ce SS = = eo eos, The Possible and the Actual M7 LOUXseen we pwo %X The Possible and the Actual IRBADINGS IN ‘THE METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY EDITED BY 7 Michael J. Loux CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca and London -_ mya a ee oe | J aon ) an iI I i I I I I I | I | | Copyeight © 1979 by Cornell University All Fights reserved. Exeept for brief quotation Pars thereof, must not be repredveed in any fo ‘writing fom the publisher. For informati Press, 124 Roberts Pace, tha ina review, this book, or rm without permission in ion address Cornell University 1 New York 14850, First published 1979 by Cornell University Press Published inthe Usited Kingdom by Comell University Press Lid, 2-4 Brook Steet, London WIY IAA. ntemitional Standard Book Neaber (cloth) 0-8014-1298-2 Untcrtianal Standard"Book Number (paper) 0801491789 Library of Congress Catalog Catt Number 79-7618 “rime in the United States of Amerie Librarians: brary of Congress cating information appears on the las exe of the book, TO NEIL DELANEY BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE CHAIRMENContents Preface smirodustion: Models and: Metaphysics Michel 1 Cour 2, The Modes of Modatiy “aatko inte deny trough Possible Worlds: Some Questions Roderick M. Chisholm 4, ‘Transworld Heir Lines Dani! Keplan 5. Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Lose es 6, ‘The Wotd Is Everything That I the Case M.J. Cresswell tr, Tranwor entity oF Wortbound Inivdoak? “ain Planing 8, The Onology ofthe Posible Nicolas Rescher t ' 1 } 128 1402 Role Won» “ David Lewis 10. Theosies of Actuality: Robert Merrihew sldams 11. How to Russell a Froge-Church David Kaplan AS Robert C. Stalnaker 13, Modal Realism: The Poisoned Pawn, Fabrizio Mondadori and Adam Morton HS, Actualism and Possible Wortds Alvin Plantings 15.” The Trouble with Possible Worlds Willie Lean Bibliography Index Contents 182 210 225 as 253 274 37 331 Preface Piaiess days, an anthology on the topic of possible worlds hardly geeds Htficston, No issue hes iven rise to as much iterture inthe st Stole or etdes: It has, of course, been the central focus of cincustions yy Prlosophical logic and ontology: but the framework of possivie world hag Played 2 prominent role in other areas of philosophy, such vs cpio G23, pilosophy of religion, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and phos. Soby of mind. Theorists have insisted that talk of allerative possibie ‘worlds illumines philosophical issues as diverse as the nature Knowledge, the ontological argument, the problem of evil, lawlike statements, the concept of causation, the nature of Course, and the mind-body problem. Such appiteations of th possible worlds are of great philosophical shaeess hinges on the legitimacy of the framework itself. Consequent ‘hisanthology, Ihave included only writings that bear on foundationalcsen tions about possible worlds. Ihave arranged the papers chronologically: an apart from my introductory essay, “Modality and Metaphysics," only «wo Of the papers appearing here (David Kaplan's “Transworld Heit Lines ramework oF terest, but obviously their and William Lyean’s “The rouble with Possible Worlds") Published previously. he papers Ihave select ced 9 fal into ewe thematie groups. lel of ib: Papers are primarily concemed with the nature and status 0; posibe worlds, David Lewis" “Possible Worlds” is a defense of the view ther Possible worlds and their contents are all equally real; Lewis takes these ‘worlds to be primitives and insists that his realistic interpretation of por 910 Preface sibitia is merely a formalization of our ommon-sense thinking about modal?» In “Modal Realism" Fabrizio Mondadori and Adam Morton try to cour'er Lewis" approach by arguing that modal notions can be under- stood independently of any reference to possible worlds or possible ob- jects. The remaining six papers in this prov all defend a possible words Jnterctation of mexlal discourse, but sitter fo show How we ean em trace an ontology of possible worlds within the context of an actwalist ontology, that is, am ontology that holds that only the actual world and its contents are real, Robert Stalnaker (in “Possible Worlds”) proposes that ‘we identify possible worlds with certain actealy existing but uninstantiated properties. Robert M. Adams (in “Theories of Actuality") takes the notion fof 2 proposition as primitive and construes worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions. In “Actualism and Possible Worlds” Alvin Plantinga tells us that possible worlds are maximally possible states of affairs and insists that tlk about nonexistent possibles ix o be understood as talk about tunexemplified individual essences. William Lyean's ‘The Trouble with Possible Worlds" represents a defense of « view like that of Stalnaker, ‘Adams, and Plantinga. He suggests that if we take some category of intensional abstract entities as basic we can provide a coherent account of unteatized possibility. In ““The Ontology of the Possible" Nicholas Resch- ce adopts a conceptualist approach to possibility, contending thatthe exis- tence of unactualized possibilia is grounded in human conceptual activity. Finally M. J. Cresswell’s ‘The World Is Everything That Is the Case" represen's a combinatorialist approach to possible worlds. Cresswell ar- gues that possible worlds are alternative set theoretical constructs of the nonmodal atoms making up the actual worl. ‘The second group of papers deals with the problem of transworld identity, In “Identity through Possible Workls: Some Questions" Roderick Chisholm tries o show how am ontology of passible workds generates this problem. David Kaplan’s “Transworld Heir Lines” is a defense of the ‘view that this problem can be handled only if we suppose that some relation weaker than that of strict identity ties objzcts im different worlds. In “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic"” David Lewis tries to {ive a formal representation of this weaker relation; he calls it the counter~ part relation and argues that itis strong enough to accommodate our ordi- nary medal intuitions. in “Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individu- als?” Alvin Plantinga criticizes Lewis" counterpart theory; he argues that the relation will not support our prephilosophical views about modality and attempts to show that transworld identity provides no serious problem for Prefiece u the defender of possible worlds. Finally, in “How to Russell a Frege- Church" David Kaplan returns to the problem of transworld identity: he suggests that we understand the problem in terms of questions about the, structure of singular propositions and argues that, when understood in these terms, transworkd identity does not warrant the sort of skepticism we mect in the papers by Chisholm and Lewis or in his own eatlier work on the problem. | was unable to obtain permission to publish two papers I had originally intended to inelude in the anthology, SauFKripke’s “'Semantical Consider ations on Modal Logic" and his paper “Identity and Necessity."" The later ccan be found in Stephen P. Schwartz's collection Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds (published by Comell University Press). The former pro- vides an account of the semantics of modal logic; a slightly different treatment of the same material can be found in Jaakko Hintikka’s “The Modes of Modality,” which appears herein. My introductory essay pro- vides an informal outline of Kripke-type semantics. "A number of people deserve my special thanks for their distinctive conitibutions to the anthology. 