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SOCIAL POWER

by

CARLOS OBREGÓN
SOCIAL POWER

Ist Edition 2022, University Editions

Copyright 2022®, Carlos Federico Obregón Díaz

Design and Edition: Ricardo Pascoe (Spot-ON)

The total or partial reproduction of this text is forbidden by any means or procedure,
including reprography and informatic treatment, photocophy or recording, withouth previ-
ous permission of the author and/or editor.

This book is available both in digital and printed versions in Amazon (www.amazon.com)
INDEX

Preamble 6

Introduction: What is Social Power? 8

Chapter One: Evolutionary

Roots of Social Power 13

Chapter Two: Evolutionary

Psychology and Social Power 25

Chapter Three: Social Power

in Enlarged Societies 45

Chapter Four: Social Power in

the Minds of Great Western Thinkers 65

Chapter Five: Social Power in Personal

and Inter-Group Relations 87

Chapter Six: Economic Power 106

Chapter Seven: Social Order

and Social Change 1 14

Chapter Eight: Political Power 136

Chapter Nine: Brief Comments on

Social Power in Other Contexts 157

[5]
PREAMBLE

Social power has always been surrounded by mystery, it is attributed to

unknown causes which make a given person very special. Whether the
divine right of kings or emperors, the abnormally high intelligence of a
genius, the unique physical abilities of a champion athlete, the inexplica-
ble entrepreneurial abilities of a billionaire, or the exceptional leadership
of a well-known political figure; it is popularly assumed that the personal
characteristics of all these powerful figures is what distinguishes them.
Thus, social power is conceived as the outcome of an intrinsic personal
advantage. Is this true? One wonders; because the fact is, that all the
time through history powerful people have always existed. And in many
cases, a powerful person is not particularly different from the average in
any dimension, and occasionally even clearly inferior in many, like the
emperor Caligula in Rome. But then, what is the source of social power?
To answer this question is extremely relevant because it may teach us nor
only what is its source, but what does social power consists of? And how
should we manage it?
Social power actually is present in any relationship between two in-
dividuals or groups, whether they are animals or humans. Social power
is an evolutionary feature that is required both to establish social order,
and to promote social change. In this book we argue that the main source
of social power is relational. The social power of an individual or group
is mostly due to his social position. Social life implies that social power is
relational because the social relations establish the social order required
for survival. This does not mean, however, that individual characteristics
do not exist, nor that they are irrelevant as a source of social power. For
example, even though in our times there has always existed a world ten-
nis champion (a relational feature); whoever is the champion now, or at a
given point in time, has special characteristics that allow him/her to win.
But whether we discuss political, organizational or any other kind of
power – the main source of power is relational. And this entails important
lessons about how to obtain and use social power. To be a genius you
need to be in the correct scientific circle. To be a historical charismatic
political leader you have to live in a historical time in which there is a

[6]
preamble 7

deterioration of the traditional relational integrative system. To be a bil-

lionaire you need to be born in the right time, belong to the right circles,
have the proper education and so on. Even among chimps, besides in-
dividual characteristics the proper management of power implies always
relational abilities.
In this manuscript social power is seen from an evolutionary perspec-
tive, both at the sociological and the psychological level. And we distin-
guish between social power in the integrative, the power and the eco-
nomic systems. We study social power between individuals and groups,
as well as political, organizational and international power. All along we
maintain a scientific discipline, but we look for general answers that can
be helpful for anyone in his/her social life whether he/she holds a pow-
erful position or not. Welcome to the journey, we believe that you will
enjoy it1.

1
I would like to thank Dorothea Schael for her comments and her careful review of this
manuscript.
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SOCIAL POWER?

Social power is exercised in distinct instances by diverse persons and insti-

tutions. The use of power may involve the use of force, or not, and may
be consequence of several different representations of the agent who ex-
ercises such power and the one who is the target of it, such as: legitimate
or illegitimate use of power, formal or informal authority, leadership, so-
cial status, economic capacity, political network, physical strength, exper-
tise, seniority, consent, identity, functionality, love relations and others.
Having power may be due to the agent’s intrinsic characteristics or the
social role assigned to a person, an institution or a social group. Power
may be used in interpersonal relations, within a social group or between
groups. Power may arise from an integrative relation, an economic one,
or from the perceived potential or actual use of force. Social power has
been studied and described in many disciplines such as social psychol-
ogy, sociology, economics, political philosophy, political science, history,
anthropology and even linguistics and literature. Given all the advan-
tages of the multidisciplinary approach to the the study of social power,
it has the drawback that each discipline uses its own distinct framework
of analysis, which many times is not fully compatible with the one used
in the other disciplines. Therefore, despite the fact that social power is
without doubt one of the most studied social phenomena of all times, it
still remains a somewhat elusive term.
In this manuscript we approach the study of social power from an
evolutionary perspective. We raise political-philosophical questions, but
we limit the responses to those that have solid scientific backup. Social
power is not an exclusive feature of humans; it happens in many species.
Thus, it is relevant both to understand the animal roots of social power
as well as the distinguishing features of social, human power.
We argue that social power is a fundamental characteristic of human
societies that allows to maintain the social order required for the groups’
survival. Human beings were evolutionary designed to survive within a
social group. Individual differences are evolutionarily required for spe-
cies´ survival under an ever changing physical and biological environ-
ment; but each individual’s survival is only possible within the group’s

[8]
introduction 9

life. The group’s survival, in turn, requires to establish social order to

be able to confront the external challenges. Thus, social power is a fun-
damental feature for societies to be able to establish social order. Social
power allows the coordination of members within a group, and the learn-
ing process that allows knowledge to be inherited from one generation to
the next in an ordered fashion. Without the use of social power, human
subsistence would be at risk. Social power, however, can also be misused
and become a threat for the group’s survival – think for example of Ca-
ligula in Rome. The distinction between functional and dysfunctional
social power is fundamental.
In the first chapter we present the evolutionary roots of social power,
and the way it is exercised in the animal world, as compared with hu-
man societies. We conclude that from an evolutionary perspective social
power is never only based upon brute force. Even in the animal kingdom,
aggression is only one part of the explanation of social order, there is
always attachment and reproduction.
In the second chapter, we discuss evolutionary psychology and social
power. We argue that a belonging instinct has to guide the other instincts
for those animals (including humans) whose survival requires social life,
because otherwise the survival of the species would be at risk (Bowlby’s
argument). Therefore, we conclude that social power is always relational.
But since individuals do exist and they are differentiated from the group,
they ought to have their own individual survival instincts, and aggression
is required to protect individuals’ survival (Freud’s argument). Thus, in
the presence of belonging failures the individual’s intrinsic characteristics
become more decisive. Usually belonging directs and maintains social
life, but whenever there are belonging failures, aggression is unleashed.
In the third chapter we explore social power in enlarged societies. We
describe the relationship between the individual and the State in distinct
societies, and how social power arises in them. We distinguish between
relational power and power based on the agent’s intrinsic characteristics.
In primary societies, social power is defined by the social role given to
each member of the society and it is mostly relational. In traditional soci-
eties, social power is also necessarily mostly relational, but the agent’s in-
trinsic characteristics become more relevant, although they still play only
a minor role. In the Western societies, as individuals become differenti-
ated also by their rights, although the main source of social power is still
relational, the individual agent’s intrinsic characteristics become more
relevant as a source of social power. Social status gained through com-
10 carlos obregón

petition by publicly elected posts or by accumulating economic wealth

becomes more relevant as a source of social power than is the case in the
traditional societies
Chapter four is about how social power is described by great West-
ern thinkers. We argue that a society cannot be only based on the will
to power, as described by Nietzsche, because it would not achieve social
stability. Social order, as Foucault arguments, has always to be based on
relational power defined by the conceptual system and its correspond-
ing institutional arrangement. However, occasionally, due to belonging
failures, naked power, in Russell’s terms, may explain social order. We
argue however that naked power (Russell’s), and charismatic power (We-
ber’s), are necessarily transitory. We conclude that private conflicts, if
well balanced with collective interest, may actually be a healthy source
of dynamism for the integrative system. But the risk is always there for
naked power to succeed; therefore, societies must be very vigilant that
social actions always respond to collective interests.
Chapter five is about social power in personal and inter-group rela-
tions. We present the main sociological and psychological theories re-
lated to social power. Sociological theories rightly point out that social
order in extended societies requires relational social power: social iden-
tity, consent and legitimacy, a hierarchy of power and a diversified func-
tional institutional setting. But psychological theories have documented
that power holders do pursue personal interests and are not as socially
responsible as they should be. The exercise of social power between in-
dividuals and groups frequently involves domination and coercion. And
the intrinsic characteristics of the agent as to resource ownership, the
holding of private, socially relevant information, financial wealth, physi-
cal strength or beauty, and intelligence may be relevant to establish ben-
eficial social exchanges, and to reward and coerce others.
Chapter six describes how economic power is expressed in the mar-
kets through commanding other’s labor, and it depends upon the intrin-
sic characteristics of the agent such as wealth, income and purchasing
power. Economic power is one of the best means for particular individu-
als or groups to advance their interest over the collective ones, and there-
fore can be certainly a route for naked power. Economic power existed
in previous societies, but it grows in relevance as the markets become
more generalized and globalized in capitalism. However, since there is
not a market equilibrium independent of the institutional arrangement,
economic power is always relational. Institutions interrelate the economic
introduction 11

system with the integrative and the power systems; and they have the
task to make private economic power compatible with the collective inter-
est of the society.
Chapter seven presents social order and social change. We argue that
both relational power and power based on the agent`s intrinsic character-
istics are required for a society to have flexible social change. If a society
only allows relational power, it would be too rigid. The old concepts and
habits defining the social relations would not adapt fast enough to techno-
logical or exogenous changes. Thus, diversity and conflict in the society
is welcome, as it makes it more diversified and flexible. But too much
conflict without institutional relational power ends up in social chaos.
Therefore, what is needed for proper social change is a strong relational
institutional setting, which however is flexible enough to incorporate fast
required changes.
Chapter eight is about political power. We argue that political power
is always relationally based; therefore, it is mainly consequence of the
social power that derives from the integrative system. The use of coercive
power can be eventually necessary to avoid deviant behavior by some
members, but power only derived from the power system can never be
the force that glues a society together. The same happens with power
in the economic system. Economic power is one of the best means for
individuals and groups to manipulate others, but it can never be the ce-
ment on which social order is built – nor the source of long-lasting politi-
cal power. Political power is usually obtained through relational means
in the integrative traditional system. However, in those occasions when
there has been a long demise of the traditional political system, it is pos-
sible to access to political power by naked force, through economic power
or even by charismatic personal characteristics. But whenever power is
accessed by any of the previously mentioned routes, or a combination
of them, it will not be long lasting – unless a new traditional system is
developed, giving rise to a new integrative system. Societies however are
not homogeneous entities. They are often composed by individuals and
groups with particular interests and values that do not necessarily align
with the ones of the society as a whole. Holding political power implies
coordinating these diverse interested individuals and groups through an
overall institutional arrangement (and its corresponding conceptual sys-
tem) capable to accept social changes brought about by the changing in-
terests of individuals and groups, but in such a way that they are aligned
with the overall society’s interests.
12 carlos obregón

Finally, chapter nine briefly discusses the application of the concepts

learnt in the previous chapters to two topics: organizational power and
international social power. Organizational power´s main task must be, we
argue, to maintain and increase competitiveness; and this is only possible
if organizational power is based upon an institutional arrangement and a
conceptual system specifically designed for that purpose. Therefore, the
main source or organizational power is relational. But creative conflict
within the organization has to be allowed; and the institutional arrange-
ment must be very flexible to adapt to the rapid changes occurring in the
organization’s competitive environment. International social power lacks
an adequate integrative system; and this is the source, we point out, of
the main global problems in which the power and the economic systems
play an inappropriate leading role. It is argued that the global institutional
arrangement needs improvement.
CHAPTER ONE: EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS
OF SOCIAL POWER

To understand social power from an evolutionary perspective it is necessary

to understand: what is the main goal of evolution? And how does evolu-
tion work? Life is an accident of matter. The DNA (life) is a small, chemical
variation of the RNA (matter). The physical universe was there long before
life, 14 billion years versus 3.8. Life is defined as receiving energy, process-
ing, and discarding it. Life happened because accidentally certain conditions
occurred on earth, like the presence of oxygen which is required to process
energy. Life´s main evolutionary goal is survival in an ever-changing ma-
terial universe. Such survival implies diversifying as much as possible the
genetic pool to increase the survival chances. The genetic pool is diversified
through species diversification (which largely happened in what is called the
Cambrian revolution) and by having individuals with distinct genetic pools
in each species. There are two main processes present in evolution: 1) the
diversification of the genetic pool by chance and 2) the process of natural
selection. The diversification of the genetic pool by chance happens through
a) Genetic drift (genetic diversification through breeding in small groups);
b) sexual reproduction (so that the offspring inherits half of its genetics from
one sexual partner and the other half from the other); c) mutation by chance;
d) geographical migration; and e) breeding between distinct species. Armed
with this highly diversified genetic pool the process of natural selection selects
the “particular genetic pools” that adapt to the new material conditions and
through inheritance it modifies the diverse surviving species’ genetic pools
to foster a better adaptation of the species. Natural selection, for example,
is the way in which the eagle’s beautiful wings were created. One must re-
call that the process of perfecting adaptation, implied in natural selection, is
only valid for one particular material environment. Drastic environmental
changes may render inappropriate all the perfection obtained through a very
long adaptive process. This is why the dinosaurs disappeared. Despite all the
complex adaptive features obtained through a very long process of adapta-
tion, they were unsuited for the new material world that happened sixty
million years ago, most likely due to the accident that a comet hit the earth.

[13]
14 carlos obregón

Life is diversified into many species, of which humans are only a very
recent one. While life appeared 3.8 billion years ago, the Homo Sapiens is
only one hundred to two hundred thousand years old. Each species’ life
is organized to maximize its survival chances. There is an order that al-
lows the species to relate to the external environment in a way favorable
to survival. Given distinct genetic histories and diverse environmental
conditions, the way in which each species establishes its survival order
is different. Evolution has no preconceived logic. It is not an intelligent
process. In the genetic code of many species there are repeated sequences
with no usefulness. Evolution is guided by survival with two rules: di-
versifying the genetic pool as much as possible by chance, and natural
selection guided by the need to adapt to the (at the time) relevant material
environment. Therefore, there is no preconceived way to establish social
order – there is not a best way; distinct species with different genetic
routes, in diverse particular material and biological environments, gener-
ate differentiated responses. What one should expect from an evolution-
ary point of view are many diversified ways to establish social order in
distinct species, and that is what one finds in the real world
The establishment of a survival order does not necessarily imply a
social group. For many species a successful survival strategy, to produce
more offspring, is to live alone. They come together only for reproduc-
tion2. Social grouping, a common feature in many species, happens some-
times for reasons such as clumped food resources or social protection. In
baboons, the survival of the newborn strictly depends upon the protec-
tion of the group. Moreover, grouping does not necessarily require a
distinct leader. Algae such as Merismopedia form complex structures by
living together as a group in regular rows, that resembles the grouping
of cells that make up tissues. Schooling fish, such as silver-side Menidia,
are born with a genetic behavioral trait to synchronize their movements
with other fish of its species. They resemble a larger organism, a fea-
ture which they use to intimidate predators. Social grouping however,
in many species does include a social leader3. In dolphins, for example,
2
Keeton, W. T. Keeton (1980). Biological Science 3rd edition, W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc. New York, London. See also Alcock J (2005). Animal Behaviour An Evolutionary Ap-
proach 8th edition, Sinauer Associates, Inc. Sunderland, Massachusetts U.S.A.
3
Richard R. J., & Krebs J.R, edited by R.M Anderson, B.D Turner & L.R. Taylor (1979),
20th Symposium of the British Ecological Society Population Dynamics, Blackwell Scientific
Productions, London, Melbourne. See also Bell, P. & Christopher Woodcock, C. (1978), The
Diversity of Green Plants 2nd edition, Edward Arnold, London. Also Shaw, E (1962), Scien-
tific American Animal Societies and Evolution, W.H. Freeman and company, San Francisco.
chapter one 15

a larger male leader dominates smaller dolphins – usually female. But

leadership is not always obtained through brutal force. While brutal force
is the key for leadership in species like the chimpanzees; inheritance and
consensus are used in other species. Bees, chimps, clownfish and hyenas
all live in groups with a leader or dominant individual. So do many other
animals. In chimps brutal force is used for the alpha leader to get his way;
leadership usually last three to five years, and in many occasions the al-
pha leader looks for the support of other males. Spotted hyenas in Africa
are a female-dominated animal group. When the queen, or alpha female,
dies, her youngest daughter simply assumes her position, usually with-
out any disputes within the group. Clownfish, which live in warm water
reefs and lagoons, also have a peaceful transfer of power. In this case the
female is the largest fish within the group. When she dies, the largest
male in the group changes sex to become the new breeding female. The
transition of power is built into their biological code and is irreversible. In
insect societies, including many ants, bumblebees, and wasps, when the
queen dies the colony dies with her; therefore, the transition of power is
not required. Honeybees do replace their queens if they are getting old
and running out of steam. They typically just rear one queen. And this
reared young queen will then mate and be laying eggs alongside the old
queen; so, this is a very peaceful process for queen replacement. How-
ever, in some cases, such as when a honeybee colony splits into two, and
the mother queen, the old queen, goes away with one swarm of bees
and they establish a new colony, the old colony is left with no queen.
In this case, the first queen to become an adult may try to kill the other
queens before they’ve reached adulthood. And in some cases, the honey-
bee workers try to stop the fighting.
Social order happens in many different ways in distinct animal societies,
and social power sometimes lies in the use of brutal force, and some other
times in a peaceful, consensual inheritance process, and then in some cases
in a mixture of both. Social order is not uniquely established by the domi-
nant leader, often decisions as what to do involve the whole group. In the
Vulturine Guinea Fowl, a distinctive large bird native to savannahs of East
Africa, whenever dominant individuals monopolize a particularly rich food
patch, the excluded subordinates work to move the group away from that
spot, ultimately forcing the dominants to abandon a rich source of food
so that the group as a whole might benefit from a different feeding area4.
4
These comments are taken from https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/20/world/animals-lead-
ership-transfer-power-scn/index.html
16 carlos obregón

But whatever social order a species establishes, it must comply with

promoting the species’ survival chances. In many species social power is a
critical element of social order; and in these cases, it is an evolutionary re-
quirement that social power must be used under the general direction of es-
tablishing the social order required for survival. Social order however does
not imply a static society; on the contrary, it requires a dynamic one, always
guided by increasing the survival chances. And these dynamic processes
may require not only cooperation between the members of the society, but
also competition. And such competition may imply confrontation between
the individual members. However, the confrontation between individuals
always operates subdued to the superior goal of establishing the social order
required to promote the survival chances of the species. Surviving how-
ever, is not a mathematical process of optimization with a prescribed path
of action. Instead, is a process of chance, in an ever-changing material and
biological universe; in which, social power is used both to compete within
the species and to confront other species, for defense or for obtaining food
and other survival requirements. Thus, social power is for many species the
key for survival and/or for selecting the reproductive partner. Moreover, in
an ever-changing uncertain world, decisions are not always optimal, many
happen to be incorrect – surviving only requires that most of them, on the
aggregate, promote survival. And since, due to uncertainty, it is impossible
to know beforehand which is the optimal decision, the evolutionary process
produces a wide probability distribution of the genetic pool (which explains
why some newborns do not have legs, or have other physical or mental
impediments for surviving). The use of social force, occasionally, may im-
ply unnecessary destruction. Cats, for example, sometimes kill a mouse –
even if they will not eat it. Thus, not every single use of social force can be
explained by survival reasons. Many particular uses are destructive and
unneeded from an evolutionary perspective; but on the aggregate, the use
of social force is guided by the need of a social surviving order. Moreover,
social force aimed at destroying the established order is required to be able
to maintain a dynamic social order – capable of change when needed.
The survival instincts of aggression, sex, hunger, and fear guide the
individual to the use of social force to satisfy his/her survival needs; and
therefore, there is always some degree of confrontation between the in-
dividual’s needs and those of the social group. This confrontation is re-
quired to maintain a healthy dynamic social group, capable of change.
Whenever the dynamics of the social group threaten the individuals’
survival, there is a social revolt that changes the social group’s dynam-
chapter one 17

ics. Thus, social confrontation and the use of social force are required
for social change – in order to maintain a healthy dynamic social order.
And this process happens by trial and error. Therefore, it usually implies
many unneeded confrontations; but on the aggregate they do promote
the survival chances of the species in an ever-changing, uncertain world.

social power among chimpanzees

Chimpanzees usually live in groups of around 20 individuals. Chimps

defend their territory5. Social groups consist of a dominant male who
often fights for the position, adult females, subordinate males, and young-
sters6.  They break off into smaller interchangeable groups and periodi-
cally come together. An extended family group may consist of several
dozen individuals7. Chimpanzees search for food communally.
Social power is critical to establish social order in chimpanzee groups.
However, brute strength and intimidation is only one of the strategies that
defines the leadership of the dominant male. Leaders use two other strate-
gies to gain and keep power: emotional intelligence and political alliances.
A leader with emotional intelligence grooms those he seeks to influence,
shares food, and plays with babies to impress their mothers. And to retain
power, the leader carefully manages his relationships with other powerful
males. A chimp who relies primarily on intimidation lasts less than two
years, whereas those who focus on coalition-building last 10 years or more8.
Family relationships are critical to chimps. Infants are reared by their
mothers, but related females and older siblings often share their care. If
a mother is incapacitated or dies, caregiving will be provided by others9.
Chimps usually have lifelong bonds. Babies remain close to their mothers
5
Ross, Ben. “The Human-Chimp Connection,” http://www.benross.net/chimp.htm
6
Ibid
7
Nishida, T. (1968). The social group of wild chimpanzees in the Mahale Mountains. Pri-
mates, 9, 167-224.
And Goodall, J. (1986). The Chimpanzees of Gombe. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Pres
8
Erna Walraven, the author of Wild Leadership:what wild animals teach us about leadership (New Hol-
land), is the emeritus senior curator at Taronga Zoo in Sydney. https://www.afr.com/work-and-careers/
leaders/what-wild-animals-can-teach-you-about-leadership-20190902-p52n64
9
“Tool Use, Hunting, and Other Discoveries” Jane Goodall Institute http://www.janegood-
all.org/chimpanzees/tool-use-hunting-other-discoveries
18 carlos obregón

for the first ten years of their lives10. There are no monogamous bonds for
life, but the males in a group play with all the children and protect them11.
Touching and grooming are essential for chimpanzees. Grooming is a
means to deep bonding; it produces dopamine and oxytocin and reduc-
es stress12. Chimps are affectionate and intelligent. They develop trust,
loyalty, commitment, altruistic behavior and caring—which glue their
societies; but they can also be dishonest and manipulative13.
Chimps have a rich language of calls and vocal expressions. They
announce to each other the presence of certain foods or the danger of a
predator. Their range of sounds expresses a wide range of emotions from
excitement to contentment and from joy to fear.10
Through imitation and observation, they learn key tasks such as: how
to make a night nest, how to play, which plants to eat for medicinal pur-
poses and how to use tools for a variety of purposes like cracking open
nuts, fishing insects out of a tree trunk or termite mound, use leaves as
sponges, and use objects as weapons.8 These behaviors are handed down
through generations and can vary from one group to another4

difference in the use of social power between

the chimpanzees and the homo sapiens

Around six to seven million years ago, chimpanzees and hominids dif-
ferentiated themselves from a common ancestor. In these six/seven mil-
lion years six factors evolved together which differentiated the hominids
from the chimps: 1) greater technical skill used in hunting, gathering and
rituals; 2) the increased need for cooperation and communication, ex-
panding social life, increasing the ability to imitate others and understand
their minds and creating the need for learning to regulate one’s emotions;
3) greater cognitive capacity leading to more sophisticated thoughts; 4)
physical development that creates the required bipedalism, freeing hands
for other activities and creating phonological physical ability; 5) larger
brain size, and 6) a more sophisticated language.
10
Ibid.
11
Ross, Ben. “The Human-Chimp Connection,” op. cit.
12
Bright, Michael. Intelligence in Animals, London: Toucan Books/Reader’s Digest, 1994
13
https://www.releasechimps.org/chimpanzees/chimpanzee-society
chapter one 19

What distinguished the hominids from the chimpanzees was likely

not very much present in the beginning, but two and a half million
years ago the differences seem to have been clearly established. An-
thropologists have found rock technologies in Africa dated three and a
half million years ago, which the chimpanzees can learn in the labora-
tory, and they also found rock technologies from two and a half mil-
lion years ago, which the chimpanzees cannot learn. Thus, apparently
something happened in this one million years that clearly differenti-
ated the hominids.
The general process which differentiated humans from their ances-
tors likely started with the discovery of a rock technology that allowed a
surplus of production, that permitted the enlargement of the social group.
This started the development of a more sophisticated language to support
the new larger social life. The use of the hands for the new technologies
created an erected hominid which was already a reality two million years
ago (the Homo Erectus), the new position facilitated a better phonetic
capacity which allowed for even better language refinements. An increas-
ingly sophisticated language, the need to read other minds in a more
intense social life and new, more complex technologies promoted the en-
largement of the brain. Chimpanzees in the laboratory are able to learn
some human protolanguages, but they cannot learn a synthetic language
which was already in place two hundred thousand years ago. What par-
ticularly distinguishes the Homo Sapiens is his more intense social life;
this is the main reason for his survival versus the Homo Neanderthalis,
who had a larger brain and was physically stronger.
What differentiates humans from other animals is the use of a more
sophisticated language that allows more refined combinations of abstract
thoughts that allow humans to have the notion of an extended time. Ani-
mals learn from the environment the same way that humans do. The
human mind works similarly to the minds of other advanced mammals, it
captures the outside world through images formed from the perceptions
received through the senses. Humans store these images and retreat them
when needed. Animals do the same. The only difference is that human’s
capacity to recombine the images – our imagination – is more sophisti-
cated than the one of other mammals. This is due to the syntactic human
language that allows more combinations of images. The advanced hu-
man language in turn, is consequence of a more sophisticated social life.
What we have called “human reason”, as distinctive from other animals,
is nothing else than a higher combinatory capacity of images.
20 carlos obregón

An extended social life and a more sophisticated language has, as a

necessary consequence, the development of a conceptual system and its
corresponding institutional arrangement around which social life is orga-
nized and social power is defined. Sophisticated burial rituals, as old as
five hundred thousand years, already reveal the presence of an advanced
conceptual system and its corresponding institutional arrangement.
Primary humans’ anxiety, due to both the consciousness of their insig-
nificance and their death, and their incipient technology to dominate the
environment, created the psychological need for certitude. The humans’
cosmogony connection was established through emotional rituals which
integrated the society, nature, and the whole universe. In such rituals ev-
erybody participated, and knew each other, allowing for limbic connec-
tions among all of the participants. Primary societies develop a cosmogony
vision of an integrated universe – a conceptual system, to which humans
were assumed to belong; that I have called in other works Magic. Magic
integrates humans to the universe; and made them eternal. In the primary
society, humans believed in reincarnation; that death and life are an un-
distinguishable continuum. Magic integrates humans with the existential
universe, and defines a relational order between geographical space, animal
lineage, social group, time and individuals14. The social order reproduces
the planetary and biological orders. In the context of magic, the directional
and irreversible time that characterizes individual life and death is an event
of little significance, because it is understood and expressed in the context
of an overall integrative conceptual cosmogony in which time is cyclical
and / or repeatable. The social group is part of nature, and everything that
dies, resurfaces. Since humans believed in reincarnation, it is not unusual
for individual human sacrifices to occur; because what really mattered was
the energy of the universal order, and not the life or death of an individual.
The institutional arrangement of the primary society fosters conserva-
tive behavior, which was key for survival. Primitive humans have little
control of their environment, and one of the keys for survival is to ob-
serve regularities which could be used to anchor the events in the outside
world. For example, observing at what time during the day animals go
to drink water in the lagoon, was important for hunting and survival.
But it implied understanding the passage of time during the day and
identifying the different day moments by the position of the sun. It is
only by observing regularities that humans can gain slowly some control
over their environment. These regularities imply in some sense a cycli-
14
Levy Strauss, 1968.- The Savage Mind, Chicago University Press. Chicago, US.
chapter one 21

cal time, because events repeat themselves. Regularities in the planets in

the sky, in the biological world, and in animal behavior, were key in the
development of magic as a cosmogony in which the universe is ordered,
and to which humans belong. This notion of cyclical time is key for the
conceptualization of reincarnation. The established order in the primary
cosmogony was the element which most influenced later thinkers in their
conception of an essential world.
Magic’s basic function was to provide a belonging connection – that
to the biological and material universe. Given the uncertain and uncon-
trollable primary universe, magic’s main task was to gestate a conserva-
tive attitude toward the external world. Such a conservative attitude, as
Rappaport argues, was necessary for survival15. This explains why in
the primary society, the notion of individual freedom that characterizes
individualism, did not exist; and in many cases, individual innovation
was penalized by death.
The main goal in the primary society was the group’s survival against
a difficult, changing, challenging, and threatening environment; over
which it had almost no control. As noted by Lévi-Strauss, everyone does
what he/she has to do, and there is a universal cosmogony order estab-
lishing the relationship between all the existing entities16. A cosmogony
order which defines with accurate precision the conduct that has to be
followed by each individual. Magic is a universal cosmogony that inte-
grates humans to everything surrounding them and gives certainty to
their environment. The primary focus of the cosmogony, as Kuper 17
demonstrated, is the relationship with nature.
In Magic, as Lévi-Strauss beautifully shows in The Savage Mind, tech-
nological praxis and ritual are the same18. Magic in the primary society
was not unrelated, like magic today, to science and technology. Unlike
the present societies, in which rituals are important, but not considered
essential in all activities; in primary magic, rituals are inseparable from
technological maneuvering. Rituals gave humans an emotional connec-
tion with the outside world and reinforced the conservative nature of
both social and individual actions.
Rappaport, R. A. (2001). Ritual, and Religion in the Making of Humanity, Cambridge
15

University Press, Cambridge.

16
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1962). Totemism, London, Merlin Press (original French edition,
1962). Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1968). The Savage Mind, op. cit.
17
Kuper, A. 2nd ed. (2005). The Reinvention of Primitive Society. Routledge. London.
18
Op. cit.
22 carlos obregón

It is true that we find similarities between many primary societies and

the Western society. For example, the unicellular family may exist in both,
as Malinowski19 has pointed out. It is also true that there are great differenc-
es between diverse primary societies. But despite all of this, as evidenced
by Kuper20, the characteristic that appears in all primary societies, and that
makes them different both from the Western societies and from the tradi-
tional society, is that there is a primary cosmogony. And, as a consequence
of such a cosmogony, individual causation is conceived as an expression
of the universal force, that explains everything, including the origin and
the total order of the cosmos. Lévi-Strauss 21 shows that this universal cos-
mogony is a general way of thinking about nature and its relationship with
society; which has nothing to do with religion. In the primary society, the
individual is not differentiated from the social group, society is not differen-
tiated from nature, and nature is not differentiated from God; and there is
no individual freedom, in the sense that we understand it today.
Primary human societies differentiated themselves from the hominids
and the chimps mainly in three ways: social life was more extended and
implied an increasing need for communication and cooperation, technol-
ogy was more sophisticated, and language was more complex. These dif-
ferentiations implied that social order was even more decisive for survival
and that the use of brute force as social organizer was greatly diminished.
Thus if, as we have seen with the chimps, in the hominids emotional
intelligence and political maneuvering were key for social organization,
they became even more important in primary human societies. Which
does not mean that the use of brute force disappeared, it was always
there, but the importance of its role as a social organizer was less relevant.
Brute force is always present in human societies because of two main
reasons: 1) The individual genetic differences and the individual’s sur-
vival instincts make the full integration between the individual and the
social group impossible; there is always some tension between the indi-
vidual’s interests and those of the social group. This tension is required,
because it makes the social group dynamic and capable of social change.
2) Relations between social groups that do not share a common concep-
tual system occur through mutual agreements which are always backed
up by the potential or real use of brute force.
Malinowski, Bronislaw (1913). The Family Among the Australian Aborigines, London,
19

University of London Press. 1913.

20
Kuper, A. 2nd ed. (2005). The Reinvention of Primitive Society. Op. cit.
21
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1968). The Savage Mind. Op. cit.
chapter one 23

However, with humans, brute force as a social organizer of the in-

group is greatly diminished. A more productive, stable and enlarged social
group requires a longer lasting social organization, which cannot be sub-
ject to abrupt leadership changes consequence of frequent challenges of
the leader by brute force. Therefore, the relevance of brute force as social
organizer is greatly diminished in humans versus hominids and chimps.
Richard Wrangam, a professor of Human Evolutionary Biology at
Harvard, discusses the scientific evidence showing that humans have low
propensity for reactive aggression and high propensity for proactive ag-
gression22. Reactive aggression is a response to a threat or frustrating event.
Proactive aggression involves a purposeful planned attack with an external
or internal reward as a goal. Proactive aggression is both used by chimps
and humans in attacking out-groups. In chimps, reactive aggression is used
routinely in dyadic competitive fights over mates, food, or dominance sta-
tus23. By comparison, frequency of fighting in small scale human societies
is very low24. Human intersexual violence is less frequent than in chimps25.
The rate of within group fighting is always lower in humans26.

conclusion

From an evolutionary perspective, social power is never only based upon

brute force. Even in the animal kingdom aggression is only part of the
explanation of social order, there is always attachment and reproduction.
22
2018, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29279379/
23
Muller MN. In: Behavioural Diversity in Chimpanzees and Bonobos. Boesch C, Hohmann G, March-
ant L, editors. Cambridge Univ Press; Cambridge, UK: 2002. pp. 112–124. See also, Goodall
J.  The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior. Harvard Univ Press; Cambridge, MA: 1986.
24
Hess N, Helfrecht C, Hagen E, Sell A, Hewlett B. Interpersonal aggression among Aka
Hunter-Gatherers of the Central African Republic: Assessing the effects of sex, strength,
and anger. Hum Nat. 2010; 21:330–354.
25
Devries KM, et al. Global health. The global prevalence of intimate partner violence
against women. Science.  2013; 340:1527–1528. See also, Abrahams N, et al. Worldwide
prevalence of non-partner sexual violence: A systematic review. Lancet.  2014; 383:1648–
1654. See also, Muller MN, Emery Thompson M, Kahlenberg SM, Wrangham RW. Sex-
ual coercion by male chimpanzees shows that female choice may be more apparent than
real. Behav Ecol Sociobiol. 2011; 65:921–933.
26
Cieri RL, Churchill SE, Franciscus RG, Tan J, Hare B. Craniofacial feminization, social
tolerance, and the origins of behavioral modernity. Curr Anthropol. 2014; 55:419–443.
24 carlos obregón

The key evolutionary goal is survival; this requires adapting to environ-

mental changes, which life does by diversifying as much as possible the
genetic pool among species and individuals. The existence of individuals
means a greater possibility of adaptation of the species, as some individu-
als would be genetically better prepared to survive, and they will inherit
to the new generation of the species their superior (for a given environ-
ment) genetic characteristics. Therefore, surviving means dying and re-
producing. Surviving and reproduction therefore are the main reasons
for the evolutionary development of the individuals’ instincts.
CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
AND SOCIAL POWER

Any human relation implies the use of social power. The question is:
what is the source of that power? It either comes from the agent’s in-
trinsic characteristics (understanding by the agent the one that exercises
the social power) or it is given to the agent as a consequence of a social
relation. Social power is relational whenever it implies the consent of
the target (understanding as target the one upon which social power is
exerted) or it is consequence of the role assigned to the agent and to the
target by the conceptual system and the institutional arrangement of the
society of reference.
The question addressed in this chapter is whether the individual’s
psychology is evolutionarily consequence of the use of aggression (based
on the individual’s characteristics – such as for example physical strength)
or of a belonging relation that ties together the agent and the target. Two
great psychologists are key to understand the role of evolution in shap-
ing the individual’s psychology: Freud and Bowlby. In Freud´s view, the
individual’s psychology is defined by the confrontation between the indi-
vidual’s evolutionary instincts (the id) and the restrictive impositions of
the society (super ego). In Bowlby´s framework, the individual’s psychol-
ogy is consequence of the quality of belonging that the child receives.
Their contrasting points of view have very relevant consequence for our
discussion of social power.
In Freud the world is seen as the confrontation between individual
actors searching to satisfy their instinctual desires. Aggression plays a
key role, and a restrictive society that condemns this satisfaction is to
be blamed for the individual’s psychopathologies. Individuals´ exercise of
social power is seen by Freud as dominated by sex and aggression. And
the society is conceived as repressive of the individuals’ evolutionary in-
stincts. In Bowlby instead, there is a belonging instinct. The belonging
instinct dominates the relationship between the mother or care giver and
the child. The belonging instinct guides the individual’s survival instincts
to proper social satisfaction. Thus, there is not an unavoidable confron-

[25]
26 carlos obregón

tation between the individual and the society. It is true that newborns
are by nature aggressive, but the mother teaches them to channel such
aggression in socially accepted ways. Thus, in Bowlby the exercise of
social power is consequence of an essentially harmonious relationship be-
tween the individual and the society, in which the latter provides the first
with the adequate belonging to guide its evolutionary instincts. In par-
ticular cases, belonging failures do create conditions that favor individual
psychopathologies; but these isolated cases are not the main cement on
which the society is built.

freud

Sigmund Freud has to be read in a historical context. There are two great
influences that define his thinking: Darwin’s works and the conservative
and restrictive conditions of the Christian society of his time. Freud was
so deeply impressed after reading Darwin, that he dropped out of his
medical career and studied zoology for two years to fully understand this
author. Darwin had pointed out that all animals have a preservation in-
stinct that includes both the fight for survival and the drive to reproduce.
Darwinian natural selection is behind Freud’s main concepts. To Freud,
the animal origin of man is the cause of the unconscious roots of human
behavior. The ego is the servant of unconscious and uncontrollable forc-
es of the mind. Freud became an atheist because he thought that religion
tends to suppress the natural evolutionary forces of survival such as sex.
And for him, these repressive moralistic forces explained the neurosis
in his patients. For Freud, Darwin, having proved the animal origin of
man, opened the door to explain human behavior in scientific terms; and
to put aside spiritual and rationally preconceived moral norms unsuited
for psychological health. Freud was convinced that in humans – as in all
animals – their biological search for survival defined a set of emotions
that conditioned their behavior.
In particular, Freud distinguished the instincts of sex and aggression.
And it is the restrictive nature of the Christian society of his day that, by
repressing the satisfaction of basic instincts, creates the frustration which
is registered in the unconscious and gives rise to neurosis (the fear of be-
ing repressed again). In this way, the id - the instincts - and the super ego
– social restrictions– totally define the behavior of the ego–, which is non-
chapter two 27

existent. For Freud, trauma is frequently related to events of childhood or

youth, and experiences related to sexuality are of particular importance.
Neurosis is particularly related to the Oedipus Stage - from three to five
years -, in which the child begins its differentiation from others and starts
to play with his genitals. Freud’s method, as is well known, was to docu-
ment the psychological problems of his clients27.
Freud’s main contribution was to understand the psychological implica-
tions of our animal origin, which means that emotions are more relevant to
behavior than reasoning; and that a great part of what we do is determined
by the unconscious. This contribution changed forever the way we under-
stand ourselves and has been empirically proven to be correct by contempo-
rary neurobiology. But Freud’s contributions also have critical limitations.
Perhaps the most important one is that he never sought to solve the prob-
lem of the interaction of the instincts –the id– with different super egos. So,
for example, in Totem and Taboo, Freud studies primitive societies mistakenly
using the preconception of the relationship between the super ego and the id
of his own society - from which the Oedipus complex derives28.
Freud never developed a full-blown theory of social power, but for
what he wrote the social image left is of a social world dominated by the
competition between individuals searching for the satisfaction of their
instincts. A social world organized by means of the aggression of distinct
individuals repressed by the super ego – the society’s institutions.
Freud was wrong in critical aspects of his theory: 1) the ego is not a
servant of the conflict between the id and the super ego; 2) the develop-
ment of a psychologically healthy ego is possible; 3) by universalizing the
social relations of his time, he did not realize that in other societies and
in other historical times the key psychological problems change. Even
though neurosis is still present in Western societies it is much less rel-
evant today than it was in the society in which Freud lived. The most
acute psychological problems in contemporary Western societies are per-
sonality disorders – consequence of loneliness and anomia–, which are
much better explained as social belonging failures (versus neurosis due to
psychosexual complexes associated with restrictive parental behavior); 4)
his theory of dreams was also wrong. They are not necessarily manifesta-
tions of psychological repression of the past. When we sleep the brain´s

See Obregón, C. 2015. Darwin, Marx y Freud. Amazon.com USA. Available Research
27

Gate.com
See Obregón, C. 2009. La soledad y el amor. Amazon.com USA. Available Research
28

Gate.com
28 carlos obregón

left hemisphere does not operate properly, thus the emotions manifested
at night are just haphazardly collected images (previously stored by the
brain´s right hemisphere) mixed in unrealistic ways.
But despite all the limitations of Freud’s theory, he was right in his argu-
ment that the original basis of human behavior are the emotions, guided by
survival instincts, and that a great part of learning about the external world
is unconscious. Freud´s great contribution was his understanding of the im-
portance of emotions (consequence of our animal origin) for human behav-
ior. So, even though these emotions may be modified in distinct ways in
diverse societies, they always remain a powerful determinant of behavior,
of dreams and of psychological problems. Thus, if one judges Freud by his
insight about the importance of emotions, it must be recognized that his
contribution is of great importance in the history of human thought.
Fonagy and Target conclude that despite Freud’s weaknesses in his
theory of the stages of development, in his vision of the empty ego and its
contempt for its formation in the interaction with the environment, his con-
tributions to the study of the unconscious are undeniable; moreover, his
vision of neurosis is a guide which is still used today by contemporary post-
Freudian psychiatry29. Hall and Lindsey conclude that the main reason
why Freud continues to be relevant is not his scientific method of analysis,
but rather his complex vision of man30. Western argues that the vision of
Freud is compatible with contemporary models of artificial intelligence that
show a conflict between self-asserting and transforming the self31.
The conflict between individual animal survival instincts and social
restrictions, that Freud envisioned, is of a general nature and cannot be
underestimated, even though it must be recognized that such conflict
does not necessarily produce the psychological conflicting empty ego that
Freud envisioned. From our point of view, Freud’s great contribution is
his vision of human societies as including always some degree of tension
between the “difference” – the individuality of each human being - and
the belonging to the social group. This vision allows us to understand the
fragility of social belonging: and aggression, as a consequence of social
belonging failures.
29
Obregon, C., 2017. Quienes somos realmente: la historia del yo. Amazon.com. Also
available at research gate.com
Hall, C., Lindzey, G. y J. B. Campbell (1998). Theories of Personality. New Jersey: John
30

Wiley and Sons, 4a. ed.

