EURASIA PROGRAM

APPRAISING
THE WAR IN UKRAINE
AND LIKELY OUTCOMES
PHILIP WASIELEWSKI
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-
oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Author: Philip Wasielewski

Design: Natalia Kopytnik

© 2022 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

April 2022

Cover: Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky talks to locals as he is surrounded by Ukrainian servicemen
as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, in Bucha, outside Kyiv, Ukraine, April 4, 2022.
REUTERS/Marko Djurica
 EURASIA PROGRAM

APPRAISING
THE WAR IN UKRAINE
AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

Philip Wasielewski
Destroyed houses are seen in Borodyanka, amid Russia's invasion on Ukraine, in Kyiv region, Ukraine, April 5, 2022.
REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

After six weeks of combat, where is the

Russo-Ukrainian War going?

Modern technology both facilitates and hampers

the answer to that question. Every day, this war
is evaluated from every angle and perspective,
but modern technology provides only a soda-
straw view of the war’s entire canvas.

This article will try to discern that larger canvas

of the war, including a focus on casualties,
information operations and morale, and logistics
to see how they and the tactical correlation of
forces may influence several possible strategic
outcomes.

1
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
CORRELATION OF FORCES AND STRATEGIES
Despite pessimistic pre-war scenarios regarding
its ability to defend itself, the Ukrainian armed
forces have blunted the advance of Russian
Federation forces and counterattacked to
liberate areas near Kyiv and Chernihiv. By
some accounts, Ukraine’s goal is to exhaust
or minimize Russia’s offensive potential and
stabilize certain territories.1 The unstated second
part of this strategy is to wait for Russia to
collapse, either militarily on the field of battle or
politically at home. While Russia’s initial offensive
culminated in the north, it still holds the initiative
in the south, and conventional wisdom is that
in the next phase of the war, forces will attempt
to destroy Ukraine’s will to fight by pulverizing
cities and seizing the Donbas. Russia also
continues its efforts to seize Mariupol to create
an uninterrupted land bridge from Russia proper
to Crimea.
A lack of unity of command, wherein the army
conducts several disjointed fights rather than
one coordinated campaign, impairs Russian
operations. Russian tactical communications
are an open book to the Ukrainians, which
gives them excellent intelligence and targeting
opportunities. Further intelligence comes from
the ubiquitous presence of cell phone cameras
amongst the occupied populations and their
ability to disseminate targeting information via
cellular networks. Russia still struggles to achieve
air control, let alone air superiority.
Russia may hold Ukrainian territory, but it has
no hold on the population. Occupied Ukrainians
have not rallied to Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s cause as happened to some extent in
Crimea and in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014.
Furthermore, the almost entirely road-bound
Russian forces only truly control the towns that
they occupy, the roads they sit on, out to the
range of their main tank guns.
Russia is changing tactics due to its failure
to the win the war quickly via a coup d’main
of Kyiv. Russia has turned to air and artillery
bombardments to destroy urban resistance and
avoid further losses of its armored and infantry
forces. These tactics to surround, shell, and
starve cities into submission conquered Grozny
and Aleppo, but face a different environment in
Ukraine.
Russian forces used siege tactics in Chechnya
and Syria against relatively small numbers
2
of lightly armed insurgents who had no air
defenses. Even then, the sieges of Grozny and
Aleppo took many weeks, even months, to
complete. In Ukraine, Russia has not one Grozny
or Aleppo to conquer but multiple fortified cities
whose supply lines have not been cut (except
Mariupol) and whose forces have abundant
supplies of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.
The Russian military will be hard-pressed to
resupply the large amounts of ammunition
needed for multiple sieges. After six weeks of
