THE STRATEGY & TACTICS OF WORLD WAR II

The Chaco War, Finland in World Guadalcanal Naval 2nd Battle of the
1932–35 War II Battles Alps, 1945

#86 OCT–NOV 2022

TH E
CHACO
WAR
 S OF WORLD WAR II
THE STRATEGY & TACTIC

Zemke’s 56
th Metaxas Battle for Berlin
Drive on Suez Fighter Group Greek Fort Line

GAME EDITION
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World at War#
Drive on Suez
Rommel Drives Deep, 1942 78
Lead the German-Italian Panzer Armee Afrika (PAA) in the 1942 Players:
campaign in Egypt as Rommel drives on the Suez Canal. The game begins Solitaire +
immediately following the PAA capture of Tobruk in June 1942 and You Control:
continues through to the August battle of Alam el Halfa. Your mission Panzer Armee Afrika
is to seize strategic objectives including the major Nile Delta cities and Opposition:
the Suez Canal. You will face a wide variety of situations, from battling Middle East Command
against fierce counterattacks to finding ways to extend your supply lines. Map Scale:
While Suez is a solitaire game, multiple players can play as the PAA 1 inch = 45 km
team, making decisions by consensus, or each managing operations Unit Scale:
along one of the routes of advance. Battalions–Divisions

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 World at War#
Centrifugal Offensive
Japanese Campaign in the Pacific, 1941–42 75
Coordinate the initial Imperial Japanese Players:
campaigns of the Pacific War. Can you Solitaire
accomplish the campaign's objectives ahead of
You Control:
schedule and forestall the Allied offensive?
Imperial Japan
A critical factor in this game is victory fever. Opposition:
The more the Japanese are winning, the Allied Forces
greater the chance they will have to attain
Turn Scale:
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1 month
before the Allied counteroffensive in the
Solomons, so there are no Allied amphibious Ground Unit Scale:
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battleships, cruisers, destroyers, transports
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I–I I I
THE STRATEGY & TACTICS OF WORLD WAR II
FEATURES
6 34
The Chaco War, 1932–1935
Paraguay and Bolivia claimed
sovereignty over the Chaco, a
desolate territory stretching from
the Andes to the Paraguay River.
For landlocked Bolivia, control of it
was not just a matter of national
pride. The Chaco gave access to
the Paraguay River, which provides
a route to the Atlantic. The largest
war fought in South America in
the 20th century was the result.
By Javier Romero Muñoz
18
Between A Rock & A Hard Place:
Finland in World War II, Part I
In the 1930s the Finns faced
strategic dilemmas that ultimately
led them to fight three wars
between 1939 and 1945: the Winter
War, the Continuation War and the
Lapland War. This is our analysis.
By John D. Burtt
PUBLISHER DESIGN
Dr. Christopher Cummins Richard Aguirre
ASSISTANT PUBLISHER/ ART DIRECTOR MAP GRAPHICS
Callie Cummins Joe Youst
SENIOR EDITOR PROOF TEAM
Ty Bomba Mike Bentley, Ken Biholar, Mark Brownell,
Dave Carson, Stephen Calderon, Eric N. Jung,
ASSOCIATE/ MEDIA COLUMN EDITOR
Javier Romero Muñoz, Bob Zmuda
Chris Perello
ADVERTISING
Callie Cummins
calliecummins@decisiongames.com
4 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
The Guadalcanal Naval Campaign
From August 1942 to February 1943,
while US ground forces battled the
Japanese on Guadalcanal, the US
and Japanese Navies fought six
major actions on the seas around
it. Those naval engagements
determined the outcome of the
overall campaign as much as the
fighting on the island itself.
By Patrick S. Baker
52
The Second Battle of the Alps,
March–May 1945
On 1 March 1945, the French
activated the Alpine Corps and
detached it from their First Army in
northeast France. The new unit’s
mission was to reclaim French
control of the passes leading through
the Maritime Alps into northwest
Italy. The result was a small and
short-lived, but brutal, campaign
fought in those high places.
By Raymond E. Bell, Jr.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Photographs from the Finnish Ministry of Education & Culture,
Finnish Wartime Photo Archive, German Federal Archives,
Military Museum of Finland, Russian Ministry of Defence,
Romanian National Archives, and Wikimedia Commons used
under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 license.
Stock images from www.dreamstime.com and
www.shutterstock.com
COVER IMAGE
Verdún on the Chaco I By Enzo Pertile, used with permission.
 ISSUE #86 | OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 2022

18 34 52

DEPARTMENTS GAME EDITION RULES

Chaco War:
16 64 1932–1935
Design Corner Observation Posts: By Javier Romero Muñoz
By Joseph Miranda • Raupenschlepper Ost
By Allyn Vannoy NEXT ISSUE: #87
62
• The International Saar Force On Sale October 2022
Game Preview
& the Saar Plebiscite • Netherlands East Indies, 1941–42
War Comes Early:
By Vernie Liebl • Finland in World War II, Part II
Czechoslovakia 1938
• Marshal Zhukov as Wargamer
• Operation Tradewind: 1944
78 • The Second Front Debate, 1942–43
Invasion of Morotai
Media Reviews By Jon Cecil
By John D. Burtt
• The Arado 234 B-2 Jet
Reconnaissance Bomber
By Carl O. Schuster

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WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 5

TH E CHACO WAR
1932–1935
BY JAVIER ROMERO MUÑOZ
B
March to War
OTH PARAGUAY AND BOLIVIA CLAIMED
sovereignty over the Chaco region. The name
is a mispronunciation of the original Quechua
Indian Chacu, meaning simply “hunting land.” It is a hot,
semi-arid, flat and mostly desolate territory stretching
from the foothills of the Andes to the Paraguay River.
Until late in the 19th century the two countries’ dispute
was largely symbolic: the Chaco was an empty wasteland.
The situation changed following the outcomes of two
of the largest conflicts fought in South America in the
6 WORLD at WAR 86 |
19th century—the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–70)
and War of the Pacific (1879–83)—caused both Bolivia
and Paraguay to lose large amounts of territory.
Paraguay surrendered about half its land and
lost an amazing 90 percent of its male population.
Bolivia was deprived of an exit to the Pacific, becom-
ing a landlocked nation. Those defeats propelled a
growing nationalism in both countries, which in turn
shaped how they would react to future crises.
OCT–NOV 2022

For newly landlocked Bolivia, control of the Chaco
ceased to be a matter of national pride and became
an existential strategic objective. Gaining access to
the Paraguay River, across the Chaco, would provide
an exit to the Atlantic Ocean via the River Plate.
During the 1920s the Bolivians set up a series of
forts in the disputed area. Tensions rose, with numer-
ous small incidents and firefights taking place. In
December 1928 a Paraguayan force, acting without
orders from their nation’s government, captured
a small Bolivian fort in the Río Negro area.
In response, the Bolivians attacked two Paraguayan
forts and sent an air raid against Bahia Negra on the
Paraguay River. Both countries mobilized, but then
WORLD at WAR 86 |
Verdún on the Chaco II, digital painting by Enzo Pertile.
accepted a US-mediated peace. Even so, further incidents
continued and both countries began an arms race.
On 15 June 1932 a group of 28 Bolivian soldiers on
patrol within the Chaco moved toward Pitiantuta Lake.
It had only been mapped from the air for the first time in
April of that year by the Bolivians, but it had been discov-
ered on the ground by the Paraguayans in March 1931.
What drew the Bolivians was the Paraguayan encampment
they saw set up on the shore opposite their own approach.
Waiting until midnight, they rushed the Paraguayans
while firing in the air. The “Pitiantuta Lake Incident,”
as it came to be called, turned out to be the episode
that set in motion the Chaco War, the bloodiest con-
flict fought in South America in the 20th century.
OCT–NOV 2022 7

LEFT: Daniel Salamanca, president of Bolivia
1931–34.
8 WORLD at WAR 86 |
RIGHT: Jose Felix Estigarribia, photographed
years after the war, when he became president
of Paraguay.
OCT–NOV 2022
After the incident, Bolivian President
Daniel Salamanca ordered three
other recently established Paraguayan
outposts be captured. All were quickly
taken, and Paraguay demanded their
return. Instead, the Bolivians expanded
their army from 4,000 to 6,000 men.
That in turn convinced the
Paraguayans no diplomatic solution
was possible. Their government ordered
its army to recapture the forts, and in
August some 10,000 troops advanced
into the Chaco on that mission. The
Paraguayan commander of that force,
Lt. Col. José Félix Estigarribia (who years
later became 34th president of Paraguay),
hoped to win the war before the
Bolivians could finish their mobilization.
Boquerón
While both sides continued mobiliz-
ing, the Bolivians already on-the scene
took the offensive in hope of reaching
the Paraguay River. Starting with more
troops in the field than their enemy,
in late July 1932 they took Corrales,
Toledo and Boquerón before stop-
ping. They then halted, due in part to
Salamanca’s fear of Argentine interven-
tion and in part due to the weather,
when a series of strong storms struck.
Two months went by with no action.
The Paraguayans used the delay
to complete their mobilization. On
7 September, Estigarribia marched
from Isla Poí to Boquerón, which was
defended by some 700 Bolivians. The
Paraguayans surrounded the position
and launched a series of frontal attacks,
each repelled with heavy casualties. By
mid-month the Paraguayans, after having
successfully blocked two Bolivian relief
attempts, began using the corralito (little
corral) infiltration tactics that became
their trademark for the rest of the war.
The defenders—having become
convinced no relief force could break
through to them—surrendered on 29
September, having suffered 470 total
casualties. The thwarted Bolivian relief
attempts had chalked up a further
1,300 casualties. The Paraguayans lost
a total of 1,500 killed and wounded.
Exploiting their success, the
Paraguayans took Corrales and Toledo
by mid-October. On 23 October they
took Arce, 30 miles from Boquerón, after
The Chaco

+++ The Chaco is an inhospitable terri-

tory bordered by jungles, the Paraguay River
to the south, and the foothills of the Andes
to the north. During the early 20th century,
it was populated only by a few natives and
Mennonite colonists from Germany.
The economic development of the terri-
tory was limited to the export of quebracho
(axe breaker) wood. As the name implies, it
is an extremely hard wood, which is appre-
ciated in woodworking. During the war
both sides used it to reinforce machinegun
nests and bunkers, making them almost
impervious to rifle bullets.
The harsh climate of the Chaco
combines long drought periods in summer
(June to November) and rains in winter
(December to May). It is mostly covered
in thorny scrub, containing habitats for
poisonous insects, spiders and snakes as
well as malaria-carrying mosquitoes.
Daytime summer temperatures reach
120º Fahrenheit. The resultant need for
water added to the already difficult logistics. Thirst was the main
killer of the war, more so than bullets.
At the tactical level, machineguns and artillery proved as
deadly as they had during the Great War in Europe, though the
lower troop density still allowed for maneuver.
The struggle for the Chaco left a lasting impact on both countries’
culture, in the form of songs and books. Perhaps the best evocation
of the struggle was written by the Paraguayan Augusto Roa Bastos
(1917–2005), who served in the war as a 17-year-old as a medic and
water carrier. He described the thirst suffered by all at Boquerón.

He wrote: “Thirst, the ‘white death,’ walks among us arm in arm

with the other, the ‘red death,’ both of them cloaked with dust…In
[the past] forty-eight hours [the] officers received half a canteen,
and the troops scarcely half a mug, of almost boiling water, per ABOVE: A stockpile of quebracho (“axe breaker”) wood.
man. The tinned meat of our iron rations increases our thirst in the
BELOW: A typical view of the Chaco countryside.
most exquisite fashion. Whole platoons, mad with thirst, desert
the firing line and fall on the water trucks or the valiant water
coolies. A couple of the latter were slaughtered with bayonets a
few meters from our position. As an example to others, the thieves
were shot out of hand as they knelt by the empty water cans.” +

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 9

Diplomacy & Human Geography

+++ The Bolivians fought the war at the end of a logistical

shoestring: it took up to 14 days to travel the 1,000 miles separat-
ing the Chaco from their capital La Paz. Railroads stretched
across only half that distance.
The Paraguayans did not have that problem. They began
the war near their logistical bases, and their control of the
rivers allowed them to transport troops along those routes.
The river ports were also linked to their hinterland by railroads
built to aid in the exploitation of the region’s quebracho wood.
That network allowed a three-day transit between Asuncion
and the front.
The Paraguayans had a good relationship with the Indian
tribes of the Chaco, better than the more heavy-handed treatment
meted out by the Bolivians and Argentines. The Indians in turn
provided the Paraguayans with food and guides.
That allowed the Paraguayans to navigate the Chaco via trails ABOVE: Chamacoco, tribal BELOW: A Paraguayan train
people of the Chaco region as carrying soldiers to the front.
unknown to the Bolivians, and in that way surround and destroy
photographed in 1931.
their strongholds. The Bolivian Army had been organized and
trained to fight a mountain war against their traditional Chilean
foe, not a war in the bush of the Chaco. their border along the Chaco, in that way making supplying the
Another Bolivian handicap was the diplomatic front, on Bolivian forces more difficult.
which La Paz was in effect isolated. The Chileans would not They Argentines also provided the Paraguayans with intel-
allow the transit of weapons bound for Bolivia through their ligence reports. Over the course of the war, they intercepted some
territory. Argentina, though officially neutral, also supported the 15,000 Bolivian radio messages, of which they decrypted some
Paraguayans, allowing the passage of weapons to them despite 7,000 that they relayed to the Paraguayans. The Paraguayan Army
the embargo declared by the League of Nations. They also closed even came to include a volunteer Argentine unit, the San Martin
Regiment, recruited among Argentines resident in Paraguay. +

10 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

several days of fierce combat climaxed
by another envelopment maneuver. In
their retreat the Bolivians also gave up
Alihuatá, some 10 miles south of Arce.
By early November the Bolivians
were defending a line of entrench-
ments around a position called
7 Kilometer Fort. Despite several
Paraguayan assaults, the Bolivians held.
That, coupled with an epidemic of
tuberculosis among the Paraguayans,
forced a halt to their operations.
The success of the Paraguayan offen-
sive up to that time caused a change of
command in Bolivia. German Gen. Hans
Kundt was recalled to assume command
in the Chaco. (He had originally come
there in 1908 as part of a training mis-
sion. Recalled to Germany in 1914, he
returned to Bolivia after the First World
War, when he proved so popular he was
made minister of war from 1923 to 1930.)
Map Key
Positions & Lines of Advance
Nanawa
With Kundt at the helm, the Bolivians
seized the initiative: on the last
day of 1932 they advanced to take
Corrales. They followed that with
an assault on Nanawa, a forward
Paraguayan position southeast of
Boquerón that was defended by
2,500 troops. Kundt launched a series
of frontal assaults involving some
6,000 infantry with artillery and air
support against the Paraguayans.
The Paraguayans held. After two
days, during which the attackers lost
a third of their number in exchange
for killing about 250 of the defend-
ers, Kundt called off the attack.
In late February he tried again at
Toledo, then at Alihuatá in March and
Herrera in May. He lost thousands of
troops in exchange for little gain. He
did retake Alihuatá on 11 March 1933.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
By that time all the losses had
effectively destroyed the manpower
core of the pre-war Bolivian Army. The
surviving troops were demoralized,
and there were several mutinies.
On 4 July, Kundt tried again to
take Nanawa, launching 9,000 infan-
try supported by artillery, tanks
and flamethrowers. That effort also
ended in failure after five days, with
a total of 1,600 Bolivian casualties in
exchange for some 500 Paraguayans.
In September the Paraguayans—
still under Estigarribia—returned
to the offensive at Campo Grande
(just outside Alihuatá), where they
cut off two Bolivian regiments.
The Bolivians lost more than 2,000
total casualties, and Estigarribia
was promoted to general.
11
 The Paraguayan Army
Campo Via
Campo Grande proved to be only
the prelude of a major Paraguayan
counteroffensive. After that vic-
tory, the Paraguayans attacked along a
55-mile front with 26,000 men. Kundt
had chosen not to deploy more than
15,000 troops in the region because
he lacked the logistical resources to
fully supply more. Even so, the out-
numbered Bolivians held, inflicting
severe casualties on the Paraguayans.
In early December the Paraguayans
executed an enveloping move-
ment that broke into the enemy
rear area. Though the Bolivian Air
Force kept the Paraguayan advance
under surveillance, Kundt refused
ABOVE: Paraguayan troops in Alihuatá BELOW: Humaitá, one of the gunboats sold to change his own deployments.
in 1932. to Paraguay by Fascist Italy. That brought disaster for the
Bolivians. The Paraguayans sur-
rounded two of their divisions in a
+++ Paraguay was a poor country even by the generally low standards of South corralito that yielded more than 8,000
America. With a population of 900,000, they were outnumbered 3:1 by Bolivia. prisoners along with large amounts
After their civil war of 1922–23, the army had been reduced to 2,500 person- of weapons and ammunition. The
nel, which was gradually brought up to 4,000 prior to the start of the war. That disaster could have been even worse,
included 355 officers and 690 NCOs. but Col. Enrique Peñaranda launched
The army was organized into five infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments, an ad hoc counterattack that allowed
two artillery battalions and an engineer battalion. Weaponry included Mauser the two other divisions in the trap to
rifles for the infantry and cavalry, along with 460 machineguns, 60 field pieces and break out and retreat to Ballivián.
24 mortars. The mobilization for the war increased the size of the army to 24,000. With that, the Bolivian Army
The Paraguayans had the advantage of better social cohesion. Almost the was effectively wrecked. The com-
entire population was of mixed Guarani-Spanish descent, and most spoke both mander of one of the Paraguayan
those languages. They also had their own modest arms industry, which provided divisions proposed massing all avail-
their army with mortars and hand grenades. able motor transport to rush forward
In the early 1930s the fledging Paraguayan Air Force had six Potez 25s, an attack group to Ballivián, and
which were used for reconnaissance and bombing missions, along with seven there finish off the Bolivian rem-
Wibault fighters. During the war the Argentines provided them with eight nants before they could regroup.
additional Potez 25s. Paraguayan President Eusebio
A few months before the outbreak of hostilities, the Paraguayans bought five Ayala, however, believed the Bolivians
Fiat CR.20 fighters from Fascist Italy. The Italians also sold them two gunboats, understood they had been defeated
which played a key role carrying supplies and reinforcements along the and would sue for peace. To allow
Paraguay River. + time for diplomacy to take its course,
he proposed an armistice that the
Bolivians gladly accepted. It lasted from
19 December 1933 to 7 January 1934.
The Bolivians spent that time to raise
a new army, using the remnants of the
old force as cadre for new units. Beyond
that veteran cadre, however, the new
army was filled with poorly trained and
already demoralized conscripts, most
of them landless farmers. Many of them
deserted before hearing a shot fired in
anger. Kundt was sacked and replaced
by the hero of the day, Peñaranda.

