Vidar L.

Haanes
Professor
Church History
MF Norwegian School of Theology

Studia Theologica 2007 ;Volum 61.(1) s. 21-46

Christological Themes in Luther’s Theology

Ich glaube dass Jesus Christus, wahrhaftiger Gottesson, sei mein Herr worden (Large Catechism)

1. Introitus
Christology played such an important role for Luther1 that he described the devil's strategy as
to attack precisely these three strategic points: First, the divine nature of Christ, second, the
human nature of Christ, and third, the work of Christ.2 This is also the central point of the
Apostle's Creed, according to Luther: summa: Es hat der Teuffel keinen friede können haben,
wo der liebe Christus gepredigt wird nach dem ersten Symbolo, das er sey Gott und mensch
für uns gestorben und erstanden. 3
Theologians from Bellarmino and Gregor of Valencia to Yves M.-J. Congar have
questioned different aspects in Luther’s Christology in relation to catholic tradition. Luther
generally set forth his theology within specific disputes, and we may ask whether Luther had
a consistent Christology, a thought-through reflection on the two natures of Christ and the
asserted unity and communication between them. Or was Luther satisfied to speak of Christ's
work as savior, justifier and redeemer? These questions are of course very general, and cannot
been answered easily. In this article I will try to show that Luther in his Christology is in line
with Chalcedonian tradition.
In his treatment of Luther’s Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity in Christ
(1540), Graham White states that the structure of the theses may well be clear, but their
meaning is not. He goes on asking whether Luther’s use of the Fathers are consistent, or
whether he changed his mind between writing the two halves of the theses, as if he respects
the Fathers when they speak properly and rejects them when they speak improperly.4
As early as in his first lecture on the Psalms, Luther writes that the dogmas of the early church
are like dead letters that every new generation must awaken to new life and spirit. The early
church's dogma of Christ must be retold again and again. Luther thus wishes to remain true to

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the dogmas of the early church, not formalistically, but in such a way that they will have the
same significance as a basis for the preaching of the gospel that they had when they were first
formed.
Wherever Luther describes the incarnation in concrete terms, such as in his Large
Catechism, he writes that the Son became man (dass er Mensch worden). Luther has been
placed within the scheme of Alexandrian λογος-σαρχ-Christology, as it is described by Aloys
Grillmeier,5 but Luther is not really consistent with this kind of Christology. One may discuss
whether any form of λογος-σαρχ-Christology could give Christ the full humanity. In his Vom
Abendmahl, he writes: Auch das Gott der son nicht allein den leib on seele (wie etliche ketzer
geleret) sondern auch die seele das ist eine gantze völlige menscheit angenomen.6 The Son
has not taken upon himself one particular man, but rather humanity (Menschheit). Luther
attends to the Antiochian concern, maintaining Jesus' true humanity, to the point of almost
ending in an Antiochian Christology of the Nestorian type.7 But Luther himself is scarcely
aware of his respective use of an Alexandrian and an Antiochian terminology. For him, the
dominating factor is the concrete event that the Son became a man of flesh and blood. In
Bekenntnis of 1528, though, there is an evident anti-Nestorian tendency: Vnd das solcher
mensch sey wahrhafftiger Gott als eine ewige vnzurtrenliche person aus Gott vnd mensch
worden.8 He condemns the Arians (who deny that the Son was true God), the Macedonians
(who deny that the Spirit was true God), and the Sabellians (who modalistically blend the
three persons together).9 The unity of the person of Christ is maintained as a concrete and
indivisible unity. God is Creator and creature in one and the same person (being), he writes in
1533.10 In his edition of Die drei Symbola oder bekenntnis des Glaubens Christi (1538),11
Luther concludes with a summary of the content of the devil's fight against the Church,
namely attacking the true divinity of Christ, attacking the true humanity of Christ, and
attacking the work of Christ. Here he also mentions Manichean docetism: Die manicheer
sagten, Er were ein schemen oder schatten, durch Maria komen, wie ein gespenst, das nicht
rechten leib noch seele hette.12

2. The doctrines of the dual nature of Christ and of the Trinity

Reinhard Schwarz claims that Luther did not adopt the dogma of the early Church
uncritically, but interpreted it according to his own understanding of Christology.13 Luther's
understanding is formed in connection and confrontation with Ockhamist Christology, which,
according to Luther, has allowed philosophical and metaphysical principles to override the
biblically attested dogmatic truth, which as far as content goes, comes close to a Nestorian

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understanding of the communicatio idiomatum.14 What then is Luther's understanding of the
doctrine of the two natures and the doctrine of the hypostatic union, as compared with that of
Ockham? The terminology of Thomas Aquinas, Ockham and Biel to a great extend follows
the traditional terms of Aristotelian logic, as it is known to us through Petri Hispani's textbook
in logic, Summulae logicales (Tractatus).15 Thomas Aquinas uses the term suppositum as a
translation of hypostasis.16 His understanding of the hypostatic union corresponded to a
supposital union, whereas Luther sets up against this a personal union.17 Ockham and Biel
also use the term suppositum instead of person, as it is a more comprehensive term. Suppositio
expresses meaning connected with nouns, as opposed to copulatio, expressing meaning
connected with adjectives and verbs. A given noun with a certain meaning, significatio, can
nevertheless have varying suppositions (representing or meaning different things). Thus,
scholastic logic distinguished between different suppositions, or in other words, between the
different meanings a noun could have. Schwarz defines suppositum as: die substantiale
Einzelerscheinung, die als etwas Vollständiges selbständig besteht.18 The term is in a way
subordinated to the term individuum, since this can also express accidental being, whereas
suppositum can only express substantial being. We are reminded of the words of
R.W.Southern, who wrote: “It is necessary to always bear in mind the distinctions of meaning
between essence and substance, and between subsistentia, substans, persona, natura,
differentia: perhaps not an impossible demand for strong intellects, but a strange requirement
in speaking about the supreme unity of the Holy Trinity.”19
According to Schwarz, Biel would claim that the human nature of Christ did not
receive its own personal being through its supposital union with the Divine person, and thus
lacked verbum / λογος as its divine suppositum. The human nature of Christ is supported or
upheld by its supposital union with the verbum, instead of existing in and of itself. The human
nature thus contributes to the bearer's (verbum's) denomitatio concretiva, the concrete
denomination which proceeds from human nature, and which follows with it if it has an
independent subsistence, as accidence shares with its bearer a concrete denomination.20
The assumed human nature of Christ becomes not a person as such, but becomes the
uncreated person of the Word. Thus, the human nature cannot achieve a separate personal
existence, as if it had its own independent subsistence, and it can therefore only be taken up in
the unity of the person in supposital dependence. Graham White criticises Schwarz for
misreading Biel, giving the impression that the Nominalists could not distinguish between the
realm of ideas and the realm of reality. Schwarz thus thinks that Jesus is missing “a concrete
human personality”, while White would say that everything which can be predicated of the

