Duty To Give Reasons - MP Singh

DUTY TO GIVE REASONS FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Author(s): M. P. Singh
Source: Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January-March 1979), pp. 45-73
Published by: Indian Law Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43950620
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DUTY TO GIVE REASONS FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
M. P. Singh *
IN INDIA there is no general rule, statutory or otherwise, that reasons

must be given for every quasi-judicial or administrative decision. With
the ever expanding area and volume of these decisions affecting vital indi-
vidual interests, however, the question arises whether they should be
accompanied by reasons to repose the confidence of the people in admi-
nistrative process and to minimise the chances of arbitrariness ? In the
United Kingdom and the United States this question has been dealt with
by legislation.1 In India we have not enacted any legislation in spite
of a two decades old recommendation of the Law Commission that a
general legislation should require quasi-judicial and administrative decisions
to be accompanied by reasons.2
As a result of this legislative inertia and the pressing demands of justice
arising in individual cases, courts are evolving a body of principles on the
requirement of reasoned decisions.3 Though sporadic and piecemeal, judi-
cial efforts cannot produce as satisfactory results as the planned legislation
*LL.M. (Luck.), LL.M. (Columbia), LL.D. (Luck.), Reader in Law, Faculty of

Law, Delhi University.
The author expresses his thanks to Iqbal Singh Ishar, Lecturer in Law, Delhi Uni-
versity, for making available some of the materials used in the preparation of this
paper.
1. In the United Kingdom, s. 13 of the Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1971 re-
quires all tribunals covered by that Act to give reasons if the request for reasons has
been made prior to the decision. In practice reasons are given even without such
request. Reasons may be refused on grounds of national security and also the Lord
Chancellor may exclude any cases from the requirement of reasons if in his opinion
giving of reasons is "unnecessary or impracticable." Thus, though the Act covers a
wide range of administrative adjudication, it does not cover the whole.
In the United States ss. 555(e) and 557(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
1946 impose a general obligation to give reasons. The duty to give reasons is much
wider and general in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
2. Law Commission of India, Fourteenth Report , vol. II, pp. 394-95 (1958).
3. It may be argued, as Seervai has done, that the court should not require rea-
sons to be given for quasi-judicial or administrative decisons unless the legislature lays
down a clear policy in this regard. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 959 (2nd
ed. 1976). But this argument assumes that the statute is the whole law in itself and
there is nothing like an implied element in it as read by the courts keeping in view the
social circumstances and the needs of justice. If the assumption is true the whole of
administrative law would have been in different shape and various principles of judicial
control of administrative action, including the principles of natural justice, would have
never existed in our law. That the express law always accompanies implied law : see
L. Fuller, Anatomy afThe Law 64-99 (Pelicaned., 1971).
46 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [ Vol. 21 :1
can do, yet at the same time a series of judicial efforts may le
emergence of equally sound propositions. Whether any such pr
have emerged is the subject matter of the present enquiry in
importance of the subject, frequent and sometimes apparently c
opinions of the courts, and the dissatisfaction felt on the
approach.4
I. Express statutory requirement