12 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022


1934
At the start of 1934 the Bolivians
defended a line anchored at Santa Fe
and Ballivián. Having been driven close
to their supply sources, they set up a
strong defense supported by a network
of trenches, barbed wire and preset
fields of fire. Their troops, however,
were of much lesser quality than they
had been at the start of the war.
The Paraguayans were inferior in
numbers but had high morale and
better command. They launched a
new offensive on 25 April north of
Ballivián. Again, they broke through and
advanced, but on 10 May the Bolivians
counterattacked, cutting off two
Paraguayan divisions at Strongest. One
of those divisions managed to retreat in
good order, but the other was wrecked.
Despite that setback—it turned out
to be the only major offensive Bolivian
victory of the war—Estigarribia attacked
again in June at Ballivián. The Bolivians
held and inflicted severe casualties
on the new Paraguayan offensive.
The Paraguayans could no longer
afford frontal assaults, so Estigarribia sent
an infantry division, under Col. Rafael
Franco, to the north to attack and fix in
place as many Bolivian reserves as pos-
sible. That division advanced quickly—
they were leaving the heart of the bush
country and operating on more clear ter-
rain—and captured 27 Noviembre on 19
August. From there they advanced west.
In that direction lay the economically
vital Bolivian oilfields, so the Bolivians
sent strong forces to defend against the
new attack. In turn, Franco maneuvered
to draw those Bolivian reinforcements
(some 12,000 troops) as far away from
the southern front as possible. He and
his command were almost trapped on
two occasions, but Estigarribia used the
distraction to try again in the south.
He preceded his offensive with
careful reconnaissance and the accu-
mulation of supplies, water in particular.
(To survive in the generally dry Chaco
climate, each soldier had to be issued
a minimum of two liters per day.)
He attacked with four divisions north
of Ballivián on 10 November, sending
two of them in a flanking drive to try to
create a corralito. The next day, that force
pivoted south toward the Pilcomayo
WORLD at WAR 86 |
The Bolivian Army
+++ The peacetime Bolivian
Army had some 9,500 troops, includ-
ing 600 officers, organized into 13
infantry, five cavalry, three artillery
and four engineer regiments. In
turn, those regiments could be
field organized into six divisions of
varying sizes.
The structure of the Bolivian
Army mirrored the socio-economic
structure of the country. That is,
the officer corps was overwhelm-
ingly white and Spanish-speaking,
while the ranks were filled by
Andean Indians who spoke
Aymara or Quechua. Only some of
the NCOs managed a kind of pidgin
Hans Kundt
bilingualism.
The Bolivians had attempted to
follow the German military model
since 1908, when the first delega-
tion of advisers arrived from that country. Though they left Bolivia at the outbreak
of the First World War, one of them, Hans Kundt, returned in 1921. The Bolivians
offered him the post of chief of the general staff in order to allow him to go on
with the pre-1914 military modernization.
Kundt brought with him several other German officers, including Ernst Roehm,
future head of the Nazi Party’s storm troopers. He also began an arms purchase
program, including 39,000 rifles from Czechoslovakia and more than 100 field guns
of various calibers, machineguns and three tanks from the British firm Vickers.
The Bolivian Air Corps enjoyed a numerical superiority over the Paraguayans,
with some 38 aircraft, including Breguet 19, Curtiss Osprey, Vickers Vespa III
and Fokker fighters. They could also make use of the transports of the Bolivian
national airline, which had a dozen German Ju-52s. +
A Bolivian Curtis CW-C-14R, the mainstay of their airpower during the war.
OCT–NOV 2022 13
Verdun on the Chaco I, by Enzo Pertile. This image illustrates one of
the rare infantry vs. armor clashes of the war.
White Russians
& Indians
+++ Though largely ignored by
most histories of the war, the local
Indian tribes played an important role
in it. Before the conflict, both armies
had set up their encampments near
Indian settlements, and the imprecise
demarcation line between Bolivia and
Paraguay across the Chaco followed the
boundaries among the tribes.
Just prior to the conflict, Paraguayan
explorers crisscrossed the Chaco, estab-
lishing extensive contact with the Indians.
That was a great Paraguayan asset during
the war.
Among those explorers was Juan
Belaieff, born Ivan Timofeyevich Beliayev
(1875–1957), scion of an aristocratic
Russian family. He arrived in Paraguay in
1924, having fled there after the communist
takeover of his country. He had heard Paraguayan President
Ayala was looking for “foreign specialists” to help develop the
country, so he decided to offer his services in that role.
14
Soon after his arrival, he managed to
secure for himself a secret mission: the
exploration of the Chaco. From 1924 to 1931
he led 13 expeditions into the region to map
it and determine the best places to build
military facilities. One of his discoveries,
Pitiantuta Lake, provided the spark that set
off the war in 1932. The lake was valuable
in that whoever had its water could more
easily control that portion of the Chaco.
After the outbreak of hostilities,
Belaieff formed a detachment of Indians
who served as guides and scouts for
the Paraguayan Army and played key
roles in several battles. It was the help of
Beliayev those Indians, combined with the prewar
mapping by Belaieff, which allowed the
Paraguayans to exploit the terrain of the
Chaco, isolating and destroying Bolivian
positions using the corralito tactic.
Belaieff was not the only Russian in the Paraguayan Army.
Some 60 other White Russian emigres served in combat, adminis-
trative and training roles. In total, six of them fell in battle for their
adopted country. +
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
River, cutting off part of the Bolivian
defense and forcing the rest to retreat.
Ballivián fell on 17 November.
The Bolivians had lost some 7,000
killed and another 8,000 taken pris-
oner. Meanwhile Franco, having
been sent some reinforcements, took
Irendague on 8 December.
The sequential defeats inspired
the Bolivian general staff to depose
Salamanca. He commented sarcastically
that the coup was the only success-
ful military operation conducted by
the Bolivian army during the war. His
appointed successor, José Luis Tejada,
decreed general mobilization to again
refill the depleted army’s ranks.
1935
At the beginning of 1935, the
Paraguayans controlled most of the
Chaco. Then the start of the rainy season,
and the increasing distance from their
logistical base, stopped their advance in
the south at Villa Montes. In the center
the Bolivians held at Capirenda, at the
foothills of the Andes, until 23 January.
Estigarribia concentrated against
Villa Montes, launching a direct assault
there on 13 February that was repulsed
with heavy casualties. Again, he attacked
elsewhere to force the Bolivians to
weaken their main position. He sent
SELECTED SOURCES
Estigarribia, José Félix, The epic of the Chaco:
marshal Estigarribia’s memoirs of the Chaco
War, 1932–1935 Austin, 1950
Farcau, Bruce, The Chaco war: Bolivia and
Paraguay, 1931–1935 Westport, Conn., 1996
ABOVE LEFT: José Luis Tejada (left) with his son
in the Chaco in 1932.
two divisions across the Parapiti River,
north and south of Santa Fe, on 5 April.
There they were well into the foothills of
the Andes, terrain totally new to them.
When the Bolivians counterattacked
in mid-April, the Paraguayans were
quickly forced back across the river.
That counterattack demonstrated
the Bolivian Army was again com-
bat effective. The Paraguayans had
conquered the Chaco but lacked the
manpower to advance deeper into
Bolivia. In fact, they were scraping the
bottom of their own manpower barrel,
having begun sending 16-year-olds
to the front. The Paraguayans were by
then also fighting at the end of a long
supply line, and likely would have been
forced to retreat during the next rainy
season had the war gone on that long.
Finale
With both armies nearing total exhaus-
tion, the two governments began peace
talks in May, hosted by the Argentinians
in Buenos Aires. A general ceasefire
was signed on 12 June 1935, and on
15 August 1938 a formal peace treaty
came into effect. It granted Paraguay
Martínez, JL, Sapienza, Antonio L., The Chaco
War 1932–1935. Fighting in the Green Hell.
Warwick, UK, 2020
Querejazu Calvo, Roberto, Historia de la Guerra
del Chaco. La Paz 1990
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
ABOVE RIGHT: Enrique Peñaranda (right), and
Estigarribia after the armistice signing, 15 July
1935. Photo courtesy of Anibal Cesar, Wikimedia.
80 percent of the contested territory,
but it also provided Bolivia access to
the Paraguay River. The agreement
was brokered by Argentine President
Carlos Saavedra, who would win
the Nobel Prize for his efforts.
The Paraguayans had won, but
at a grievous cost: 36,000 killed out
of 100,000 troops mobilized, which
was 3.5 percent of their total prewar
population. The Bolivians, having
suffered some 50,000 deaths, had lost
two percent of their population.
The trauma of the war lasted
decades and reinforced the political
instability in both countries. Paraguay
suffered a series of coups and a civil
war, followed in 1954 by the establish-
ment of the longest dictatorship on the
continent, that of Alfredo Stroessner,
who ruled until being deposed by
yet another coup in 1989. Bolivia
endured one revolution and a series
of coups between 1935 and 1980.
Within the Chaco, the border was not
fully and finally defined until April 2009.
At that time a final treaty, sponsored as
in 1938 by the Argentines, was signed
by the two nations’ governments. -
Trejo, Lt. Col. Patricio, La Guerra del Chaco. Una
guerra de maniobras en el infierno verde.
Institutional Digital Repository of the Education
Center of the Argentine Armed Forces (CEFA).
15
 DESIGN CORNER
The Chaco War
BY JOSEPH MIRANDA
T
HE CHACO WAR OF THE
1930s, fought between Bolivia
and Paraguay, has a lot going
for it as a study: a relatively obscure
conflict but one which shows many of
the military trends heading into World
War II with obvious parallels with the
Spanish Civil War of 1936–39. Designer
Javier Romero has brought all this into
this issue’s wargame, Chaco War.
A big part of the game is operating
in a remote desert, the Chaco Boreal.
Supply depletion and attrition are
major factors, especially when moving
in the “bush.” This makes railroads
all the more important for effecting
both maneuver and logistics. You
also have to get your headquarters
units to the critical parts of the front.
Planning pays off in big advances.
This being the 1930s, armor and
airpower are coming onto the battle-
field. Both are represented by markers
which enhance combat. Air support
can also conduct reconnaissance,
identifying enemy forces in a theater
in which the fog (or dust cloud) of
war is a major factor. Using markers
to represent these forces shows how
mechanization was coming into play
SIGN UP NOW ON: but was still not yet the blitzkrieg.
www.WorldAtWarMagazine.com
16 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Game turns represent three months
each. Players can use operational
movement to triple unit speed as
long as they stay out of contact with
the enemy. This gives an opening
for bringing up reserves and shift-
ing forces across the map. It’s also a
reason to pull units off the front line
in order to set up a major maneu-
ver. Again, planning pays off.
As usual, war is the realm of chaos
and this is modeled with random
events. Events include everything
from tactical enhancements (like
ambushes) up to international
intervention (arms embargoes).
There’s a chance for a coup back on
the home front, something which
can be a major game changer. The
game includes a high-tech angle with
the possibility of an early form of
electronic warfare. Politics are also
in there, with general mobilizations
which bring in more reinforcements.
Finally, we have the human
dimension. Players have markers
representing leaders who can pro-
vide combat enhancements. You
have a wide range of options here to
win a victory on that remote frontier
of the 1930s South America. -
 Finnish infantry reach the Murmansk railroad near Kaeppaeselkae
late in 1941. Note the variety of cap and helmet types.

18 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

BY JOHN D. BURTT

S
TARTING IN 1323 FINLAND WAS A DUCHY WITHIN Stalin’s chance to act came with the signing of the
Sweden, until 1809 when it was invaded and annexed Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact in August
by Russia. When the Russian Revolution occurred, the 1939. In it, the Germans granted the Soviets “influence”
Finns took advantage of the chaos to declare independence. over Finland. On 12 October, as the West’s attention
Friction between left- and right-wing groups in the country was focused on the unfolding tragedy in Poland, Stalin
led to a brief civil war in 1918 that, aided by the interven- presented the Finns with the following demands.
tion of Germany, saw the left crushed in April. The 1920
• Move the border in Karelia 25 miles away from Leningrad.
Treaty of Tartu delineated the border between Finland and
• Cede the islands of Suuraari, Lavavsaari, Tytarsaari and
the Soviet Union, and peace reigned for the next 20 years.
Koivisto, along with the Rybachi peninsula, in exchange for
As war clouds gathered during the late 1930s, Soviet
2,100 square miles in East Karelia north of Lake Ladoga.
dictator Joseph Stalin developed a strategic interest in
• Lease the Hanko peninsula to the USSR to use as a military
Finland for several reasons. First was Finland’s owner-
base with a garrison of 5,000 troops.
ship of the Aland Islands in the Baltic, which could be
used as a base from which to control the shipping in and
Negotiations went back and forth without resolution
out of the eastern portion of that sea. Finland also had
until 12 November. The Finns’ final refusal to meet his
strategically important nickel deposits at Petsamo in the
demands stunned and infuriated Stalin. He had expecting
north. Finally, Finland’s southeast border lay only 20
the small over-matched country to agree to everything.
miles from Leningrad, which was both a major industrial
center and the spiritual center of the communist state.

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 19

LEFT: Gen. Meretskov (left) and one of his aids RIGHT: Finnish Field Marshal Carl Gustav
planning the initial Soviet offensive in his office Emil Mannerheim.
shortly before the start of the war. Photo courtesy of
the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

Plans & Forces Stalin told Meretskov that he expected the Soviets would eventually use
Stalin massively reinforced the border those operations to last no more than force to try to get all they wanted
region, raising the number of divisions 12 days. More particularly, the dictator rather than come to some kind of
there from seven to 24 by early December. was looking forward to receiving the compromise. The day they got the
He entrusted the coming operation to news of the capture of Viipuri no later invitation, the Finns began to quietly
Leningrad Military District commander than his birthday on 21 December. mobilize their army: 10 divisions,
Cyril Meretskov. The divisions were orga- Based on numbers alone, both plus 10 separate battalions. There
nized into four armies (each a Western those things seemed doable. The was also a 21,400-man covering
corps equivalent) totaling a little over Soviets had a 3:1 advantage in man- force of local reserves, primarily in
450,000 troops. Their makeup and assign- power, an 80:1 advantage in tanks the Karelian Isthmus, where they
ments, south to north, were as follows. and a 5:1 advantage in artillery. expected the strongest Soviet thrust.
Given their recent victory over the On 17 October the Finnish govern-
• Seventh Army consisted of nine rifle
Japanese in Mongolia (Nomonhan, ment named Marshal Carl Gustaf
divisions and four tank brigades. Its
August), as well as the roll-over of Emil Mannerheim commander-
assignment was to break through the
eastern Poland, Stain and his staff in-chief. He had led the White
frontier defenses, capture Viipuri,
(Stavka) began the war confident of forces in Finland’s civil war, and
and then turn west toward the capital
its quick and victorious outcome. was regarded as an astute leader.
of Helsinki.
They had not, however, taken into The main line of defense, the
• Eighth Army had five rifle divisions
account the terrain or the weather. Mannerheim Line, ran between 10
and one tank brigade to attack north
Much of the Finnish border area was and 35 miles back from the border
of Lake Ladoga, first straight west,
primeval forest with few roads or across the full width of the Karelian
then south to help outflank the main
bridged rivers, something the motor- isthmus. The line’s core strength came
Finnish line of resistance.
ized and mechanized elements within in the form of concrete strongpoints,
• Ninth Army had four rifle divisions
the Soviet attack would find constrict- called “permanent fire points,” in two
to go straight west with the goal of
ing. Further, the expected walkover main lines with a third line on the
capturing Oulu, 130 miles away on
led Meretskov to under-plan logistics, outskirts of Viipuri. All those positions
Finland’s west coast, in that way cut-
which in turn led to all kinds of short- were surrounded by minefields and
ting the country in half. In addition,
ages when things did not go quickly. trenches. In front of the main lines was
one of its divisions was tasked with
Crucially, the Soviets also dis- an obstacle zone of wire, minefields
supporting Fourteenth Army’s south-
missed the Finns as a serious oppo- and machinegun nests, intended to
ern flank as it advanced into Lapland.
nent. In particular, their knowledge further slow the Soviet advance.
• Fourteenth Army consisted of two
of the Finnish defensive line across Manning the Mannerheim Line
rifle and one mountain division
the Karelian isthmus was limited. was Lt. Gen. Hugo Oestermann’s
tasked with capturing the nickel
For their part, the Finns had Army of the Isthmus, with two corps.
mines at Petsamo as well as blocking
entered the negotiations expecting Its II Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen.
any incursion coming from Norway.

20 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

Harold Oehquist, with four infantry
divisions, defended the Finnish right
flank and the direct approach to
Viipuri. The III Corps, commanded
by Maj. Gen. Erich Heinrichs, with
two infantry divisions, covered the
left anchored on Lake Ladoga.
In front of that main line, Task
Forces Uusikirkko, Muolaa, Lipola
and Rautu (each named for the
main village in its area), manned the
obstacle zone along the border.
North of Lake Ladoga was Lt.
Gen. Juho Heiskanen’s IV Corps,
composed of two infantry divisions.
It had to cover some 250 miles of
border. Beyond that, all the way to
Petsamo (nearly 1,000 miles) was
initially assigned to Lt. Gen. Wiljo
Tuompo’s eight separate battalions.
Mannerheim also had two divi-
sions in reserve. From Ladoga north,
the plan was to be flexible, using the
German concept of Schlagfertigkeit
(combat skill) to maneuver speed-
ily to set up counterattacks to
disrupt the enemy’s advance.
FINLAND
Map Key
Initial Phase
On 30 November the Soviets attacked.
In the Karelian isthmus their Seventh
Army’s advance proved much slower
than anticipated due to the small
Finnish task forces. It took a week for
the Soviets to push to the Mannerheim
Line, a distance from their start line
that varied between 12 and 20 miles.
The slow progress led Stalin to
demote Meretskov to commanding only
Seventh Army, while the dictator and
Stavka assumed direct control of the
larger war. The change did not increase
the tempo. Tactical communications
among infantry, tank and artillery
units was poor, further complicat-
ing their operational coordination.
The assaults on the Mannerheim
Line stalled, including one led by the
39th Tank Brigade at the fortified vil-
lage of Summa. By 20 December the
offensive had totally petered out, having
failed to breach the line anywhere.
North of Lake Ladoga, Eighth Army’s
advance was more successful, captur-
ing the strategic village of Suojaervi on
SOVIET UNION
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
2 December. When a counterattack to
retake it failed, Mannerheim sacked
IV Corps commander Heiskanen and
replaced him with Lt. Gen. Woldemar
Haegglund. In addition, he created
a new corps-level command, under
Col. Paavo Talvela, specifically to
reverse the situation at Suojaervi.
With the thrust near Suojaervi being
handled by Talvela, Haegglund focused on
the leading enemy rifle divisions, the 168th
and 18th. By the end of December he had
slowed the advance of their spearheads
enough to concentrate a force to go after
the supply line behind them. Near the vil-
lage of Talvajaervi, Soviet troops, gorging
themselves at a Finnish kitchen unit they
had just overrun, were surprised by two
counterattacking companies and routed in
what the Finn’s dubbed the “Sausage War.”
The Soviet supply line in that area
ran on a single road. The Finns began
to maneuver more deeply to cut it,
using their better knowledge of the
terrain to get behind and surround
Soviet units in what they called motti
(encirclement) tactics. Using them, they
21

Road
ABOVE: A view across the minefield and barbed
wire in front of Mannerheim Line bunker SJ5 just
prior to the start of the Winter War.
22
Finnish Motti Tactics
Soviet Forces
Soviet Patrol
BELOW: Finnish soldiers getting breakfast at a
field kitchen in the Karelian isthmus shortly before
the start of the Winter War. Photo courtesy of the
Military Museum on the Finna service hosted by
the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Key
Road Block
Finnish Lines
of Attack
effectively destroyed the Soviet 139th
Rifle Division piecemeal. In doing so,
they captured 59 tanks, 220 machine-
guns and 3,000 rifles—all which they
quickly integrated into their own units.
Farther north they used the
same tactics against Ninth Army at
Suomussalmi. That village had been
taken by the 163rd Rifle Division after
a week of assaults against a single
Finnish battalion. Its supply line was
also a single road and, four days
after the village’s capture, the Finn’s
counterattacked and cut that road.
As the situation developed, the
rifle division commander requested
permission to retreat. A reply came
back saying a newly arriving division
was on its way to restore the situation,
and he should therefore hold where
he was until it broke through to him.
The local Finnish commander, Col.
Hjalmar Siilasvuo, was also reinforced,
to the extent of his being given the
whole 9th Infantry Division, which he
in turn used to cut off the Soviet relief
force farther back along the supply
road. By early January both Soviet
divisions were destroyed, allowing the
Finns to collect more tanks, machine-
guns, artillery and anti-tank guns.
Farthest north, Fourteenth Army’s
advance toward Petsamo was a slog in
which the Soviets were resisted by Arctic
weather as well as by the Finns. Even
so, the 122nd Rifle Division captured
the town of Salla and then pushed
toward the Lapland provincial capital
of Rovaniemi. The Finns reinforced the
commander in the region, Maj. Villio
Roininen, who stopped the advance
the same way his southern compatriots
had—by attacking the Soviet supply line.
 AY
RW
NO Frolov