1 want to thank David Kaplan for his willingness to let his early paper “Transworld Heir Lines" appear in print {ind William Lycan for contributing his helpful essay. Alvin Plantings was extremely generous both in helping me with the selection of papers and in discussing the metaphysical issues at work in the debate over possi ‘worlds. Robert M. Adams, David Solomon, James Garson, and Michae] Difly read my introductory essay and provided many helpful suggestions. ‘Ann, Laurie, Joey, Chris, Sandy, and Julie Loux all lived with me during the often trying period in which the manuscript for the anthology was being put together; for tht alone, but also for thei loving patience, they deserve lifetime of appreciation, Ryan Welsh gave her expert help inthe prepara- tion ofthe manuseript; sc deserves my thanks as well as a high-paying job withthe Seeret Service, in which her uncanny ability to decipher even the most obscure codes would doubtless do much to enhance our national security. Finally, 1 want to thank Neil Delancy; his kindness, encourage- ment, and help were given in even greater abundance than the dedication suggests. Micuast. J. Loux Nore Dame, Indiana 4 & ceRACER acerstarne nen The Possible and the Actual1 ee Tntroduction: Modality and Metaphysics MICHAEL J. LOUX University of Notre Dame [Although the idea that reality has a modal strcture is prominent in tra~ ditional metaphysics, it has not been popular in Anglo-American philoso phy, Hume vigorously attacked the view that modality is an objective feature of the world, and his philosophical descendants in the analytic tradition tended to assume that Hume's attack here was decisive. Modal ations, they argued, either are illegitimate or are mere reflections of our Aecisions to use words in certain ways; there is no modality out in the ‘world, In the past couple of decades, however, the venerable idea that reality has a modal structure has taken on a new life in analytic philosophy Results in the semantical analysis of modal logic and reflection on a variety fof forms of modal discourse have conspired to bring to the center of the philosophical arena the Leibnizian idea that our world is not the only Possible world, that there are other possible worlds, and that itis the Rarious possible worlds that constitute the subject matter of modal dis Tours In this introductory essay, | want to provide a general survey of this Scnewed interest in the traditional thesis about modality. In the first see- Ton, 1 try 0 show how the Leibnizian idea came back into philosophy by discussing in an informal way the results of recent work on the semantics of modal logic. In the second section, | try to show how these results hook up ‘with our preanalytic intuitions about modality and to indicate how the framework of possible worlds might be thought to provide the machinery for clarifying a host of problematic forms of discourse; and in the las three estions, I diseuss the metaphysical issues raised by the appeal to that framework. : 15 peg ea. =m a a g a ee eee ees ce) eelogic, for incr investigations showed the pose Michael J, Loux 1 ‘Traditional logic viewed the ‘Systematization of modal ifference as a central reece lesician’s enterprise. In the Prior navies, Aveaate Provided sininsiaking analysis ofthe special problems razed ty mass inference, dover alos: books regularly included detaied presen ne the feouse SP Motel sylogimn, But cespie is impcasre tae cre. sails: the notion of a modal logic was ranted ait suspicion by lowicians in the firs haf o traced 6 the typicelly empiri Iytic philosophy, which em ‘modalities; and in part, extensional system formalized in the P modal ee 8: This it not to say that hee was no impor nen Minced ae nef hal of the esntury. C. 1. Lewis and oer vo anid oot, atta conditional of te Rustl-Whibead yee sony 12 SRP our Prepiosophial notion of plication die ge work ithe formalization of modal inference. Despite ie vine significance, roe wait work did more to harm than to help the cas ae ibility of constructing a lege number of nonequivalent theories of modal inferoen To show how this work might have doa incipia Mathematica represents ned! existing suspicions alou ‘nodal logis t want to focus on the ease of propositnee (2s opposed to Shia model logic; and 1 want to point io four nonequreaee ropo- odes nodal s9slems. AU four incorporate the various ynbate of non- vay roPosiional logic as wel as the symbols © (or Loaves (or Mf) [RR express, respectively, necessity and possibility? The weakest of the {our systems is called Mf (sometimes, 7), it takes oe ye ‘axioms all the ‘ruthfunetionaltautologies and the following two modal formulas; (0 38) > @4D08) @Qor>4 and has (wo underived rules: modus ponens and the rule of ne “cessation, Heart ue hat fa formula, A, is.a thesis of Mf Gorn axiom of ‘heorem of Mf), then C4 is also a thesis of M.A system stronger than M is, 1. and © ae ead, respecively, I is necessary that. sad sib. oF es possible that 10 operons are thea to he rani ah Mean he abe ine in emu of hs ee Drinitve, is introduced is flows: Ot = a 4 "Necosatly...* op Ieodetion Y called the Brouwer system, It contains Mf theses of the Brouwer systcm) bus formula » all the theses of Mf are dds to the axioms of M the Following @ADD04, Another system (S-4) is bull on Af by adding to the axioms of 4? not ® but @O4>004, ‘What is interesting about $-4is that the following two formulas 1 bie in it ®O4s004 © C4004 They allow us to take any formula incomporating a sting of i operators (j.e., a string of more than one occurence of = operator, e.g., OODODP) and to substi ‘Slevant sring is replaced by a single occurrence of the moda! over Seestion. Finally, theve is 3 system (S-5) which contains both the Sroswee System and S-4, We could obtain this system by adding both (3) and (4); but we can effect this more economies axioms of Mf the single formula OA DQ04 ‘The interesting feature of S-5 is that among its theorems are @ 04 = O04 and @) 04 = onA They allow us to take 2 formats prefaced hy «sting of two or mors medst Sree te eubathe the same or different (c.g., OOGODOp), and replace i by the same formula prefaced by the last operator in the string Gn example just given, © p). ‘There are, of course, othe: propositional modal systems; but reflection ph these fours sufficient to show why the diversity of moda logics shosta ve een thought problematic. What we want is theory that sy s ‘nodal inference. We want a theory that will enable us determine wiseB Michael J. Loux moda! ‘n‘orences are legitimaté and which not, but the four systems just ‘ive us four different answers to ths question: which propositional rodat in/orences are legitimate? Just which system, then, are we to take as the coset theory of propositional modal inference? Th might be thought that there is a straightCorward strategy for coming up with an answer here. We simply look to the axioms of the different systems 3nd compare them with our considered intuitions about matters modal. Pretty clearly, (1) and (2) are acceptable. (1) tells