31
Western, D. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a psycho dynami-
cally informed psychological science. Psychological Bulletin, 124(3), pp. 333-71.
chapter two 29

Freud discovered the psychological implications of the animal that we

all are. He unraveled the powerful negative psychological consequence
of restricting the animal. But what he did not understand is that proper
belonging can produce a psychologically healthy individual. If society
denies the animal that we all carry inside, it will dominate us, and we will
be prey of aggression as a way of relating to the external world (Freud’s
world). However, if instead society acknowledges, accepts, and properly
guides our animal through satisfactory social belonging, a psychologi-
cally healthy development is possible. Understanding the evolutionary
roots of belonging was Bowlby’s contribution.

bowlby

The psychology of belonging has been empirically proven. It recovers

Freud’s vision of the importance of emotions, given the animal origin of man,
the relevance of the unconscious and the need to explain the human psyche
from an evolutionary point of view32. But in contrast to Freud, the psychol-
ogy of belonging rejects the relevance of the autonomous instincts of sex and
aggression, and focuses on the study of another evolutionary instinct, that
of attachment or belonging. The main contribution of the psychology of
belonging is that it allows to explain how the individual psyche is integrated
into the social group, mainly through the initial emotional relationship with
the mother or caregiver. There are cases of success - of safe belonging -, and
cases of failure–of insecure belonging. Safe belonging fosters the psychologi-
cal freedom sought by the defenders of the ego. Insecure belonging prevents
the exercise of psychological freedom, as argued by the detractors of the ego.
Bowlby studied in the Freudian tradition, but by the time he was
studying, several changes have occurred since Freud’s writings. The fol-
lowers of Freud had modified his thinking, arguing that there was a self
– an ego – which plays a key role in human behavior; Piaget had shown
how the baby’s consciousness develops from his/her interaction with the
environment, and Lorenz had developed his attachment experiments
with geese. Using all these elements, Bowlby developed the Psychology

32
Even though the main results are today solidly established, as always in science, the
discussion continues. See, for example, Attachment theory and its vicisitudes. Toward an
updated theory Jean Mercer, 2011. Richard Stockton. New directions in attachment theory
an research (2010), Phillip R. Shaver, Mario Mikulincer.
30 carlos obregón

of Attachment, which I have renamed the Psychology of Belonging, be-

cause attachment in humans, as opposed to more simple animals like
birds, involves emotions. Belonging changes the whole perspective of
who we are. Belonging is an instinct, which guides the other instincts
towards social life. Babies are born aggressive, and it is their caregiver
the one that teaches them social behavior. They are taught to redirect
in a socially acceptable way the other instincts of fear, hunger, sex, and
aggression. Language is a social development, and culture is transmitted
through narratives which create social belonging. The mother or care-
giver teaches the language and the culture to the baby. Belonging gives
cohesion to social life. The personality of the baby is shaped in the first
twelve months by the emotional relationship with the caregiver; long
before the baby’s capacity to be able to reason is developed.
The Psychology of Belonging (Attachment Theory) was initially pro-
posed by Bowlby33. For him, attachment is a biological imperative of evo-
lution. The infant has instincts that guide him to find a figure to attach
to, he seeks to ensure the continued availability of his caregiver. Bowlby
proposed that the way in which parents treat children is critical to explain
their development. Bowlby used an internal working model, adopted from
early work in artificial intelligence which, unlike Piaget’s Mental Schema,
has an emotional content. Thus, the internal working model that the infant
forms depends on the emotional interaction with his parents – especially
the mother; and it is this model that determines the way in which the infant
processes the world around him. Bowlby’s internal working model would
be empirically verified by Ainsworth and Main. For Bowlby belonging (at-
tachment in his words) is also crucial in the psychological development of
adults; this proposal would be empirically verified by Fonagy.
Mary Ainsworth34, who collaborated with Bowlby, has shown empiri-
cally that the infants’ internal working model varies depending on the
quality of the relation with the mother or caregiver. Her experiments led
to the conclusion that the quality of preverbal communication between
mother and infant, defines how secure the personality of the child is. She
33
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: vol. 1. Attachment. New York: Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1973). Attachment and loss: vol. 2. Separation and anger. New York: Basic
Books. Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss: vol. 3. Loss: Sadness and depression. New
York: Basic Books.
34
Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Infant care and the growth of love.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Ainsworth, M. D. S., M. C. Blehar, E.
Waters and S. Wall (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological of the Strange Situa-
tion. Hillsdalle, NJ.
chapter two 31

constructed the experiment of the “Strange Situation”, in which the moth-

er abandons the child temporarily in a strange room with an unknown
person. This experiment classified children, according to their behavioral
response, into three categories: secure children, avoidant children, and
ambivalent children. Mothers of secure children establish a contingent
and collaborative communication. Insecure children (avoidant and am-
bivalent) optimize as far as they can the quality of protection they receive.
Avoidant children hide their emotions and make clear that they do not
expect attention. Ambivalent children show concern at all times about the
availability of the mother, seeking to be heard by her.
A student of Ainsworth, Mary Main35, experimentally discovered a
new category of infants, disorganized children. Disorganized behavior is
the result of fear of the parents, whom infants identify as a source of dan-
ger; or alternatively, it is a consequence of watching the parents behave
fearful and impotent. Mary Main 36was also concerned with designing
longitudinal studies, to assess the permanence of the internal working
model. The first important result of Main found a strong correlation be-
tween the classification of the child’s personality, according to the in-
fant’s behavior in the “Strange Situation” at twelve months, with internal
models of representation with which the child interprets the events that
occur when he/she is six years old. The second important result was
the correlation between the infant´s behavior at twelve months, and the
representational mental state of the parents regarding belonging. Main
proposed that the internal working model is actually a structural process,
that defines not only feelings and behavior; but also attention, memory
and cognitive awareness. The internal working model relates not only
with different patterns of nonverbal behavior, but also with language pat-
terns and mental structure37. Main’s studies have shown that the rules by

35
Main, M., and J. Solomon (1990). “Procedures for identifying infants as disorganized/
disoriented during the Ainsworth Strange Situation” in M. Greenberg, D. Cicchetti and E.
M. Cummings (eds.), Attachment during the preschool years: Theory, research and inter-
vention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 121-160.
36
Main, M., E. Hesse and N. Kaplan (2005). “Predictability of attachment behavior and
representational processes” in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann and E. Waters (eds.), At-
tachment from infancy to adulthood: Lessons from longitudinal studies, New York: Guil-
ford Press, pp. 245-304.
37
Main et. at., 1985, p. 67. Main, M., N. Kaplan and J. Cassidy (1985). “Security in infancy,
childhood, and adulthood: A move to the level of representation” in I. Bretherton and E.
Waters (eds.), Growing points of attachment theory and research. Monographs of the Soci-
ety for Research in Child Development, 50 (2-3, serial núm. 209), pp. 66-104
32 carlos obregón

which the baby learns to survive, are maintained throughout its life; and
define not only his subsequent behavior, but how he perceives the exter-
nal world. Main also has shown that these rules have a decisive influence
on the style that the individual will have to exercise his/her parenthood.
Several studies have confirmed the proposals of Bowlby, Ainsworth
and Main. Van Ijsendoorn 38 corroborated Main’s correlations in six
countries. Hesse 39recorded that Benoit and Parker found correlations
in three generations. Sroufe 40showed that secure children become con-
fident leaders; avoidant children tend to victimize other children; and
ambivalent children tend to be the victims. As adults, avoidant children
have a risk factor linking them with problems of narcissism, schizoid, and
obsessive behavior. As teenagers, ambivalent children tend to correlate
with anorexia, and as adults relate to hysteria and histrionic behavior41.
Disorganized children, when exposed in life to additional social pressures
are associated with serious personality disorders42.
The relationship of belonging has a fundamental emotional central-
ity. There is a limbic connection between mammals, product of a long
evolution, which allows the protection of infants and the development
of group life. In the case of reptiles, the brain controls body balance and
ensures survival; aggression is a means to get what they need, they have
no emotions and only optimize their own survival. In mammals, instead,
the limbic brain controls emotions, relationships, hormonal balance, and
sex. In mammals the limbic brain restricts the reptilian aggression and
inclines them to provide the required social protection for the relationship
between mother and baby to be able to develop. The limbic communica-
tion is essential to establish the relationship of belonging: without emo-
38
Van Ijzendoorn, M. H. and A. Sagi (1999). “Cross-cultural Patterns of Attachment: Uni-
versal and Contextual Dimensions” in J. Cassidy and P. R. Shaver (eds.), Handbook of
attachment: Theory, research, and clinical applications. New York: Guilford Press, pp.
713-734.
39
Hesse, E. (1999). “The adult attachment interview: Historical and current perspectives”
in J. Cassidy y P. R. Shaver (eds.), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research, and clinical
applications. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 395-433. 1999.
40
Sroufe, L. A., E. A. Carlson, A. K. Levy and B. Egeland (1999). Implications of attach-
ment theory for developmental psychopathology. Development and Psychopathology, 11,
pp. 1-13..
41
Schore, A. (2002). Advances in neuro psychoanalysis, attachment theory, and trauma
research: Implications for self psychology. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 22, pp. 433-484.
42
Fonagy, P. (2003). Towards a developmental understanding of violence. Br. J Psychiatry,
183, pp. 190-192.
chapter two 33

tion there is no belonging. Verbal expressions, of which the cortical brain

is capable, are meaningless if they are not supported by the emotional
nonverbal communication – that comes from the limbic relationship.
Neurobiology has proven that the neuronal development of the infant
depends on the quality of the belonging relationship with the parents.
Both the psychological theory of belonging and contemporary neurobiol-
ogy highlight the importance of the quality of nonverbal communication,
and of the emotional relationship. Some genetic studies, particularly of
twins raised separately, have shown the power of genetics in determining
some key traits such as intelligence, personality, temperament, preferenc-
es, and aversions. But none of these traits are correlated with how secure
the personality is. How secure is the behavior of the child, the adolescent,
and the adult does not correlate with any gene: it is explained by the
quality of care and nonverbal communication that the infant receives 43
The brain is divided into two hemispheres, which interact between
them. When the left hemisphere dominates, the information is processed
linearly (a fact at once), logic and language are used. On this side syllogistic
reasoning: cause-effect, binary logic, good and evil, right and wrong, and
linguistic analysis is exercised. When the right hemisphere dominates the
information is processed visually, spatially, nonlinearly, and holistically.
The autobiographical self, nonverbal cues, a comprehensive sense of the
body, mental models of self, strong emotions, and social understanding,
are processed mainly by the right hemisphere44. Historical and self narra-
tives emerge from the interaction of the two hemispheres, the left seeking
to logically explain the autobiographical, social, and emotional informa-
tion in the right hemisphere45. These narratives, which imply the notion
of an extended time, only prevail between humans, due to the ability to
abstract of the cortical brain. Memory is the form in which experience
creates the neuronal maps. There are two forms of memory: unconscious
– implicit; and conscious– explicit. Implicit memory is available since
birth, and records physical, behavioral, emotional, and perceptual mo-
dalities. This memory does not require conscious attention, and events
cannot be remembered. Explicit memory depends on the maturation of
the hippocampus in the limbic brain, which takes a year and a half. The
hippocampus creates a contextual neural map of integral representations.
43
Siegel and Hartzell, 2003, p. 149. Siegel, D.J. and M. Hartzell (2003, paperback ed. 2004).
Parenting from the Inside Out. New York: Penguin Group.
44
Siegel and Hartzell, 2003, op. cit.
45
Siegel, D.J. (1999). The Developing Mind. Guilford Press. New York.
34 carlos obregón

By the second year of life the infant can develop a sense of self, and of
the passage of time, which allows for autobiographical memory; in this
case the prefrontal cortex is involved. Explicit memory allows through
the narrative to create stories and dreams, which give the mind a sense
of reality, and allow it to organize experience into an image of its being
in the world. Explicit memory requires conscious attention, and recorded
events tend to be remembered both as data, as well as episodes. Our
perceptions of the outside world, and our emotions depend not only on
the explicit memory but also on the implicit, to which we do not have
access through reason. Emotion is a fundamental aspect of integration of
many brain functions. Emotions give a sense of vitality to being. Emo-
tion, meaning, and social connection, are defined by the same neuronal
process46. Primary emotion puts the mind in an alert mode, which is
followed by an assessment that gives rise to categorical emotions (like
sadness, disgust, etc.). Resonance occurs when two people align their
primary emotions, which occurs among infants and their mothers in the
first two days after birth. Emotions are in the limbic brain; usually mam-
mals are able to transmit their emotions. Iacoboni 47discovered mirror
neurons in humans, that had been discovered years before in monkeys.
These neurons give us the ability to correctly interpret other mammals;
an advantage obtained in the evolutionary process. Thus, emotions can
be understood as neuronal integration processes, that connect us with
others. The integration of the activity of two brains is a vital process for
survival, and it is required for the proper development of the genetic
potential48. That is why emotional imbalances have important implica-
tions for the ability to reason, as well as for the physical health of the
individual. Acute belonging problems disrupt the function of brain cir-
cuitry required for mentalizing49. Our brains are built to be influenced
46
Siegel and Hartzell, 2003 op. cit
47
Iacoboni, M. et al. Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation. Science, 286, 1999, pp.
2526- 2528.
48
Siegel, 1999, op. cit.
49
Mentalizing is a concept coined in psychology, which involves making mental our emo-
tions, reading them carefully and creating alternatives via the representational imagination
to explain our past with psychological flexibility and build future viable alternatives to be
considered. Mentalizing involves the holistic imaginative capacity of the right hemisphere
and the emotional limbic brain; but also involves both logic and reason, so it also requires
both the use of the left hemisphere as well as of the cortical brain. For more extensive expla-
nations, see Allen et. at ., 2008; Obregon, 2009, op. cit. Allen, GJ, P. Fonagy and Bateman
AW (2008), Metalizing in Clinical Practice, American Psychiatric Publishing, Arlington, VA.
chapter two 35

by the interaction with other brains, this is an evolutionary survival trait.

Collaborative and contingent communication, that which appropriately
responds to signals from another, is essential; because it is the process by
which children create both their social knowledge and the understanding
of themselves. The growth of the baby’s brain literally requires interac-
tion from brain to brain and occurs as a consequence of a positive rela-
tionship between mother and infant50. Neurologically coherence requires
environmental contingent responses51; which may involve either or both
cerebral hemispheres. Neurons that fire together create neural synaptic
circuits, that underlie the operation of the flow of information in the hu-
man brain. These circuits store information and form a model of internal
memory, that consists of invariant memories which organize the infinite
information that is perceived from abroad. Without these models of in-
ternal memory, the infinite information from the environment would not
be actionable and would constitute a chaos. Thus, most of what we per-
ceive does not come to us by our senses but is generated by the internal
memory model. Therefore, early childhood is crucial because it defines
the brain’s first model of the world.
Lewis, et al. 52point out that implicit memory is part of our knowledge,
and our limbic brain allows us perceptions of which we have no rational
explanation; and yet, much of our behavior is explained by these emo-
tions and limbic connections. Neural connections that were developed be-
fore the existence of explicit memory are not remembered or understood
by the cortical brain. Reason cannot replace the importance of limbic con-
nections to other mammals and humans: “limbic resonance, regulation,
and revision define our emotional limbic existence…”53. Limbic biology
and chemical relations govern mammals.
Our genetic code is defined in such a way that it only develops prop-
erly through an adequate experience with the outside world. From any
given genetic inheritance, there are several possible developments; and
which of these happens, depends on the social experience. And in this,
the initial care of the infant and the child’s early years play a basic role.

50
Schore, A. (2002). Advances in neuro psychoanalysis, attachment theory, and trauma
research: Implications for self psychology. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 22, pp. 433-484.
51
Siegel, 1999, op. cit.
Lewis, T., Amini, F., Lannon, R. (2000). A General Theory of love, Vintage Books, New
52

York. Lewis, et al 2000, p. 288.

53
Lewis et. at., 2000, p. 229. Op. cit.
36 carlos obregón

Suomi54, shows that monkeys with a gene that impacts the metabolism
of serotonin show abnormal social behavior in the absence of maternal
care; however, if they are grown with appropriate mothering, the ab-
normal behavior is regulated. The need for a social life is not only hu-
man, but also, in general, a characteristic of mammals and even other
animals like birds. Harlow’s and Lorenz’s experiments, among others,
have shown the strength of the social instincts in mammals and other
species. Lorenz showed how ducks and geese instinctively follow their
mother and, cheating the instinctive attachment system, he managed to
make them follow other objects, including himself. The instinctive at-
tachment system of birds is programmed to make them follow anything
that moves and appears before their eyes in early life. Lorenz’s studies
have also been repeated with mammals such as sheep, guinea pigs, and
monkeys. This instinct to belong of birds and mammals was called by
Lorenz “imprinting”. Harlow showed that a monkey prefers to stay with
an artificial mother, instead of staying next to a device that gives milk.
Hofer 55 has shown that the mother-child relationship in rats is vital for
the proper chemical and physiological functioning of the rat daughter.
The mother’s body, when it is close to the daughter’s, regulates chemical
and biological processes in the baby all throughout her body system: it af-
fects the heart rate, the sleep, and the immune, neurochemical, circadian
and endocrine systems. Children regulate their sleep better if they sleep
with an artificial breathing bear, than with a simple Winnie the Poo. The
syndrome of sudden infant death is related to maternal sleep habits that
leave the baby alone; it is noteworthy that the syndrome increases four
times when mothers are depressed. Babies who sleep with their mothers,
on the contrary, breast feed up to three times more than those who sleep
54
Suomi, S. J. “A Biobehavioral Perspective on Developmental Psychopathology: Excessive
Aggression and Serotonergic Dysfunction in monkeys.” In A. J. Sameroff, M. Lewis, and S.
Miller, (Eds.), Handbook of Developmental Psychopathology, second edition. New York:
Plenum Press, 2000.
55
Hofer, M. A. (1987). “Early relationships: a psychologist’s view”. Child Development,
58(3): 633-47.
Hofer, M. A. (1995). “Hidden regulators: implications for a new understanding of attach-
ment, separation, and loss.” In S. Goldberg, R. Muir, and J. Kerr *Eds.), Attachment The-
ory: Social, Development, and Clinical Perspectives. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Analytic Press.
Hofer, M. A. (1996). “On the nature and consequences of early loss.” Psychosomatic Medi-
cine, 58: 570-81.
Hofer, M. A. (2004). The Emerging Neurobiology of Attachment and Separation: How Par-
ents Shape Their Infant’s Brain and Behavior. In S. W. Coates & J. L. Rosenthal (Eds.), Sep-
tember 11- “When the Bough Broke”, Attachment Theory, Psychobiology, and Social Policy:
An Integrated Approach to Trauma. New York: Analytic Press. 1987, 1995, 1996, and 2004.
chapter two 37

alone56. Mammals generally grow, protect and defend their descendants

when they are immature. Babies after being born are able to distinguish
the voice of the mother rather than the father’s, implying some form of
prenatal learning. At 42 minutes old, they are able to mimic the facial
expression of an adult. And at 36 hours of age, they react to the emotions
and facial expressions of the mother57.
We are genetically prepared to develop interacting with other human
beings, neurotransmitters are released by the body as a result of interper-
sonal relationships. In relationships with people close to us the body re-
leases opium, and another neurotransmitter, oxytocin, which is released
by the mother before delivery and in adolescents during the crush. Long
forced separations disturb adult cardiovascular, hormonal, and immu-
nological processes and functions. Neurotransmitters are used in adults
for the treatment of nervous disorders: serotonin (Prozac) is used for
anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and hostility, among others; opium
reduces anxiety.
The brain is created through the energy that activates neurons; the
flow of energy in the mind is defined from a flow of information; and
the integration of information into a coherent whole is facilitated or in-
hibited as a result of interpersonal relationships, and the primary means
of communication in such relationships are emotions. “…an individual’s
ability to organize emotions – a product in part, of earlier attachment re-
lationships - directly shapes the ability of the mind to integrate experience
and adapt to future stressors.”58 Experience directly influences synaptic
connections - the manner in which neurons are connected between them
- and strengthens them or leads them to their demise. Anxiety and de-
pression are the first consequences of the limbic omission. Spitz59 already
showed since 1945, that children in orphanages and prisons, which are
not given interpersonal care, lose weight, get sick and often die. Adult
monkeys that grow up isolated cannot interact with other monkeys, and

56
McKenna, J. J. (1996). “Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in cross-cultural perspective: Is infant-
parent cosleeping proactive?” Annual Review of Anthropology, 25: 201-16. McKenna, 1996.
57
Meltzoff, A., & Moore, M. (1998). Infant intersubjectivity: Broadening the dialogue to
include imitation, identity and intention. In S. Braten (Ed.), Intersubjective communication
and emotion in early ontogeny (pp. 47-88). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Meltzoff and Moore, 1998.
58
Siegel, 1999 p. 4. Op. cit.
59
Spitz, R.A. (1945). Hospitalism: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in
early childhood. The psychoanalytic Study of the Child 1:53-73.
38 carlos obregón

they tend to self-mutilation, and stop eating and drinking for long peri-
ods. The monkeys that grew in isolation do not develop their mammalian
nervous system properly and show a general disruption of brain function
that Kraemer doubts that can be remedied or controlled through drugs.
This general disorganization of the brain produces aggressive social be-
haviors. Monkeys growing next to mothers who were showing emotional
stress presented personality disorders60. The limbic isolation in humans
also has serious consequences, the lack of a relationship of belonging to
the family and to society leads to all kinds of undesirable aggressive be-
haviors, such as crime. Lewis, et al. 61 note that: “no intrinsic restriction
on harming people exists outside the limbic domain”. For these authors
violence between groups is due to the rational explanation that the enemy
is not like us. The unsatisfied limbic brain seeks to replace relationships
with substitutes like drugs, alcohol, excessive plastic surgery, and others.
Thus, the behavior of serial criminals may be explained, in some cases,
by genetic defects, and in others, as a result of extreme limbic negligence;
and in most cases as a combination of the two factors. Grossly inad-
equate synaptic connections in the early years can impair brain function
to the point of leaving it without redress. When acute negligence with
the child occurs, babies show a head circumference less than normal,
their brain has shrunk by the loss of millions of cells result of the lack
of interpersonal relationships and of maternal protection; the possible
cause is excess cortisol and other hormones triggered by stress that cause
neuronal damage62. In less extreme negligence cases, limbic omission has
60
Kraemer, G. W. (1985). “Effects of differences in early social experience of primate neu-
robiological-behavioral development.” In M. Reite and T. Field (Eds.), The Psychology of
Attachment and Separation. New York: Academic Press.
Kraemer, G. W. (1992). “A psychobiological theory of attachment.” Behavioral and Brain
Sciences , 15: 493-541.
Kraemer, G. W., M. H. Ebert, D. E. Schmidt & W. T. McKinney (1989). “A longitudinal
study of the effect of different social rearing conditions on cerebrospinal fluid norepinephrine
and biogenic amine metabolites in rhesus monkeys.” Neuropsychopharmacology , 2(3): 175-89.
Kraemer, G. W. & A. S. Clarke (1990). “The behavioral neurobiology of self-injurious
behavior in Rhesus monkeys.” Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmatology and Biological Psy-
chiatry , 14: S141-S168.
Kraemer, G. W. & A. S. Clarke (1996). “Social attachment, brain function, and aggression.”
Annals of the New York Academy of Science s, 794: 121-35.
61
2000, p. 216. Op.cit.
62
Teicher, M. “The Neurobiology of Child Abuse.” Scientific American (March 2002): 68-75.
Teicher, M. H., Ito, Y., Glod, C. A., Andersen, S. L., Dumont, N., & Ackerman, E. (1997). Pre-
liminary evidence for abnormal cortical development in physically and sexually abused children
using EEG coherence and MRI. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 821, 160-175.
chapter two 39

consequences of aggressive and undesirable social behavior. When dam-

age is reparable, psychiatric and psychological therapies can contribute to
create new relationships with trustable personalities and can contribute
to recovery. Most adults, however, remain with the personality that they
developed as children; so that even if there is hope of change, it does not
happen very often.
Bowlby, like Freud, did not have an explicit theory of social power,
but from what he wrote a social world emerges which is very distinct
from Freud´s; in Bowlby’s social world the instinct of belonging predomi-
nates and the aggressive interaction between the individuals in a group is
conceptualized as a belonging failure. Moreover, instead of the super ego
being always restrictive of the individual’s basic instincts as in Freud, in
Bowlby it is flexible and capable to establish conditions under which the
individual’s basic instincts can be satisfied in a harmonious social relation.

the three ways of belonging

Bowlby did not explore the consequences of belonging for the relationship
between the individual and the larger social group, and the one of the indi-
vidual and/or social group with the existential universe. In other works63,
we have defined belonging as the development of the potential biological
and genetic connection that individuals have with the external world. We
have indicated three ways of belonging (see table 1.1). The first one I have
called love which is realizing our potential belonging with our mother or
caregiver and those people near to us – which has been well documented
by the psychology of attachment of Bowlby and others, discussed in the
previous pages. The second way of belonging is realizing our potential
belonging with the social group which we have called social significance,
because the individual gets meaning or significance in its social life. The
third way of belonging is realizing our potential belonging with the bio-
logical and material universe that surrounds us, which we have called ex-
istential significance. Belonging always has an emotional centrality, but it
also involves reason, since we belong with our whole self. Belonging does
not eliminate our individuality but provides meaning to our individual life
by identifying ourselves with the exterior world. This identification is the
realization of our biological and genetic potential and is always imperfect,
63
Obregon, C., 2009. La soledad y el amor. Amazon.com. Also available at Research gate.com
40 carlos obregón

we can never fully integrate ourselves with the exterior world because
our individuality is an evolutionary reality. Therefore, there is always
some tension between the individual and the exterior world. Thus, while
Bowlby was right in that a harmonious belonging is possible, it is also true
that by its very nature belonging is imperfect, and there is always room for
belonging failures in which individual’s basic instincts such as aggression
predominate, and Freud becomes relevant. This inherent tension between
the individual and the exterior world is a healthy characteristic which
strengthens the possibility of proper social change.

table 1.1: belonging relationships: the three ways

Belonging is the identification with the outside world, as a consequence of realizing our evolution-
ary potential to relate to it.
Love is the relationship of belonging to people near to us.
Social significance is the relationship of belonging to the social group.
Existential significance is the relationship of belonging to the existential universe.

As for the first way of belonging, as we have seen, our emotional de-
velopment starts from the pre-verbal information we receive as babies; and
around it we form internal working models that guide - throughout our
whole life - our relationship with the outside world. The degree of contin-
gency and collaboration that the initial relationship has with the mother
or caregiver defines the adult’s personality. This pre-verbal relationship is
emotional; prior to language and to the use of the abstraction capacity of
the cortical brain. The first way of belonging provides emotional centrality
– the limbic contact with other brains - which is necessary to achieve the
proper psychological balance required for adequate brain development. In
primary societies this emotional centrality is initially satisfied by the social
group as a whole, which, given its dimensions, allows visual limbic contact
between its members. Subsequently it is satisfied in traditional societies by
the extended family, and finally, by the single-celled family and other small
groups in the Western societies. The Limbic emotional centrality is an evo-
lutionary neural need for the proper development of the human brain.
As for the second way of belonging, beings with sophisticated brains,
who need a long gestation period, require not only the protection of the
mother or caregiver but also of the social group. Social belonging is fun-
damental for the economic and psychological survival of the individual.
The individual´s autobiographical conception requires language, which is
chapter two 41

of social origin. Language and the beginnings of the mentalization pro-

cess are learned from the mother, who initiates the socialization process
of the baby, and this process occurs in the context of ​​the previous emo-
tional relationship that has already been established between the mother
and the infant. Conceptual systems and their corresponding institutional
arrangements have an emotional base that is expressed in the arts - music,
dance, painting, literature, poetry, in preparing food, in the rituals of so-
cial relations and in many other ways that constitute an intrinsic and fun-
damental part of what we call culture. The emotional basis of belonging,
as we have already pointed out, is present in the three ways of belonging.
Neurobiological and psychological dependence of the individual of the
social group has been demonstrated by various social sciences64.
As regards to the third way of belonging, the genetic potential connec-
tion with the biological and material universe that surrounds us is the ba-
sic condition for the existence of human life. The emotional relationship
with the existential universe, based on pleasure and pain, is fundamental
as a guide in our vital survival process. This belonging process is connect-
ed to our respiratory and cardiovascular systems which work properly
with the movement that exploring the outside world implies. Breathing is
essential in the process, hence the emphasis of meditation techniques on
it. The respiratory contact with nature provides us pleasure. Voluntary
movement in the exploration of a challenging and novel natural world
is required for proper brain development. Neuroplasticity and neurogen-
esis require that we are aware of what happens in the exterior world; we
are made to develop our brains in a relationship with the outside world.

the second way of belonging – social significance

The fact that evolutionarily we became humans due to an intensification

of the group’s social life, has been scientifically documented by many
disciplines. Archaeology has discovered that the first social stone artefacts
are as old as 2.6 million years. Paleontology has shown that social hunting
is as old as 2 million years. Evolutionary linguistics shows that we only
have a linguistic historical record of around 7000 years; but that based
upon records from archaeology, paleontology, and genetics, it is possible
to have an idea of the evolution of language. A protolanguage probably
64
Ibid
42 carlos obregón

was already there 2 million years ago, and was quite sophisticated 500
thousand years ago. A syntactic language is likely 100 thousand years
old. Sociology has extensively documented the social origin of humans.
Durkheim, for example, attributed suicide to social alienation. In psy-
chology, social psychology and several other schools have empirically
documented the social nature of humans65. There is a contemporary dis-
cussion, as to whether social dynamics starts with the group or with the
individual; this is due to the surge of individualism, associated with the
economic view of the free markets. Such a discussion, relevant as it may
be for particular economic or social policies, is irrelevant for what we
are discussing here. Individuals exist because the genetic diversification
of the human species optimizes its survival chances; but the existence of
individuals does not imply that social dynamics starts from the individu-
als. Individuals are always the product of a social context. Individualism
is a contemporary philosophical position that argues that more spheres
of public life must be determined freely by the individuals; but, without
judging whether this position is right or wrong, the fact remains that indi-
vidualism is in itself a social conception and that markets always operate
within a given institutional social context.
We became humans as the result of a more intense social life, conse-
quence of an advanced rock technology, that allowed the creation of an
economic surplus. The child’s brain requires social nurturing to mature.
Language is a social outcome. Humans are social beings evolutionarily
designed to belong to small in-groups in which they could develop emo-
tional ties which are required for their proper brain development.

the third way of belonging: existential significance

Evolutionarily, we have a potential belonging to the biological and mate-

rial universe, which is necessary for survival. 1) Our whole genetics only
evolves properly if we have the adequate link with the external environ-
ment; as, among others, Nobel laureates Hubel and Wiesel have shown66.

