PROJECT MANAGEMENT

CIA – 1
TITLE – Project Planning Practices (Time, Cost & Resources)

By
Group 2
2127114 – GokulaKrishnan. B
2127118 - Harish S
2127205 - Gajji Akhil
2127221 - Nikhil Andrew P S
2127320 - Sadhas Ruben
2127323 - Saranyan

Submitted on
05-12-2022

Under the guidance of

Prof. Lakshmi Prasad V

School of Business & Management

CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore
December 2022
 Projects that were chosen by the group
S No Project Success Failure

1 Berlin Brandenburg Airport No Yes

2 Target’s failed entry into Canada No Yes

3 Polavaram project No Yes

4 Kochi metro Yes No

5 TCS Passport Seva Yes No

1. Berlin Brandenburg Airport:
Project Summary:
The Berlin airport is a rare example of a difficult infrastructure project from the Federal
Republic of Germany, a country known for its efficiency and engineering brilliance.
Perhaps a better name for Berlin's new airport would be "Brandenburg" rather than
"Brandenburg." The project had selected the "it'll open when it opens" policy to avoid more
embarrassment. The airport's intended October 2011 opening date has been pushed back
due to controversy and ineptitude, resulting in the construction not being able to handle
nearly as much traffic as it could. Inspectors evaluating the airport discovered 120,000
problems, including fire safety dangers, as well as about 170,000 kilometers (106,000
miles) of incorrectly wired cabling built in and around the airport at the time of its scheduled
first operation. Everything seemed to be going badly for BER. It took more than nine years
to resolve the airport's challenges, and officials verified that it will be ready for takeoff in
October 2020. However, its accomplishment came at a perilous time: the global
coronavirus pandemic has reduced travel significantly, and the airport has remained
relatively empty as a result. BER is now linked with inept governmental administration and
financial mismanagement, all of which contribute to significant project failure.

What led to the failure of Berlin Brandenburg Airport?

Politicians on the Supervisory Board: The supervisory board was entirely made up of
politicians with no experience in project management. They were in charge of making
critical decisions. The endeavor was doomed from the outset. It all began in 1990, when
developers spent six years deciding where to build. It took another decade for the official
ground-breaking to occur after that. As more problems arose, private investors fled, leaving
the government to finance and oversee growth on its own. During the global financial crisis
of 2007-08, it was difficult to find a contractor to develop and fund the airport. While the
project should have been put on hold, lawmakers continued to push it forward with public
cash.

Quality- Inadequate quality tests: It is remarkable that the Berlin Brandenburg Airport
project encountered significant quality issues in a country so focused on excellence and
high-quality standards. According to sources, 66,500 flaws were detected, 34,000 of which
were "serious" and 5,845 of which were "critical." Non-functional fire protection, an alarm
system that did not satisfy building requirements, poorly situated smoke extractors,
conducts that were not isolated, and walls that were built to the wrong fire rating were all
critical problems. Major reconstructions were planned to remedy the terrible situation.

Inconsistent Leadership: This construction project was governed by a board of directors

with no prior airport development experience. Furthermore, bribes were allegedly accepted
by a number of board members and decision-making panel members. Alfredo di Mauro,
the airport's chief planner for fire prevention, was discovered not to be a certified engineer
in 2014. As a result of di Mauro's mistakes, the airport has lost millions (if not billions) of
dollars.

Imtech, the principal contractor for the Brandenburg airport, declared bankruptcy in 2015.
These examples of leadership inconsistency illustrate the importance of having an
independent party participate in the initial design, cost estimation, and ongoing
management of a project.

2. Target's unsuccessful entry into Canada

Project Summary

Target established target-Canada in 2011 and committed to purchase approximately 220

stores across the country. They began three stores in 2013, and by mid-2014, they had
roughly 133. However, they had closed all of its facilities and discontinued operations in
Canada by mid-2015, a two-year timeframe. Target announced in January 2015 that it
would close all 133 of its Canadian outlets after only two years in business. Target's original
goal of turning a profit within a year of launch was broken when CEO Brian Cornell
declared that the company would not be profitable until at least 2021, and that extra cash
would be required to keep afloat. Target has decided to exit the Canadian market and
refocus its efforts on the United States, where it plans to pursue smaller locations in
metropolitan areas and expand its e-commerce operations. Target exited the Canadian
market, incurring a $5.4 billion write-down and a $2 billion cumulative estimated loss.

What Caused Target's Failure?