Headquarters

Duhanov
FINLAND 22 Dec–Tsuikov

Group Lapland
N. Finland Group

N. Finland Group
Group Talvela

Panin
Group Talvela
23 Dec–Kozlov
IV Army Corps
USSR

Habarov
13 Dec–Shtern

Grendahl

ESTONIA Jakolev
9 Dec–Meretskov
25 Dec–NW Front

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 23

On 1 December 1939, Soviet Foreign Secretary Molotov signs the treaty between the puppet
Finnish People's Government and the USSR. The head of that regime, Otto Ville Kuusinen is
standing at the far right.
Stalin meanwhile also announced
the establishment of the (communist)
“Democratic Republic of Finland,”
under President Otto Ville Kuusinen,
an exiled Finnish Bolshevik. Stalin then
stated he would only deal diplomati-
cally with the DRF regime—which, not
surprisingly, promised him every-
thing he demanded. The League of
Nations then reacted by expelling
the Soviet Union on 15 December.
Stalin’s creation of the DRF further
backfired in that it confirmed the
Finns’ worst fear he would not quit
until their entire country had been
conquered. It heightened their resolve.
Reassessment
Unhappy with the progress of the war,
in early January Stalin ordered offensive
actions halted while the army’s poor
performance was assessed. He cre-
ated Northwest Front (Western army
group equivalent), with Semyon K.
Timoshenko, at the time commander
of the Kiev Military District, reassigned
to lead it and come up with a remedy.
Timoshenko quickly identified the
largest problem the Soviet Army faced
was its tactics—developed for the
open terrain of Eastern Europe and
Central Asia—failed in the forests of
Finland. He also reverted to the initial
operational approach of Meretskov,
which had called for a much nar-
24
rower attack focus. He put the Soviet
forces outside the Karelian isthmus
formally on the defensive, while he
heavily reinforced the isthmus.
Seventh Army grew from nine to
15 divisions, and Thirteenth Army,
under Gen. Vladimer Grendahl, was
created next to it with another five rifle
divisions. Three additional rifle divi-
sions were brought in as reserves.
Most importantly, Timoshenko
revamped offensive tactics.
Specifically, more detailed recon-
naissance of the Mannerheim Line
took place; new artillery fire plans
were created based on that recon-
naissance; newly organized mortar
units were deployed to help pin the
defenders, and lateral communica-
tions among units was improved.
While the Soviets reorganized,
the Finns continued counterattack-
ing. North of Lake Ladoga, one of
Haegglund’s divisions succeeded in cut-
ting off and destroying Soviet 168th and
18th Rifle Divisions, slicing them into
multiple pockets using the motti tactic.
World media meanwhile reacted
to the “David and Goliath” aspect of
the war. The League of Nations first
called for arbitration. Washington
gave the Finns USD 2.5 million (50
million in today’s dollars). The British
assembled a 57,000-man task force
and requested permission from
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Sweden and Norway to allow it pass
through their territories to get to the
war zone to fight alongside the Finns.
Both countries refused that request,
primarily over fear the British would
not leave after the Soviet attack ended.
Though both those governments
refused to get directly involved in the
war, volunteers from both did fight in
it. A 2,500-man “Swedish Volunteer
Corps” took up positions in Lapland.
Timoshenko’s Offensive
By the start of February 1940 the Soviets
were ready to resume the offensive, and
there was nothing subtle in their new
plan. Focused solely in the Karelian
isthmus, the operational methodol-
ogy was one of sustained attrition.
As Timoshenko explained it:
“By making a succession of
direct attacks we shall compel
him [the Finns] to lose blood, in
other words to lose something
he has less of than we have.”
For 10 days the Soviets subjected the
Mannerheim Line to heavy artillery and
aerial attack, along with infantry probes
to find weak points. On 11 February
the ground assault began, focused on
a limited sector. Near Summa the 100th
and 113th Rifle Divisions, reinforced with
tanks, slammed into the portion of the
line defended by Finnish 13th Division.
 Seven hours later the key bunker there
had been captured and the line effec-
tively breached. The follow-on 123rd Rifle
Division began to pour through and widen
the initial 100-meter gap. By 14 February,
Mannerheim was forced to order a retreat
to the interim line, having lost 6,400
men in three days of constant battle.
That new line came under intense
pressure almost immediately. Ostermann
requested his own relief, and he was
replaced by Heinrich as army com-
mander while Talvela took over III Corps.
Timoshenko kept up the attack, and
by the end of February Mannerheim had
been forced to abandon the interim line
and fall back to the last line outside
Viipuri. Within another two weeks
the Soviets had pushed past
the city on both flanks and
were close to surrounding it.
ABOVE: Soviet dead with their wrecked vehicles
and equipment, after having been ambushed on
the road near Suomussalmi. Photo courtesy of
the Finnish Wartime Photo Archive.
On 6 March, as the Soviets closed in
around Viipuri, Stalin, having discarded
the useless DRF, opened new talks with
the Finnish government in Helsinki.
Both sides by then had an interest
in hurrying to find a settlement.
The Finns, despite the continuous
rumors of Western intervention, needed
peace because their forces were close to
collapse. That would likely lead to the swift
Soviet occupation of their whole nation.
Ironically, for Stalin those same
rumors might also potentially
spell disaster at the grand-
strategic level. Such an
Anglo-French
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
BELOW: A well-camouflaged Finnish heavy
machinegun in a forward position on the
Karelian isthmus at the start of the Winter War.
Courtesy of the Military Museum of Finland.
intervention would automatically make
the USSR at least a cobelligerent of
Germany in the larger European war.
Stalin’s goal in that regard was to take
his country into the war only when
he chose to do so, and on the side he
thereby picked to be its winner.
Unwilling to risk waiting longer
for the Allies to act, the Finns gave in
to Soviet demands on 13 March. They
had to cede the entire Karelian isthmus
along with a substantial area north of
Lake Ladoga. In total, they lost about 10
percent of their territory, which put in
motion the westward movement of some
400,000 refugees from those regions.
25

The war cost the Finns nearly 25,000
dead and 43,000 wounded. Soviet
losses have never been known with
certainty, but the best estimates are
130,000 dead and 270,000 wounded.
The Winter War would prove to
have significant effects on the war in
the rest of Europe. The initially poor
Soviet performance cemented in Hitler
the view they could be easily defeated.
He missed the fact the Soviets learned
valuable lessons, and had successfully
regrouped in the field in the middle of a
campaign fought in near-Artic condi-
tions. Further, of course, Stalin had
created a hostile force on his northern
border, one eager for payback.
Aftermath
As the Finns had feared, Stalin was
not long satisfied with the accord
ending the Winter War. He began
applying new pressure in a variety
of ways almost immediately. He
wanted more nickel from Petsamo,
the demilitarization of the Aland
Islands, expanded troop presence
at Hanko, and a say in the internal
political organization of Finland.
26
Prime Minister Risto Ryti continued
the official “state of war” in Finland to
allow more emergency military spend-
ing in preparation for what everyone
knew would eventually be coming:
another Soviet attack. Work on a new
defensive line was also begun.
Finnish overtures to the only
country available to them, Germany,
to exchange raw materials for food
and military equipment were initially
rejected by Hitler. In July 1940 things
changed, however, after Hitler decided
to invade the Soviet Union. With
that decision came new contacts.
First, on 12 September the two
governments signed a deal in which
the Finns allowed rail-transit rights for
German troops to cross their territory to
get to the far north of Norway. In return
the Germans supplied them with some
artillery, anti-tank guns and aircraft.
In November 1940, Soviet Foreign
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov visited
Berlin for talks aimed at fine-turning
the 1939 pact. Among the questions he
asked—due to those troop movements
across, and supplies being sent to,
Finland—was whether the Germans still
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Finnish civilians evacuate Saarkisyrjaa
after the Winter War. Finnish Wartime
Photo Archive.
recognized Finland as part of the Soviet
sphere of influence? Hitler told Molotov
the nickel from Petsamo was critical for
Germany’s economy, and he could not
stand aside if a new war between the
Soviet Union and Finland threatened it.
In January 1941, Lt. Gen. Erik
Heinrichs, Finland’s army chief
of staff, was shown the portion of
Hitler Directive 21 (the Barbarossa
plan), which stated: “Finland
will cover the advance of the
Northern Group of German forces
moving from Norway (detach-
ments of Group XXI) and will
operate in conjunction with them.
Finland will also be respon-
sible for eliminating Hanko.”
The negotiations with the Germans
were kept within Ryti’s inner circle,
bypassing Finland’s parliament. Ryti
and Mannerheim stipulated Finland
would only become actively involved
if the Soviets attacked them. In making
that stipulation, Ryti was hoping to be
able to maintain relations with Britain
and the US. For that reason, Finnish
participation in Barbarossa had to be as
a result of actions taken against them
by the Soviets, rather than Helsinki’s
falling into line with Berlin’s world view.
In May, less than a month before
Barbarossa began, the Germans
requested Finnish help to cut the
rail line from Murmansk. At the
same time, the Soviets softened their
approach to Finland, offering 20,000
tons of grain as a “gift,” a tacit nod to
Moscow’s understanding they were
driving Finland toward Germany.
By then it was too late. On 22
June the Germans launched the
invasion. On 25 June, after Soviet
bombers attacked several of their
cities, the Finns declared war.
The plan split Finland into two
commands. The northern part was
under control of German Gen. Paul
von Falkenhorst’s Army Group
Norway while the south was under
Mannerheim and the Finns.
In the far north Gen. Eduard Dietl’s
Mountain Corps Norway, consisting
of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Infantry
Divisions with an attached battalion of
Finnish troops (Task Force P, a.k.a. the
Ivalo Battalion), would attack east to
take Murmansk, 55 miles away, with that
operation codenamed Platinum Fox.
The main German attack, Operation
Polar Fox, would be carried out by
Gen. Hans Feige’s XXXVI Corps—169th
Infantry Division and SS Division Nord,
aided by the 6th Division from Finnish
III Corps. It was to push through Salla
and on to Kantalahti on the White Sea
in order to cut the Murmansk rail line.
At that time the Germans were not
worried about Allied lend lease ship-
ments, due to their expectation of a
short war leading to the total collapse
the Soviet regime. Rather, Polar Fox
was intended to ensure the Soviets
could not rapidly transport troops
north to attack Petsamo or threaten
the German bases in Norway.

Plans & Forces

By December 1940 Finland’s armed
forces had expanded, and they were
much better prepared for war than they
had been the year prior. In particular,
the 13 divisions, which full mobilization
would increase to 16, were better armed
with artillery, much of it captured from
the Soviets during the Winter War.
The Germans initially commit-
ted two regular infantry divisions,
the 169th and 163rd, to Finland. Two
mountain infantry divisions, each with
two regiments, were committed to
the far north from bases in Norway.
Finally, the SS Nord (North)
Motorized Infantry Division, with two
regiments, was committed from Norway ABOVE: Molotov saying goodbye to German BELOW: Finland’s President Risto Ryti
as well. These 8,100 troops were only Foreign Secretary Joachim von Ribbentrop at the announced the start of the “Continuation War”
marginally trained for Arctic warfare, end of their November 1940 meeting in Berlin. on the radio on 26 June 1941.
German Federal Archives.
and the division’s sole redeeming fea-
ture lay in the fact it was the only motor-
ized unit in the far northern theater.
For the Finns, their stated goal
was to regain the land lost during
the Winter War. Privately, how-
ever, their goals were much larger,
with Ryti postulating the expansion
of Finnish territory as far as the White
Sea and the Svir and Neva Rivers.
The German focus in Finland was
threefold. First, they wanted to tie
down as many Soviet troops there
as possible. Second, they wanted to
protect Petsamo to assure the contin-
ued delivery of nickel to their indus-
try. Finally, they wanted to protect
their aero-naval bases in Norway.

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 27

 Farther south, but still in the
German command zone, was the rest
of Finland’s III Corps, under Lt. Gen.
Hjalmar Siilasvuo, with the 3rd Division.
Split into two task forces, the division
was to cover the German right with a
parallel push east. The final goal was
Loukhi on the Murmansk rail line.
The main Finnish attack would be by
Heinrich’s Karelian Army, specifically
the four divisions of VI and VII Corps.
Their attack north of Lake Ladoga was
to recapture lost land, and then push
past the 1939 border to a better defense
line on the Svir River. Backing up those
Finns was the German 163rd Division.
On the other side of the Lake,
Heinrichs had the seven divisions of II
and IV Corps ready to recapture Viipuri
and then move to the 1939 border.
In addition to those drives,
Mannerheim had the 14th Division on
the boundary between Falkenhorst’s
and Heinrich’s armies. The 17th Division
would besiege the 35,000 Soviets in
Hanko, and 1st Division was in reserve.
Despite the fact Finnish hopes for
their own national survival rested on
an overall German victory, there was
minimal coordination between the two
countries. Both expected a short war,
so contingency planning did not seem
Men and vehicles of German Panzer Battalion 40
moving toward the front at Vasonvaara on 1 July
1941. Finnish Wartime Photo Archive.
28
necessary. As a result, chains of command
within Finland were inefficient and would
cause problems if the war continued. For
example, Heinrichs reported to both Feige
and Falkenhorst but also received orders
directly from Mannerheim’s headquarters.
In June 1941 the Soviets were
covering Finland with only some 15
divisions in three armies. North to
south they were Fourteenth Army (four
divisions), Seventh Army (four divi-
sions), and Twenty-Third Army (four
divisions). Those forces were backed
up by the 1st Tank Division and the 10th
Mechanized Corps; however, those units
were destined to be withdrawn to the
main front when Barbarossa plunged
the entire Soviet border into crisis.
The Soviet forces around Finland
were similarly not the same army
that had fought the Winter War.
They were dug in and heavily forti-
fied, entirely on the defensive.
1941—The North
The German-led attack to capture
Murmansk, or at least cut its rail line,
was a failure. In turn, that failure
stemmed from the Germans’ underes-
timation of the enemy and the terrain.
Dietl’s troops had moved from
Norway to the Petsamo area as soon as
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Barbarossa began. On 29 June they start-
ed their march toward Murmansk, and
almost immediately ran into problems.
Prewar intelligence had estimated
only a single Soviet division was defend-
ing the area, and that same intelligence
report indicated good roads existed
in the region. Both those beliefs were
incorrect. Two Soviet divisions defended
the area, and hardly any roads existed,
particularly ones running east-west.
Soviet naval superiority off the coast
also made things more difficult, since
they could use it to launch amphibi-
ous landings. The Germans struggled
to reach the Litsa River, and could not
get any farther. After 10 weeks, they
had only advanced a third of the way to
Murmansk at a cost of over 10,000 casu-
alties. The front would see no significant
movement for the next three years.
Over 200 miles south of Dietl,
Feige’s offensive began on 1 July with
a pincer attack by the 169th and SS
Nord Divisions on Salla, along with a
deeper advance by Finnish 6th Division.
Those efforts soon stalled due to a
strong Soviet defense and counterat-
tacks. In particular, the SS division
collapsed almost immediately; how-
ever, Hitler refused to withdraw it.
 The battle for Salla made Feige
order the Finns to end their deep
penetration effort and instead move
straight north to aid in its capture,
which finally happened on 8 July.
Even then, Soviet 122nd Rifle Division
was able to withdraw along with 1st
Tank Division. Attacks by the 169th
and 6th Divisions continued until
they finally stalled near the Vilmajoki
River, still 30 miles short of their goal
of Kantalahti. As in the far north, that
line did not move again until 1944.
Finally, Finnish 3rd Division, start-
ing 60 miles farther south, began a
drive toward Louhki. It made good
progress, advancing some 40 miles
in two weeks. On 8 August the divi-
sion captured Kestenga, but further
progress was stymied by the Soviet
88th and 54th Rifle Divisions.
A final assault in November, rein-
forced with some German troops,
temporarily broke through, but the
advance was again halted two weeks
later, still 20 miles short of the goal. The
Finnish command cited strong Soviet
opposition and a needed reorganiza-
Finnish troops loading captured Soviet equipment, to be hauled away for their own use, east of
Kestenga on 17 November 1941. Finnish Wartime Photo Archive.
tion of their own forces as the reason,
but other factors were in play.
That is, late in October the Roosevelt
Administration sent a memo to the
Finnish government requesting “assur-
ances” their troops would refrain from
operations beyond the pre-Winter-
War border. The Finns rejected the
memo, but then discontinued their
push toward the Murmansk rail line,
much to the Germans’ displeasure.
Lake Ladoga & Karelia
The main Finnish assault began
north of Lake Ladoga on 10 July. It
was delayed to better coordinate it
with the advance of German Army
Group North. The Finns refrained
from immediately attacking on
the Karelian isthmus concerned
such a drive would, by threaten-
ing Leningrad, cause the Soviets to
reinforce the whole area heavily.
Heinrich’s two corps attacked north
and south of Lake Jaenisjaervi, with VII
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Corps moving toward Sortavala and
VI Corps toward Liomola. Hagglund’s
VII Corps bogged down quickly
against Soviet fortifications manned
by the 168th Rifle Division. Part of that
force took Liomola on 14 July and
then split, some pushing west, others
pushing south toward Lake Ladoga.
That latter group reached the
town of Koirinoja the next day, cut-
ting off the Soviet 168th. They then
continued their push southwest
along the lake shore, reaching the
1939 border at Vitele on 24 July.
North of the main drive, Task
Force Oinonen—made up of cav-
alry and some light infantry—pushed
east, but the Soviet defenses there
proved too strong. Similarly, German
163rd Infantry Division, which was
inexperienced in wilderness war-
fare, stalled in front of Suvilahti.
With the 1939 border having been
reached, Mannerheim called a halt to
VI Corps operations. He was concerned
29
 Map Key Initial Finnish Attacks
Barbarossa Jun–Dec 1941

6 Dec

FINLAND

t
1 Sep

2 Sept

31 Aug
USSR

30 Dec

1 Sept

30 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

about the stalled VII Corps, as well as the
60 miles of Ladoga shoreline forming the
flank. The Soviets proved Mannerheim’s
worries correct, launching several
amphibious assaults, coupled with
an overland counterattack by the
198th Motorized Rifle Division, which
forced him to pull back some troops.
On 31 July, Mannerheim launched
II Corps into the Karelian isthmus
toward the west shore of Lake Ladoga.
Ten days later that corps took the town
of Hiitola, isolating the Soviet 142nd,
198th and 168th Rifle Divisions. With
that Soviet resistance in the region
crumbled, with Sortavala falling on
15 August. Even so, the Soviet Navy
evacuated some 26,000 troops, using its
control of the lake to good advantage.
On the isthmus the three divisions of
IV Corps got the go ahead on 21 August
to take Viipuri. Soviet defensive plans
called for one division to defend the
city while two others were held back
for counterattacks. When the Finnish
attack began, their II Corps moved
onto the Soviet flank. Soviet 123rd and
115th Rifle Divisions counterattacked
and pushed II Corps back three miles.
As they did so, however, Finnish 8th
Infantry Division crossed the Bay
of Viipuri and sealed off the city.
With that, Stavka decided to try
to cut their losses, ordering Twenty-
Third Army to withdraw into the
Mannerheim line. Despite that, the
Finns’ continued advance cut off much
of the withdrawing force, killing or
capturing a total of about 16,000 Soviets
while 12,000 got away south. The Finns
moved up all along the old border,
capturing over 300 artillery pieces
and 55 tanks to add to their arsenal.
As September started, the Finns
had achieved their main goals: they
had recaptured the territory lost
in 1939, and in some places had
crossed into Soviet territory to reach
optimum defensive positions.
Mannerheim had, from the begin-
ning, urged taking all of eastern (Soviet)
Karelia. That area had been the focus of
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
what in Finland was called the “Kinship
War,” during which (1918–22) East
Karelia rose against the communists.
Mannerheim had sworn: “I will not
sheath my sword…before Lenin’s last
soldier is driven not only from Finland,
but from East Karelia as well.”
On 4 September, therefore,
Heinrichs began advancing into East
Karelia. By the start of December, VI
Corps had gone beyond the Svir River,
while to the north the capital of East
Karelia, Petroskoi, fell on 1 October.
With that, despite repeated requests
by the Germans for further attacks,
the Finns ceased offensive operations.
The defensive line they established
remained largely in place for the next
30 months. Overall the Finnish advance
had cost them some 75,000 casualties,
with 25,000 of those killed in action. -
Ed’s Note: This article will be con-
cluded in World at War #87.
A modern-day reenactor simulating a Finnish
sniper on the Karelian isthmus during the
Winter War.
31
 THE STRATEGY & TACTICS OF WORLD WAR II
Five Days at
Winter War: USS Wahoo:
Oosterbeek: Destruction of
Finland vs. the
Soviet Union
Destruction of the
1st Airborne
Beta Convoy
A Lady Comes
of Age Winter War covers the Soviet invasion represent all these differences, e.g. unit
#77 APR–MAY 2021 GAME EDITION
of Finland over the Winter of 1939–40. breakdowns, special forces and Finnish
The Soviets initially expected a quick motti tactics. Ground units represent

inter
W
victory. However, the Finns, under the detachments, battalions, regiments,
leadership of Carl Gustav Mannerheim, brigades, divisions and corps. Aircraft

ar outmaneuvered the ponderous Red

Army forces. The game system is based
units represent the number of sorties to
accomplish a mission.
on the asymmetrical situation of the
Players: 2 (Soviet Union vs. Finland),
campaign. The Soviets have superior
Level: Operational,
numbers. The Finns have superior tac-
Hex Scale: 21 miles / 33.8 km,
tics and knowledge of the terrain. Both
Turn Scale: 10 days,
sides must exploit their advantages to be
Map: 22×34-inch, Counters: 176
victorious. The game has special rules to