An express statutory requirement of giving of reasons for a decision
has always been held mandatory and its non-observance goes to jurisdic-
tion vitiating the entire decision.5 This is equally true even if the require-
ment is imposed by subordinate legislation and not by the parent Act.6
The requirement is not met by merely recording the reasons on the file ;
they must also be made known to the party affected by the decision.7
This applies equally to quasi-judicial as well as administrative decision as
has been unequivocally made clear by the Supreme Court in its recent
decisions in Union of ìndia v. M.L. Capoor 8 and Ajantha Industries ' cases.9
In M. L. Capoor the slection committee for the slection of police
officers for higher posts was required by regulation 5(5) of the Indian
Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 to "record
its reasons" for the supersession of any officer in the matter of selection.
The committee gave a uniform reason in all cases of supersession that
"On an over all assessment the records of these officers concerned are not
such as to justify their appointment ...at this stage in preference to those
selected".9" Holding that even if the selection process was an administrative
act, the court said, that the requirement of reasons was mandatory and
was not met by "rubber-stamp" reasons given mechanically in all cases
without application of mind in each case. In Ajantha Industries 10 the
4. See, for example, Seervai, supra note 3 at 955 and M.P. Jain, Administrative
Law, 8 A.S.I.L. 225 at 236 (1972).
5. See Ajantha Industries v. Central Board , Direct laxes , A l.K. 1976 b.c. 4J/ at
441; M.U.M. Services Ltd . v. R.T.A. Malabar , A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 59, 60; Sudhansu Kanta
State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 299; Kishori Lai v. Dy. Commr., Kamrup, A.I.R.
1955 Assam 183, 191; Vemulu Thimmappa v. Addi Distt. Magistrate , A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C.
(Andhra) 4458; Bagga Singh v. Distt . Magistrate , Barnalas A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 150 and
Ratilal Bhogilal v. State of Gujarat , A.I.R. 19 66 Guj. 244, 245.
6. See Union of India v. M.L. Capoor , A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 87, 98 and r.J, Joseph v.
Supdt. of Post Offices , A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 197, 199.
7. Ajantha Industries ' case, supra note 5 at 440. The court said :
We are clearly of opinion that the requirement of recording reasons under
section 127(1) is a mandatory direction undsr the law and non-communication
thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not
communicated to the assessee.
8. Supra note 6 at 98.
9a. M.L. Capoor' s case, supra note 6 at 91.
10. Supra note 5.
1979 ] DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 47
Central Board of Direct Taxes had tran

lant from Nellore to Hyderabad under
Act, 1961 which authorised the boar
income-tax office to another "after re
transfer order was challenged for non
reasons. Rejecting, inter alia , the defe
decision11 the court had held such orde
the requirement of reasons unnecessary
When law requires reasons to be re

affecting prejudicially the interests of
the order in court, it ceases to be a m
the violation of the principles of n
omission to communicate the reasons
Some statutes require, instead of rea

recorded.13 Grounds may be distinguis
represent a finite number of alternati
requires grounds to be stated, "the dec
grounds forms the basis of the decisio
stated for the decision."14 While thi
statutes15 and can be discerned in the c
consequence for the purposes of statut
with the requirement of statement of
quasi-judicial or administrative in the
the requirement of statement of reaso
11. Kashiram v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1028. This case was distingu-
ished by the court as falling within the proviso to s. 127(1) which gave exemption from
the requirement of recording reasons.
12. Ajantha Industries' case, supra note 5 at 441.
13. See for example, the Indian Press Act, 1910, s. 4; The Criminal Procedure
Còde, 1973, ss. 99A and 99D; The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1961; The Main-
tenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, s. 3 and the Constitution of India, art. 22(5).
14. Michael Akehurst, Statements of Reasons for Judicial and Administrative
Decisions, 33 M.L.R. 154, 155 (1970).
15. See the statutes cited in supra note 13. Art. 22(5) of the Constitution does not
mention the grounds of detention but it refers to the grounds mentioned in the pre-
ventive detention law such as s. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.
16. For example in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor , supra note 6 at 98 Beg, J., as
he then was, said : "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain con-
clusions are based and the actual conclusions" and in Narayan Das v. State of M.P .
A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2086 at 2088 Mitter, J., said : "Grounds of the opinion must mean
the conclusion of facts on which the opinion is based".
17. May be it is for this reason that S.N. Jain has treated Capoor and Narayan
Das crises under one category, i.e., of reasoned decisions. See S.N. Jain, Giving of
Reasons by Administrative Bodies : Recent Cases, 16 J. I. L.I. 142 at 147-48 (1974).
18. See Narayan Das v. State of M.P. , supra note 16; State of U.P. v. Lalai
Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 202 and Hàrnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh , A.I.R. 1961
S.C. 1662.
48 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [ Vol. 21 : 1
that "you must state the grounds it is no answer to say that they
be stated because they are implied.... Where there is a statutory
speak, silence is lethal sin,..."19
II. Statutory silence