Data loading and data quality:

The underlying reason of Target's supply chain failure in 2012 was swiftly identified: faults
in the company's supply chain software, which oversees inventory movement. Countless
errors were made in the start, and the corporation spent months attempting to recover from
them. A separate procedure was in place to ensure that the correct data was entered into
SAP. Personnel in Mississauga were unable to upload it directly. Instead, the data was sent
to a Target office in India, where employees entered it into SAP. More contractors were
also needed in India.

Empty shelves but Stock overflow:

Footfall was higher than expected in the early days, which was a positive, but it didn't take
long for customers to complain about bare shelves on social media. Target told reporters
that it was overwhelmed by demand and was working to improve product delivery
accuracy. Target's distribution centers were bursting at the seams with merchandise, even
as customers faced sparsely stocked stores. Target Canada had ordered far more inventory
than it could possibly sell.

Distribution Problems:

Dimensions and numbers were occasionally a subject of controversy in distribution. A

headquarters employee may have ordered 1,000 toothbrushes and entered them wrongly
into SAP as a case pack of ten boxes of 100 toothbrushes each. However, shipping
arrangements may differ. As a result, that shipment would be impossible to be handled
because it would not be found in the distribution center's software.

Malfunctioning Point of Sale System:

The point-of-sale system was not functioning properly. The self-service checkout machines
gave me the incorrect change. The cash machines started up unusually slowly and
occasionally froze. Items would not scan, or the POS would display the incorrect price. The
transaction would appear to be finished, and the customer would depart, but the payment
would never be processed.

Lessons Learned:

Technology:

Target's technology—the mechanisms that allow the company to purchase items from
vendors, transport them through warehouses, and rapidly place them on store shelves—was
one of the most important decisions it made. The essential point here is to find the
technology that best matches your needs and not to assume that operations in one location
would be the same as activities in another. Their problems with empty shelves,
overstocking, delivery issues, and so on would be easily handled if they had a better IT
system.

Training:

Target has a distinct, well-established corporate culture in the United States, which is seen
as one of the reasons for the company's success, and the company's management wished to
replicate it in Canada. Training is one of the most important parts of being effective with
client relations and functioning in another country. Countries will have their unique work
culture, which cannot be assumed to be the same as any other country.

Culture:

Even if a country of operations is adjacent to or in the same physical region as the home of
operations, they will operate in completely different ways. It is a requirement to conduct
market research before beginning business in any location. We would need to understand
everything from the customer's culture and purchasing habits to the employee's work
culture.

Conclusion

Target Canada entered bankruptcy, wasting billions of dollars, destroying its reputation,
and laying off approximately 17,600 employees. In most cases, a company's prospects of
survival would have been nil, and Target has been lucky to continue its success in the
United States.

3. Polavaram project

Project Summary:

The Polavaram project involves the construction of a dam for hydroelectric irrigation and
water delivery. The project, which is controlled by the government of Andhra Pradesh,
began building in 2004. It is being built on the Godavari at Polavaram, Andhra Pradesh's
West Godavari district. The project is anticipated to begin operations in July 2022. This
project will result in the construction of the Polavaram reservoir, which will have a total
capacity of 194 tmcft. Backwater from the reservoir spread into regions of Odisha and
Chhattisgarh. This reservoir will provide a boost to the tourism sector in the Godavari
districts by covering the Papikonda national park.
The National Waterway 4 and the Hydro Electric Project (HEP) are being built on the left
bank of the Godavari.

The Polavaram project dates back to July 1941, when the Madras Presidency presented the
first proposal for this project. Mr. Tanguturi Anjaiah, then Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh, laid the project's foundation in 1980. Dr. Y S Rajasekhara Reddy did Bhoomi
Pooja later that year. The projects estimated cost at the time was roughly Rs 8261 crores.
A decade later, in 2014, the then-Chief Minister, Mr. N Chandrababu Naidu, and his
government broke ground on the major Polavaram dam.

Until then, the surrounding canals had been built, and the project had been temporarily
halted due to issues with obtaining clearances from various authorities and ministries. He
refused to continue the project unless the Khammam district's seven mandals were merged
into the state of Andhra Pradesh.

The idea was then taken seriously in December, with a request for a deadline extension by
the transitory. By then, a loan of Rs 4300 crores had become non-performing in July of
2015. The government signed a new contract with Navayuga Engineering in January 2018
for concrete work on the sill channel, project spillover, and stilling basin. The completion
of the Polavaram diaphragm wall on July 11, 2018 is a crucial milestone in this project.
The project is believed to be 70% complete as of May 2019.