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P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
 THE

GUADALCANAL

34 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

BY PATRICK S. BAKER
A
Savo Island
FTER THEIR ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,
the Japanese expanded across the Western Pacific,
occupying numerous places to create a defen-
sive perimeter around their home islands and important
continental conquests, and from which they could also
threaten further offensives. As part of that expansion, they
occupied Guadalcanal in May 1942 and started building an
airfield at Lunga Point on its north coast. By August they
had stationed 600 combat troops, 2,200 Korean laborers,
and some Japanese construction specialists at the airfield.
When Allied air reconnaissance spotted the nearly
complete runway, they found themselves in a grave
situation. The airbase was a potentially serious threat
to Australia itself, as well as to the line of commu-
nications between there and the US. Neutralizing it
became a matter of urgency and, despite having had
little time for preparation, the US conducted its first
amphibious landing of the war at Guadalcanal.
On the night of 6/7 August a landing force of transports,
cargo ships and destroyer-transports approached the
island. Supporting the invasion were three American fleet
carriers—Enterprise, Wasp and Saratoga—one battleship,
11 heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and 31 destroyers.
The warships shelled the invasion beaches, while
carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions beyond
them. Some 3,000 Marines landed on Tulagi, Gavutu and
Tanambogo, with 11,000 going ashore on Guadalcanal
itself. The landings on the three nearby small islands
were fiercely resisted, with their garrisons fighting nearly
to the last man and the Marines losing 122 men.
The 8 August landing on Guadalcanal met little
resistance. The assault force quickly occupied the airstrip,
WORLD at WAR 86 |
renaming it Henderson Field in honor of Marine pilot
Lofton Henderson who had been killed during the Battle
of Midway. They also captured food, supplies and intact
construction equipment abandoned by the Japanese.
During 7 and 8 August, Japanese naval aircraft
from their main base in the area, Rabaul, attacked
the offshore vessels numerous times. They heav-
ily damaged a transport, which sank two days later,
and badly damaged a destroyer. During those attacks
the Japanese lost 36 aircraft while the US lost 19.
After two days of combat, the Expeditionary Force
commander, Vice Adm. Frank Fletcher, became con-
cerned about his fighter loses. His three carriers had
99 fighters at the start of the battle and had already
lost 14. Further, he knew he faced superior numbers
of Japanese land-based aircraft, and he was also wor-
ried about his ships’ diminishing fuel. On 8 August, in
a controversial decision, he withdrew his carriers.
That left the transports without air cover. The
amphibious force commander, Rear Adm. Richmond
Turner, therefore believed he had no choice but
to withdraw them as well. He did order them to
continue to unload troops and supplies, plan-
ning to pull out during the evening of 9 August.
In addition to airstrikes, Japanese Eighth Fleet com-
mander Vice Adm. Gunichi Mikawa launched a sortie by
surface units. Commanding from the heavy cruiser Chokai,
accompanied by the light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari and
two destroyers, he departed Rabaul. On the evening of 7
August, Mikawa’s ships were joined by four more heavy
cruisers—Aoba, Furutaka, Kako and Kinugasa—and
that combined force headed toward Guadalcanal.
The Enterprise and other ships of her screening force in action during
the Battle of Santa Cruz, 26 October 1942. A bomb is exploding
behind the carrier, while two Japanese dive bombers are visible above
near the center of the photograph. A flash from anti-aircraft guns of
the battleship USS South Dakota is visible in the distance.
OCT–NOV 2022 35
 ings were considered too vague to call
for more than general protective actions.
As he approached Guadalcanal,
Mikawa launched floatplanes that
provided an accurate picture of Allied
forces and positions. Armed with that
information, he told his captains they
would approach south of Savo Island,
attack as they maneuvered around
it, and then depart back north.
The Allied force of cruisers and
destroyers covering the transports
was commanded by British Rear
Adm. Victor Crutchley. He split his
force to cover both the north and
Mikawa Crutchley south channels of Savo Island.
The south channel was guarded by
two US destroyers, the heavy cruiser
Mikawa planned to attack on the Channel, they were spotted by a US sub- Chicago and the Australian heavy cruiser
night of 8/9 August, hoping to avoid US marine and an Australian scout-plane. Canberra. The north was protected
aircraft and use Japanese night-fighting Both sightings were reported, but the by two US destroyers with the heavy
expertise to maximum advantage. As messages failed to reach the Allied fleet cruisers Vincennes, Quincy and Astoria.
they steamed through Saint George until that evening. Even then, the warn- Two radar-equipped US destroyers
were posted as pickets west of Savo.
Crutchley deployed his remaining
Map Key seven destroyers near the transports
Japanese ship tracks to guard against submarine attack.
Japanese fire & torpedo attacks Unaware of the Japanese approach,
IJN vessels CA = Armored Cruiser the Allied ships were only at “Condition
Allied vessels CL = Light Cruiser II,” meaning half the crews were on
Flagship DD = Destroyer duty while half rested. Most of the
cruiser captains were asleep. Crutchley
had moved his flagship, the heavy
cruiser Australia, to be near the
transports and to confer with Turner.
CR

Approaching at night, Mikawa

UD

again launched floatplanes to recon-

IV
18

gi noiter the Allies and drop flares during

na i
Yu ubar (F)
DD L Y ryu the battle. Sailing in line ahead, the
CR

C n
Te Japanese slipped successfully between
UD

CL a
tak o
IV

ru Kak sa the destroyers, whose radars were

6

u
F A a
CA C inug oba hindered by the nearby islands.
K AA ai
CA C ok Mikawa ordered his ships to 30
Ch
CA knots, and at 1:25 a.m. released them to
operate independently. At 1:35 Japanese
lookouts spotted the Allied southern
force silhouetted by the fire from the
still burning transport damaged earlier.
DD Mikawa ordered torpedoes
fired at those ships at 1:38, just as
Chokai
his lookouts spotted the northern
DD
force. The Japanese turned north to
face that threat while still targeting
their guns on the southern force.
Allied Cruisers At 1:43 the destroyer USS Patterson
spotted Kinugasa at just 5,500 yards.
Patterson sent alert messages by radio

36 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

 The Quincy on fire, illuminated by searchlights in a photograph taken from one of the
Japanese ships in the battle.
and signal lamp: “Warning! Warning!
Strange ships entering the harbor!”
Patterson’s captain ordered full
speed and fired star shells above the
Japanese column. At the same time
the Japanese floatplanes dropped
flares over Canberra and Chicago.
Canberra responded quickly, turn-
ing to stay between the Japanese and
the transports, increasing speed and
training its guns toward the threat.
Less than a minute later Chokai and
Furutaka opened fire on Canberra,
scoring several hits. Aoba and Kako
joined in the attack, and in the next
three minutes the Australian cruiser
took 24 hits. The gunnery officer was
killed; the captain mortally wounded,
and power was knocked out throughout
the ship. The cruiser shuddered to a
halt with a pronounced list, power-
less to fight the fires or run pumps.
The Chicago, illuminated by the
flares and seeing the sudden turn by
Canberra, went to general quarters
and its commander, Capt. Howard
D. Bode, was roused from sleep.
He ordered his 5-inch guns to fire
star shells toward the Japanese, but
they failed to detonate properly.
At 1:47 a torpedo hit Chicago,
damaging the main battery direction
center. A second torpedo struck but
failed to explode. The ship was also
hit by gunfire. Chicago steamed west
for 40 minutes, abandoning the trans-
ports it had been assigned to guard.
The cruiser fired secondary batteries
BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
Japan
5 heavy cruisers ....................... 2 damaged
2 light cruisers ......................... 1 damaged
1 destroyer
58 killed
at the last ships in the Japanese col-
umn, lightly damaging the Tenryu.
Bode did not attempt to maintain
control of the surviving ships of the
southern force, as he should have
done as senior officer present. Nor did
he inform anyone he was steaming
his own ship away from the battle.
Mikawa turned his force north to
engage the other Allied ships. The
Tenryu, Yubari and Furutaka took a
more westerly course than the other
four cruisers, which resulted in the
Japanese bracketing the Allies.
Though they spotted the firing to
the south, the northern force was slow
to go to general quarters as they were
unsure exactly what was happening.
At 1:44 the Japanese launched torpe-
does at them, and six minutes later
illuminated them with searchlights.
Astoria went into action, but was hit
hard by fire from Chokai that disabled
its engines. Drifting to a stop, the cruiser
was soon on fire but continued to shoot,
inflicting some damage on Chokai.
Quincy was next. Though at least one
of its salvos struck Chokai’s bridge, it
too was soon on fire and took numerous
other hits including three torpedoes.
Quincy sank about two hours later.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Allies
6 heavy cruisers ..........4 sunk, 1 damaged
2 light cruisers
15 destroyers ............................ 2 damaged
1,077 killed
Vincennes was also hit by
three torpedoes and more than
70 shells. It sank at 2:50.
At 2:16 Mikawa called a staff meet-
ing to discuss continuing the battle
by attacking the transports anchored
nearby. His worried that his own ships
were scattered and low on ammuni-
tion. Further, he feared the US carriers
were in the area, and he therefore
wanted to be well away before day-
light in order to avoid aerial attack.
So Mikawa ordered his com-
mand back to Rabaul. Even as they
steamed away, they inflected some
damage on another destroyer.
The Battle of Savo Island was a
tactical victory for the Japanese, with
the Allies losing four heavy cruis-
ers and three destroyers damaged.
In return, the Japanese had only
three of their own ships damaged.
Even so, the battle was a strategic
loss for the Japanese, as the Allied
defense had been enough to make
Mikawa refrain from attacking the
transports. Had he pressed the attack
on those ships, it would have wrecked
the Allies’ ability to sustain the ground
campaign at least temporarily.
37
 Chitose damaged

Ryujo sunk

Japanese planes
Jintsu damaged, Mutsuki sunk attack Enterprise
by bombers from Henderson Field Ryujo planes attack
Henderson Field

Enterprise damaged
Saratoga planes
attack Ryujo

Wasp

Japanese Forces

Main body
Vanguard &
Advance Force
Diversionary Group
(Ryujo)
Transport Group
Enterprise
Fleet Carriers: Zuikaku, & & Saratoga
Shokaku
Lt. Carrier Ryujo
Seaplane Carrier Chitose
Enterprise
Wasp & Saratoga
Allied Forces

Enterprise & Saratoga

Wasp

Fleet Carriers: Enterprise,

Saratoga, & Wasp

38 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

Eastern Solomons
After the Battle of Savo Island, the
Japanese developed a plan to recap-
ture Guadalcanal. On 16 August, three
transport ships loaded with a total of
1,400 troops and guarded by a light
cruiser and eight destroyers, headed
toward the island. The convoy was com-
manded by Rear Adm. Raizo Tanaka.
Five days later, three combat task
forces headed toward Guadalcanal.
The “main body” was centered
around the fleet carriers Shokaku and
Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo,
screened by a heavy cruiser and
eight destroyers, and all commanded
by Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo.
The “vanguard force” consisted of
two battleships, three heavy cruisers,
one light cruiser and three destroyers, all
commanded by Rear Adm. Hiroaki Abe.
The “advanced force” contained
five heavy cruisers, a light cruiser,
six destroyers and the seaplane-
carrier Chitose, all commanded by
Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo.
On 21 August the US carrier task
force—centered on Enterprise, Saratoga
and Wasp and under Fletcher—
headed back toward Guadalcanal
from the south. The carriers were
to again support the Marines, pro-
tect Henderson Field and engage
Japanese naval forces in the area.
The next day both sides conducted
aerial scouting, but neither detected
the other. The disappearance of one
of the Japanese scouts, shot down
by aircraft from Enterprise before
it could report, made the Japanese
suspect US carriers were indeed in the
vicinity. Fletcher remained unaware
of the approaching Japanese.
At 9:50 a.m. on 23 August a US
flying boat spotted the troop con-
voy. That afternoon a strike force
from Saratoga, and another from
Henderson Field, launched to attack
it. Tanaka was aware he had been
detected, and so he temporarily reversed
course to try to elude the attack.
The ploy worked. By evening, with
no further sightings of enemy forces
having been made, Fletcher ordered
Wasp and her escorts south to refuel.
At 1:45 a.m. on 24 August, Nagumo
ordered Ryujo, along with a heavy
BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS
Japan
2 fleet carriers
1 light carrier .....................................1 sunk
3 battleships
13 heavy cruisers
3 light cruisers ......................... 1 damaged
30 destroyers .....................................1 sunk
1 seaplane tender .................... 1 damaged
4 patrol boats
3 transports ........................................1 sunk
171–177 aircraft ..................... 75 destroyed
290+ killed
cruiser and two destroyers, to go forward
to launch an aerial attack against
Henderson Field. That was a feint to
draw away the Americans’ attention
from the other Japanese forces.
At 9:35 a.m. a reconnaissance plane
sighted the Ryujo force. Fletcher delayed
ordering a strike against those ships
until he could be certain there were
no other Japanese carriers nearby.
Finally, at 1:40 p.m., with no reports
of other enemy aircraft carriers hav-
ing come in, he ordered Saratoga to
launch a strike against the Ryujo.
At 2:23 p.m. the airstrike from Ryujo
struck Henderson Field, inflicting little
damage. Almost simultaneously, a
Japanese scout plane spotted the US car-
riers and managed to report before being
shot down. Nagumo instantly ordered
a strike launched from his carriers.
The first wave was off by 2:50
p.m. The second wave launched at
4:00 p.m. while Abe’s force acceler-
ated toward the Americans, hoping
to bring on a night surface action.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
The view from flight deck of USS
Wasp, with the Saratoga Enterprise in
the background, during the run up to
the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
Allies
3 carriers ................................... 1 damaged
1 battleship
3 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
11 destroyers
176 aircraft ............................. 20 destroyed
90 killed
The Saratoga strike badly damaged
Ryujo, hitting it with three bombs and a
torpedo. The surviving crew abandoned
the carrier at dusk and it soon sank.
After completing rescue operations.
Ryujo’s escorts rejoined Nagumo’s force.
At 4:02 p.m. the US carriers’ radars
detected the incoming Japanese
attack. The Americans vectored in
fighters, but the efforts of the strike
force’s escorting Zeros allowed most
of the bombers to get through.
In a furious 20-minute battle,
Enterprise was hit three times by bombs
that left it badly damaged and burning.
Even so, the Japanese had lost 25 out 37
planes and Enterprise’s damage-control
effort allowed the ship to resume flight
operations an hour after the attack.
The second wave of Japanese
aircraft failed to find the Americans
and returned to their carriers.
Meanwhile, two dive bombers from
Saratoga found Kondo’s advanced
force and attacked the Chitose, heav-
ily damaging that unarmored ship.
39

Tanaka
All US aircraft then either landed
at Henderson Field or returned to
their carriers. The carriers with-
drew south to avoid any oncom-
ing Japanese surface ships.
The Japanese surface force
turned back at midnight without
having encountered any US ships.
The Japanese carriers, having suf-
fered heavy aircraft losses and
low on fuel, also moved north.
The next day, believing the American
carriers had been knocked out of
action, Tanaka turned back toward
Guadalcanal. His slow convoy was
joined by five destroyers that had shelled
Henderson Field the prior night.
At 8:05 a.m. 18 planes from
Henderson attacked the convoy,
heavily damaging the light cruiser
Jintsu. A troop transport was also hit
and later sank. Soon thereafter some
The Enterprise maneuvering to try to thwart
aerial attackers during the Battle of the Eastern
Solomons on 24 August 1942.
40
B-17s from Espiritu Santo arrived
and sank a destroyer. Tanaka took
his surviving ships back to base.
The waters around Savo,
Guadalcanal and Florida Island were
already being called “Ironbottom
Sound,” for all the ships and planes
sunk and shot down in the area.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons
cost the Americans 25 aircraft and the
Enterprise was damaged. The Japanese
lost Ryujo, a light cruiser, a destroyer,
a troop ship and 75 aircraft. It was a
tactical and strategic victory for the US.
Tokyo Express
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons
made the Japanese decide to switch to
bringing reinforcements and supplies
to Guadalcanal by destroyer and small
transports, operating solely at night.
They had to operate that way because
the daytime sky was controlled by US
planes based at Henderson Field.
On the night of 17/18 August, nearly
1,000 Japanese troops were landed by
transports escorted by seven destroyers.
That kind of night run of ships down
New Georgia Sound, nicknamed the
“Slot,” was soon nicknamed the “Tokyo
Express” by the Americans and “Rat
Transportation” by the Japanese.
Tanaka was put in command of the
operation, and he soon got the nick-
name “Tenacious Tanaka” for his deter-
mination in carrying out his mission. As
he continued to send in small numbers
of troops and supplies, the Americans
became aware of the activity but seemed
unable to do anything about it.
Tanaka staged the Express runs
from the Shortland Islands. They were
just outside the range of Henderson-
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
based dive-bombers, but near enough
to allow his ships to complete a run
to Guadalcanal and return in a night.
Between 26 and 28 August, Japanese
destroyers delivered 480 men. On 29
August the Japanese set out too early
and were caught by a patrol of dive
bombers at dusk. The Americans sank
a destroyer and the rest turned back.
Soon the Japanese began shell-
ing Henderson Field after dropping
off their cargoes. On 5/6 September,
two US destroyer-transports attacked
three Japanese destroyers that were
shelling Henderson Field. All three
of those Japanese ships were sunk.
While the Japanese were build-
ing up their ground force, so were
the Americans. On 15 September
the Wasp and Hornet, along with
the battleship North Carolina and
10 other ships, escorted transports
carrying Marines to Guadalcanal.
Wasp was struck and sunk by
two torpedoes fired from a Japanese
submarine. One torpedo from the same
spread hit and damaged the North
Carolina and another hit a destroyer
that sank later. Even so, 4,000 Marine
reinforcements were landed safely.
Cape Esperance
In September and October, Tanaka’s
destroyers performed wonders, bring-
ing some 20,000 troops and their
equipment to the island. The Japanese
had decided on making a heavy blow
against Henderson. During the night of
11/12 October, the heavy cruisers Aoba,
Kinugasa and Furutaka and two destroy-
ers, all commanded by Rear Adm.
Aritomo Goto, moved to attack the air-
field while the seaplane carriers Chitose
and Nisshin, escorted by six destroyers,
made another run of the Express.
As the bombardment group
approached Ironbottom Sound near
Cape Esperance, they were surprised
by Task Force 64.2, which consisted of
five destroyers and the heavy cruisers
San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City,
and Helena. Commanded by Rear
Adm. Norman Scott, the task force
had escorted army reinforcements to
Guadalcanal before taking up positions
to block the Express. More importantly,
TF64.2 had by then been together for
several weeks and had been relentlessly
drilling in night combat techniques.
As Goto’s force approached, Scott
had his ships turn, thereby inadvertently
crossing the Japanese T. At 11:45 p.m.,
with Aoba visible to Helena at 5,000
yards, Scott gave the order to fire. His
whole force fired on the luckless Aoba,
which was soon hit more than 40 times.
Goto was killed and Aoba turned to flee.