us that a necessary truth tentails (ne., necessarily implies) osly necessary truths, and that seems onect. (2), on the other hand, tells us that if a proposition js necessarily tive, ten vis true, and that seems 2s certain as anything. Things becom bit more complicated when we confront the more complex axioms generat~ ing the Brouwer system, S-4 and S-5; but even lire, it might be thought, a careful consideration of our modal intuitions will enable us to decide one Shay or the other. Consider (3). What (3) tells cs is that i a proposition is True, tien it is not just possible; its possibility is a matter of necessity. Now, if we think that the possibility attaching to a true proposition is not just a mater of contingency, that a true proposition does not jst happen to be possible, but that itis necessarily possible, then we will want to claim thatthe inferenees licensed by the Brouwer system are all legitimate modal inferences. If, on the other hand, we think, :n line with (4), that a proposi~ tion is necessarily tue only if its necessity is 1 matter of necessity, then we will take the inferences licensed by S-4 10 be one and all legitinate. Finally, if we think that both (3) and (4) represent the formalization of correct modal inference (jc. if we think ths the moda! status of a proposi- tion, no matter what that status, is 2 matter of necessity), then we commit ‘ourselves fo the view that S-5 provides a correct systematization of legiti- rate modal inference. “This line of thinking has a certain plausibility to it, but there are two problems. Firs, the assumption that everyone interested inthe systematiza- tion of modal inference has clear-cut intuitions about (3), (4), and (7) is likely hazardous. Philosophers frequently cisim to have no firm intuitions avall on these matters: they claim that it is just not intuitively clear what we are to say about the modal status attaching to modal propositions. But even if they are wrong about this, there is a second difficulty. If we take our intuitions to be decisive in determining our choice of a modal logic, then ‘we must remember that our original intuitions about the axioms generating the Brouwer system, S-4, and $-5 have to be tested, in tum, by our intuitions about the formulas derivable from: those axioms, But when we Introduction 19 reflect on the formulas derivable in these different systems, we are con- fronted with strings of symbols about which no one, 1 think, has any clear-cut intuitions. Consider (10) ODp 20000 p (11) ~(©0000q) v (004) (12) ~ (QODEDDOSr) & ~ GOON). (10) is derivable in the Brouwer system; (11), in S-4; and (12), in S-S. But ‘what are we to say about these formulas? Do they represent the symbotiza~ tion of trve modal principles? No one, | think, can answer this question ‘simply by reading out the formulas; andthe problem is not just that we are “unsure whether ‘If possibly necessarily p, then necessarily possibly possi- bly necessarily p” isa correct modal principle. Few, if any, of us have even the faintest idea what this sentence means 11 is not surprising, then, That the diversity of modal systems should have bbeen thought problematic in the first half of this century. The different systomts yield different answers to the question: which swodal inferences are legitimate? and our intuitions fail to cary us very far in determining which ‘answer to this question is correct. There is, however, another reason why Togicians had doubts about the notion of a modal logic. Lewis and other early figures in twentieth-century modal logic were successful in giving, iomatie presentations of the vations modal systems; but while they ste ‘ceeded in specifying the syntax for those systems, they failed to come up swith anything like a thoroughgoing semantics for the various modal sys- tems. They failed, that is, to identify models for those systems, sets of objects in terms of which the formulas ofthe systems could be interpreted. ‘The result was that modal logicians were incapable of defining the notion of & valid formula of a modal system and so were incapable of providing completeness proofs for the systems. ‘This second difficulty is not unrelated to the first; for in the absence of @ semantics, modal logicians lacked anything more than the ordinary lan- ‘guage renderings of Cand © as ‘Necessarily... * and "Possibly... "A clear-cut semantics for the various systems would provide us with models for the systems, sets of objects we could take the bare formulas of the system to be about; and presumably that would provide us with some ‘clear-cut intuitions as to what a choice from among the various nonequiva- Tent ealeuli actually involves. The stus of modal logic, then, was precarious in the First hair ives . : ie oe ee comes ee en ee 5I I I I I I I | | | of noncqufea a S4F¥eying the field inthe early fies found a variety Jee peguvalent systemstizations of legitimate eae inference, all of tient lacking the Kind of perspicuous semantics Associated with’ pure! cree aOhalis systems of logic. inthe late fifties and early sixties, how- runic te Were important breakthroughs inthe study of ‘modal systems. & ‘umber of different logicians (more or less concurrently) came up with ine) {0 Providing a semantics for modal logie, The intuitive core of poss 2 Wa the Leibnizan idea that necessary tu ic, truth across ali Possible worlds. The idea that we can provide a Leibaiice interpretation of wed np obi N85 NOK altogether novel. In the fortis, Rear Camap had by ee test Ou the implications ofthe Lebnisian tome ee >iodal logic Gy ference to-what he called state deseripions# For Camap, 2 state description is a maximally consisent set of atomic sentences, that is, a sea meee emenees such that for every atomie sentenas: ‘Sy either § ites mar ofthe se or the negation of $ isa member of thee, Camap's cca nM the notion of a tite description enables ns re explain what vrei) i the sease of foxieal truth amounts to fr, given ae wotion, te gi thst a semene is necessarily (logically) tree Justin case it is LeU INOY state description. The atempt to undersiagg modal logic in Leibni sya ihet» Was not new in the late fifties and early stares Testes mantcal investigations of that period wae ne « Laibizian notion of necessity across words tothe sae saol Medal systems. Those investigations showed now va could give a modatng he sae ie Modal operators in Leibnzian tenms wile ae enasit the fact that those symbols function as operant Ponequivaient modal systems. As {ave indicated, « number of logicians worked out a Leibnizian shal aes fof modal logic; but rather than generalize aboue their work, 1 shal foees on the work of just one of these writers Sear Kripke,? and £ {hall ty to spelt out the precise way in which he accommodated the Leibniaian theme in providing a semanties forthe toss ‘modal systems 1 Have outing. I shall firs discuss the ease of propositions’ vests logic; 5 NaH Como, Mein at Necesity (Chien: Uae of Ch se nopprne ee Rr Monin, Sig Kar, Da Se one iit Fg tun, as “Sons German Mal Cn de Pilsophien Caen G22) FT tine etal Ly. Reo (Oxlont cents New Yor: Oxi Unies es Te gan Hf Matty," Chapter 2 is Sloman a set of objects, G is one of defined over the members of, Of K as the set of all poss worl Introduction 1B US that “this is WWE ate fo suppose that iis antecedently tive to itself Having