This period of Spanish dominance is understandably considered a hat-trick

of successes — 2008, 2010 and 2012 — but realistically, the identity of

this side changed significantly after the departure of Luis Aragones and
the appointment of Vicente del Bosque immediately after Euro 2008.

Aragones, slightly curiously given his previous reputation as a back-to-

basics, old-school manager, embraced Spain’s wealth of attacking options
to create a wonderfully vibrant, free-flowing attacking unit that
completely dominated Euro 2008.

Del Bosque was somewhat more cautious. Whereas Aragones had used a
single holding midfielder with Xavi Hernandez alongside, Del Bosque
shifted to a 4-2-3-1 formation and used both Sergio Busquets and Xabi
Alonso. Xavi was pushed forward to play as the number 10, a position he
never played at Barcelona. The result was inevitable: Spain held the ball
for even longer, suffocating opponents with their possession play while
not actually creating much.

Andres Iniesta was moved to the flank, a position he played for Barca only
in big matches. Although he was unable to influence the game as
regularly, it’s arguable that Iniesta’s standout contributions came at
international level rather than club level. Without Lionel Messi providing
sudden accelerations between the lines, Iniesta took on more creative
responsibility, and in certain games — particularly the World Cup final,
where he scored the winner — almost led the fight single-handedly.

There are a variety of memorable photos from Spain matches during this
period, particularly at Euro 2012, that depict Iniesta surrounded by
multiple opponents, seemingly showing the extent to which he caused
problems. That was only partly true, though: the reality was that Spain
kept so many players behind the ball that the opposition didn’t need to
worry about many other attackers, and could double- and treble-up on
him. For a side packed with so many attacking talents, it’s remarkable that
Spain only scored eight goals in seven matches en route to World Cup
2010 success.

The situation up front was strange. In Euro 2008, David Villa and
Fernando Torres formed a good partnership, even if Spain sometimes
looked better with only one of them on the pitch. By World Cup 2010,
Torres’ fitness problems meant he was often on the bench, and by Euro
2012, Villa was out injured and Torres was a shadow of his former self.
And therefore, Spain often ended up playing without a conventional
centre-forward.

For the opening game of Euro 2012, against Italy, Del Bosque elected to
field Cesc Fabregas upfront. Spain hadn’t even trained in that system, and
the decision was sprung on the side shortly before the game. It meant
Spain were essentially playing with a back four, and then six midfielders:
Busquets, Alonso, Xavi, Iniesta, David Silva and Fabregas. Spain had
plenty of players looking to get on the ball but no-one running in behind.
Italy nearly snatched a surprise win that day, although Fabregas rounded
off a fine move for the equaliser, which hinted at the type of football Del
Bosque wanted with this system.
But then he moved away from the approach, trying Torres and Alvaro
Negredo up front, before eventually returning to Fabregas up top for the
final of Euro 2012, also against Italy. By that stage, even footballing
romantics who had previously marvelled at Spain’s pass-and-move style
were now having their patience severely tested by their inability to create
chances. The semi-final against neighbours Portugal was, for some, the
final straw — Spain failed to score in 120 minutes and were very nearly
made to pay when Cristiano Ronaldo fired wide at the end of a counter-
attack.

“Throughout their years of success, they have tried to keep the same
philosophy, which is based around wanting to have the ball,” said Arsene
Wenger, observing the tournament as a television pundit.

“Although they have struggled to score goals, they are the masters of
possession. They are the best in the world technically and I have big
respect for what they have done… however, they have betrayed their
philosophy and turned it into something more negative. Originally, they
wanted possession in order to attack and win the game; now it seems to
be, first and foremost, a way not to lose.”

Even Wenger, the staunchest defender of possession-based football, was

now frustrated at Spain’s caution.

The final, though, showed what Spain could be. Their 4-0 destruction of
an unusually positive, possession-based Italy side was utterly ruthless, and
featured a wonderful opener that saw the front three combining for a truly
brilliant team goal nodded in by Silva, as if to prove you don’t need to
play with a big number nine.

The second was a brilliantly direct passing move, with Xavi slipping in
Jordi Alba — the one player in this side who provided searing directness.
The third and fourth goals, scored by substitutes Torres and Juan Mata,
were scored after Italy had gone down to 10 men because of injury. Del
Bosque, perhaps noting the criticism of his side, had introduced three
players to offer more goalscoring threat, and Spain went for the kill. “That
was the real Spain,” said Gerard Pique afterwards. But was it? That was
the exception to the rule.
The real Spain was reflected by the fact they’d kept a clean sheet in 10 out
of 10 knockout games from Euro 2008, World Cup 2010 and Euro 2012.
What happened at the other end was, sometimes, almost an afterthought.

But there’s no question that this Spain side has a place in history. Not only
did they win three straight tournaments, they did so with perhaps the most
defined, obvious philosophy international football had witnessed since the
Dutch Total Football of the 1970s, popularising possession football like
never before.

(Photo: Paul Gilham – FIFA via Getty Images)