5

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
NEGOTIATIONS: A STRATEGIC
PLANNING MODEL
Dr Farouk I. Heiba Professor of Marketing/International Business, and Director of
International Marketing Council, College of Business, San Diego State University, San
Diego, California 92182 - U.S.A.

Environmental determinants of International Business Negotiations: A Strategic

Planning Model
Negotiation is a skill which can be learned. Most American and Western executives do not,
however, devote sufficient time or effort to learn the art of negotiation or to understand the
cultural differences among nations. The accelerating interdependency among global societies and
the growing role of U.S. and Western countries in international trade, especially with Third
World governments, strongly necessitate learning, experience, and training in this important task.
True understanding of environmental determinants, styles, and tactics of international business
negotiations is a must, if one is to achieve desirable outcomes. The old attitude of bargaining
overseas and the John Wayne approach will not work anymore. "Go native" and "adaptibility"
will be the key words for successful international business negotiations in the future.

Biography ging. It contains various elements of individual

Farouk I. Heiba is Professor of Marketing and
International Business and Director of the
International Marketing Council, College of
Business, San Diego State University. Dr.
Heiba earned his Ph.D., MBA and MA from
the Wharton School, University of Pennsyl-
vania, where he worked for several years at
the Multinational Enterprise Department and
the Management and Behavioral Science
Center. He also was an Associate Professor
of International Management and Director of
the International Management Program at
the College of Business, University of Utah.
In addition to his quality research and publi-
cations in marketing and international busi-
ness, Professor Heiba was involved in and
conducted a number of domestic and interna-
tional consulting projects and executive
development programmes.
I. Introduction
"The negotiation process is a very complicated
social process, involving an intricate structure of
attitudes and opinions, social relationships - both
inside and outside the firm - and the way such
attitudes, opinions, and social relations are chan-
and organizational behaviour, influenced by the
past and perception of the future as well as the
present. It is composed of a large number of deci-
sions, made by different people at different points
in time. The understanding of the final outcome
of such a process depends on an understanding
of all its stages and parts" (Aharoni, 1966).1
These days, the name of the game of any
international business venture success is
interactive planned negotiation. Had Adam
been a better negotiator he might still be in
the Garden of Eden. And, if the early settlers
(of America) and the American Indians had
better understood their cultural differences,
the course of U.S. history might have been
totally different (Unterman, 1983).2
Many executives and policymakers tend to
regard negotiation like most people view
having children - it is something one does
almost instinctively, with varying amounts of
skill, confidence, and pleasure, but not a
likely subject for analysis or scholarly
research. These people believe that good
negotiators are born, not made; and if made,
made in the trenches, not in the classroom
(Green, 1983).3
International Marketing Review
6 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
Most of the time poor communication
plays a role in the failure of business negotia-
tion or becomes a serious barrier (Rogers &
Roethlisberger, 1952).4 And when people of
one nation negotiate with people of another,
they often unwittingly trample all over the
other customs of those people and the negoti-
ations are consequently doomed to failure
before they even start (Unterman, 1983).5
Graham and Herberger (1983)6 relate the
failure of most American international busi-
ness negotiations to their "do-or-die" atti-
tude which is influenced by their frontier past
or the Old West style of John Wayne. Such
an attitude often defeats American purpose.
They tend to "shoot first, ask questions
later." This naive attitude may cause them,
instead of their adversaries, to bite the dust.
American linguistic and cultural myopia is
losing them friends, business and respect in
the world. Their negotiating style doesn't
work well overseas and there are needs for
new emphasis and new innovative
approaches in the future.
The view of negotiation as an art and a skill
which should be learned in order to achieve
desirable success with foreign partners, is
shared by a number of scholars in the field
of negotiation such as Coffin (1973), Cohen
(1980), Edwards and White (1977), Llich
(1980), Karrass (1970), Hierenberg (1968),
Nierenberg (1963), Unterman (1983), Walton
and McKersil (1965), Warschaw (1980), Fisher
and Ury (1981) and Raiffa (1982)7 Some
emphasize the importance of cross-cultural
relations to negotiations. Others demonstrate
how the presence or absence of certain key
variables affect the structure, process and the
results of negotiation. Thus, using decision
analysis to assess the probabilities of various
results as trial can help during the negotia-
tion processes with realistic consideration of
"ethical issues" and "strategic choice" in all
interactive competitive bargaining (Raiffa,
Autumn/Winter 1984
1982).8
Looking at the future, from a strategic
window, realistic international business
negotiation solutions should depend, in large
part, on a continuous learning process. The
long run solutions to the cultural myopia of
American business executives are more chal-
lenging. Graham and Herberger (1983)9
pointed out that if Americans are to take
advantage of technology, creativity, and
other natural resources, they must invest in
the education and training of potential busi-
ness leaders. This training must start early,
for true understanding of other cultures
comes from immersion in it. Ideally, training
for U.S. multinational executives of the
future would begin in high schools.
