Heirs of Rabandon v. Rabandon, et al.

G.R. No. 165014

July 31, 2013

Facts:
Respondents filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession of
the subject property from petitioners, seeking as well the payment of damages. They alleged that
the subject property was owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana Bacalso, pursuant to
Decree No. 98992. Although such document was lost during the last World War, its existence
could still be shown by a certification (LRA certification) issued by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), among other things. Petitioners on the other hand contended that they inherited
the subject property from their predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, who bought the foregoing even
before the second World War. The title thereto was lost, but the property had been declared by
them for taxation purposes and they paid the corresponding realty taxes due thereon.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that they had the better right to the
ownership and possession of the subject property. It based its conclusion on the fact that the
subject property was declared by petitioners for taxation purposes and that they paid the realty
taxes due thereon. The CA, upon appeal, reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that
respondents had the better right of ownership and possession over the subject property. It
observed that, apart from the self-serving testimonies of some of the petitioners, the only
evidence adduced by them in support of their claim are mere copies of tax declarations and tax
receipts over the subject property.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents have the better right over the subject property.

Ruling:
Yes, respondents have the better right over the property. The probative value of
petitioners’ evidence, which consist of tax declarations and tax receipts, pales in comparison to
that of respondents’ evidence which consists of a decree of ownership, i.e., Decree No. 98992,
under the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana. While the actual copy of the said
decree was lost, the existence of the said decree was actually proven by the LRA certification
and the daybook entry. It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and
rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the
decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the
property registration decree. Besides, tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the
basis of a claim for ownership when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property. In this case, records are bereft of any showing that petitioners, or any of their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in actual possession of the subject property prior to 1989 as
they claim. The tax declarations and tax receipts are insufficient to prove their proffered theory
that their predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, was the lawful possessor and owner of the foregoing
property even before the last World War. In fact, petitioners altogether failed to prove the
legitimacy of Remegio's possession and ownership since they failed to present the pertinent deed
of sale or any other evidence of the latter's title.
 Balais-Mabanag vs Register of Deeds of Quezon City
G.R. No. 153142
March 29, 2010

Facts:
On January 19, 1985, a document entitled receipt of down payment was executed by the
Coronels, stipulating the receipt of down payment from Ramona Alcaraz through her mother,
respondent Concepcion Alcaraz, with the sum of ₱50,000.00 as down payment on the total
purchase price of ₱1,240,000.00 for their "inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City." Soon after, the subject property was transferred in the
names of the Coronels after which they sold the same property to the petitioner for the higher
price of ₱1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum of ₱300,000.00. For this reason,
the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down payment of
₱50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona. Concepcion then filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages in her own name in the RTC which ruled in favor of Concepcion.
Upon the finality of the RTC Decision, petitioners together with the Coronels questioned
Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was correct in challenging Ramona’s qualifications to
acquire land.

Ruling:
No, the petitioner is not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualifications to acquire
land. Moreover, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land
will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in
favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.
Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative
shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically
state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien
transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the
Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the
violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the
transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to
the previous owner or any other individual.
 Heirs of Johnny Aoas vs Juliet As-il
G.R. No. 219558
October 19, 2016

Facts:
As-il filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages against the Heirs of Aoas before
the MTC, claiming absolute ownership and possessory rights over the 42 square meter portion of
a parcel of land. She alleged that she, by her predecessors and successors-in-interest, had been in
actual, open, physical, and notorious possession of the subject property. She discovered that the
Heirs of Aoas, by stealth and strategy, initiated the preparatory digging, clearing and construction
of a house and enclosing the subject land, thus, depriving and dispossessing her of the same, and
that when confronted, they asserted ownership of the same property. As such, As-il asked the
MTC to order the Heirs of Aoas to vacate the subject property and that compensation be given to
her as well as damages and attorney's fees. In their Answer, the Heirs of Aoas contended that the
area As-il claimed was their property, it being part of a land registered in their names. They
likewise claimed that As-il asserted her claim over the property after they had already built the
residential house on the same property.

Issue:
Whether or not an ejectment suit under Rule 70 of the RoC is the proper remedy for the
case.

Ruling:
No, an ejectment suit under Rule 70 of the RoC is not the proper remedy for the case.
From a deeper analysis of the records and attendant circumstances, it is clear that this case deals
not with the right to possess the property. Instead, the main discussions went around the
boundary dispute between the contending parties over the land. This is apparent from the fact
that the properties being claimed by both parties are covered by separate certificates of title and
overlapped each other.
Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be resolved in the
context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. In Manalang v. Bacani, the
Court held that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves
different issues, to wit: The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration
or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendant's possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff
and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
 Pilar Dev’t Corp. vs Dumadag
G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for
allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter
property. In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material allegations of the
Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has
jurisdiction and authority over them. The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to
possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that
only the local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession
or ownership.
Anchoring its pleadings on Art. 630 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the
portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for
public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public
dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence,
the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably
with Arts. 428 and 539 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is the owner of the portion of the subject property occupied by
respondents.