fighting, it has expended immense amounts
of precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, and other ordnance, which
cannot be quickly replaced.
What forces Russia
commits in the next few
weeks will be its strategic
reserve. For the first time
in the history of modern
European warfare, Russia
may run out of soldiers.
In regard to manpower, reinforcements from
Russia’s Far East and the Caucasus have entered
the conflict, while other units redeploy from the
north of Ukraine to the south. Once they arrive
on the battlefield, they may be the last trained
and equipped combat units that Russia can
generate for months. If these reinforcements and
revised tactics do not achieve success, then the
Russian military has limited options to quickly
generate additional forces. Belarus is reluctant
to enter the war, and recruiting Syrian volunteers
for urban combat is wishful thinking since part of
the reason for Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria
came from the reluctance of Syrian forces to
engage in urban combat.
Russia has already committed three quarters of
its available ground and airborne tactical units
to Ukraine. It has only approximately 30-35
battalion tactical groups in reserve, and some
of these must stay in Kaliningrad and the North
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES
Ukrainian service members stand in a front of an Antonov An-225 Mriya cargo plane, the world's biggest aircraft, destroyed
by Russian troops as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, at an airfield in the settlement of Hostomel, in Kyiv region, Ukraine
April 3, 2022. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
Caucasus to leave a modicum of military power
for other contingencies. Unlike the Soviet-Finnish
War of 1939-1940, Russia does not have a large
enough army to send in endless echelons of
troops to steamroll enemy opposition. What
forces it commits in the next few weeks will be its
strategic reserve. For the first time in the history
of modern European warfare, Russia may run out
of soldiers.
How Russia uses its remaining tactical units
will be critical. The Ukrainian General Staff
believes that Russia will now seek to occupy
the Donetsk, Kherson, and Luhansk regions in
their entirety.2 To do so, Russia may attempt to
encircle Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas.
If successful, Russia could claim that it has
“demilitarized” Ukraine and use the occupied
territory as a bargaining chip in negotiations or
formally incorporate these regions into Russia.
If this is Russia’s backup strategy, then it will be
as hard to achieve as its first. A Donbas offensive
faces several challenges. First, supply lines from
Russia to the recently captured city of Izium,
a likely attack position for a Donbas offensive,
are very tenuous. Second, Russian command
and control and logistics capabilities to date
offer little confidence that they can coordinate
and support deep tactical movements. Third,
Ukrainian forces have the advantage of interior
lines of communication and could shuttle forces
to attack dispersed Russian axes of advance.
The withdrawal of Russian forces near Kyiv also
3
frees Ukrainian forces to deploy to the Donbas
and strike the flanks of any Russian encircling
movement. Fourth, the withdrawal of Russian
forces from the north may provide additional
troops for the Donbas offensive, but these units
require time to refit and reassemble. The road
movement of forces from the vicinity of Kyiv
to attack positions near Izium or Donetsk via
Gomel, Belarus; Belgorod, Russia; and Luhansk,
Ukraine is the equivalent of driving from St.
Louis to New York City. If it does not use railcars
and tank transporters, the mechanized forces
completing that road march will require extensive
maintenance before any attack, and the troops
will need time for refitting and recovery. Finally,
if Russia takes too long to concentrate men
and materiel for a Donbas offensive, then the
Ukrainian military may strike first. If Ukraine
can quickly reorganize its forces, then it could
preempt any Russian offensive by trying to retake
Kherson and possibly the Perekop Isthmus to
Crimea.
Whatever Russia does next, if it does not
strike soon and succeed, then the initiative for
offensive action could shift to Ukraine. Ukrainian