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individual Jesus as a man, can be predicated of his human nature. Jesus’ concrete human
personality would thus be simply his human nature.21
Biel and d'Ailly's use of the term supposital union corresponds for that matter with the
term hypostatic union. But when the assumed human nature is thus denied personal existence,
the explanation lies in the ontological principle that created and uncreated must be kept
strictly apart. Dieses Axiom ist der neuralgische Punkt der ockhamistischen Christologie,
according to Schwarz.22 Schwarz suggests, again according to White, that the Ockhamists are
engaged in a project of denying the humanity of Jesus, that they are so caught up in their
philosophical games that they cannot assert “God” and “man” of the same object. Luther’s
Christology is thus “correct”, making no sort of restriction on the Christological proposition
“God is man”. Despite the distinction of their natures, God and man is one and the same
person in Christ.23 White, on the other hand, defends the Ockhamist Christology, saying that it
attempted to interpret the two natures of Christ as ways of designating Christ, based on
reality. Propositions such as “the Son of God is a creature” are literary true; but one may want
to avoid them to avoid misunderstanding.24 White is rather polemic against Schwarz.
Biel himself kept to the Aristotelian axiom: nulla proportio est finiti ad infinitum. The
hypostatic union would apparently be impossible, but it is nevertheless defended because the
human nature, which is and remains infinitely different from the divine nature and person, has
a relationship with its divine bearer based on its supposital dependence on the divine nature.
This does not contradict the axiom. According to scholastic logic, two entities can stand in
relationship to each other (proportion), although there be an infinite distance between them in
terms of perfection, if they are in a relationship of dependence, and if the one is giving and
active and the other is receptive and passive.
The Ockhamist doctrine of the hypostatic union in Christ takes as its starting point the
early church dogma that the Son of God, as the second person of the Trinity in his unity with
the divine nature, does not become a human person in the incarnation, but takes on human
nature. The problem is how the assumed human nature is united with the divine person. The
Ockhamists saw to possibilities. Either the human nature can blend with the person of Christ
into one person, such that the divine nature is no longer a person, but the human nature has
become the person of Christ. This last understanding Ockham rejects as false, since one could
imagine a corresponding union with a donkey or a stone. The second possibility, and thus an
Ockhamist Christology, will imply the idea that the assumed human nature of Christ stands in
an enhypostatic dependence upon the divine person who undertakes this assumption of human
nature.25 It is this dependence which Ockham characterizes as sustentari or sustenficari, and

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which causes the immediate union (coniunctio) of the two natures of Christ to lead to a unity
and identity in the one person of Christ. The human nature of Christ will then not only stand
in supposital dependence on the divine person, but will also be one or identical with it.26
William of Ockham expresses it in this way:

That Christ could have the highest lordship of all such things and be supreme
judge of all as God and by the nature of divinity, but lack these things according
to the nature of his humanity, is no more remarkable than that he could be
impassible and immortal and equal to the Father according to his divine nature,
yet be passible, mortal and less than the Father, and suffer hunger, thirst and
other bodily afflictions according to his human nature: for thus these things are
outside the divine nature – as is lack of individual lordship over temporal things.
And just as texts asserting that Christ was God, from eternity, creator, founder
and equal to the Father, should be understood of Christ according to his divinity,
not his humanity, so texts that assert that Christ was king and lord of all must be
understood of Christ according to his divinity, not according to his humanity as
passible and mortal man.27

Luther’s grievance against the Ockhamists is that they cannot say of Christ: this man is God.
Instead, they follow Aristotle, saying that in affirmative propositions, subject and predicate
must correlate. Luther was even uncertain as to whether they interpreted Aristotle correctly
here. Ad propositionem affirmativam requiritur extremorum composition meant in Luther's
opinion rather that when two words refer to the same thing, they must stand together or be
connected. Luther wrote that the Ockhamists couldn't repeat Matt 3:17 or 17:5 according to
the biblical text: Hic est filius meus dilectus, but rather had to say: Hic filius Dei, sustentans
humanam naturam, est filius meus dilectus.28 This last statement is correct according to school
logic, but does not tell the truth about Christ. Because one wishes to express the Christian
faith correctly according to logic, one ends up denying the true humanity of Christ. Luther
criticizes the doctrine of transubstantiation in like manner, since one cannot be satisfied with
the words of Christ: Hoc est corpus meum.
In his treatise Vom Abendmahl, Luther firmly denies that he confuses the two natures.
What he does is confirm that God is man and man is God – Jesus Christ is God and man in
the same person.29 He blends the two natures into one person, and it is this person who is the
subject of the entire work of Christ. One and the same person is both God and man. Gott ist

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Mensch is a Christology von Oben, beginning with creation and not reaching completion
before the formulation of the suffering and death of God. Mensch ist Gott is a Christology von
Unten, reaching completion in the doctrine of ubiquity.30 Luther denies that his Christology of
unity is an expression of monophysitism, and says rather that Zwingli's Christology is
Nestorian. Despite the terminology used in Vom Abendmahl, one cannot say that Luther
succumbs to the temptation of speculative theology, engaging in natural theology and
exploring the possibilities of God according to his absolute power and within the confines of
an Aristotelian-Ockhamist metaphysics.31
Yves M.-J. Congar thinks that Luther's Christology is monergistic, and thus deviant
from traditional Christology. God alone initiates the act of redemption. God's monergism
entails the reduction of Christ's humanity to the place or the locality where the drama of
redemption is developed, whereas the source of salvation in the Thomistic tradition, albeit
secondary and completely dependent upon God, is in his humanity.32 According to Congar,
Luther's Christology can be expressed in «Les formules fondamentales»: ce qui est dit du
Christ est dit tropologiquement des fidèles; fides Christi = Christus = iustitia : l’admirable
échange, opus Dei.33 What then is the significance of the humanity of Christ and of his
suffering? Congar writes: «Luther tend à voir cette humanité, non comme cause de notre
salut, mais lieu et situation où ”Dieu” seul opère le salut. Lien de toute cette théologie avec la
notion de personne et de nature chez Luther; son idée de la communication des idiomes.»
Congar concludes that Luther's Christology is a “Christologie de l’Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes.”
A characteristic difference between Catholic and Lutheran theology lies in the
understanding of how the human nature of Christ cooperates in the work of salvation. Congar
relates this to Luther's Christology, more than to the doctrine of justification in itself, and
claims that Luther distances himself from the traditional understanding of the two natures.
Moreover, he criticizes him for deficiencies in his doctrine of the Trinity. It is of course not
difficult to criticize Congar for using texts such as Dictata super Psalterium (1513) parallel to
Vom Abendmahl (1528), the large Commentary on Galatians (1535) and Von den Konziliis
und Kirchen (1539). Even though Luther's theology remains fundamentally the same, at least
from 1519, there are still shifts in emphasis, also in his Christology. This is especially visible
in connection with the Eucharistic controversy in 1528.
Does Luther's soteriology influence his Christology? One can ask whether the
Chalcedonian understanding of the hypostatic union of the divine and human nature in the
person of Jesus Christ changes character for Luther, as his focus shifts from Christ as
redeemer, mediator and high priest, to Christ as vicarious impletor legis, scapegoat and shelter

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from the wrath of God. In her dissertation, Dorothea Vorländer claims that Luther links his
Christology to his soteriology, thereby following up the fundamental intentions of Chalcedon.
She sees a certain shift in Luther's understanding of the doctrine of the two natures, from a
pure paradox theory to more of a conceptual harmony.34 On the basis of Congar’s criticism,
Vorländer asks if Luther's understanding of the doctrine of two natures nevertheless can be
said to be in accordance with, or within the boundaries of, Chalcedonian thought. She wishes
to answer this in the affirmative, for Luther has not departed from the dogmatic statements of
Chalcedon, but has rather intensified them and taken them to their furthest consequences in
light of the Christological statements of the New Testament.35 All the central points of
Chalcedon are confirmed even more strongly by Luther, weakening the conceptual harmony,
since the Christ event has become, according to Luther, a coincidentia oppositorum.
Vorländer herself does not follow up this thought, but there is obviously a connection here
between Luther, Cusanus and Augustine. The idea of coincidentia oppositorum is central to
Cusanus, De Visione Dei,36 but it can also be understood on the background of Augustine's
Christology, where he maintains the contradictoriness of time and eternity united in the
person of Christ. But where Augustine links the paradoxical contradiction of the incarnation
to the realm of faith, Cusanus applies it to the entire universe. For Augustine, it is the
foundation of faith and of the temporal history of Christianity; for Cusanus, it is the
foundation of an entire metaphysics.37
Théodore de Régnon has claimed that western theology in the middle ages, in contrast
to the eastern, cappadocian tradition, was so marked by Augustine's conception of the unity of
God that the doctrine of the Trinity and the understanding of the three persons of the Godhead
remained in the background, or were reduced to an abstract debate about the relationship
between the divine attributes.38 But this assertion is too one-sided. Luther is increasingly
concerned with the doctrine of the Trinity after 1533, as a consequence of an increasing
antitrinitarianism.39 The Trinity of God is described as persons, Father, Son and Spirit. In
addition, Luther uses terms such as maiestet, wessen (essence), einiger, etc. It does not seem
as if Luther binds himself to one specific set of concepts. He attempts to describe God as He
is, and uses the concept of essence: “ynn einem gleichen wessen” (1523), which we should
understand as a paraphrase of homoousios. One can ask whether Eck's accusation of Arianism
from 1521 can have played a role. The question is then what is the meaning of Luther's
reservation on this issue in Rationis Latominae Confutatio (1521): “Quod si odit anima mea
vocem homousion, et nolim ea uti, non ero haereticus.”40 On this basis, observant theologians
such as Robert Bellarmino and Gregor of Valencia could claim that Luther was antitrinitarian.