defined the nos notion of = model by tell ‘atomic sentences of Mf and Informally, the idea is that truth value in each world, Given 2 that-any nonatomie sentence of. ‘We need merely invoke the foll Formula is either true or false (2) ~ 4 is tee in W if and oF (©) (Av B) is true in it and only ife © @ Rules (a) and (6) gives us reci formulas em w. 9.4 is tue in W if and only if there i atleast one possi Wt such that W" is accessible to W and A is ime ino 2A is true in W if and only if for every world, 1” ey ‘ceessible 10H, is trae in W’ ding the truth ‘Sema Consieetiony ax Mods! Logie ible words; G is for det onal connectives ~ sig + Kripke tells us, we is to be thought of as, Gi and & represen a celation which Repke calls iors and others have called accessibility. In ‘elation in such a way toa world, 1”, itively, iy that a world, Wis possible » just in case every situation that o HW". Now, we are to suppose that R is defined of ace ase tht every world is ion of an M-model streture, Kripi 18 us that @ model is 2 # various possible worlds to the iruth ‘model assigns to each ‘del, we can determi ‘Mf has in say possible world lowing rules and the assump if A is false in w, is tue in W or 2 € actual possibility We are to understand this le relative to or accessi btains in W is possible in ver K in advanes xed just whi be ‘elatve to which, To get an M-model structee Subject to just one restriction: the relate ive; it has to be the that is, ich worlds are possi- » the specification is values. lof Ma the iuth value on that model; tion that every Wis2 Michael J. Loux ‘otis rth-fanetionalcomieetives enn be define in terms of those 17, (8) ain (i) provide us with the resources Sor determining the ruth value of fornniag embedding &, , and =, Ru'es (¢) and (J), on the other hand, invoke the Leibnizian notion that necessity is truth across all possible ‘woulds and that possibility is truth in some possible world; but given the Smtecedently defined notion of relative possibilty they restrict the Leibni- Tian idea by specifying thatthe caleulation of truth values for fonnulas embedding D and © need only consult the worlds accessible to the world svith respect to which we are assigning trth values to those formulas, ‘There are, of course, many different models for M, a& many as result fom assigning different truth values tothe atomie formulas of Min cach of the various possible works, Kripke defines the notion of vaidin-in-M by teling vs that a formula is M-valid jus in case it comes out true in all thodels on an M-mode! stricture. Informally, what this comesto is that a formula is M-valid just in case, when we restrict the accessibility relation nly by specifying that it be reflexive, the formula comes ovt rue in all posible worlds under all assignments of truth value to its atomic con- Pihuents in those worlds. Given this definition of validity-in-M, Kripke Nav able to prove the completeness of Mf, to show, that js, tht every ornula that ix M/-vatid can be derived ly soceessive applications of the rules of At ‘What is significant in the defiiton of vatidity-ineM, then, isthe Wea that relative possibility must be reflexive. That the relation must be reflex- ive comes out when we reflect on the asiom @ o4>48 We want this axiom to be valid, that is, to come true in every work, W tinder every assignment of truth value to Aint W. Now, take any arbitrary World, I; EIA D A contes out False in 1” in only one case, viz, the ease Where GA is true in 1, but yt is false in IY. But for C4 to be true in W, A ‘must be true in all worlds accessible to W/. Thus, if 4 > 4 is to come out falsg in W, A must be true in all worlds secessible to W, but false in itself; and this can happen only If W jx not possible relative to itself, 5, Kripke’ setegy here involves the use of semantic iableaux which provide dagramma- sic wets for validity inthe various systems; the completeness proofs show that every formula thts poses the dagrammati est for vlty In » given system is provable in tat systems, ‘ure fetal ofthe actual proofs go beyond the ivormal presentation given here. {. Asiom (1) (464,034 A) >(@A DO A) is wesker han (2) in nt requiring hat any restctions be ple onthe secesiity ration Iurodution xf j ence, to ensure validity for (1) (as well us forall Formulas derivable from i, we need merely make the relation of accessibility reflexive. in defining the notion of validity-in-the Brouwer system, Kripke intro: duces the notion of a B-model structure, where a B-model structure is like fan M-mode! structure except that the relation of accessibility is further restricted, It is not simply reflexive, but symmettical as well; that is, in « ‘B-mode| structure the relation of relative possibility is so defined over the ‘various possible worlds that each world is possible relative to itself and for any worlds, W and 17", if W is possible relative to W”, then W" i, in tum. possible relative to W."Then, Kripke tells us that a formula is B-vaig just. fh ease it comes out true in all models on a -model structure (Le, just ir case it comes out tru in all possible worlds under all interpretations of i: I ‘tomic constituents when the relation of accessibility is taken to be both reflexive and symmetrical). That reflexivity is required here is obvious ‘when we recall that the Brouwer system contains M, but that symmetry ilso is required becomes clear when we reflect on the additional axion required to generate the Brouwer system: i @ 42004 ‘Again, we want 9) Io be valid, to come out trae in all possible worlds Ander all interpretations of A. $0, take any arbitrary world, W; 4 >DOA comes ovt false in in only one case, the case where A is true in W, bu DOA is false in W. Now, DOA is false in W only if there is 2 wor! accessible to W for which there is no accessible world in which 4 is tru. ‘But since we are assuming that is true in W, this ean happen only if W i rot accessible to all the worlds acesssible to it, To ensure, then, that (2 never comes out false in cessiiily be symmetrical Kripke similarly defines valdity-in-S-4 in terms of truth jn every mode fon an S-é model structure, where an S-4 model structure is like a Hemodel sicture except that relative possibilty is stipulated to be both reflexive ant transitive, ie., to be'such that each world is possible relative {o self and jfa world, Wy, is possible relative to a world, Wz, and anothe ‘world, Ws, is possible relative to W, then Ws is possible relative to Ws. ‘As in the case of the B-model structure, the $- model structure has to be reflexive since S-4 contains M; but transitivity is required as well. Cor sider the axiom generating S-4: possible world, we need only require that @) OAD 0A.