembly/test fixtures (for
example, material specifications, dimensional tolerances, surface finishes, assembly process variables, etc.) can
greatly affect conclusions drawn from the prototype test data and even invalidate the entire prototype effort.
Prototype hardware was built as a proof-of-concept and therefore was not flight representative. This approach
used existing parts and yielded encouraging initial results, but the reduced level of design rigor contributed to the
difficulties in subsequent fabrication. In this regard, prototyping failed to reveal subtleties in critical design
features and fabrication parameters that were unique to the build-up of a flight-configuration hardware.
Recommendation(s)
When developing complex hardware, every effort should be made to maximize the likeness of prototype and
subsequent design configurations. If the final design configuration is known, prototype hardware should be built
to closely approximate this configuration regardless of short-term cost or schedule implications. If the final design
configuration is not known, every effort should be made to minimize changes to a well-performing prototype
configuration.
Program Relation
N/A
Program/Project Phase
None
Mission Directorate(s)
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Aeronautics Research
Human Exploration and Operations
Topic(s)
None
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