65
Ibid
66
Hubel and Wiesel, 1970. They showed that cats that grew with one eye intentionally
obstructed, developed brain aberrations. Hubel, D. H. & T. N. Wiesel (1970). The period
of susceptibility to the psychological effects of unilateral eye closure in kittens”. Journal of
Psychology, 206 (2): 419-36. chapter 2 – 49.
chapter two 43

This is the most critical discovery of contemporary neurobiology. 2) We

are genetically prepared to recognize and to respond to environmental
cues, for instance, expressions of aggression from other animals, or facial
expressions from other primates. We are attracted to fruits’ colors, that
we recognize, and which indicate their vitamin content. Our hunger in-
stinct guides us as to what to eat from the environment. 3) Other animals’
company contributes to our psychological regulation and survival. 4)
Meditation regulates our stress, changes our brains, and stimulates
our immunological system. 5) Breathing deeply, and peacefully contem-
plating nature, also regulates our stress. 6) In a very general sense, our
survival depends upon the adequate development of our potential be-
longing to the existential universe. Therefore, like for any other animal,
human existential belonging promotes surviving. Humans are insignifi-
cant compared to the universe. We have been around only two hundred
thousand years versus 14 billion years for the universe; our material size
divided by the one of the universe is practically zero; and we die in eighty
years, versus stars which live between 10 million and 10 billion years.
And since we are the only species conscious of extended time (a sophisti-
cated language made us aware both of our future death, and of our insig-
nificance); humans´ answer has been to develop a conceptual existential
significance.

conclusion

A belonging instinct has to guide the other instincts for those animals
whose survival requires social life, because otherwise the survival of the
species would be at risk (Bowlby’s argument). But since individuals do
exist and they are differentiated from the group, they ought to have their
own individual survival instincts, and aggression is required to protect
individuals’ survival (Freud’s argument).
Belonging failures unleash aggression as a social organizer. At the
family level they produce insecure personalities with tendencies to de-
velop psychopathologies. At the social level, whenever social belonging
fails, sociopathology may be produced.
The discussion of the relationship between the individual and the so-
cial group will be left for following chapters, but for now it should be
pointed out that the individuals’ instincts play a key role in the group’s
44 carlos obregón

survival; confronted with serious belonging failures, the unleashing of

the individuals’ aggression may in some instances be needed to stimulate
a required social change.
Since the belonging instinct always (with the exception of belonging
failures) guides the other instincts, social power is always exercised with-
in an institutional arrangement and its corresponding conceptual system.
Thus, social power is always fundamentally relational. The psychology
of the individual is shaped by the quality of belonging received, and this
defines how he/she exercises social power. However, in exceptional cas-
es, whenever there are belonging failures the individuals relate to each
other based on aggression and the individual’s intrinsic characteristics
become more definitive as a source of social power.
CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL POWER IN
ENLARGED SOCIETIES

In the last two chapters we have seen that social power is not only conse-
quence of coercive power or aggression, but it is also based upon repro-
ductive instincts manifested in attachment or belonging. When one looks
at social power in enlarged societies, it is even more evident that it cannot
be based only upon coercive force, because individuals do not even have
physical contact between each other; and the State does not have the re-
sources to be vigilant of the activities of all the individuals. Social order in
enlarged societies has to depend upon something more than pure coercive
power (aggression in Freud’s terms), it has to depend upon social belong-
ing (on Bowlby’s terms). However, social power in enlarged societies is no
longer based on the limbic connection that can be found within a family
or a small group. Therefore, there is more dependence upon the envelope
conceptual belonging that binds the enlarged society together – it contains
the competing conceptual systems of the small groups that constitute the
society -; and the limbic connection, which is evolutionarily needed, is sat-
isfied by small groups within the enlarged society which are connected
between them by the envelope conceptual system and its corresponding
institutional arrangement.
Social power is an elusive term, The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as: the
ability or right to control people (acts and/or thoughts), organizations and
events; the amount of political control a person or a group has in a country;
an official or legal right to do something; a natural skill or an ability to do
something; a person, organization, or country that has control over others,
often because of wealth /financial strength, importance, or great military
strength; to act with great strength or in a forceful way; physical strength or
force67. In the definition we can appreciate already two key distinctions that
will be relevant for our discussion. The first one is that social power may be
due to: 1) The agent’s intrinsic characteristics – intelligence, ability, natural
skill, wealth/financial strength, military training, physical strength and so
on; or 2) an agent/target relational characteristic – social power either de-

67
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/power

[45]
46 carlos obregón

pends upon the target’s acceptance of the agent’s power or emanates from
the social role of the agent (given by the conceptual system and the cor-
responding institutional arrangement of the society in question) – the social
right, the official or legal right and so on; or 3) simultaneously to 1) and 2).
In the third case is important in what proportion 1) and 2) participate. The
main theses in this chapter are: 1) that social power always is explained by
the third case; it always implies both the agent’s intrinsic power and social
relational power; and 2) that the social order required for survival neces-
sarily implies that social power has to be primarily explained by relational
power and only secondarily by the agent’s intrinsic characteristics.
Although an individual may coerce others (through aggression or
menacing) to do what he wants, based upon his superior intrinsic charac-
teristics, and no doubt this is a source of social power, in the society as a
whole most of any individual’s social power is relationally based (it is the
consequence of social belonging).
Very important philosophic traditions and social thinkers have addressed
the question of social power, among them we may mention: the Hindu re-
ligion and Buddhism; the Greek philosophers; Confucius; the philosophers
of modernity such as Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Smith, and Marx;
more contemporary philosophers and sociologists such as Nietzsche, We-
ber, Russell, and Foucault; contemporary disciplines in social psychology,
sociology, political analysis and anthropology. In fact, the list is almost end-
less, because social power is an obliged topic in any political philosophy and
in any analysis of societies, groups or individuals’ interaction.
The first thing to appreciate, is that diverse thinkers give a differ-
ent degree of importance to the distinctions made earlier. In particular,
the agent’s intrinsic characteristics as a source of social power is a more
relevant topic for Western thinkers, since Western individualism has dif-
ferentiated the individuals by their rights. In primary societies, individu-
als are not yet differentiated, and the social order is defined by a global
cosmology that defines the relationship of the human group with nature.
Therefore, in these societies social power is conceptualized mostly as rela-
tional and the intrinsic characteristics of the agent are less relevant (as dis-
cussed chapter one, reactive aggression is much less common in hunter
gatherers than amongst the chimps).
As the social groups expanded mainly as a consequence of sedentary
life, primary societies evolved into traditional enlarged societies, in which
rationality and religion play a key role to establish the social order. In
traditional societies, individuals are differentiated according to their du-
chapter three 47

ties, and hierarchical structures are created which imply differential social
power of distinct individuals. In these societies, social power is more and
more related to the intrinsic agent´s characteristics, such as his personal
knowledge or his special relationship with God; but still social power is
mostly defined as relational. In Western societies social power is also in
general terms conceptualized as relational – an agent-target relation (this
is the hardcore of democracy); but social power as a consequence of the
intrinsic characteristics of the agent increases significantly its relevance,
particularly in the economic areas of the social life68.
These distinctions are relevant mainly because of two reasons: 1)
Around eighty per cent of the world’s population today lives in societies
in which social order is still mainly defined by traditional societies, and
only 20% in cultures which are defined by Western individualism. 2)
Even in the West today, 40 to 50% of the Gross Domestic Product is
decided by the governments. Which reminds us that the differentiation of
the individual rights is a social concession. A concession that may change
all the time, as the governments using their sovereignty (representing
the State), may increase or decrease taxes or may even confiscate private
property arguing public benefit.
Therefore, any discussion of social power has to go beyond Western
individualism for two reasons: first, to be able to understand social power
in other societies; and second, to understand social power in the history
of the West, and the influence of these historical roots in contemporary
Western individualism.
The conception of social power as derived from the agent´s intrinsic
characteristics assumes that: due to these characteristics the agent has the
power to influence, convince or force others to do what the agent decides
others have to do. But this conception takes the agent as an exogenous
agent, which is never true. The agent itself is part of the society and has
always a social role, previously defined by the conceptual system and
the institutional arrangement of the society of reference. Therefore, any
agent’s action always implies relational power. Social power is always by
definition relational because humans are social beings.
However, since the integration between the individual and the society
is always imperfect, the social role of specific agents is never totally de-

68
It must be pointed out in here that the primary society, the traditional society or the
Western society never existed. These categories are abstract categories, useful for analysis
and discussion that we find relevant; but other authors may prefer to use other distinct
abstract categories.
48 carlos obregón

fined, and there is always space for the agent’s intrinsic characteristics to
influence social power. But the agent’s intrinsic characteristics as a source
of social power always have to be of secondary importance versus the
primary importance of relational power. This is necessarily so, because
otherwise the survival of the society would be at risk. A society in which
the main source of social power are the agent’s intrinsic characteristics
will be by definition highly unstable, and its survival will be at risk.
In animal societies reproduction plays a key role in defining the social
order and the instinct of attachment, as we have discussed, is critical
for its survival. We already saw that with the chimps, long lasting lead-
ership requires emotional belonging and political coalitions. In human
extended societies, the use of force cannot establish social order because
no leader or group can interact all the time with all the participants of the
group. Therefore, social order in extended societies requires relational
power as the primary source of social power.
In this chapter we provide a framework of analysis to discuss the re-
lationship between the individual and the society, which is applicable to
distinct societies in diverse historical times. And we use this framework to
discuss the differences as to what social power means between primary,
traditional and Western societies.

a framework of analysis69

We should start reminding us of the fact that what distinguishes hu-

mans from chimps and other animals is the development of a syntactic
69
In what follows we will describe a framework we have used in previous works to un-
derstand the relationship between the individual and the society which is applicable to
distinct societies in different points of time. A framework of analysis necessarily includes
abstract categories, the choosing of which is somewhat arbitrary in the sense that another
set of abstract categories could be used. The abstract categories discussed in here apply to
all societies in distinct historical periods; but the specific way in which they happen to be
shaped, varies from one society to the other and from one historical period to another. All
societies must relate to nature, they must have social order to survive, and they must take
care of their children; but the specific way they do it significantly varies from one society to
another. There are as many possibilities as there are societies, and this enormous diversi-
fication is an evolutionary strength. But to perform social analysis a specific set of abstract
categories has to be used, as we have done here.
However, there are some restrictions as to which abstract categories can be used, they must
satisfy two requisites: 1) be consistent with evolutionary theory; and 2) be coherent with
the empirical data and the recent scientific discoveries in neurobiology and social sciences.
chapter three 49

language, which allows the notion of an extended time and the imagina-
tion of more abstract categories. These abstract categories sustain an
extended social life through the development of a conceptual system
and its corresponding institutional arrangement; the first empirical cor-
roborations of which are dated already four hundred thousand years
ago, in the evidence we have of human burials (which likely started
significantly earlier).
As we have shown in the last chapter, there is plenty scientific evi-
dence that: 1) human´s evolutionary survival requires a social life (the
second way of belonging); 2) children to survive need the protection of a
caregiver, who regularly is the mother (the first way of belonging); and 3)
the relationship with the external world is also required for survival (the
third way of belonging). Therefore, for survival reasons, the conceptual
system and the corresponding institutional arrangement have to define
the three belonging ways.
In particular, social belonging (the second way) has to satisfy some
specific evolutionary requirements. Since social existence means that
the society must be integrated, there must be an integrative system that
glues the society together. But social integration is always imperfect be-
cause evolutionarily the individual is always differentiated from the social
group, as he/she has a particular, specific genetic pool; therefore, despite
the integrative system there is always some unresolved tension between
the individual and the society. Thus, for the cases in which the indi-
vidual does not voluntarily comply with his social duties, there has to be
a power system that allows the society to force the individual to comply.
Moreover, the social group’s survival may be threatened by the aggres-
sion of other social groups; to defend the social group, and to attack
other social groups when it is socially beneficial, is the second important
function of the power system. Finally, social survival implies having the
material means required to survive; therefore, there must be an economic
system. This classification of social belonging into the integrative system,
the power system and the economic system was originally proposed by
Kenneth Bolding, and we find it particularly useful.
Table 3.1 shows that the conceptual system and the corresponding
institutional arrangement define the three belonging ways; and that the
second way of belonging, social significance, is expressed in the three
social systems previously mentioned which interact dynamically among
them. The definition of each one of these categories, which the reader is
encouraged to review, is provided in table 3.2.
50 carlos obregón

table 3.1 social interaction

Love
individual Social significance Institution: Conceptual System and
Institutional Arrangement
Existential significance

Integrative System
Social significance: Economic and Trade System
Power System

table 3.2 definitions of categories of analysis of social belonging

Institution: is the sum of a Conceptual system and its corresponding Institutional Arrangement.
Conceptual System: it is a mixture of knowledge, beliefs and habits that fully explain the social
and physical reality, and guide and direct social and individual behavior.
Institutional Arrangement: The set of institutions that make operative the Conceptual system.
Integrative system: traditions and customs and social obligations, for example: established rules,
the law; values ​​and social beliefs in general; ethical principles; religion; benevolence; and indi-
vidual commitments individually socially sanctioned.
Economic and Exchange System: the production and distribution of economic goods and the
selfish exchange in any social relations, including economic exchange.
Power System: the social use of force

Summarizing, in any society language allows the social group to de-

velop a conceptual system that defines the three ways of belonging: Love
(the relationship with people near to us); social belonging (the relation with
the society); and existential belonging (the relationship with the whole uni-
verse). The conceptual system has a corresponding institutional arrange-
ment that organizes in pragmatic terms the social life. Social belonging is
defined mainly by the integrative system that defines the values and ways of
life that glue the society together. The integrative system is the main base of
relational social power. But since there are always belonging failures, there
is always the possibility of individual deviant behavior and there has to be
a power system, which is also used to interact with out-groups. Notice that
the power system is also a social system, and therefore it is also relationally
based. Finally, social life requires the production and distribution of neces-
chapter three 51

sary goods and services; thus, social belonging always needs an economic
system.; which being social is also relationally based. In relative terms, how-
ever, both the power system and the economic system are more influenced
by the agent’s intrinsic characteristics than the integrative system.
Only for analytical purposes, we have created the three highly arbitrary
abstract social categories: the primary society, the traditional society, and
the Western society (which we already introduced earlier in this manu-
script). Of course, none of them has ever existed as such. But this arbitrary
classification has the purpose to focus the discussion on the particular, dif-
ferential characteristics of contemporary Western societies versus other
societies, including the ones that existed in the West’s own history. In the
primary societies, individuals are not differentiated – individuals are not
expected to make individual decisions – the decisions are taken by the
group, which is small enough to allow the communication between all the
members. And each individual’s duty is fully specified by the cosmogony
provided by magic. Therefore, almost all social power is relational based.
In the traditional societies, as the society becomes larger and more com-
plex, direct communication between all the members becomes impossible.
Therefore, individuals have to be differentiated; a hierarchical organiza-
tion is required, and individuals are expected to take individual decisions.
Although social power is still mainly relationally based, the agent’s intrinsic
characteristics gain relevance as a source of power. In the traditional societ-
ies the individuals are only differentiated by their duties. In the Western
societies, individuals are differentiated not only by their duties, but also
by their rights. Therefore, although still most social power is relationally
based, the agents intrinsic characteristics are even more relevant as a source
of power that in the traditional sacristies. Table 3.3 provides the definitions
of the primary, the traditional and the Western society.

Table 3.3 The Primary, the Traditional, and the The Western societies

Primary Society: the individual is not differentiated from the society. The society, in turn, is not
differentiated from the existential universe.
Traditional Society: the individual is differentiated from society in terms of his responsibilities, but
not in terms of his rights. The society may or may not be differentiated from existential universe.
The Western Society: the individual is differentiated, in addition to his responsibilities, by his
rights. The individual exercise his rights of: expression; political participation and voting free-
dom; economic freedom and property; and to pursue his individual economic interests. The
society is differentiated from the existential universe.
52 carlos obregón

This framework of analysis opens new venues to understand what social

power is. The use of force only occurs in the power system; but social power
also exists in the integrative and in the economic systems. Moreover, since
the three systems interact all the time, social power is usually a consequence
of more than one system. Think, for example, of the Catholic Church: its
social power is mostly based on the integrative system, but its social power
relies also on its economic strength, and in several historical occasions and
instances on the use of force (during the Inquisition, for example).
In what follows we will very briefly describe some of the character-
istics of social power in the integrative system, the power system, the
economic system, the primary societies, the traditional societies and the
Western societies. However, we will not discuss the full implications of
the framework of analysis proposed in here until the second section, in
which it is used to discuss other authors’ views on social power.

Social Power in the Integrative System

For every society the core system is the integrative; which provides the
set of values, beliefs and institutions that hold the society together and
defines the life of the social group. The social power based on the integra-
tive system is particularly strong, because it represents the power of the
whole society. It is by definition a relational power, since the power of the
agent comes from his/her social role which is embedded in an integrative
system that represents the implicitly accepted way of life of the commu-
nity in question. There are many examples in daily life: a policeman, a
teacher, a priest, a public servant and so on. Their authority is respected
and their opinions are listened to because of the social role they represent.
Individual characteristics are no match for institutional recognition. Any
profession requires social recognition.
Individual characteristics do make a difference; for example, we
all want to go with the best doctor. But how do we find the best one?
Necessarily through social recognition. We are social animals. Even
our thought process, which uses language, is of social origin. Physical
strength is no longer an important social organizer in human societies;
and intelligence and other individual characteristics, while relevant, are
of secondary importance versus the social roles defined and institutional-
ized by the integrative system.
chapter three 53

In complex societies, there may be competing integrative systems, and

finding a comprehensive umbrella for all of them may be a very difficult
challenge. This was the historical case of China, and the main reason of
the success of Confucius’ political philosophy which provided the inte-
grative umbrella for the complex Chinese Empire.
Belonging failures in the integrative system may give rise to individual
and/or group violence, in which cases the agent’s intrinsic characteristics
become important in defining social power. The exercise of coercive so-
cial power implying only the agent’s intrinsic characteristics does happen
in the society, but only at the level of the interaction amongst individuals
or groups, not at the social level. Thus, one may think of an agent using
his physical strength to impose conditions on a target. And it happens all
the time; think for example of sexual violations in the military, bullying in
schools, violence in prisons, marital abuses and so on. The exercise of so-
cial power implying only the agent’s intrinsic characteristics is a belonging
failure, which happens in occasions as a consequence of the fact that the full
integration between the individual and the society is impossible. But when a
belonging failure happens, there is always a social effort to prevent, punish
and eradicate the deviant behavior through education, ethical principles,
institutional reorganizations, reward and punishment measures, and so on.

Social Power in the Power System

While the exercise of social power in the integrative system and in the
economic system does not imply the use of force, in the power system it
always does.
Social power in the power system, at the social level, is always rela-
tional. It emanates from the role of the agent given by the conceptual
system and the corresponding institutional arrangement of the society in
question. The power system implies the use of force. But the use of force
in human beings has become socialized. You may be a tall, exceptionally
strong man, but you are no match against a group of police officers or
soldiers. The use of individual force against members of the in-group is
generally legally forbidden. The use of force at the social level has two
purposes: 1) prevent, correct, and penalize deviant individual behavior in
the in-group; and 2) fight out-groups (either to defend the in-group or to
take advantage of the out-groups).
54 carlos obregón

At the social level, in-group relations based upon physical aggression

or the menace of it are forbidden in all the societies; this is a necessary
precondition for the social order required for evolutionary survival. As
we discussed in chapter one, what distinguishes a human group or so-
ciety from the chimps and other animal groups is that aggression is no
longer a key social organizer.
In the relationship between out-groups, the social power based on
the use of force is predominant; but even in this case, as Henry Kiss-
inger wrote brilliantly in his book Diplomacy, war is always a prelude to
a diplomatic peaceful agreement. No State can maintain a war forever.
The recent case of the abandonment of Afghanistan by the US, after
twenty years of presence, proves it. The failure of the US to reconstruct
a new Afghan integrative system made it impossible for the US to re-
main – because brute force is not enough to maintain social order in
human societies.

Social Power in the Economic System

Classical economists defined economic value as the capacity, through

the markets, to command the labor of others to do what one wants.
Social power in the economic system is therefore related to the indi-
vidual agent’s intrinsic characteristics, such as: wealth, income, and
consumption capacity. Being wealthy in some societies provides a
high social status.
But any economic transaction occurs within a set of institutions that
necessarily implies relational power. Think of someone buying with a
credit card, and you will rapidly realize the many institutions involved.
Moreover, many economic transactions relate directly to the integrative
system, for example: government expenditures and taxes, churches´ eco-
nomic transactions and so on. And many other economic transactions
relate directly to the power system such as: defense expenditures, police
expenditures and so on.
Social power in the economic system is, therefore, always relational.
But in some societies, like the Western ones, the social allowance of the
presence of large free markets have made the agent’s intrinsic economic
characteristics a more relevant source of social power. We will explore
more the social power in the economic system in the sixth chapter.
chapter three 55

Social Power in Primary Societies

In primary societies social power is mostly relational and the social power
based on the agent´s characteristics is almost irrelevant.
Primary societies are characterized by small groups in which physical
interaction amongst the members is still possible. These societies´ main con-
cern, as we have seen, is survival in a hostile environment. Magic therefore
is a pragmatic conceptual system that establishes a universal cosmogony
that defines the duties of each individual which are established by the corre-
sponding institutional arrangement. The source of social power is the strict
definition of each individual’s social role provided by the universal cosmog-
ony. Individuals are not yet differentiated and decisions are taken by the
group. Thus, social power is mostly relational and the agent’s power based
on his own intrinsic characteristics, even though it exists, is of minor im-
portance. What distinguishes the primary human societies from the chimps
is precisely that the social order substitutes the individual agent’s intrinsic
characteristics (such as his aggressive capacity or his physical strength) with
a well established social order defined by the cosmogony of magic.
In the primary societies the integrative system glues the society together
– which is needed for survival. The economic system is defined by the in-
tegrative system of the social group, and it is the latter the one which de-
fines who produces what and who consumes what. Therefore, the agent’s
intrinsic characteristics are mostly irrelevant in the economic system of the
primary societies. The power system is used against individual deviant be-
havior within the in-group and to fight out-groups. The power system is also
defined by the integrative system, and the agent’s intrinsic characteristics are
irrelevant in interpersonal interactions, because given the small size of the so-
ciety the implementation of the social rules can be strictly supervised by the
whole group. Thus, the power system is used to penalize in-group deviant
behavior, which happens rarely; or to fight out-groups, either to defend the
in-group or to attack the out-groups to take advantage of them.

Social Power in Traditional Societies

In the traditional societies social power is still mostly relational, but the in-
trinsic characteristics of the agent gain relevance as a source of social power.
56 carlos obregón

There is no particular historical date that signals the transition from

the primary societies to the traditional ones. In fact, traditional societies
have many inherited characteristics from the primary societies. But what
seems clear is that as life became urban and technologies became more
sophisticated the populations became larger70. And as the social group
expands, the physical interaction between all the group members is no
longer possible; therefore, the individual, intrinsic characteristics of an
agent cannot be a source of social power at the level of the society as a
whole. Hierarchical organizations are required, and individuals are dif-
ferentiated according to their duties – in respect to which they have to
take individual decisions. The main source of social power in traditional
societies is relational, and it is given by the social role assigned to each in-
dividual by the conceptual system and its corresponding institutional ar-
rangement of the society of reference. However, the differentiation of the
individuals according to their duties makes it more necessary to rely on
the agent’s intrinsic characteristics; which are not a social organizer, but
are useful for performing better the social role assigned to the individual.
While in the primary societies the integrative system is fully domi-
nant, in the traditional societies the power system and the economic sys-
tem gain independence and become fully differentiated.
The integrative system is still the hardcore of social life in traditional
societies. But as the society becomes larger and complex, the possibility
of deviant individual behavior increases and also the interaction with
other out-groups become more frequent and decisive. Thus, the power
system gains relevance. In some societies, for periods, the leaders of the
power system (the military leaders) may become extremely important for
the survival of the group, and in such cases they may accumulate enough
social power to overthrow the traditional representatives of the integra-
tive system. Think for example of Caesar dismantling the power of the
Roman Senate.
The economic system also gains relevance; and wealth, income and
consumption capacity may provide a new basis of social power. Think of
the merchants in the Mediterranean Sea or of the Jews in Rome.
In what follows we present some specific examples of the use of social
power in some traditional societies.
70
In fact, traditional societies have had quite large populations. Mexico City before the
conquest had a population of half a million people; the Roman Empire at its peak had a
population of around sixty five million people, comparable to a large European country of
today; and China today, which is a traditional society, has one thousand four hundred mil-
lion people – the largest population in the world.
chapter three 57

Social Power in The Hindu Religion and in India and South Asia Today

A good place to start our quest about the social power in traditional societies
is the Hindu religion, which is a differentiated version of the primary magic.
There is no personal God. There is reincarnation. And the social world is
ordered by the Hindu’s cosmology which classifies the castes and the spe-
cific duties of each individual in a hierarchical organization, which serves the
purpose of providing a social order that allows for social survival.
Since the individual is already differentiated by his/her duties, it was
necessary to provide guidance for the individual’s religious practice;
Buddhism is a derived version of the Hindu religion that addresses this
particular issue. Buddhism is about renouncing personal pleasures and
illuminating oneself to understand two fundamental principles: a) that
everything started to exist interrelated and b) that therefore individual
existence is an illusion. The personal realization of these two principles
happens with the integration (through illumination) to the whole existen-
tial universe, which conduces the individual to fulfill his/her social duties.
In India social order today is still mostly provided by the traditional
society’s caste system, although the influence of the West has opened two
new venues to obtain social power: wealth accumulation through the eco-
nomic system, and political power competing for a public post through
democracy. Competition in these two new venues opens the possibility
of social power based on the agent’s intrinsic characteristics, but still most
of the social power in India is relational and it is given by the social role
assigned by the conceptual system and the institutional arrangement.
The cosmic principles of the Hindu religion have been highly influ-
ential in all South Asia, in which the traditional society still defines to a
large extent the social order. Therefore, social power is predominantly
relational, and the personal characteristics of the agent, while relevant,
are of secondary importance.

Social Power in Confucius’ Thought in China and North Asia

Buddhism has been highly influential in China. But due to its individualistic
bias it was insufficient to solve the problem of social order in China, whose
empire consisted of many nations, and therefore lacked the old caste tradi-
58 carlos obregón

tion that sustained the social order in India. Therefore, a new conception
was needed, and this was provided by Confucius’ rationalism. For Con-
fucius human beings are social by nature and must develop virtuous rela-
tionships among them, relationships of excellence. These relationships are
dominated by the principle of “shu”, reciprocity. The center of Confucius´
ethics is the “xiao” family feeling. The most important social relationships
for Confucius are five: ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife,
elder and younger, brother and friendship. The objective of the ethics of
Confucius is to develop the social harmony between individuals’ interests
and those of society, always giving priority to the common interest. The two
basic virtues for this author are “ren” (humanism or kindness) and “li” (act
properly). The virtue of “ren” leads to the “shu” reciprocity of Confucius:
“Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you”71.
There is already an important lesson in Confucius’ thought: the State
cannot impose social order by force. The power system cannot by itself
establish a lasting social order. Social power cannot uniquely be based on
the power system. The main social power that glues the society together
comes from the integrative system.
In Neo Confucianism, social belonging and love are defined by Con-
fucius’ doctrine, while existential belonging is defined by Buddhism and
Taoism. Neo Confucianism was very influential in North Asia and still
explains, to a large extent, the social order in the countries in this region.
In Neo Confucianism social order is mainly relational and the intrinsic
characteristics of the agent are of secondary relevance72.

71
The difference between the “shu” reciprocity of Confucius and the golden rule of Kant is
that the second rests on the duty imposed by reason, while the first rests on the development
of virtuous conduct in moral praxis. The virtue of “li” is the concrete individual application of
the virtue of “ren” in individual behavior. “Li” is learned through the rituals of the commu-
nity. “Li” is the individual’s own behavior which explains social order beyond the strength of
the State to impose it. The superior person “junzi”, is the one who cultivates the moral virtues,
and the one who behaves in the appropriate way “dao”. Mencius, a disciple of Confucius,
developed an idealistic Confucianism in which humans are by nature good, and by being
virtuous they develop their innate nature; but this idealism is not present in the initial thought
of Confucius. The ethics of Confucius is an ethic of responsibilities that promote social order.
72
The confrontation with the West was particularly difficult for China that was no longer a military
society. China was a culturally centered society integrated by Neo Confucianism, with low military
defense capabilities. And as a consequence, it was invaded by several Western countries which orga-
nized the pillage of China. At the end of the pillage period, the Kuomintang (the Chinese leaders in
government) allied with the Western interests – which was forbidden by the values taught by Con-
fucius. As a consequence, the Chinese Revolution started, which finally banished the Kuomintang.
The Chinese Revolution then can be seen both as the inauguration of communism and as the re-
instauration of Neo Confucianism; both with the same purpose – to reintegrate the Chinese Empire.
chapter three 59

China today is a communist country, therefore access to political

power through democratic competition is not possible. However, access
through wealth is allowed, and given the interaction with Western capi-
talism this route to social power has gained much relevance. But still, the
traditional Neo Confucianism is the relational source of social power that
explains most of the Chinese social order.
In some other North Asian countries (such as Japan or Korea), like in
India, the venue to social power through political democratic competition
is open. But nevertheless, social order is largely defined by the traditional
relational society’s values provided by Neo Confucianism. An interest-
ing fact that underpins this idea is that in Japan the Liberal Democratic
Party has been in power since 1955 until today, except for two very brief
periods, 1993-94 and 2009-12.
Both in China and North Asia the fundamental source of social pow-
er is relational, but the intrinsic characteristics of the agent have slowly
gained more relevance, particularly in the economic system.

Social Power in Greek and Roman Thought

Democracy as a source of social power started in Greece, and it was the

consequence of a historical accident. The Persian Empire was built based
on the Iron Revolution, which created arms that were more powerful than
the previous ones of copper and bronze used in the Egyptian Empire. Giv-
en its use for building arms, Persia declared illegal the private production
of iron and determined it to be an exclusive State activity. But iron was not
only useful for the production of arms, but also for many other productive
activities; therefore, offshore workshops were built which were the starting
point of the Greek cities. These cities lacked a traditional integrative system
and needed a form of government to manage the collective interest of the
new workshops’ owners; therefore, democracy started.
Democracy however was only to be exerted by the male citizens that
had finished their military service (around 20% of the population); and
was always under the suspicion of the Greek rationality. Plato, in the book
VI of The Republic argues that democracy can promote non educated, pop-
ulist leaders, unable to govern, and that eventually it will create conditions
that make tyrannies possible. Aristotle was also suspicious of democracy,
because it was based on the vote of the poor and the ignorant.
60 carlos obregón

Plato’s and Aristotle’s criticisms of democracy already antici-

pated some of its main problems, democracy is an institution that
emerges under particular historical circumstances. Its success in
the Western countries relates to the historical institutions that
these countries have developed. In particular, the key ingredient
for a democratic system to work well is the presence of a large
middle class. In the West, democracy was not truly consolidated
until the second half of the twentieth century. And it associates
with larger governments, bigger social expenditures and the de-
cisive presence of a consolidated large middle class; whose exis-
tence sustained the key democratic institutions of free press and
an independent and fair judicial system (needed as an arbitrator
of conflicts between the political parties). In developing countries,
there has never been a consolidated middle class and democracies
have had at best mixed results; and in many occasions, they have
given rise to inept leaders and/or tyrants, as Plato and Aristo-
tle predicted long time ago. At the world level the absence of a
middle class and of common institutions hinders the possibility of
a global democracy.
The Roman Republic´ s political system was built acknowledg-
ing the criticisms to democracy of the rational Greek philosophers.
While the consuls were popularly elected, the Senate, which was
the center piece of the Roman Republic, was elected by the high-
class minorities.
In a first stage in Rome, the source of political social power
was, as in many other traditional societies, a general council with
the direct representation of diverse clans or regions. In a second
stage in the Republic, the main source of political social power was
the Senate. And in a third stage, in the Empire, the main source
of political power was the absolute power of the emperors. The
Roman political system went from a highly relationally based po-
litical power like the initial General Council, to a less relationally
based political power like the Senate in which the agent´ s personal
intrinsic characteristics became more important (think of Cicero),
although still of secondary importance, to a very low relationally
based political power in which the personal intrinsic characteristics
of the agent were more decisive, like in the Empire. As we know,
the absolute power of the emperors constituted a belonging failure
and partially explains the demise of the Roman Empire.
chapter three 61

Social Power in Medieval Christianity and in the Islam Today

The base of social power both in medieval Christianity and in the Islam
today is the belief in God. Religious leaders (which may or not be as-
sumed of divine origin) hold the political power of the State because they
represent God’s laws and/or God’s will. In the Christian world, in some
countries the State always has differentiated itself from the Church (Eng-
land), in others the Church was also the State, and they differentiated
from one another only later in history (Italy). But in any case, all through
the Middle Ages, the Church in Europe, in addition to its religious activi-
ties, was a powerful State with decisive influence in most countries. In the
Islam today, religious representatives are still politically very powerful.
Social power in medieval Christianity, and in the Islam today, is main-
ly relational and it is based on the belief in God, and the agent’s intrinsic
characteristics only play a secondary role.

Social Power in Modern Western Thinkers

With the demise of Rome, several barbarian States were formed of which
by far the most important one was France. In fact, in the eighth century,
Charles Martel, King of France, was the one who prevented the Muslims
from invading Europe. All through the Middle Ages, kings were in con-
stant wars with other feudal lords, who also ambitioned to become kings,
or who did not fully accept the king’s authority. What really made a king
significantly more powerful than other feudal lords, in those days, were
the new Burgos (cities) under his authority. And while it was generally
accepted that their right to be kings was divine, it also had to be justi-
fied conceptually by the new political support of the new citizens. This
was Hobbes´ political philosophy’s main goal. Hobbes argued that the
King’s power is consequence of an implicit contract between the citizens,
through which they acknowledge the power of the State – in order to
prevent the chaos that would be produced if the individuals’ aggression
towards each order is not controlled and ordered by the State.
However, as the cities grew in power, Hobbes’ philosophy became ob-
solete, and other thinkers fully realized the consequences of the new source
of social power residing in the citizens. Locke soon realized that the State
62 carlos obregón

just does not have the resources to be vigilant of everybody’s behavior.

Therefore, social order cannot be based only on the coercive power of
the State. Locke presents a sophisticated system of thought in which social
order is consequence of: 1) an ethical individual who has access to God’s
moral law and who usually acts morally by God’s design; 2) but since hu-
mans are biased by their passions, a written law is needed, which expresses
a tacit social contract that follows God’s moral law and it is accepted by
everybody. In Rousseau, like in Locke, a social contract has a fundamen-
tal function, it is the key for the benevolent nature of humans to emerge.
Without it, humans can be corrupted by inadequate cultural institutions,
which may promote the malevolence of humans. In Rousseau, the social
contract is explicit, and it champions the importance of democracy.
Most contemporary political philosophers, explaining social order,
will argue - as Rousseau did - that an explicit social contract is required.
The social order in the Western societies however, is not only sustained
by democracy, but by a complex integrative system which among others
includes religious institutions, free press, a judicial system, a written law,
an open discussion of social ethics which serves as the basis of the educa-
tion of children and youngsters, and the explicit and permanent political
participation of a large middle class. In addition to the integrative system,
the social order in the Western societies is sustained by a power system
– represented by the military and law enforcement institutions, and an
economic system – characterized by the private ownership of the means
of production, and the free exchange of goods and services.

Social Power in the Western Society

The main feature of the Western societies is that individuals for the first
time are differentiated not only by their duties but also by their rights.
The newborn democracy implies a political relational power. The new-
born capitalism implies that the agent´s characteristics of wealth, income
and consumption capacity become more important than ever before.
Thus, although social power is still highly relational, the individual
agent’s intrinsic characteristics become more important than in the tradi-
tional societies, particularly in the economic system.
There is no date that signals the advent of the Western societies, which
have many inherited features both from the primary societies and the
chapter three 63

traditional societies, but what specifically distinguishes them is that they

differentiate the individuals in terms of their rights – as a consequence of
the growth of the Burgos or cities at the end of the West’s feudal times.
The growth of the new Burgos was due to the intensification of the trade
with the East and the Americas; which fostered the need for the mass
production that occasioned the birth of the new cities. The newborn cit-
ies required a new form of government, and the outcome was democracy
and the new differentiated human rights of the individuals.

conclusion

What distinguishes human societies from chimps is that they learned new
rock production technologies that had as a consequence the enlargement
of the social group. In the extended groups of the primary societies a
developed language that characterized the Homo Sapiens gives rise to
the conceptual system of magic, which is a cosmological thought that em-
braces everything that exists – even time and dead people. Magic defines
everyone’s role in the institutional arrangement of the primary societies.
Social power is defined by the social role given to each member of the
society and it is mostly relational. Leadership by force, which is already
short lived among the chimps, became even more difficult in the extend-
ed primary societies, the survival of which required everyone to follow
the assigned social role. The individual agent’s intrinsic characteristics
are less relevant in primary societies because individuals have much less
margin for personal decisions, and their actions are strictly supervised by
the group; which, although larger than chimp groupings, is small enough
to closely follow each one´s activities.
In traditional enlarged societies, which are significantly larger than
the primary societies, a complex conceptual system and a corresponding
institutional arrangement is required; which on occasions may need to
embrace several conceptual systems and institutional arrangements, of
societies that have been conquered. Social power in these societies is also
necessarily mostly relational with the agent’s intrinsic characteristics only
playing a minor role. Social power is mostly a consequence of the social
role assigned by the integrative system which puts the society together.
But since deviant behavior and confronting out-groups requires the use
of force, the power system becomes more relevant in these enlarged soci-
64 carlos obregón

eties. And the complexity of the society also involves the differentiation
of a sophisticated economic system. Social power then may be expressed
in any one of the three systems: the integrative, the power or the eco-
nomic. The agent’s intrinsic characteristics in the economic system such
as: wealth, income, or consumption capacity, become a source of social
power in traditional societies. But it is always highly dependent upon the
integrative system, which defines when and how economic power can be
used or not. A recent example is what is happening in China, where the
Chinese government is demanding the political control of the large high-
tech Chinese companies. Social power in these enlarged societies may
also be obtained due to the agent’s intrinsic characteristics through the
power system, think of Hercules or the military heroes in many of these
societies. But again, this power is subject to social recognition via the inte-
grative system; for example, after winning a big battle against the enemy,
a Roman general returned to Rome to give tribute to the emperor; he was
always reminded that he was only mortal, while the emperor was divine.
In the Western societies, as individuals become differentiated also by
their rights, although the main source of social power is still relational,
the individual agent’s intrinsic characteristics become more relevant as
a source of social power. Social status gained through competition by
publicly elected posts or by accumulating economic wealth became more
relevant as a source of social power than in the traditional societies.
CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL POWER IN THE MINDS
OF GREAT WESTERN THINKERS

Several contemporary Western thinkers have focused their attention on

the understanding of social power. We will briefly review some of their
proposals. In reviewing these thinkers, we will confront their notions of
social power with the most recent knowledge accumulated in evolutionary
neurobiology and social sciences. In doing so, we will follow the philo-
sophical deconstruction proposed by Derrida. Derrida has suggested that
many of the philosophical conclusions of leading contemporary (and previ-
ous) philosophers are deduced from a set of philosophical preconceptions
assumed from the start – which are exogenous to the philosophical analysis
presented. These philosophical preconceptions are presented as unques-
tionable universal truths around which the philosophical system is built.
These initial philosophical preconceptions (universal assumed truths)
allow the philosopher to present a highly congruent philosophical system
that he uses to discuss the relevant philosophical questions that he raises
– in our case the sources of social power. These complex philosophical
systems are useful to illuminate certain aspect of social reality, but the
conclusions obtained must be scientifically evaluated, because they are
deduced from initial philosophical preconceptions that are assumed with-
out any scientific rigor.
The human mind, whether alone or aided by science, does not have ac-
cess to universal truths; therefore, nothing sustains the initial philosophical
preconceptions. We have learnt from contemporary neurobiology that hu-
mans obtain information through the senses and with it they create images
of reality that are stored in the mind and are retrieved when needed. In
other works, I have explored at length this argument and shown that nei-
ther the mind alone, nor the mind aided by science has access to universal
truths73. The universal philosophical preconceptions assumed by the great
philosophers cannot be known by the human mind; Derrida is correct,
they are assumed from the start without any scientific backing.

73
Obregon, C., The Philosophy of Belonging. 2nd Edition, 2021. Amazon.com. Also available
at Research Gtae.com

[65]
66 carlos obregón

In particular, the philosophical individualism that characterizes the

Western philosophers originates from the philosophical preconception
that social reality is the result of the actions of the individuals that consti-
tute the society. This preconception does not withstand the confrontation
with the contemporary knowledge accumulated in evolutionary neurobi-
ology and social sciences. And once we remove it, it becomes clear that
despite the fact that in Western societies the intrinsic characteristics of the
agent have become a more relevant source of social power, still, like in
other societies, the main source of social power is relational.
In the first section in this chapter, we briefly review how the human
mind works according to the most recent findings in neurobiology, and
we also discuss the meaning of scientific knowledge. The conclusion, as
we said, is that humans do not have access to know the universal initial
preconceptions assumed by great philosophers. Most of these preconcep-
tions in the modern times have a religious origin. And they were based
on faith, and not on scientific knowledge.
In the second section we discuss the conceptions of the sources of so-
cial power of four more recent key Western thinkers – Nietzsche, Weber,
Russell, and Foucault – in the context of the contemporary knowledge in
neurobiology and social sciences.

first section: how do humans get to know reality?

Most traditional philosophical thought has been built upon a precon-

ceived ontology – initially preconceived universal truths, and an epis-
temology is then developed to explain how it is that humans can get to
know the ontology that was initially assumed. However, as Derrida has
shown with his deconstruction, traditional philosophy never proofs the
existence of the initially preconceived ontology. That explains why we
have diverse ontological realities, with distinct philosophies. In The Phi-
losophy of Belonging74, I have proposed that the only way to avoid the tautol-
ogy that traditional philosophy entails is to start our philosophical inquiry
without any ontological preconception. Thus, to get to the ontological
explanation of what is out there, we first need to solve the epistemologi-
cal problem of how we get to know reality, because we cannot affirm the
existence of whatever we cannot know.
74
Ibid.
chapter four 67

Therefore, the traditional philosophical method of inquiry is reversed.