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In addition, during the Leipzig disputation Eck had demonstrated his view on the relationship
between scripture and tradition by referring to Arius, who asked Athanasius where the word
homoousios could be found in the scripture. This led Latomus to come to the conclusion that
also Luther would not use the word homoousios. In his answer to Latomus, Luther in fact
grants the Arians a certain formal correctness, even though they clearly thought heretically in
substance. They were fighting against a new, profane word in the confession of faith. Luther
could support this agenda. They were fighting against the possible consequences, the
possibility that the entire scripture might be interpreted with other words, something the
scholastics in Luther's opinion had in fact done. In addition, Luther was trying to demonstrate
that a number of outstanding men, including Jerome, had not accepted the word homoousios.
But here Luther makes a fateful mistake, as Jerome had not warned against the use of the
word homoousios in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, but rather the word
hypostasis, since for a western theologian, this word could hardly be distinguished from the
word substantia. Luther's point was that the issue itself stood firm, even without the term
homoousios, and that it was thus a suppositio ficti. Luther did not oppose NC, but he was
simply critical to the use of dogmatic terms that were not supported by scripture.41
Despite these objections, one can confirm that the doctrine of the Trinity was
fundamental to Luther's theological thought. Both in the confessions and in his exegesis of the
Credo, he generally follows a Trinitarian structure. The article on the person of Christ follows
the article on the Father and creation.42 Luther refers to the Trinitarian dogma of the early
church, but he also gives the doctrine of the Trinity a prominent place in his own
presentations of the faith.43 For Luther, the gospel is the key word, and then comes the 2nd
article in a compressed form concerning the person of Christ: that Christ is true God and true
man. This is followed by the work of Christ (according to Apostolicum), and finally, the
application pro me.44
According to Werner Elert, Luther's relationship with the doctrine of two natures was
more immediate and different than his relationship with the doctrine of the Trinity.45 But the
question is whether the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines can be separated in this
manner, such that Luther can be said to have one Trinitarian Christology, and another two-
nature Christology. Luther does not abandon the fundamental Trinitarian conception when he
treats the person of Christ separately.46 The deity of Christ is understood on the background of
the Trinitarian God, both as the Son's Trinitarian identity in relation to the Father and Spirit,
as well at the entire Trinity's relation to creation. When Luther speaks of Christ as true God,
he does not have a general concept of God in mind, nor simply the divine functions.47 True

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God means that Christ is the Son from eternity, with all that belongs to this eternal God, both
his eternal being and his creative acts. This is intellectually impossible, but Luther maintains
it as an indispensable paradox, unacceptable for the mind but inescapable for the faith; in
other words, coincidentia oppositorum. This must be given to us von oben, von Himel herab
kommen.48 Luther simply develops a paradox-theology, in which he demonstrates the logical
difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity and two-nature Christology.49

Das eynes nicht drey und drey nicht eins ist, mensch ist nicht Gott und Scheppfer ist
nicht die creatur... wir Christen haben teglich ddran zu lernen, das wir lernen drey
zelen und sagen: drey ist nicht drey, sondern eins und doch drey, …das war sey und
Gott die zwey uber unsern verstand zusamen reime, das dieser mensch als Gottes
topffen der topffer selbst sey jnn einem persönlichen wesen und jnn ewigkeit nicht
getrennet noch gesondert.50
Wir sagen , das eben dieser Mensch der rechte warhafftige Gott und ausser jm
kein Gott sey, Und wo das kindlin jnn der wigen odder der mutter an armen und
brüsten ligt, da sey Gott wesentlich und personlich.51

3. Communicatio idiomatum
The theory of communicatio idiomatum springs from the doctrine of Jesus Christ as true God
and true man, two natures united in one person, each having its own substance. When Luther
disputed on more narrowly Christological topics, starting in 1539, he showed his interest in
the person of Jesus Christ and in the hypostatic union between the divine and the human
nature of Christ. Generally, the various treatments of Luther's Christology either start with his
early writings, with a preference for the Christmas sermon, or with the later writings, with
emphasis on his Christological disputations. By emphasizing Luther's later works, one easily
loses sight of the communicatio idiomatum as an expression of the struggle between God and
humanity bound by the devil.52 We find this line of thought, however, in the Genesis lecture,53
as well as in the lecture on Isaiah 53 from 1544.54
In Luther's Disputationen, we first and foremost find: a) Communicatio idiomatum as
a fundamental category for expressing linguistically the Mystery of Christ. This shows that
Luther used this term more often from the 1530's on, plausibly as a consequence of a greater
interest in the history of dogma.55 b) Emphasis on the difference between theology and

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philosophy. c) Fidelity to and use of the classical dogmatic formulas, parallel with a criticism
of late Scholastic Christology.
Luther's agenda is primarily soteriological: God's salvation is offered to us in the
person of Jesus Christ. This presupposes that Christ really is God himself, while at the same
time being a real, true human being, so that he can give us this gift fully. Consequently, these
two natures find in Christ their unconditional, personal unity.
The two natures of Christ communicate their qualities to each other. This is the
Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures, as Luther confirms it in his preface to the disputation
on the divine and human natures of Christ: Fides catholica haec est, ut unum dominum
Christum confiteamur verum Deum et hominem. Ex hac veritate geminae substantiae et
unitate personae sequitur illa, quae dicitur, communicatio idiomatum.56 This is a truth of faith,
not a truth of reason, and it is incomprehensible even for the angels, says Luther.57 But despite
the contradiction between the divine and the human natures, these are joined in the highest
unity, coniunctae, so that they are indivisible and exist in each other. Hic facta est unio
personae. Da gehets ineinander humanitas et divinitas. Die unitas, die helts. Duas fateor
naturas, sed non separati possunt.58 The natures are still separated, however, so that the
divine remains divine and the human remains human, and at the same time they are not two
persons, but one and the same person Jesus Christ. A central passage if one is to understand
Luther's view on the doctrine of two natures is the paragraph where he denies that divinity is
the same as humanity, or that divine nature is the same as human nature, but rather says that
God is man and man is God: “Wir sagen nicht / das Gottheit sey menscheit odder Gotliche
natur sey menschliche natur / welches were die natur ynn ein wesen gemenget / Sondern wir
mengen die zwo unterschiedliche natur ynn eyn eynige person und sagen / Gott ist mensch
und mensch ist Gott.”59
The concept and significance of communicatio idiomatum makes it possible to transfer
statements about Christ as God to his humanity – and vice versa. We see this especially in the
so-called theopaschite formula in Luther, that it was God who suffered for our sins, and that
God himself died in Christ. This is of great importance for Luther, despite the traditional idea
of communio naturarum, where each of the natures has its own proprium, and where the
supernatural and the human, signs and suffering, are distributed respectively to the divinity
and humanity of Christ. Only if the man Jesus was at the same time God can one say that he
conquered sin and death by his own death. Luther is thus very close to Cyril's doctrine of two
natures, but has distanced himself to a certain degree from the Western reception of
Chalcedon, which was influenced by Leo's letters in which the distinctiveness of the natures