forces on the offensive would require Russian
forces to defend disjointed fronts with unreliable
supply lines or face the most difficult of tactical
maneuvers: a fighting withdrawal. Therefore,
Russia’s next steps must either win this war, or it
will soon have no good military alternatives.
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
UNDERSTANDING THE TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE
SUPPORTING ELEMENTS OF THE WAR
For both Russia and Ukraine, their ability to turn
tactics on the ground into strategic success will
depend largely on three factors: a capability
to continue to field combat units, supply them,
and have them fight. Therefore, this article
will now analyze casualties and losses of war
materiel, logistics, and morale for each side.
Understanding, as best as possible due to
the fog of war, the losses that both sides have
sustained provides an approximate yardstick
regarding the challenges to come in maintaining
tactical units on the front lines. A brief review
of logistics should show the limitations each
side may face in carrying out the fight. Finally, a
review of each nation’s information operations
and the morale of their armed forces and
population may give a sense of the will of each
army to continue this fight as well as the will of
each country’s population to make sacrifices for
it.
Casualties and Materiel Losses
Russia. Due to the wide area of the battlefield
and the confusion of multiple combat operations,
determining exact casualties is problematic
even for the Russians themselves. On March 2,
2022, Russia announced that 498 troops had
died, with 1,597 wounded, and on March 25, it
updated that casualty list to 1,351 dead and 3,825
wounded.3 On March 8, a U.S. intelligence official
estimated Russian deaths between 2,000 and
4,000.4 Ten days later, press reports of U.S. and
allied intelligence assessments put the range
of Russian killed in action (KIA) between 3,000
and 10,000, with one report calling a figure of
7,000 deaths “conservative.”5 Taking the middle
figure of these two assessments provides a KIA
rate of approximately 3,000-3,500 KIA every
ten days. On March 23, the Wall Street Journal
reported a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) assessment that since February 24, the
Russian military had suffered between 7,000-
15,000 KIA and total casualties could number
40,000.6 The figure of 15,000 KIA circa March 23
is unlikely because it would mean a jump from
7,000 to 15,000 KIA over a ten-day period. That
doubles the KIA rate at a time when much of the
Russian army was conducting an operational
pause. However, if the loss rate stayed basically
the same or slightly lower due to fewer Russian
attacks during the last ten days of March, then a
4
more likely figure for Russian KIA by early April
sits at approximately 10,000.
Poor medical evacuation
capabilities and loss of
the “Golden Hour,” the first
hour of emergency medical
treatment for wounded
soldiers, for many Russian
wounded could mean a
killed-to-wounded ratio of
1:2.3, which is consistent
with the ratio of losses by
Soviet forces in the Second
World War.
Estimating the number of combat wounded is
equally problematic. A modern military standard
to approximate the number of killed-to-wounded
is one dead soldier for every three or four
wounded. Using this standard would mean that
the Russian military has sustained between
30,000-40,000 wounded if it has suffered 10,000
KIA. However, the modern ratio of 1:3 or 1:4 for
killed-to-wounded may be inapplicable because
Russia’s demonstrated inadequate logistical
system means not only the inefficient delivery
of supplies to the front but also a similarly
inadequate delivery system of wounded to
the rear. Therefore, poor medical evacuation
capabilities and loss of the “Golden Hour,” the
first hour of emergency medical treatment for
wounded soldiers, for many Russian wounded
could mean a killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.3,
which is consistent with the ratio of losses
by Soviet forces in the Second World War.7
Additionally, the most recent official Russian
casualty claims had a killed-to-wounded ratio
of 1:2.8, less than the 1:3 or 1:4 ratio common to
military planning. Therefore, a killed-to-wounded
ratio of 1:2.3 approximates the number of Russian
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