Instead of defining a preconceived ontology, and then developing an epis-
temology to justify the already initially assumed ontology; we must de-
velop first an epistemology free of preconceptions, and then, based only
upon what we can know scientifically, we answer the ontological ques-
tion of : What is out there?
Since science historically has been the best-known way to establish an
institutional pragmatic positive feedback loop with reality, we propose
to use scientific knowledge to understand how we get to know reality,
and what we can know. In what follows, we first explore how our mind
works, and how it does know reality, based upon neurobiology, cognitive
psychology, and evolutionary linguistics. And then, we explore how we
can get to know reality with the help of science. We review the litera-
ture in the philosophy of science to establish how we get to know reality
through the scientific method. The main conclusion of this first section is
that neither the mind, nor the mind aided by the scientific method, can
know reality as it is; it cannot know any ontological essence.
What the mind knows are images, that are formed based upon in-
formation from the senses, preselected through emotions, which are
evolutionarily inherited. Different animals perceive distinct realities, two
human beings may also perceive different realities, and even the same
person perceives diverse realities under distinct emotional states. This,
however, does not mean that reality does not exist75.

75
How does the mind know? To clarify how the mind works, and how it gets to know real-
ity, we have to recall humans’ evolutionary background. Life is defined by a process that
takes energy from the environment, which it uses and then discards. Thus, life always im-
plies a response to the environment, which establishes a positive feedback loop that allows
for subsistence. The mechanisms of response of simple organisms, are inherited by reptiles
in the form of surviving instincts, among which the two predominant ones are: aggression
and attachment. Birds and other animals, are genetically prepared to follow whatever they
first see - they attach. And aggression is a necessary instinct for individual survival. In more
advanced animals, like many mammals, emotions are a sophisticated survival mechanisms
of response, inherited from less sophisticated ways of life. Emotions in humans are the fore-
most survival connection with external reality. Emotions allow us to differentiate from the
infinite information in the environment those cues that are necessary for subsistence. Emo-
tions guide our senses to search for the relevant survival information. With this information
the mind forms neural maps -images of reality - which then are decomposed, codified and
stored. And they can be recomposed whenever it is needed.
Many animals’ brains work in a similar way to ours, they also perceive reality through their
senses directed by inherited survival patterns of response - which in mammals are emotions
- and form mental images with this sensory information. It has been shown in the labora-
tory that rats, for example, are able to differentiate not only among objects but also between
abstract images; they learn for example the difference between a square, and a rectangle
68 carlos obregón

We can clearly interact with the out there. We can create positive
feedback loops with reality, which are required for evolutionary subsis-
tence, and we can accumulate knowledge. However, we relate to an ex-
istential world through internal images, and therefore we never know
reality as it is; nor do we, neurologically speaking, have the capacity to
know the true essence of reality. The scientific method strengthens to
a large extent our possibilities to establish positive feedback loops with
reality; in particular, it has shown that it largely increases our capacity to
accumulate knowledge. But science is necessarily based upon the mind’s
way to perceive reality though images. Any scientific model starts with
preconceived scientific insights, consequence of the creative imagination
(Ramachandran, 2011, pp. 206-207). What we call human reason is just an evolutionary
development, characterized by a synthetic language that reflects a higher cognitive capacity
that allows a much higher combination of images, which in turn fosters a quite more sophis-
ticated abstract thought that allows for the vision of an extended time, and our conscious
awareness of our future death. This more sophisticated abstract thought both produced and
was the result of brain developments linked to what we call human reason. Human abstract
thought, much later on will allow the development of mathematics, and even much later a
scientific process. A more sophisticated abstract thought does characterize human beings;
but the mind process by which the mind gets to know reality is still the same as the one of
other evolved animals: through neural maps, which are images of reality, based upon sen-
sory information preselected emotionally. Reason works with the previously stored images,
it does not have any other input. Thus using reason, it is impossible to know the essence of
the universe, or reality as it is.
Cognitive psychology has provided many experiments which show that different people
perceive reality in a distinct way. What emerges from all the cognitive empirical research,
is a Self which is defined through early emotional contact with the caregiver. The uncon-
scious plays a key role in the behavior, but it is not the one rigidly defined by Freud’s
conflict between the Id and the Super Ego. The unconscious is consequence of the indi-
vidual’s psychological background, which has an emotional content. Therefore, reality
is not only perceived distinctly by different animals; it is also perceived differently even
between diverse individuals. Why is it that evolution made us perceive reality through
images? Why does perception depend upon emotions? Why does the perception of real-
ity have a psychological content? The general principle governing biological evolution
is survival value. Imagination is just the capacity to combine images, and imagination is
key for survival. It allows us to plan future actions. Imagination also allows us to have a
psychological buffer, when confronted with very menacing real situations. Imagination
permits flexible responses, guided not only by conscious decisions, but by the previous
emotional learning stored in the unconscious. Diversity in the responses of different in-
dividuals to a given reality is an evolutionary strength for the surviving of the species.
Images are nothing else that neural maps of the external world, of our own body, of our
psychological self, including our emotions, and of our present and past relationships with
the out-there. These neural maps by being flexible, maximize our surviving capacity, and
make us substantially more adaptable beings. Imagination allows us to produce adequate
mental states, that reduce stress and improve our capacity to fight illness and other ad-
verse circumstances. Thus, there are all sort of evolutionary reasons for which we were
designed not to know reality as it is.
chapter four 69

of the scientist. And imagination is nothing else than the combination of

images previously stored in the mind76.
76
How do we know through science? The mind cannot know the essence of the universe
by itself, or reality as it is. The question that remains is: can it do so aided by science?
There is a long tradition in the philosophy of science that argues that it does. This argu-
ment initially was based on the naïve idea of positivism
​​ that empirical reality was, by
definition, reality as it is. Positivism today is largely rejected. However, the school denom-
inated Analytical Philosophy has followed the positivist tradition. This school is repre-
sented by Bertrand Russell, John Searle, and others, and it is still widely accepted. Russell
has argued that language and reality have the same common structure; and therefore that
mathematical logic and language are equivalents. However, from an evolutionary stand-
point, Russell’s argument cannot be maintained; because, since the structure of language
changes through time, it is easy to see that it does not correspond to reality. Moreover,
since the structure of language relates to the mind’s capacity to combine images, it fol-
lows that human vision of reality depends on the structure of language. And since the
structure of language changes, human vision of reality is not unique, it changes through
evolutionary time. Moreover, mathematical logic and language are not equivalents, be-
cause language changes through time. A protolanguage was already well developed five
hundred thousand years ago, a syntactic language was already there one hundred thou-
sand years ago, mathematics is only a few thousand years old, and scientific knowledge
has only really expanded rapidly in the last five hundred years. There is clearly not the
correspondence that Russell has argued. Assuming a correspondence between language,
mathematics, and reality, is of course equivalent to implying that the human mind can
know reality as it is. That is why Russell defends what is called neutral monism (the no-
tion that the world is made of a substance that is neither exclusively mental nor physical)
and the proposal of logical atomism (the notion that the world consists of a plurality
of independent things with their qualities and of the relationships among them). The
consequence is that reductionism is possible. John Searle assumes that knowledge can
integrate everything; from the quantic atom, to brain neurobiology, to consciousness, to
freedom to choose, to mutual agreements, to institutions, to the ethics of what we should
do. But in science, while reductionism is a fruitful research strategy, nothing indicates that
we can achieve knowledge of reality as it is. We have not only been unable to integrate
diverse natural sciences, but even the integration only within the field of physics has not
been fully achieved. It has not been possible to integrate Quantum Physics with General
Relativity, and we do not know if we will be able to do it or not. The idea of integrating
​​
all the natural and social sciences today, does not have any true scientific content. We
must not confuse reductionism as a valid scientific strategy, which has already provided
great achievements, with the ontological metaphysical assumption that out there there is
a unique integrated reality which we will have the capacity to know as it is.
Post-Positivism, represented mainly by Popper and Kuhn, maintains that there is a reality
out there, but that we cannot get to know it as it is. The scientific paradigm, previous theories,
scientific antecedents, the previous knowledge and values ​​of the researcher, all can influence
what is observed. Popper rejects the positivist proposal that it is possible to induce true reality
from the study of individual particularities. He introduced the notion of falsiability, which
argues that a theory can never be empirically verified, but that it can be shown to be false.
Critical scientific thinking consists of eliminating false theories. Kuhn addresses two questions
that Popper left unanswered. The first one is how it is that scientific knowledge grows (which
was Putnam’s, 1974, and others´ criticism of Popper ); and the second, how a particular scien-
tific analysis is linked to a broader research program (Lakatus´, 1978, critique of Popper). Both
Popper and Kuhn have been subject to criticisms, but what is relevant in their contribution
70 carlos obregón

We are evolutionarily prepared to interact with the external real-

ity, through positive feedback loops which allow the accumulation of
knowledge about it. This potential connection we have called Existen-
tial Belonging which, we recall, is the potential evolutionary-biological
connection of humans with their external reality. In addition, we are
social beings, and require a connection with the social group to sur-
vive, which we have called Social Belonging. And we also require to
be cared for as babies, through the love of persons near to us, like our
mother or caregiver, this we have called Love, and it is the first way of
Belonging. Evolutionarily we came to be humans as a consequence of
an intensification of our social life, due to the enlargement of the social
group; produced by the discovery of rock technologies. Language is a
social product, and any form of knowledge is socially produced. This
does not mean that there are no individual discoveries, it just points out
that any individual discovery is necessarily based upon previously ac-
cumulated social knowledge.
The main conclusion of this first section is that all human knowledge
is social knowledge; thus, philosophical thought is always the result of
social belonging. And the initial, preconceived assumptions utilized by
the great philosophers are a consequence of the socio-historical reality,
and the particular society and culture of their time.

from the point of view of the argumentation presented here, is that they clearly established
that science cannot know reality as it is. Based upon our previous discussion, it is clear that
Post-Positivism is right in the assertion that we cannot know reality as it is. We only know
reality though images formed out of sensory information guided by emotions; therefore, sci-
entific models have to be the result of imagination. Scientific models are a preconception of
reality based upon imagination, which are subject to empirical verification; which in Popper’s
sense means that they always have the possibility to be shown to be false.
For instance, which model of reality is the correct one: Newton’s or Einstein’s? Is time
absolute, like in Newton, or it is a geometrical dimension of reality, like in Einstein? The
answers are that none of the two models are false; and that both concepts of time explain
rather well 95% of the macro physical events of the universe. But, reality cannot be both.
Scientific models are imagined preconceptions that are empirically shown to establish a posi-
tive feedback loops with reality - that do not fail. The mind aided by science cannot know
the essence of reality, it cannot know reality as it is.
Science, like any human thought, is the outcome of imagination. Like all other human
knowledge, it is based on images which are based on emotionally preselected information.
Mathematical modeling is just human imagination. Scientific models can never be verified.
There is not scientific basis to uphold metaphysical reductionism. The mind aided by sci-
ence cannot get to know the true essence of the universe; reality as it is can never be known
by humans. Science, however, provides a systematic way to interact with reality that allows
for increasingly perfecting the positive feedback loop with it; and, it is safe to conclude that
science is the best known way to establish such a positive feedback loop.
chapter four 71

modern and contemporary thinkers

As we have been discussing in the previous chapter, one of the main

concerns of modern Western thinkers was the establishment of social
order. Hobbes´ solution was his implicit contract in which the citizens
accept the power of the King – representing the State – to avoid the
social chaos produced by aggression amongst individuals. Therefore,
in Hobbes social power resides in the State, represented by the King.
However, modern philosophers soon realized that the State could not
be vigilant of all the activities of all the individuals all the time, therefore
social order can only be sustained if the individuals behave ethically.
The solution was provided by the religious belief that individuals have
access to the eternal moral values in the mind of God, and that he has
inspired them to behave accordingly to such beliefs. Social order for
the modern thinkers was a delicate balance between ethical individuals,
which occasionally might be biased by their passions, and a vigilant
State that represents a social contract. In Locke the social contract is im-
plicit and in Rousseau it is explicit; but in both cases the social contract
protects the society from a selfish individual biased by his passions.
Citizens are protected against the tyranny of the State both by the social
contract and by the divine law. And minorities are protected against
majorities´ tyranny by the divine law. Thus, in the modern thinkers
the religious belief in God was an important feature of their explana-
tion as to how social order is obtained. Social order for these thinkers
is not based upon a social power defined exclusively by the intrinsic
characteristics of the agent. Social power is the consequence of an es-
tablished social order based on the divine law (anchored in humanity’s
brotherhood) that guides individual behavior and illuminates the social
contract. Therefore, social power is relational.
However, since human access to universal moral truths cannot be
shown scientifically, the question has to be raised again as to how
social order can be explained. More recent thinkers, as we will see,
provide different answers. Some of them, like Nietzsche, go back to
the intrinsic characteristics of the agent as the source of social power
and insist that social order is consequence of the confrontation be-
tween relative individual powers. A position that not even Hobbes
would subscribe – because for him the power of the King was needed.
Others, like Weber and Russell, accept that social power is relational
and consequence of an established social order, either based on tradi-
72 carlos obregón

tions or on contemporary Western rationalizations. But for Weber

relational power is insufficient to establish a proper Western social or-
der, and the education of the individual is required. While for Russell
naked power, based upon the intrinsic characteristics of the agent, is
a possibility to establish social order in some societies in certain cases,
although it would be short-lived. Foucault explains better than anyone
else why the sources of social power have to be relational; again, he
leaves unexplained the short-lived cases in which naked power is used
to establish the social order.

friedrich nietzsche

Western thinkers as to the sources of social power, Nietzsche’s concep-

tion of the will to power is a good starting point. Nietzsche was critical of
the universal truths assumed by Christianity, he is famous for saying that
“God is dead”. Yet he introduced new universal philosophical preconcep-
tions of his own.
For Nietzsche all existing things relate to one another through their
pursuit of the expansion of their power; a drive toward overcoming resis-
tance77. In Reginster’s account, Nietzsche should not be read as claiming
that there are no other psychological drives besides power, but as claim-
ing the centrality of power. From this perspective, social power is the ca-
pacity of an individual to exert his/her will to power in a given society. In
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, not only individuals but everything that exists
can be understood from the doctrine of the Will to Power. “That doctrine
seems to include the proposal that creatures like us (or more broadly:
all life, or even all things) aim at the enhancement of their power—and
then further, and that this fact entails that enhanced power is good for
us (or for everything)”78. “What is good? Everything that heightens the
feeling of power in humans, the will to power, power itself. What is bad?
Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that
power is growing, that resistance is overcome”79. Nietzsche places a high

Reginster, Bernard,2006, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, Cambridge,

77

MA: Harvard University Press.

78
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
79
Ibid
chapter four 73

value on individuality and on the independence from conventions of so-

ciety, religion, or morality80. 
Nietzsche´s explanation of the sources of social power does not resist
scientific scrutiny. The idea that humans interact based upon their relative
power has been very attractive for many scholars, such as Hobbes, Freud
and Lorenz – and as we have been mentioning, it is true scientifically that
newborn babies are aggressive81, a characteristic built in evolutionarily for
human survival. But as has been extensively documented by the psychol-
ogy of belonging, the instinct of belonging guides the one of aggression –
an evolutionary requirement for social life to be possible. In fact, mothers
teach the children to unlearn their innate aggression, and to channel it in
socially positive ways. Humans from their origin were already social beings
– a quality inherited from their animal predecessors; and what character-
izes them, is that social life is much more intense that the one of other ani-
mals. Humans therefore, from a scientific point of view, interact based on
a belonging instinct which guides the aggression instinct. Nietzsche’s view
that the source of social power is the Will to Power is just a philosophical
preconception, and it does not have scientific validity.
The Will to Power doctrine not only relates to human social life, it seems
to claim that everything that exists rests fundamentally on an underlying basis
of “power-centers”, whose activity and interactions are explained by the prin-
ciple that they pursue the expansion of their power. However, it is never clear
what these “power-centers” are or are supposed to be. Some readers have at-
tempted to find in the Will to Power doctrine a (quasi-) scientific conjecture (see
Schacht, Abel and Anderson)82. This position however cannot be defended,
modern physics sees the universe as composed of matter – fermions - and
80
Simmel, Georg, [1907] 1920, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche: ein Vortragszyklus, München: Dunck-
er & Humboldt. See also, Nehamas, Alexander, 1985, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; Thiele, Leslie Paul, 1990, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics
of the Soul: a Study of Heroic Individualism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; and
Gemes, Ken, 1992, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
52(1): 47–65. doi:10.2307/2107743.
81
Fonagy, 2004; Allen et al., 2008. Fonagy, P.2004, “Early life trauma and the psychogenesis
and prevention of violence”, Ann NY Acad Sci, Vol. 1036, pp. 181-200. Allen, GJ, P. Fonagy
and Bateman AW (2008), Metalizing in Clinical Practice, American Psychiatric Publishing, Arlington, VA.
82
Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Anderson 1994, 2012. Schacht. Richard, 1983, Nietzsche, Lon-
don: Routledge. Abel, Günther, 1984, Nietzsche: die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige
Wiederkehr, Berlin: W. de Gruyter. Anderson, R. Lanier, 1994, “Nietzsche’s Will to Pow-
er as a Doctrine of the Unity of Science”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 25(5):
729–50. doi:10.1016/0039-3681(94)90037-X –––, 2012, “The Will to Power in Science and
Philosophy”, in Heit, Abel, and Brusotti 2012: 55–72.
74 carlos obregón

energy – bosons; this view is empirically documented and sustained by theo-

retical modeling, and must not be confused with, and has nothing to do with,
the philosophical preconception of the Will to Power proposed by Nietzsche.
Other authors such as Kaufmann, Soll, and Clark and Dudrick83 have de-
fended the Will to Power as a psychological hypothesis, which as Restinger
has insisted claims the centrality of power. There are a large number of other
texts suggesting that Nietzsche’s main agenda was to argue that the psycho-
logical world—or the world as a whole—is fundamentally composed of cen-
ters of power exerting force against one another. Nietzsche himself claims
that psychology should “be recognized again as the queen of the sciences”,
and he proposes to understand psychology “as morphology and the doctrine
of the development of the will to power”84. But, as we just mentioned, scientifically
the psychology of attachment has shown that psychological centrality is pro-
vided by belonging, and not by power (aggression).
Nietzsche’s Will to Power doctrine, as argued by Maudemarie Clark85,
is based on a philosophical preconception that is a consequence of his own
values. As Nehamas and Poellner86 pointed out, what Nietzsche does is to
reject traditional essentialism by replacing the stable essences with his own
preconception of the power centers. And using his own preconceived doc-
trine of the Will to Power this author creates his own metaphysics, for this
argument see for example Heidegger, Jaspers and Richardson87.
83
Kaufmann [1950] 1974, Soll 2015; Clark and Dudrick 2015. Kaufmann, Walter, [1950]
1974, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. Soll, Ivan, 2015, “Nietzsche Disempowered: Reading the Will to Power out of
Nietzsche’s Philosophy”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 46(3): 425–50. Clark, Maudemarie and
David Dudrick, 2015, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology: Will to Power as Theory of
the Soul”, in Clark 2015: 260–86. doi:10.1093/acprof: oso/9780199371846.003.0015
84
Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann (trans.), New York: Vintage, 1966 (1886). Pag.23.
85
Maudemarie Clark (2000, see also 1990: 205–44). Clark, Maudemarie, 1990, Ni-
etzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/
CBO9780511624728 –––, 2000, “Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Will to Power: Neither Onto-
logical nor Biological”, International Studies in Philosophy, 32(3): 119–35. doi:10.5840/intstud-
phil200032346
86
Nehamas 1985: 74–105, Poellner 1995: 137–98. Nehamas, Alexander,1985, Nietzsche: Life
as Literature, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Poellner, Peter, 1995, Nietzsche and
Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198250630.001.0001
87
Heidegger 1961, Jaspers [1936] 1965, and Richardson 1996. Heidegger, Martin, 1961, Ni-
etzsche, Pfullingen: Neske. Translated in 4 vols. by David Farrell Krell, as Nietzsche, London:
Routledge, 1981 ff. Jaspers, Karl, [1936] 1965, Nietzsche: an Introduction to the Understanding of
his Philosophical Activity, Charles Wallraff and Frederick Schmitz (trans.), Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press. Richardson, John, 1996, Nietzsche’s System, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. doi:10.1093/0195098463.001.0001
chapter four 75

Nietzsche´s Will to Power doctrine is part of the Western philosophical

preconception that the social world is ordered on the basis of the actions of
independent individuals; who, in the particular view of Nietzsche, relate to
each other on the basis of their relative power. But evolutionarily the social
order is consequence of a historical institutional arrangement and its corre-
sponding conceptual system; which embraces and guides the actions of the
individuals. Of course individual actions are relevant for social outcomes;
but they do not occur in a vacuum, they happen in an already established
institutional arrangement which from the evolutionary point of view was
there (and has been changing) before even the human race appeared.
Nietzsche´s doctrine of the Will to Power was highly influential in the
philosophy of existentialism; in which Heidegger endows humans with
freedom, and Sartre transforms it into individual freedom. But as we
have discussed elsewhere88, despite the virtues of philosophical existen-
tialism as an excellent treatise on individual freedom in Western societies
– it has the fundamental problem that it cannot explain how social order
exists. Social order requires a conceptual system and its corresponding
institutional arrangement, and it is not the exclusive consequence of the
actions of independent individuals (whether they are exercising their so-
cial power or their individual freedom).

max weber

Max Weber sees social power as relational, for him it always implies the
target’s acceptance; and it is defined by the social conceptual system and
institutional arrangement in which such a relation is embedded. Thus,
Weber’s understanding of social power is a major departure from Ni-
etzsche’s Will to Power (who sees the basis of social power in the agent’s
intrinsic characteristics). Weber points out that “the merely external fact
of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to signify domination in our
sense; we cannot overlook the meaning of the fact that the command is
accepted as a valid norm”89. In other words, domination – social power –
has to be mediated through mutual interpretation, in which the rulers claim
legitimacy and the ruled acquiesce to it voluntarily.
88
The Philosophy of Belonging, Op. cit.
Weber 1921–22/1978 p. 946. Weber, Max 1921–22/1978. Economy and Society, 2 volumes,
89

G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.

76 carlos obregón

Weber defines social power as “the probability that one actor within
a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”90. We-
ber argues that in any State, even the democratic ones, domination of
the ruled by the ruler(s) is simply an inescapable political reality. Weber
sees social power (domination) as relational, that is mediated through
mutual  interpretation, in which the rulers claim legitimacy and the ruled
acquiesce to it voluntarily.
The basis of power for him may be distinct in different societies. Weber
distinguishes between three types of legitimate social power91: 1) charis-
matic (leadership, family, religious); 2) traditional (patriarch, patrimonial,
feudalism; and 3) rational (modern law and State, bureaucratic). Charis-
matic authority is unstable and leads to rational authority, and traditional
authority evolves inescapably into rational authority. The inevitable emer-
gence of rational authority – based upon knowledge and away from magic
– creates a challenge, according to him, for individual freedom.
The process of rationalization in contemporary societies increases
knowledge, grows impersonality, and enhances control92. Knowledge,
because to act rationally is to act on the basis of conscious reflection
about the known probable consequences of an action. Impersonality, be-
cause rationalization, according to Weber, entails objectification93– in-
dustrial capitalism reduces workers to sheer numbers in an accounting
book. Control, because scientific and technical rationalization has greatly
improved the human capacity for a bureaucratic administration, legal
formalism, and industrial capitalism.
Weber is a defender of individual freedom. In the Protestant Ethics and
The Spirit of Capitalism, he carefully details how the individual relationship
with the Church is undermined by Protestantism; and how the relation-
ship with God becomes personal, and it is defined by the individual work-
ing for the wellbeing of the community. The protestant ethics therefore
liberates the individual from the Church; but at the same time, capitalism
creates the conditions of rationality than threaten the possibility of a truly
liberated individual.
Weber, Max 1946, p.152. Cited in Ng, S. H. (1980). The social psychology of power. San
90

Diego: Academic Press.

91
Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1992). The Political and Social theory of Max Weber: Collected
Essays. University of Chicago Press. p. 46.
92
Brubaker 1991, 32–35. Brubaker, Rogers, 1992. The Limits of Rationality, London: Routledge.
93
Versachlichung.
chapter four 77

Protestant ethics implied the transition from traditional power, based

on religion, to rational power, based on the bureaucratic State. Rational
power however is a threat to individual freedom, because for Weber
it produces two problems: 1) it creates a world with no objectively as-
certainable ground for the individual’s convictions; and 2) it creates an
imminent iron cage of bureaucratic petrification. Rationality creates the
“sensualists without heart” and the “specialists without spirit”. Modern
humanity94 has lost both freedom and moral agency. A modern indi-
vidual tends to act only on his own aesthetic impulse and arbitrary con-
victions – which creates a purposeless agitation of subjective values that
cannot be rationally communicated. And, at the same time, he is subject
to an objective instrumental rationality. The consequence is the disempow-
erment of the modern self.
Weber sees the consequences of Nietzsche’s announcement of the
“death of God” as one of the tragedies of rationality; because it leaves
the individual with no objective moral basis to form his own individual
moral judgment. And he refuses to accept the nihilism that this entails.
He argues that modern societies must fight back to create the conditions
for an individual to be able to act morally. He also refuses the postmod-
ernism that denies the possibility of self-autonomous freedom95. Weber´s
criticism of rationality has the purpose to defend the need to promote a
moral, free individual, capable to bridge between moral deontology and
consequential ethical considerations. “Seen in this light, Weber’s ethi-
cal sensibility is built on a firm rejection of a Nietzsche’s divination and
Foucault’s resignation alike, both of which are radically at odds with a
Kantian ethic of duty. In other words, Weber’s ethical project can be
described as a search for a non-arbitrary form of freedom (his Kantian
side), in what he perceives as an increasingly post-metaphysical world
(his Nietzsche’s side)”96.
Democracy for him is not enough, because it is compatible with char-
ismatic leadership as well as with the process of social rationalization.
What is needed are individuals able to fully participate politically, both
as leaders and as followers. And this necessarily implies education. We-
ber suggested two sets of ethical virtues that a proper political education
94
Menschentum.
95
Like in Foucault, see also Vattimo 1988, 31–47. Vattimo, Giani, 1988. The End of Mo-
dernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, J. Snyder (trans.), Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
96
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/
78 carlos obregón

should cultivate — the ethic of conviction97 and the ethic of responsibil-

ity98. Weber argues that “the ethic of conviction and the ethic of respon-
sibility are not absolute opposites. They are complementary to one an-
other, and only in combination do they produce the true human being
who is capable of having a vocation for politics”99. Weber’s main concern
was the lack of individual autonomy and freedom in an increasingly ra-
tionalized society. His solution was educating the individual so that he
can become “person of vocation”.
Weber was a highly influential writer whose concerns regarding ratio-
nal capitalism influenced many authors on the left and on the right such
as: Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, György Lukács, Jürgen Haber-
mas, Carl Schmitt, Joseph Schumpeter, Leo Strauss, Hans Morgenthau,
Raymond Aron and Michel Foucault.
Weber is inspired by Western individualism, and he centers his analy-
sis on the Western society. His eurocentrism has the consequence that, in
his view, the rationalization process of the society seems inevitable. Yet
other cultures have had different historical trajectories than the West’s;
and many of them still live in societies in which traditional power domi-
nates. However, given the influence of the West in other societies, We-
ber’s analysis is highly relevant for the whole world.
Weber’s is a sophisticated sociological analysis that uncovers the re-
lational basis of social power and points out the origin of social power
in the conceptual system and the institutional arrangement of reference.
Yet it is restricted to an analysis of the Western culture. And therefore,
it gives the impression that what has occurred historically in the West, is
necessarily the normal process for any society in history – which is not
the case. Moreover, like for most Western thinkers, the solution for We-
ber resides in the individual. A properly educated ethical individual is for
him the solution for both adequate leaders and proper followers. How-
ever, while his point of the need to have educated, ethical individuals is
well taken; it must be pointed out that Weber lacks a proper study of the
institutions as a source of social power (and as a necessary requirement
for a stable social order).
Weber’s thought is an analysis of Western societies which claims that
the rationalization process in these societies is betraying the ideological
97
Gesinnungsethik.
98
Verantwortungsethik. 
99
Weber 1919/1994, 368. Weber, Max 1919/1994. “The Profession and Vocation of Poli-
tics” in Max Weber: Political Writing.
chapter four 79

principle on which they were built: individual freedom. And it is a proposal

to rescue the individual through education. For Weber, as for most West-
ern thinkers, the social dynamics is, or ought to be, explained by individual
actions. But as we have discussed before, this philosophical preconception
of Weber is not compatible with scientific evolutionary knowledge.
The consequence of his individualistic philosophical preconception is
that Weber never enters the analysis of the conceptual system and the
institutional arrangement as a source of social power in distinct contem-
porary societies, which do not necessarily follow the Western path of
rationalization described by him. Nor does he describe the institutional
arrangement required for democracy to work properly in Western societ-
ies. The whole question of the discussion of the design of the institutional
arrangement and its consequences in defining social power escapes We-
ber; because he, as most Western thinkers, preconceives social dynamics
as defined only by individual actions.

bertrand russell

Russell defines power as the ability to produce intended results100. He

clearly distinguishes between relational power, which appeals to the
agent’s social authority and has the acquiescence of the target – which he
calls traditional power - and power based on the intrinsic characteristics
of the agent – which he calls naked power. He identifies three main forms
of power: traditional power, naked power, and revolutionary power.
Traditional power exists through force of habit, examples are: orga-
nized religion – priestly power, and monarchy – kingly power. Tradition-
al power appeals to tradition. Examples: The New Testament appeals
to Old Testament prophets, medieval kingdoms claiming to be restoring
the Roman Empire, Napoleon claiming to have restored the kingdom of
Charlemagne, and Pope Gregory VII.
Naked power rises to prominence whenever traditional power decays
and there are no limitations to personal ambition. It requires no appeal to
authority, no acquiescence of the subject. It is usually military in nature.
Some examples are Agathocles of Syracuse and Caesar Borgia. He argues
that periods of naked power come to an end by foreign invasion (e.g.,
Greece), stable dictatorship that becomes traditional (e.g., Augustus), or
100
Russell, Bertrand 1938 (2004) Power. Routledge Classics edition of Power.
80 carlos obregón

by forming a new religion (e.g., Islam). Naked power is required to fight

defensive or offensive wars and local crime, but when it is the basis for
social order it generates horrors such as war, slavery, cruelty to children,
workhouses, religious persecution, and antisemitism.
Revolutionary power is power granted by popular assent of a major-
ity (or large minority) which is not naked. Examples are early Christian-
ity, the Reformation, the American Independence, and the French and
Russian Revolutions.
Russell argues that economic power is derivative since it relies heav-
ily on other sources of power such as the enforcement of law or public
opinion. But he says that influential private groups can induce the State
to enter war, in a manner which is advantageous to themselves though
not necessarily to the nation as a whole.
He points out that historical examples of unified fanaticism almost
always end in their defeat.
Philosophies that exult or defend power, Russell argues, are all based
on the love of power, from which not much good comes. But given the in-
evitability of power, Russell provides three criteria for a love of power to be
beneficent; it must be bound up with an unshakeable desire for an end that
is not power, its purpose must be to help the desires of others, and the nega-
tive effects of the means must not overwhelm the positive effects of the end.
Russell believes in constitutional democracy, but he repeatedly points
out its flaws and limitations. For example, he notes that Hitler and Lenin
owe their rise to democracy, in defiance of the assumption that democ-
racy prevents tyrants.
He considers that the love of power is a part of normal human nature,
but when power is raised to a political philosophy that justifies power by
itself, it becomes insane and leads to all kinds of human disasters. When
power is desired as an end in itself, it become a force of domination
and coercion which has the aim to exploit other people. Both traditional
and naked power can embody the dominance view: Physical force can
be used to dominate and injure; propaganda can be used to manipulate
people to support ideas and actions that are contrary to their own inter-
ests. What is required by the dominance view is that the power holder
acts for self- or group-enrichment, at the expense of others, with power
for its own sake as the ultimate goal.
From Jesus Christ to Tolkien’s Galadriel, power is seen as a tempta-
tion that must ultimately corrupt even the best intentions of its holder, if it
is sought for its own sake. Skepticism of power was one ingredient in the
chapter four 81

political revolution created by Enlightenment thinkers, such as Locke and

Rousseau, through their emphasis on popular sovereignty. Russell advo-
cates a better distribution of power. He emphasizes education as the way
to a new world in which judgments become to be based upon knowledge.
Russell´s distinction between traditional, naked and revolutionary
power is a clear recognition on the relevance of relational power; since
traditional power is the only stable form or power that can sustain long
periods of social order. His cyclical view of power, in which traditional
power may decay into naked power, which eventually will give rise to
revolutionary power that again, ultimately creates a new form of tradi-
tional power, is an interesting proposal which takes us away from the uni-
directional social development towards rationalization argued by Weber.
Russell, like Weber, has the philosophical preconception of Western
individualism that social dynamics is explained by individual actions.
Therefore, as Weber, he sees in individual education the basis of a proper
social dynamics. Like in Weber, in Russell there is not a proper analysis
of the social dynamics that characterizes other societies, distinct from the
Western ones, nor does he have a proper analysis of the consequences
of institutional design in the determination of social power, and there is
neither an adequate explanation of the role of institutions in the determi-
nation of the social order.

michael foucault

Foucault sees power as relational. He explores the question of why a

target accepts the agent’s authority, and his answer is that it is because
power is derived directly from the conceptual system, which defines the
ways in which we know the world, and in the corresponding institutional
arrangement that establishes the power relations. The target deeply be-
lieves in what the agent tells him, for it gives him a sense of belonging
and contributes to his psychological well-being. Power is a major source
of social discipline and conformity.
For this author, the notion that power is related to the agent´s in-
trinsic characteristics is a misunderstanding, because the agent and the
target are embedded in a social relation which is the one that defines
both knowledge and the power relations in society. Foucault’s point is
that the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated.
82 carlos obregón

Foucault showed, for example, that our conceptions and experiences of

sexuality are in fact always the result of specific cultural conventions and
mechanisms of power, and that they could not exist independently of
them. Power relations are “the internal conditions” of our sexual identi-
ties. Foucault argues that power is immanent in all social relations and
that all social relations are relations of power, whether in family or in the
hierarchies of government and others social institutions.
For Foucault: “There is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”. ‘Power is
everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ so in this sense it is neither
an agency nor a structure. Instead, it is a kind of ‘metapower’ or ‘regime
of truth’ that pervades society, and which is in constant flux and nego-
tiation101. Foucault uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to point out that
power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific un-
derstanding, and ‘truth’. Foucault´s work marks a radical departure from
previous modes of conceiving power and cannot be easily integrated with
previous ideas, as power is diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied
and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coer-
cive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them’102.
For Foucault power is not just a negative, coercive or repressive thing
that forces us to do things against our wishes, but can also be a necessary,
productive and positive force in society103. ‘We must cease once and for
all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘re-
presses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.  In fact, power
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals
of truth.  The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production’104.
To understand power Foucault proposes the archeological method
and the genealogical analysis. “The key idea of the archaeological method
is that systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or discursive forma-
tions, in Foucault’s terminology) are governed by rules, beyond those of
grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness of individual
101
Foucault, Michel (1998) The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, London, Penguin. P.63.
102
Gaventa, John (2003) Power after Lukes: a review of the literature, Brighton: Institute of De-
velopment Studies. P.1.
103
Ibid, p.2.
104
Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: the birth of a prison. London, Penguin.
op.cit. p.194.
chapter four 83

subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines

the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period”105. “The point
of a genealogical analysis is to show that a given system of thought (it-
self uncovered in its essential structures by archaeology, which therefore
remains part of Foucault’s historiography) was the result of contingent
turns of history, not the outcome of rationally inevitable trends”106.
Foucault applies his archeological method to distinct social institutions
in which power is manifested such as prisons, schools or mental hospitals.
He argues that “some section of population was classified as sick, criminal
and mad so that they could be placed under surveillance and “observed”
by particular authorities. The surveillance was coded as a discourse, a
terrain of thought, a system of knowledge, a particular kind of language
that allowed some things to be said and disallowed some others”107. Fou-
cault was fascinated by the mechanisms of prison surveillance, school
discipline, systems for the administration and control of populations, and
the promotion of norms about bodily conduct, including sex. He stud-
ied psychology, medicine and criminology and their roles as bodies of
knowledge that define norms of behavior and deviance. Physical bodies
are subjugated and made to behave in certain ways, as a microcosm of
social control of the wider population, through what he called ‘bio-pow-
er’. Disciplinary and bio-power create a ‘discursive practice’ or a body of
knowledge and behavior that defines what is normal, acceptable, deviant,
etc. – but it is a discursive practice that is nonetheless in constant flux108.
Foucault argues that to understand the practice of government in the
sense of controlling people’s conduct, one has to study the specific tech-
nologies of power, but also the rationality underpinning them. It means
examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices and
systems of practices, and what role they play within them. The exposition
and analysis of the historically changing governmental rationalities was a
pivotal goal of Foucault’s lectures. His analysis makes clear that modern
governmental rationality has two major features: 1) it is characterized by
the centralization of political power. A centralized state with highly orga-
nized administration and bureaucracy has emerged; 2) it is also character-
ized by individualizing power—or “pastoral power” as he also calls it. The
105
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#MajoWork
106
Ibid
107
https://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-everywhere/
108
Foucault 1991, op. cit.
84 carlos obregón

result is the intervention of the state in the everyday life of individuals for
example, their diet, mental health, and sexual practices.
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality allowed him to clarify his un-
derstanding of resistance. Governing involves offering reasons why those
governed should do what they are told, and this implies that they can also
question these reasons. Foucault claims that this is why the capacity to
govern has historically developed in tandem with the practice of political
critique. The practice of critique must question the reasons for govern-
ing  and the legitimate principles, procedures and means of governing.
Foucault believed in possibilities for action and resistance. Discourse can
be a site of both power and resistance, with scope to ‘evade, subvert or
contest strategies of power’109. Discourse transmits and produces power;
it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and
makes it possible to thwart’110.
‘Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with saying what counts as true’111. These ‘general poli-
tics’ and ‘regimes of truth’ are the result of scientific discourse and institu-
tions and are reinforced (and redefined) constantly through the education
system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies.
In the lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics, he analyzes neoliberalism as
a historically novel form of governmentality – a rationality of governing
connected with specific technologies of power. Neoliberalism is under-
stood as a governmental form to ensure that capitalism works. It aims to
create social conditions that not only encourage and necessitate competi-
tiveness and self-interest, but also produce them.
Foucault´s contributions reveal at once the relational character of pow-
er, in particular that the target´s acceptance is consequence of a conceptual
system (knowledge) that defines a particular institutional arrangement
(that defines power relations). In Foucault no longer social dynamics
is the consequence of individual actions, but the result of those actions
embedded in a conceptual system and a corresponding institutional ar-
109
Gaventa 2003, op.cit. P 3.
110
Foucault 1998, op. cit. P. 100-1.
Rabinow, Paul (editor) (1991) The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought, Lon-
111

don, Penguin.
chapter four 85

rangement that defines the particular culture in a given society. However,

individuals still have a role in slowly redefining the conceptual system
and its institutional arrangement.
What is missing in Foucault is an analysis of why and when what
Russell called naked power occurs. As we have suggested before, when it
occurs it is a consequence of a belonging failure.