‘Michac! J. Loux We Want (4) to come out true of truth value to 4. But again consider an arbitrary. world, W. (4) comes Out false in W i ase where Da is tre in W and Oa ot tana Me this requires that A be true in all Worlds accessible to W, but false in some world accessible 1 a world seeessible to WIE, however, We insist that relative possibilty be transhve, this cannot happen; for since 7 iele ca essibe to any world accessible to W orth secessible 19 1 halt CA wil be tue in W only f OA eee wel nally, Kripke defines 5 in terms of truth in ev pong (nse! structure, where this as tne, except that relative Possibility is ken to be an equivalence 1 is, iis a relation dhat Guy Ns Smell, and anskive. All of te Properties are re. Se, ee SS contains both the Brouwer system aoe S, for which the ccessblity relation is reflexive-symmeticat sn reflexive-transitive re Sion given the definitions of valaiy-inae Brouwer system, weuligrln-S-4 and valdivy-in-S-5, Kripke women Prove the éompiete thon ton Bacts AhoWwing tha every fon thee in one of these ystems is provable in thal sysen Nok, Sortesponding to each of the four propositional modal ‘Fscussed, there is 3 system of quantified soon logic. systems T Bach contains 2. Cortity tema inci esc of mn nl ogo 0. Quine, wn as trie tsb ‘ht ne fw dena W ‘eter sited ee (what be calls Aristittian essen false. Quine asks the dese ih & nde OF ated muda! gic Necessity, nine is greaer tha seven ©) Bo (ecesaiy, is pater than seven Since (6) Nine is be mater of planus ism G + i Ut Woop fo be ale ise) by wap of {0 Neseooil, Ws mbes of pants et san sen i Moear, ares eal fg Tiee thence of wopeysittions wae preg iting se abs. i fake Aces fo Quine, the on Preserving the ir of (0), and with ele imaey of qusniicsion ne odin by denying tat mods is mater alas tise inrrctton oF weal sete, ts depenls on he tage devees "as “ene a ts nis neces es site cates Sry om ae wat eign deg PS fomer itd rm oie way sping Geog race aed Modality, Introduetion 2 ai ofthe theses ofthe propositional nodal logic in question, all of the theses of frst order predicate logic, and modal fomvolee vrs ing the See ioe dtsnlfication. Toward defining validity for each of Shere eee aticaTPhe intwoduces the notion of a quanificational mods! ane cope aiid model structure of one ofthe four srt we have sonsioneny eet witha function that asigns to each world a setof obiane gent rely, Kripke ells us, we arto think ofeach such eet as the no of objects aon pn Pattiowla possible world. He alls these sets domains feo ie We can aa ne olds ad symbolizes the union ofthese domuins ty The naerink OF Aas the set ofall possible objects. Next, Kripke denne: thc notion of a quantification 1, telling us that this i binary Function from predicate expressions and possible worlds to sete of tuples of ob- Hes Informally, what a quantificational model docs is provide ty interp he Predicate expressions of our systems; for each pred: Sraroetble wort, it assigns a set of ordered n-tuples of obese Cate insletons Tor one place predicates, sets of oxeted pairs fer vec place Peach Ste) We ae ty think of these sets as the extensions cr aeeesnts i the vatious worlds, te sets BE n-tples which in neck ee Haag various predicates. Using the notion of a quantification gen Ksipke gives us directions for determining te th valve ther vere fornul io the various systems has inthe different worlds on = gives quantifica- Forme yok NE have altealy seen how to dotermine the uth vale ae {putas incorporating propositional comectives and moda 4 ators at we need are directions for determining the truth vale of formulas Fine naabe Predicate expressions and the apparatus of quantification, Ly Eins these drecions, Kripke begins with te case of unquantifec omic formulas of the form Fx,,..., sy. He tells us that @ determine ¢ fe Linsky, Reference and Modality, p. 30 defend Arisoclian escent, Bui Quine tes 2 uim view ofthis csi is po ist of my pan... And in coueusion Iyay. Sen aenied mgs Cid, p3), ialy Gaes ene Te day Rtn. and «hes ter piper stow tng pee eee lee dos ot com is proponents bs Aral OF & semantics for mil loge sophers eae to I Tamework fo wiephysics, Since Quine's uithcues ae ened py ass control i cen dcusign’ coo ae the bey of ty essay. to in Litshy'sauhology Reference eis tno oF te pivotal paper oncered wid Que’ obeeting Toi and ths intrested ener date ota analogy id Mg ied oat| 6 Michal J. Loos value tiv a formula of this form has in a world, W, on a chosen quantifica- ona! inodel, we must assign objects from % to the variables 215... si Hf the s-tuple of objects assigned these variables belongs to the set of mtuples sihich the model in question assigns “F” in W, then Fit, » Xn ty tue in W on that model; otherwise, it is false in W. Combining this ecount with Kripke's account of the truth-funetional connectives and the modal opertiors, we have the tools for dctermining the truth value of an ngoanified formula of any degree of compleity. Now, if we beat 9 aid that ascriptions of truth value to a formula are always made relative to quantfiestional model and relative to an assignment of objects in Ato the Torln's free variables, we can summarize Kripke’s trealment of quan ‘Ghod formulas by saying that where Fx, yy.» 9% 15a formula with Siecae ym as free variables, () (¥ X)(FX, Yay ++ Ya) is tue ina worlds W, just in case Fx, ‘Ya comes out true in W regardless of how we readjust the value of x with objects from 1 snd (3) (B3MFss You. 090) is uc in a world, WV, ust in ease there is at Teast one object in W” which, when construed as the Value of x, makes # Jn come out {rue in W.. These rules provide us with the resources for determining the trth conditions that any formula from one of our four systems of quantified nodal logic has in a possible world on 2 quantificational model, so that uth these rules before him, Kripke can say that a formula is vali (in the “guanifcadonal version of MB, S-4, or SS) just in ease it comes out toe Jal! qoantificational models on 2 (M-, B-, S-4, or S-5) quantficatonal model -iructure; and using this definition, he ean go on to prove the completeness of each of these systems.* T have focused on Kripke's version of the Leibnizian strategy for dealing swith modal logic; but as I indicated earlier, other logicians developed Miemative versions of essentially the same strategy, and what their com ‘bined “Tort gives us is a semantics for modal logic. It takes the purely syntactical treatments of modal inference sound in the work of logicians like Lewis and shows how we can define validity forthe bare formulas of the different modal systems. Thus, their work serves to handle the second jeuliy we pointed to in our original discussion of modal logic; but thelr 1, My cincession ofthe semanties for quantified moa loge is necessary oversimplified. ‘One ere haut donot sets concerns the poplton ofthe varows wos. Ar possible cers eter than G40 be populated wih eects wo found in. C7 Ae wor! poptations areescsOers aovrers to sich questions Fave imperian consequeness fr one's aiid sort Toe to poate one’s annwersdstenine weer oF wot the Baran fora (Ys) Dyer Dl e¥apFa) and tis eonvere (CHa) Fx 3 (Ys) Cx) come ou ald Intraduetion n Leibrizian strategy also seems to provide a framework for handling the first difficulty, that of deciding just which among the many nonequivalent systems provides the correct account of the range of legitimate modal inference. What their work suggests is that in all the systems we have Considered the modal operators function as something like quantifiers over possible worlds. D functions as a kind of universal quantifier its applica- tion to a formula, A, yields a second formula that is true in a world, W, just tease the original formula, A, is true in every world that is possible relative to H?; whereas © functions as a kind of existential quantifier; the result of applying it toa formula, A, isa formula true in a world, W, justin tase there ig at feast one world accessible to W in