In sum, this paper aims to explore and
analyze the environmental determinates and
the processes of conducting international
business negotiations, with special references
to the Third World countries. In addition,
a strategic planning model for international
business negotiations is introduced to
picturize what ought to be done in this field
to achieve successful results by negotiating
parties.
II. Definition and Nature of Negotiations
The term "negotiation" can be described in
terms of two elements which normally
should be present for business agreements
to take place: there must be both common
interests and issues of conflict. Without
common interest there is nothing to negotiate
for, and without conflict there is nothing to
negotiate about. In addition, negotiation can
be defined in either a narrow or a broad
sense. A relatively narrow definition is:
Negotiation is a process in which explicit
proposals are put forward for discussion in
order to reach agreement on an exchange or
on the realization of a common interest
where conflicting interests are present. It is
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 7
the confrontation of explicit proposals that
distinguishes negotiation from tactical bar-
gaining and other types of conflict behaviour
(Ikle, 1967).10
In discussing certain proposals, the nego-
tiating parties make some moves - those of
tactical bargaining - to strengthen their posi-
tion and weaken that of the opponent or to
influence the outcome in various ways
(Kapoor, 1971).11
Negotiation does not necessarily lead to
explicit agreement on all points; in fact,
agreement may be reached on only some of
the explicit proposals being negotiated. Even
then agreements vary widely in their degree
of specificity and in the extent of disagree-
ment which remains. The outcome of negoti-
ations is more than just an explicit agreement
(Kapoor, 1971).12
The negotiation process includes strategies
and tactics expressed within a broader frame-
work of interactions between groups with
both common and conflicting interests. Each
group has its own concept of what is "right,"
"reasonable," or "appropriate" in negotia-
tions; also each group has its own expecta-
tions of the likely response of an opposing
group to an issue, event, or mood (Schelling,
1960).13
A negotiator's expectations or the response
of opposing groups are determined by his
own "self-reference criterion," i.e., "the
unconscious reference to one's own cultural
values" (Lee, 1966).14 Foreign countries,
especially in the Middle East, are compared
to the United States and judged according to
American standards. The larger the variation
in habits, culture and business conduct
between a foreign country and the United
States, the stronger the subjective uncer-
tainty (Aharoni, 1966).15
International business negotiations take
place within a broader framework than
domestic negotiations. This, in terms of the
art of politics and the concepts of social
science, can become as important, or even
more important, to the success of an invest-
ment venture negotiation as hard-headed
technical and financial calculation or a care-
fully prepared legal and administrative basis
for an overseas organization (Williams,
1965).16
III. Characteristics of Business
Negotiation in the Third World
A very limited number of decision-makers in
Third World countries have sufficient
comprehension of economic/business issues
largely because their career orientation has
been in other areas such as politics, the mili-
tary, civil administration and foreign rela-
tions. Usually, top management executives
have a very limited understanding of the
non-economic forces influencing government
actions and policies. Consequently, host
government officials and those executives
experience serious problems of communi-
cation with each other and, in turn, key deci-
sion-makers are suspicious of the motives
and methods of businessmen (Kapoor,
1970).17
In such a situation, the negotiation process
between foreign investors and host
governments in the Third World is often
coloured by mutual distrust and suspicion.
Therefore, negotiations take time, and the
foreign investor has to attempt to reduce the
fears of the host government decision-
makers.
Thus, to avoid the negotiating parties'
"xenophobia" (Third World host countries'
fear of foreign investors due to their back-
ground of colonialization experience and the
MNE fear of host governments' uncertain
policies of nationalization and other political
risks), and to cope with the lack of experience
in international business negotiations, a new
model for international business negotiations
International Marketing Review
8 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
is needed. This new model systematically
organizes such negotiations to the benefit of
the involved parties, as well as maximizes
the positive and minimizes the negative
aspects of international business
negotiations.