conclusion

Since the human mind does not have access to universal truths, the justi-
fication of the social order as a consequence of the moral principles in the
mind of God is no longer possible. Social order then must be explained
either by the use of force, based upon the intrinsic characteristics of the
agent, or as consequence of an integrative system that embeds social tradi-
tions. The first explanation (Nietzsche’s) does not hold because it does not
produce a stable society. And the fourth explanation (Foucault’s) necessar-
ily leaves social power as relational and defined by the conceptual system
and its corresponding institutional arrangement. However sometimes,
due to belonging failures, naked power (in Russell’s terms) may arise and
temporarily may explain social order. Naked power (Russell’s) and Char-
ismatic power (Weber’s) are necessarily transitory; therefore, in all the
cases the sources of stable social power are relational and emerge from the
conceptual system and its corresponding institutional arrangement.
However, the fact that a stable social power at the level of the society
as a whole cannot be explained solely by the agent’s intrinsic characteris-
tics, does not imply that such characteristics are not always present, and
neither that they do not play a social role. Individuals and groups are
always differentiated from the society as a whole, and in addition to their
social responsibilities they are always looking for their private interests.
Thus, as we mentioned before, in addition to the integrative system a
society requires a power system in which naked power is used to penalize
and correct deviant individual behavior, as well as to fight other societies.
The integrative system is always under the pressure of individuals
and groups trying to impose their private interest above the collective in-
terest. One of the roles of a proper integrative system (guided by the con-
ceptual system and its institutional arrangement) is to mediate between
private and collective interests, but on occasions it fails; this was Russell’s
86 carlos obregón

point in defining naked power. However, even if the integrative system

prevails, it is under constant pressure for change, given the permanence
of particular interests of individuals and groups that always will fight the
integrative system to accommodate their personal interest. In particular,
in the Western societies the growing relevance of the economic system fa-
cilitates the pressure of individuals and groups on the integrative system.
This is specially the case at the international level, given the weakness of
the global integrative system.
Private pressures, if well balanced with collective interest, may actu-
ally be a healthy source of dynamism for the integrative system – but the
risk is always there for naked power to succeed. Therefore, societies must
be very vigilant that social actions always respond to collective interests.
A full theory of social power needs to explain not only the relational
sources of social power; but also how the intrinsic characteristics of the
agent inevitably affect the social order provided by the integrative sys-
tem. This is the purpose of this manuscript, but we still need to develop
other topics in the following chapters before we can conclude.
CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL POWER IN PERSONAL
AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

As we have seen in the first chapter, the view of social power as the
exclusive consequence of the agent´s intrinsic characteristics (which to a
large extent is the result of Freud’s and others’ view of the social world as
the confrontation of relative powers and the dominion of the strongest) is
unsustainable from an evolutionary point of view. Social order requires
that the instinct of aggression is guided by the one of belonging (along the
lines of Bowlby’s and the Psychology of Belonging´s view of the world);
therefore, social power always has a relational component.
As Foucault has shown, any human interaction is social in nature, and
therefore any power interaction always happens with a social background,
defined by the knowledge provided by the conceptual system and the
corresponding institutional arrangement that defines roles and sets social
expectations; thus, any power relation is always relational in nature.
However, the fact that any human power relation is always relational
in nature does not mean that the agent’s intrinsic characteristics do not
play an important role in power – social – relations. Since individuals are
never fully integrated in the society because their individual existence
is evolutionarily required, there is always tension between the society’s
interest, and the individual’s. Therefore, as we have seen, even in extend-
ed societies the particular interests of individuals and groups are always
threatening the survival of a proper integrative system – vigilant of the
collective interests; and the possibility of naked power (dominated by the
agent’s – an individual or a group – intrinsic characteristics and interests)
is always a transitory possibility. In particular, in small groups and in in-
terpersonal interactions, in which physical and visual contact is possible,
the intrinsic characteristics of the agent may become particularly relevant
as a source of social power.
In social psychology it has been empirically proven that certain char-
acteristics of an agent (a person, a group, or an institution) create the con-
ditions under which he/she has the capacity to influence others (targets)
condition, behavior, or state of mind. As we review these studies, how-

[87]
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ever, it is necessary to distinguish in which cases the capacity to influence

others is mainly due to the intrinsic characteristics of the agent, such as
physical strength, intelligence, or financial wellbeing, or it is mostly due
to the relational power that the agent has, as a consequence of the role
that the agent displays in the institutional arrangement that corresponds
to the accepted conceptual system of the society in question.
Let us take as an example the first studies made by Ash on conformity
in the 50’s. In several of these studies this author proved empirically that
an authority figure influences the perception of reality of the target. In
particular, in some studies it is shown that the judgment of the target
(usually a student) as to the length of a line of light in front of him is in-
fluenced with statistical significance by the judgment made by the author-
ity figure (usually announced as an important university professor) who
intentionally announces a mistaken length. The influence of the authority
figure (the agent) on the perception of the target is a scientific fact that is
unquestionable; however, it must be pointed out that this influence is not
due to the intrinsic characteristics of the agent, but to the social role of
the agent as an authority figure. Because, in these studies, no matter who
is presented as an important university professor; the results of the study
would be the same. Therefore, the intrinsic characteristics of the agent in
this example do not count – anyone could be presented as the authority
figure. What is relevant is the announced social role of the agent – his/her
relational power. However, as we will see in other examples, in personal
and group power relations, the intrinsic characteristics of the agent do
play an important role.
In this chapter we will review relevant literature in social psychology
and sociology that relates to the power interactions between individu-
als, in small groups and in extended societies, paying special attention to
whether such interactions, and to what extent, are guided by the agent’s
intrinsic characteristics or by relational power – in which the agent’s in-
fluence requires the acquiescence of the target or it is due to the role of
the agent in the institutional arrangement corresponding to the conceptu-
al system of the society in question. We conclude that social psychology
has shown that in individual interactions and in small groups the agent’s
individual characteristics may be a relevant source of power, but that in
extended societies, as sociological theories argue, the source of power is
mostly relational. However, since extended societies are composed of
small groups, they may always look for ways to use their particular in-
trinsic characteristics, as well as whatever relational power is ascribed to
chapter five 89

them, to obtain social privileges; and therefore, the extended society´s in-
tegrative system must always be vigilant on how relational power is used
and when and under which circumstances power based in the agent’s
intrinsic characteristics should be allowed.

social power in social psychology

In social psychology social power is defined as one’s capacity to alter

another person´s condition, behavior, or state of mind. There are sev-
eral theories that have been proposed as to where power comes from.
Theories related to power as control have shown that: 1) Power does
change people, and people with power often use it to satisfy their per-
sonal self-interests; even in the cases in which it is relational based. And
2) That power is often perceived by both powerholders and by powerless
people as related to the agent’s intrinsic personal characteristics. French
and Raven´s theory of the bases of power shows that, in small groups, re-
ward, coercive and informational power may have as a source the agent’s
intrinsic personal characteristics. In extended groups however, the source
of all the power bases is mostly relational. Social Exchange Theory has
shown that there is a relevant number of social exchanges that are based
on the personal intrinsic characteristics of the agent; but a careful review
of this theory shows that there are many other exchanges based on rela-
tional power. Resource dependence theory shows that resource owner-
ship may provide power in certain circumstances. Resource ownership is
an agent’s personal intrinsic characteristic that may be relevant in small
groups; however, in extended societies critical resources are regulated,
and therefore the power they provide is relational based. In general, the
theories in social psychology have shown that power based in the agent’s
intrinsic characteristics is socially relevant, in many occasions, in small
groups; in extended societies power is mostly relational based.

Power as Control

It has been extensively documented that powerholders behave differently

than powerless people. Powerless subjects look to those with power for
90 carlos obregón

direction and expect the powerful to assume responsibility for actions112.

Power holders are associated with stereotyping others and paying care-
less social attention, failure to recognize others’ points of view113, self-
serving behavior114, hostile teasing and aggression115, an increased likeli-
hood to sexually harass116, and with domestic abuse117. It has also been
shown that the powerful are viewed with distrust; individuals described
as “power seeking” are seen more negatively than others118.
Powerholders have a strong orientation towards rewards and oppor-
tunities119, and depress perceptions of potential risks or disadvantages120.
They show a predisposition for action rather than watchful delibera-
tion121. Powerholders are more sensitive and responsive to goals than are
the powerless122. Powerholders attend to others when that serves their
112
Milgram, S. (1969). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.
113
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and per-
spectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17, 1068–1074.
Chen et al., 2001; Ng, 1982. Chen, S., Lee-Chai, A. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). Relation-
114

ship orientation as a moderator of the effects of social power. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 80, 173–187.
Ng, S. H. (1982). Power and intergroup discrimination. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Social identity
and intergroup relations (pp. 179–206). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H. & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach and inhibition.
115

Psychological Review, 110, 265–284

116
Bargh, J. A., Raymond, P., Pryor, J. B., & Strack, F. (1995). Attractiveness of the under-
ling: An automatic power–sex association and its consequences for sexual harassment and
aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 768–781.
117
Bugental, D. B. (1993). Communication in abusive relationships: Cognitive con-
structions of interpersonal power. American Behavioral Scientist, 36, 288–308
118
Ng, S. H. (1980). The social psychology of power. San Diego: Academic Press.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H. & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach and inhibition.
119

Psychological Review, 110, 265–284

120
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk- taking. European Jour-
nal of Social Psychology, 36, 511–536.
121
Galinsky et al., 2005; Magee, 2009. Galinsky, A., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. (2005).
From power to action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 453–466.
Magee, J. C. (2009). Seeing power in action: The roles of deliberation, implementation, and
action in inferences of power. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1–14 adtager
he/sheto be born in theorical l advantagee to the journe, we believe that you will enjoy it.
any one in his social life(2) (PDF) Concepts and historical perspectives on power.
122
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of
power holders’ social attention. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
99, 227–243
chapter five 91

own goals and interests but are much less likely to attend when it does
not123. Powerholders express their individual dispositions and preferenc-
es, powerless ones may foster accommodation to the situation and to oth-
ers’ expectations124. Powerholders associate with agency and approach,
and powerless associate with sociability and avoidance125.
In Power as Control (PAC) theories, power is defined as unilateral
outcome control (versus the symmetrical interdependence proposed by
Thibaut & Kelley). This research has shown that power leads people to
stereotype others and to pay careless social attention126. Fiske127 points
out that powerholders’ cognitive load is much higher and precludes care-
ful attention. Keltner128 argues that power instills a tendency to approach
behavioral rewards; and since powerless people offer little reward, they
123
Galinsky et al., 2006; Goodwin et al., 2000; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006; Vescio, Ger-
vais, Heiphetz, & Bloodhart, 2009. Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld,
D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17, 1068–1074.
Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T., & Yzerbyt, V., (2000). Power can bias im-
pression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. Group Pro-
cesses and Intergroup Relations, 3, 227–256. Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When
power does not corrupt: Superior individuation processes among powerful perceiv-
ers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 549–565.Overbeck, J. R., &
Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of power holders’ so-
cial attention. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 227–243.
Vescio, T. K., Gervais, S. J., Heiphetz, L., & Bloodhart, B. (2009). The stereotypic behaviors of
the powerful and their effect on the relatively powerless. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook
of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 247–265). New York: Psychology Press.
124
Chen et al., 2001, op. cit; Overbeck et al., 2006, op. cit; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld,
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008.
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J., & Liljenquist, K. (2008).
Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and
dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1450–1466.
125
Vescio and colleagues (2009), op. cit.
126
Its strongest proponents are Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996;
Goodwin et al., 2000 and Keltner et al. 2003.
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 48, 621–628.
Dépret, E., & Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and power: Some cognitive consequenc-
es of social structure as a source of control deprivation. In F. G. G. Weary & K. Marsh
(Eds.), Control motivation and social cognition (pp. 176–202). New York: Springer- Verlag
Goodwin,S.A.,Gubin,A.,Fiske,S.T.,&Yzerbyt,V.,(2000).Powercanbiasimpressionprocesses:Stereo-
typing subordinates by default and by design. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 3, 227–256.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H. & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach and inhibition. Psychologi-
cal Review, 110, 265–284.
127
Fiske 1993, op.cit
128
Keltner et al. 2003.
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get little attention. It is only when the responsibility in the outcome of the
powerholders is significantly increased that their attention improves129.
The empirical results in power and fate control are solid, and they
show that on many occasions organizational power holders do not de-
pend on subordinates for their own outcomes; these results emphasize
domination and coercion as opposed to functional group structures and
processes. Power in these studies does not require the acquiescence of
the target. However, these models do not distinguish whether the agent’s
power comes from his intrinsic characteristic or from his social role – in
which case the source of power would still be relational even without
requiring the acquiescence of the target.
Power changes people’s behavior and other’s perception of them. Peo-
ple with power often use it to satisfy personal interests – even in the cases
in which it is relational based. Power is often mistakenly seen in society
as an intrinsic characteristic of the agent. This is one of the main reasons
why the explanation of power as based on personal characteristics has
been so popular.

French and Raven – The Bases of Social Power

French and Raven’s 1953 article on the bases of social power classifies
the bases of power into five categories: Reward power, coercive power,
legitimate power, expert power, and referent power. Later, they added
one more: Informational power. In the real world, power bases are used
simultaneously.
Reward power stems from the ability of the agent to offer a positive
incentive. Coercive power relates to the agent´s capacity to bring about
change by threatening the target with negative, undesirable consequences
if the target does not comply. Both reward power and coercive power
require social surveillance. Legitimate power stems from the target’s ac-
cepting the right of the agent to require the changed behavior, and the
target’s obligation to comply. Expert power results from the target’s faith
that the agent has some superior insight or knowledge about what behav-

Overbeck & Park, 2001, op.cit; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003.
129

Vescio, T. K., Snyder, M., & Butz, D. A. (2003). Power in stereotypically masculine do-
mains: A social influence strategy X stereotype match model. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 85, 1062–1078
chapter five 93

ior is best under the circumstances. Referent power stems from the target
identifying with the agent or seeing the agent as a model that the target
would want to emulate. Legitimate power, expert power and referent
power do not require social surveillance. Informational power relates to
the capacity to explain with persuasive reasons why a certain course of
action would be a better and more effective behavior130.
Already in French and Raven’s classification we can see the tension
between two conceptions of social power. Reward, coercive and informa-
tional power may be due to the agent’s intrinsic characteristic (physical,
mental, based on financial strength or the ownership of relevant infor-
mation) or it may have been granted by the society as a privilege of the
position held. Legitimate, expert and referent power necessarily imply
relational power. They all imply a social relation of some sort. Legitimacy
is the consequence of social recognition. The acknowledgment of expert
power has to be based on social credentials, as the target usually does not
have the knowledge to evaluate the expert. And referent power stems
from a social relation.
In small groups and in interpersonal interactions, reward and coercive
power may be either due to the agent’s intrinsic characteristics or to the so-
cial role assigned to the agent. In extended groups, the agent’s physical or
intrinsic characteristics are normally not very relevant, and only a handful of
individuals are wealthy enough to be able to reward or coerce others in a so-
cially significant way. Therefore, in extended groups the capacity to reward
or coerce others largely depends upon the social role assigned to the agent.
Informational power, whether in personal interactions, small groups,
or extended groups, may be due both to the agent’s intrinsic characteris-
tics (for example, the private ownership of relevant information by large
private companies), or to relational social characteristics (information
held by the State or publicly released).
Legitimate, expert and referent power, whether in personal interac-
tions, small groups or extended groups, is always relational.
Therefore, one may conclude that: 1) In small groups: reward, coer-
cive and informational power based on the agent’s intrinsic characteristics
are very important. While all other bases of power are relational. And, 2)
In extended groups: the bases of power are mostly relational, since only
few individuals have the position to reward, coerce or use informational
power at the social level.
130
Raven, B, H., The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal
Influence. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1--22
94 carlos obregón

Social Exchange Theory

Thibaut and Kelley’s 1959 book, as well as Homans´ works of 1958 and
1961, and Blau’s, dated 1964, started Social Exchange Theory (SET)131.
SET establishes the fact that social power in certain occasions may be
due to the agent’s intrinsic characteristics, which allow him/her to estab-
lish a trade. This theory is based on the economic principle that people
use to choose those social relations that maximize the difference between
benefits and costs. In very simple terms, it involves a calculation of the
rewards and punishments that a social relation implies. The theory is
an adaptation of economic theory (and may include all sorts of expec-
tations – including rational expectations using all the available present
information) to all kinds of social exchanges. The theory has several prin-
ciples132: 1) Social behavior can be explained in terms of costs, rewards,
and exchanges; 2) people seek to maximize rewards and minimize costs
in pursuit of the greatest profit; 3) social interaction involves two parties,
each exchanging a reward needed by the other person; 4) social exchange
theory can be used to explain the development and management of inter-
personal relationships; 5) social exchanges affect the relationships among
members of groups and organizations.
Affect theory of social exchange shows how the conditions of ex-
changes promote interpersonal and group relationships through emotions
and affective processes. The theoretical arguments center on the follow-
ing claims: 1) Emotions produced by exchange are involuntary, internal
responses; 2) individuals attempt to understand what in a social exchange
situation produces emotions; 3) the mode of exchange determines the fea-
tures of the exchange task and influences the attribution of the emotion
produced; 4) the attribution of emotions resulting from different exchange
modes impact the solidarity felt with partners or groups; 5) through these
emotional processes, networks can develop group properties.
SET has been successfully applied to many individual and group so-
cial relations such as interracial marriages, sexual behavior, part time jobs
and many others; and has been particularly useful in business and inter-

131
Thibaut, J. W. & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. NY: John Wiley &
Sons. Homans, G. C. (1958). Social behavior as exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 63,
597- 606. Homans. G.C. (1961). Social behavior. NY: Harcourt Brace. Blau, P. M. (1964).
Exchange and power in social life. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
132
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontentcgi?article=1003&context=engl_reports
chapter five 95

national settings. It clearly shows that in a society like the Western one in
which the individuals have been differentiated by their rights, individual
decisions are necessarily influenced by selfish considerations.
There are however several limitations to the use of SET for all social
relations, in what follows we will mention the main ones:
1) SET is a theory of social exchange based on exchanges decid-
ed at the individual level, as they occur in a Western society;
but social exchanges may also happen as a consequence of the
integrative system and be decided at the social level. In pri-
mary societies, for example, Levy Strauss documented social
exchanges – socially decided – as an explanation of kinship.
2) SET is an extension of the economic system to other social
activities but is unable to explain those human activities guided
by the integrative or the power system. As an example, I have
shown elsewhere that altruism (one sided economics– such as
grants, social aids and so on) cannot be explained by the agent
maximizing his/her personal utility; because this would imply
that the target has less than the minimum that the agent consid-
ers necessary in all the n-1 goods and services that the target
holds (good 1 being the one given altruistically by the agent)
– a very unrealistic mathematical condition. One sided eco-
nomics, therefore, is better explained by the integrative system,
and it responds to social values held by the agent – goodness
and social responsibility do exist. This is congruent with the
results obtained in behavioral economics in the dictator game
in which, without any obligation, the agent gives the target
half of what he receives in around seventy percent of cases. In
Western societies there are many exchanges (economic trans-
actions) guided by the integrative and the power systems.
3) In terms of French and Raven’s power bases, social exchange
theory is relevant for reward, coercive and private informa-
tional power; and it is unable to explain legitimate, expert and
referent power.
4) The principles of social exchange do not necessarily apply to
all exchanges because of restrictions and endowments created
by roles and social structure.
5) One of the most prominent questions raised about the theory is the
degree to which humans really are as rational and calculating as
social exchange theory would lead us to believe. Particularly given
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the results obtained by behavioral economics, it seems clear that

human beings, even in Western societies, and even in economic
issues, do not always behave guided by their selfish interest.
We will discuss more about SET theory in chapter six, in the meantime
we may conclude that: 1) SET theory has shown that in Western societies
selfish interest are important in the determination of social exchanges in
multiple cases; therefore, the agent’s personal intrinsic characteristics are
relevant. But 2) there are many exchanges – even economic ones – guided
by the integrative and the power systems that cannot be explained by SET
theory. Therefore, in many exchanges relational power is determinant.

Resource Dependence Theories

An organization or an individual engages in transactions with other ac-

tors and organizations in order to acquire resources. Resources that the
organization needs may be scarce, not always readily obtainable, or un-
der the control of uncooperative actors and may create dependencies. 
This theory argues that Group or Person A has power when A pos-
sesses a resource on which B is dependent, and B cannot substitute a
different resource for the one possessed by A133. It emphasizes the de-
pendence of the powerless party134. It has been successfully applied to

133
As a theory of organizational power see Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, and Emerson, 1962.
At the individual level see Molm, Quist, & Wiseley, 1994; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Salancik
& Pfeffer, 1977.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource
dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power–dependence relations. American Sociological Review,
27, 31–40.
Molm, L. D., Quist, T. M., & Wiseley, P. A. (1994). Imbalanced structures, unfair strate-
gies: Power and justice in social exchange. American Sociological Review, 59, 98–121.
adtager he/sheto be born in theorical l advantagee to the journe, we believe that you will
enjoy it. any one in his social life...
Lee, F., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Is it lonely at the top?: The independence
and interdependence of power holders. Research in Organizational Behavior, 23, 43–91.
Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1977). Who gets power—and how they hold onto it: A strategic
contingency model of power. Organizational Dynamics, 5, 3–21.
134
The interpersonal equivalent of resource dependence theory is strategic contingency theory;
see Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., Lee, C. A., Schneck, R. S., & Pennings, J. M. (1971).
A strategic contingencies theory of intra-organizational power. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 16, 216–229.
chapter five 97

organizational and intraindividual cases; in particular, to the study of the

strategies used by the organizations to limit their dependency.
Since the theory is based on resource ownership it does relate to the
intrinsic characteristics of the agent. The theory is particularly relevant
for special circumstances or small groups. In extended societies, critical
resources are regulated by the State and therefore the power related to
them is relational.

Social Power in Sociological Theories

Sociological theories in general have emphasized that power is relational;

although some of them pay special attention to the sociological conse-
quences of the intrinsic characteristics of the agent. Since the modern phi-
losophers like Locke and Rousseau it has been emphasized that the State
has power because the consent of the citizens. Theories of consent and
legitimacy have emphasized that power is relational based; that power
of one over the other involves mutual dependence135, that high power is
situationally contingent136, and that power is a function of the consent of
subordinates137. Social Identity Theory argues that individuals identify
with groups that can offer them a positive social identity, and therefore
social power is obtained from the relational identity. And social func-
tionalism138 defends that power inequality arises from the needs of social
groups and societies to order and govern themselves to attain outcomes
valued by the entire group. Thus, social power is also relational based.
The conception of power as responsibility was central in traditional so-
cieties; in Neo-Confucianism in China, for example, the authority was
under the obligation to exercise control over self and impulses, and to
Hamilton, G. G., & Biggart, N. W. (1985). Why people obey: Theoretical observations
135

on power and obedience in complex organizations. Sociological Perspectives, 28, 3–28.

136
Van Ogtrop, K. (2003). Attila the honey I’m home. In C. Hanauer (Ed.), The bitch in
the house (pp. 259–170). New York: Harper & Row.
137
Hindess, B. (1996). Discourses of power: From Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
138
Of which some of the main proponents are Arendt (1970), Mann (1986), and Parsons
(1967).
Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. London: Penguin Press.
Mann, M. (1986). The sources of social power (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Parsons, T. (1967). Sociological theory and modern society. New York: Free Press.
98 carlos obregón

subordinate personal interests to the good of others while everyone had

a duty to respect and obey hierarchical relationships139.

Power as Consent and Legitimacy

Legitimacy as a source of power has been studied in social psychology140.

And some studies have focused on the relationship between consent and
legitimacy141: but the importance of consent for legitimacy, and of legiti-
macy for the stability of the social order, is better analyzed by political
philosophers and sociologists.
Legitimacy is required for the agent (the authority) to exercise power
if the social order is to have long term stability; illegitimate power would

139
Obregon, C. 2008. De la filosofia a la economia. Trillas, Mexico. Amazon.com. Also
available at research gate.com. See also cf. Jones 1981.
140
Social psychologists do talk extensively about legitimacy (French & Raven, 1959; Raven,
1965; Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, 2001; Kelman, 2001; Keltner et al., 2003; Lammers, Galin-
sky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008.
French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. H. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright
(Ed.), Studies of social power (pp. 118–149). Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.
Raven, B. H. (1965). Social influence and power. In I. D. Steiner & M. Fishbein (Eds.),
Current studies in social psychology (pp. 371–381). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Haines, E. L., & Jost, J. T. (2000). Placating the powerless: Effects of legitimate and illegiti-
mate explanation on affect, memory, and stereotyping. Social Justice Research, 13, 219–236
Jost, J. T. (2001). Outgroup favoritism and the theory of system justification: An experi-
mental paradigm for investigating the effects of socio- economic success on stereotype con-
tent. In G. Moskowitz (Ed.), Cognitive social psychology: The Princeton Symposium
on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition (pp. 89–102). Mahwah, NJ: Erlba.
Kelman, H. C. (2001). Reflections on social and psychological processes of legitimization
and delegitimization. In J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), The psychology of legitimacy: Emerg-
ing perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations (pp. 54–73). New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H. & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach and inhibition.
Psychological Review, 110, 265–284.
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2008). Legitimacy moder-
ates the effect of power on approach. Psychological Science 19, 558-564.
141
Destructive obedience (Milgram, 1969), the psychology of imprisonment (Haney, Banks,
& Zimbardo, 1973) and system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994).
Milgram, S. (1969). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row. Haney, C., Banks,
W. C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated
prison. Naval Research Review, 30, 4–17. Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of
stereotyping in system- justification and the production of false consciousness. British Jour-
nal of Social Psychology, 33, 1–27.
chapter five 99

be continuously challenged. The legitimate right to power may be grant-

ed by tradition, by God, by the blessing of an institution (the State, the
church, the army, a corporation and so forth); or by an accepted political
method of access (such as the Roman nomination of the senate, the Eng-
lish nomination of the chamber of the lords, the nomination of the Pope
by the catholic church, or accepted democratic processes – which may be
different one from another). In any case, legitimacy implies the consent
of the target (the subordinate). This consent implies the mutual acknowl-
edgement by the agent (authority), and the target (the subordinate), that
the agent’s power emerges from a mutually accepted conceptual system
and its corresponding institutional arrangement. This mutual acknowl-
edgment not only gives power to the agent, but also responsibilities in
relationship to the target (subordinate)142. Casual observers see power-
holders as unconstrained143; but the powerholders perceive themselves
as highly constrained144. Power, to have long term stability, from this
perspective in necessarily relational.
From a political standpoint, is has been noticed for a long time by the
modern philosophers, among them Locke, that no State can impose so-
cial order without the ethical behavior of individual members, because no
State has the resources to be vigilant of every citizen, all the time. There-
fore, a social ethics that implies relational power is required – which in
some societies may even be an envelope that contains several ethics, but
all of them promote the proper social behavior of the individual145.

Power as Identity

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is particularly relevant to our definition of

relational power. SIT shows that the identity, social significance, and so-
cial power of a person depends upon his/her belonging to an in-group.
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), people seek to maintain a
142
Among others this point is made by Hamilton, G. G., & Biggart, N. W. (1985). Why
people obey: Theoretical observations on power and obedience in complex organizations.
Sociological Perspectives, 28, 3–28.
143
Overbeck et al., 2006, op.cit.
144
Orizio, R. (2003). Talk of the devil: Encounters with seven dictators. New York: Walker.
145
See Obregon, C. 2021. Poverty and Discrimination. Amazon.com. Also available at
research gate.com
100 carlos obregón

positive self-image in two respects: (1) a positive personal identity and (2)
a positive social identity. This theory maintains that individuals naturally
strive for a positive self-image, and social identity is enhanced by the
process of categorizing people into in-groups and out-groups. Thus, the
need for social identity supports the formation of prejudice. This theory
illustrates the general tendency that humans have to discriminate. The
Minimal Group Paradigm studies reveal how the mere categorization as
a group member can lead to in-group bias, the favoring of in-group mem-
bers over out-group members in evaluations and allocation of resourc-
es146. In these studies, participants are arbitrarily (with no rationale) clas-
sified as belonging to groups. And they are asked to take part in a reward
allocation task between the two groups. In the famous Tajfel and Turner
experiment with 15-year-old boys from Bristol, the boys were placed into
cubicles on their own and they were required to allocate points to mem-
bers of their own or other groups. The boys did not know who was in the
other groups. The points were always awarded in favor of the in-group
members first, even though in some cases giving points to both groups
would have increased the rewards for everyone. Results across hundreds
of studies show that participants rate in-group members more positively,
exhibit preference for in-group members in allocation of resources, and
want to maintain maximal difference in allocation between in-group and
out-group members, thereby giving out-group members less than an
equality norm would require. Given the fact that group membership in
this paradigm does not involve a deeply-held attachment and operates
within the wider context of equality norms, this tendency to discriminate
is an important finding, and indicative of the spontaneous nature of preju-
dice and discrimination in intergroup contexts. This result was ground-
breaking because it demonstrated that human beings naturally divide
themselves into groups and being categorized as an in-group member is
enough for individuals to discriminate against out-group members. An-
other critical finding of this theory is that individuals do not discriminate
to harm the out-group, but to protect the in-group. Therefore, discrimina-
tion is the by-product of in-group protection. Whereas social categoriza-
tion is sufficient to create discriminatory treatment, often motivated by
in-group favoritism, direct competition between groups exacerbates this
bias, typically generating responses directly to punish the out-group.

146
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C, 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.
In: Worchel, S. and Austin, W.G., Eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relation, Hall Publishers,
Chicago, 7-24.
chapter five 101

While SIT argues that individuals identify with groups that can of-
fer them a positive social identity, Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)147,
which is an extension of SIT, stresses that individuals compare with
their groups to determine how strongly to align with the group. SCT
argues that the group’s possession of influence confers social power
to an individual. Simon and Oakes148 argue that shared superordinate
identities lead to influence based on consensual understandings; while
conflicting identities between two parties lead to conflict and coercion.
Social Dominance Theory (SDT)149 argues that group-based hierarchy
is universal and inevitable.
Interracial marriage is an example of how SIT operates and how it
differs from the Social Exchange Theory (SET) reviewed before. Inter-
racial marriage challenges the barriers of racial identity. SET argues that
inter-racial marriage is explained as an exchange of accepted race (white)
for the higher socio-economic status of the black partner; and initial data
seemed to support the thesis150. However, as inter-racial marriage has
grown151 it is clear that partners in the marriage tend to have equal so-
cioeconomic status, and therefore instead of an exchange interracial mar-
riage is due to open views about race – which indicates the surge of a

147
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self- concept: A socio- cognitive theory
of group behavior. Advances in Group Processes, 2, 77–12
Simon, B., & Oakes, P. (2006). Beyond dependence: An identity approach to social
148

power and domination. Human Relations, 59, 105–139

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierar-
149

chy and oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press.

150
Feliciano, Robnett, and Komaie 2009; Fu 2001; Gullickson 2006; Gullickson and Fu
2010; Hou and Myles 2013; Kalmijn 1993; Kalmijn 2010; Qian 1997. Feliciano, Cynthia,
Belinda Robnett, and Golnaz Komaie. 2009. “Gendered Racial Exclusion among White
Internet Daters.” Social Science Research 38(1):41-56. Fu, Vincent Kang. 2001. “Racial
Intermarriage Pairings.” Demography 38(2):147-159. Gullickson, Aaron. 2006. “Education
and Black-White Interracial Marriage.” Demography 43(4):673-689. Gullickson, Aaron
and Vincent Kang Fu. 2010. “An Endorsement of Exchange Theory in Mate Selection.”
American Journal of Sociology 115(4):1243-1251. Hou, Fend and John Myles. 2013. “In-
terracial Marriage and Status-Caste Exchange in Canada and the United States.” Ethnic
and Racial Studies 36(1):75-96. Kalmijn, Matthijs. 1993. “Trends in Black/White Inter-
marriage.” Social Forces 72(1):119-146. Kalmijn, Matthijs. 2010. “Educational Inequality,
Homogamy, and Status Exchange in Black-White Intermarriage.” American Journal of So-
ciology 115(4):1252-1263. Qian, Zhenchao. 1997. “Breaking the Racial Barriers: Variations
in Interracial Marriage Between 1980 and 1990.” Demography 34(2):273-276.
Interracial marriages in the US increased from an estimated 2% of married couples in
151

1970 to 17% in 2015.

102 carlos obregón

broader inter-racial identity between similarly educated people152. Interra-

cial couples (like other couples) tend toward similarity in socioeconomic
status and they have similar levels of education153. Inter-racial couples are
less traditional and more politically and culturally progressive154.
Interracial marriage therefore in the society as a whole is better ex-
plained by the integrative system, rather than by the economic and ex-
change system, which does not deny the fact exchanges may occur in
particular cases.
SIT has shown that social power is derived from identity provided by
the integrative system of the in-group, and therefore it is relational.

Functional Power

For functionalism society is more than the sum of its parts, which work
for the stability of the whole155. Durkheim envisioned society as an organ-
ism in which each component plays a necessary role. An institution only
exists because it serves a vital role in the functioning of society. Family,
government, media, education, religion, and others are core institutions
that define social order and allow for social stability. New social needs
will be responded with new institutions.
Social groups require organization, coordination and direction to
meet their goals, and this give rise to the emergence of power. Groups in-
vest power in one or a few individuals to ensure the success of the entire
group. But power implies a social responsibility, which was very explicit

152
In fact, it has been argued that much of the evidence seemingly in support of race-status
exchange theory may actually result from miss-specified statistical models. Rosenfeld, Mi-
chael J. 2005. “A Critique of Exchange Theory in Mate Selection.” The American Journal
of Sociology 110(5):1284-1325.
153
Rosenfeld 2005, op. cit.
154
Fitzpatrick, Sharp, and Reifman 2009; Herman and Campbell 2012; Yancey 2002. Fitz-
patrick, Jacki, Elizabeth A Sharp, and Alan Reifman. 2009. “Midlife Singles’ Willingness
to Date Partners With Heterogeneous Characteristics.” Family Relations 58 (1):121-133.
Herman, Melissa R. and Mary E. Campbell. 2012. “I Wouldn’t But You Can: Attitudes
Toward Interracial Relationships.” Social Science Research 41(2):343-358. Yancey, George
A. 2002. “Who Dates Interracially: An Examination of the Characteristics of Those Who
Have Dated Interracially.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 33(2):179-190.
George., Ritzer (1988). Contemporary sociological theory (2nd ed.). New York, N.Y. etc.:
155

McGraw-Hill.
chapter five 103

in most traditional societies such as the Hindu society or those under the
influence of Neo Confucianism. Therefore, from this perspective social
power is always relational.
Parsons156 sees society as a homeostatic organism with a cybernetic
hierarchy that has “conditions” on one end and “controls” on the other.
The conditions refer to the physical and organic characteristics of the
environment; the controls are the cultural characteristics. In this way,
economic transformations are the highest in the hierarchy of conditions
and lowest in the hierarchy of controls, while changes in the pattern of
cultural values hierarchize inversely. For Parsons change in the values
of culture is extraordinarily slow and social systems have adaptive char-
acteristics and develop the integration function. Social change occurs
through the development of increasingly differentiated social structures
and with more specific functions that increase the overall adaptive capac-
ity of the global system.
Merton157 made power and conflict central issues for research within a
functionalist paradigm158. He argues that not all institutions are functional
to the society as a whole, some of them may be only functional for a dom-
inant individual or a group. Moreover, there are latent functions, where a
social pattern results in an unrecognized or unintended consequence. He
adds that there may be functional alternatives to the actual institutions
and structures. Merton uses Durkheim’s notion of anomie as implying a
discontinuity between cultural goals and the accepted methods available
for reaching them; anomie therefore, is central to explain social change.
Social change can occur either through innovation or rebellion.
Functionalism has been criticized for defending the status quo and be-
ing unable to explain social conflict and drastic social change.
As to the charge of defending the status quo, Merton has explicitly
acknowledged that diverse institutional functional arrangements may
work, of which the status quo is only one. However, the criticism of
defending the status quo clearly applies to some of the arguments made
by some authors; in particular, two arguments of the functionalists are
unwarranted: 1) That the Western society is superior to other societies

Parsons, Talcott (1977). Social systems and the evolution of action theory. New York: Free Press.
156

See also François., Bourricaud (1981). The sociology of Talcott Parsons (Pbk. ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
157
Merton, Robert King (1968). Social theory and social structure (1968 enlarged ed.). New York.
This argument is made by Holmwood, John (2005). Modern social theory: an introduction.
158

Harrington, Austin, 1970. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87-110.