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was maintained to a greater degree.60 Vorländer claims that because of his Christology,
Luther's thought is more functional concerning the unity of the person of Christ, and not
purely substantial, like the Alexandrians.61 It is therefore not correct to accuse him of
Eutychianism.62 It is not sufficient though to say that Luther's thought is functional, but rather
that it is personal. The unity is personal, based on the Chalcedonian confession of one and the
same Christ (ένα και τόν αύτόν Χριστόν),63 and this acquires new significance in Luther.
In his presentation of Luther's Christology (1970), Ian K. Siggins maintains that
Luther was faithful to Chalcedon, going neither to a monophysite nor a Nestorian extreme.
Siggins makes a point of emphasizing Luther's concrete, Biblical language. In referring to the
concept of communicatio idiomatum, Siggins writes of “Luther’s haphazard attempts at
adapting inherited technicalities – technical Christology which fails to clarify the faith…”64
Siggins gives the impression that Luther is pressed to use technical terms such as
communication idiomatum to clarify his position in the Eucharistic controversy, a theory that
actually reduces the soteriological power of his thought.65 Marc Lienhard (1973/1982) places
greater emphasis than Siggins does on the importance of Luther's understanding of Christ's
true humanity, his suffering and his temptations. As a result, he underlines Luther's use of the
concept of communicatio idiomatum and the Trinitarian background. Lienhard places Luther
firmly within Chalcedonian Christology, whereas from Roman Catholic quarters, Congar's
criticism was renewed and expanded on. The papal prelate Theobald Beer concludes his
presentation of Luther's Christology with a claim that Luther departs on central points from
traditional and early church Christology and Trinitarian doctrine.66 But if one looks more
closely at Beer's use of sources, one finds that large parts of Luther's Christology are not used
in his monograph.67
In Luther’s late disputations his point of view is often the difference between
philosophical and theological language.68 He uses the term communicatio idiomatum mainly
to prove that whatever can be said about Christ as human can also be said about Christ as
God.69 But Luther does not state this only for the person of Christ, but for the Godhead as a
whole, such that he can say: “This human has created the world,” and “this God suffered, died
and was buried,” and “Christ is both visible and invisible.”70 His understanding of the
communicatio idiomatum is specified by the fact that he uses only concrete statements about
Christ. One can say “Christ is human”, but not “Christ is humanity”. At the same time,
abstract statements about the divine nature can be made, since these are synonymous with
concrete statements. Thus, both statements are correct: “Christ is God” and “Christ is the
Godhead”. This is also Gabriel Biel's understanding, but Luther has a peculiar argumentation,

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claiming that the indicated synonymy between God and Godhead, in contrast to the
homonymy between human and humanity, is valid only in theology and not in philosophy.
Biel, on the other hand, claims that abstract statements about the divine nature also can refer
to Christ, since they refer (supponunt) to the divine nature, which is (really) identical to Christ
as divine person (suppositum). Biel distinguishes between real identity and formal difference
in the relationship between nature and suppositum (person) in God.71 For Biel, secundum
quod homo and secundum humanitatem have a different meaning, while Luther holds that
these expressions are synonymous.72 In order to emphasize the unity of the two natures,
Luther also says that one cannot use statements exclusively valid for the Godhead (exclusa
divinitate) when speaking of the human nature.73 In his disputation On the Divinity and
Humanity of Christ Luther argues that Christ is not a composite and he criticises the
Ockhamists for saying that divine nature carried human nature, which implies that the person
of Christ were a composite, composed of the person and what it carries.

45. For all deny that Christ is “composed” [of two natures] though they affirm that he
is “constituted.” 46. But none have spoken more awkwardly [insulsius] than the
Nominalists [Moderni], as they are called, who of all men wish to seem to speak most
subtly and properly. 47. These say that the human nature was sustained or supposited
by the divine nature, or by a divine supposite. 48. This is said monstrously and nearly
forces God as it were to carry or bear the humanity. 49. But all of them think [sapiunt]
in a correct and catholic way, so that they are to be pardoned their inept way of
speaking. 50. For they wished to utter something ineffable, and then every image
limps and never (as they say) runs on all four feet. 51. If [anyone] is not pleased by
this or does not understand it, that Christ according as he is a man is a creature
[Christus secundum quod homo est creatura], the grammarian consoles him. 52. Let
him who has learned to discuss the same matter in various ways be commanded to
speak as simply as possible.74

This last exhortation, to speak as simply as possible, is important in Luther’s critique. It is true
that the one person (suppositum) of Christ could be referred to either as man or as God. But
basically there is only one self-sufficient entity at issue. This is why Luther argues so strongly
against the Nominalists, as they easily can end up with fallacies like “composition”,
“division” and secundum quid.75 Luther can speak about communicatio idiomatum as did
Ockham and Biel, but when it comes to the person of Christ; he prefers to speak in a simple

12
way: that man is God and God is man. We shall see that he follows the same principle in his
teaching on the real presence in the Eucharist.

4. Ubiquity and Real Presence

How does then Luther understand the presence of Christ in the created world? Oecolampadius
wrote in De genuina Verborum Domini that Christ in his human nature was subject to the
same spatial limitations as humans in general.76 He claimed to find support in Augustine for
this assertion.77 According to Oecolampadius, ubiquity is a divine and not a human
characteristic, and belongs therefore to the divine and not the human nature of Christ. As a
man, Christ can therefore only be in one place at one time, namely in heaven at the right hand
of the Father. He can't at the same time, as man, be in the sacrament. If Christ's (human) body
should really be in the sacrament, one would have one Christ in heaven and another on earth.
In fact, one would have many Christs: “Unum esse Christum in coelis & alterum in terris, imo
innumeros.”78 Luther does not answer by explaining where Christ is. On the contrary, he
problematizes the localization of Christ at the right hand of the Father, as if this were a
concrete, spatial place in heaven, with Christ sitting on a golden throne with a long robe, such
as children and painters imagine heaven. Luther uses the doctrine of two natures to reject this
idea.79 For Luther, it was absurd to claim that God's Son had left heaven when he became a
man in the womb of Mary, and to claim that Christ could not be in heaven at the right hand of
the Father and at the same time be present on earth in the Lord's Supper, as Karlstadt, Zwingli
and Oecolampadius argued in the dispute on the Real Presence.80
In his answer to Karlstadt on the question of the Real Presence in the Lord's Supper,
Luther emphasizes the clear word of the Scripture.81 Other arguments, even Christological,
are secondary, and the arguments of reason are rejected, just as Luther rejects the scholastic
doctrine of concomitance in 1523.82 “Ich sehe die dürre, helle gewaltige wort Gottes, die mich
zwingen zu bekennen, das Christus leib und blut ym sacrament sey,“ he writes against „the
heavenly prophets“.83 He continues: „Wie Christus yns Sacrament bracht werde odder uns
müsse auffpffayffen, weys ich nicht, Das weys ich aber wol, das Gotts wort nicht liegen kann,
wilchs da sagt, Es sey Christus leyb und blut ym Sacrament.“84 The word of Scripture gives
the grounds for the doctrine of Real Presence, but it is likewise the limit for what can be said
or speculated about concerning the topic. One can neither say more nor less than the
Scripture: „Wo die schrift etwas gründet zu glauben, da soll man nicht weichen von den
worten, wie sie lauten.“85 Luther's point is that when the Scripture speaks of something that