However, before introducing such a new
model for international business negotia-
tions, it is important to familiarize the reader
with the environment where these negotia-
tions take place. Some variables of that
environment have, indeed, more influence in
deciding the direction of such negotiations
than the negotiators themselves. Some
environmental determinants are discussed in
this paper in two basic groups, namely: 1)
sociocultural determinants, and 2) economic-
political determinants. Other environmental
determinants are out of the scope of this
paper.
IV Environmental Determinants of
International Business Negotiations
A. Sociocultural Determinants
Values Systems
When American executives travel to Third
World countries to negotiate business, they
are frequently shocked to discover to what
extent the many variables of foreign
behaviour and customs complicate their
efforts (Hall, 1960).18 This is why it is so
important for American and other Western
businessmen to truly understand the various
societal aspects and cultural values they
usually face when negotiating business over-
seas, if they are to achieve any successful
ventures. Value systems affect many human
aspects that are important in shaping the
society's economic behaviour and perform-
ance. The study of different cultural values
indicates that an act considered right in one
society may be repugnant in another (Brislin,
Bochnernad & Lonner, 1975).19 Value
Autumn/Winter 1984
systems or the ideological aspects of a culture
refers to the ways of looking at life - philoso-
phical, tenets, religious beliefs, and rules of
behaviour. Values are beliefs upon which
people build their lives (Terpstra, 1983).20
Each individual's perception of the world
around him is to some extent viewed through
his enculturative screen. To the ancient
Greeks, to the Chinese, and to most other
known people, one's own culture and values
were taken as the standard against which all
others were judged. This ethnocentric
mentality still characterizes the behaviour of
many people (Murdock, 1969).21
In Latin America, for example, it is
important that each negotiator show an
interest in and concern for others' family
before discussing business. The American
executive who charges into a discussion of
business without realizing this perfectly legit-
imate cultural difference is not going to have
much success in those countries.
In any Japanese delegation, it is usually the
oldest member who does all the talking at the
conference table, the other members having
expressed themselves in earlier, private
discussions. But when they sit across the
table from an American delegation where
everyone presents their opinion, there is an
immediate cultural gap which often results
in little being achieved (Unterman, 1983).22
The Chinese cultural factors that affect
negotiating style with Americans are national
pride and interest. The Chinese stress
patience, general trust, and ethical and moral
principles; whereas, Americans tend to be
highly legalistic. The Chinese also try to
influence negotiation processes by shaming
practices. This permeates Chinese relations
with others reflecting their cultural values
and traditional belief that others can be
controlled by shaming them (Pye, 1982).23
Scandinavians like to have plenty of space
around them when they talk with people;
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 9
some Middle Eastern people like to stand
close. None of them is "right" or "wrong";
they are just different. Yet, while lip service
is often paid to the understanding of these
differences, they are rarely accorded the
necessary respect.
Personal Contacts
American executives and other Western
investors know by their experience that to
facilitate their business negotiations, they
should, at a price, communicate sometimes
with people who make things happen and
who have good contacts with key officials.
Otherwise they have to wait, sometimes long
waiting, just to meet certain decision-makers
in order to negotiate business. Once, in
Egypt, for example, an American busi-
nessman wanted to open an office in Cairo
and ordered telephones to his office and
house. He discovered that the regular
waiting list would be more than two years.
He called the Minister of Communications in
Egypt and asked him if he could, based on
the nature of his business, get a telephone
immediately. The Minister replied that the
soonest time would be at least a month. The
American businessman contacted one of
those who makes things happen for a price
and he got his telephone the second day.
In Third World countries, personal contacts
have more effect in speeding negotiations
and related business than in bureaucratic
systems.
Personal contacts are, however, considered
part of international bribery. In many coun-
tries bribery has been, and still is, an accept-
able way of doing business, but is illegal in
the United States. The use of illegal payments
has become a proper and ordinary method
of business by many American and Western
companies. This is because they believe that a
flat and righteous decision not to bribe many
make it impossible to do business in some
countries (Turner, 1973). A few years ago,
a suit was brought against the McDonnell-
Douglas Corporation by the American Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission for bribing
airline officials. Interestingly, a company
spokesman said, "It is management's belief
that McDonnell-Douglas simply conformed
to local custom" (Aviation Week, 1979).24
From a moral and ethical point of view, it
is more important, when Americans negot-
iate or do business overseas, to do the "right
thing" rather than to do things right.