104 carlos obregón

in its capacity to adapt; 2) that inequality serves social stability. The first
argument made by Parsons - a direct inheritance of Spencer’s idealism –
is theoretically unjustified and incompatible with Darwin’s evolutionary
theory (in which superiority is only relative to a given specific environ-
ment). In real life, in the recent years, a selected group of Asian coun-
tries, including China, have been better able to adapt to the new global-
ism than the Western countries. The second argument is made by Davis
and Moore159; these authors argued that the most difficult jobs in any so-
ciety have the highest incomes in order to motivate individuals to fill the
roles needed by the division of labor; and therefore, that inequality serves
social stability. But their position is mistaken, because as we will see in the
next chapter the neoclassical assumption that individual rewards equal
individual merits does not hold theoretically – the economic equilibrium
has key institutional determinants. Therefore, income inequalities cannot
be explained with the argument that leaders do produce a higher social
product. High corporate management’s salaries differentials with the rest
of the organization are much higher in the US than in Japan or China, for
example, and there is no evidence that the US top management is more
productive than their Japanese or Chinese counterparts.
As to the charge that functionalism has been unable to explain social
conflict and drastic social change, as we have pointed out Merton spe-
cifically discusses social conflict and social change and shows that they
are compatible with a functional perspective. Yet, some other schools of
thought in sociology and economics address these two topics in a more
comprehensive way – as we will see in the discussion of Marxist conflict
theory and institutionalism, in the next chapter.
Functionalism justifies social power in terms of the social relation that
requires it.

conclusion

Sociological theories rightly have pointed out that social order in extend-
ed societies requires relational social power: social identity, consent and
legitimacy, a hierarchy of power and a diversified functional institutional
setting. But psychological theories have documented that power hold-
159
Davis, Kingsley; Moore, Wilbert E. (1945). “Some Principles of Stratification”. American
Sociological Review. 10 (2): 242–249. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2085643
chapter five 105

ers do pursue personal interests and are not as socially responsible as

they should be, that the exercise of social power between individuals and
groups frequently involves domination and coercion, and that the intrin-
sic characteristics of the agent as to resource ownership, the holding of
private socially relevant information, financial wealth, physical strength
or beauty, and intelligence may be relevant to establish beneficial social
exchanges, and to reward and coerce others.
Social diversity is a healthy characteristic of human societies which
require to change to better adapt to new conditions. Conflict between
diverse groups of interest and their institutional resolution is both the
key for appropriate social order and to adequate social change. However,
to avoid the possibility of a highly destructive naked power it is critical
for societies to properly regulate both the use of relational power (which
tends to be used for private benefit), and in which cases and under which
circumstances the use of power based on the agent’s personal intrinsic
characteristics should be allowed. However, to properly address the is-
sue of social order and social change, which will be the topic of chapter
seven, we would need to explore before, in the next chapter, the sources
of economic power.
CHAPTER SIX: ECONOMIC POWER

In a typical Western economy, the private sector´s economy is only about

sixty percent of the economy, and the other forty percent is under the control
of the government, representing relational interests. To this forty percent we
need to add those activities commanded by private institutions like religious
groups, charity institutions and so on – maybe another five percent. Thus,
grossly only a little more than half of the economy is commanded by indi-
vidual interests and preferences; yet a large part of economic theory is based
on the dynamics of the private sector economy. It is therefore required to
look at economic power in a broader perspective, that takes into account
not only the individual intrinsic characteristics of the economic agents, but
also the relational institutional setting in which they operate. Any economic
market operates within an institutional arrangement and its corresponding
conceptual system and therefore the economic system (and the exercise of
economic power) is interrelated with the integrative and the power systems.
The purpose of this chapter is to define what is economic power. We
discuss the theory of value of the classical economist, the neoclassical
view, and the Marxist conception of social conflict. We conclude with a
definition of economic power and its role in the social system.

economic power

The classical economists defined the economic value of a given economic

good or service as the capacity that it has to command social necessary
labor160. This definition is extremely important, because it unveils the
social power of owning such a good or service. Whenever we buy some-
thing, we are actually commanding others to work in their production.
Therefore, economic power truly means social power.
However, an economic transaction does not necessarily originate in
the economic system, it is not always the consequence of a selfish con-
160
For a discussion on the classical economists’ theory of value see Obregon, C. 2008., Teo-
rias del desarrollo economico. Amazon.com. Also available at Research Gate.com

[106]
chapter six 107

sideration to maximize personal interests or preferences, it may originate

in the integrative or in the power system. The construction of a church
or an Egyptian pyramid is certainly an important economic action that
commands the labor of many economic agents, but it originates in a value
of the integrative system that has little to do with the individual agents’
economic interests or preferences. The same goes for the production of
sophisticated military weapons, or in general the equipment of the mili-
tary and the police, which originate in the power system.
It is critical to distinguish the economic power of institutions from the
one of individuals. Too much of the economic analysis is based upon indi-
viduals’ interests and actions, as if they alone define economic value; but
in the real world institutions representing relational – integrative and pow-
er interests – have a huge command over economic goods and services.

The Neoclassical View

The market economy is seen as the consequence of individuals’ initial en-

dowments, available technology, and individual preferences. This school
launched several research programs, such as: Welfare Economics and
General Equilibrium Theory, aiming at showing the uniqueness and ex-
istence of an economic equilibrium that optimizes the general welfare.
This could be seen as a follow up of Smith’s maxim that free economic
actions by individuals in open markets create general wellbeing for the
society; except, that Smith’s argument was based on the fact that these
free economic actions promote economic growth, and the neoclassical
school’s argument was based on the assumption that they maximize eco-
nomic welfare.
The Rational Expectation School argued that the economic agents
optimize the use of all the information available and created partial equi-
librium models that remain always close to full employment equilibrium.
This school was highly influential in macroeconomics for decades, but
the 2008 GFC (Global Financial Crisis) and the 2020 GPC (Global Pan-
demic Crisis) have shown that they were wrong. And macroeconomics
has gone back to Keynes’ economics which is better explained with insti-
tutional economics and game theory’s multi-equilibriums.
The neoclassical school failed to show both a unique equilibrium and
the optimization of welfare. A market equilibrium is decisively influenced
108 carlos obregón

by the institutional arrangement, and there is a multiplicity of equilibri-

ums, some of which may result in underdevelopment or unemployment.
Informational economics showed the existence of multiequilibriums,
some exhibiting underdevelopment and others underemployment. Game
theory showed Nash multiequilibriums which are not Pareto optimal.
Institutional economics has shown that the market equilibrium depends
upon the institutional arrangement. And Keynes’ economics has shown
that the economy is not necessarily stable and that major economic crises
can occur, like the 2008 GFC and the 2020 GPC. Keynes’ economics
can be better understood in the light of the contributions of game theory,
information economics and institutional economics. In this perspective,
institutions build the bridge between the present and the future, and eco-
nomic uncertainty can be seen as mistrust in the institutions to do well
their job161. And this mistrust is seen as the major cause of large global
economic crisis. Institutions define the game to be played and provide the
necessary information for the economy to work properly. Therefore, the
market equilibrium depends critically on the institutional arrangement162.
Despite the failures of Welfare Economics, General Equilibrium The-
ory and the School of Rational Expectations, the neoclassical model has
been critical in the advancement of economic science. Game Theory,
Information Theory and the mathematical formalization of institutional
economics would not be possible without the original contributions made
by the hardcore neoclassical economists.
Moreover, the failures of the neoclassical school do not imply that the
institutions can replace the markets (which are still needed for econom-
ic efficiency – to transmit the rapid changing preferences of the middle
class), nor that markets are not related to economic growth.
It is still true that the main explanation for the rapid economic growth
in capitalism is the enlargement of the markets, as Smith argued. But this
market enlargement is mainly due to the increasing size of the middle class
in the Western countries, derived from their particular historical institu-
tional arrangement. Open trade and free markets do not produce economic
growth in developing economies that lack the proper institutional arrange-
ment, the neoclassical model has failed in these countries. Moreover, insti-
tutions cannot replace the markets, as the failure of the communist model
161
Obregon, C. 2021., Keynes Today. Amazon.com. Also available at research gate.com
162
For a theoretical analysis of neoclassical economics, rational expectations, information
theory, game theory, institutional economics and Keynes’ economics see Obregon, C.
2021., New Economics. Amazon.com. Also available at research gate.com
chapter six 109

has shown. And it is possible to achieve rapid economic growth with insti-
tutional arrangements that differ from the neoclassical recommendations,
as the group of successful Asian countries have already proven.
In terms of economic power, the fact that institutions are key in the
determination of the final economic equilibrium means that: economic
power (given the technology) not only depends upon the agent’s intrinsic
characteristics (his wealth or income – his endowments, and his prefer-
ences) but is always relational. It critically depends upon the institutional
arrangement. In fact, the institutional arrangement is also definitive in the
determination of the available technology, which cannot be taken as given.

The Marxist View

Karl Marx changed the classical labor value theory to a theory based on
socially necessary labor – which is the labor needed for the production
of goods that have been satisfactorily sold in the markets163. Incorporated
labor for Marx only creates value if the market buys the goods that have
been produced, otherwise it does not. Marx argued that capitalism reveals
the true nature of the human beings as a species being, because production
and trade are globalized. Since all value comes from labor, the difference
between the compensation of labor and the income received for the sale
of the economic good – which is the capitalist profit – is exploitation.
Humans in capitalism are alienated from their true nature as species being.
The alienation only ends in the human society which needs to satisfy
two conditions: 1) the common ownership of the means of production,
so that the capitalist profits become fully socialized – thus, communism is
the first necessary step towards the human society; and 2) that the society
truly satisfies the needs that the individuals have for their proper integral
development – which is the second necessary step for a communist soci-
ety to become a human society.
Marx forecasted that the first step, communism, would necessarily
have to occur in capitalism at the global level; because the global process
of production made proletariats aware of their true nature as species being,
and of the exploitation that they are suffering; and therefore, they would
necessarily unite in a global revolution against the capitalist class.
163
For a discussion on Marx’ economics see, Obregon, C. 2008., Teorias del desarrollo
economico. Amazon.com. Also available at Research Gate.com
110 carlos obregón

Marx´s forecast was wrong. The revolution never happened globally,

nor in the Western advanced countries. It occurred in developing coun-
tries: Russia, China, Cuba. The Western proletariat never united; in fact,
it fought against one another, shoulder to shoulder with the capitalists of
their nations, in the two World Wars.
The main problem of the communist model is that, despite following
the recommendations of the Western economists (Solow’s model of eco-
nomic growth, among others), and creating high savings, developing sci-
ence and technology, and promoting education – it did not grow properly.
The USSR 1950 -2000 in per capita terms grew as much as Africa. The
collapse of the USSR showed the weakness of the communist economic
model – it can distribute, but it cannot grow. Why? Because despite the
large size of its market, the USSR did not have the fast-changing preferenc-
es of a large middle class guiding the market’s technological development.
The world´s frontier technology was developed in the West, which did
have a large middle-class market; and the USSR developed with second
class technology; that is why, when it opened up in the 1990’s, it collapsed.
The Marxist’s view of the world, alike the classical and the neoclassical
one, has the problem that it explains economic equilibrium only in market
terms – but the market equilibrium is highly dependent on the institutional
arrangement. Economic growth requires the proper institutional arrange-
ment. And, while wealth and income distribution strategies are welcome,
they only work well if there is a proper model of economic growth164.
The Marxist view is based upon the conflict between social classes, each
one defending their interest, using their own agent’s intrinsic characteris-
tics; it leaves aside the relational character of social power due to a com-
mon institutional arrangement. In the real world the Marxist revolution
in the Western countries never happened; instead, these countries drasti-
cally changed their institutional arrangement: with governments control-
ling between two thirds and one half of the economy, with social payments
becoming between one fifth and one third of the economy, and with a fast-
growing middle class. The communist countries, where the revolution was
enacted, never had proper economic growth due to the lack of an adequate
institutional arrangement. On the other hand, a selected group of Asian
countries grew very fast due to a proper model of economic growth based
on an institutional arrangement (the Asian Growth Model), which was very
different to the one recommended either by Marxist economics or by neo-

see Obregon, C. 2020., Three Lessons From Economists: That policy makers should never forget.
164

Amazon.com. Also available at research gate.com

chapter six 111

classical economics. The countries where the well-being of the lowest classes
improved the most in the last six decades were the ones that followed the
Asian Growth Model, which did not include any social conflict165.

Definition of Economic Power

Classical economics´ labor value theory unraveled the command power

upon the labor of others that the purchasing power of an agent has. Eco-
nomic power therefore is highly related to the intrinsic characteristic of the
agent such as: his wealth, income and purchasing power. Smith showed the
importance of liberating economic power in free markets, which foster the
individuals’ creativity. Individuals chasing their particular, selfish interests
trade among each other, enlarge the market, induce technological change
and generate economic growth and therefore social well-being. Neoclassi-
cal economics attempted to show that a unique market equilibrium could
be obtained based upon the individual’s endowments, the given technol-
ogy, and the individuals’ preferences; and that such equilibrium was stable
and maximize economic welfare. The neoclassical attempt however failed.
Marxist economics has pointed out the conflict between diverse eco-
nomic classes; and this highlights that economic power can be used to
advance the particular interests of individuals or groups.
The recent discoveries of game theory, information economics, in-
stitutional economics and Keynes´ economics have serious consequences
for the understanding of what economic power is. Technology is not
given, it depends endogenously on the model of economic growth; the
individuals’ endowments are not given either, they are also influenced by
the model of economic growth. A market solution does not exist by it-
self. Economic institutions and policies are as old as humanity. Economic
power does not depend only on the intrinsic characteristic of the agent
such as: wealth, income and purchasing power; it also critically depends
upon the relational institutional arrangement.
In the real world, capitalism has become a hybrid system in which
markets do play a crucial role, but governments do, too. Taxes are
around two fifths of the economy which means that there is a relational–
collective decision on around forty percent of the use of the economic
165
For a discussion on models of economic growth see, see Obregon, C. 2021., New Econom-
ics. Amazon.com. Also available at research gate.com
112 carlos obregón

resources produced annually. The success of capitalism is due to the en-

largement of the middle class in the Western world, and it is related to the
particular institutional arrangement of the West. Free markets without
the right institutional arrangement do not work properly, as the failure of
the neoclassical economics in developing economies has shown.
Free markets however are relevant; and, as Smith thought, they are re-
quired for fast economic growth. Institutions cannot replace markets, as the
failure of the communist model has proven. Frontier technology is globally
defined by the changing preferences of a dynamic middle class – which mainly
resides in the Western countries - and participating freely in the global econ-
omy is required to participate in the benefits of the frontier technology. But
participating freely in the global economy can be done with distinct institu-
tional arrangements, with different characteristics from the ones proposed by
neoclassical economics – as the successful Asian growth model has taught us.
Economic power does allow an individual to command others´ labor, as
the classical economists proposed. And it can be used, as Marxist economics
pointed out, to advance the interests of individuals and groups; and there-
fore, it is always related to the possibility of these groups to use their intrin-
sic agent´s characteristics to be able to exercise naked power. But since the
market equilibrium depends upon the institutional arrangement, economic
power is always relational; and therefore, only partially defined by the in-
trinsic characteristics of the agent. The institutional arrangement can guide
the private interests so that they are compatible with the collective ones. A
proper model of economic growth and adequate distribution policies can cer-
tainly provide an appropriate institutional arrangement; one that safeguards
the collective interest while allowing the private interest to flourish.
Changes in the institutional arrangement are the reason why the an-
nounced Marxist revolution never happened in the advanced Western
countries. Today however, both the global institutional arrangement,
and the one existing in developing economies are highly deficient; and
this is the main reason of many unresolved global problems such as:
underdevelopment and poverty, global financial crisis, global environ-
mental crisis, global crime, global health crisis and so on.

conclusion

Economic power is expressed in the markets through commanding oth-

er’s labor, and it depends upon the intrinsic characteristics of the agent
chapter six 113

such as wealth, income and purchasing power. Economic power is one

of the best means for particular individuals or groups to advance their
interest over the collective ones and therefore can be certainly a route for
naked power. Economic power existed in previous societies, but it grows
in relevance as the markets become more generalized and globalized in
capitalism. Economic power is however only one of the sources of social
power. Social power may also be the consequence of integrative power,
and of the power system itself (by military force for example). Since a
market solution requires institutions, and these are always related to the
integrative and the power systems, that means that economic power can-
not be understood by itself (as both the neoclassical school and the Marx-
ist school have attempted).
In the neoclassical (classical) school, an individual economic agent
expressing his preferences commands through his/her economic power
the labor of others. In Marxism, the market price differential with labor
costs is defined as exploitation. But the market price needed to define
the Marxist’s exploitation, as well as the neoclassical (classical) capacity
to command labor depends crucially on the institutional arrangement –
which is necessarily influenced by the integrative and the power systems.
The Marxist view that all the social institutions represent the capital-
ist’s interests is untenable in a world in which the institutional arrange-
ment is composed of many institutions that are much older than cap-
italism. And the neoclassical view of economic power as unrelated to
institutions is also unsustainable.
Economic power has to be understood in the context the institutional
arrangement heavily influenced by the integrative and the power systems.
Economic power comes from the possibility to command the labor of
others through the economic purchasing power of the economic agent given
his intrinsic characteristics such as: wealth, income and purchasing power.
Economic power is one of the best routes through which individual or
groups can impose their particular interests to the collective interests of soci-
ety; therefore, economic power always implies the possibility of naked power
to impose itself in a given society. However, since there is not a market
equilibrium independent of the institutional arrangement, economic power
is always relational. Institutions interrelate the economic system with the in-
tegrative and the power systems; and they have the task to make private
economic power compatible with the collective interest of the society.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL ORDER
AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In this chapter we address the critical issue of social order and social change
from the perspective of several schools of thought: Functionalism; Conflict,
Critical and Post-Critical Theory; Structuralism and Post-Structuralism; So-
cial Exchange Theory; Symbolic Interactionism; Ethnomethodology; and
Institutionalism. As well, we present our own view. We argue that social
order requires both stability and change. That societies are composed of
diverse groups and individuals, and that the micro aspects of social dynam-
ics are as relevant as the macro aspects. That social change happens both at
the level of: a) the technology, and the material economic and institutional
conditions; and b) the social ideas that define the conceptual system of the
society. Social power, we argue, is always relational; but given that the soci-
ety is composed of diverse groups and individuals, there is always social con-
flict – in which the agent’s intrinsic characteristics do play an important role.
For its survival, any society requires social order, which is provided
by the conceptual system and the institutional arrangement that define
the three ways of belonging; and within social belonging the three so-
cial systems: the integrative, the power and the economic. The social
structure defined by the three social systems provides stability and func-
tionality, for the society to satisfy its survival needs and to face external
threats. But the society is composed of individuals and groups which
have particular interests that diverge from the collective ones. And these
particular groups may have a diversity of conceptual systems of reference
with their corresponding institutional arrangements. In these cases, there-
fore, the society’s overall conceptual system and its corresponding insti-
tutional arrangement is an envelope including the previously mentioned
diversity. Diversity necessarily implies confrontation and conflict, which
is required for society to maintain its flexibility and its capacity to change.
This diversity is key for society to face in a flexible way the ever-changing
circumstances. Societies are exposed to internal and external shocks such
as: technological and social innovations, natural disasters, climate chang-
es, scarcity of certain key natural resources, threat of other societies and

[114]
chapter seven 115

so on. Internal diversity, discussion and conflict provides the society the
required flexibility to confront external and internal shocks.
Social order cannot be maintained only with stability; it requires prop-
er social change. Social change is a dynamic characteristic of societies
that require continuous adaptability, but within a stable framework that
allows the society’s daily functioning required for its survival. To be suc-
cessful, social change requires social conflict and diversity, that occurs
within a flexible institutional arrangement capable to provide the neces-
sary relational stability for the society to operate properly.
Some social theories have focused on the macro aspects of societies,
and some others on the micro aspects; some of them emphasized social
stability and others conflict and social change; some based social change
only on economic issues and others include changes in ideas, organiza-
tional ways of life and social concepts.
In what follows we will provide our own view in social order and so-
cial change, and we will contrast it with: 1) Functionalism (which empha-
sizes macro aspects and stability); 2) Conflict, Critical and Post-Critical
Theory (which emphasizes macro aspects and critical perspectives, social
conflict and social change based on economic issues); 3) Structuralism
and Post-Structuralism (which emphasizes stability and specificity); 4) So-
cial Exchange Theory (which emphasizes micro aspects and selfishness
– a neoclassical view of the world extended to social issues); 5) Symbolic
Interactionism (which emphasizes micro aspects and changes at the con-
ceptual level); 6) Ethnomethodology (which emphasizes micro aspects
of social order); and 7) Institutionalism and Neo Institutionalism (which
emphasizes both micro and macro aspects, and social change both in
material-economic issues and at the conceptual level).
Our conclusion in this chapter is that: while belonging is required for
social stability and proper functioning, diversity and conflict are needed
for adequate social change. Social power based on belonging is relational,
the social power displayed in social conflict is based on the agent’s (a
person, a group or an institution) intrinsic characteristics. Social conflict
may involve the use of naked power or may be managed and resolved by
institutions designed for that purpose (for example the Supreme Court of
Justice). When social conflict is resolved by naked power, it leads to un-
stable social equilibriums, in which the naked power will be continuously
challenged. When it is resolved institutionally (either by existing institu-
tions or newly created ones), it may be accepted by all the participants
and conduce to legitimate permanent changes. The resilience of a society
116 carlos obregón

to adapt properly to internal and external shocks depends upon its abil-
ity to resolve social conflict institutionally. However, changes based on
naked power are occasionally necessary precursors of a new institutional-
ized way of living; think of the French Revolution, the US Civil War, and
women’s and black’s movements demanding the right to vote.

functionalism: macro social stability and change

Functionalism sees social power as relational. In Parsons, stability is em-

phasized and although social change occurs as a consequence of social
adaptations to internal and external shocks, there is not a specific discus-
sion of the role of social conflict in the process of social change. Merton
however, made power and conflict central issues of social change
Merton specifically discusses social conflict and social change and
shows that they are compatible with a functional perspective. He explic-
itly acknowledged that there may be functional alternatives to the actual
institutions and structures, that some institutions are only functional for
a dominant individual or a group, that institutions may produce unrec-
ognized or unintended consequences, that social anomie is central to
explain social change and that social change can occur either through
innovation or rebellion.
Yet despite Merton’s key contributions, functionalism is not particu-
larly suited to understand social conflict and social change for two rea-
sons: a) it focuses on the macro level; and b) it is centered on functional-
ity, and not on the conflict between individuals and groups.

conflict (critical) theory: macro social conflict

Conflict theory sees social power as the consequence of the intrinsic char-
acteristics of the agent (individual or group), and social order as the out-
come of the conflict between the interests of groups and individuals. The
State and other institutions are seen as obeying the interest of the most
powerful. And the role of theory is to promote social change in favor of
the powerless members of society. It has its origins in the Marxist concep-
tion of class conflict, but it has its own theoretical developments.
chapter seven 117

C. Wright Mills has been called the modern founder of conflict the-
ory. He views social structures as created through conflict between peo-
ple with differing interests and resources. Individuals’ endowments, in
turn, are influenced by these structures and by the “unequal distribution
of power and resources in the society”166. He argues that the interests of
the elite are opposed to those of the people. For him the policies of the
powerful elite would result in “increased escalation of conflict, produc-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, and possibly the annihilation of the
human race.167
Alan Sears168 argues that for critical theory consensus is a euphemism
for ideology, because the more powerful are able to impose their concep-
tions on others. The State serves the particular interests of the most pow-
erful. Therefore, consensus entrenches stratification that generates social
conflict. The disadvantaged have structural interests that run counter
to the status quo. This conflict based on inequality can only be overcome
through a fundamental transformation of the existing relations in the so-
ciety. The role of theory resides in realizing the human potential to trans-
form society into one with equal division of labor. The disadvantaged are
the agents of change. Inequality on a global level is characterized by the
purposeful underdevelopment of Third World countries. International
institutions benefit the most powerful countries and multi-national cor-
porations.
Critical theory explains major social movements, whether they are
revolutionary or nonviolent, and it has been highly influential in feminist
theory, queer theory and the race conflict approach. Critical theory sees
functionalism as a defense of the status quo, because the functionality of
the society serves the ideological interests of the powerful.
Critical theory´s view of social conflict as ideological is related to
the postmodernist mistrust of abstract principles and universalist ideas.
Postmodernism´s criticism of modernism and social progress is highly
influenced by critical theory. Social progress for postmodernism is not
an abstract general truth that has to be followed, but an ideology of the
powerful. Postmodernism mistrusts grand theories and ideologies; and
therefore, it is linked to Derrida’s deconstructionism.
Knapp, P. (1994). One World – Many Worlds: Contemporary Sociological Theory (2nd Ed.).
166

Harpercollins College Div, pp. 228–246.

167
Knapp, P. (1994). Op. cit.
Sears, Alan. (2008) A Good Book, In Theory: A Guide to Theoretical Thinking. North York:
168

Higher Education University of Toronto Press, pg. 34-6

118 carlos obregón

However, despite the common ground between critical theory

and postmodernism and post-structuralism, critical theory is by itself
a grand theory. In a way, critical theory is just the opposite of the
grand theory presented by functionalism. Functionalism is a grand
theory that mainly argues that society works well, critical theory is a
grand theory that says that it does not work well. If one is going to
follow Derrida’s deconstructionism one should mistrust both grand
theories – functionalism and critical theory.
Just as functionalism has been criticized for defending stability
and the status quo, critical theory has been criticized for being too
politicized, for downplaying the unity in society, and for taking a
negative view of society as one filled with conflict, tension and co-
ercion169.
A satisfactory social theory must be able to explain both: 1) so-
cial stability and 2) social change; and the role of social conflict
in social change. Moreover, the explanation must be based on the
microanalysis of the interaction between individuals and groups. A
macro perspective based upon ad hoc abstract constructions by the
analyst may serve the purpose to illustrate better the social dynam-
ics; but caution must advert that alternative abstract categories can
be built by diverse analysts. At the end, the usefulness of the abstract
macro-categories must be judged by their capacity to illustrate social
dynamics, which is always based on the micro-interaction between
individuals and groups. Whatever theory of social dynamics is pro-
posed must be compatible with: 1) Scientific knowledge in neuroevo-
lutionary biology and in social sciences; and 2) the fact that, histori-
cally, social dynamics in distinct societies has been very diverse.
Neither functionalism, nor critical theory satisfies the previous
conditions. None of them has a satisfactory explanation of the mi-
cro dynamics of societies. Neither of them explains properly the
diversity of social dynamics appreciated in distinct societies. And
both rely too much on abstract constructs unrelated to the scientific
knowledge in neuroevolutionary biology and in social sciences, that
is why they diverge between them so much. The abstract constructs
of functionalism are more useful to illuminate the process of social
stability, while the abstract constructs of conflict (critical) theory il-
luminate better the process of social conflict.

169
Stolley, Kathy S. The basics of sociology. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005, p.27
chapter seven 119

structuralism and post structuralism

Both structuralism and post-structuralism reject the empiricist view that

language connects our mind and the world; language instead is seen as
social system of signs170. The subject is only possible through language171.
The difference between the two is that while structuralism aims at dis-
covering an objective reality, and thus searches for truth; the post-struc-
turalists argue that physical reality can only be apprehended through
language; and since our conscious self itself is a product of language, the
quest for objective meanings and universal structures is illusory. Post-
structuralism follows Derrida’s deconstructionism.
Structuralism started in linguistics with Saussure172 and was further
developed with Jakobson, and expanded to anthropology with Claude
Lévi-Strauss, and eventually reached philosophy and all the social sci-
ences. The post-structuralist movement started with Derrida173. Subse-
quently, the post-structuralist movement expanded under thinkers such
as Foucault, Barthes, and Lacan, who fell under the influence of Derrida.
Saussure’s theory argues: 1) that language is a closed and self-standing
system; and 2) that language underlies and explains the signifying sys-
tem. Both points are accepted by structuralism. Post-structuralism accepts
the first and rejects the second.
Structuralism affirms that there is no reality outside language. Louis
Althusser has pointed out that language necessarily reflects social ideol-
ogy as understood conventions through which people live and see the
world (here is the connection with critical theory). Post-structuralism
agrees with this world view but goes further. Derrida condemns structur-
alism for its search of stable truths. He argues that, in the same way that
absolute knowledge is inexistent in philosophy, absolute meanings can-
not be found behind words; which clearly contradicts Saussure’s affirma-
tion that signifier and signified are linked to each other like the two sides
170
According to Saussure, language is a system of differences with no positive terms; there-
fore, a language is needed to be able to differentiate reality. De Saussure, Ferdinand.  Course
in General Linguistics.  New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
171
An argument made by Jacques Lacan.
172
Saussure views language as a totality at any given moment, and the central point of his
theory is that signs do not correspond to exterior entities, but become meaningful only
within this totality.
173
See Derrida’s essay, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,”
given at a symposium at John Hopkins University in 1966
120 carlos obregón

of a sheet of paper. Thus, while structuralism tries to maintain a close

connection between the signifier and the signified, post-structuralism de-
nies the very existence of the signified.
The post-structuralist critique to structuralism as the incapacity to
reach the true reality is, as we have discussed before, scientifically cor-
rect. However, the fact that any scientific model is a construct of the hu-
man mind does not mean that there is not a reality out there. It is true,
as Derrida and others argue, that the reality we perceive depends upon
our own mind’s model, and therefore there can be more than one mind’s
model of reality. As we mentioned in an earlier chapter, both Newton’s
and Einstein’s notion of time work well for most of the macrophysics
events – despite the fact that they are very different. The fact that both
work well shows that they are the mind’s constructions, because reality
cannot be both. But not any notion of time will work well. Some scientific
mind models interact properly with the reality out there and some do
not – which means that there is a reality out there, otherwise any notion
of time would work properly. Scientific knowledge grows based upon the
scientific models that work well.
There are many conceptual systems and their corresponding institu-
tional arrangements that can establish social order, and there is no way
to describe one as superior to others (as Parson argued). And it is also
true that social science can never discover the “real truth” of societies
(as analytical philosophy argues). Social sciences, like any science - as
post-structuralism discusses - is limited by the fact that it is the mind’s
construction, based on ideas defined by language. But beyond the fact
that all the above is true, still one has to keep in mind that any conceptual
system and its corresponding institutional arrangement needs to work
well, in the sense of allowing the survival of the group or society in the
real world out there – therefore, societies (as functionalism suggests) have
to be functional. And scientific models of societies need to be able to an-
swer what characteristics of these diverse conceptual systems and their
corresponding institutional arrangements allow them to be functional for
the society’s survival. Thus, there is not one theory in the social sciences
that is necessarily correct – several may work to explain observed real
societies. But as Popper has suggested, there are many social theories
that must be discarded because they cannot explain real societies. As we
have argued before, any social science arguments must be congruent with
what we know in neuroevolutionary biology and with empirical findings
in several social sciences.
chapter seven 121

The main contribution of structuralism is that social power is always

relational, the main contribution of post-structuralism is that there is
more than one way to establish the relational power and that relational
power may actually respond to the particular interest of individuals and/
or groups.
Social sciences have moved away from relying on abstract constructs
and have studied better some of the micro-aspects of social dynamics.
In what follow we will review three schools that have emphasized the
micro dynamics of societies: Social Exchange Theory – somewhat in the
line of functionalism in the sense that it is inclined towards explaining
stability; Symbolic Interactionism – which is less able to explain both
social stability and social conflict, and somewhat better in explaining the
conceptual diversity of social dynamics in distinct societies; and Ethno-
methodology – which puts emphasis on the specificity of any social rela-
tion. After reviewing these three schools, and as a preview of our own
vision of social stability and change, we will discuss Institutionalism and
Neo-Institutionalism.

micro social stability and change in social

exchange theory

We have already discussed Social Exchange Theory (SET) in the previ-

ous chapter, and its roots in the neoclassical economic model. Therefore,
we will only emphasize here the aspects that have to do with social change.
In SET (and the neoclassical model) social change occurs through three
channels: 1) Changes in consumer preferences; 2) technological change;
3) changes in initial endowments.
1) Changes in consumer preferences. Consumer preferences
change slowly, and in this sense, SET is compatible with func-
tionalism, in terms of seeing the culture as changing slowly;
however, they change more rapidly in the Western society
than in others – as they interact with the fast technological
change in Western societies. Consumer preferences do not
change due to social conflict, nor due to cultural changes in the
integrative or in the power systems.
2) Technological change and innovation. Innovation is due to the
capitalists looking for profits. And in the neoclassical growth
122 carlos obregón

models endogenous technological change has been discussed

as being produced by four causes: a) The development of sci-
ence; b) learning by doing; c) education; and d) research and
development. The rapid technological change interacts with
the consumer preferences which interact dynamically with the
new technological possibilities.
3) Change in endowments. This may be due to: 1) Deployment
or exhaustion of natural resources; 2) new discoveries of natu-
ral resources; 3) changes in the income distribution: and 4)
other factors. All of which are exogenous and unexplained by
the neoclassical model or SET.
The strength of the theory is that it explains some of the key
micro aspects of social change. The problems with this theory are
that: a) It is unable to explain abrupt social changes; b) it does not
take into account social conflict; and c) it cannot explain changes in
the integrative or in the power systems – nor its relationships with
the economic system.
The economic growth of the West was not only due a large mar-
ket, high savings, advanced science, learning by doing, research and
development and high education; the USSR had all these six ele-
ments, and despite this during 1950-2000 its GDP per capita grew
less than the one of Africa. What differentiated the West from the
USSR was the enlargement of the market due to a growing middle
class, whose dynamic changing preferences guided and diversified
the West’ s technological development. The technological develop-
ment in the USSR was oriented instead only to military weapons
and the space adventure. But the rise of the middle class in the West
has to be understood as the result of social conflict in the integrative
and in the power systems. Capitalism cannot be understood without
democracy, which is the outcome of social conflicts and of a long hu-
man struggle for finding new values and new ways of life.
SET and neoclassical theory, by leaving aside the integrative
system, the power system and social conflict, result in a very lim-
ited view of social change. As we have been pointing out, it has the
advantage that it describes some key aspects of the micro dynamics
of social change. But by focusing on the individual agent, it leaves
unanswered how the social structure (the institutional arrange-
ment) conditions and promotes the individual agent’s preferences
and actions.
chapter seven 123

micro social stability and change in

symbolic interactionism

Symbolic interactionism discusses how individuals interact with one an-

other to create symbolic worlds, and how these worlds influence individ-
ual’s behavior174. R. Collins views symbolic interactionism as studying
the way the social world is created through interaction between individu-
als and their environment175. In Mind, Self and Society, a book published
posthumously by Mead’s students based on his thoughts. Mind refers to
the individual´s use of symbolic language and thought to create meanings
for the world around. Self refers to an individual’s ability to reflect on
the way that the individual is perceived by others. And Society refers to
the place in which all of these interactions take place. Power and abuse,
classes and outside social structures deny the individuals’ ability to char-
acterize themselves176. Blumer argued that through interaction individu-
als are able to “produce common symbols by approving, arranging, and
redefining them177.”A mutual exchange of interpretation is the ground
of socialization178. Joel M. Charon179 argues that there are five central
ideas proposed by social interactionism: 1) The human being must be
understood as a social person; 2) the human being must be understood
as a thinking being; 3) humans do not sense their environment directly;
instead, humans define symbolically the situation they are in; 4) the cause
of human action is the result of what is occurring in our present situation;
5) human beings are described as active beings in relation to their envi-
ronment. David A. Snow defines four orienting principles: human agen-

West, Richard L.; Turner, Lynn H, 2020. Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and
174

Application (7th ed.). New York.

“Symbolic interactionist perspective on linking privacy and identity in social working sites” Conference
175

Papers- International Communication Association: 1–27. 2012

176
Brewster, Kiyona (August 2013). “Beyond classic symbolic interactionism: Towards an
intersectional reading of George H. Mead’s ‘Mind, Self, and Society’”. American Sociological
Association. Conference Papers: 1–20 – via Soc INDEX with Full Text.
177
Blumer, Herbert (1969). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
178
Caglar, Sebnem; Alver, Fusun (2015). “The impact of symbolic interactionism on re-
search studies about communication science”. International Journal of Arts and Sciences. 8:
479–84.
179
Charon, Joel M. (2004). Symbolic Interactionism: An Introduction, An Interpretation, An Integra-
tion. Boston: Pearson. p. 31.
124 carlos obregón

cy, interactive determination, symbolization, and emergence180. Symbolic

interactionism is connected with language. Language initiates all forms
of communication, verbal and non-verbal; Blumer defines this source
of meaning as a connection that arises out of the social interaction that
people have with each other. Symbolic interactionism is a construction of
people’s social reality; therefore, it defines social structure181.
Social power in the interactionist sense is relational; it is negotiated
and renegotiated between actors with different capacities and different
interests182. Inequality is constructed through differential abilities of in-
volved actors to define the situation (it is due to differential agent’s intrin-
sic characteristics) 183. 
Symbolic interactionism has been criticized for not being precise
enough to be testable. However, it has been very influential in more test-
able theories such as: role theory and identity theory. It has also been
argued that it does not pay enough attention to the influence of the social
structure in the interaction between individuals.
Symbolic interactionism can explain both social stability and social
change, but it does not have a specific theory of either of them. Social
conflict and differential power can be described with symbolic interac-
tionism, but its role in social change is never clearly established.
The advantages of symbolic interactionism are: 1) that it describes
the micro dynamics of societies at the conceptual level; 2) that it focuses
on the role of language and symbols in building social reality; and 3)
that it explains the conceptual building of the integrative system. The
disadvantages are that: 1) It does not have a theory of social change; 2) it
does neither have a theory of social stability; 3) it does not establish the
connection between social conflict and social change; 4) it does not have
an adequate theory of the power system; 5) it does not have a proper
theory of the economic system; 6) it does not have a theory of how social
change happens in neither the economic system, nor the power system.

180
Reynolds, Larry T., and Nancy J. Herman-Kinney. 1958(2003). Handbook of Symbolic
Interactionism. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Alta Mira Press
181
Tryker, Sheldon (1968). “Identity salience and role performance: The relevance of sym-
bolic interaction theory for family research”. Journal of Marriage and Family. 30 (4): 558–64.
Dennis, Alex and Peter J. Martin (2005). “Symbolic Interactionism and the Concept of
182

Power.” British Journal of Sociology 56(2): 191-213.

183
Schwalbe, Michael and Sandra Godwin, Daphne Holden, Douglas Schrock, Shealy
Thompson, Michelle Wolkomir. 2000 “Generic Processes in the Reproduction of Inequal-
ity: An Interactionist Analysis.” Social Forces 79(2):419-52.
chapter seven 125

social order in ethnomethodology

Social order exists whenever societies resolve their daily functioning. Eth-
nomethodology develops as the explicit recognition that each society or
social group has its own particular methods to establish social order. It is
a micro-oriented analysis that refuses any social analysis that starts with
abstract general categories, and instead it focuses in discover and describe
the specificities of each case.
Psathas184 argues that ethnomethodogy studies can be classified in five
types: 1) The organization of practical actions and practical reasoning185.
2)The organization of talk-in-interaction – also known as conversational
analysis186. 3)Talk-in-interaction within institutional or organizational set-
tings187. 4) The study of work. ‘Work’ is used here to refer to any social
activity.5) The haecceity of work (What makes an activity what it is?)188.
Ethnomethodology emphasizes the relational character of social power.

macro and micro stability and change in

institutionalism and neo-institutionalism

As we have seen before, market equilibrium prices cannot be defined only

by endowments, technology, and individual preferences – institutions are
definitive. Social change is discussed in institutionalism by Thorstein Ve-
blen and in neo-institutionalism by Douglas North.
Veblen defines an institution as the sum of the habits of thought (in our
language, the conceptual system) and the habits of life (in our language, the

Psathas, G. (1995) Talk and Social Structure’ and ‘Studies of Work, in Human Studies, 18:
184

139–155.
See Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Malden MA: Polity Press/Blackwell
185

Publishing. 1984. First published in 1967.