which A is true. The Gifferent systems agree, then, in that their modal formulas are to be under- stood in terms of quanitification over accessible worlds; they differ in that tach places different restrictions on the accessibility relation. In M, the relation is merely reflexive; in the Brouwer system, reflexive and symmet~ in Sod, reflexive suid transitive; and in-S-5, reflexive, symmetrical, nd (rnsitive, The Leitmizian strategy, then, gives us something Tike a pieture of what the various modal systems are about and provides an ecount of how the differences in those systems depend on the various restrictions we place on the accessibility relation. But, then, our choice of a sodal system need not be dictated by our very shaky intuitions about the Complex formvlas of those systems. We can rather ask ourselves which pisture best conforms to out notions of modal inference. Suppose that our Concem is with metaphysical (as opposed, say, 10 physical or causal) necessity and possibility? Invoking the Leibnizian account of the various modal systems, we can answer this question by asking another: Do we think that what is metaphysically necessary or possible can vary across possible worlds? If we answer the question affirmatively, then we commit ourselves to the view that M, the Brouwer system, or S-4 provides # 9, Metaphysical modality is whst Alvin Plantings cals broaily logis! modality. The tion of metaphysis! possibility I narrower than that of stil logialposiiiy (Where = rae om ir poe js in cave sno he negation ofa hes of 23) st der ore) re Ppncader thon iat of essa or physical possiblity (where » proposition is posible js in ie tse aot incompatble wih fe laws of rte). fs the sense of possibility at work neath ofthe following i) this posible that this page bared (Gi) Ars posse dat Jimmy Caner ron 2 two minute mie, Gi) 1 pose dat there Be no Inman eines Metaphysical necessity and possiblity wil concern usin the remainder ofthis ex :. vss 4. Lous Jatouetion 2» a rod temizaion of legitimate inference of the ‘etaphysically | te nl Sms) Seems to hinge onthe notion ofa posible word, tr we ae Son of eo one Posible world 1 another If howcver oe ieee | 2 Sense thee relly ae pose vende ie than our own and that in I te hold that what is metaphysically possible or afta anf | This atleast is what ey wee Kripke's version of Leibnizian seman. join mon pire ssbl Stuation or state of ata ie sear’ then we AS SuBbests, Dut here one might object that my presentation misleading, omeet nao OSPET in thinking tbat iis $5 that protege tivong |° Theeticizm would be that while Kile snp ropnents of the I Correct theory of inference bearing on ne'aphysical modality; for itis only Bizian strategy informally talk Of possible worlds und possible objects, they along fede Setar, where sesesebily in equine rater, Ott |, sw eatefl 9 distinguish tis pass" itive pictore from the set sent tt fo fone every world at accessible to ee Only 8.5 the oma, machinery employed in thse Semanics. isthe ine ens worlds, oo ae ht Lelbsizion dea that necessity fetnah sores op possible ‘he fone, the critic contends, that is essential to the Leibnizians project I roe gee that i we take metaphysical modality to be hee or invariant, ec ee would have us think ofthe various meat the Lenin strategy suggests that we conan SS as the corset theory Te paely uniterpreted systems of inscription incomporsing¢ q Of legitimate modal inference. wlan) and two kinds of rules: (1) rules that Hence the ance g Teens te se PuOrs out of the primitive vocabulary and (@) mace tee es hh Ee aitelonment ors semantics for mot ogierpase a important ken). Niewed in these toms, the various systemn ve sek enn f I Breakthrough in the study of modat inference. stave lite to alter the views se ate t0 define the notion of validity for these syatome; eed inact who insisted tha no sense ean be mad wt Se a, 2SEME, {0 consitue them as languages about ene wee potion Or iar ot bos dchard extensions whe sgn ‘identified the oma sms Of which we can give sense tothe concept ot sine gehen Phosgene wa ith H8 nation of an extensional syeery on for the formula in the system. But, of objcets is Becessiry and contingent, passibie Provided moda! iogic sant euil insist that any sos of objects which satiey the fosnah e ith a80lid foundation, Furthermore, he somemtee strategy developed by Seat imposed by Kripke's account, ean pay the role of fant Thus, J Kits 2 ots proved w nave spe reread tie field of modal | ite we ton fo noe PUPOEES, choose to tink of Kms the wey sebic for it was discovered that by adapiing the Semantical apparatus of cron totds and ashe se of al possible objects, noting ne ipke's | toon atts the specia contexts of tense logis cornea logio, and Semantics commits uso this choice; and our eet hs Waar losic, cach ofthese nonextensionalsystens cove also be provided Point hols forthe asounts provided by oer proponent | rll the Letnizin trategy may giv laity othe study of nonex- existence of no peculiar objects whatesoy too areas itm it might be tought thatthe price the see, oxacte is "her is surly something right inthis erie, To the ent Taesring, the task of defining validity for these systems Joss ot require us 10, Acyl words nod be ese eine ile 85 ml ie mink OF Krpke's K and, for example, assets of possible wena and | te stn ea a ae wroeiels Any objets tat can be construed at having Ba ons ve he eet tenon inept ot mtn ye the questa td by the semavtes will do as members of K and ie Ber Chay MES SAMS 5 yee tae oe cxivalence i dheston ist Cnn we really think of the modid sysene the way | toss, Stegested? The answer, { think, is that we eannot if we are tot ke them to30 Michael J. Loux tbe systems of madal logic, systems tht provide theres of legitimate oe france. The point here is that as ong fs we tke A the Brouwer rvaten, So, and S-5 as systems of wnntereresed inscriptions with 90 sen ie at all with the sentences of ordinary discourse CF the caregests, invoke any formally adequate ses of obs in defining sai for those systems. Buf we take them a5 ode ORY theories oF vara inference, ten we have o suppose tat the oe ‘making up the ae those systems are tings that are plausibly Hoe of as con mod ine sbjet mater of modal discourse and while he ee that there soe powsble wor ober than the actual may inal QPP problematic, ar Powe iclt tobe convinced both that the ideas eres respectable ici aee i encapsulates a compaling account of the sublect maler of ‘modal discourse. a eth possible words, we want to sy, that hey PSST an Dave pie of metaphysical machinery, the armchah invention of speculative ontologist lacking what "Bertrand Russell called “a robust sense sree” But the fact is that refletion on some of ou Hest deep-seated of eae that he appeal fo possvle worse nothing mors ee & ine ear generally eld. prephilosophical views shoe ese fomalieatge at Teast mos) of us think that dings might RO Eo ra pat there are different ways things might have bse alternative others ght have gone; and we tendo tink that hese TGS wravgc ign Rave been constitute the touchstones for determine ‘the truth things rie fences prefaced by modal operators. Thus, we nk Of the value epecesery that wo pl two equals four” a the claim (ht 8 cl things might ave been, so matter Row things MBN Mes saerced rom the way they actually ar, two pus two Would TAYE equaled