Patterns of Negotiation Agreements
American businessmen should know the
rules for negotiating agreements in Third
World countries. Even if they cannot be
expected to know the details of each coun-
try's commercial legal practices, just the
awareness of and the expectation of the exist-
ence of differences will eliminate much
complication.
These days, no Americans will conduct any
business without some written agreement or
contract. In the Arab world, however, once
a man's word is given in a particular kind of
way, it is just as binding, if not more so, than
most American contracts. Informal patterns
and unstated agreements often cause unto-
ward difficulty in a cross-cultural situation.
It is difficult for American executives to
adjust their frame of reference to the fact that
what constitutes one thing to them is some-
thing entirely different to the Arabs. For
example, a critical factor in business negotia-
tions is whether the Americans bargain at the
beginning of any business deal or at the end
of the deal. As a general rule, in the Middle
East, one cannot bargain at the end of a busi-
ness deal. If he does not bargain at the begin-
ning, a native businessman is entitled to
whatever he asks for (Hall, 1960).25
One of the greatest difficulties American
businessmen have in Third World countries
International Marketing Review
1 0 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
comes from the fact that they often think they
have a commitment when they do not. The
Americans' failure to recognize binding obli-
gations, plus their custom of setting organiz-
ational goals ahead of everything else, has
put them in hot water far too often (Hall,
1960).26
The cure for ignorance of the social and
legal rules which underlie business agree-
ments is not an easy one. This is because the
subject is complex, little research has been
conducted to determine the different cultural
concepts of what is an agreement, the people
of each country think that their own code
is the only one and that everything else is
dishonest and, finally, that each code of
conduct is different from the American code
(Hall, 1960).27
Publicity vs. Secrecy
Foreign investment proposals are frequently
accompanied by publicity. Publicity is a
major tool of negotiation. Frequently, parties
to a negotiation will purposely disclose
confidential information to strengthen their
bargaining position. However, in the Third
World publicity should be avoided at least
until a final agreement has been reached
between the foreign investor and the host
government. A major influence on internat-
ional business negotiation in the Middle East
is the ability of different participants to keep
their deliberations a secret. Any leaks of such
negotiations can lead to undesirable
outcomes.
B. Economic and Political
Determinants
Nationalism
Nationalism in Third World nations is a
complex problem of increasing concern to
international business negotiators. When citi-
zens of a nation share a sense of common
Autumn/Winter 1984
identity stemming from a common
community, history, language, religion, race,
or ideology, nationalism is the emotional
cement which binds a people together to
make a nationality. It is marked by loyalty
and devotion to a nation exalting it above all
other nations. Nationalism often carries an
antiforeign bias and injects an emotional
energy into international relations, bedevi-
ling cross-national communication and
inciting governments to behaviour that can
undermine the achievement of their own
economic and political objectives (Root,
1978).28
Nationalism influence is most apparent in
Third World countries, expressed, for
example, in the prevalence of protest against
"neo-economic colonialism." But it also
seems to be a factor even in industrialized
areas like Canada (Fayerweather, 1972).29 The
popularity of J. Servan-Schreiber's The
American Challenge (1968)30 suggests that it
may be a primary rallying attraction in
emerging Pan-European nationalism. The
existence of nationalism has several impacts
on and implications for international busi-
ness executives and negotiators as follows:
(1) In commercial policy, developing coun-
tries of the Third World generally place
great emphasis on policies of substitu-
ting domestic production for imports;
(2) In almost all developing nations, there
is strong opposition to the direct
foreign investment and to the employ-
ment of foreign personnel (Johnson,
1965).31
(3) American executives must not let their
own nationalism colour their business
programs; their task is to accomplish a
business mission, not to carry the flag.
(4) Americans are foreigners out of their
country and may be victims of local
nationalism, or xenophobia. A possible
strategy to avoid this might be to
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 1 1
develop as national an image as
possible. Indeed, one of the challenges
facing international executives and
negotiators is finding how best to adapt
to the demands of local nationalism
without diminishing the international
strength of their interests.