Difficult problems arise when the statute is silent on the requ
of reasoned decisions. A statute authorises taking away of an ind
right by an administrative action and the action is taken withou
the individual know what the reasons are for such action. Can the indivi-
dual compel the administrator to let him know the reasons for his
decision ? If so, on what basis ? Should the court, if the individual
approaches it, refuse to interfere on grounds of statutory silence or read
an implied requirement of statement of reasons as it does about the
requirement of hearing or bias ? Can the individual question the vali-
dity of the statute itself because non-requirement of reasons imposes
an unreasonable restriction on one of his rights guaranteed in article 19(1)
of the Constitution ? These and several other similar questions arise
before the courts when the statute is silent on the requirement of reasoned
decisions. Let us examine how the courts have answered them in the past
and what guidelines they lay down for the future.
(a) Constitutional requirement

The Constitution of India guarantees certain fundamental rights which
cannot be curtailed by legislative or executive action except to the extent
and in the manner provided in the Constitution. Some of these rights
such as freedom of speech and expression, assembly, association, move-
ment, acquisition, holding and disposal of property, and occupation, trade
and business are guaranteed by article 19(1) on which only reasonable res-
trictions can be imposed by law on grounds mentioned in clauses (2) to (6)
of that article. The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon the sub-
stantive as well as procedural aspects of a law. Can the validity of a law be
questioned under article 19 on the ground that it imposes an unreasonable
restriction on a right guaranteed in article 19 by not requiring reasons to
be stated for a decision ? In Anumathi Sadhukhan v. A.K. Chatterjee,20
the Calcutta High Court answered this question in the affirmative. In
that case clauses 9 and 13 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order,
1949 which authorised refusal to issue or renew a licence or suspension or
cancellation of a licence already issued "without assigning any reasons",
were found imposing unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner's right to
trade and business under article 19(l)(g) and were, therefore, held un-
constitutional.
19. Lalai Singh's case, id. at 204.

20. A.l.R. 1951 Cal. 90 }92.
Similarly in Narasimha v. Distt. Magi

said that rule 43 made under section
authorised the district magistrate to r
cretion would amount to an unreasonable restriction on the right to
acquire, hold and dispose of property under article 19(1 )(/) unless the
requirement of reasons was implied in the rule. The court, therefore, set
aside the order of the district magistrate and asked him to decide the
matter according to law. Later this proposition was repeated, though
not applied on procedural considerations, by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in V.K. Baiar ama Chetty v. State of Madras?2 Subsequently in
D. Balakrishnamurthy v. Municipal Commissioner 23 the same High Court
found no unreasonable restriction on the 'right to hold property under
article 19(1)(/) in a provision of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956 which empowered the commissioner to suggest alteration in the
building plans without giving reasons. The court, however, did not say
that the constitutional plea was misplaced or could not be raised.
No Supreme Court decision is traceable in which either a law was
invalidated under article 19(1) because it did not require reasons for deci-
sions to be stated or in which the requirement of reasoned decision was
implied in the law to protect it against an attack under that article. In
Kishan Chand Arora v. Commissioner of Police 24, among others, a question
was raised that section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866 which
authorised the commissioner of police to refuse a licence in his discretion
to the keepers of eating houses and places of public resort and entertain-
ment, imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade and busi-
ness under article 19(l)(g) as it did not require reasons to be given for
such refusal. By a majority of three to two the Supreme Court negatived
this contention. The majority view was that since the decision of the
commissioner was administrative and not quasi-judicial, he was under no
obligation to give reasons,25 while the minority view was that without
regard to the nature of the decision the law imposed unreasonable restric-
tion on the right under article 19(l)(g) as, among others it did not provide
for giving of reasons.26
Since Arora law has undergone important developments. The distinc-
tion between quasi-judical and administrative actions created by the courts
mainly for the purpose of application of the principles of natural justice to
the administrative adjudication,27 has recently been abandoned or ignored
21 . A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 476, 478.