differ Mepis suggests tat tn ordinary clcouree we take the neeessh See ro he the ind of universal quanti the seman’ of Kripke and rer ess it is. We do not, of course, alk of “posible wore" at ae ensopher’s name fr the diferent ways things might have Dect ne Riess, we seem to recognize that thee are suc thingy and with MRopet other that we ake ourecivest be talking when We say "ests Hess" the sane way, when we sty hat night Bas tumed out or it yd uave happened that Fimmy Carters secretary of ate, we Sem 6 be Saying that hee is atleast one way things might have 606, such that had eee pe ha way, Jimmy Carter would have been sereary of Sst and tay Bore rnc be aking Te mght have tamed out that. oF“ MiB re ppened that...” (ur ovdnary language counterparts © the losi- niroduetion a an's ‘tis possible that... °) a8 a kind of existential quantifier OF posible worlds and to be construing those worlds asthe things that make four possibility-claims true or false." > ‘or ter ur discussion has focused on the nation of mosality de dict, he notion of necessity and possiblity ait applisto propositions: and we nave moni the idea that modal discourse is discourse about possible words © pane eal plausibility here. But there are other forms of discourse fr teh posrble words interpretation seems equally plausible. Consiter Trica of what is ealed modality de re. Whereas de dicto moéally ar ches to propositions, an acription of de re modality specifies the mods aioe ofan object's exemplifcaion ofan attribute Thus, we think tat the sna or hree necessarily or essentially exemplifies the property of Pein Prime but only contingent, the property of being fascinate Quine. Prerae, we distinguish between Jimmy Carter's exemplifying the Prop: Tyo being a person and his exemplifying the prope of being presi sryse United States: the former, we says is necessary oF essentials the t= ee enly contingent or accidental, In all these cases, what wo say 701068 we peal tothe notion of de re modality. We can get atthe Siference Baearde dicto and ce re modality if we Suppose that Kripke fs now thinking about the number three and then refiect on (013) Necessarily, the thing Kripke is thinking about is prime and (14) The thing Kripke is thinking sbout is necessarily prime, (13) favolves an ascription of dedicto modality and (14) an ssrivin of sexe modality. Whereas itis, subject to ovr supposition about Kripke, ‘uae to think that (14 is tre, ther are compeliing reasons for ink ne rat ¢13) is false. (13) tells us that a certain proposition, the proposition that the thing Keipke is thinking about is prime, is necessarily tre, that it could ot have been false. But this is implausible, for surely it could have tured fut that Kripke is thinking of something else, sty Quine; but hae things tured out that way, the propestion thatthe thing Kripke is thinking about ie prime would have been false. (I), however, makes no claim at a oct the modal situs ofa proposition. I simple tells us thatthe thing Kripke is thinking about has and has neeessurily the propery of being prime; i tells 11 This isthe view argued for in David Lewis" “Possible Works," Chapter 9 ofthis aathotogy. 3prin. pug st he thing in question could no: have existed without being amber aeecite® Me recall that Kripke is, in foot thinking about the ‘ule thre, that claim seems true enough Fi i But while scriptions of de re modality are not 9 be identitied with | Tee abtions of de acto modality, itis plausible to ink that the former, like | ths later, involve a reference to possible woee other than the one that is Sri. Thus. when we say that Jimmy Carter hes the, Property of being a ro aa necessarily oF essentially (that Fimmy Carter ‘0 be a person), Michael J, Loux | cnly eontingenty president ("He's president a ‘ight; but he needn't have ent Ford might say 10 console himself), we one to be saying that while: this individu resident, things might have tumed ont CEtTeteuty, so that he would, say, have fost the election of 1976, tn both sade We, sins ate plausibly construed as claves about Possible worlés. We seom to be claiming, in ihe fie case, that Jimmy Stet ts the propery of being a person ia the rece world and in every SIME Possible world in which he exist, and, in she second, that while Jimmy Carter is president in the actus] ‘world, there are possible worlds ‘where he exists but fails to achieve that distings ‘The ide that possible worlds are elements in the ontology to which we eases, th SIN atin ac oar ce tan Sees fatter Wg ange sy ges eto | Soper me at nar MB {0 Re oven ati sex, den x ecm Per“ ad “p deputne for proper ames) is esesiy tue fi ng Ad rope, su «en hand {hnicl wil @ sl erent @ vrewory in theses re I sl ees onic ju inine encmplis Pg wong alt tegen. Fn Weel strain af a Se a Tae co anes De Rew Be Dim," Mat 3 (OH sve tony tcen dErémodaiy end posible wre epucs oy ee Oi Weniy 0 Werltound indiuas” Chaps Napa anihoiogy "stam 2nd Powsbie Wed.” Chaper1¢ of th anon 18 de commit ourselves in lection on counterfact our nox philosophic discourse is likewise ! discourse, While the p (15) IfNixon had not resigned, there would have bee ‘are not explicitly modal, Propositions in resisting anal Sirietly extensionalise the fom “If it were been) the case that q We are likely 4g ‘counterfactual ci reason explicitly mot Uhings (possible worlds othe: than ontology required for standard exter growing number of philosopi intuitions. Counterfactual Course about possible worlds; but tual discourse agrees with explicit tn important difference. re) involve quantifc articular counterfactual ‘more narrowly eircumse the pennant, Toronto we World where the Blue Jays win the obviously are possible worlds wher fow, if uy, of the citizens of claim, hese the is very “close” to, ible world whielt is as ud be (Would have lnims about how things have act rity here is no nec analysis for precisely th claims are sbout 86 resists an extensionalist oes: counterfactual he actual world) that go be ‘onal discourse. In recent hers have tried to give substance » they have argued, is in: they have insisted that while ily modal discourse on this score. YY (whether de dic Ascriptions of modalin al! possible worids; but claim, the referen: ribed. When I say thet if the Bi Toronto find the even its eye 10 just one passibh ry similar to the actu ctl world as is eu, 14, two cena tis in islaker ("4 Theory af Condon." Aesth (Onford: Bail Blechwall, 15 Mass: Harvard University ds spprosch to souneeicvals in Studies tn Losical Theory, Davie Lewis (Counter» veoaintan | stn the Blue Jays" winning the pennant i 294 am saying thatin that wine Toronto goes wild. More generally, Nese theorists have proposed wor counterfactual ofthe form ‘IF it were We Ce that p, then it would be an ee that q” is a claim about that wore “which resembles the actual theo closely as is compatile with P's being Oe init, the claim that in won id is toe. tis dificat nat to nd ‘proposal attractive, for it apres the insight that when we, Ik oF think counterfactually We ae coord with ways things might Nave Bone PAL «id not; and it does this ceive accommodating our intuition that there 162 iifference between coun Terfactual and explicitly modsl feeper ae of aiseourse that has of ie PS claimed to be about possible worlds is talk sbout meaning: ‘Pitosophers of an extensionalist pone always, found