Interest Groups
Interest groups usually influence the negotia-
tion process to the benefit of their own
members. When a group tries to promote the
views and policies of its members, such a
group can be external (outside a country but
having influence over its economic and
political policies) or internal (indigenous to
the country).
(1) External Groups: The primary external
interest groups with significant powers
over host countries are the internat-
ional lending and development institu-
tions, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Such
institutions have lent large sums of
money to developing nations on the
condition that the recipient will accept
the changes in policies and practices
advocated by the lending institutions.
Sometimes, such requested changes in
policies could cause serious troubles to
the recipient country like what
happened in Egypt in 1979 and 1980.32
(2) Internal Groups: They are the groups
who have economic and political clout
in the country. The views of such
groups exercise an important influence
on negotiation between foreign inves-
tors and the host country.
Indigenous business interests, especially
the big establishments, often fear the
entry of foreign companies based on
the fact that they would have access to
larger and better resources and become
latter competitors in domestic markets.
Government officials usually listen
seriously to the views of these groups
regarding foreign investment propo-
sals. This is because they are contribu-
tors to political parties and because
they can motivate political leaders of
opposition parties to agitate over the
desirability of certain investment plans
(Weiner, 1962).33 With the increasing
restrictions on the entry of foreign
investment in the Third World, foreign
companies become more interested in
securing some form of local spon-
sorship, i.e., gain the collaboration or
support of an indigenous group for
certain business proposals. The local
sponsors are far better placed to coun-
teract the moves of other indigenous
groups opposing the same proposals
(Kapoor, 1971). 34
Economic Benefit/Cost Perception
From the early stage of the business negotia-
tion process, the success or failure of such a
process depends, in the large part, upon the
negotiators' perception of the economic
benefits/costs and the common interest. In a
simple economic model (as shown in Figure
1), if the perception of one of the negotiating
parties is positive, in terms of the gained
benefits exceeding the investment costs of
other alternatives available in that time, he
would continue the process to reach an
agreement. Conflict occurs if there is a
perception gap between the parties involved.
Conflict can be solved by negotiating further
to close such a gap or reaching an acceptable
compromise.
Without common interest there is nothing to
negotiate for, and without conflict there is
nothing to negotiate about. If a business
agreement cannot be reached through two-
party negotiators, a three-party process,
International Marketing Review
1 2 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
which involves a mediator, is a better
answer.
A Strategic Planning Model
The model (as shown in Figure 2) consists
of five basic stages of negotiation processes.
These five stages are:
Stage I: Entry strategy to MNE, function
to cost/benefit analysis and
environmental studies;
Stage II: Initial negotiation process by
MNE and host country;
Stage III: Positive continuous negotiation
process (the working mech-
anism);
Stage IV: Expectation by host country and
MNE:
Step A: Outputs, function to national
priorities and values.
Autumn/Winter 1984
Step B: Confirmation strategy, function to
mutual benefits.
V. The Final International Business
Agreements
Stage I: Entry Strategy
Based upon the research findings of a
company's environmental studies and econ-
omic benefit/cost analysis of an investment
proposal in a certain foreign market, a deci-
sion of Go-No-Go will be made. Environ-
mental studies should include all external
and internal determinants. And economic
benefit/cost analysis should include risk
analysis and the probability of a number of
perceptions at various situations.
If the decision is in favour of the Go mode,
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 1 3
management has to select the best entry
strategy to the chosen foreign market. The
alternative entry modes to foreign markets
are:
(1) Indirect exporting: EMC Trading Co.,
Piggyback, etc.
(2) Direct exporting: agent/distributor,
branch/subsidiary, etc.
(3) Licensing and franchising.
(4) Contractual arrangements: technical/
management contracts, service/consul-
ting, turnkey/constructions contracts,
etc.
(5) Joint ventures: binational, multina-
tional, etc.
(6) Wholly owned: new establishment,
acquisition, etc.
The selection of an entry strategy which is
considered the most appropriate one for a
company's purpose should be based on two
types of criteria (for more details see: Root
(1982) and Terpstra (1983)]:35
(1) Basic Criteria: Company objectives and
goals, resources/size, international
business experience, product line, tech-
nology, commitment, competition, etc.