A local woman salutes Ukrainian service members, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Chernihiv
region, Ukraine April 2, 2022. Picture taken April 2, 2022. REUTERS/Serhii Nuzhnenko
5
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
wounded at 23,000 if there have been 10,000
KIA.
However, Russian forces are suffering further
losses beyond the normal count of killed and
wounded in action. First, Russia lost over 550
prisoners of war by mid-March and likely more
by early April.8 Second, considering winter
conditions, there must be a number of cold-
weather casualties, frostbite, trench foot, and
hypothermia, and illnesses, such as pneumonia,
flu, or COVID, that have taken men off of the
battlefield. Third, accidents—vehicle crashes,
negligent discharges of weapons, etc.—are
natural occurrences on any battlefield. In the
Second World War, Soviet non-combat deaths
were approximately nine percent of combat
deaths, which would mean Russian forces in
Ukraine may have sustained approximately 900
non-combat deaths beyond the estimated 10,000
combat deaths. Fourth, psychiatric casualties are
not uncommon on a battlefield. For example, one
account of U.S. casualties in World War II states
that 312,354 men were discharged for combat-
related psychiatric breakdowns in comparison
to the 671,846 who were physically wounded.9
Finally, there are the missing in action: those
who are genuinely lost or cut off from their units
and trying to make their way back and those, as
noted below in the discussion on morale, who
have purposefully absented themselves from
the battlefield and have fallen back to a safe
position to avoid further fighting. The number
of total Russian casualties after six weeks of
fighting probably exceeds 35,000 men, and
when all factors are considered, the figure could
approach 38,000. Higher numbers are possible,
as are lower, but this figure is still an astounding
casualty rate for an army in a post-World War II
conventional conflict.
Personnel losses are compounded by materiel
losses, which further degrade Russia’s
combat capabilities. The website Oryx, which
meticulously tracks materiel losses in this war
using social media to confirm its data, estimated
Russian combat equipment losses as of April 6
at 446 tanks and 824 armored/infantry fighting
vehicles and personnel carriers.10 Again, based
on conservative methodology, actual losses are
probably much higher, and these do not account
for a plethora of other destroyed vehicles,
artillery pieces, anti-aircraft weapons, etc. In
the short run, Russia has the reserve capacity
to replace these losses, if it can transport new
equipment to the battlefield. The question, then,
considering combat losses and a limited number
of reserves is: who will man this replacement
equipment if it ever arrives?
6
The question, then,
considering combat losses
and a limited number
of reserves is: who will
man this replacement
equipment if it ever
arrives?
Ukraine. On March 12, President Volodymyr
Zelensky announced that the Ukrainian military
had suffered approximately 1,300 deaths in the
first 16 days of fighting. Kyiv has not provided
additional official updates, so casualty rates must
be extrapolated—therefore, like Russian losses,
can only be rough estimates. If the Ukrainian
KIA rate remained constant with the first official
announcement and a slight downturn is factored
in for decreased fighting over the last ten days,
then, as of early April, Ukraine may have suffered
approximately 3,100 KIA. Since Ukrainian military
medical services can use nearby civilian medical
infrastructure, a 1:3.5 ratio for killed-to-wounded
could be assumed, which would mean Ukraine
has had approximately 10,850 combat wounded.
According to press reporting, Russia has given
the International Red Cross information on
500 Ukrainian military prisoners.11 In addition
to prisoners of war, adding factors, such as
illnesses, accidents, missing in action, and
psychiatric casualties, would put total casualty
figures for the Ukrainian military as of early April
at approximately 16,000-18,000. This, too, is a
substantial casualty rate for a modern army, but
Ukraine is in a better position to mitigate these
losses than Russia. Fighting on its own territory,
Ukraine can more easily find replacements for its
casualties due to its ability to mobilize citizens,
including an informal reserve of nearly 400,000
veterans, who fought between 2014-2022 along
the line of control in Donbas, into local territorial
defense units.
Losses of Ukrainian military materiel are largely
unknown due to operational security measures,
but the website Oryx, as of April 6, reported
that Ukraine has lost 94 tanks and 171 armored/
infantry fighting vehicles and personnel carriers.12
True losses are likely greater but have not
affected the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian
military, which is maximizing man-portable anti-air
and anti-tank missiles against Russian forces as
much as its armored and mechanized vehicles.
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES
However, for the Ukrainian military to transition
from a defense utilizing small groups of soldiers
and territorial reservists with hand-held weapons
to a conventional combined arms offense, it will
need to find a way to reconstitute its regular
army infantry, armor, and artillery units. The
side—Russia or Ukraine—which is the quickest to
reconstitute its tactical units, may have the best
chance to gain the initiative in the next phase of
this war.
Logistics
Russia. Russia’s logistical system has been
unable to fully support Russian operations and
is unlikely to improve in the next several weeks.
Russian soldiers have complained about a lack
of materiel support and have looted stores for
food, most likely less out of maliciousness and
more out of self-preservation. No new Russian
offensive will succeed if its troops are not
resupplied, nor will plans to shell Ukrainian cities
into submission succeed if sufficient munitions
never reach the front.
Ukraine. Ukraine has three supply sources:
domestic arms factories and stockpiles,