13
belongs to the realm of faith, one is to follow it according to its literal meaning.86 But this still
presupposes that the statement doesn't conflict with an article of faith that is based on the
Scripture as a whole (analogia fidei). The question then remains whether the incarnation and
the doctrine of Christ's true human nature conflict with such an understanding of verba. This
is thus the point in the development where the issue touches upon Christology. If Luther is to
be able to maintain his doctrine of Real Presence based on verba, he has to acknowledge that
it is analogous to the Church's doctrine of the incarnation and two-nature Christology. For
Luther, the question of the Real Presence is always a question of the authority of Scripture.
Luther rejects all speculation concerning the “how” of Real Presence. His intention is to
torpedo the so-called “evidence” of the Swiss reformers against the doctrine of Real
Presence.87 The issue is the two natures of Christ and of the Lord's Supper: De predicatione
Identica.88 The two natures of the Lord's Supper have obvious scriptural parallels in the
Trinitarian unity of God and in the unity of the person of Christ.89 The Trinitarian unity is
called a natural unity, whereas the Christological unity is called a personal unity. From this
personal unity springs an expression such as “God is man and man is God,” just as statements
about God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the Father as God, Son as God and Holy Spirit
as God, all spring from the understanding of the natural unity of God. We can confirm that in
his theology, Luther places great emphasis on the unity of God, in nature and essence. At the
same time, it is important that the two sides of the person of Christ are kept together in a
unity.
In his Neue Dogma, Theodor Mahlmann presupposes that Melanchthon, in contrast to
Luther, has an exegetical basis for the Real Presence.90 The hermeneutical principles that
Mahlmann associates with Melanchthon, however, can just as well be associated with Luther.
For Luther, it is important to show that arguments of reason do not hold up in matters of faith,
just as they do not do so in connection with the incarnation or the omnipotence of God.91
Luther uses the doctrine of two natures in analogy to the relationship between the elements of
the Lord's Supper and the Real Presence. For man's reason, it is just as unreasonable to say
that God is man, as it is to say that bread is flesh.92 If Christ can be God and man, then the
bread of the Lord's Supper can also be flesh.
Luther argues from Col 2:9 and John 14:9, both of which indicate that the divinity of
Christ is just as spatial as his humanity. If Oecolampadius is right and the humanity of Christ
is localized in heaven, and at the same time the fullness of God is in him, and God is in
creation, then all of creation will be spatially present on the throne in heaven.93 The idea is
that God is present in his creation. The ubiquity of God is justified on the basis of Acts 17:28.

14
In 1525 Oecolampadius used the same argument.94 God is Creator, and is therefore present in
his creation. The ubiquity of God understood in this manner is nothing else than the effective
power or omnipotence of God.95 Luther's thought is Trinitarian, with a Trinitarian
understanding of creation as his starting point.96 The relationship between the Creator and
creation concerns at the same time each person of the Trinity, and the Trinity as a whole. The
question is whether that which can be said of God's Son according to the first article of the
confession of faith, also can be said of the person of Christ according to both natures. If the
incarnate Son of God in his essence possesses the entire nature of God, then one must say that
there is no God apart from the incarnated. The whole fullness of God is bodily present in him.
Luther thus wishes to maintain that in the one person of Christ, all that belongs to the eternal
Son of God also belongs to the human nature of Christ:

Den die Gottheit ist unbeweglich ynn yhr selbs, kan nicht von eym ort zum andern
faren wie die creatur. drumb ist er hie nicht vom hymel gestiegen als auff einer leytter
odder herab gefaren als an eynem seyl, sondern war zuvor da ynn dem jungfrewlichen
leibe, wesentlich und personlich, wie an allem andern enden uberal, nach göttlicher
natur art und macht.97

Even though one can say that God is in his creation and the divinity is present in a person, it is
only about Christ that one can say: Christ is God himself. This is an issue concerning the
relationship between creation theology and the incarnation. Against Oecolampadius, Luther
would then say that the body of Christ is at the right hand of the Father, but the right hand of
the Father is everywhere in creation, and therefore also in the bread and wine on the altar. The
body and blood of Christ must also be there where the right hand of the Father is. In addition,
God is immanent; he is not situated on his throne up in heaven.
But is this a proof of the Real Presence, as Regin Prenter claims: „Der Diener soll bei
dem Abendmahl die allgegenwärtige Gabe mit demjenigen Wort austeilen, womit Gott selber
uns diese Gabe zueignet. Und ohne dies zueignende Wort Gottes wäre die Realpräsenz zwar
ohne Nutz, aber deshalb nicht weniger wirklich.“ 98 Against this interpretation, Oddvar Jensen
is of the opinion that the presence that exists because of the doctrine of ubiquity is the general
presence of the Creator, and precisely not the Real Presence of the Lord's Supper.99 As the
Son of God, Christ partakes in the ubiquity of God. This does not mean, however, that the
presence of the Son cannot be qualified in any other way than by the omnipresence of God. If
that were the case, the incarnation would have happened in everyone, as an unspecified

15
ubiquity in all people, as creatures of God. The immanence of the Creator (ubiquity) and the
Real Presence of the Lord's Supper are not the same, even though it is one and the same
Christ in both instances. Here creation theology is crucial if one is to understand Luther.
God is the Creator, essentially different from all of creation, which is nevertheless
filled with God's presence through his continuing creation. It is precisely the doctrine of
ubiquity that keeps one from ending up in pantheism, by maintaining the essential difference
between the omnipresent Creator and his creation. Luther simply wanted to counter the
radical reformers argument that the doctrine of Real Presence went against the word of the
confession on the true humanity of Christ, in that his humanity, his flesh and blood, could not
be bodily present in heaven, and at the same time be present in the elements. On the contrary,
says Luther; this is in line with both scripture and the confession, and precisely with the 1st
article on the creation. For Luther, the Father alone is not the subject of creation, but rather
the triune God, with the three persons of the Trinity together and individually being the one
true God. The incarnation must be understood concretely and literally, as God putting on
human flesh. Thus the divine and human natures of Christ are related to creation, in a manner
appropriate to the Creator alone. In the incarnation, Christ as human takes the place that the
Son has had from eternity in relation to creation. According to Oddvar Jensen, Luther's
doctrine of ubiquity is really a doctrine of creation, a concrete interpretation of the incarnation
from the perspective of creation theology.100 This is in agreement with Albrecht Peters’
understanding, that ubiquity is the Creator's presence in his creation. In the doctrine of
ubiquity, a bridge is built over the doctrine of the Trinity, from the incarnation back to
creation.101 Thus, these two have a broader or more comprehensive understanding of ubiquity
than does Prenter, who connects the ubiquity of Christ with the ascension. This implies that
the body and blood of Christ are omnipresent first after the ascension.102 In support of
Prenter’s view, one could point to Luther’s theology of kenosis, that Christ freely emptied
himself of his omnipresence, and didn’t get it back until the day of his ascension.
For Luther, incarnation and ubiquity are two sides of the same coin. Luther uses John
3:13 to interpret the incarnation in such a way that the body of Jesus is in heaven and on earth
at the same time.103 Luther's first intimation of a doctrine of ubiquity is often said to be found
in his sermons.104 Christ has everything in his hand, says Luther, and is present everywhere,
not only according to his divine nature but also according to his human nature. He is therefore
Lord of all: “Non solum secundum divinitatem, sed humanitatem est dominus omnium, habet
omnia in manu et ubique praesens.”105