What caused the Polavaram Project to fail?

The reasons for the Polavaram project's failure can be divided into three categories: time,
cost, and quality.

Time:

One of the primary causes for the project's schedule lag is that there were numerous
challenges encountered in obtaining permissions from authorities such as the Central
Electrical Authority, the CWC, and the Ministry of Environment. According to reports, the
Union Ministry of Environment will grant permission only if the state holds public hearings
in Chhattisgarh and Odisha and obtains approval for the project to proceed. It was
discovered that the state government of Andhra Pradesh has not been working on it
seriously. Another reason for the delay could be disagreements between the parties. The
majority of AP parties supported the Polavaram project, but the Telangana separatist parties
and groups did not. This was done for two reasons – this project doesn’t seem to be
beneficial to Telangana state and also this project might lead to the submerging of
Khammam district villages.

Cost:

It has been difficult for the Andhra Pradesh government to locate a financier who will
provide adequate funding for the project to be completed without interruptions. Work on
repair and the construction of the left and right canals was severely hampered by a lack of
money. Despite this, the government budgeted Rs 6500 crores in 2005 to carry out 26
irrigation projects, including the Polavaram project. However, due to incorrect project
allocation, this amount has been fully depleted. Because the majority of the funding were
taken up by the Polavaram project, other projects were delayed. Furthermore, this has
resulted in a cost overrun of approximately 583%.

Quality:

According to the report, if the dam collapses when natural disasters such as floods and
earthquakes are at their peak, or owing to poor quality or inappropriate construction of the
wall, the lives of over 50 lakh people living in the delta of Godavari districts downstream
of this dam will be jeopardized. The dam design was not approved by the Central Water
Commission (CWC) because it did not take into account the flood situation estimates by
CWC from 102000 to 142000 comes with respect to the spillway design, and the Andhra
Pradesh state government has not made changes in relation to the estimated level of
backwater.

Lessons Learned:

People must stay informed about alternate proposals that are available through the media.
This will compel the government to make sound judgments, as they are now aware that the
general public is aware of the project's ongoing occurrences. Alternative solutions for the
Polavaram dam project must be explored and executed when they can deliver roughly the
same level of impact on economic growth and the lives of people living in the Godavari
delta. Mr. T Hanumantha Rao, the former irrigation chief engineer of Andhra Pradesh, once
proposed something similar, but it was not seriously considered.
4. Kochi metro:

Project Summary:

The Kochi Metro (KMRL) is a rapid transport system serving Kochi, Kerala, India. It was
built in four years, making it India's fastest metro project. The Kochi metro project is the
country's first to combine rail, road, and water transportation facilities. The first phase will
cost 51.81 billion yen (US$690 million). In October 2017, the Urban Development Ministry
named Kochi Metro the Best Urban Mobility Project in India as part of the biennial Urban
Mobility India (UMI) international conference.

The construction began in June 2013, and on June 17, 2017, India's Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi, opened a 13.4-kilometer (8.3-mile) segment of the line from Aluva to
Palarivattom to passengers. The second 5 km (3.1 mi) segment from Palarivattom to
Maharaja's College metro station opened on October 3, 2017. On September 3rd, 2019, a
new 5.65 km (3.51 mi) segment from Maharaja's College Stadium to Thaikoodam was
opened. Kochi Metro also includes self-driving train technology, which it hopes to use in
the near future.

Kochi Metro was praised for hiring Kudumbashree employees as well as a few transgender
people. It is the world's first rapid transit system in which women execute all managerial
roles. In addition to traditional tickets, it has implemented a single card, a single timetable,
and a single command and control. The Kochi One Mobile App, in conjunction with this
debit card, allows passengers to use various means of public transit, as well as conduct
mercantile and internet activities. The 'click and collect' option will be launched in the near
future, allowing things ordered online to be collected in metro stations. Every Metro station
in Kochi is themed around Kerala culture and nature.

What led to the success of Kochi Metro Project?

Time:

The project demonstrated that a technologically sophisticated project could be quickly

implemented in Kerala. The sceptics who predicted the metro would take 10-15 years to
complete were proven wrong. Kerala residents shown their ability to complete large-scale
projects on time. KMRL not only served the people with purpose on time, but also used
technology to its benefit. Whereas numerous metros in various states are still looking for
solutions to finish the project.