(2) Strategic Criteria:
(a) Foreign country: infrastructure,
competition, investment costs,
profits, restrictive investment poli-
cies, etc.
(b) Home country: Large vs. small
markets, oligopolistic competition, restric-
tions on investment abroad, etc.
Stage II: Initial Negotiations
By completing Stage I, the two interested
parties, i.e., a foreign company (or multina-
tional enterprise) and a host country, start
initial negotiations (Stage II) to do business.
International Marketing Review
1 4 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
The negotiating style, attitude, and experi-
ence of the two-party negotiators could
promote the negotiation to a further step,
i.e., Stage III, if it succeeds or leads to failure.
If the initial negotiations fail, they should go
back to Stage I for revaluation of the entry
strategy and for adjustment.
Stage III: Positive Continuous
Negotiations Processes
Stage III is the stage when each party starts to
show interest and willingness to do business
with each other. It is a positive step toward
negotiating an investment proposal. Each
party will spell out his requirements, condi-
tions, constraints, legal aspects, etc. The
harder each party works, the more positive
the negotiation becomes. This stage is the
working mechanism of negotiating proposals
of common interest.
Stage IV: Expectation
On the completion of Stage III, the negotia-
tion process enters a critical stage of expect-
ation, i.e., Stage IV. In this stage, the whole
negotiation process destiny is decided either
for success or for failure. This is because each
negotiating party begins to calculate for his
expectation of gains and benefits.
From the host country's point of view, if the
economic and social expectations are
perceived positively, i.e., desirable outputs,
and in accordance with its national priorities
of development, the host country will accept
the investment proposal. But if the expecta-
tions are perceived as negative outcomes, the
proposal will be rejected.
In case of rejection, the host country has two
ways to exist from negotiation:
(1) Short exit by going back to Stage III to
negotiate for better terms. This exit is
usually followed if the rejection is
based on minor conflicts.
(2) Long exit by going back to Stage I to
Autumn/Winter 1984
start from the beginning with different
strategy and/or different outlook. This
exit is usually followed if the extent of
expectation is excessive and the rejec-
tion is based on major conflicts.
From the foreign company's (or multinational
enterprise) point of view, two outputs are
expected:
(1) Positive Outputs: If the outcome is posi-
tive, it will accept the proposal and
confirm the negotiation terms.
(2) Negative Outputs: If the outcome is
negative, it will reject the proposal and
exit from the negotiation via the short
or the long exits. The short exist to go
back to Stage III to negotiate for closing
the conflict gap and to reconcile any
differences. The long exit to go back to
Stage I to revaluate the whole situation
and adopt a different strategy and new
negotiating style.
Stage V: The Final International
Business Agreements
Upon the success of negotiation in Stage IV,
the two interested parties will finalize their
international business agreement through
legal documents and official contracts. Such
legal documents explain each party's rights,
responsibility, and other related issues. Each
party will become legally binding with the
final agreement's terms.
After Stage V: New Situations or
Expectations
If a new situation or a new expectation occurs
after reaching the final international business
agreement [due to unforeseen circumstances,
e.g., coup d'etat, changing the ruling regime
(such as in Iran), the assassination of the key
negotiator (such as in Egypt), bankruptcy of
the foreign company, etc.], the two inter-
ested parties have to negotiate for the new
situation.
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 1 5
In such a situation, three possible expecta-
tions can be projected as follows:
(1) The new situation will not change the
current agreement. Thus, it will
continue on the same terms;
(2) The new situation will cause minor
problems. Thus, it will go back to Stage
III (short exit) to reconcile any
differences;
(3) The new situation will create a major
conflict, based on new perception or
disagreement of the entire negotiation
terms. Thus, it will go back to Stage I
(long exit) to find out what ought to be
done.
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Coffin, R. (1973), The Negotiator, New York: AMACOM.
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Footnotes
1. Yair Aharoni (1966), The Foreign Investment Decision
Process, Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard Univer-
sity, pp. 45-46.
2. Israel Unterman (1983), 'Negotiators are to be Diplo-
matic,' The San Diego Union, August 6, 1983.
3. Eric D. Green (1983), "The Art and Science of Negoti-
ator A Book Review,' American Bar Association
Journal, April 1983.
4. Carl R. Rogers and F. J. Roethlisberger (1952),
'Barriers and Gateways to Communication,' Harvard
Business Review, July-August, pp. 158-162.