Ruling:
No, petitioner is not the owner of the portion of the subject property occupied by
respondents. While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the
servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635
thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established for public or
communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the
absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."
By virtue of the special laws related to the same, it was proven that petitioner’s right of
ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along
the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial court’s
opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the
subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement
purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is
public land. Likewise, the Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over
the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is
immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their
possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
 Naga Centrum, Inc. vs Sps. Orzales
G.R. No. 203576
September 14, 2016

Facts:
The plaintiffs-appellees own a house and lot which is surrounded on the North by the
property of Aurora dela Cruz; on the West, by the property of Bernardo Tawagon; and on the
East and South, by the property of the defendant-appellant. They alleged that when they acquired
their property in 1965, their access to the public highway (Valentin Street) was through Rizal
Street, which forms part of a property now owned by the defendant-appellant. But when the
squatters inhabiting said place were evicted, the defendant-appellant caused Rizal Street to be
closed by enclosing its property with a concrete fence. Although the plaintiffs-appellees were
allowed to pass through the steel gate of the defendant-appellant, the same is subject to the
schedule set by the latter. This prompted the plaintiffs-appellees to ask for a permanent right of
way through the intervention of the court after the defendant-appellant refused their offer to buy
the portion where the proposed right of way is sought to be established.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have a right to demand a right of way.

Ruling:
Yes, the respondents have a right to demand a right of way. To be entitled to an easement
of right of way, the following requisites should be met: 1. An immovable is surrounded by other
immovables belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; 2.
Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; 3. The isolation of the
immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and 4. The proposed easement of right of way is
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The only issues raised by petitioner in this case relate to the third and fourth requisites. It
claims that respondents should be faulted for the isolation of their property, as they failed to
secure a right of way from their seller when they bought the same in 1965. However, respondents
may not be blamed for the isolation they are now suffering. By its very location, their property is
isolated, and this is not their fault. Suffice it to say further that the Court agrees with the findings
of the lower courts that the closure of Rizal Street by the petitioner caused such property to be
isolated.
All in all, the location of the easement as depicted and illustrated in the sketch approved
by the trial court appears to be legal, reasonable, and just. Petitioner's argument that since there
are permanent structures already erected on the appointed right of way, then the parties should
negotiate a different location therefor cannot be accepted. To allow this would be tantamount to
rewarding malice, cunning, and bad faith. A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate
the courts' decisions by performing acts upon the disputed property during the pendency of the
case, which would allow it to achieve the objectives it desires.
 Dolar vs Brgy. Lublub
G.R. No. 152663
November 18, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6
hectares. They then donated the same to Brgy. Lublub, subject to certain conditions. Following
the execution of the deed, Brgy. Lublub immediately took possession of the donated property,
which soon became the site of several government office buildings and recreational facilities.
Respondent barangay however did not have the donation registered under its name. Almost eight
(8) years from contract execution, petitioner was issued the TCT covering the donated area. Soon
after, petitioner executed another deed donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented by its incumbent
barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same
donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the same conditions expressly set forth in
the first.
Barangay Lublub’s peaceful possession of the donated area remained undisturbed until
the Lots were included in the published list of tax delinquent properties for disposition. At the
auction sale that followed, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder and was awarded the
property, and on May 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Recovery of Possession with Damages against Brgy. Lublub involving the land donated,
claiming that the donation had ceased to be effective, for failure to comply with the conditions of
the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may still revoke the donation made in favor of respondent.

Ruling:
No, petitioner may no longer revoke the donation made in favor of respondent. Petitioner
can hardly fault the trial court for its holding that petitioner’s action to revoke is time-barred. As
may be recalled, respondent barangay had, under the terms of the donation, five (5) years from
the execution of the conveying deed in Sept. 1981, or up Sept. 1986, within which to introduce
and complete the contemplated development of the donated area. Following Art. 764 of the Civil
Code, petitioner had four (4) years from Sept. 1986, or up to Sept. 1990, within which to seek the
revocation of the subject donation on the ground of breach of contract. The Court can grant that
the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donations, as here, are governed by the
general rules on prescription, which, in context, is Art. 1144 of the Civil Code providing that
actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of
action. Ten years from Sept. 1986 – the date when petitioner’s right to revoke accrued - would be
September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioner’s suit to revoke was filed only in
May 1998.
In all, petitioner’s right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed been
prescribed, regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable
Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent
barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to
revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and development conditions of
the donation.