a
gas
Kinu
CA
a
tak
Furu
DD

CA uki
Fub
Mu

DD
rak
um
o

CA Aoba
Mu

Aoba
rak

Kinugasa US Force
um
o

Furutaka sinks
Fubuki sinks

1 Transport, 2 DDs (IJN)

Planned course
for bombardment
Map Key
Japanese ship tracks (main force)
Japanese DD escort ship tracks
Japanese bombardment
IJN vessels US vessels
Flagship
CA = Armored Cruiser DD = Destroyer

Henderson
Field

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 41


BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE
Japan
3 heavy cruisers ..........1 damaged, 1 sunk
2 destroyers .......................................1 sunk
341–454 killed, 111 captured
Next in line to be pummeled was
Furutaka, which was struck by a
torpedo that caused it to start burn-
ing and lose power. Then a Japanese
destroyer was hammered and sunk.
The battle was not completely one-
sided—two US destroyers were caught in
the crossfire, taking hits from both sides.
The Boise was badly damaged and had to
withdraw, while Salt Lake City received
minor damage exchanging fire with
Kinugasa. At that point Scott broke off.
Hearing of the bombardment
group’s distress, the commander of
that night’s Express run detached
four of his destroyers to aid the dam-
aged ships. Those destroyers were
spotted by Marine planes the next
morning and two were sunk.
Determined to knock Henderson
out of operation, Japanese bombers
struck heavily on 13 October. That night
the battleships Kongo and Haruna,
along with a light cruiser and eight
destroyers, shelled the airstrip. For
42
United States
2 heavy cruisers ....................... 1 damaged
2 light cruisers ......................... 1 damaged
5 destroyers .................1 damaged, 1 sunk
163 killed
90 minutes they blasted Henderson
Field with over 900 rounds. Forty-eight
aircraft, as well as a large quantity of
supplies, were destroyed. Three US
patrol boats sortied and attacked
the bombardment force, inflicting
minor damage on some destroyers.
On the night of 14/15 October a
force of at two heavy cruisers attacked
Henderson again, putting 150 rounds
within its perimeter. Concurrently the
Express, using fast transports escorted
by destroyers, made a run down the Slot.
Thinking Henderson was too
damaged to still be operational, those
Japanese transports continued to
unload during daylight. Launching
everything that was still operational,
the Americans sank three transports
and forced the rest to withdraw.
The next night the bombardment
force returned and heavily shelled the
airfield, putting 900 rounds of 8-inch
and 300 rounds of 5-inch artillery on
the already badly shot up installation.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
A crewman points to the trophy flags painted on
the pilothouse of the light cruiser USS Boise as a
score of enemy ships claimed sunk in the Battle
of Cape Esperance, 11–12 October 1942. The
scoreboard overstates actual enemy losses, which
were one heavy cruiser (Furutaka) and one
destroyer (Fubuki) sunk and one heavy cruiser
(Aoba) badly damaged. Such overclaiming was
typical of night surface actions on both sides.
Santa Cruz Islands
The Japanese planned an all-out
ground offensive to start on 20
October. In support of it, and want-
ing to engage and destroy the US
naval forces they guessed would
respond to the ground attack, the
Japanese deployed considerable
naval forces. That included the
fleet carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku and
Junyo, the light carrier Zuiho and
the battleships Kongo, Haruna, Hiei,
and Kirishima, along with several
cruisers and destroyers as escorts.
The Americans defeated the Japanese
ground assault in five days of combat.
Mistakenly believing the Japanese Army
had captured Henderson Field, Tanaka
led a supply convoy, escorted by cruisers
and destroyers, toward Guadalcanal
on the morning of 25 October. Aircraft
from Henderson Field spotted the
convoy and attacked it, sinking a light
cruiser and damaging a destroyer.
The last two operational US carriers
in the Pacific, Hornet and Enterprise,
along with the battleship South Dakota,
six cruisers and 16 destroyers, all
under the command of Adm. Thomas
Kinkaid, had meanwhile steamed for the
Solomons as the Japanese had predicted
they would. The failure of the land
attack and the losses to Tanaka’s convoy
did nothing to deter them from seek-
ing a new and decisive carrier battle.
As the Americans moved north of
the Santa Cruz Islands on 25 October,
a reconnaissance plane located the
Japanese carriers just out of range.
Kinkaid went to top speed to close the
gap, but the Japanese, knowing they
were detected, fled north at top speed.
At 2:50 a.m. on 26 October, the
Japanese reversed course and headed
back toward the Americans. By 5:00
a.m. the two fleets were only 230
miles part and both sides launched

ku
oka
Sh
12:30 pm 26 Oct Zuih
1:00 pm 26 Oct Junyo
CA Atago
(Kondo)
4:00 am
26 Oct
4:00 am 26 Oct
search planes. At 6:45 a US plane
sighted the Japanese. Ten minutes later
a Japanese plane spotted Hornet.
The Japanese launched first, get-
ting 64 planes in the air by 7:40. At
that same moment, two Dauntless
aircraft found and attacked Zuiho,
damaging the light carrier enough to
prevent it from launching aircraft.
The Japanese vanguard, centered
on Hiei and Kirishima, raced to try to
engage the Americans. At 8:10 a.m. their
carriers launched a second wave of 24
planes, and 30 minutes later a third
wave of 20 more planes went aloft. By
9:10 the Japanese had 110 planes on
their way to attack the US carriers.
The Americans, believing a rapid
attack was more important than a
massed one, and lacking the fuel to
spend time assembling a large strike
in the air, flew in groups of fewer than
30 planes toward the Japanese. By
8:20 the Americans had 75 planes,
in three groups, on their way.
At 8:40 the opposing formations
passed within sight of each other. The
o
Shokaku hit
aku 9:27 am 26 Oct
ik
Zu
Zuiho hit Hiei 2:00 pm 27 Oct
7:41 am 26 Oct
Atago 2:00 pm 27 Oct
BB
Hie yo
i (A
be) Jun Enterprise hit, DD Porter
sinks 10:15 am 26 Oct
CV Junyo
(Kakuta)
10:17 pm 26 Oct
CV Shokaku
(Nagumo)
3:30 am Hornet hit
26 Oct 9:12 am 26 Oct
Hornet sinks
1:35 pm 26 Oct
escorting Japanese fighters attacked
the Americans, shooting down a few.
Just after 9:00 a.m. Hornet was
attacked by dive-bombers and torpedo
planes from two different directions
simultaneously. The carrier was hit by
three bombs; one plane made a suicide
dive into the flight deck, and then two
torpedoes struck. Hornet was burn-
ing and dead in the water. A second
Japanese plane deliberately crashed into
the stricken ship, igniting a larger fire.
While Hornet’s crew fought to keep
the carrier afloat, at 9:27 its own first
strike group attacked Shokaku, seri-
ously damaging that carrier. Meanwhile
the planes from Enterprise and the
second group from Hornet could not
find any carriers, so they attacked
two heavy cruisers from the van-
guard group, badly damaging one.
At 9:30 Enterprise started to recover
various damaged and fuel-starved
aircraft, some originally from Hornet.
The second Japanese attack was
detected approaching at the same
time. Enterprise ceased landing opera-
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Map Key
Japanese naval
vessel tracks
US naval
vessel tracks
Carriers (USA)
Carriers (IJN)
Vanguard Force
(Kondo) & Advance
Force (Kakuta/Abe)
Vessel sunk
BB = Battleship
CA = Armored Cruiser
CL = Light Cruiser
CV = Carrier
12:00 am 27 Oct DD = Destroyer
CV Enterprise (Kinkaid)
CV Hornet (Murray)
tions 30 minutes later and ordered the
circling low-on-fuel planes to ditch.
At 10:08 the second-wave Japanese
started their attack runs through intense
anti-aircraft fire from Enterprise and
her escorts. The carrier was struck
twice by bombs, with a third a near
miss. The ship was badly damaged,
including a jammed forward elevator.
At 10:40 torpedo planes attacked
the Enterprise group, damaging and
setting on fire the destroyer Smith.
Smith’s captain ordered his ship into
the huge wake of South Dakota, which
helped extinguish the flames, allow-
ing the destroyer to resume station.
By 11:15 a.m. Enterprise’s crew had
doused the flames and repaired enough
damage to resume taking on aircraft;
however, at 11:21 a strike force from
Junyo arrived. Those dive bombers
caused more damage to Enterprise, and
also hit South Dakota and a light cruiser.
Hornet was out of action and
Enterprise was severely damaged.
Further, Kinkaid believed there was
at least one undamaged Japanese
43

BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
Japan
2 fleet carriers .......................... 1 damaged
2 light carriers .......................... 1 damaged
4 battleships
8 heavy cruisers ....................... 1 damaged
2 light cruisers
24 destroyers ............................ 1 damaged
199 aircraft ............................. 99 destroyed
400–500 killed
carrier in the area, so he decided to
withdraw Enterprise’s task group. He
left behind Hornet’s group, order-
ing them to depart as soon as pos-
sible. Enterprise continued recovering
aircraft as its group moved off.
At 1:00 p.m. the Japanese surface
groups linked up and headed toward the
Americans at top speed. Meanwhile the
damaged carriers Zuiho and Shokaku
retreated, leaving Zuikaku and Junyo
to continue the fight. Those carriers
launched a last strike at Hornet and,
just as that stricken carrier was get-
ting under tow, the planes arrived
and scored a hit with one torpedo.
With no power and listing badly,
Hornet’s crew abandoned ship and the
rest of the task group retreated after
rescuing them. Two Japanese destroy-
ers finished off Hornet with torpedoes.
44
United States
2 fleet carriers .............1 damaged, 1 sunk
1 battleship ............................... 1 damaged
3 heavy cruisers
3 light cruisers ......................... 1 damaged
12 destroyers ...............2 damaged, 1 sunk
136 aircraft ............................. 81 destroyed
266 killed
The battle was a tactical and stra-
tegic victory for the Japanese. They
temporarily controlled the sea around
Guadalcanal, but that win had cost
them a fleet carrier, a light carrier
heavily damaged and a cruiser dam-
aged. Crucially, among their roughly
500 casualties, 148 aircrew (all effec-
tively irreplaceable) had been killed.
With Hornet gone, Enterprise was
the only operational US carrier in
the Pacific. The ship received emer-
gency repairs at New Caledonia and
returned to the fight in just two weeks.
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
In the first days of November, the
Express ran 65 destroyer sorties. That
brought the number of Japanese
troops on the island to 30,000, at the
cost of three destroyers damaged.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Japanese planes readying for takeoff
from the Shokaku on the morning of 26
October 1942.
Opposing their runs down the
Slot were US Patrol (PT) boats. The
geography of small islands and nar-
row seas seemingly favored the swift
and nimble torpedo vessels, but they
lacked radar and were armed with
defective torpedoes. They damaged
one destroyer, and one time even
forced the Express to turn around,
but otherwise they were ineffective.
In response to the Japanese buildup,
the Americans brought in a large convoy
of transports guarded by the heavy
cruisers San Francisco and Portland,
the light cruisers Helena, Juneau and
Atlanta and eight destroyers, jointly
commanded by Rear Adms. Daniel
Callaghan and Norman Scott. They suc-
cessfully unloaded the reinforcements
and supplies on 11 and 12 November,
after which the transports left.
On 12 November the Japanese
started down the Slot with the battle-
ships Hiei and Kirishima, a light cruiser
and 14 destroyers. Tanaka followed
with a convoy of transports and 12
destroyers carrying 11,000 troops.
The Japanese covering force
was spotted by an American plane.
Callaghan was a few days senior to the
more experienced Scott, and took com-
mand of the whole US task force to inter-
cept the Japanese. He formed for battle
and attempted to cross the Japanese T.
 During their approach to
Guadalcanal, the Japanese went through
a large and strong rain storm that,
along with their complicated arrange-
ment, caused their formation to break
into small groups. At the same time,
Callaghan issued unclear orders that
caused the American formation to fall
into disarray. Soon US and Japanese
ships were intermingled at close range.
At 1:48 a.m. on 13 November, Hiei
and a destroyer turned on their search-
lights and spotted Atlanta at just 3,000
yards. Both sides opened fire. Grasping
that his ships were virtually surrounded,
Callahan ordered: “Odd ships fire to
starboard; even ships fire to port!”
The trouble was, no such number- Scott Callaghan
ing system had been put in place
before the battle. In a melee one officer
ling that cruiser to retreat with Helena unaware they had scored a major
described as “a barroom brawl after
following to try to protect the damaged victory, and the way to Henderson
the lights had been shot out,” Atlanta
ship. Portland sank a destroyer, but Field was open, withdrew.
was put out of action and Scott killed.
took a torpedo in the stern, damaging During the following day, Hiei
In return, Hiei was attacked by the
its steering. Juneau was also a victim of was sunk by US aircraft while
Americans and knocked out of the fight.
a torpedo and was forced to withdraw. Juneau was torpedoed and sunk
The Japanese pounded San
The US also lost four destroyers in by a Japanese submarine. Damage
Francisco, killing Callaghan and compel-
40 minutes of fighting. The Japanese,

Time Key

DD Kagero CL Sendai BB Kirishima

DD Uranami
DD Ayanami
Kirishima sinks CL Nagara
3:00 am
i
nam
Ura

Unknown

Nagara
Ayanami sinks
11:30 pm
Walke sinks
11:42 pm BB South Dakota
Preston sinks
South Dakota 11:36 pm BB Washington
Washington 11:00 pm 14 Nov

Ship Key
CA = Armored Cruiser BB = Battleship
CL = Light Cruiser DD = Destroyer

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 45


Japanese transports, beached and
burning, on the shore of Guadalcanal
on 15 November 1942.
NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL
Japan
1 carrier
2 battleships ......................................2 sunk
6 heavy cruisers ..........2 damaged, 1 sunk
4 light cruisers ......................... 1 damaged
22 destroyers ...............4 damaged, 3 sunk
11 transports .............7 sunk, 4 beached &
destroyed
64 aircraft destroyed
1,900 killed (excluding transport losses)
control efforts on Atlanta failed, and
that cruiser sank around 8:00 p.m.
This first day of the battle had been a
defeat for the Americans, with the loss of
two light cruisers and four destroyers as
well as two heavy and two light cruisers
damaged and forced to withdraw. The
Japanese lost Hiei and two destroyers.
The Japanese remained confident
enough to send forward Tanaka’s
convoy. To cover the transports and
bombard Henderson Field, a force
of four heavy and two light cruisers
and six destroyers moved down the
Slot on the night of 13/14 November.
They inflicted little damage.
Meanwhile Enterprise and its escorts
returned to the area. As the Japanese
bombardment force retreated, aircraft
from Enterprise, Henderson Field and
Espiritu Santo attacked, sinking the
heavy cruiser Kinugasa and heavily
damaging Maya. Ensuing air attacks
sank seven of Tanaka’s transports,
leaving just four to press on. Kondo
arrived with Kirishima, two heavy and
two light cruisers and eight destroyers.
46
United States
1 fleet carrier
2 battleships ............................. 1 damaged
2 heavy cruisers ....................... 2 damaged
3 light cruisers ..................................2 sunk
12 destroyers ...............3 damaged, 7 sunk
36 aircraft destroyed
1,732 killed
To offset the losses of surface
ships, on 13 November the Americans
detached the battleships Washington
and South Dakota and four destroy-
ers from Enterprise’s screening force
under Rear Adm. Willis Lee. He
was tasked to defend Henderson
Field and intercept Kondo. Lee’s
task force arrived off of Savo Island
on the evening of 14 November.
As Kondo approached Savo
Island, he sent ahead a light cruiser
and two destroyers to scout. At
10:55 p.m. Lee detected those
scouts on radar and opened fire on
them at 11:17, but to little effect.
Kondo then sent forward another
light cruiser with four more destroyers to
engage what he thought was only a few
US destroyers. Those ships mauled the
US destroyers, sinking two and crippling
the other two. Believing he had won the
battle, Kondo moved forward his heavy
units to bombard Henderson Field,
unaware Lee’s battleships were on scene.
South Dakota experienced some
electrical problems that affected radar
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
and fire direction, and was therefore
unable to fight effectively. When
South Dakota was illuminated by
searchlights from Kirishima, it was
quickly targeted and hit at least 26
times. Badly damaged and on fire,
South Dakota was forced to retreat.
Still undetected by the Japanese,
Washington got within 9,000
yards of Kirishima before open-
ing fire. Hit 20 times, the Japanese
battleship was soon burning, flood-
ing and without rudder control.
Washington turned into shal-
low water to avoid torpedoes and
to attempt to lure the surviving
Japanese away from Henderson Field.
Believing he had cleared the path,
Kondo ordered Tanaka’s remain-
ing ships to Guadalcanal and then
retreated with his surviving ships.
Tanaka’s four transports beached
themselves on Guadalcanal, where
they were soon attacked by US aircraft,
destroying them and most of the equip-
ment on board. Only 2,000 of 7,000
embarked troops landed, and none of
their heavy weapons made it ashore.
The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
was a tactical and strategic victory
for the US, won at the cost of two
light cruisers and seven destroyers
sunk, and two heavy cruisers and a
battleship damaged. The Japanese
lost two battleships, a heavy cruiser,
three destroyers and 11 transports.
Further, their reinforcement and
resupply effort had been thwarted.
Tassafaronga
The battles of mid-November dissuaded
the Japanese from making another
Express run with surface ships for two
weeks. Instead they switched to using
submarines, which were smaller and
slower but harder to detect and attack.
Finally, on 30 November, Tanaka
again headed down the Slot with
eight destroyers. Six of them were
used as transports and two as escorts.
Coast-watchers reported their depar-
ture to the Americans. Rear Adm.
Carleton H. Wright, commanding
the cruisers New Orleans, Pensacola,
Honolulu and Northampton along
with six destroyers, was ordered
to intercept the Japanese force.
 lulu
Des.Div 24
Hono
Suzukaze, Kawakaze CL
Des.Div 15
Kagero, Kurashio, Oyashio

Takanami
Des.Div 30

s
DD
Makanami, Naganami
Northampton sinks
CA Northampton
torpedoed 11:48 pm Map Key
IJN ship tracks (main force)
CAs Minneapolis & Japanese fire & torpedo attacks
CA Pensacola New Orleans torpedoed 11:22 pm
torpedoed 11:39 pm US ship tracks
pm CA = Armored Cruiser
:06 24
11 .Div CL = Light Cruiser DD = Destroyer
s 15
De iv
.s D pm
De 11:20 v 30
i Takanami sinks
s.D
De US Cruisers

At just before 11:00 p.m. the two forc-

es approached each other south of Savo BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA
Island near Tassafaronga Point. Wright’s Japan United States
force was advancing with all nine ships 4 heavy cruisers ..........3 damaged, 1 sunk
steaming almost parallel, while the 1 light cruiser
Japanese were traveling in line ahead. 8 destroyers .......................................1 sunk 6 destroyers .................3 damaged, 7 sunk
At 11:06 Minneapolis detected 197–211 killed 395 killed
the Japanese on radar and Wright
ordered his ships to turn, putting
them on a heading directly toward
the enemy. The two forces were pass-
ing each other on opposite headings,
but the Japanese were still unaware
the Americans were present.
The commander of the four leading
US destroyers requested permission
to fire torpedoes, but Wright delayed
before giving his ascent. The optimum
firing solution was therefore lost, and
the 20-torpedo spread had to chase
the Japanese. At this same time, Wright
ordered his cruisers to open fire, reveal-
ing their positions to the Japanese.
Even so, the Americans had surprised
the Japanese. The destroyer Takanami
was battered but still managed to fire
In a photo taken in Tulagi harbor soon after the Battle of
torpedoes before sinking. Tanaka’s last Tassafaronga, the USS New Orleans is shown with its bow
three ships in line fired their torpedoes missing due to a magazine explosion.
and then retreated at top speed.