5. Israel Unterman (1983), op. cit.
6. John L. Graham and Roy A. Herberger, Jr. (1983),
'Negotiators Abroad: Don't Shoot from the Hip,'
Harvard Business Review, July-August, pp. 160-168.
International Marketing Review
1 6 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
7. Royce A. Coffin (1973), The Negotiator, New York: 19. Brislin, Bochnerand and Lonner (1975), Cross-
AMACOM; H. Cohen (1980), You Can Negotiate
Anything, New York: Lyle Stuart; Harry T. Edwards
and James J. White (1977), The Lawyer as a Negotiator, 20. Vern Terpstra (1983), International Marketing,
MN: West & Co.; John Llich (1980), Power Nego-
tiating, MA; Addison-Wesley; Chester L. Karrass
(1970), The Negotiating Power, New York: Crowell
Co.; Gerard I. Hierenberg (1968), The Art of Nego-
tiating, New York: Hawthorne; Jesse S. Nierenberg
(1963), Getting Through to People, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall; Israel Unterman (1983), op. cit.;
Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersil (1965),
A Beliavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York: Questions of Illicit Payments,' January 8, p. 25.
McGraw-Hill; Tessa Albert Warschaw (1980),
Winning by Negotiation, New York: McGraw-Hill;
Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981), Getting to Yes,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin; and Howard Raiffa
(1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard
University Press.
8. Howard Raiffa (1982), op. cit.
9. John L. Graham and Roy A. Herberger (1983), op.
cit., p. 168.
10. Fred C. Ikle (1967), How to Negotiate, New York: 30. J. Servan-Schreiber (1968), The American Challenge,
Praeger, p. 2.
11. A Kapoor (1971), 'International Business-Govern-
ment Negotiations in Developing Countries,' The
Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies,
Washington, D.C., March 29.
12. Ibid.
13. Thomas C. Schelling (1960), The Strategy of Conflict,
New York: Oxford University Press, p. 15.
14. James A. Lee (1966), 'Cultural Analysis in Overseas
Operations,' Harvard Business Review, March-April,
p. 110.
15. Yair Aharoni (1966), op. cit., p. 94.
16. Simon Williams (1965), 'Negotiating Investment in
Emerging Countries,' Business Review, January/
February, pp. 89-99.
17. A. Kapoor (1970), 'Business-Government Relations
Become Respectable,' Columbia Journal of World Busi-
ness, July/August.
18. Edward T. Hall (1960), The Silent Language in Over-
seas Business,' Harvard Business Review, May/June,
pp. 87-96.
Autumn/Winter 1984
Cultural Perspective on Learning, Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications.
Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, p. 108.
21. Peter Murdock (1969), Culture and Society, University
of Pittsburg Press.
22. Israel Unterman (1983), op. cit.
23. Lucian Pye (1982), Chinese Commercial Negotiating
Style, Cambridge, MA; Oelgeschlager, Gunn and
Hain.
24. Aviation Week (1979), 'Committee Makes Progress on
25. Edward T. Hall (1960), op. cit., p. 92.
26. Ibid., p. 93.
27. Ibid., p. 94.
28. Franklin R. Root (1978), International Trade and Invest-
ment, South-Western Publishing Co., pp. 4-5.
29. John Fayerweather (1972), 'Nationalism and the
Multinational Firm,' in Kapoor and Grub (eds.), The
Multinational Enterprise in Transition, Princeton, NJ:
The Darwin Press, pp. 339-353.
New York: Atheneum.
31. Harry G. Johnson (1965), 'A Theoretical Model of
Economic Nationalism in New and Developing
States,' Political Science Quarterly, 80, June,
pp. 169-185.
32. In 1979 IMF accepted to give Egypt a loan on the
condition that the Egyptian government would
change its monetary policy and discontinue the food
subsidies to the masses. When the government tried
to implement this request, bloody violence, demon-
strations, and strikes shocked the whole country.
33. Myron Weiner (1962), The Politics of Scarcity: Public
Pressure and Political Response in India, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, pp. 97-129.
34. A. Kapoor (1971), op. cit.
35. Franklin R. Root (1982), Foreign Market Entry Strat-
egies, New York: AMACOM, Ch. 1; Vern Terpstra
(1983), op. cit., Ch. 10.