22. A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 93, 97.
23. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 489, 491.
24. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 705.
25. Id. at 710.
26. Id. at 715.
27. See H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law 190 (3rd ed., 1971).
in a number of cases.28 Side by side the requirement of reason

has been counted as one of the principles of natural justice.2*
available where laws have been invalidated under article 19(1) because
they did not provide for hearing.30 And in some cases requirement of
hearing has been found implicit in the statute to save it from an attack
under article 19(1).31
Viewed in the light of these developments, the majority stand in Arora
has lost its force. And one has every reason to believe that if today again
the Supreme Court is faced with a similar case it might read an implied re-
quirement of reasoned decision in the statute, as was done by the Madras
High Court in Narasimha ,32 to save it from invalidation under article
19(1).
More potential and wide in scope than article 19 is article 1433 which
has recently emerged as one of the strongest weapons in the hands of the
courts to control any kind of arbitrariness in state action that adversely
affects the rights of an individual. Speaking in the context of the validity
of state action under article 14 in transferring a state employee from one
post to another, Bhagwati, J., in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 84
said :
Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions

and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within tradi-
tional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view,
equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.... Where an act is arbitrary, it
is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic
and constitutional law and is therefore violative of article 14....34a
28. See A.K. Kriapak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150, 154; M/s E.E.C.
Ltd., v. State of West Bengal , A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 266 and Govt, of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 596. For a summary of the case law, both Indian and foreign, on
the subject see Bhagwati, J., in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597,
625-630. At page 626 he observes :
Now if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there
can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative
function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as
quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural
justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent mis-
carriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-
judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry.
29. See, infra note 40.
30. See State of M.P. v. Bharat Singh , A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1170.
31. See Govt, of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat, supra note 28 at 597 and Haradhan Saha v.
State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154, 2158.
32. Supra note 21.
33. Art. 14 reads : The btate shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."
34. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555.
34a. Id. at 583.
1979] DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 51
Re-enforcing this approach, in M

Bhagwati, J., has gone to say that a
action and any procedure which is
"arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive"
be specific, he has said that a proce
personal liberty without the observ
tice, 36 could not be "right and just
bad under article 14.37 More recent
quirement of reasons, the court in G
has stated that "fairness founded on
epitomised in Arts. 14 and 16(l)".37f
What has been said in Maneka G
to personal liberty under article
also - fundamental or otherwise.39 And once article 14 is read to re-
quire observance of the principles of natural justice for affecting any right
of an individual it would naturally extend to cover the requirement of
stating reasons for decisions because the Supreme Court has already
opined that the requirement of reasons is, "like the principle of audi
alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice...."40
After Maneka Gandhi article 21 has emerged as an independent pro-
vision requiring the observance of the principles of natural justice in the
area of personal liberty. In Sunil Baíra v. Delhi Administration ,40° the
Supreme Court has read in section 56 of the Prisons Act, 1894 an implied
duty on the jail superintendent to give reasons for putting bar fetters on a
prisoner to avoid invalidity of that provision under article 21. Similarly in
In re Special Courts Bill , 1978i0h the Supreme Court held that absence of
a provision of transfer of a case from one special court to another in the

36. The court has talked of two main principles of natural justice, namely, nemo
judex in sua causa and audi alteram partem but since the case was concerned only with
the question of audi alteram partem , the court confined its observations to that principle
only. See id. at 625.
37. The court did not say it so clearly but when it says that the "procedure esta-
blished by law" under art. 21 must satisfy the requirement of art. 14 and art. 14 in turn
requires that the procedure must be fair. It clearly means that a procedure which lacks
fairness is ultimately violative of art. 14 though immediately it may be an impairment of
art. 21 as the Court has said. Id.t at 624.
37°. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 429.
37*. Id . at 434.
38. Art. 21 reads : "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal libert
except according to procedure established by law".
39. For example Royappa's case, supra note 34, related to a service matter and not
personal liberty.
40, Siemens bngg. & Mfg. Co . v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1976 SC. 1785, at 1789.
40a. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675, 1735.
40*. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 478, 517.
Special Courts Bill, 1978 offended article 21 because of absence o

guards against bias.
Apart from articles 14, 19 and 21 the courts read the require
reasoned decisions in article 136 under which the Supreme Cour
special leave may hear appeals from the decisions of any tribun
armed forces tribunals and in articles 226 and 227 which respect
to the High Courts power to issue writs and have superintenden
the subordinate courts and tribunals.41 The courts hold that th
of these powers will be defeated or they cannot be effectively
unless the tribunals are made to give reasons for their decisions.42 Al
as it will be noted below, the final propositions in this regard ha
be settled, it is certain that once the requirement of reasons em
principle of natural justice, the writ of certiorari will be issued f
observance. And since grounds for appeal under article 136 are
as for the issuance of certiorari , an appeal under that article w
allowed for non-observance of the requirement of reasons subje
condition that while certiorari could be issued even to quash ad
tive decisions an appeal would be allowed only against the decisi
tribunals.
(b) Implied statutory requirement