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 47

 The four other destroyers con-
tinued on, dumping their supply
barrels into the water before firing
torpedoes and retiring west. There
were 44 Japanese torpedoes in the
water heading toward the US cruisers.
At 11:27 p.m. two torpedoes
hit Minneapolis, wrecking that
ship. New Orleans was also hit,
with its forecastle blown off.
Pensacola turned hard to miss
the two damaged cruisers, but was
also hit. The engine room flooded;
the ship lost power and stopped
dead in the water on fire.
Honolulu turned hard and
headed northwest at high speed,
avoiding the torpedoes.
Northampton attempted to maneu-
ver, but took two hits and quickly sank.
The three damaged cruisers were
saved by their crews’ efforts at damage
control. All reached safety at Tulagi, but
were then out of the war for months.
Tassafaronga was a tactical victory
for the Japanese, but it provided no
help for them in regard to affecting
the course of the larger campaign.
Express Runs Continue
The Tokyo Express continued to run
in December and early January using
destroyers and submarines. Those
runs were opposed by the 16 PT-boats
stationed on Tulagi and airplanes
flying from Henderson Field.
The night of 7/8 December saw a
run by 11 destroyers to Guadalcanal.
Three were spotted at dusk by American
planes, so they turned back without
approaching the island. The remaining
eight were confronted by eight PT-Boats
that fired torpedoes, all of which missed.
Then they attacked the lead Japanese
ship with machinegun and light cannon
fire. The Japanese retreated without
having offloaded any men or supplies.
During the first week of December,
Japanese submarines delivered some
20 tons of supplies without interfer-
ence from the Americans. Then, on the
evening of 9/10 December, a pair of
PT-boats sank the submarine I-3 with a
torpedo. That loss caused the Japanese
to suspend submarine supply runs.
Three days after the sinking of
the I-3, Tanaka lead a group of 11
destroyers on another run down the
Slot. While dropping off supplies,
they were attacked by six PT-boats.
Tanaka’s flagship was badly damaged
by a torpedo and he was wounded. The

Night Combat &

Type-93 Torpedoes

+++ Before World War II began, both the US and Japanese

Navies’ high commands had roughly the same strategic vision in
regard to how it would be fought. That is, both believed the war
would be decided in a climactic battle between battleships with
all other types of combatants playing only supporting roles.
The Japanese, however—knowing they would be outnumbered
and on the defense—sought the ability to whittle down the advanc-
ing US fleet with aerial attacks from carriers and surface attacks
from destroyers and cruisers. To conduct that portion of the war,
they developed a night combat doctrine emphasizing torpedoes.
Direct nighttime observation of ships was limited by the low
contrast of vessels against the dark horizon. The ability to see
ships in the dark was reduced even further when they were
silhouetted against a coastal landmass.
To overcome that limitation the Japanese went to great lengths
to exploit the visual capabilities of their lookouts. First, candidate
sailors were tested and selected for excellent night-vision. The
chosen sentinels were supplied with large pedestal-mounted
binoculars with apertures up to 8.3 inches (21cm). The lenses
were of the highest optical quality.
They also put great effort into making a low-flash gunpowder
to protect the lookouts’ night-vision and make their ships’ salvos
harder to spot and track. The lookouts were also trained to shield
their eyes when their ship was about to fire a salvo (signaled by
the sounding of a buzzer).
To avoid giving away their positions with the use of search-
lights, the Japanese developed effective star shells. Adopted in
1935, those parachute-suspended shells had a large illumination
radius and intense brightness. The 8-inch star shell had a candle-
power of 1.7 million, while the 5-inch version had a candlepower
of 680,000,
A type 93 Long Lance torpedo outside
US Navy HQ.
The Japanese also developed a nearly perfect weapon for
night combat, the Type-93 torpedo, nicknamed the “Long Lance.”
Technically advanced for the time, they went into service in 1935.
At 30 feet long and 24 inches in diameter, they were too big for use
on submarines, so they were exclusively deployed on destroyers
and cruisers. Powered by oxygen, they were almost totally wake-
less, making them hard to detect and avoid.
Further, the oxygen power gave them high speed and long
range. For example, they had a range of 13 miles at 50 knots, while
at 35 knots they had a range of 25 miles. The Long Lance also had
a huge warhead of 1,180 lbs. (490 kg). In comparison, the standard
US Mark 14 torpedo had a range of 8.5 miles at 26 knots and only
an 825 lb. warhead.
The Type-93, combined with the sailors’ night combat skills,
proved a devastating combination against Allied ships at
Guadalcanal. Over the course of the campaign,Type-93s sank six
destroyers, five cruisers and a fleet carrier. +

48 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

destroyer later sank, after Tanaka had
been evacuated for medical treatment.
His inability to deliver final victory had
made him fall out of favor in Tokyo; after
recovering he was reassigned to a desk
job in Burma for the rest of the war.
The Japanese called a halt to supply
runs until the next moonless phase in early
January 1943. During that standdown,
their high command decided Guadalcanal
was untenable and should be evacuated.
On 14 January 1943 the Tokyo Express
ran in 850 elite troops to act as rearguard
for the evacuation. Then, in three unop-
posed operations using a cruiser and 20
destroyers, they took every Japanese sol-
dier off the island. The Americans did lit-
tle to interfere with the evacuation. They
were regrouping their own forces in prep-
aration to meet another major Japanese
offensive they believed was coming.
Summing Up
The last Japanese left Guadalcanal on
7 February 1943, and the Americans
officially declared the island secure
two days later. The campaign had
cost the Allies 7,100 dead and more
than 7,700 wounded. They also lost
29 ships, including two fleet carri-
ers, six cruisers and 14 destroyers,
along with some 600 aircraft.
The Japanese lost about 19,200 dead,
including 8,500 killed in action with the
rest taken by disease and starvation.
They had 38 ships sunk, among them
a light carrier, two battleships, three
heavy cruisers and 13 destroyers.
The campaign was the turning
point of the war in the Pacific, finally
and fully shifting the strategic initia-
tive from the Japanese to the Allies. In
choosing to fight the campaign, the
Japanese committed a crucial error
by engaging the US in a prolonged
campaign of attrition they themselves
could not sustain. They could not
afford to lose the ships, planes and
men even as they won some victories,
while the Allies could and did pay
the price necessary for final victory.
Further, even when the Japanese
managed to create—or were oth-
erwise fortuitously presented
with—situations in which one more
bold move could have given them
the victory, they balked. They knew
from the start a conservative opera-
tional approach could not work for
them, but none of their admirals
was willing to take responsibil-
ity for risking the alternative. -

SELECTED SOURCES
Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1978.)
Frank, Richard. Guadalcanal: The Definitive
Account of the Landmark Battle. (New York:
Random House, 1990.)
Hone, Trent. Give Them Hell!: The US Navy’s
Night Combat Doctrine and the Campaign for
Guadalcanal. War in History 13, no. 2 (2006).
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Struggle for
Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943, vol.
V of History of United States Naval Operations
in World War II. (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1969.)

An aerial view of Henderson Field, with the Lunga River running across
the upper portion of the photo. Several planes are parked on the left, and
numerous bomb and shell craters are visible.

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 49

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 SECOND
THE
BATTLE OF THE

ALPS
March–May 1945

52 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

BY RAYMOND E. BELL, JR.
O
N 15 AUGUST 1944 A JOINT AMERICAN-
British-Canadian-French task force landed on the
south coast of France and began to move north to
link up with the Allied forces advancing out of Normandy.
That Allied move was only perfunctorily contested by the
retreating Germans, leaving the situation on the Franco-
Italian border in what amounted to strategic limbo.
No attempt was made by the Allies to attack into north-
west Italy across those mountains (the Maritime Alps).
Instead, elements of the joint Allied 1st Airborne Task
Force and the American 45th Infantry Division, along
with the irregular infantry of the French Forces of the
Interior (FFI or “resistance”) moved into defensive posi-
tions to secure the region from cross-border attack.
The German and Fascist-Italian forces compos-
ing the “Ligurian Army” in northwest Italy were com-
manded by Italian Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. They
WORLD at WAR 86 |
similarly moved, on the east side of the border, to secure
the trans-Alpine passes between Switzerland and the
Mediterranean Sea. In taking possession of those passes,
and occupying the mountain crests between them, the
Fascists and Germans were in position to strongly resist
any Allied attempt to push them off that rugged terrain.
On the western side of the mountains, French Army
B, after taking over from the Americans and before being
renamed First French Army, initially deployed a border cover
force of two Moroccan infantry divisions and FFI partisans
to contain any attempted Axis move back into France.
The FFI troops came from all across recently liber-
ated southern France, as well as from locally recruited
men who knew the terrain along the border. Those units
organized as separate battalions with regional names,
and were commanded by former reserve officers and
non-commissioned officers recalled to the colors.
A mid-winter view of the Little Saint Bernard Pass. Of course, in
military terms, there is nothing little or otherwise insignificant
about it.
OCT–NOV 2022 53
 The Second Alpine Campaign had its
origins in the Allied “Anvil-Dragoon”
landings on France’s Mediterranean
coast in August 1944.

On 7 September, all those units
were incorporated into the 1st Alpine
Division, which on 16 November
was again redesignated, this time as
the 27th Alpine Division. It consisted
of two demi-brigades (US regiment
equivalents), and, along with a
separate alpine infantry regiment, it
took up positions just north of Col
de Lautaret. Another non-divisional
unit occupied the area between
Lautaret and the village of Larche,
about 30 miles to the south.
Until 14 March 1945 the area
of the border covering force was
divided into two zones, a northern
one assigned to the French and the
southern assigned to the Americans.
The northern zone, which reached
from the Swiss border south to Larche,
had originally been assigned to the
2nd Moroccan Infantry Division and
the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division
reinforced by the FFI. By November
1944 the Moroccan units had departed,
leaving the zone to the 27th Alpine
Division and a few non-divisional units.

Allied Cooperation

+++ When the Allies landed in southern France late in the

summer of 1944 and advanced north, there was concern about
the flank situation that evolved on the Franco-Italian border.
Though a major Axis attack there was not anticipated, there was
concern about border security. That autumn the French took over
responsibility for the region, which included operating with Italian
partisans along the border.
At the same time, Italian partisan formations acquired the
official support of the Americans and British. Those guerrillas
were the main source of intelligence concerning Axis operations
in the part of Italy still under occupation.
A British military mission was based in the French city of
Guillestre, and an American one was established in Grenoble. A partisan mass funeral in Asiago on 29 May 1945 for those killed
The British mission provided the partisans logistical support in the fighting against the Germans and Fascist Italians.
Photo courtesy of Linda Vignato, Wikimedia.
form of weapons and munitions, while the Americans concerned
themselves primarily with the recovery of escaped Allied prison-
ers of war. In January 1945 the French permitted Italian partisan bases to
be set up in Annecy and Avignon. By the end of that month, bases
in Grenoble and Nice had also been added. +

54 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

 Second Battle of the Alps
23 March–2 May 1945

ax 26

RN 90 S

e V

m
RN 6 e

S
25
a

o
n
r

RN 94 20

RN 100

Map Key

German LXXV Corps main

e concentration area, May 2

French attack and advance

US attack and advance

RN 7 British attack and advance

The positions indicated by the arrows

MEDITERRANEAN SEA were reached on or just prior to May 2.

RN 90 Major Roads

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 55

 The southern zone, extending from
Larche to the Mediterranean, had
been held by the US 44th Anti-Aircraft
Brigade, but on 14 March 1945 it
relinquished its positions to the French
1st Mechanized Infantry Division.
Weather & Terrain
The Allied advance across southern
France in 1944 began at what was
already the start of autumn in the
Maritime Alps. That meant rain, wind
and mist were the principal weather
conditions adversely affecting troop
deployment. As the autumn pro-
gressed, wind-driven sleet became
common across the operational area,
which turned the ground to mud,
hampering off-road mobility.
The mountain peaks and ridges
got snow starting in the early fall, and
the highest elevations never became
56
completely devoid of it throughout the
year. As the weather became colder the
ground froze, making the roads and
paths icy and hazardous to negotiate.
Starting in December, harsh winds
and deep snow further hindered
ground operations and troop move-
ment. The mountains began to accu-
mulate snow, and the constantly low
temperatures made the environment
even more uncomfortable. The con-
stant penetrating cold had a deleteri-
ous impact on soldiers’ morale, and
their efficiency was keenly affected.
The spring of 1945 was slow in
coming. When the snow finally did
begin to melt, the heavy rains returned
and mud again replaced frozen
ground. The mountainous terrain
itself also favored the defense in that
it rendered large-scale maneuver
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
almost impossible. It was terrain best
suited to dismounted light troops.
There were only seven significant
crossing points for motor vehicles in
the whole mountain chain, including
the well-known passes of the Little St.
Bernard, Mount Cenis, Mountgenevre,
Larche, and Tende. Into the spring
of 1945 they were all still held and
well-defended by the enemy.
When the French constructed the
Maginot Line in the 1930s, they included
in that effort a large number of con-
crete fortifications, some 53 of them
with accompanying outworks, in the
Maritime Alps. They were grouped in
three sectors and contained 23 artillery
forts armed with 81mm mortars, 75mm
cannon, or combinations of both.
When the region was occupied by
the Germans and Italians in 1940, many
of those forts were decommissioned;

LOWER LEFT: One of the Maginot Line redoubts
that were refurbished by the Germans and used
as defensive strongpoints during the campaign.
Note the damage from bullet strikes. Photo
courtesy Desdenova, Wikimedia.
however, late in 1944 some were brought
back on line in anticipation of possible
Allied moves into northwest Italy. That
combination of mountainous terrain,
newly created defensive positions,
reoccupied Maginot Line fortifications
and experienced and well-equipped
enemy troops, made the Maritime
Alps a formidable obstacle against any
Allied attempt to drive the Germans
and Italians from them and into Italy.
French Forces
On 1 March 1945, French Lt. Gen. Paul
Doyen activated the Alpine Corps
consisting of the 27th Alpine Division,
various separate regiments, and the
1st Mechanized Infantry Division. (The
latter was detached from French First
Army fighting in northeast France.)
His mission was to take the mountain
passes leading into northwest Italy and
dislodge the enemy from the mountain
crests and ridge lines between them.
Of his two divisions, only the 27th
was suitable for mountain operations.
It consisted of the 5th and 7th Light
Mountain Infantry Demi-Brigades and
the 159th Alpine Infantry Regiment.
The other division was not trained
or equipped for mountain combat.
It was assigned to the south sector,
where it would participate in only one
limited and unsuccessful offensive
operation. The mechanized division
had been assigned to a sector inap-
propriate to it simply on the basis of
its availability in a time of general
French manpower shortages.
The Alpine front was redivided
into three sectors—north, central and
FRENCH ORDER OF
BATTLE—24 MARCH 1945
Detachment of the
Army of the Alps
27th Alpine Division
5th Demi-brigade
7th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
13th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
27th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
ABOVE: Armbands such as these were often the th
7 Demi-brigade
only ‘uniforms’ worn by the FFI. Photo by Gary L
Hider, Shutterstock.
6th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
11th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
15th Alpine Chasseur Battalion
th
159 Alpine Infantry Regiment
69th Mountain Artillery Regiment
south—with the Alpine Corps headquar-
93rd Mountain Artillery Regiment
ters in Grenoble, a distant 45 miles from
the initial frontline but the closest major 1st Mechanized Infantry Division
transport and communications hub. In 3rd Alpine Infantry Regiment
corps reserve at that headquarters was 141st Alpine Infantry Regiment
the 159th Alpine Infantry Regiment. 99th Alpine Infantry Regiment
The largest grouping of units, both 5th Motorized Dragoon Regiment
regulars and FFI, was in the north- Group Arve-Beaufortin
ern sector. Designated Battlegroups Mont Blanc Battalion
Arve-Beaufortin, Tarentaise and +
Maurienne, their troop structure was
primarily drawn from the 27th’s demi-
brigades—each with three light infantry
battalions and a mountain artillery
battalion equipped with 75mm guns.
Significantly, every one of the French
battalions and regiments had at least
one section (platoon equivalent) of
ski-equipped scouts. They proved to
be among the most effective troops
deployed in the campaign due to their
ability to move quickly cross-country,
which proved the key to the success of
the battle for the Larche in April 1945.
The central sector had three
battlegroups. BG Brianconnais, on the
northern edge of the sector, consisted of
the three-battalion 99th Alpine Infantry
Regiment supported by the 1st Battalion
of the 93rd Mountain Artillery Regiment.
BG Queyras, in the sector’s center, was
composed of the 2nd Battalion of the
141st Alpine Infantry Regiment with
the 3rd Battalion of the 69th Mountain
Artillery Regiment in support. BG Ubaye,
in the sector’s south part, was the 1st Two modern-day historical reenactors
dressed and armed as typical FFI fighters
Battalion of the 141st Alpine Infantry from 1944-45. They were mostly young
Regiment along with the battalion-sized and full of fight, hot for revenge on the
“regiment” of the 5th Dragoons (dis- Germans, but at the same time they were
under-trained and lightly armed.
mounted cavalry) and the 2nd Battalion
of the 69th Mountain Artillery Regiment.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 57
 FASCIST-ITALIAN
LIGURIAN ARMY
German LXXV
Infantry Corps
5th Mountain Infantry Division
Mountain Infantry Regiment 85
Mountain Infantry Regiment 100
Mountain Artillery Regiment 95
5th Reconnaissance Battalion
5th Engineer Battalion
5th Training Battalion
Special Assault Company
34th Infantry Division
Grenadier Regiment 80
Grenadier Regiment 107
Grenadier Regiment 253
Artillery Regiment 34
34th Recon. Battalion
34th Engineer Battalion
2nd Italian Littorio Infantry Division
3rd Infantry Regiment
4th Alpine Regiment
2nd Artillery Regiment
Recon. Squadron
Anti-tank Companies (2)
4th Italian Alpine Division
7th Alpine Regiment
8th Alpine Regiment
4th Artillery Regiment
Recon. Squadron
Anti-tank Companies (2)
Folgore Parachute Regiment
+ LXXV Infantry Corps that, in turn, was
The military coat of arms of Mussolini’s
(German puppet state) “Italian Social
Republic.”
58
ABOVE: Mussolini talking with one of his
puppet state’s young soldiers about to leave
for the front in December 1944. Photo: German
Federal Archives.
As noted above, deployed in the
south sector were the 1st Mechanized
Infantry Division with the attached 3rd
Alpine Infantry Regiment. That divi-
sion’s organization mirrored that of a
US infantry division. As opposed to the
other two sectors, its subordinate units
were not organized into battlegroups.
Axis Forces
The opposing enemy front was
divided into two sectors, both of
which were manned by the German
under the administrative control of
the Fascist-Italian Ligurian Army.
The northern sector had the German
5th Mountain Infantry Division and
units of the Italian 4th Alpine and
Folgore (Thunderbolt) Parachute
Regiments. The German 34th Infantry
Division and units of the Italian 3rd
Infantry Regiment covered the south-
ern sector. The two German divisions
were both rated excellent by French
military intelligence, while the Italian
units were not rated as highly.
The 5th Mountain Division consisted
of the 85th and 100th Mountain Infantry
Regiments, while the 34th Infantry
Division was composed of the 80th, 107th
and 253rd Infantry Regiments. Both
divisions had an artillery regiment and
a reconnaissance group (battalion).
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
RIGHT: An Italian paratrooper at the front late
in 1944. German Federal Archives.
The 5th Mountain Division also had a
combat engineer company designated
as a “special assault” unit. That divi-
sion was a veteran unit fully equipped
and trained for mountain warfare. The
34th, though initially recruited in the
Rhineland, had been equipped and
trained for mountain warfare. Both
divisions had been held in reserve
in north-central Italy before deploy-
ment to the Franco-Italian border.
Of the two Italian divisions, the 2nd
Littorio consisted of the 3rd Infantry
Regiment and the 4th Alpine Infantry
Regiment, while the 4th Alpine Infantry
Division contained the 7th and 8th Alpine
Infantry Regiments. Both divisions had
an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance
squadron and two anti-tank companies.
The 2nd Littorio was considered
the better of the two units because
it was fully and properly equipped
to fight in the mountains. The 4th,
however, was rated as having scant
combat value by the French.
Rounding out the enemy force was
the three-battalion parachute regiment.
It was a dedicated Fascist unit, but it was
not equipped to fight in the mountains.
French Offensive
While there had been some sporadic
combat in the border region’s moun-
tains, passes and valleys prior to 23

March 1945 (see sidebar), it was not
until spring arrived that energetic
measures were taken by the French to
seriously confront the enemy there.
From 23 to 31 March, in the north-
ern sector, 5th Demi-Brigade attacked
the German positions around the
Little St. Bernard Pass. They quickly
took the two crests commanding
the pass from their German defend-
ers, but the Germans then coun-
terattacked and expelled them.
Farther south in the same sector,
from 5 to 12 April, the 7th Demi-Brigade
attacked Mount Cenis pass and was also
initially successful. Again, though, the
Germans deftly counterattacked and
recaptured the crest, forcing the French
to retreat back into the nearby valley.
A third attack, by 1st Mechanized
Infantry Division in the southern sector,
was unable to secure the Authion massif.
Unfortunately, that division showed
no proficiency in the alpine terrain. Its
efforts were continually unsuccessful.
The only successful French attack
was conducted from 22 to 26 April in the
heights leading to the Larche mountain
pass in the southern part of the central
sector. There German Battlegroup
Maddelena, consisting of a com-
pany of the 34th Division’s 34th Fusilier
Battalion and a battalion of the Fascist
Italian 3rd Alpine Regiment, opposed
two similarly sized French groups.
The Axis battlegroup occupied the
former French border forts of Roche
La Croix and fort of Saint Ours, situ-
ated above the hamlets of Meyronnes,
Granges de Gascon and Saint Ours
Haut. Further, the village of Larche itself
was also a strong defensive position.
Included in the Axis defense
scheme were two concrete Maginot
Line fortifications that provided
additional power to their already
well-entrenched line. The Roche La
Croix fort consisting of six interlock-
ing fortified blocks and the Saint
Ours Haut fort had five such blocks,
and both had been fully rehabili-
tated by the Germans and Italians.
The French northern attack group
consisted of two squadrons of the 5th
Demi-Brigade (totaling approximately
two infantry companies in strength),
two sections (platoons) of the 159th
Alpine Infantry Regiment and three
ski troop sections. The southern attack
group was composed of a squadron
of the 5th, one company the 99th and
another from the 159th, two sections
of the 141st Alpine Infantry Regiment,
and three ski troop sections. The 24th
Chasseur Battalion was in reserve.