16
 5. Finita simul et infinita
Luther bases the contrast between God and man on contradictory characteristics, such as
finita–infinita; creatura–Creator; and subsequently on the depravity of human nature caused
by original sin and concupiscence, causing death by which man is no longer capax Dei: …in
hac corrupta natura, quae omnino non est capax divinitatis, non possumus eum (scil Spiritum
sanctum) ferre et conspicere, qualis est.106 But what happens to the above-mentioned
contradictory characteristics when Christ unites divine and human nature in himself? One can
say that humanity's sinful contradiction to God is conquered in Christ, because Christ as true
God is without sin and evil desire. He could therefore voluntarily give himself up to death, in
order to conquer death from within. Is the conquering of sin, law and death that was a result
of the divinity of Christ then made available to man imputatively by faith, in an interaction
between Christ and the sinner? This was how Melanchthon understood it: the incarnation does
not entail the sanctification of man and man's participation in divine nature (2 Pet 1:4). Man
remains sinful and impure. We escape divine punishment only because God sees the
righteousness of Christ and attributes it to us.
The claim that Christ is a union of finite and infinite was quite problematic in the early
church, especially among the Antiochene theologians, being influenced by the Aristotelian
tradition. 107 It was believed that the infinite distance between the divine and human natures in
the person of Christ remained unchanged in their union in the hypostasis of the λογος. The
Fathers tried to solve this problem, and Chalcedonian Christology is a result of this struggle,
stating that finite and infinite is united in the Person of Christ. The idea of a mingling of the
two into one nature was at least rejected: nulla proportio est finiti ad infinitum. Luther sees
the incarnation differently and more radically:

Es ist ein philosophisches Argument, dass es keine Verhältnisbeziehung von Geschöpf

und Schöpfer, Endlichem und Unendlichem gebe. Wir machen gleichwohl nicht nur
eine Verhältnisbeziehung, sondern (sogar) eine Einheit von Endlichem und
Unendlichem. Aristoteles... hätte jene Behauptung nicht zugestanden, dass dieselbe
Verhältnisbeziehung zwischen Endlichem und Unendlichem bestehe.108

Luther writes that in the incarnation the impossible happened: proportio finiti et infiniti.
Consequently, the person of Christ can be called finita simul et infinita.109 He maintains that
the incarnation is a philosophical impossibility.110 Late scholastic theologians didn't really

17
think that the mysteries of the faith could be proven philosophically, but they generally placed
greater emphasis on the fact that they should correspond with reason and should be
explainable by reason. Luther, in contrast, seems to consciously speak in objectionable terms,
such as when he says that the “infinite becomes finite” instead of using the formulation: “the
infinite God in the person of the λογος takes on human, finite nature, without thereby giving
up his infinite nature, which would be impossible”. In the same way, Christ is a union of
Creator and creation, God and man, which is a philosophically absurd statement.111 In order to
still be able to say this, Luther uses the idea of communicatio idiomatum. He doesn’t say that
Christ is Creator only, but that he is God and man in the same person. He is personaliter
connected (coniunctae) with each of the natures in the unity of the person. There are not two
sons, two judges, two persons or two Jesuses.112
Concerning the question of to what degree or in what way Jesus is created, Luther
must clearly mark a distance toward two heretical directions, Arianism which denied the true
divinity of Christ, and Schwenckfeld, who from 1538 had defended a doctrine that the
glorified humanity of Christ was uncreated. Behind this heresy was the assumption that if the
risen and glorified Christ can be worshiped, then he must be uncreated.113 Both of these
heresies broke with the doctrine of two natures and the hypostatic union in the one person.
In the disputation On the divinity and humanity of Christ, Luther is concerned with the
decadence and the regeneration of language.114 Luther introduces a differentiation in the use
of the concept of creatura, between the traditional, old philosophical meaning (lingua vetus)
and the new, theological, or rather, Christological, meaning (nova vocabula). Creatura
significat id: in philosophy, “created” means that which is not a divine essence or a divine
person. In Christology, however, the word “created” means something new, namely the
supposital bearer, the suppositantem.115 In lingua vetus and in other connections (res),
“created” means something infinitely separated from the Deity. According to the nova
vocabula, it means something inseparable and in the same person ineffably connected,
conjunctam, with the Deity. In the old language, “created” means that which the Creator has
created and distinguished from himself, but this meaning has no place in creatura Christi.
There, Creator and created are one and the same.116 In all these texts, Luther is attempting to
counter both Arianism and Schwenckfeld's heresy, without actually going into the doctrine of
two natures. He especially highlights the significance of the word “created”, which, when it is
used of Jesus Christ, acquires a new and different meaning than it had before and still has in
philosophical discourse.

18
 Is there then any connection at all between the old and the new meanings of the word
“created”, or is Luther simply submitting evidence based on two words that sound the same
but have nothing to do with each other? Luther to a certain degree criticizes Augustine, who
stated: “Qui creator est, voluit esse creatura.”117 The Scholastics generally do not speak of the
person of Christ as created, but rather of the createdness of the human nature in which he
clothed himself.118 But as Graham White shows, this way of arguing is not peculiar for
Luther, but is common for scholastic logic. Words have a meaning given by general rules, but
these rules only get one as far as what the words mean de virtute sermonis.119 For Luther, the
point is not the ontological-logical distinction between nature and person, but rather to
maintain the contrast between created and uncreated in Christ.120 The question then is whether
the contrast is cancelled out. That depends on what Luther means with his theory of words
acquiring new meanings when they are transferred from the sphere of philosophy to theology,
and especially to Christology.121 It is obvious that the contrast between the createdness and
uncreatedness of Christ disappears when they are no longer considered each other's negations,
which would be the case if the only thing that the createdness of Christ had in common with
the createdness of other created beings, was the equivalent (äquivoken) sound of the word. In
this way, Luther criticizes a theology which aspired to a common terminology in theology and
philosophy, simply by saying that that which is true in theology can be meaningless and
absurd in philosophy, namely the fundamental theological claim: Verbum caro factum est.
One can say Deus est homo and homo est Deus, which is true without äquivocatio: Gott und
Mensch ynn einer person.

6. Conclusio
It is difficult to prove that Luther’s Christology was consistent or homogeneous, as his
theology as such consists of various different components. The close connection between
Christology and Luther's other theological themes leads to a slight modification of the
Chalcedonian heritage, but Luther does not turn away from Chalcedon. He asks the
fundamental questions once again – always assigning importance to the Christological and
Trinitarian dogmas of the ancient church.122 In Vom Abendmahl Christi Luther summarizes
the Christological dogma: „Dieser artickel vnser glaubens is: Ihesus Christus ist wesentlich/
natürlicher/ warhafftiger/ völliger Gott vnd Mensch ynn einer person vnzurtrennet vnd
vngeteilet.“123 We may conclude that the soteriological intention of Luther's Christology, and
especially the doctrine of two natures, does not go beyond the formula of Chalcedon. On the

19
contrary, this soteriological element is the real intention of the formula: “for us and for our
salvation,” as Luther maintains against all ontological speculations on the terms of the
doctrine of two natures.