186
Sacks, H. (1978) “Some Technical Considerations of a Dirty Joke,” in J. Schenkein (ed.) Studies
in the Organization of Conversational Interaction, Academic Press, New York, NY, pp. 249–269.
G. Psathas (ed.) Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology, Irvington Press,
187

New York, NY
188
Further discussion of the varieties and diversity of ethnomethodological studies can be
found in Doug Maynard & Steve Clayman, “The Diversity of Ethnomethodology”, ASR,
V.17, pp. 385–418. 1991. A survey of various ethnomethodological approaches to the study
of social practices. Pages 413–418.
126 carlos obregón

institutional arrangement). Veblen’s theory of social change is based on

increases in population and changes in man’s technological knowledge to
dominate the natural environment189. The new habits of life of the new tech-
nology (the industrious class), are confronted with the old habits of life of the
old technology (the leisure class). The result is unpredictable; it may or not
lead to the adoption of new habits; since, in many cases, the old habits of
thought persist for long periods. Human behavior responds to habits, the de-
velopment of which is based on innate instincts such as: parental bent (com-
munity), workmanship instinct (which creates technology), and idle curiosity
(which creates science). Regarding innate predispositions, instincts exercise
control over habits and institutions, but it is a control that is “neither too rigid
nor too insistent”190. In turn, instincts themselves become more defined with
the development of the habits of life and thought; thus, institutions give a
historical ubiquity to natural instincts. In fact, to a large extent, Veblen’s work
consists of giving historical content to humans´natural instincts.
Veblen´s theory of history distinguishes four historical stages: the age
of savagery, the age of barbarism, the age of arts and crafts, and the age
of machines. In savagery, idle curiosity gives animistic explanations for
observed behavior and retards technological advance. In the barbarian era,
the institution of property arises, either from a warlike background or from
the power of spiritual management. The institution of the leisure class is a
product of this predatory age. In the age of arts and crafts, the artisan main-
tains a cause-effect relationship with his product. In this age, the individual
free agent is gestated, science is properly developed, and the natural rights
of the individual are established. The pecuniary profit becomes the incen-
tive of the industry. In the final age of machines, large companies grow,
and the leisure class almost disappears; however pecuniary traits prevail
and are characteristic of the upper classes, while the lower classes are indus-
trious. This last age, which is the present one, is characterized by a serious
pecuniary contamination of idle curiosity and scientific production, which
does not make Veblen feel optimistic about the future.
Veblen’s theory of history is questionable from several points of view;
however, there is a great contribution that deserves to be highlighted and
that was not understood by the neo- institutionalists. For Veblen, economic
science is a category of thought that belongs to the age of the arts and crafts.
Economic science observes humans from a social system characterized by
For a more detailed analysis of Veblen’s thought, see Obregón, 1981. El pensamiento de
189

Thorstein Veblen. Trimestre economico. Mexico

190
Veblen cited in Obregon, 1981, op. cit. p. 722.
chapter seven 127

the belief in natural rights. But in the age of machines, in which the West
lives, it is clearly impossible for a worker to dispose of his own work. Thus,
there is in Veblen a genesis of the Western free individual agent as a social
institution. The institution of the free individual agent appears in the age of
arts and crafts, and it rapidly diminishing its relevance in the age of machines.
The most important limitation that Veblen finds in both the neoclassical
and the Marxist schools, is the fact that both conceptions were the specific
result of a given historical era, and of a certain conception that humans have
had of themselves and of their social and natural environments. In the neoclas-
sical school, the preferences and decisions of the independent individual are a
cornerstone of the economic system. In Marxism, exploitation is whatever is
left in the price after the payment of socially necessary labor; and as the pro-
letariat gets aware of its alienated situation (alienated from its true nature as a
species being), the proletariat´s international revolution will give back the own-
ership of the means of production to the proletariat. And communism (the first
step towards the human society) would be inaugurated. Both Marxism and the
neoclassical school depend for their view of the world on a market relation be-
tween producers and consumers, that requires a free individual economic agent
acting in the markets. However, according to Veblen, this free individual eco-
nomic agent actually is a social institution that started historically in the era of
arts and crafts, and which actually is disappearing in the age of the machines.
One of the deficiencies of Veblen’s thought is that, despite the fact that
in many different paragraphs he recognizes the volitional and intentional
character of human behavior, he maintains a vision of history based only on
technological change. Because, even though technology is not definitive in
Veblen, insofar as it may not succeed in the conflict with old habits; the truth
is that this author does not have a role for the human´s capacity to create
their own social environment191. This absence in Veblen’s thought provoked
Commons´s and Knight´s criticism192.
Veblen´s institutionalism has several key contributions: 1) It defines with clar-
ity the intimate relation between the habits of life and the habits of thought; 2)
it sees technology as the main motor for social change; 3) it understands that
institutions change through history; 4) it explicitly finds the historical genesis
of the Western free individual; 5) it sees history as indeterminate. However, it
also has limitations such as: 1) The study of history is largely influenced by the
West; 2) it does not explain social change in other societies that followed social
191
Obregón, C. 1984 De la filosofia a la economia. caps 8 and 9. Trillas, Mexico. Available
at Research Gate.com
192
Two thinkers with great influence on the later development of neoinstitutionalism.
128 carlos obregón

diversification patters distinct from the West, like China, the Arab countries,
Africa, Japan, most of Asia, and large parts of Latin America; 3) it is a macro
theory, which does not have a clear role for the individual agent.
The writings of North193 opened new and important horizons of re-
search. North has solved some of the important problems of Veblen’s old
institutionalism. He fruitfully constructs a vision of social change that draws
on the contributions of Commons, Knight, and other authors. North’s theo-
retical framework allows, in contrast to Veblen´s, to analyze the importance
of different institutional arrangements at the social level – and acknowledges
humans´ capacity to design distinct institutional arrangements. In North,
society´s changes are not only due to technological advances, but also to
changes at the conceptual level. North, in contrast to Veblen, presents a care-
ful analysis of those institutions that develop around the control of the social
environment; which is of enormous relevance for the modern world. Indi-
vidual social creativity and its consequences are neglected by Veblen; North
instead, studies and analyzes its implications for social dynamics.
However, North and the neo-institutionalists maintain the neoclassical
mistake of assuming an independent free economic agent throughout his-
tory, as if it was an essential feature of any human society, in any historical
time (of which Veblen accused the neoclassical and the Marxist school).
Williamson explains the emergence of the corporation but, surprisingly
enough, maintains a creative and independent individual as a key founda-
tion of the social system. North analyzes the historical development of insti-
tutions and their influence on the individual; but only to conclude that the
optimal institutional framework is the one that encourages the individual
to unleash his/her creativity. The individual of neo-institutionalism, even
though he possesses a limited rationality, remains basically the same as the
one conceived by the neoclassical school. If institutions do not preclude
the essential individual creativity, the neo-institutional individual is a free
economic agent, and he/she is the cornerstone of economic progress.
In North, human nature is given, and it is the same in any historical
period. We can identify four fundamental consequences of not establish-
ing the institutional historical genesis of the free individual agent:
1) The relevance of the community in the history of the West is disal-
lowed, and no longer understood. Individual selfishness is privileged
as a source of social change. Institutions become accessory, insofar
193
In particular, North (2005), for a discussion on Veblen’s and North’s theories of social
change see Obregon, C. 2008. Institucionalismo y desarrollo. Amazon.com. Also available
at research gate.com
chapter seven 129

as their role is to adequately incentivize the creative individual, who

is the true agent of historical change. The immediate consequence
is that there is no need to study other cultures in terms of possible
social genesis (other relationships between the individual and the
society) distinct from the route taken by the West. In North’s neo-
institutionalism, despite the explicit recognition of the importance
of institutions, the historical diversity in different societies is never
recognized. Individuals in other societies are essentially the same.
According to North, the historical problem of other societies distinct
from the West is that institutions have not allowed the innate cre-
ativity of the individual to operate. In North´s view, underdeveloped
societies will actually develop if they liberate the individual´s creativ-
ity. Thus, the only route towards development is imitating the West.
This position is highly unsustainable in the light of the success of the
Asian growth model, particularly the recent one of China.
2) According to North´s vision, if institutions adequately incentiv-
ize the individual, the world develops and functions. But the role
of institutions to guide the individuals´ interests and make them
compatible with the interest of the community is not analyzed
in detail. In this way, for example, emphasis is placed on the pro-
ducer and the creative individual, and not on the consumption of
the middle class, a consequence of democracy, as the source of
technological development. But even more seriously, the integra-
tive system and the power system are left aside, without analyzing
how they may in distinct ways define and allow the space in which
individual economic relations occur.
3) The neo-institutional ontology of a given human nature, pro-
vides this vision with an element of harmony absent in the
real world. According to neo-institutionalism, if institutions
correctly motivated the individual: economic development
would take place in any country, private property would be re-
spected worldwide, and individual creativity would guarantee
global prosperity. Thus, the problem of the absence of a global
democracy is left aside. And the need to create international
institutions that seriously seek to be a substitute for the lack of
global democracy is never raised.
4) By distorting the history of the West through the introduction
of a preconceived human nature, neo-institutionalism seeks to
reorder world history according to that of the West. This is,
130 carlos obregón

fundamentally, an idealistic view of history; but instead of the

Marxist ideal species being, or the neoclassical ideal of a free
economic agent, the neo-institutionalist ideal is a free economic
agent with limited rationality,
5) As the history of the West is distorted, the degree to which
the institution of the free individual economic agent begins to
change in the West is no longer studied. However, in a century
in which government participation in the economy has grown
exorbitantly, as has the size of corporations, it cannot be ar-
gued that the only agent of historical change continues to be
the free individual economic agent with limited rationality.

macro and micro stability and social change:

our own view

A we have argued before a satisfactory social theory must be able to

explain: 1) social stability; 2) social change; and 3) the role of social con-
flict in social change. Moreover, the explanation must be based on the
microanalysis of the interaction between individuals and groups. And
any macro-perspective must be understood as based upon ad hoc abstract
constructions by the analyst which serve the purpose to illustrate better
the social dynamics, but caution must be put in that different abstract
constructions could be built by diverse analysts. And at the end the use-
fulness of the abstract macro-categories must be judged by their capacity
to illustrate social dynamics, which is always based on the micro-interac-
tion between individuals and groups. Whatever social theory is proposed
must be compatible with: 1) Scientific knowledge in neuroevolutionary
biology and in social sciences; and 2) the fact that social dynamics in dis-
tinct societies has been historically very diverse.

What do we know scientifically?

Human beings started living in social groups, and what characterizes

them as a species is that they intensified furthermore their social life.
Thus, humans are social beings. Any social theory based on the free
chapter seven 131

individual of the Western society as the key element of social dynamics

must be refused, the key element of social dynamics is always a social
group. Groups of course are formed of individuals, but a distinction must
be made between individuality and individualism. Individuality is a bio-
logical reality, individualism is the particular differentiation in Western
societies of an individual that has human rights: among them, political
and economic freedom. The rights of individualism however, at the end,
are given by the society.
Scientifically we know that humans do not have access to essential
eternal truths. Therefore, there is no way to know the true essence of
humans. Humanism is a socially constructed concept about humans. We
must reject any essential vision of the nature of humans such as: the neo-
classical free independent individual; the neo-institutionalist free individ-
ual with limited rationality; and the Marxist species being. Language is of
social origin. Therefore, what Veblen called habits of thought and habits
of life are of social origin – the true agent of social stability and change is
a social individual, who has a physical individuality but always exists in a
social group that defines both his/her conceptual and institutional reality.
Different social groups have formed different conceptual systems and
institutional arrangements in which the power to define the social chang-
es needed to adapt to external and internal shocks may reside either in
democratic decisions (made by the free Western individual), in group
decisions (like in primary societies) or in a selected group chosen by the
elites (like the Roman senate). But social power is always relational.
Individualism is only one of the many social differentiations in human
history, and even today it is not of general acceptance. Around eighty
percent of the population of the world today lives in societies where social
stability and social change are defined by traditional conceptual systems
and institutional arrangements that have diverse characteristics between
them – but which have the commonality that the individual differentia-
tion of human rights is not the axis of social stability and change.
Scientifically we know that rock technology played a decisive part
in the evolution of human beings, because it allowed extended groups
to exist and the development of an erected human that used the hands,
a larger brain, a sophisticated language, and the capacity to read other’s
emotions. Thus technology, as Marx, Veblen and North argued, is a fun-
damental element of social change. But we also have enough evidence
that humans since the beginnings have constructed conceptual systems,
burial ceremonies are documented at least two hundred thousand years
132 carlos obregón

before the Homo Sapiens. Therefore, symbolic interactionism is also

right, individuals interact with one another to create symbolic worlds,
and these worlds influence the individual´s behavior. These individuals
are already social individuals, not isolated individual social agents; there
is no doubt that conceptual systems do exist in human societies and that
they have a dynamic of its own. And that, independently of who takes the
decisions, social engineering responding to external and internal shocks is
a required survival characteristic of human societies.
Although individualism is a particular social differentiation of the West-
ern society, individuality is an evolutionary biological reality consequence
of the evolutionary requirement to diversify as much as possible the genetic
pool. And individuals to survive need survival instincts such as hunger,
fear, sex, and aggression. Therefore, although individuals are always so-
cial, there is also always a tension between the individual and the group
that is never fully resolved. As we have argued before, and as it has been
largely documented in psychology, belonging failures bring back individu-
al aggression as the main form of social relation between individuals.
Moreover, evolutionarily human beings were made to belong to small
groups of around one hundred to one hundred and fifty members. In
these groups, social belonging occurs through physical interaction be-
tween the members, and therefore it is still partially based on limbic con-
nections. As societies are extended, and they are composed of many small
groups, social belonging within the groups is still limbic, but between the
groups it is not. Thus, there is an evolutionary potential conflict not only
between the individual and the social group; but also, between the dis-
tinct groups that constitute the extended society.
Social conflict is an evolutionary feature of human societies because
social belonging always has failures. A full integration between the in-
dividual and the group and between the distinct groups that constitute
the society is an evolutionary impossibility. Social conflict in fact is a
healthy feature in human societies. If, as an example, one looks at the
recent history in Western societies, many positive features that are ac-
cepted today and that functionalism argued to be highly valuable adap-
tive features like democracy, black voting or female voting, were the
result of social conflict.
Social conflict however has to happen within an institutional arrange-
ment that provides unity and functionality. If social life was only guided
by social conflict, nothing would guarantee social survival. Thus, al-
though on occasions social conflict destroys the old institutional arrange-
chapter seven 133

ment and creates a new one, an institutional arrangement is needed for

the functionality of the society -in this point functionalism is right. Naked
power cannot provide for long social stability. Social power in order to
provide long lasting stability has to be relational. But the intrinsic charac-
teristics of the agent (whether an individual or a group) do play a key role
in social conflict, which is a fundamental element in the process of social
change. Social change based on social conflict may on occasions end up
in the total destruction of a particular society, but in most this does not
happen because social conflict is guided by social belonging and at the
end a new form of relational power is institutionalized.
Social belonging is defined by the three social systems: the integrative,
the power and the economic system. These systems, as we have argued,
are abstract constructions useful for social analysis that could be substi-
tuted for other ones. We use them because they have the advantage to
point out that economic power is only one of the features of social stabil-
ity and change. Integrative power and the power system itself also play a
fundamental role in social stability and change.
Social stability and social change happen in different ways in distinct
societies, in this ethnomethodology is correct. We have used the abstract
categories of the primary society, the traditional society, and the West-
ern society to exemplify this diversity. But in the real world there are,
of course, many different societies within these abstract categories; and
the boundaries between these general abstract categories are not clearly
defined either. But what is an undeniable scientific fact is: that the social
differentiation made in in the West, particularly as it relates to human
rights and democracy, is only one of the several routes of differentiation
taken historically.
Social stability and change happen in different ways in distinct societ-
ies. There are however some common features: 1) social belonging and
social conflict always exist; 2) social belonging in general guides social
conflict; 3) all societies develop functionality; 4) social change is the con-
sequence of external and internal shocks, among which social conflict is
an important one – because it provides social flexibility in the response to
the shocks suffered; 5) all societies develop a conceptual system and an
institutional arrangement that adapts and changes through time; 6) social
change happens both at the level of the institutional arrangement and at
the level of the conceptual system; 7) because of evolutionary individual-
ity the agent of change has to be the individual; but in all cases, even in
Western individualism, the individual is always a social individual.
134 carlos obregón

Social Stability and Social Change: Towards a New View

The micro functioning of the society is extremely relevant in any society,

in this SET, symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology are correct.
And the microanalysis is particularly relevant for Western societies. But
such micro functioning always occurs within a historical context which im-
plies a given conceptual system and an institutional arrangement. The agent
of change is always the individual, but is a social individual influenced by the
conceptual system and its corresponding institutional arrangement. Change
happens both in the institutional arrangement and in the conceptual system,
and there is social creativity at both levels.
The economic development of the West is due to several factors such
as: 1) technology, as Veblen states; 2) free markets, as the neoclassical
thinkers defend; and 3) individual innovation, as North argues. But it is
also consequence of the consolidation of the middle class, which was the
one that definitively enlarged the market and whose dynamic preferences
guided and fostered technological development. Thus, social change is
always the consequence of a complex interaction between the three so-
cial systems: the integrative, the power and the economic and exchange
system.
The price system as a transmitter of information does not have a
specific relevance in Veblen. In North instead, it is essential to transmit
incentives for individual creativity. In the new view proposed here, the
price system is crucial to transmit the changing needs of the middle class,
which provide the central guidance for the fast technological develop-
ment in capitalism194.
The economic development of Asia is not well explained neither by
Veblen nor by North. The new view presented in here explains it in terms
of institutional policies that: a) reflect the institutional strengths of these
cultures; b) recognize the need for an endogenous savings policy; and c)
establish an investment policy aimed at producing for the mass consump-
tion of the Western´s middle class – and therefore using world´s frontier
technology.
Underdevelopment in North is the consequence of institutions that
do not promote individual creativity and innovation. In Veblen it is ex-
plained by obsolete institutions that do not allow technological develop-
ment. In the new view presented in here, underdevelopment is the con-
194
see Obregon, C. 2021., New Economics. Amazon.com. Also available at research gate.com
chapter seven 135

sequence of: a) a non-competitive local institutional arrangement; and b)

an inadequate global institutional arrangement195.
The world´s global problems are explained in Veblen by the preva-
lence of old habits of life and thought, in North they are the consequence
of not having proper institutions that free human individual creativity
in all the countries; in the new view presented here they are the conse-
quence of an improper global institutional arrangement.

conclusion

Both relational power and power based on the agent`s intrinsic character-
istics are required for a society to have flexible social change. If a society
only allowed relational power, it would be too rigid. The old concepts
and habits defining the social relations would not adapt fast enough to
technological or exogenous changes. Thus, diversity and conflict in the
society is welcome, as it makes it more diversified and flexible. But too
much conflict without institutional relational power ends up in social
chaos. Therefore, what is needed for proper social change is a strong
relational institutional setting, which however is flexible enough to incor-
porate changes fast; changes due to the social diversity allowed, and the
conflict of ideas that propose distinct paths to accommodate to endog-
enous and exogenous parametrical changes. The flexible institutionaliza-
tion of diversity is a critical element for a society to have the capacity to
have an adequate process of social change.

195
see Obregón, C. Institucionalimo y desarrollo. Amazon.com. Also available at research
gate.com
CHAPTER EIGHT: POLITICAL POWER

A political leader is always surrounded by mystery, there are always ex-

planations of his power as based on his/her personal intrinsic character-
istics. The main thesis in this chapter is that political power is essentially
relational in nature and that only a small portion of it is due to the par-
ticular politician’s intrinsic characteristics. Charismatic leaders situated
in diverse parts of the political spectrum, such as Hitler, Stalin, Castro,
Trump or López Obrador have in common that they are a consequence
of a previous erosion of what Russell named the traditional system. In
the case of Hitler, Germany’s traditional system´s decay was due to the
hyperinflation of the 20’s, the 1930’s Great Depression and the restrictive
trade conditions imposed by its European partners. In the case of Stalin,
the decay of the traditional system was due to its incapacity to confront
the first World War, which had the consequence of massive desertions
in the front, that were a precedent of the communist revolution. In the
case of Castro, the decay of the traditional system was mainly due to the
US´s change of its guaranteed import price for Cuban sugar, which made
the Cuban economic system non-viable. In the case of Trump, the decay
of the traditional system was due both to the growing participation of
migrants and to the 2008 GFC (Global Financial Crisis) which hit very
strongly a large part of the finances of the white middle class, which did
not recover well under Obama’s two terms because this president’s re-
covery program was insufficient. In the case of López Obrador, the decay
of the traditional system was due to the fact that the two political parties
in government in the last several decades had not been able to solve the
two main problems of the Mexican society: the lack of economic growth
and the increasing crime.
Charismatic leaders often use naked power to remain in office, but
unless they are able to build a new traditional system of power, their
power will be necessarily transitory. The real reason for the acquisition
of power by the charismatic leader is not his/her personal charisma (his/
her intrinsic characteristics), but the previous demise of the traditional
power which demands a transitory charismatic leader. It is true that di-
verse leaders may be better or worse suited for the task required, but

[136]
chapter eight 137

ultimately someone will have to lead the society when the demise of the
traditional system occurs. And on the other side, no charismatic leader,
no matter what his/her qualities are, would be able to produce by himself
the demise of the traditional system. As Foucault´s contributions have
shown, political power is by nature relational. The target´s acceptance is
required, and it is consequence of a conceptual system (knowledge) that
defines a particular institutional arrangement (that defines power rela-
tions). As Gene Sharp has argued: If subjects do not obey, leaders have
no power196. Social dynamics is the consequence of individual actions,
but the result of those actions embedded in a conceptual system and
a corresponding institutional arrangement is what defines the particular
culture in a given society. Individuals do have a role in redefining the
conceptual system and its institutional arrangement; but changes happen
slowly. Abrupt changes, whether revolutionary or not, when they occur
are always consequence of a previous long period of erosion of the tradi-
tional system of power.

social order and the prince – machiavelli’s theory

of political power

Amongst the authors that have questioned whether political power is

relationally based, the most famous is Machiavelli. Machiavelli goes fur-
ther than Hobbes. In the latter author, there is an implicit social contract
by which citizens give the political power to the State represented by the
King. In Machiavelli, the political power of the State is based only on its
coercive power. However, in both authors the State by itself is capable
to establish social order. We have already pointed out that this is not
possible because no State has the surveillance capacity that this would
require. Anyway, we will briefly present Machiavelli’s thought and then
our arguments, showing that he is wrong.
Machiavelli criticizes the moralistic view of authority in his best-
known treatise, The Prince. “For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on
which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of
power”197. For him the only concern of the political ruler is the acquisition
196
Sharp, Gene (May 2010). From dictatorship to democracy: a conceptual framework for
liberation From  (PDF) (4th U.S. ed.). East Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution.
197
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/
138 carlos obregón

and maintenance of power. Machiavelli believes that, through the proper

application of power, individuals can be brought to obey, and that the
ruler using his authority will be able to maintain the state in safety and
security. For him coercion creates legality and therefore he concentrates
his attention on the use of force. Legitimacy for him rests on the threat of
coercive power. “Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I
will not consider laws but speak of arms”198. For Machiavelli people obey
only because they fear the consequences of not doing so. “Machiavelli’s
argument in The Prince is designed to demonstrate that politics can only
coherently be defined in terms of the supremacy of coercive power; au-
thority as a right to command has no independent status”199.
If Machiavelli’s thesis were right, one should expect a correlation be-
tween the use of coercive force and social order. A simple test would
be to analyze if there exists a relationship between jailed people per one
hundred thousand inhabitants (representing coercive power) versus ho-
micides per one hundred thousand inhabitants (representing social or-
der). A clear negative relation would mean that Machiavelli is right, the
absence of a relation, that he is wrong. I have explored in other works
this relationship. I have shown that both the Very High Human Develop-
ment countries and Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest
number of jailed people, 248 and 244 respectively; while the Very High
Human Development countries have the lowest homicide rate, 3.2, of
any region and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) the highest of
all of them, 23.1. Moreover, South Asia (which is a very poor region) has
a homicide rate similar to the one of Very High Human Development
countries, 3.3, and has the lowest number of jailed people, 48, while the
Very High Human Development countries, as we said, have the highest
number of people jailed, 248200.
After reviewing all the relevant theories about crime, and their empiri-
cal findings, the conclusions in Social Order: Harmony and Conflict in Human
Societies201 are that: 1) A more cohesive social order is clearly a European
and Asian phenomenon, which shows the decisive influence of the con-
ceptual system and the institutional arrangement. 2) Crime as a social

198
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, Alan H. Gilbert (trans.), 3 volumes, continuous
pagination, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965. The Prince (in Volume 1, pp. 47).
199
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/
200
See Obregon, Carlos, 2019., Social Order: Harmony and Conflict in Human Societies table 1.1 pp 20.
201
Ibid.
chapter eight 139

phenomenon cannot be explained by a single factor. Thus, there is not a

simple answer as to whether poverty, unemployment or social depriva-
tion will correlate or not with crime, because what is relevant is whether
they happen within a well-established social belonging scheme or not.
In poor Asian countries and in Europe, there is high collective efficacy,
while in LAC it is very low. 3) The best route to reduce crime is to
reconstruct the integrative system of the groups that constitute the large
society. Emotional belonging is an evolutionary necessity and has to be
satisfied at the group level. There cannot be overall social order in a soci-
ety without having social order at the level of the groups within said so-
ciety. For a more detailed explanation of these conclusions see figure 8.1.

figure 8.1 social order in human societies

1) A more cohesive social order is clearly a European and Asian phenomenon, which shows the
decisive influence of the conceptual system and the institutional arrangement. Even within
LAC and Africa the homicide rates vary substantially at the same GDP level and similar
under five years old mortality rates, which shows that there are differences between countries
as to the cohesive quality of their corresponding conceptual systems and institutional arrange-
ments202.
2) A society may involve different groups with distinct beliefs but there has to be a strong
belonging within each group and an overreaching envelope conceptual system that glues
all the groups together in such a way that even though their beliefs are incompatible, the
networks established amongst them guarantees social order. Whenever any one of these
two conditions is not met crime occurs. Social integration is higher in Asia and in Europe
in general. Control/ social bond theory argues that what prevents people from crime is that
they are “bonded” to society, especially the norms of society that they have internalized. For
these theories people will commit crime unless they are properly socialized. Again, bonding
theory speaks of social cohesion but at the microsocial level and it is compatible with the data.
Thus, once there is a problem of social integration (social belonging is a better term) culture
and social structure diverge, social disorganization is widespread, and for some individuals
social belonging – or identity - is no longer to the main society but to groups that dissent and
antagonize with the established norms, and which do not have proper networks to the rest of
society. These groups establish their own bonding (belonging), and crime is learned within
these groups. Labeling makes the differential association and the differential belonging even
worse. And conflict theory reinforces these results, because if there is not proper belonging
between the high class and the lower classes social disintegration will be reinforced203. Thus,
there is not a simple answer as to whether poverty, unemployment or social deprivation will

202
Ibid. Pp-35
203
Marxist theories of crime are unable to explain why higher levels of capitalism are not
associated with more crime in the data.
140 carlos obregón

correlate or not with crime, because what is relevant is whether they happen within a well-
established social belonging scheme or not204.
III) We are foremost social beings. The isolated rational selfish calculator never existed and does
not represent what human beings are. Social crime is a social phenomenon and must be un-
derstood as such, it is the consequence of belonging failures, usually both in the family and in
the society at large. To reduce social crime neither the use of power or of economic incentives
will work appropriately, because it is not a problem of the power system or of the economic
and exchange system, it is a consequence of the inadequate functioning of the integrative sys-
tem. The best route to reduce crime is to reconstruct the integrative system of the groups that
constitute the large society. Emotional belonging is an evolutionary necessity and has to be
satisfied at the group level. There cannot be overall social order in a society without having
social order at the level of the groups within said society. Comparisons between countries in
the long run, clearly show that neither economic growth, nor social progress, are necessary
determinants of social order. Social order cannot be imposed by force because the State does
not have the resource to be vigilant of everyone’s behavior; and it cannot be bought through
monetary incentives, because human beings, even if they are poor, are not isolated selfish
rational calculators. Social order has to be the consequence of values ​​that the individual inter-
nalizes since he is a child, and of a lifestyle that he accepts as legitimate. Having more people
in prison does not correlate with the degree of social order, and countries which are very
poor and with low levels of social progress are capable of achieving social order. All this does
not suggest that we should not have policies for social progress or for economic growth, both
are needed and have merits of their own, but they do not necessarily relate to social order.
Social order must be understood for what it is, a phenomenon with its own causes, and which
requires special social policies.

legitimate and illegitimate political power

It is necessary to distinguish between authoritarian, dictatorial political

regimes, and legitimate regimes. In authoritarian regimes, the illegitimate
power violates the conceptual system of the community, which is domi-
nated by naked force. In legitimate regimes, the authority that is exer-
cised is congruent with the conceptual system of the society in question.
The absence of a democratic system based on individual voting does
not always result in an authoritarian state. It is necessary to differentiate
historically, and in non-Western contemporary societies, other legitimate
forms of political participation that do not correspond to the West’s po-

204
Chintrakarn and Herzer 2012 found, for example, that income inequality in USA exerts
a robust crime-reducing effect, a significant negative effect.
chapter eight 141

litical development. For example, in the indigenous villages in Chiapas,

in southern Mexico, people’s decisions are made communally (there are
no individual decisions, and the individual voting process is not the axis
of the political system); however, it is clear that the social process of
decision-making has legitimacy and recognition from the inhabitants of
the villages. But if political legitimacy can exist without the exercise of in-
dividual voting, then: What is political legitimacy? And how to define it?
The concept of political legitimacy, like any other concept, depends on
the social conceptual system of reference. In primary societies life is com-
munal, the individual does what has to be done, and he does not have
individual political freedom in the Western sense of decision making. How-
ever, it is still necessary to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
political power in primary societies. Political power is legitimate in primary
societies when the individual feels fulfilled, has belonging and emotional
stability and conceptions of himself as a substantial element of the social
political process (although he/she enjoys a kind of political freedom which
is very different from the West’s). Political power is illegitimate in those
primary societies conquered by force, where individuals are enslaved and
forced to carry on a social life that violates their traditions of belonging (that
is, their own conceptual system and its corresponding historical institution-
al arrangement), and therefore do not enjoy political freedom in any sense.
In traditional societies, as opposed to primary ones, there is already
individual freedom of decision; but only to be used to adequately comply
with the social responsibilities imposed, and there is no political freedom
in the sense of the West’s. In traditional societies, whenever there is legiti-
mate political power, the individual, by performing his social obligations,
participates in the social process of the society in question. In traditional
societies individual and group political participation occurs, and it is rec-
ognized as an important source of social stability; but the participation is
not through individual vote, it is not the individual will, expressed in the
vote, that defines the social legitimacy of the political order. For example:
1) In Muslim societies, it is recognized that the open discussion of the
Koran in the community is a proper source for the establishment of a
legitimate social order; 2) Confucius saw in the proper individual and
family behavior the basis of a legitimate social order; 3) in Buddhism,
meditation is practiced individually (although it is socially stimulated),
but it leads to the love for others and so it fosters social stability and
the legitimacy of the social order ; and 4) in Christianity the individual
moral behavior is a prerequisite for the establishment of a legitimate so-
142 carlos obregón

cial order. The individuals’ political participation in the form of com-

munal discussion, in many traditional societies, is seen as conducive to a
legitimate social order. However, individual participation in the political
decision-making process is usually not allowed in the traditional societies
for everyone. In many of them, it is allowed only to a few (for example,
in the Roman senate). But it is always possible to distinguish in these tra-
ditional societies between those with a legitimate social order and those
with an illegitimate one. The Roman republic, represented by the senate,
was a legitimate social order, while later on the imperial Rome, imposed
by military force, was not.
In general terms: the social order is legitimate when it is congruent
with the conceptual system of reference. If the social order is legitimate,
political power is relational based. Political power is always granted by
the society’s conceptual system. When political power is granted only to
a minority, as in ancient Greece or Rome, this minority, for the social
order to be legitimate, is obliged to exercise their political power for the
benefit of the community. The social order is illegitimate when it is in-
congruous with the conceptual system of reference; in these cases, a dicta-
tor’s or a group’s political power is exercised nakedly for selfish benefits.
An authoritarian regime is the consequence of an illegitimate social order.
A large literature discusses the issue of whether an authority is legiti-
mate or not. Anarchists205 have argued that the duty of individual moral
autonomy is incompatible with the duty of obeying a political author-
ity, and that therefore all authority is illegitimate. The problem with this
position is that it cannot explain the actual existence of the State and the
obedience of most citizens, which is a reality. To explain this reality, we
are left with two possibilities: 1) That the de facto authority deserves the
obedience of the de facto subjects206. In this line of thought, some writers
have argued that the de facto authority is based on its capacity to solve
various coordination, assurance, and free rider problems207. 2) That the
obedience of most citizens is based upon ethical considerations and that
the State’s authority is normative in nature.

205
Wolff, Robert Paul, 1970, In Defense of Anarchism, New York: Harper & Row.
206
153 Hobbes, Thomas, 1668, Leviathan, Edwin Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Pub-
lishers, 1992. Hume, David, 1748, “Of the Original Contract,” in Hume’s Ethical Writings,
Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. Austin, John,
1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H. L. A. Hart (ed.), London: Weidenfeld
& Nickolson, 1955.
207
154 Hurd, Heidi, 2001, Moral Combat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
chapter eight 143

I have argued elsewhere that social order cannot be sustained in the

long run if it is not normative, and that it requires citizens who uphold
the ethical values ​​that constitute the accepted social conceptual system;
thus, social power has to be relationally based. If citizens do not behave
ethically, there is no State that has the capacity to establish social order by
brute force208. Therefore, of the two explanations mentioned above, the
first one does not work unless the second one is also included.
Most thinkers have argued that a legitimate authority in a normative
sense is required209. The right to rule usually implies obedience (a moral
duty to obey) by the subjects of the State, and non-interference by other
states210. There are four types of theories about the moral duty to obey:
consent theories211, reasonable consensus theories212, associative obligation
theories213, and instrumentalist theories214. The instrumentalists’ argument
is that subjects are better off by complying with the authority, but this is
not always the case. Consent theories have a broader scope, but still are
insufficient - as many have argued - in that legitimacy must also imply that
the State is just – that it respects the natural right to freedom215. Associative
obligation theories argue in favor of the community commitments. And
reasonable consensus theories bring along historical principles of justice
that bind together the culture. None of the four types of theories is fully
convincing by itself, but the four taken together make a strong case about
the moral duty to obey as a fundamental element for social order to be
established; therefore, social power is always relationally based.
It is only in recent Western societies, with the triumph of individu-
alism, that the exercise of the individual freedom to decide politically
becomes a “human right” that guarantees free expression and free indi-

See Obregon Carlos 2019, Social Order: Harmony and Conflict in Human Societies.
208

Amazon.com also available at Research Gate.com.

209
Hart, H.L.A., 1961, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Buchanan, Allen, 2004, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford
210

University Press.
Simmons, A. John, 2001, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations,
211

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

212
Rawls, John, 1996, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.
213
Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
214
Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
215
Locke, John, 1690, Second Treatise on Civil Government, C. B MacPherson (ed.), In-
dianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1990.
144 carlos obregón

vidual voting. Individual political freedom becomes the central axis of

social harmony and the source of political power. Individualism in the
West took many years to develop and still exists, in most Western soci-
eties, together with particular historical institutions of each society that
condition in a unique way the exercise of the individual vote216.
In the West, the political legitimacy of the regime to exercise political
power depends on the individual’s political freedom to decide democrati-
cally. But in primary and traditional societies, as we have discussed, there
are other forms of political legitimacy. In general, when most individuals
participate in the political process voluntarily, and in the terms estab-
lished by their own conceptual system of reference, the social order is
legitimate because it is relationally based. The usage of political power in
legitimate societies counts with the implicit/explicit approval of its indi-
vidual members, who share the conception that the existing social order
is adequate.
Political legitimacy in this work is defined based on the notion of be-
longing, and it is conceived in more general terms than those of individu-
alism and Marxism217so that, contrary to these two schools of thought, it
is applicable for different cultures and other historical times. Belonging is
required to be able to obtain psychological freedom. Thus, a first condi-
tion for a society to be legitimate is for the individuals in the society to
have belonging and emotional stability.
Legitimacy implies free political participation in the institutional ar-
rangement of the society in which one lives. Political freedom exists when
said institutional arrangement does not violate the society’s conceptual
system; when it occurs in synchrony with said conceptual system.
Legitimacy does not necessarily imply that political decisions are tak-
en by all members of a community; nor that there exists individual free
universal vote. Political decisions may imply a democratic process like in
Western societies, may be taken collectively as in the primary societies,
or may be the result of deliberation of a designated small group as in
traditional societies. In any case, the political decision for political legiti-
macy to exist must be taken in sync with the social conceptual system
of reference. This is what distinguishes free societies from conquered,

216
The individual vote and democracy, as we know it today, took many years to be established.
217
In the essentialism of individualism, political freedom is defined as the exercise of the
inalienable human rights. In Marxist’s essentialism political freedom is only achieved with
the communal appropriation of the means of production and the final establishment of the
human society in which individuals freely develop their true essence of species being.
chapter eight 145

authoritarian, or exploited societies. This is what differentiates, for ex-

ample, Cicero’s republican from Caligula’s dictatorial Imperial Rome.
Legitimacy exists when the following two conditions are satisfied: 1)
The individuals of that society have adequate belonging and emotional
stability; 2) individuals participate in their political system according to
their conceptual system of reference, and the process of mentalizing (or
political decision making) is done (even if only by a minority) in the ben-
efit of the society in question.
The political freedom of Western individualism is a particular case
of political freedom as defined in this book. The newly proposed defini-
tion has three immediate implications: 1) In societies other than those of
the modern-contemporary West, political freedom is expressed in other
ways than the respect for human rights and individual voting; 2) even in
the modern-contemporary West itself, the individual’s political freedom
to decide rests on an institutional arrangement that goes well beyond the
respect of human rights and individual voting; and 3) at the global level
there is no political freedom.

Ethics, Justice, and Political Power

There has been a long discussion in the literature as to whether the right
to exercise authority and the duty to obey must have or not an ethical
background. There are in general two possible positions to be taken: 1)
The authority has the right to impose its commands. 2) The authority
does not have the right to impose its commands.
The first argument, that the authority has the right to impose its com-
mands can be defended on two grounds: a) Simply because of its coercive
power capacity; b) because it is the best suited to decide what is best for
the society. In the first argument, which is defended by Hobbes, Machia-
velli, and John Austin218, it is assumed that the State can by itself and
without the consent of the subjects maintain social order. Which, as we
have been discussing, can only be true temporarily – the State never has
the resources to be vigilant of everyone’s behavior, all the time.
The second argument, that the authority does not have the right to
impose its commands, can also be defended on two grounds: a) The au-
Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H. L. A. Hart (ed.), London:
218

Weidenfeld & Nickolson, 1955.