international shipments, and captured Russian
equipment and ordnance. This has been
sufficient to maintain its army in the field.
However, usage rates of anti-aircraft missiles
and losses of aircraft are critical vulnerabilities
as both are hard to replace. Suggestions and
plans for providing alternative sources of these
items have been made but not enacted.13 The
failure to do so will degrade Ukraine’s ability to
defend itself from the air beyond short-range
man-portable anti-air missiles. Also, the failure of
the West to provide Ukraine with anti-ship missile
systems leaves Ukraine’s remaining port of
Odessa vulnerable to the threat of an amphibious
assault and allows the Russian navy to continue
to blockade Ukraine’s maritime commerce with
impunity.
Information Operations and Morale
Russia. Russia has opted out of the information
war to win over international public opinion,
probably knowing it would never win sympathy
for its Goliath fighting the Ukrainian David.
Instead, Russia has concentrated its information
operations on a more important center of gravity:
domestic public opinion. To a degree, that
strategy is working. Currently half of Russians
support the war either actively or passively, and
even Russian dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky
acknowledges an uptick in popular support
for Putin due to patriotic impulses of a nation
at war.14 The “Z” symbol serving as an identity
marker on many Russian vehicles in Ukraine has
7
become a rallying sign for pro-war Russians.
However, there is a backlash against the war
in part of Russian society. This may grow
larger once sanctions further diminish Russia’s
economy, especially consumer disposable
income, and the scale of casualties becomes
known. Various Russian cultural, educational,
sports, and entertainment figures have come
out against the war. Demonstrations have taken
place in numerous cities throughout Russia with
thousands detained.15 Probably more unsettling
for the Kremlin are the cracks showing in its
normally tame mainstream media. On a pro-
Kremlin prime time talk show, guests not only
criticized the war in Ukraine saying it will be
worse than the Soviet war in Afghanistan, but
also complained about the war isolating Russia.16
One Russian media figure, Marina Ovsyannikova,
dramatically protested the war by disrupting a
news program.
Putin has not taken a public-facing role to garner
domestic support. Since his initial address to the
nation on February 24, Putin rarely appears in
public or speaks on television to rally support for
the war. In two appearances, a televised meeting
with regional governors and at a concert-
rally celebrating the eighth anniversary of the
annexation of Crimea, he castigated enemies,
external and internal. Unlike during the Second
Chechen War, he has not been seen decorating
heroes or visiting soldiers at the front and the
wounded in hospitals.
Just as domestic anti-
war sentiment is visible
despite recent draconian
legislation to punish
opposition to Russia’s
“special military operation,”
Russian soldiers in the field
are also demonstrating that
their morale is less than
solid.
Just as domestic anti-war sentiment is visible
despite recent draconian legislation to
punish opposition to Russia’s “special military
operation,” Russian soldiers in the field are also
demonstrating that their morale is less than solid.
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Meeting of the Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, with foreign journalists, March 2, 2022.
(Office of the President of Ukraine)
There are reports of soldiers damaging vehicles
to have an excuse to leave the battlefield,
surrendering of their own free will, and otherwise
expressing discontent, if not with the war, then at
least with leadership and logistics.
It is difficult to determine objectively the overall
morale of Russian soldiers on the front lines
due to military censorship and Ukrainian control
of the war narrative. However, there are some
historical barometers that can provide some
hints. In his study of German army fighting power
in World War II, Martin van Creveld concluded
that the average soldier’s will to fight was
influenced by the belief that he was a member
of a well-integrated, well-lead team whose
structure, administration, and functioning were
perceived to be equitable and just.17 It is unlikely
that the average Russian solider in Ukraine has
much evidence that he is part of a well-integrated
and well-lead team, and his morale probably
reflects these circumstances.
Ukraine. Ukrainian information operations aim
to mobilize domestic and international support
while simultaneously attempting to undermine
Russian military and civilian support for the war.
Their methods will probably be studied for years
to come. Some are very powerful, such as the
8
Telegram channel Search for Your Own (Ищи
Своих in Russian), which show either the faces
of dead Russian soldiers or the videotapes of
captured Russian soldiers speaking to their
parents. Such pictures and videos are contrary
to the Geneva Conventions, but, since they pale
in comparison to Russia’s targeting of civilians,
there has been limited international reaction to
their use. Almost all videos of the war, as well
as most press reporting, come from Ukrainian
or Ukrainian-sympathetic sources, and it is
Ukraine’s information that is shaping the world’s
view of this war.
Zelensky, a former actor, has played a major
role in Ukraine’s information operations. His
charismatic leadership has galvanized world
opinion and motivated Ukrainian resistance
under extremely difficult circumstances. A
Ukrainian poll in early March indicated that 67%
of the population is willing to continue armed
resistance, with 14% unwilling. Additionally,
79% reject accepting Moscow’s recognition of
the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’
Republics, and 75% oppose Russia’s annexation
of Crimea—two key Russian war demands.18
A more recent poll showed that 93% of those
questioned believed that Ukraine will repel
Russia’s attack.19
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