Professor, Dr. Vidar L. Haanes

MF Norwegian School of Theology
P.O.B. 5144 Majorstua
N-0302 Oslo, Norway

NOTES:

1
Karl Holl’s statement (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, I : Luther, Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr,
1927, 71) that Christology played a limited roll for Luther has rightly been rejected. Cf. Risto Saarinen, Gottes
Wirken auf uns. Die transzendentale Deutung des gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung (Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989) 92f.
2
M. Luther, WA = Luthers Werke - Kritische Gesamtausg. (Weimar, 1883-1993) 50, 269,1-20.
3
M. Luther, WA 50, 268, 15-18.
4
G. White, Luther as Nominalist (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) 236.
5
A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition I (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1975) 326ff. Bernhard Lohse,
Martin Luther’s Theology, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999) 228.
6
M. Luther, CL. = Luthers Werke in Auswahl / herausgegeben von Otto Clemen (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1950-1963) Band III, 508, 24-26.
7
Cf. Confessio Augustana III: filius dei assumpserit humanam naturam. See W. Maurer: Historischer
Kommentar zur Confessio Augustana (Gütersloh, Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1978) Band II, 30, who claims that
the notion of assumptio is foreign to Luther. Cf. Athanasianum 33.
8
Cl III, 508, 18-36.
9
Luther's condemnation is close to the text from the Council of Florence in 1439-45: Hinc damnat
Sabellium personas confundentem et ipsarum distinctionem realem penitus auferentem. Damnat Arianos,
Eunomianos, Macedonianos solum Patrem Deum verum esse dicentes. Filium autem et Spiritus Sanctum in
creaturarum ordine collocantes. Damnat et qoscumque alios, gradus seu inaequalitatem in Trinitatem facientes.
H. Denzinger & A. Schönmetzer: Enchiridion Symbolorum. Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et
Morum (Freiburg: Herder, 1963) nr. 1332.
10
„Gott der schepffer und die creatur ein personlich wesen sey“, „Von Jesu Chr.“ 1533 (WA
37,43,40f.).
11
WA 50, 262-468
12
WA 50, 267,30f. – cf. 268,7f.

20
 13
R. Schwarz: „Gott ist Mensch. Zur lehre von der Person Christi bei den Ockhamisten und bei Luther,“
ZThK 63 (1966), 300. Cf. Heiko Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and late Medieval
nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 258.
14
Schwarz: “Gott ist Mensch” focuses on the confrontation, while White: Luther as Nominalist
criticises Schwarz, and focuses on Luther’s connection with the Nominalists.
15
Cf. Leo J. Elders: The Metaphysics of Being of St.Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective
(Leiden: Brill, 1993); A. Maierù: University Training in Medieval Europe (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 95-99.
16
Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiæ, (Ed. Thomas Gilby; London: Blackfriars, 1964-1981) I, 39, 1-3.
17
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 293; 297
18
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 295
19
R.W. Southern: Scholastic humanism and the unification of Europe II: The heroic age (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001), 132.
20
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 299, n38
21
White, Luther as Nominalist, 276.
22
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 300.
23
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 343; White, Luther as Nominalist, 277-278.
24
White, Luther as Nominalist, 287.
25
Bernhard Lohse, referring to the “Fasten Postille” (1525) argues that Luther adopted and sharpened
the doctrine of enhypostasis to read that the human nature of Christ has no hypostasis of its own but possesses it
in divine nature (Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 229).
26
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 303-305; 308f.; 336f.
27
William of Ockham, A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government over Things Divine and
Human [Breviloquium de principatu] (Cambridge University Press 1992) 35. Cf. Thomas Aquinas: STh. 3, q, 46,
a. 12.
28
WA Briefen 9, 444, 51ff.
29
WA 26, 324 = Cl III, 393, 4-21
30
O. Jensen, Kristi Person. Til betydningen av læren om Kristi person i Martin Luthers teologi 1520-
1546 (Dr.theol. diss., Oslo Univ., 1987), 163.
31
Cf. B. Hägglund, Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition. Luthers
Stellung zur Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheit (Lund: Gleerups, 1955).
32
Here Congar refers especially to Swedish Luther research: G. Aulén: Christus Victor, R.Bring:
Dualismen hos Luther, A.Nygren: Försoningen – en gudsgjerning, H.Lindroth: Försoningen – en dogmhistorisk
och systematisk undersökning.
33
Y. Congar, Yves, ”Regards et réflexions sur la christologie de Luther”,Das Konzil von Chalkedon,
Geschichte und Gegenwart Band III, hg. A. Grillmeier und H. Bacht (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1954), 457-486.
34
D. Vorländer, Deus Incarnatus. Die Darstellung und Interpretation der chalkedonensischen
Zweinaturenlehre bei Luther bis 1521 (Witten: Luther-Verlag 1974), 133. She upbraids Congar in particular
(pp.78; 88).

21
 35
„Doch dürfte diese paradoxale Gestalt, die das altkirchliche Christusdogma bei Luther gelegentlich
annimmt, wohl eher dem Geheimnis der Person Christi und des in ihr gegenwärtigen Heiles entsprechen als der
in der ursprünglichen Konzilsdefinition enthaltende rational – ontologische Zug“ (Vorländer, Deus Incarnatus,
234).
36
See however Vorländer, Deus Incarnatus, 85n. Cf. F. E. Cranz, Nicholas of Cusa and the
Renaissance (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000), 90.
37
Augustin, De Trinitate XV, 28 (§51) (Patrologia Latina 42) 1098; especially Sermo CXVII, 3, §5,
(PL XXXVIII), 663, where Augustine says that we cannot comprehend God, and a pious admittance of ones own
ignorance is far better than a reckless maintaining of ones knowledge (scientia). In a letter he writes that it is as
if we have in us a docta ignorantia, an ignorantia taught to us by the Spirit of God who comes to our aid in our
weakness. Epistola CXXX, 15, §28, (PL 33) 505.
38
Théodore de Régnon: La méthaphysique des couses d'après saint Thomas et Albert le Grand, 1892,
cf. Michael R. Barnes, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology”, Theological Studies 56, (1995): 237-
250.
39
R. Jansen, Studien zu Luthers Trinitätslehre, (Bern & Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1976), 207ff., Cf
Risto Saarinen and Simo Knuuttila, „Luther's Trinitarian Theology and its Medieval Background,“ Studia
Theologica 53, (1999): 3-12.
40
WA 8, 117,20-118,5.
41
Jansen, Studien zu Luthers Trinitätslehre, 89.
42
According to Albrecht Peters, this is ordo rerum, while in those instances where the paragraph or
article about the Fall is placed between those concerning creation and the person and work of Christ, it is
according ordo temporum – as in CA 1: concerning God, 2: concerning the Fall, 3: concerning the Son of God.
Cf. A.Peters, Zur Bleibende Aktualität des Augsb. Bek., (Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1981), 51; Jensen,
Kristi Person, 72f.
43
Lorenz Grönvik, Die Taufe in der Theologie Martin Luthers, (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A. Vol.
36 nr. 1; Åbo: V&R, 1968), 199. Prenter shows that Holl is also influenced by R. Seeberg, despite Seebergs’s
criticism of Holl's tendency to interpret Luther in a modalist direction. Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator: Studier i
Luthers Teologi, (København: Samlerens forlag, 1946), 183-186.
44
See for example Predigt über das Symbolum (1523): Euangelium enim nihil aliud docet quam Iesum
Christum, qui est dei filius et homo, qui omnem vitam suam, passionem &c. assumpsit propter me et petravit, ut
ego patri reconciliarer. WA 11, 48, 27-29
45
Werner Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums, 3. Aufl., (München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1965), 191, 197.
46
Jensen, Kristi Person, 74-75.
47
Jensen, Kristi Person, 78.
48
WA 37, 39,41. In contradiction to Pannenberg's placement of Luther's Christology von unten (W.
Pannenberg, Jesus – God and Man, (London: SPCK, 1968), 36.
49
Cf. „Von Jesu Christo eine Predigt zu Hofe zu Torgau gepredigt“ (1533), WA 37, 35-72.
50
WA 37, 44, 14-20
51
WA 37, 43,3-5, cf. Bek 44, WA 54,157,25-34