In reading an implied obligation to record reasons for the de
the courts appear to have drawn a distinction between the decis
the first instance and the appellate or revisionai decisions of the
trative bodies. They also appear to have treated disciplinary pro
differently. For a clear picture of the legal position we may fo
distinction in our discussion.
(i) Decisions of the first instance :

It seems to have been well established that a statute always implies
reasons to be stated for all quasi-judicial decisions if it provides for an
appeal or revision against such decisions.43 In Mahabir Prasad v. State
of l/.P.44 the Supreme Court has clearly stated that when a quasi-judicial
41. The word "tribunals" has been deleted from article 227 by the Constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. But the courts have held that the word "courts''
in that article is wide enough to bring in tribunals within its jurisdiction. See S.D.
Ghat i v- State , A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 384.
42. See cases cited in infra notes 110 and 111.
43. For example, in Jagannath v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 Delhi 121 at 124
the High Court observed :
[W]here a right has been given to the petitioner to appeal to the Central
Board of Revenue and then file a revision before the Central Government,
the obvious intention of the legislature is to require the subordinate authori-
ties to making a speaking order.
Also see Pirbhai v. Manepatil , A.I.R. 1966 Guj. 175, 177.
44. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302, 1304. Also see State of Gujarat v. Krishna Cinema ,
A.I.Rģ 1971 S.C. 1650, 1653 and Chowgule & Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2021.
order is subject to appeal to a highe

that the order must state reasons as
"an empty formality".
Even if the statute does not pro
courts have held that all quasi-judic
In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab 46
of saying that the absence of app
reasons be indicated where severe
elected post ensues in consequence
need not always be in writing and
An oral pronouncement of reasons i
subsequent recording in the file wit
be enough compliance with the requ
Finally, it may be stated that since
appeal to the Supreme Court by its
is an implied obligation on all tribu
state reasons for their decisions. This seems to have been established in a
number of decisions.49
Some cases seem to create slight doubt about the foregoing proposi-
tions. For example, in Nandram Hunatram , Calcutta v. Union of India10 the
45. See Govindrao v. State of M.P. , A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1222, 1226 ; State of Punjab
v. Bakhtawar Singh , A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2083; Siemens Engg . & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India,
supra note 40 at 1789; Sahela Ram w. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1968 Punj. 127, 136-137;
M. Pattabhiraman v. Accommodation Controller , A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 102, 103-4 ; Testeels
Ltd. v. N.M. Desai , A.I.R. 1970 Guj. 1 (upheld by the Supreme Court in N.M. Desai v.
Testeels Ltd., C.A. No. ^45 of 1970 decided on 17-12-1975); Ibrahim Kunju v. State of
Kerala , A.I.R. 1970 Ker. 65; Apeejay ( P .) Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 577,
584 and Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 86 of 1978
dated 24 January, 1979 (S.C.)
46. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1571 at 1577.
47. Maharashtra S.R.T. Corpn. v. B.R.M . Service, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 329.
48. Although article 136 permits an appeal against the decisions of the
"tribunals" and not all quasi-judicial authorities, but in practice the Supreme Cour
seems to have never drawn a distinction between a tribunal and a quasi-judicial
authority. On the contrary it has applied the same tests for determining whether a body
is tribunal as it has applied to determine whether it is quasi-judicial. See Bharat Bank
Ltd . v. Employees of the Bharat Bank, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188, Durga Shankar Meh ta v.
Raghur aj Singh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520 and Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles ,
A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 874. For a similar view see S.N. Jain, Administrative Tribunals in
India 5-8 (1977).
49. See for example, the cases cited in nn. 39-41 supra and Hari Nagar Sugar
Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1669; Bhagat Raja v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1606. This proposition should not be confused with cases discussed
below where difference of opinion has been expressed with respect to requirement of
reasons by the appellate or revisionai authority.
50. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1922. In this case in clear'violation of the terms of the lease
the lessees by their admitted mismanagement had created an imminent danger of the
mine being flooded. Inspite of notice the lessees did not take any action ?s a result of
which the government had to take over the mine and cancel the lease.
Supreme Court refused to interfere although no reason for the can