Behind Axis Lines

+++ While the Germans and the Italian-Fascists manned the

ridge lines, mountains and passes opposite the French, they
were having trouble with Italian partisans in the territory behind
them. As early as August 1944, after the swift Allied advance
to the south edge of the Po Valley, Italian guerrillas were
conducting offensive operations using the Maritime Alps as their
operational bases.
One example was the “Battle of the Granaries.” It was fought
on the slopes of the French-Italian border at Rocciamelone on 26
August between the partisan Stellina (Little Star) Group and some
Fascist paramilitary police and a few accompanying Germans.
The action got its start when a partisan from a nearby village
gave warning of the Fascist column’s march into the mountains
coming north out of the city of Susa. Three companies of the A view of Rocciamelone as it still looks today, little changed since 1945.
Stellina Group assembled and watched as the column marched
through clusters of houses along narrow roads and paths heading
in the direction of Rocciamelone. turn sought refuge inside the buildings. As dusk approached, the
When the column arrived at the town's granaries, where some Fascist commander agreed, first, to a ceasefire and finally to the
20 women and children were living at the time, they stopped to surrender of his surrounded unit.
rest after their arduous climb in hot weather. It was then that the The partisan leader, fearing the civilians would otherwise
partisans chose to attack. be kept as hostages, was careful to secure their release. He
In a fight that lasted all afternoon, the lightly armed but highly then allowed the Fascists to retreat back down the slopes,
motivated partisans surrounded the Fascists. The Fascists in ending the battle. +

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 59


The main body of the northern
attack group moved directly on Larche
from the north and west, but also
sent some ski troops around the flank
to circle back and approach it from
the east. The southern group also
advanced from multiple directions.
The French soon forced the Germans
to withdraw from some outlying
hamlets. Then the 5th Demi-Brigade
took the former Maginot Line fort of
St. Ours Haut and went on to close
in on Larche from the west. South
of Larche, a company from the 99th
Alpine Infantry Regiment attacked to
capture the Maginot Line Fort de Roche
la Croix, and from there advanced
on Larche to help tighten the devel-
oping encirclement of the town.
Larche itself then came under
attack, at first principally by the
ski troop sections coming from all
directions except the south. The
encirclement was soon completed,
and Larche fell on 25 April.
60
The light infantry of the 24th
Chasseurs took up positions on the
Italian border the next day, while 5th
Demi-Brigade passed through them
to move into Italy. That ended French
combat operations on the border until
the final offensive into Italy began a few
days later, which lasted until V-E Day.
By the last week of April the retreat-
ing Germans and fast-disolving Fascist
Italian units had to engage on a second
front against partisans who had begun
operating freely across northwest
Italy. So bitter did that irregular fight-
ing become, the Germans deployed
their hated military police among the
civilian population to suppress it.
They used brutal retaliatory tactics
in which as many as 10 civilian hostages
were shot for every German soldier
killed or wounded. Despite that horren-
dous conduct, it failed to deter the par-
tisans from continuing to do everything
possible to impede German and Fascist-
Italian operations. One further result of
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
US troops in Italy did fight through the Alps in
1945, but that took place in the Tyrolean Alps off
to the east.
all that was, when the French crossed
into Italy they found many objectives
already secured by Italian partisans who,
along with most of the local popu-
lace, wildly celebrated their arrival.
In the northern sector, the rein-
forced 5th Demi-brigade battlegroup
advanced on the Italian city of Aoste
through Little St. Bernard Pass. To its
south, the 7th Demi-Brigade advanced
on the Italian city of Susa and then on
toward Turin after having been joined
by units from the central sector.
In the central sector’s northern
region, the reinforced 99th Alpine
Infantry Regiment advanced into Italy
from the vicinity of the French border
city of Briancon through four passes.
One of its groups helped seal off some
of the enemy in the Italian town of
Bardonnechia. A second thrust was
made to Ouix, while the fourth battle-
group, Group Queyras, was given the
mission of occupying the area around
Pellice. Once through the mountain
passes, the French made rapid prog-
ress as they advanced to link up with
the Anglo-American forces running
rampant over the Po River valley.
As they came down from the
mountains and entered the Italian
border towns, the French were
greeted as liberators by the inhabit-
ants. Even so, there were difficulties.
The Italian territory occupied by
the French was coveted by Paris. The
French high command issued orders for
its occupying units to stay put after V-E
Day. It took a threat from Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower to cut off logistical support
to those French units to get the Paris gov-
ernment to back down and leave Italian
soil. Even so, it was not until October
1945 the last French forces departed Italy.
Analysis
The Second Battle of the Alps was
basically a holding operation by the
Axis and an economy of force mis-
SOURCES
Passemord, Maurice, Haute Lutte, Service historique
de l’armee de Terre; Paris, France, 1989.
A US-made light tank rusting today where it was
wrecked during the fight for Authion in 1945.
sion by the French. Both adversaries
committed only minimal forces to it.
Except for a few pitched fights, most of
the activity was limited to aggressive
patrolling that culminated in a final
offensive operation launched just days
prior to the overall end of the war.
The major French effort in 1944–45
was not along their border with Italy,
so the units deployed there were few in
number and not first line formations.
Two French divisions bore the opera-
tional burden. Of those, only the 27th
Alpine Division could appropriately
be called mountain combat capable.
Hastily organized on an ad hoc
basis with FFI personnel hurriedly
transformed into the regular army,
the French overall performed well
enough as they gained experience in
high terrain combat. Their best troops
were the ski-equipped scouts and, as
demonstrated in the battle for Larche,
they were the most successful.
Rainero, Romain H. and Sicurezza, Renato, ed.,
“Italy at war; the fifth year: 1944,” Italy in the 2
World War/Aspects and Problems, Military
Graphi Publishers: Gaeta, Italy, 1995.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
The adversaries both accom-
plished their designated missions.
The French executed the economy
of force mission effectively, even
though they were handicapped by
inadequately armed and indifferently
equipped units from the former FFI.
The Germans set an excellent
example of how to conduct a suc-
cessful holding operation. Their first
class mountain troops, along with a
regular infantry division, by holding
the key passes and dueling principally
with French patrols in harsh weather,
were able to hold their positions with
relative ease until near the very end
of the war. Never intended to take
the offensive, the Axis force proved
adequate for its task. In the end, it
was major operations elsewhere in
France and Italy that dictated the
outcome in the Maritime Alps. -
Vigneros, Marcel, Rearming the French, US
Government Publishing Office: Washington
DC, 1957.
61
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OBSERVATION POST
Raupenschlepper Ost
BY ALLYN VANNOY
A
A
S MUCH AS THE ARMY OF THE THIRD REICH
has been analyzed in regard to its blitzkrieg mobile
warfare tactics, its swarming panzers represented
only a comparatively small part of its overall strike force.
While it was well organized and efficiently led, it was
never the unstoppable war machine propaganda and
newsreels made it out to be. It looked so good in the early
years of the war because its enemies were poorly led and
ill-prepared. Even then, a key German shortcoming was
the limited mechanization within their support units.
The Germans had realized what made a unit combat
effective was its mobility as much as its firepower. In that way,
motorized infantry divisions were soon seen to be as useful
as panzer divisions. At the same time, though, they lagged
in dealing with the fact that, in a protracted war, an army’s
support units needed to be as mobile as its combat elements.
With the start of the invasion of the Soviet Union,
transportation of supplies presented some of the great-
est challenges. Despite field commanders’ calls to be
provided with tracked vehicles for the transportation
of men and supplies in Russia, where paved roads were
mostly nonexistent, the invasion depended on trucks and
horse-drawn wagons and carts for those purposes.
A German division was supposed to be logistically self-suf-
ficient, meaning it was to use its own men, horses and vehicles
64 WORLD at WAR 86 |
An anti-tank gun armed RSO on display at the Panzermuseum
in Munster. Photo courtesy of Banznerfahrer via Wikimedia.
to haul supplies from army railheads or supply depots. Thus
the supply train of one of their infantry divisions in 1943 had
256 trucks and 2,652 horses all attended by 4,047 personnel.
Their further efforts to design vehicles that could bet-
ter meet support demands in Russia, brought forth the
Raupenschlepper Ost (Caterpillar Tractor East), a.k.a. the “RSO”
A fully tracked lightweight vehicle, the RSO had been
conceived in response to the poor performance of wheeled
and even half-tracked vehicles in mud and snow during
the first autumn and winter of the eastern front in 1941–42.
The seasonal mud in particular required a fully tracked
supply vehicle to maintain the army’s logistical system.
Steyr, an Austrian-based manufacturer, responded with
a small vehicle based upon its 1.5-ton light truck, the 1500A,
which was already in use. Initially designed as a supply
delivery vehicle, it eventually served a variety of other roles:
moving personnel within divisions, as well as towing how-
itzers, anti-tank guns and light anti-aircraft guns. Two main
variants were built: the basic cargo carrier and prime mover,
and a self-propelled anti-tank vehicle armed with a gun.
The original version had a steel cab, but later mod-
els had a soft-top slab-sided cab. All models had
wooden drop-side cargo beds common in light trucks
of the time. It had a ground clearance of 22 inches, and
was powered by a gasoline-powered V-8 engine.
OCT–NOV 2022
ABOVE: A supply delivery RSO model on display in the Auto and Technik
Museum, Sinsheim. Photo courtesy of Alf van Beem via Wikimedia.

RIGHT: An RSO at the head of a supply column moving behind the front on
21 June 1943. German Federal Archives.

The transmission had one reverse gear and four for-

ward gears. It had four large steel disk wheels per track,
mounted in pairs with elliptic springs, all in a single line
in a “slack-track” system with no return rollers. That
provided a suspension system able to handle mud or
snow without buildup or freezing between the wheels,
as could occur with the more complex overlapping-
interleaved suspension systems of German halftracks. were produced during the war starting in 1942. Some opera-
Steering was done with two levers. A spring-loaded tional models are still available on the open market today.
pintle was fitted at the rear, and tow hooks were avail- The RSO gave outstanding service due to its reli-
able on the front. It had a top speed of 19 mph. ability, ease of maintenance and ability to perform a
When orders for the RSO surpassed Steyr’s produc- variety of roles in terrain where other vehicles were not
tion capacity, other manufacturers were added in order to able to operate. Had the Germans initially gone into
produce more of them faster. Approximately 23,000 RSOs Russia with a completely mechanized support force, they
could likely have defeated the Soviets that year. -

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 65

OBSERVATION POST
The International Saar
Force & the Saar Plebiscite
BY VERNIE LIEBL
II
N 1918 GERMANY LOST WORLD WAR I, AND
France, impoverished and seeking both recom-
pense and revenge, demanded the 730 square miles
of industrial land between Saarbrucken, Neunkirchen
and Merzig. That demand was written into the Treaty of
Versailles, defining it as the “Saar Region.” It was to be an
“independent regional authority,” but one occupied by
French troops for 15 years, at which time there would be
a plebiscite to determine its ultimate political status.
The plebiscite was to offer three options:
• maintenance of the status quo of French occupation and
economic exploitation;
• full annexation to France; or
• reintegration into Germany.
66 WORLD at WAR 86 |
The Netherland contingent of the ISF being inspected by their
commander prior to departing for the Saar. Photo courtesy of the
Dutch Ministry of Defence.
In that way, when the treaty came into effect on 10
January 1920, the residents of the region were no lon-
ger legally German, but had become “Saarlanders” in
a mandated territory under the League of Nations.
The French initially deployed 6,000 troops in the Saar,
but reduced that to 1,800 by 1924, and three years later
they had fully withdrawn. A small British contingent of
a few hundred soldiers had initially also been deployed,
but they were all home before the end of 1920.
Even so, there remained foreign contingents—from
Britain, Norway and Czechoslovakia—augmenting the
ethnic German police. The government of the Saar was
overwhelmingly French, with only an incremental increase in
participation by Germans during the 1920s and early 1930s.
Economically, the French mandate in effect made
the roughly 70,000 German miners into government
employees. They also took control of iron and steel produc-
OCT–NOV 2022
tion, the banking system and electrical generation. They
flooded the Saar with their own currency, set up French
language schools and demanded bilingual signage.
Most Saarlanders felt the mandate was illegitimate, and
as a result they clung ever tighter to the German language
and culture. There was hostility between the populace
and the French-sponsored administration, expressed in
an increasing number of protests in the form of indus-
trial and mining strikes. The administration responded by
expelling the most troublesome individuals from politics,
along with temporary regional entry and exit bans.
The 30 January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as
chancellor of Germany changed everything. As he consoli-
dated sole political power in Berlin, thousands of German
communists, social democrats and Jews fled to the Saar. As
the date for the plebiscite approached, set for 13 January
1935, an internal political struggle began in the Saar
between the anti-Nazi “United Front” and the “German
Front,” which desired total reintegration with Germany.
Between Hitler’s ascension to the chancellorship and
the plebiscite, the number of Nazi “brown shirt” and
“black shirt” storm troopers in the region grew to 40,000.
Another new organization, the Ordnungsdienst (Security
Service), a volunteer paramilitary police auxiliary, also set
up in support of the German Front with its membership ABOVE: ON 16 January 1935, just a few days after the vote, some Nazis
of 21,000 men and women. In comparison, the popula- hung in effigy the anti-reunification Saar Police Chief (M. Matz). The sign
beneath the effigy points toward France, only 4 KM away, offering a clue as
tion of the Saar totaled only a little more than 800,000, to where he should head.
while the regular police numbered around 2,000.
One of the conditions of the plebiscite was to have each BELOW: The coat of arms of the “Territory of the Saar Basin” between 1920
and 1935.
voting station manned by several policemen and at least one
neutral-country observer.
The League of Nations had 3,300 frontline per-
prevailed on several sonnel supported by 700
neighboring countries to logistics troops. The four
provide the observers: countries providing forces
Luxembourg, Switzerland were: Great Britain, Italy, the
and the Netherlands. Netherlands and Sweden.
The number of poll- The British provided
ing locations was set at 1,500 men, comprised of
860—one station for roughly a brigade headquarters to
every 580 registered voters. command the overall ISF,
That stretched the police and infantry battalion from
to the breaking point, and the 1st Essex Regiment and
necessitated removing them another from the 1st East
from their normal jobs. Lancashires, and D Squadron
With that police withdrawal, of the 12th Royal Lancers
it was feared the German Front (armored cars). There was no
would be free to foment unrest provision for artillery, tanks or
and intimidate voters. The League machineguns, but they did bring
of Nations therefore authorized its a number of trucks, thereby provid-
first deployment of an armed force, ing the motor transport for the ISF.
which they called the “International Saar The next-largest detachment was that
Force” (ISF), as a peacekeeping measure. of the Italians, with 1,300. They deployed
The ISF came to be composed of personnel a brigade headquarters with three infantry bat-
from four countries, each of which volunteered for the task. It talions of 300 men each. Two of the battalions were from

WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022 67

OBSERVATION POST
the 1st Grenadier Regiment, and the
third was a military police unit. They
also sent a squadron of tankettes.
The Dutch contributed 250 men,
including a battalion headquarters
and two infantry companies, all from
the Royal Netherlands Marines.
Sweden also sent 250 men in a battal-
ion headquarters and two infantry com-
panies from their 1st Lifeguard Regiment.
Lead elements of the ISF deployed
to the Saar on 13 December 1934, with
the rest arriving by 22 December. That
left just over three weeks to deploy.
An issue immediately arose when
plebiscite officials said each voting site
would require three trucks to transport
the ballot boxes, police, observers,
government officials and ISF security
forces. That meant a requirement for
2,580 trucks, but the ISF had only
60. Further complicating the issue,
the ISF would not be able to provide
even one squad per polling station,
while the plebiscite officials were
calling for a full platoon at each.
The solution was to deploy the
ISF trucks, each carrying a squad
68
along preplanned routes to pick
up the ballot boxes. Each truck was
given a route that called for pickups
from about 15 voting stations.
The German Front and its support-
ing paramilitary organizations were
given strict instructions from Berlin
not to interfere with the plebiscite or
the ISF. Nazi leaders were confident
the plebiscite would go their way,
thus their orders to not interfere.
On the day of the plebiscite noth-
ing untoward occurred. The ISF trucks,
despite a heavy snowstorm, made
their rounds and the ballot boxes
were gathered. The votes were then
tallied by officials from Luxembourg,
Switzerland and the Netherlands.
On 15 January 1935 the results were
announced, showing an overwhelm-
ing 90.7 percent vote for reintegration
with Germany and thereby providing
Hitler with his first foreign policy vic-
tory. The day was treated as a holiday
throughout the Saar. Swastika flags
suddenly appeared everywhere and
church bells rang non-stop. When night
fell, the city of Saarbrucken, despite the
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Dutch soldiers of the ISF driving on British trucks
through driving snow to collect the ballot boxes.
Photo courtesy of the Dutch National Archives.
snow, remained lit up all night and a
torchlight parade moved through the
streets into the early morning hours.
The ISF remained for nearly another
month to ensure a peaceful transi-
tion. They began their withdrawal
on 12 February and were all out by
27 February. Once the ISF had with-
drawn, the local police were unable to
restrain the Nazi paramilitaries, who
began to persecute former United
Front supporters. Soon thousands of
social democrats, communists and
Jews had fled west into France or
Luxembourg. That continued until
Germany sealed its borders during the
1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland.
Soon after World War II ended
in Europe, the Americans, whose
forces had overrun the Saar, offered
to return it to the French. That time,
however, the French were content
to have it remain in Germany. -
OBSERVATION POST
Operation Tradewind:
1944 Invasion of Morotai
BY JON CECIL
L
L
OCATED MIDWAY BETWEEN NEW GUINEA
and the Philippines, the strategic value of Morotai
came from its airfield, which was needed to proj-
ect airpower in support of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s
coming invasion of Mindanao. Morotai lay within the
boundaries of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area
Theatre of Operations (SWPA), and he ordered its capture
when reconnaissance showed the neighboring island
of Halmahera was much more strongly defended.
On the other side, Gen. Korechika Anami’s Second
Area Army (US army group equivalent), headquartered
on Celebes in the Netherlands East Indies, was respon-
sible for the defense of Halmahera, Batjan and Morotai.
Lt. Gen. Nobuo Ishii’s 32nd Infantry Division arrived on
Halmahera in May 1944 to defend its nine airstrips. He sent
two battalions from the division’s 211th Regiment to Morotai,
where they began work on an airstrip near the village of Pitoe.
That effort was soon abandoned due to drainage problems,
and both battalions were moved back to Halmahera.
70 WORLD at WAR 86 |
Amphibious landing forces approaching Red Beach on Morotai on
15 September 1944.
A composite force of 500 men from 32nd Division and
Rear Adm. Ichihei Yokokawa’s 26th Special Base Force
were left on Morotai. The most skilled troops among
them were those of Maj. Takenobu Kawashima’s 2nd
Provisional Raiding Unit. It was made up of four com-
panies of Formosan natives, specially trained in jungle
warfare, who formed the “Takasago Volunteers.”
Kawashima deployed the bulk of his troops
in the southwest of the island, spreading the
remaining elements around the coast.
The invasion of Morotai—codenamed Operation
Tradewind—was scheduled to begin with an
amphibious assault by “Task Force Daredevil” on 15
September 1944. That same day, 1st Marine Division
was scheduled to assault the Central Pacific island
of Peleliu as part of Operation Stalemate II.
In preparation for the two invasions, the US Navy con-
ducted a carrier air offensive by Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher’s
Task Force 38 between 28 August and 24 September. That
OCT–NOV 2022
effort ultimately destroyed more than 1,000 Japanese
aircraft and sank or damaged 150 ships. American losses
were 54 aircraft in combat and 18 from accidents.
Tradewind’s naval task force arrived off Morotai of the
morning of 15 September without its approach having
been detected by the Japanese. The invasion force num-
bered 57,000 US Army soldiers with support elements from
the US Army Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force.
Gen. Walter Krueger’s XI Corps included Maj. Gen. John
C. Person’s 31st Infantry Division and the 126th Regimental
Combat Team of Maj. Gen. William H. Gill’s 32nd Infantry
Division. Those units were supported by an anti-aircraft
group and several engineer units. MacArthur accompanied
the task force aboard the light cruiser USS Nashville.
To help maintain the element of surprise, the Allies had
sent only a few photo-reconnaissance missions over the
island. As a result, Krueger had only limited information about
the condition of the invasion beaches and Japanese positions.
The general expectation was there would be little opposition.
The landings targeted the Gila peninsula, a location as
close as possible to the sites selected for the new airfields
that were to be built on the Doroeba plain. Two areas on
the southwestern coast were determined suitable landing
sites, and were designated as Red Beach and White Beach.
Coast Guard sailors looking off the stern of their LST at the line
of others coming behind them on the approach to the island.
WORLD at WAR 86 |
Unfortunately, the aerial reconnaissance did not reveal
the actual condition of those beaches. They both proved
unsuitable, in that they were muddy and difficult for land-
ing craft to approach because of their many rocky ridges
and coral reefs. Men and equipment had to step off the
landing craft into deep surf, which slowed the landing
and resulted in the loss of large amounts of equipment.
The landings began at 6:30 a.m. on 15 September.
After a two hour bombardment, the first wave went in at
8:30 a.m. meeting no opposition. The 31st Division’s 155th
and 167th Regiment Combat Teams (RCT) landed on Red
Beach, and the 124th RCT landed on White Beach.
By the end of the day, the GIs secured all their objec-
tives and held a perimeter 2,000 yards inland. There had
been little fighting and few casualties. The defending 2nd
Provisional Raiding Unit had simply withdrawn inland.
Meanwhile a survey party determined Pitoe Bay,
opposite White Beach, was better suited to receive
landing craft. Codenamed Blue Beach, it became
the primary landing zone starting the next day.
The 31st Division continued to advance inland,
still meeting little opposition. They secured the
perimeter around the uncompleted Japanese air-
field area during the afternoon of the second day.
OCT–NOV 2022 71
OBSERVATION POST
Map Key