FUTURE SCENARIOS

Based on the above review of the war to date and factoring in trends regarding
casualties, logistics, and morale, there are five possible paths forward for this war:

(1) Russia defeats Ukraine. Victory would be defined by Ukraine accepting Russia’s
maximalist demands, including recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics; possible surrender of
other territory near Crimea; agreement never to join NATO or the EU; and limitations
on the size of its military. For this to happen, the Ukrainian military would have to
be decisively defeated on the battlefield, and Ukrainian national will would have to
collapse. For that to happen, Russian military effectiveness would have to improve
dramatically, and the war would need to continue until Russia could grind Ukraine’s
military into defeat. This assumes Russia’s domestic situation remains calm, and its
economy can support an extended war despite sanctions. Russian victory is possible,
but numerous factors would have to line up in Russia’s favor and Ukraine’s disfavor.

What makes this scenario unlikely is Ukraine’s national will to resist. Breaking it
would require a drastic change of circumstances on the battlefield. This is why some
speculate that Putin may consider using a nuclear weapon, the “escalate to de-
escalate” option. Putin may convince himself that the only path to victory is via an
overwhelming psychological blow to Ukraine’s national will. Putin’s justification for
such extreme action could be the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
to force Japan to sue for peace and prevent horrific casualties from an invasion of its
home islands. However horrible, this is an option if the Russian military is willing to
carry out a nuclear strike command.

(2) Russia declares victory and partly withdraws. If Russia cannot coerce Ukraine into
meeting its maximalist demands but does not wish to negotiate and compromise,
then it could declare that it had achieved the goals of the “special military operation”
and withdraw troops back into Belarus, Russia, and those areas of Ukraine that it
wishes to annex. These areas are most likely to be in southern Ukraine to connect
Russia with Crimea (should Mariupol fall) or at least secure for Crimea’s access to
fresh water from the Dnepr River. Since Ukraine would never agree to this annexation,
a Russian declaration of victory and withdrawal to a fortified defense line would
present Ukraine with a dilemma: accept a ceasefire under unfavorable conditions or
continue the war. Putin could claim that Ukraine had been “punished” to put a positive
spin on a disastrous campaign and serve as a warning to other states on Russia’s
periphery of the damage that they will sustain if they ever violate Russia’s perceived
security interests. This move might also prevent the destruction of the Russian army
and avert domestic unrest that could threaten Putin’s hold on power.

9
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(3) Ukraine defeats Russia. A Ukrainian victory would be defined by a return to the
status quo before February 24, without conditions that violated its sovereignty.
This would require either a collapse of the Russian army in the field or a political
agreement with Russia, most likely due to a change of government in Moscow, which
then would withdraw its army to end international sanctions. In other words, this
scenario requires a close repeat of Russian history in 1917. However, even in victory,
Ukraine would face years of rebuilding and resettling its refugees and internally
displaced persons, the costs for which seized Russian assets would hopefully help
defray.

(4) A Negotiated Settlement. Russia’s devastation of Ukraine’s cities, coupled with

Ukraine’s devastation of Russia’s army and the effects of international sanctions,
could lead both sides to a negotiated settlement. Zelensky no longer believes NATO
membership is possible and has signaled that Ukraine is willing to compromise on
this key Russian demand. The Kremlin recognizes that regime change is impossible
and that it needs Zelensky’s credibility to get Ukrainians to agree to any compromises
that give Russia a face-saving way out of this war. Both sides could continue to
agree to disagree about the status of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’
Republics, which would then put negotiating positions close to the status quo
ante bellum. From Moscow’s perspective, it could declare victory and announce to
domestic audiences that Ukraine had “learned a lesson” and would never again
threaten Donetsk and Luhansk. From Kyiv’s perspective, a negotiated settlement
would allow Ukraine to rebuild and await favorable circumstances to regain territories
lost in 2014.

(5) A War of Attrition. As horrible as it is, this war does not have to end soon if both
countries have the will to continue to fight, if not to victory, then to avoid defeat. The
front could stabilize with Russia’s military unable to advance and Ukraine unable to
dislodge it. As the war continues, both the Russian and Ukrainian economies would
suffer, and millions of refugees could remain in Europe. Like South Korea and South
Vietnam before it, Ukraine would become the hot focus of a new Cold War.