Technology:

The metro uses cutting-edge technologies from around the world. Metro combines modern
trains, power, and station design. The metro project has brought technological expertise to
Kochi, which might be utilized to improve any city in Kerala.

Innovation in Utilization of resources Human resource:

Development, like information technology, has a hard and a soft side. Kochi Metro has
focused on its soft side in addition to the effective installation of its metal-and-concrete
infrastructure. Consider transgender people's training and job. It also took the initiative to
hire women as drivers. The metro has brought about a cultural shift in people's views. This
could serve as a blueprint for any metro in India.

Natural Resource:

Kochi Metro offers a lot of new features. Solar power provides 25% of its electricity
demands. The system is also involved in environmental initiatives, such as the installation
of non-motorized transit lanes in the city, the installation of solar panels for electricity, and
the construction of a vertical garden on every sixth metro pillar.

Lessons discovered:

Inspiration

• Look for power and inspiration in your own territory and culture.

• Develop a strong and inspiring mindset for your teamwork.

Integration

• Create a seamless integrated public transportation system

• Rethink the utilization of public areas (sidewalks and bicycle lanes)

• Gather all forces under the umbrella of a Unified Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Innovation

• Make the most of Intelligent Transportation Systems

• Rely on societal advancements

• Make full use of professional communication

Conclusion:

Kochi Metro has not only been a successful project, but it has also served as a model for
many others. The concrete plan and structural reasoning were both flawless. It has applied
a variety of lessons to the upcoming construction project.

5. TCS Passport Seva

Project Summary:

The Indian government issued the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) in 2006 to share
core and support infrastructure, enable interoperability through standards, and give citizens
with a uniform view of government. The goal was to provide digital access to services to
people of all nationalities as well as rural and underserved populations. The Passport Seva
initiative was one of the government's first projects under the NeGP, and it rapidly became
a hallmark project due to its size and associated media coverage. TCS signed a six-year
contract with a two-year extension option in October 2008 after the Ministries of External
Affairs and Information Technology issued a request for proposals (RFP) in 2007.

Following a competitive bidding process, TCS was selected as the implementation partner
to revamp the passport issuing process in 2008. Following consideration of feedback, the
first step in achieving a pleasant experience was to reduce passport requirements, which
included adjustments to the documentation procedure. Because of the internet, cell phones,
and big data, TCS was quick to embrace these technologies to make the passport issuance
process simple, efficient, and seamless.

Objectives of the Project:

• A tier 3 data centre and disaster recovery facility

• A central passport printing facility

• A network operations centre

• A contact centre that operates in 17 languages, uses IVRS/agent support, and provides
• A security operations centre; leasing, equipping, and managing 77 passport offices;
designing, developing, and maintaining the passport issuance application and portal; data
migration from the legacy system; fee collection and account reconciliation; change
management, training, and communication management; citizen feedback and grievance
management; and coordination with various stakeholders such as the police, India Post, and
Security Printing Pvt. Ltd.

What Led to the success of TCS Passport Seva Project?

Simplification of the Project:

The project was completed in a systematic manner using a combination of technology and
gradual implementation. This was essential to the scheme's success. Designing the
application flow in a single direction is one of the most critical decisions. It would control
admission to passport offices when paired with an electronic queue management system.

Planned Rollout:

As part of a phased deployment, the first four passport facilities in the state of Karnataka
launched in May 2010. Based on the results of these testing, the countrywide deployment
began in June 2011. By May 2012, all 77 authorised passport facilities were operational.
As a result, certification and operations commenced in June 2012. As part of the
enhancements developed in conjunction with TCS, a mobile application was deployed in
March 2013, followed by an online payment system in June 2013.

Green e-governance:

Digitization of the entire passport issuance procedure has significantly reduced paperwork.
Because the process has been simplified, fewer annexures are required along with the
application.

Creating new job opportunities:

TCS employs over 3,000 people, whereas MEA employs over 2,000 people on the Passport
Seva Project. TCS has hired around 2,000 individuals from the towns where PSKs can be
found. As a result, the personnel's family earnings and social standing have increased,
particularly for those from economically disadvantaged families. Women account for more
than 45 percent of all project hires, including senior positions.
Conclusion:

The TCS passport seva project has been a huge success thanks to careful planning and the
effective use of technology and other resources. To date, the system has received over 90
million applications. This project is a classic illustration of how private companies and the
government should work together to make citizens' lives easier.

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