easing ak (rouse ‘The problem with Prcanings, they lave told us is ht they Bek $2 ghtforward principles of ~Spivioation and clear-cut erteria of en ‘Some ofthese thinkers have proposed that we simply ive up talk oe reaning, but others, unwilling a mage in such das conceptual revision, MME tried to elucidate the Mae et meaning in terms of the mmare TansPart ‘concept of reference. In rao extreme form, this aprosch denties He meaning of a nonlogical Ue Messon with its extension singular tems ‘said to take their referents rrr meanings, the meanings of preicsto ers 2 ‘identified with the eof n-tuples which satisfy them, and sentence’ TA nid to have as theit a cTpge the trth values. But while it may appese ‘make meaning-talk mepoctble, this extreme form ofthe retest theory of meaning fails to te a sfieientl fine-grained account of ‘meanings: coreferential singular sive a ont be synonymous, as do coextenshe predicates and sen- wes ith the same rath vale. Defenders of referential theory have terehly recognized the short comings ofthe tec) ofits extreme form and wear a o expres its contra nsight in ways avoid these difficulties na ensonalty Iti notorious, bower, that NE attempts have not been very successful sr er coextensonalty problems sight lead one conclude that the referential’ strategy 182 philosophical dead ‘end and to tempt one either rerio the skeptics and reject tal of meaning or 1° bite the bullet and 15, my scout ne is oben in sams of WaT thing, the court nce he pment ohne outers WA academia are neces fae: nes We meen fe fil in scons that perhaps since Pea on er way af ms) wm ctw ts “ls i etal worl tniroduetion 35 take as primitive the occult entities extensionalsts Rave had so much fon aie dng: Nevertheless, thre is somebing atrative in he idea that the dering ean can be undersiood in ers of the notion of extension. saree ges th idea attractive ithe insight that to know the MEAT ofa Wns Mp be able to fix ts extension. To know the meaning of a predicate vey for example, i to be able to determine which objots of tuples of Gojcts satisfy it and to Know the meaning of 2 dee lrative sentence is to ow under which conditions it comes out tues sr owing numberof writers have been arguing (hal = ¢% preserve ane Jajgnt while avoiding the dificlies associated With standard ref ins Tal aberies,"® Those theories go wrongs tMEY SeSH=, not in elsiming creaming ean be explicated in refercatial rms in SHPO tht Ha eternal Tore of aterm ea Be identified simply by eferones 0 verual objects. Thy printout hat we use inguisti expressions no merely seiing about how things actually are, but in talking about Hom they Tight have een; and what his shows, they cai, i a8 the referential meh an expression extends beyond objects inthe actual wor fo objects sora posite worlds. Meaning is a referential concept and so mis be alyzed in terms of the notion ofan extension; but its i ‘amodal notion ari nonce, isto be explicated in possible-worlds (erm “Toward accom aa pore eve two facets ofthe notion of meaning, defenders of “modal eeaeelisn’* usally tell us thatthe meaning of @nonlogica} expression reer peeretcal entity, 2 function from posible world to exsensons: isa tion that assigns to each possible word the extension the XPS. i ame hen oe se itn talking about that workd- Thus, snghlar Wms Sion tas My meanings function from world to objets the meaning of 97 parece predicate isa function from worlds ose of ors nnawples; and the meaning ca Mjectarative sentence is a funetion from worlds to truth values. Wee er area of discourse that has traionaly proved probleme (Ot te ete i tak about tings like properties, relations, indvisne we topts, and propositions, Extensionaists have typically attempted 10 . for any property, 7. 8 has P at 1 \We ean, then, show the compatibility between transtemporal individuals re the indiscemibilty of identicals in either of these two waysi bub proponents of ransworld individuals urge, parallel moves in ths transworld rier enable us to accommodate the invitvely appealing idea that there r= cise itive ways things might have gone for one and the same individual svthout rejecting the Indiscemibility of Ydenticals. We can efther 1ake ropes to be world-indexed (90 that x single individual has the eitinet re compatible properties of being-P-in-W and being-not in P-in-H), oF 3 can take the indiscemibility of iGenticuls to require both world and time ‘quantifiers, reading it as follows: For any object, and any abject, y, if x is identical with 9» ther or any property, ay wor Wand any times fas Pin WY ate if and only if y has 2 in WY at Inireduetion a and in ether ease identity across worlds tums out to be no mnore problema- tie than the idea of identity across times. “The second argument asks us to take a pair of distinct objects, «and y, and an ordered series of worlds, W,)... Wy» andl to make successive identity-preservng interchanges of properties in «and y as we move from fone world in the series to ils sneeessor; the argument contends that the tulfimate result of these interch is an interchange in identity itself, wreh is supposed to be incompatible with the transitivity of identity, Proponents of transworld individu: ‘however, insist that the argument fails to recognize a pair of properties that cannot inelligibly he thought of tr interchanged—the individual essences or haecceities of x and y. In the initial world, 1,, x has the property of being identical with x and y has the propery of being denial with y. But a requirement of preserving identity ae move from any workl, Ws» to its successor-world, Wiss, is that x have its identity-property in'both 1, and Wie, and similarly for ys but, re ost have the propery of being iditeal with x nthe lst word in the series, WV, and y must have the property of being identical with y in thet world; bet that, defenders of transworld individuals argue, is sufficient to ensure that s-in-W is dential with x-in-W, and similarly for y. Our interchanges may show that many of the properties of x ean be properties Sy and vice versa, but they fail to show thatthe defender of trnsworld Sndvidats is commited to denying the transvitiy of identity hut, of course, this appeal to individual essences or haeescities plays treet int the harals ofthe thi argument, for even if the appeal to fseceltis enables the defender of trinsworid individuals to preserve the Uninciness of x and y across the series of aujacent worlds, he seems forced to deny that we ean consult ay “empirically manifest propery in determining whieh object is which in a given world. Prety clearly, the properties of being identical with x and being identical with y a not Trpiteslly manifest properties by appeal to which we can make any non- Shrular headway in resolving questions of identity; but, then, x in one svorid ean be empirically indiscernible from y in another, and vies versa. rod that seems to mean that we have no workable criteria of identity and Aitference here, so that talk of identity and difference would appear o be, seihe third angumeat contends, unintelligible in the transworld case, 23, See Chisholn’s “enliy hough Possible Words; Some Quexions." Chater 3 of higtaology, and Plantings's“Tiéesworld Klett or Worklhnond Ividsls?" Chapter 7 fof tis abology. 7 24, Soe taming’ ence,” Milosphica Review, 79 (1970), A61-A92. t ‘ t —-— — oo