10
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES
CONCLUSION
The military theorist Clausewitz believed war was
a contest of wills. He also believed in the concept
of the center of gravity: “the characteristics,
capabilities, or locations from which a military
force derives its freedom of action, physical
strength, or will to fight.” An argument can be
made that the Ukrainian and Russian centers of
gravity are found in their national leaders.20 The
winner of this war may be the leader, Zelensky or
Putin, who most effectively galvanizes his country
to fight and then manages the armed forces, and
the logistics to sustain those forces, to achieve
the nation’s war aims.
A definitive victory for one side would require a
collapse of the army and domestic political will
of the other side. Russia could declare victory
and withdraw after annexing more Ukrainian
territory and inflicting what it perceives as
sufficient punishment on Kyiv. A negotiated
settlement would reflect both the military realities
on the ground and the political and economic
realities inside each country. In Russia’s case,
a negotiated settlement is unlikely to provide
results that justify having gone to war. A long war
of attrition, similar to the one between Egypt and
Israel from 1967-1970, that left both countries
with ruined economies, militaries, and societies,
11
is possible. A peace agreement after such a
war would most likely be reached as a result of
mutual exhaustion and unlikely solve anything,
except perhaps to provide a rest period before
the next war.
Which scenario is most likely to occur? Russia
faces a myriad of daunting tactical, logistical,
manpower, and morale challenges in continuing
the war, but it is not impossible for it to annex
portions of Ukraine if its army and national
will remain intact. However, under the best
circumstances, what Russia would “win” would
be an occupied population seething with
resentment and offering years of resistance, a
West united against Russia, and an economic
future for Russia that is really no future. Russia’s
only hope for “victory” is for Ukraine to become
exhausted before it does, but even this type
of victory would redefine the term “Pyrrhic.”
More likely Russia will either see its invasion
eventually repelled or will have to compromise at
the negotiating table. Either event would cause
seismic waves inside Russian society and body
politic. That much of the canvas is clear after six
weeks.
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Endnotes

1 Mykola Bielieskov, “Ukraine’s Strategy in Russian Invasion: similar to Finland’s Winter War,” Euromaidan Press, March
11, 2022, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/03/11/ukraines-strategy-in-russian-invasion-is-similar-to-finlands-winter-
war/.
2 Olena Roshchina, “Росія прагне захопити Херсонську, Донецьку й Луганську області повністю – зведення
Генштабу [Russia intends to completely seize Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts – General Staff summary],”
Ukrainska Pravda, April 2, 2022, https://www.pravda.com/ua/news/2022/04/2/7336585.
3 Reuters, “Russia says 498 of its soldiers killed, 1,597 wounded in Ukraine – RIA,” March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.
com/world/russia-says-498-of-its-soldiers-killed-1597-wounded-ukraine-ria-2022-03-02/; and Matthew Luxmoore,
“Russia More Than Doubles Count of Its Troops Killed in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022, https://www.wsj.
com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-25/card/russia-more-than-doubles-count-of-its-war-dead-to-1-
351-troops-killed-in-ukraine-Db3WixxGFfHSIRnLbYPZ.
4 Dan Lamothe and Ellen Nakashima, “Up to 4,000 Russian soldiers may have died in Ukraine, U.S. general says,”
Washington Post, March 8, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2002/03/08/russian-mili-
tary-deaths-ukraine/.
5 Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis, and Jeremy Herb, “Mounting Russian casualties in Ukraine lead to more ques-
tions about its military readiness,” CNN, March 18, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/17/europe/russian-ca-
sualties-ukraine-military-readiness/index.html; and Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, “As Russian
Troop Deaths Climb, Morale Becomes an Issue, Officials Say,” New York Times, March 17, 2022, https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html.
6 Daniel Michaels, “NATO: Up to 40,000 Russian Troops Killed, Wounded, Taken Prisoner or Missing in Ukraine,” Wall
Street Journal, March 23, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-23/card/russia-
lost-up-to-40-000-troops-in-ukraine-nato-estimates-xjZjWxinMDHzdeRZvAeD.
7 There is no more complicated or controversial subject than trying to determine Soviet casualties during the Second
World War/Great Patriotic War. In the best attempt for accuracy for this report, the killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.3 is
determined from figures found in a 1993 Russian Ministry of Defense study prepared by General G.F. Krivosheev, which
is not without its detractors because of disagreements over the losses of POWs and other categories separate from
combat dead and wounded. The Krivosheev report specifies that during the Second World War, Soviet forces sustained
6,329,600 killed in action or died of wounds; 555,500 non-combat deaths (disease, accidents, etc.); and 14,685,593
wounded in action. Using these figures provides a killed-to-wounded ratio of 1:2.32. The percentage of non-combat
deaths to killed in action is approximately 9%. Krivosheev’s report is at https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/
more.htm?id=11359251@cmsArticle and an English translation is available at documents.theblackvault.com/documents/
SovietLosses.pdf.
8 Interfax-Ukraine, “There are currently 562 Russian prisoners of war in Ukraine – Vereschuk,” March 19, 2022, https://
en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/815830.html.
9 D.M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and The Invasion of Japan, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD,
2009, p. 4.
10 Stijn Mitzer, “Attack on Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html. Accessed April 6,
2022.
11 Svitlana Kisilova, “РФ заявляє, що тримає в полоні 500 українців йvготова до обміну, але проосить менше
“злоби” [Russia says it holds 500 Ukrainians captive and ready for exchange, but asks for less “malice”],” Ukrainska
Pravda, March 21, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333410.
12 Stijn Mitzer, “Attack on Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html. Accessed April 6,
2022.
13 Jeremy Herb, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler, and Oren Liebermann, “Pentagon says Polish proposal to transfer jets
to US to give to Ukraine isn’t ‘tenable’,” CNN, March 8, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/politics/poland-jets-
ukraine-russia/index.html.
14 Kseniya Kirillova, “Putin Is Losing the War, but Russians Have Stockholm Syndrome,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, volume 19, no. 33, March 10, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/putin-is-losing-the-war-but-russians-
have-stockholm-syndrome/.
15 Moscow Times, “Russia Detains Around 4,600 at Ukraine Conflict Protests,” March 7, 2022, https://www.moscow-
times.com/202/03/07/russia-detains-around-4600-at-ukraine-conflict-protests-a76797.