146 carlos obregón

thority’s power always rests on the acceptance of the subjects; b) the sub-
jects are always better informed than the authority and therefore must also
participate in the decisions. Subjects may or may not participate in the deci-
sions, and still the decisions of the authority may be considered legitimate
in many societies by its members. Therefore, the defense b) of the second
argument does not hold for many societies. But the defense a) does hold.
The authority’s power always has to rest on the acceptance of the subjects,
it has to be always relational; because otherwise individuals defending their
particular interests would be aggressive to each other, and social chaos
would prevail. The individuals are taught, since they are children, to value
and accept the society’s conceptual system, and that implies learning an
individual ethical behavior and learning to respect the authority.
But the question becomes how this individuals’ acceptance of the au-
thority is manifested. There has been a long discussion between political
philosophers on this issue. Locke proposed tacit consent, but it is clearly in-
sufficient because it ignores the reasons people may have for not consenting.
However, explicit consent presents an individualistic vision of society that
does not capture well the communal aspects of social life. Even in the ab-
sence of explicit consent in some cases persons may be said to have consent-
ed to political authority; Estlund describes this as normative consent219. He
argues that if it is immoral not to consent, the non-consent is nullified. John
Rawls220 “argues that the liberal principle of political legitimacy requires that
coercive institutions be so structured that they accord with the reasonable
views of the members of the society. As long as they do so, they have the
right to impose duties on their members. The members may not demur on
the basis of unreasonable views. Furthermore, it is not necessary in this view
that the persons over whom authority is wielded have voluntarily acted
or given any sign of agreement. All that need be the case is that the basic
principles that regulate the coercive institutions be ones that the reasonable
members can agree to” 221 One of the problems with Rawls’ proposal is
that it still relies on the idea of individualistic consensus. Dworkin222 has
advanced the idea of communities of principle, he argues that communities
establish obligations just like families, even when there is not a voluntary
association, and even if there is disagreement on many political principles.
219
Estlund, David, 2007, Democratic Authority, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
220
Rawls, John, 1996, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.
221
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/
222
Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
chapter eight 147

Whatever philosophical explanation one may wish to pursue, the fact

in real societies is that social order prevails and that it would not be
possible without the individual’s consent. In diverse societies, in distinct
historical periods, consent may be given in different ways; but in all of
them, consent follows the accepted social ways outlined in the society’s
conceptual system. Explicit consent is more a feature of Western indi-
vidualistic societies, but even in them democratic explicit consent may
not be enough. The law, even in Western societies, is not based only on
the majority’s will. The law always has an ethical background. And of
course, there is a discussion between diverse ethics in many heteroge-
neous societies, but all of the distinct ethics have one common purpose:
the preservation of the community’s life.
The individuals’ consent is expressed in their daily ethical behavior,
without which social order would not exist. Mothers teach children to
channel aggression in accepted social ways. Despite diverse ideologies
and distinct ethics, any society has an ethical envelope in its conceptual
system that allows the teaching of children’s behavior so that it allows for
social order to exists. Coercive power is needed to support social order,
but it is always insufficient; social order requires an integrative system
that glues the society together, this is what fosters individuals behaving
ethically in socially accepted ways.
Since humans, as we have seen, do not have access to universal ethi-
cal principles, what exists are diverse ethics that confront each other; and
that in heterogeneous societies give rise to a socially accepted way of life
which is the origin of the common law.
The difference between long lasting political power and a transitory
one, is that the first is based upon a common law that reflects an accepted
way of life, consequence of ethical discussions aimed at preserving, main-
taining, and improving the communal life, while the second relies on
coercive power that cannot last because it creates its own opposition and
eventually ceases to exist.

The Belonging Justice

In Western communities the plurality of visions is synthesized in an ex-

plicit agreement that is the written law; and there is a balance between
different powers in the democratic society, that prevents the abuse of
148 carlos obregón

power by a few members. The social belonging order requires two con-
ditions: 1) Ethical agents: an individual guided by a social ethics. Social
ethics may not be a homogeneous proposal, but the result of the discus-
sion between different ethics; which have in common that they all pro-
mote an individual behavior that favors the social order; and 2) appropri-
ate institutions: an institutional arrangement that implements the social
agreements reached in the written law, so that the State and a broad set
of democratic institutions of civil society (such as the free press or non-
governmental organizations) create a balance of power that prevents the
abuse of a few in favor of their personal interest.
The belonging social order is explained by a delicate balance between so-
cial ethics (which guides individual ethical conduct), individual interests, and
an explicit social contract based on democracy (in Western societies), which is
expressed in written justice. Written justice and its interpretation, reflects a so-
cial belonging vision of what is just that comes from a social belonging ethics,
which is not necessarily homogeneous, but can be defined based on the dis-
cussion of different ethics with different points of view. Social belonging ethics
is part of the conceptual system and is expressed in a set of institutions that
guide and define the social order, such as the family, universities, schools in
general, NGOs - non-governmental organizations, the church, and many oth-
ers The State is responsible for enforcing the written law and its interpretation
– which is based on the social conception of what is just. And there is a social
discussion about what is ethical and what is not, that continually illuminates
and redefines the social perception of what is just, and that ultimately directs
changes in the social conceptual system and its corresponding institutional
arrangement and, of course, can lead to changes in the written law itself and
in its interpretation. The social order requires a social belonging ethics that
guides individual behavior; and it would be inexplicable if it was based only
on the coercive power of the State. But the latter is also needed, as it would
also be impossible to obtain social order only based on ethical or justice con-
siderations. Whether ethics or justice are based on reason or benevolence, or
a combination of both, they will always be insufficient to contain the indi-
vidual passions guided by personal interests. Neither Hume’s benevolence,
nor Kant’s reason, nor reason guided by Rawls’ hypothetical contract, can ex-
plain the social order - for none of them can stop the social force represented
by individual interests. For this reason, as Locke already pointed out, the writ-
ten law is necessary as a specific manifestation of a social contract (in Locke it
is tacit); which in Western societies, as Rousseau pointed out, must be explicit.
The struggle for power between political parties, in democracies, is bounded
chapter eight 149

by the individual vote, the judicial system, and other key institutions like the
free press and an institutionalized military force. Contemporary social order
implies: 1) The coercive power of the State to implement the rule of law; 2) a
judicial system’s interpretation of the written law (which reflects the notion of
justice that derives from social belonging ethics); and 3) an individual ethical
conduct (which is guided by the social ethics). The social order in democracies
is irrational, insofar as it reflects the will of the majority; but it is always guided
by a social vision of what is ethical and just, and what is not. The individual
is guided in his conduct not only by his individual interests, but also by
the principles of ethical conduct that were instilled in him since childhood,
and that give him a sense of belonging to the group, which is fundamental
both for individual and group survival. An essential part of any ethical
and social vision of justice, as Smith said, is that it must answer the ques-
tion of: In which cases it is valid for the individual to act only based on his
individual interests, and in which cases it is not?

The Ethics of Belonging

Any society is subject to social disarray, whether in the form of crime,

civil war, or other forms of social unrest. Social disarray is part of the
social dynamics of change, but always a new form of social order needs
to be reestablished. As we said, social order cannot be based just on the
coercive power of the State; it necessarily requires for individuals to be-
have ethically. Therefore, ethical relativism - the lack of accepted com-
mon ethical values - is scientifically unacceptable; because it is unable to
explain the social order that exists in real societies. But then the question
becomes: What is the source of ethical values? Historically there have
been two answers: the cosmogony of magic, in the primary society; and
the essentialist ethics that characterized both rationality in the traditional
society, and harmony in the Western society. However, as we have been
pointing out, there are no scientific bases to sustain neither magic nor es-
sentialist ethics. Therefore, we need another explanation as to the source
of ethical values: one is that is compatible with science. This is the pur-
pose of the ethics of belonging.
The history of humanity’s ethical thinking is based on philosophical
preconceptions that cannot be supported scientifically. But that does not
mean that the history of ethics does not have any value. As Derrida has
150 carlos obregón

argued, great philosophical abstractions remain of great value and impor-

tance, even after understanding that they are basically deductions from
preconceptions that are assumed at the outset. First, because in the process
of their deductive expansion they teach us a lot. Second, because they
have had great influence on the real institutional world in which we live.
And third, because they represent ideologies that propose alternatives as
to what the society should do in the future to come. But it is important to
present these deductive exercises for what they really are: intelligent, ab-
stract conjectures, deduced from philosophical preconceptions, that can be
useful for illuminating reality or guiding it. And we need to always remind
ourselves that they are not inferred from scientific knowledge. These ab-
stractions, as we have pointed out, are already part of the institutional his-
tory of man; so that they will most likely remain with us for a long period,
as an integral part of the ethical plurality in which Western society and
other societies live. In this section, we aim at developing a new ethics based
on the latest scientific knowledge, which we call the ethics of belonging.
Not only do different cultures have different ethics, but any culture can
contain in itself various ethics, as is the case with Western society. The eth-
ical pluralism of the West keeps alive many of the historical ethics, as well
as the thinking of the proponents of ethical relativism. And the question
then is: What defines the social order in a society that is ethically plural,
like the Western one? There are three possible answers. The first is that
only what the democratic majority decides is done. This answer, however,
has the problem that it would make social equilibrium very unstable and
explosive. Because the fickle dictatorship of the majority plus one, does
not guarantee the continuity required by social life; the latter, among other
things, requires educating the individual about what is to be considered
an ethically acceptable behavior. The second answer is the route taken
by Rawls and Sen, namely, that there is a consensus on certain common
minimum principles, and that they guide consensual social action. The
problem with this route is that it is not possible to demonstrate that: 1)
there is such a proposed consensus; 2) our individual reason has access
to know such consensual principles; and 3) the individual is a moral indi-
vidual who is willing to guide his/her conduct by the consensus that his/her
reason discovers. In fact, reality reveals that the consensus that everyone
in society is supposed to have found, changes from author to author. And
that individual behavior is quite complex and cannot be explained only by
an ethical individual. The third answer is given by the ethics of belonging.
The main tenets of the ethics of belonging are presented in figure 8.2.
chapter eight 151

figure 8.2 the ethics of belonging

The ethics of belonging argues that: 1) Every society requires a social ethics; which can be a set of
different ethics, as in the case of the West. 2) In Western societies (in the context of an already given
historical institutional arrangement, which defines life in the diverse institutions: government agen-
cies, churches, universities, schools in general, social clubs, NGOs, families and so on) there is an
alive discussion of the set of formal ethics (along with the arguments of ethical relativism) among the
members of the society, which slowly and marginally introduce changes to the historical institutional
arrangement. 3) Even though ethics are diverse among themselves, they all have in common that
they promote individual behavior that favors the social order. 4) In the ethical discussion between
views that may be different, proposals are made and certain agreements of what to do politically are
reached (in a democratic society most agreements are established amongst the representatives elected
by the popular vote, whose re-election depends on their decisions reflecting what the majority wants).
And these agreements are specified in a specific legal institutional settlement and a written law. 5) The
legal institutional settlement and the written law is what defines justice; and imparting it is one of the
State’s duties (which includes interpreting the written law). 6) But the implementation of justice is just
one of several elements that explain the social order. Social order rests on a delicate balance between
diverse elements: the historical institutional arrangement, different social ethics, individual and group
ethical conduct, individual and groups interests, and the State’s implementation of justice. 7) Once the
individual has been differentiated on the basis of his rights, the relationship of the individual’s rights to
society is the fundamental issue in the establishment of the social order. And this relationship implies a
delicate balance between three ways of communication: Through the institutions of the State, the mar-
kets, and alternative methods of social choice (which include other institutions, as well as the method
of social choice proposed by Sen). 8) The individual acts as a political man, an economic man, and an
ethical responsible man. 9) There is a complicated interaction between ethical principles and interests,
that define both social and individual and groups action. 10) The delicate balance that defines social
order, can be broken eventually; and when it happens, it will take a long time for the society to achieve
another new stable equilibrium. 11) But ultimately evolutionary survival requires that social order
exists, even if it is imperfect and always changing. 12) Belonging guides humans towards social order;
but there are always belonging failures which can happen at three levels: a) At the level of society at
large. This type of social failures does not happen often; but when it occurs, it becomes a true threat
for the established social order. b) At the level of the interaction between a subset of micro-networks
that constitute the society. This usually produces riots and social unrest, the resolution of which usu-
ally happens through social change. c) At the level of the micro-networks educating the individual,
especially the family whether unicellular or extended. This usually produces insecure individuals who
may later on develop aggressive and antisocial behavior.
Throughout the previously described process, Veblen’s definition of an institution, which we have
adopted, is very important: an institution is the sum of a conceptual system and its correspond-
ing institutional arrangement. A society is defined by its institutions. Institutions are the histori-
cal memory of society, and they give it its homeostatic character. The narratives give meaning,
consistency, and stability to the social order; and they are the counterpart of historical surviving
institutions. These collective narratives, together with actual lessons in real behavior, are the
ethical education given to the individual. For example, in the West, in most cases, as opposed to
other, traditional societies, part of the education to the individual is to teach him to respect and
tolerate ethical plurality. Without institutions, as well as without ethical individuals, it is not pos-
sible to explain the stability of the social order. A large part of social stability is provided by the
community’s own history, reflected in its institutions.
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The social order is determined on the basis of three acting social

forces: 1) An ethical individual; 2) an institutional arrangement, that cor-
responds to a conceptual system, which reflects the historical trajectory
of the society in question; and 3) the decisions and agreements that are
made in the current political and economic system (which may or may
not, depending on society in question, rely on individual actions and deci-
sions that reflect individual selfishness and individual interests).
The institutional arrangement is a historical outcome, that has its par-
allel in a conceptual system that already contains a social ethics; this so-
cial ethics is taught to the individual both through concepts and through
actions. The individual’s ethics guides his/her actions, and it is one of the
important clues for establishing social order. The individual’s learning of
what is ethically and socially acceptable comes initially from his interac-
tion with his mother or caregiver; and later on, from his relations with
other individuals, and institutions, that reflect the conceptual system of
society as a whole. Without institutions, the social order is unexplainable.
Institutions, rather than the individual interest, nor individual rational
ethical principles, are the ones that provide stability to the social order;
and these institutions are a clear consequence of the need for social be-
longing of the human being. The ethics of belonging emphasizes that
there are general principles to all cultures that come from our evolution-
ary survival characteristics. But these principles are not those of Western
humanism, which is just one out of several ethical conceptual systems
that can be derived from the evolutionary general principles of survival.
The ethics of belonging takes from anthropological cultural ethical rela-
tivism the historical and social evidence: that different cultures have dif-
ferent social ethics; but points out, that these distinct social ethics have
in common that they are consistent with the general evolutionary prin-
ciples of survival, which guarantees the existence of the social order. In-
dividual ethical behavior is a necessity to be able to establish social order
in expanded communities. The ethics of belonging departs from ethical
relativism, which is unable to explain and promote the social order, as it
establishes general principles that derive from our evolutionary heritage.
And the ethics of belonging also avoids the absolute universal principles
of ethical essentialism, which cannot explain cultural ethical diversity.
There are general evolutionary principles of survival common to all
cultures; but social belonging, although evolutionarily indispensable, is
expressed in different cultures through different conceptual systems and
institutional arrangements. The evolutionary need for belonging indicates
chapter eight 153

that each culture, or social group, requires a common ethical conceptual

system of reference, and its corresponding institutional arrangement, that
guarantees the ethical conduct of most individuals, so that social order
can be established within each of these societies. This explains the histori-
cal success of essentialism versus relativism. For the former provides a
solution to the social order, while the latter does not. But reason, neuro-
biologically speaking, is limited by our emotional relationship with the
external world; so that it does not have access to universal ethical prin-
ciples such as essentialism presupposes.
Overall evolutionary principles are common to all cultures, and they
establish the need for a common social ethics for each social group, the
specific way in which these ethical principles of behavior are established,
depends on the specific historical development of each culture. So, it is
impossible to arrive to common universal truths about what is ethical or
what is the just. Distinct societies are built based upon different concep-
tual systems and institutional arrangements. Cultural ethical diversity ex-
plains why ethical relativism exits; while the need to explain social order,
explains the triumph of essentialism. The ethics of belonging explains
both: cultural ethical diversity and social order.
The ethics of belonging rejects the essentialist thesis that humans are
ethical beings prone to making universal good. Human relations developed
from our evolutionary and neurobiological reality of groups delimited by
limbic and conceptual belonging. The notion of a universal ethic does not
correspond to the scientific evolutionary reality of the formation of human
social groups. But, at the same time, it rejects that humans are dominated by
their passions, and their individual instinct of aggression, as well as the no-
tion that everything is relative in social relations. Human existence is defined
by the development of belonging to the external world, which modulates
individual aggression, and orients it to social coexistence in groups delim-
ited by such belonging. In this way, social order is indispensable for human
survival. Social order is established as a consequence of the limbic and con-
ceptual membership that amalgamates the specific social group in question.
The individual learns to behave socially in an ethical manner, and to
be non-aggressive, from the mother and other social members; but this
behavior is restricted to the community to which the corresponding con-
ceptual system relates. While aggression within a community that shares
a conceptual system is rare and is usually a consequence of failures of
social or family belonging, aggression between communities belonging to
distinct conceptual systems is common.
154 carlos obregón

The ethics of belonging may become a relevant guide to human con-

duct within a community. With the ethics of belonging, ethical dilemmas
can be evaluated under a different perspective. Once we understand: 1)
That there are no scientific bases to maintain universal truths; 2) that the
social order cannot be established only as a consequence of individual self-
ish actions; and 3) that social order requires an individual that fulfills his/
her duties; several ethical implications follow. The first one, is that human
rights are neither universal nor inalienable. The survival of the group,
from an evolutionary perspective, has priority over individual survival.
Therefore, if needed for its survival, the social group has the ethical right
to sacrifice the individual. This explains both human sacrifices in primary
societies, as well as why enlisting in the army to go to war is mandatory in
Western societies. But there is an ethical belonging lesson in here: societ-
ies do not have the right to sacrifice individual lives unless it is needed for
their survival. The argument is simple, a society is composed of individu-
als, therefore sacrificing them with no purpose puts at risk its survival.
The second ethical implication is that human rights are not only insuf-
ficient, but inadequate, to foster a proper global institutional arrangement.
The ethics of belonging makes it clear that there are distinct possibilities
for the conceptual systems of different societies to evolve; thus, a truly
global institutional arrangement must start by recognizing the validity of
diverse conceptual views and different institutional ways to live. The lon-
ger we delay recognizing this point, the less likely it is that we can succeed
at establishing the most needed proper global institutional arrangement.
The third one, is that science can help us to understand where we come
from, and who we are; but where we want to go depends upon our ideals.
Therefore, the discussion as to the distinct ideals proposed by different
ethics will continue. As to which is the best ideal, the ethics of belong-
ing has nothing to say, except that there is no way to define it through
rationality, therefore the best ideal is the one which the participants of the
society decide. The fourth one, is that it is not possible to make universal
ethical judgments, but given a specific conceptual system and its corre-
sponding institutional arrangement it is possible to identify specific belong-
ing failures. The fifth one, is that a society has the right to penalize those
individual activities that threaten the established social order. The sixth
one, is that the right of individual freedom is a particular characteristic of
the Western society. The seventh one, is that given the right of individual
freedom, it is possible to use the ethics of belonging to solve some ethical
dilemmas; but these solutions are only adequate for the Western society.
chapter eight 155

Examples of how to use the ethics of belonging to solve Western ethical

dilemmas can be found in The Philosophy of Belonging223.

Ethics and Political Power

Political power based on coercive power cannot guarantee social order,

because there is no State with enough resources to be vigilant of all the
individuals and groups, all the time. Social order requires ethical behav-
ior by individuals and groups; their acknowledgment of the necessary
role of a social authority is required. Society is necessarily glued together
through the integrative system, which contains the social ethics (which
may be in some societies, as said before, an envelope of distinct alterna-
tive ethical views). There is always tension between the individuals´ and
groups´ interests and ethical values, and those of the larger society. And
this tension maintains the society in a continuous process of change, that
makes it more flexible to confront internal and external shocks. Eventu-
ally, open conflict may arise, and major changes may happen in societies.
But these changes, if they are to last, have to give rise again to a new
integrative system capable to guarantee the social order that the society
needs for its daily functioning and survival.
A stable exercise of political power has to be based on the integrative
system and therefore, the main base of political power is always relational.
While the agent´s intrinsic characteristics may be important to define some
conflicts between individuals and groups and may be decisive in moments of
open conflict in the larger society, they are never enough to glue the society
together. Therefore, they cannot be the permanent base of political power.

conclusion

Political power is always relational based; therefore, it is mainly conse-

quence of the social power that derives from the integrative system. The
use of coercive power in the power system can become eventually neces-
sary to avoid deviant behavior by a few members, but power in the pow-
er system can never be the force that glues a society together. The same
223
Op .cit.
156 carlos obregón

happens with power in the economic system. Economic power is one of

the best means for individuals and groups to manipulate others but can
never be the cement on which social order is built – not the source of
long-lasting political power.
Political power is usually obtained through relational means in the inte-
grative traditional system. However, in those occasions when there has been
a long demise of the traditional political system, it is possible to access to
political power through the use of naked force, through economic power or
even by charismatic personal characteristics. But whenever power is accessed
by any of the previously mentioned routes it will not be long- lasting unless
a new traditional system is developed giving rise to a new integrative system.
Societies however are not homogeneous entities. They are often com-
posed by individuals and groups with particular interests and values that
do not necessarily align with the ones of the society as a whole. Holding
political power implies coordinating these diverse interests of individuals
and groups through an overall institutional arrangement (and its cor-
responding conceptual system) capable to accept social changes brought
about by the changing interests of individuals and groups, but in such
a way that those interests are mostly aligned with the overall society’s
interests. Since this task is always incomplete and imperfect, there will
always be tension between the societies’ interest and values and those of
the individuals and groups forming it. But the result must be acceptable
enough to allow for social order to occur.
Therefore, it is true that the political authority always has to be con-
fronting individuals and interested groups, and it is also true that this
implies, on occasions, the use of coercive power; but the quality of the
institutional arrangement depends upon its ability to solve the confronta-
tion with the minimum use of coercive power. With a solid institutional
arrangement, the political authority may go through the confrontation
with interested groups and individuals using mostly the law. The law is
a written statement of the agreements reached by the society to rule on
its internal differences. The use of coercive power outside of the law will
bring neither political stability nor long-lasting political changes.
An authority’s main base of power is the integrative system; political
power is mostly relational. However, in order to deal with deviant be-
havior coercive power is also needed as a complement. And the authority
also needs to regulate and be vigilant of the adequate performance of the
economic system which must not only guarantee economic growth but
economic fairness for the members of the society in question.
CHAPTER NINE: BRIEF COMMENTS ON SOCIAL
POWER IN OTHER CONTEXTS

In this chapter will briefly discuss social power in two other contexts: 1)
Organizational power; and 2) Social power in international relations.

Organizational Power

We have already established that social power is mostly relationally

based; and that the agent’s intrinsic characteristics, while relevant in spe-
cific contexts, are of secondary importance as a source of social power.
But, what about organizational power? How relevant are the agent’s in-
trinsic characteristics as a source of organizational power? Organizations
are generally seen as hierarchical social structures, is it true? And are
they distinct from other social structures, so that relational power is less
relevant? To answer these questions, it is critical to understand how or-
ganizations should be managed.

organizational power´s special characteristics

Organizations are distinct from other social structures in several ways. First,
they are owned by someone (even if owned by the government, or if they
are non-profitable). Second, they have a specific purpose. Third, they com-
pete with other organizations. Fourth, many of them are in a very dynamic
environment due to fast technological and market conditions changes. Due
to all of this, organizations are a special kind of social structure.
Organizational power emerges from the will of the owners or share-
holders represented by a board, which decides who will be the chairman
of the company; thus, by its very nature organizations are hierarchical
institutions. Power goes down from the shareholders to the board, to the

[157]
158 carlos obregón

chairman, to the executive committee, and so forth. As a consequence,

many of the theories and definitions of organizational power are centered
on the dependence of many on a few, that have the key to control the
resources of the organization and who make the fundamental decisions.
While to some extent this is undeniably true, and recognizing the need of
leadership by a few in the organization so that the latter can attain its pur-
pose, it is also true that organizations are more and more confronted with
a rapidly changing environment, in which - to maintain their competitive
edge - they must use all the available human and material resources in
an optimal way. In particular, innovation is becoming critical; and it de-
pends on the open participation of many in the organization to evaluate
the rapidly changing technological possibilities and market needs. Those
collaborators closely attached to the market because of their contact with
the customer, and those following technological developments, are the
ones that can make the critical difference in a very aggressive innovative
environment. And this necessarily implies a more flexible, less hierarchi-
cal organization – in which competitive reasons predominate over hier-
archical positions.
Organizations like any other social structure are political, and within
them there is a system of power defined by the hierarchical structure, and
there is confrontation between different individuals and groups to get to
the higher positions. There is also an economic system within the organi-
zation, that defines compensation and performance rewards; and there is
a battle to access the best paid jobs, and the key positions that influence
which will be the compensatory scheme.
This confrontation between individuals and groups within the organi-
zation is healthy, because it maintains dynamism within the organization,
whenever it results in raising to the best paid positions those individu-
als and groups who have the best performance against the market. But
this result is not necessarily guaranteed, the conflict may also degenerate
in a bureaucratic confrontation oriented to obtaining the actual control
of the organization, managing the compensatory scheme, and satisfying
selfish interests no longer linked to a better performance of the organiza-
tion against the market. What guarantees that a healthy competition be-
tween individuals and groups within the organization is maintained is an
adequate integrative system, that establishes the proper institutional ar-
rangement. Like in any game theory, the competition´s results are highly
dependent upon the settings of the game – in this case the institutional
arrangement of the organization, defined by the integrative system.
chapter nine 159

limitations of some traditional definitions

and theories of organizational power

Following Max Weber´s definition of power as: the probability that one
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability
rests; Dahl asserted in 1957 that A has power over B to the extent that he
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do224. This very ba-
sic interpretation of power has carried through the decades: power is sim-
ply defined as the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be
done. But in Weber social power as we have seen is relational, it implies
the target’s acceptance, and it is embedded in a social conceptual system;
while in Dahl it is restricted to the agent’s intrinsic characteristics which
define his/her power to impose his/her will on others. While in Weber
power is relational and it involves, besides the power and the economic
systems, the integrative system; in Dahl the integrative system is excluded.
However, as we said, Dahl has been highly influential in the definitions
of organizational power. Let us review some of these definitions. Salancik
& Pfeffer define power as: the ability of those who posses power to bring
about the outcomes they desire225. For Mintzberg power is the capacity
to effect or affect organizational outcomes226. For Robbins227 power is the
ability that you have to influence the behavior of another stakeholder in
your organization. Your power is measured by the extent that you can use
your influence to get a stakeholder to do something that he or she would
otherwise prefer not to do. What all these definitions have in common is
that they see power as a confrontation between the groups and individuals
that constitute the organization. They all leave out the integrative system.
Several theories have been used to explain organizational power,
among them we can mention five: Power Dependence Theory, Social
Exchange Theory, Strategic Contingency Theory, Critical Contingencies
Model, and Mintzberg’s theory. Power Dependence Theory, which we
have discussed before, sees power as the consequence of someone else
224
Dahl, R.A. 1957., The Concept of Power. http://fbaum.unc.edu/teaching/articles/Dahl_Pow-
er_1957.pdf
225
1977, op. cit.
226
Henry Mintzberg, H.,1983. Power In and Around Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
227
Robbins, S. P. (1996). Organizational behavior: Concepts, controversies, applications. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
160 carlos obregón

depending on us for something of relevance. Social Exchange Theory,

which we also have discussed before, sees power as our capacity to ex-
change social commodities. Strategic Contingency Theory is an exten-
sion of Power Dependence Theory, developed by Salancik and Pfeffer; it
argues that power is the consequence of control of resources, control of
technical skill, control of a body of knowledge, legal prerogatives, and ac-
cess to powerful people. Critical Contingencies Model, developed by D.J.
Hickson and his associates, is also an extension of Power Dependence
Theory; it argues that power is related to having something highly val-
ued by others, like expertise. And Mintzberg’s theory sees organizational
behavior as a power game in which players want to control the company´s
decisions and activities. The players use their own bases of power and
their political skills. Again, what we find is that all of these theories have
in common that they see an organization as a power confrontation; they
see power exclusively as it relates to the power and economic systems,
and they all exclude the integrative system.
Something critical is missing in these theories and definitions of orga-
nizational power because what they entail is that if you are wrong and
you are powerful the decisions that will be taken will seriously damage
the organization. Moreover, organizational power conceived this way is
not related to the main goals of the organization. Innovation, productiv-
ity, market share and any other reactive behavior of the company versus
suppliers, customers and the competition are unrelated to this definition
of power. Yet one should expect that organizational power is used in such
a way that the organizational energy is mostly used to achieve the main
goals of the organization, which are to foster innovation to maintain and
increase its competitiveness in an ever-changing environment. Innovation
and change may require confrontation between individuals and groups;
but as we saw in our chapter on social change, this confrontation has to
occur within a well-established integrative system, so that it is used for the
benefit of the future of the organization as a whole. Confrontations be-
tween individuals’ and groups’ power within the power and the economic
systems will not make the organizational changes optimal for its success,
unless they happen within the adequate institutional arrangement defined
by the integrative system. The use of power in the organization has to be
related to the success of the organization´s major goals. The main source
of organizational power has to be relational (based on the integrative sys-
tem), because it needs to prepare the organization to act united to compete
in the best possible way. An organization is not a zero-sum game in
chapter nine 161

which the more powerful can get more of an already defined pot; it is
a competitive entity in an ever changing environment and its rewards
may change a lot depending upon how it is managed. Therefore, it is
crucial that the organizational energy is used to innovate and compete,
and not in bureaucratic economic and power games between the indi-
viduals and groups that constitute the organization.
Morgan228 has identified fourteen sources of power in an organiza-
tion: 1) Formal authority; 2) control of scarce resources; 3) use of or-
ganizational structure, rules and regulations; 4) control of decision
processes; 5) control of knowledge and information; 6) control of
boundaries; 7) ability to cope with uncertainty. 8) control of technology
9) interpersonal alliances, networks and control of informal organization;
10) control of counter organizations; 11) symbolism and the management
of meaning; 12) gender and the management of gender relations; 13)
structural factors that affect the stage of action; and 14) the power one al-
ready has (personal power). Again, there is nothing in this list that incor-
porates the need of a specific open integrative system that guarantees the
creative participation of everybody in the organization, and that prevents
the dominance of bureaucratic fights between individuals and groups that
may seriously jeopardize the competitive capacity of the organization.
French and Raven’s power bases have been used to discuss organiza-
tional power. Singh argues that: “The superiority of expert and referent
power, which depend on individual characteristics, is made evident. In
contrast, coercive, reward, and legitimate powers, which depend heavily
upon formal charters of authority and are abrasive and conditional by
nature, are seen to be relatively inferior sources of power”229. But this
statement does not yet get to what is - in our opinion - the real issue. Be-
cause expert and referent power can also be used in bureaucratic confron-
tations. We need to avoid, as he argues, authority heavily based upon
formal charters, but we also need to avoid expert and referent power
when used bureaucratically in the internal confrontation of individuals
and groups. This point is made by Yukl and Taber, who argue that the
degree to which lower-level employees possessing specialized technical
expertise or access to vital information, can influence senior managers
is critical to achieve good organizational results. Schlesienger has argued
that the role of an efficacious leader is to be a good follower, as well.
228
Morgan, G. 1997. Images of Organization. Sage Publications.
229
Singh, A (2009)., Organizational Power in Perspective. Leadership and Management in En-
gineering/ Volume 9 – issue4.
162 carlos obregón

Unfortunately, senior managers often find themselves threatened in this

situation. Thus, it frequently has happened that a sharp and qualified
employee is fired on a flimsy excuse230.
Singh himself recognizes that even expert and referent power can
be used negatively. Singh argues that negative power will: curb creativi-
ty, stall personality growth, limit ethical practice, prevent career advance-
ment, manipulate the psyche, bear false witness, overtly or covertly ex-
hibits bias, and act arbitrarily and capriciously from a position of power.
Singh concludes that only participative power-sharing styles, engendered
through expertise and human relational skills, which encourage reflection
and choice, yield win-win outcomes. Positive uses of power that create a
healthy organizational climate enhance productivity and financial profits.

relational organizational power versus

agents’ intrinsic characteristics

In a bureaucratic organization hierarchy predominates over competitive-

ness, everybody’s relative power in the organization is defined by his/
her formal organizational role, and the roles and which person occupies
them, is defined at the top. Relations, therefore, are defined by the peo-
ple at the top of the hierarchy. There is not a true target´s acceptance,
because whatever the people at the bottom of the organization think is
not relevant; they have to obey the orders from the top. And although
everybody’s relative power is defined by the position occupied within
the organization; neither the position, nor the person occupying it are
necessarily defined with the goal of maximizing the competitiveness of
the organization.
If the people at the top are wrong, the organization will have a bad
performance. And the main problems of such bureaucratic autocracies
are: 1) that the feedback from the market and from the technological
changes does not get to the people at the top quickly enough; and 2) that
the people at the top are not necessarily the best prepared ones in the
organization to make decisions with the information received.
Bureaucratic autocracies may have some virtues when the chain of
command is very long and the tasks to be done are very well defined,
Schlesinger, A. M. , Jr. (1987). “On leadership.” Muammar Al-Qaddafi, B. Kyle, Chelsea
230

House, New York.

chapter nine 163

like in the military. But they certainly have major drawbacks. The mili-
tia when given broader, less well-defined tasks usually fails, because it
is very badly suited to read the feedback from the environment. This
explains the failure of the US´ military command to modify the civil insti-
tutions in Afghanistan; after more than twenty years of occupation, they
left the country basically in the same social and political conditions that
existed when they initially occupied it. It also explains the failure of the
militia in Mexico in reducing overall crime.
In previous chapters we have discussed relational power as the one
derived either from the target´s acceptance or from a social role defined
in accordance with the conceptual system and the institutional arrange-
ment of the society in question. The main task of the conceptual system
and the institutional arrangement is to foster the main evolutionary pur-
pose of social life, which is survival. In the case of organizations, the
main purpose of the institutional arrangement (that defines roles), and
the conceptual system (that defines the organizational culture), has to be
to maintain and increase organizational competitiveness. Thus, relational
power in an organization can be defined as the one that derives from an
organizational role defined by the institutional arrangement to maximize
the organization’s competitiveness. The acceptance of this power by the
organizational members (targets) comes from an organizational culture
that chooses the best equipped individuals – in terms of their competitive
capabilities –to fulfill the roles defined by the institutional arrangement.
An organization is a social entity, and its best possible competitive
functioning requires that the main source of organizational power is
relational. While the agent’s intrinsic characteristics are also relevant,
specially as to the individuals capability to fulfill his organizational role,
as well as to his/her creativity participating in institutional design; the
organizational life implies an institutional arrangement and a concep-
tual system that goes beyond specific individuals, a good organization
has to maintain its quality beyond the death or institutional resignation
of any individual member, no matter how relevant he is in the organi-
zational life.
While hierarchical bureaucratic autocracies can survive in slowly
changing environments in which they usually enjoy, from the beginning,
a competitive edge of some sort (like a monopoly advantage, due to own-
ership of key resources or legal franchises); in fast changing environ-
ments, like the global capitalism of today, they are no match for those
organizations with a well-designed competitive culture.
164 carlos obregón

social power in international relations

Since as we have seen, the main source of social power is relational; it

follows that the absence of an adequate relation – established by the in-
stitutional arrangement and the conceptual system – will create problems
for the performance of the social entity in question. The lack of relational
power implies the social predominance of the agent’s intrinsic character-
istics such as military strength, financial resources, consumption power
and so on. As I have argued in other works, this is, in synthesis, the main
problem of the international system of today. The lack of a proper global
integrative system has left international relations too much dependent on
the power and the economic systems.
In Western nations the plurality of visions is synthesized in an explicit
agreement that is the written law; and there is a balance between different
powers in the democratic society, that prevents the abuse of power, based on
their intrinsic characteristics, by a few members. But at a global level, without
a world’s democratic society, nothing guarantees that an agreement will be
reached. There is not an accepted international law, and there are no glob-
ally accepted judges. There is a fundamental distinction between the declara-
tion of human rights of the American Independence in 1776 and the French
Revolution in 1789 on one side, and the United Nations´ declaration of 1948,
on the other. The first two are the consequence of what I have called belong-
ing justice: they were made within an institutional arrangement that reflected
the changes in the social conceptual system, which meant that the declara-
tions of human rights, that were introduced in the written belonging law, and
their implementation was monitored by the national State and by a constituted
democratic civil society. The third instead is not the consequence of belonging
justice: it does not have an institutional arrangement of reference. Internation-
al law is weak because it has neither a State, not a constituted democratic civil
society that oversees its fulfillment. At the international level, there is little hope
for significant partial agreements to reduce the great injustices that prevail;
because, given the absence of a global democracy, the relations between States
are more related to the power and economic systems than to the integrative
system. They are based on interests rather than on common principles. This
explains the little international aid given to the poor countries, and the enor-
mous abuses that are committed against the most dispossessed, both by their
own powerful elites, and by citizens of the most developed countries on earth.
The lack of an adequate global institutional arrangement and its cor-
responding conceptual system relates to the main problems of the global
chapter nine 165

community of today such as: militarism and wars, global crime, global
financial crises, global health crises, environmental crises, underdevelop-
ment and poverty, and so on. For the reader interested in this topic, I
recommend reading my recent book: A new global order231. In this book we
acknowledge that there is nothing to indicate that a true global community
will be established in the future, and that we do not have – nor do we rec-
ommend – an idealistic position. But we believe that it is necessary to em-
phasize that the growing interaction between different communities at the
global level, makes it essential to make serious efforts in the direction of
improving the integrative elements of the actual institutional arrangement.

conclusion

Humans are evolutionarily designed to be social beings. Social order and

appropriate social change are requisites for human survival. The main
source of social power is relational, as Foucault has argued, and it is based
on the integrative system that glues the society together an allows its func-
tionality. However, individuals are evolutionarily differentiated from the
social group, and therefore there is always conflict between individuals’ and
groups’ private interests and those of the society as a whole. Therefore,
social power is also exercised in the power and the economic system. In
general, sociological theories have emphasized the relational aspects of so-
cial power, but psychological theories have documented the social conflict
between individuals and groups. In a well functioning society, the instinct
of belonging guides the individual’s survival instincts towards accepted and
healthy social behavior; but belonging failures may give rise to social ag-
gression. The role of an adequate institutional arrangement is to allow social
change, promoted by social conflict and other causes such as technological
change, in such a way that it is compatible with the society’s overall interests.
Political power is mostly relationally based. Although coercive power
and economic power are always also used for political purposes, in gen-
eral they cannot provide the cement that glues the society together. How-
ever, after a long decay of the traditional integrative system, it is possible
to access to political power through naked, charismatic and economic
powers. But the power obtained by any of these three routes will be tran-
sitory, unless it gives rise to a new traditional integrative power.
231
Obregon, C., 2020., A new global order. Amazon.com. Also available at Research Gate.com
166 carlos obregón

Organizational power must also be relationally based for an organi-

zation to remain competitive, and it should be able to incorporate fast
institutional changes.
Internationally, there is a lack of an adequate global institutional ar-
rangement, and this is the cause of many of today´s global problems.
Social power can be exercised in the three social systems: the integra-
tive, the power and the economic. The main source of social power is
always relational, and it is based on the integrative system. However,
power exercised in the power and economic systems (based upon the
agent’s intrinsic characteristics) creates the social conflict required for so-
cial change. Social change, however, to be adequate, needs a strong, flex-
ible institutional arrangement; one capable to guide it in such a way as to
make compatible private and social interests.
Whatever social position one holds, it is always important to remind
oneself that the main source of our power is relational; and that coercive
and economic power should only be used as complementary to the inte-
grative power.

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