72 WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022

 After 16 September operations on
Morotai were largely limited to patrol-
ling, though the Japanese mounted an
unsuccessful attack on 18 September.
The limited Japanese resistance
meant the US ground troops did not
require air support, so the fleet car-
rier group left for other duties on 17
September. The six escort carriers
remained on station, but their air-
craft saw little action until four escort
carriers departed on 25 September
and the last two left on 4 October.
After 17 September, the 126th RCT
made several landings along Morotai’s
coast and offshore islands to establish
radar stations and observation posts.
Those landings were generally unop-
posed, though patrols made numerous
contacts with small groups of Japanese.
On 20 September the 31st Division
advanced farther inland to secure a
larger perimeter after MacArthur’s
headquarters decided to expand
airfield construction. Again, the
advance met little resistance.
On 22 September a Japanese force
attacked the headquarters of the 1/167th
Infantry but was repulsed. On the fol-
lowing day a company from the 126th
RCT attacked some well dug-in Japanese
they had found near Wajaboeta, on
the island’s west coast, and were
repulsed. The 126th resumed its attack
the next day and took that position.
The Japanese had belatedly rec-
ognized the significance of the threat
posed by Morotai’s capture. To disrupt
the airfield construction, they sent
reinforcements from Halmahera
between late September and early
November. These troops included
the main body of the 211th Regiment,
the 3/210th Regiment and three raid-
ing detachments. Col. Kisou Ouchi,
commander of the 211th, was given
charge of all the forces on Morotai.
Decryptions of Japanese mes-
sages gave advance warning about
the Japanese reinforcements. US
PT boats intercepted and destroyed
many of the barges the Japanese used
as transports, but they were unable
to totally stop the build-up. The last
US infantrymen coming ashore in deep
water on 15 September.
Japanese barge from Halmahera would
reach Morotai on 12 May 1945.
Though the 2nd Provisional Raiding
Unit attacked the US perimeter on
several occasions, even with the
reinforcements it did not disrupt the
airfield construction. The survivors
fell back into the interior, where many
died from disease and starvation.
Late in December 1944, the 136th
RCT of Maj. Gen. Percy Clarkson’s 33rd
Infantry Division arrived on Morotai
from New Guinea. After landing on the
west coast, that RCT moved against
Japanese positions from the southwest
and north. The move was supported by
the 130th RCT, and the 3/167th Infantry
was also committed to the operation, all
in an attempt to prevent the Japanese
from scattering into small groups across
the island’s mountainous interior.
At the start of January 1945, US
forces discovered two battalions of
the 211th Regiment dug in on a hill
about four miles north of the perim-
eter. The 1/136th and 2/136th attacked
on 3 January. They won that battle
by the afternoon of the next day, and
all the Japanese were cleared out of
the area by 5 January. On 10 January
the Americans found and overran
the island’s Japanese radio station.
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
Japanese aircraft raided Morotai for
several months after the landings, flying
179 sorties between mid-September
1944 and early February 1945. In total,
those attacks destroyed 42 Allied
aircraft and damaged 32 others while
killing 19 men and wounding 99. The
most successful raid was on the night
of 22/23 November, which destroyed
15 aircraft and damaged eight more.
Regular air raids fell off at the end of
January 1945, though the final one did
not occur until 22 March. US anti-aircraft
fire downed most of the 26 Japanese air-
craft lost over Morotai during the raids.
Four squadrons of PT boats initially
operated from Morotai, with three of
them withdrawn by February 1945. They
patrolled the waters around Morotai and
conducted operations into Japanese-
occupied Netherlands East Indies (NEI)
in support of Australian and Dutch
reconnaissance parties ashore there.
American engineers completed
the abandoned Japanese airstrip for
use as a fighter base on 29 September
1944. Meanwhile work started on
a much larger bomber base on the
south coast, which was finished a
week later. The engineers constructed
a third airstrip by 17 October.
The 31st Division remained on
Morotai until 12 April 1945, when
73
OBSERVATION POST
Men from a US Navy combat
demolition unit preparing TNT hoses
to blast a channel prior to going
ashore on Morotai.
it departed for landings planned
against southeastern Mindanao in the
Philippines. It was replaced by Maj.
Gen. Harry H. Johnson’s 93rd Infantry
Division, which was a segregated
African-American unit deployed for
security and construction tasks.
The 93rd began intensive patrolling
to eliminate the remaining Japanese
on the island. At the time, most of
those Japanese were on the island’s
west coast, where they remained
close to the gardens they had planted
to provide their supply of food.
The 93rd Division landed patrols
along the coast, and they fought
many skirmishes with small Japanese
units. One of the division’s goals was
to capture the senior Japanese com-
mander, Col. Ouchi, who was taken
prisoner on 2 August 1945. He was the
74
highest-ranking Japanese officer to be
taken alive during the Pacific war.
Throughout the campaign, US casual-
ties totaled only 30 dead, 85 wounded
and one missing. Japanese losses totaled
an estimated 300 killed and 13 captured.
Morotai played a more significant
role in the liberation of the Philippines
than had been proposed by Allied plan-
ners. In September 1944, MacArthur
postponed the invasion of Mindanao
in favor of landings on Leyte, which
took place during October. The airbases
on Morotai were the closest air facili-
ties to Leyte, and aircraft based there
could support attacks against targets
across the southern Philippines.
After airfields had been completed
on Leyte, Morotai was used as a stag-
ing base for land-based fighters and
bombers flying to the Philippines. The
island remained a vital Allied base even
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
after Leyte was secured. American and
Australian planes based on Morotai
continued to attack Japanese targets in
the NEI and the southern Philippines
until the last days of the war.
Postscript
On 9 September 1945, all Japanese
on Morotai officially surrendered.
For one conscript, however, the war
did not end at that time. Pvt. Teruo
Nakamura, a Formosan native of the 4th
Takasago Volunteers, remained hidden
on the island until 1974, when he was
captured by Indonesian soldiers who
tricked him into allowing them to get
close to him by dressing in Japanese
uniforms. Nakamura handed over his
rifle, which he had kept in meticulous
condition, along with five rounds. He
is considered to have been the longest-
serving soldier of World War II. -
 RAF
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
DELUXE EDITION

I NC L U D E S LION, EAGL E & 2-PL AYER

France has fallen. England stands alone against the CONTENTS:

might of a triumphant Germany, defended only by the • 176 Counters • 4 Player Aid cards
• 165 Cards • Planning display
Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons of the Royal Air Force.
• 2-sided Mounted • 2 Dice
Hitler orders his mighty Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF Game Board • Storage bags
in preparation for Operation Sealion—the invasion of • 3 Rule booklets
England. German fighters and bombers fill the English • Campaign Analysis $130
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skies and the RAF responds.

Now you command history’s greatest air campaign—the Battle of Britain.

Improving on his award winning solitaire classic, with this third edition,
designer John Butterfield ramps up the historical accuracy, tension and
play options with three complete games. Control the British Fighter
Command in RAF Lion, Luftwaffe forces raiding England in RAF Eagle, or
take on a live opponent in RAF 2-Player.

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OBSERVATION POST
The Arado 234 B-2 Jet
Reconnaissance Bomber
BY CARL O. SCHUSTER
O
O
N 9 SEPTEMBER 1944, GERMANY’S
Sonderkommando (Special Unit) Goetz launched
its first Arado 234B reconnaissance sortie over
Britain. German armed forces high command was desper-
ate for information about the Allied units still on that island.
They were worried the Allies might land in the Netherlands
to open the Scheldt Estuary to allow the use of Antwerp
as a major logistical hub, and at the same time cut off the
German armies then retreating across northeastern France.
Most operational-level commanders in France, and
much of the high command staff, rejected that assess-
ment—but they wanted convincing evidence.
The photographs taken in the first half of 1944
had shown what looked to have been a major army
buildup in East Anglia, but no reconnaissance planes
had returned from missions there since late July.
Though originally designed as a bomber, the Arado 234B
jet aircraft had the speed and high ceiling that offered a
good chance of returning from a reconnaissance mission
over hostile territory. Two of the Special Unit’s four Arados
were production aircraft; the other two were prototypes.
The unit had received the two prototypes in July in
order to test them in an operational environment, develop
standard procedures and tactics, and train pilots and
76 WORLD at WAR 86 |
An Ar 234 bomber version that was captured by the British. It was
later restored and put on display at the Smithsonian.
Photo by Alan Wilson, Wikimedia.
aircrew. In that way, Capt. Erich Sommer conducted his-
tory’s first jet reconnaissance mission on 2 August.
Those first missions over France and the English Channel
showed the Arado could easily evade Allied fighters. The
two production aircraft were delivered in late August, and
the Special Unit’s 1st Squadron was formally established as
an operational unit and moved to Rheine Main Airbase.
The Arado derived from a November 1940 Luftwaffe
request for a jet-powered bomber with an 810 nautical mile
(1,500 km) range while carrying a 1,100 lb. (500 kg) bom-
bload. Prototype production began in January 1941 for a
plane that would be equipped with two turbojet engines.
The prototypes’ airframes were completed by April, but the
engines could not be gotten ready before January 1942.
Early flight testing involved towing aloft one of the
prototypes to evaluate its landing, takeoff and flight sta-
bility characteristics. Those first two were immediately
rated as outstanding by the test pilots and ground crew,
but they all disliked the unorthodox landing carriage.
That is, the plane took off atop a reusable wheeled trol-
ley and landed on retractable skis. Once landed, the ground
crew had to use a crane to lift the plane back up onto
another sled and tow it to the hangar. That operation took
nearly 30 minutes, which made the plane vulnerable dur-
ing that time and also extended mission turnaround time.
OCT–NOV 2022

Joy Cohn via Wikimedia
The first two pre-production engines were finally delivered
in February 1943. Despite being intended only for static tests,
they were mounted on Prototype V1 and used in taxiing trials.
More problems with the trolley surfaced immediately. They
had a steerable nose wheel, but turning the aircraft required
great care to avoid shifting the plane’s alignment enough to tip
it. Hydraulic clamps solved that problem, but the installation
of the engines exposed yet other problems with the trolley.
The first test flight took place on 15 July 1943. The
trolley’s nose wheel oscillated as the plane neared
takeoff speed and nothing worked to fix that.
Releasing the trolley from the ascending plane also created
challenges. Initially the pilot released it manually at takeoff,
and five parachutes slowed its descent to prevent damage;
however, that proved impractical. The parachutes did not
always deploy in time, destroying the trolley on impact.
After two trolleys were wrecked that way, procedures were
modified so the pilot released the trolley just as takeoff speed
was achieved. That solved the trolley destruction problem,
but it introduced another: retraction of the landing skis.
The landing skis were deployed alongside the trolley
to enhance its stability, and they used the same hydraulic
system for their retraction and deployment. Sometimes
they refused to retract when the trolley was released.
The designers finally decided to ‘cut the Gordian knot’
by building in tricycle landing gear using large low-pressure
tires. The delivery in late July of much improved and more
powerful engines ensured the plane could accommodate
the additional weight of that landing gear. The fuselage was
also expanded to accommodate it. Operational units soon
removed the rear-firing 20mm tail cannon as useless, thereby
reducing the plane’s weight by nearly 880 lbs (400 kg).
Arado delivered the first Ar-234B-1 “Blitz” bomber, the
V-9, with a new pressurized cabin and an ejection seat, in
March 1944. Tooling for mass production had begun in
December 1943. Some of the early production models did
WORLD at WAR 86 |
Arado 234B Characteristics
Crew 1
Length 12.64 m / 41 ft, 5"
Wingspan 14.4 m / 47 ft, 3"
Max Takeoff Weight 9,800 kg / 21,600 lbs
2× Jumo 004B turbojets,
Propulsion
1,980 lbs of thrust each
461 mph at 8,000 m / 26,250 ft
Top Speed
435 mph at 10,000 m / 32,800 ft
Typical Mission Speed 350 mph at 33,000 ft
Max Range/Mission Radius 891 nm / 350 nm
Defensive Armament 2× fixed 20 mm
Ammunition Carried 200 rounds
Cameras (Recce Mission) 2–4 Cameras
1× 1,000 kg / 2,200 lb
Bombs (Bombing Mission)
or 3× 500 kg / 1,100 lb
not have ejection seats and pressurized cabins, but they
become standard features on all planes by October 1944.
Production and operations were limited by engine
availability and fuel supplies. The engines required 80
octane gasoline for starting, and shifted to kerosene-
based jet fuel when the engine reached 6,000 rpm.
The Arado only needed 1,100 yards (1,000 m) for
takeoff and 2,200 yards (2,000 m) for landing, but
the ailerons had to be adjusted precisely or it suf-
fered directional instability at high speeds. That also
limited dive speeds to under 540 mph (870 kph).
Otherwise the Arado was easy to fly. The plane recov-
ered naturally from flat spins, and it had a better turn
radius and roll rate than the Me-262 (though climb and
acceleration were inferior to that of the fighter).
The Arado flew with two to four cameras, but those
missions’ effectiveness was limited by arguments over
reconnaissance doctrine. That Luftwaffe’s photographic
analysts preferred to use multiple cameras to build
three-dimensional images to enable them to get precise
measurements of the targets. That helped greatly in dis-
tinguishing real from fake equipment and positions.
The high command and political leadership preferred rapid
delivery over precision exploitation, and they had no patience
for the longer development time stereoscopic photography
required. As a result, the Arados’ mission-return success rarely
provided the images needed to defeat Allied deception efforts.
The Arado 234B set the example for aerial reconnais-
sance missions against a seemingly impenetrable air defense
system. With a cruising speed of 350 mph (563 kph) at 33,000
feet, the Arado was all but impossible to intercept. No recon-
naissance variants were lost to Allied air defenses, a record
only matched by America’s SR-71 performance during and
after the Cold War. In most ways the Arado represents yet
another German weapon system introduced too late and
in too limited numbers to affect the course of the war. -
OCT–NOV 2022 77
 MEDIA REVIEWS
T
T
HE STORY OF SOME CITIES
impacted by World War II—e.g.
Leningrad. Berlin, London—
have been written many times. One
has been neglected: Rome. There’s
probably a good reason for the neglect.
It was an Axis city plagued by the
Italians’ erstwhile German allies after
the Italians switched sides in 1943, so
there was little sympathy for the city’s
suffering. As the British pointed out to
78
Rome, City in Terror:
The Nazi Occupation 1943–44
REVIEWED BY JOHN D. BURTT
the Pope, when asked to spare Rome
from the Allied bombing deluge, “You
bombed us,” referring to the Italian
contribution to the air blitz on London.
Failmezger starts his story with
the scattergun and desperate peace
negotiations the Italian govern-
ment under Marshal Pietro Badoglio
attempted once the writing was on the
wall in Sicily, invaded in July 1943. With
the help of the papacy an armistice
was hammered out just before the
Allies landed at Salerno (9 September
1943). But if the writing was clear to
the Italians, it was equally clear to the
Germans and they were much better
organized. They moved quickly to gar-
rison cities, disarm Italian troops, and
prepare to hold Italy as long as possible.
Chaos was created initially as Romans
surged to protect their city from the
Germans, but at times their own police
interfered and arrested them for carry-
ing guns. By the time the chaos settled,
the Germans had the city and country.
The next 10 months of the city’s
occupation are described, with an
emphasis on the Italian partisans who
WORLD at WAR 86 | OCT–NOV 2022
fought, the Allied POWs who escaped
via the “Escape Line,” the OSS spies
who operated in the city, and the Jews
who were targeted for transport. One
of the more interesting segments of
Failmezger’s story is the detail he
collected on the Nazi Gestapo—the
reader learns how they were organized
to handle intelligence, sabotage, and
policing. As one aspect of their con-
trol, over 430,000 Italians were sent to
Germany as slave labor. He also details
the cost of partisan efforts, noting a
successful partisan bomb/ambush
of a German police unit led directly
to the massacre of 335 civilians.
The story is intense as the author
uses a lot of personal recollections.
The picture that emerges is one of
near civil war: along with Italians
against the Germans, pro Mussolini
fascists fought both anti-fascists
and communists. With a good bib-
liography, detailed appendices, and
period pictures, Failmezger’s book
on Rome fills a major hole in the
annals of World War II cities. -
Pacific Battles Volume 1: The Rising Sun
Pacific Battles covers the great land battles of the
Pacific theater in WWII. Players command anywhere
from a division to a corps worth of forces, and
employment of combined arms tactics is critical. The
system shows the evolution of tactical doctrine in both
the Japanese and Allied armies with Banzai charges,
superior US fire coordination, naval bombardment,
airpower, amphibious landings, and engineer
operations. This volume includes 3 games:

• The Fall of Singapore: Dec. 1941–Feb. 1942

• Struggle on Bataan: 9 Jan.–9 Apr. 1942
• Turning Point Guadalcanal: Aug. 1942–Feb. 1943

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