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 52
This is treated in particular by K.O. Nilsson, Simul. Das Miteinander von Göttlichem und
Menschlichem in Luthers Theologi, (Göttingen, V&R 1966), 203ff., 250f., Th. Beer, Der fröliche Wechsel und
Streit (Einsideln: Johannes Verlag, 1980) 339n; 376n, as well as M. Lienhard, Luthers Witness to Jesus Christ
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1982), 335-346. Luther uses the concept of communicatio idiomatum at least 11 times
in his later writings.
53
WA 42-44
54
WA 40 III, 685-746.
55
Nilsson, Simul, 229.
56
Luther: ”Disptutatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi”, 28/2-1540, WA 39, II, 93,2-5
57
WA 39 II, 98,13ff.
58
WA 39 II, 101,28-102,2
59
WA 26, 324. This quote is the starting point for Schwarz’ article (1966): Gott ist Mensch, cf. Simo
Peura, Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von 1513-1519
(Mainz: Zabern, 1994).
60
Denzinger nr. 294: Ep. "Lectis dilectionis tuae", with reference to Leo the Great, Ep [28] dogm. ad
Flav. 2-4 (PL 54, 757-771).
61
Vorländer, Deus Incarnatus, 231-234
62
Cf. K.Barth Kirchliche Dogmatik I/2, 27, on the placement of Luther in the category that historians of
dogma have called Alexandrian Christology.
63
Denzinger nr. 302: Symbolum Chalcedonense.
64
I.K.Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970), 238; 222.
65
Regin Prenter writes that in the concept of communicatio idiomatum, there is a tendency towards
monophysitism, a tinge of docetism, and that what Luther wants to express with the concept is that it is
impossible to distinguish between the divine and the human in Christ, and that after the Incarnation, it is not
possible to imagine a relationship to God that is not at the same time a relationship with the man Jesus Christ.
Skabelse og Genløsning (København: G.E.C.Gads forlag 1962), 375.
66
Th. Beer, Der fröliche Wechsel, 441ff.
67
A comparison with Marc Lienhard's treatment of Luther's Christology shows that, of the 40 instances
in Luther's disputations on Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity that Beer refers to, Lienhard uses only six.
On the other hand, Lienhard refers to 140 instances that Beer does not use at all.
68
White, Luther as Nominalist, 233ff.
69
“Ergo recte quod dico de homine Christo, dico etiam de Deo” (WA 39,II, 101,22f.)
70
WA 39 II, 23; 93
71
Cf. A. Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers späten Disputationen, (Diss. Theol. Reihe, Band
41; Erzabtei St.Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1990), 196. Cf. A. E. McGrath, “Homo assumptis”, EThL 60, (1984): 282-
297.
72
White, Luther as Nominalist, 271.
73
WA 39 II, 107, 29.

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 74
WA 39 II, 92-121 (Translated for Project Wittenberg by Christopher B. Brown, Online:
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/wittenberg-home.html., 05.05.2005)
75
White, Luther as Nominalist, 253
76
Oecolampadius: De genuina Verborum Domini, Hoc est corpus meum, iuxta uetissimos autores,
expositione liber (s.n., s.d.) (St Andrews, Scotland, 1525) CVIIIaa
77
“Non est autem conseques, ut quod in deo est, ita sit ubiq; ut deus, nam & de nobis ueracissima
scriptura dicit, quod in ullo uiuimus, mouemur & sumus, sed aliter homo ille in deo, quonia aliter & deus ille in
homine proprio quodam, & utrung; est unus Christus Ihesus, ubique per id quod deus est, in coelo per id quod
homo” (Augustin, Epistola, PL 33, 835).
78
Oecolampadius, De genuina Verborum Domini, CIVb
79
WA 18, 206,11-20
80
WA 23, 131,7-9. Cf. T.G.A. Hardt, Venerabilis et adorabilis Eucharistia, en studie i den lutherska
nattvardsläran under 1500-talet, (Studia doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia, 9; Uppsala, 1971), 57. Johannes
Brenz, with Luther's help, defeated this spatial understanding of “the right hand of God”: “Nam quantum ad
hunc locum (ascendit ad coelos) attinet, abunde tibi satisfaciet egregius Lutheri sermo, nuper adeo de
Sacramento editus.” Cf. M. Brecht, Die frühe Theologie des Johannes Brenz, (Tübingen, Mohr 1966) 98n.
81
On Karlstadts doctrine of the sacraments, cf. Ronald J. Sider, Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt : the
development of his thought, 1517-1525, (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 188-190, 292-295.
82
„Von Anbeten,“ WA 11, 450, 9-14.
83
WA 18, 166, 8f.
84
WA 18, 166, 10-13, cf. 206, 20ff.
85
WA 18, 147, 23f.
86
WA 11, 436, 21-437, 2. See A. Peters, Realpräsenz. Luthers Zeugnis von Christi Gegenwart im
Abendmahl, (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1966), 170-176; Tom G.A. Hardt, Venerabilis et adorabilis
Eucharistia, 55f.
87
WA 23, 129,31-131,2.
88
Cl III, 455-462
89
Predicatio identica de diuersis naturis / das ist / das zweyerley vnterschiedliche natur solten ein ding
sein (Cl III, 456,7-9)
90
Mahlmann 1969:20. Albrecht Peters confronts Karl Barth's (and Franz Hildebrandt's) thesis that
Luther's doctrine of Real Presence is a dogmatic presupposition and not an exegetical result. This is the same
claim that Mahlmann bases his work on (Peters, Realpräsenz,164f.).
91
WA 23, 117, 17-23; 121, 7-14.
92
WA 18, 187, 2.
93
WA 23, 131, 21-27.
94
H. Olsson, Schöpfung, Vernunft und Gesetz in Luthers Theologie, (Uppsala universitet, 1971), 369-
375.
95
The power of God is nothing other than God himself, says Luther: Gottes gewalt, arm, hand, wesen,
angesicht etc. seine gewalt ist... er selbst... , WA 23,139,12-23. Cf. Seeberg Dogmengeschichte IV/1 458-462.

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 96
Jensen, Kristi Person, 135.
97
WA 23, 141,13-18
98
Regin Prenter, „Das Ausb. Bek. und die römische Messopferlehre“, KuD (1955):55.
99
Jensen, Kristi Person, 137.
100
Jensen, Kristi Person, 140.
101
Peters, Realpräsenz, 82.
102
Prenter, „Das Ausb. Bek.“, 55.
103
WA 23, 147, 28-32.
104
For the dating of Luther's doctrine of ubiquity, with emphasis on how Luther's Christology builds
upon that of Cyril, cf. Hardt, Venerabilis et adorabilis Eucharistia, 50-56.
105
Sermon von dem sacrament, 28.-29. March 1526 (WA 19, 491, 1-10)
106
WA 39, I, 217, 9-12.
107
Werner Elert, „Über die Satzes Finitum infiniti non capax“, ZSTh 16 (1939): 500-504.
108
WA 39 II, 112, 15; 21.
109
WA 39 II, 340, 14-16.
110
WA 39 II, 9, 3f; 15, 6f.
111
WA 39 II, 8, 20-9,1.
112
WA 39 II, 98, 5-10; 99, 24f.
113
Lienhard, Luther’s Witness, 333.
114
White, Luther as Nominalist, 308-312.
115
WA 39 II, 29, 31-33.
116
WA 39 II, 105,4-7, cf. 39 II, 118, 14-22; 121,15-17.
117
WA 39 II, 105,10-12; Augustin: Sermo 192,1,1 (PL 38, 1011-1012).
118
Cf. Thomas Aquinas: “Ariani autem haeretici Christum dixerit esse creaturam, et minorem Patre.
Non solum ratione humanae naturae, sed etiam ratione divinae personae. Et ideo non est absolute dicendum quod
Christus sit creatura, vel minor Patri: sed qum determinatione, scilicet secundum humanam naturam” (STh. III,
q.16 a.8).
119
White, Luther as Nominalist, 310
120
Schwarz, ”Gott ist Mensch”, 334-337.
121
A third component, namely that of access, links the idea of different significations and the idea of
different spheres. If we have access to the objects we are talking about, we can deal with them correctly. Given
access to God (God’s presence), we can do the right sort of theology. Cf. Peura, Mehr als ein Mensch?, 202.
122
Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 10.
123
Cl. III, 394,17-19

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