12
 APPRAISING THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

16 Jack Wright and Chris Pleasance, “Russia learns the TRUTH: State TV DEFIES President Putin’s propaganda edict
and broadcasts criticism of the war in Ukraine – with guests describing the shambolic invasion as “like Afghanistan, but
even WORSE,” Daily Mail, March 11, 2022, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10600711/Ukraine-war-Guests-Rus-
sian-state-TV-invasion-like-Afghanistan-worse.html.
17 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Greenwood Press, Westport,
Connecticut, 1982, pp. 163-164.
18 Miriam Berger, “A majority of Ukrainians support armed resistance and oppose concessions to Russia, poll finds,”
Washington Post, March 10, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/10/ukraine-poll-majority-ukraini-
ans-support-armed-resistance-oppose-concessions-russia-new-poll-finds/.
19 EuroMaidan Press, “More Ukrainians support military alliance with UK & Poland than NATO accession, poll shows,”
March 23, 2022, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/03/23/more-ukrainians-support-military-alliance-with-uk-than-na-
to-accession-poll-shows/.
20 This concept was first developed by Antulio Echevarria when he stated that the mind of the commander-in-chief
was the American center of gravity in war. See, Tom Ricks, “Echevarria: The president’s mind is the true American cen-
ter of gravity, plus why landpower is different, and more thoughts,” Foreign Policy, October 1, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/10/01/echevarria-the-presidents-mind-is-the-true-american-center-of-gravity-plus-why-landpower-is-different-
and-more-thoughts/.

13
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Philip Wasielewski is a 2022 Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Insitute and a former
Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency. He was a member of the first CIA team into Afghanistan in 2001 and served a three-
year assignment on the National Security Council staff as the Director for Intelligence and Covert Action
programs. His CIA career was paralleled by a concurrent 30-year Marine Corps career (7 years active duty
and 23 reserve) as an infantry officer including mobilizations for Afghanistan and Iraq. Philip Wasielewski
graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1983 with a B.A. in International Relations and European
History. He also has an M.A. from Harvard's Davis Center for Russian Studies and an M.A. in National
Security Studies from the Army War College.

14
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