of a mine lease was given either by the state government at the
stage or by the central government at the revisionai stage. Ex
this case in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India 61 the court said that "t
there were so notorious that the reasons for the action of the State
Government and confirmation of its order by the Central Government
were too obvious and could not possibly be questioned by anybody".510
Similarly, in Bhagat Ram the Supreme Court upheld a decision of the
state government agreeing with the High Court that the mind of the
government had been fully applied to the representations of the appellant
though the reasons had not been recorded. Because of the fact that in
all other respects the decision of the government was fully legal and the
term of the office for which appellant was fighting had already expired and
there was no statutory provision for any other relief to the appellant, the
court thought it proper to dismiss the appeal with clear emphasis on the
requirement of reasoned decisions.52 Thus, in spite of some apparent
deviation from the established practice, these two cases do not affect, parti-
cularly in view of the comments made in the subsequent pages, the well-
accepted proposition that for all quasi-judicial decisions of the first in-
stance reasons must be recorded.
What has been said above with respect to quasi-judicial decisions if,
however, not yet applicable to purely administrative decisions. Recently,
in Mahabir Jute Mills v. Shibban Lai 58 the Supreme Court rejected a plea
that the government order under section 4 ( k ) of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 refusing to refer a dispute to the industrial tribunal
was bad because it was unspeaking. It stated that the order was purely
administrative and while it was desirable that even the administrative
orders affecting the rights of the parties should be speaking, it was not
necessary unless the statute specifically so required.54 Since in this case
government decision involved more of policy than law and related to
procedural rights, it may be expected that it will not be extended to those
decisions which immediately affect the substantive rights of the individual.
Positively, once it is agreed that the requirement of recording reasons is
necessary for the proper administration of justice or for the prevention of
miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to justify the application of that require-
ment only to quasi-judicial decisions and not to administrative decisions
having a similar effect on the rights of an individual. If, as is the apparent

51a. Id. at 1614.
53. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2057. Cf. U.S. Kohli v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1978 Cal.
513, 515 where the Calcutta High Court after citing Mahabir Jute Mills for laying down
that no reasons need be given for administrative orders, observed that "Orders which
affęct rights of the parties should contain casons.'*
54. Id. at 2060.
trend, the requirement of reason

natural justice, the court will not h
principles of natural justice in respe
individual rights.85 The latest deci
Branch Press v. Belliappa 55a proce
argument of the appellant that the
an administrative act, and therefo
closed for such termination, the
withheld on the ground that "the i
and not judicial."650 It went on
one of the fundamentals of good a
less than the judiciary is under a ge
(//) Decision of the appellate or rev

An appellate or revisionai authori
partly affirm and partly reverse th
uncertainty prevails on the requir
first situation, the law seems to be
two. Courts have consistently held
rity is wholly or partially reverse
such reversal must be stated.56
The courts have not been so con
appellate or revisionai authority sim
authority. Conflicting views had
55. The two well-recognised principle
hearing and absence of bias. That these p
quasi-judicial or administrative, has been
Supreme Court. See cases cited in supra no
55®. Supra note 37 a.
55 b. Id. at 434 (emphasis supplied) .
55c. Ibid. The decision in Belliappa sh
in so far as the court was emphasising
court and was somewhat ambiguous in sta
Of course, there is always some reason
of a temporary employee. It is not nece
of termination communicated to the em
a specific charge of arbitrary discrimin
buted to the authority terminating the
rity making the impugned order to exp
for the impugned action ( Id . at 432).
See also Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administra
out adverting to the distinction between
of the Prisons Act, 1894 an implied dut
before putting any person under bar fette
56. See, Hari Nagar Sugar Mills' case, su
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297, 1301; Vedachala M
276, 280; Commissioner of Income-tax,
1435; contra, R.K. Bhargava v. State of U
decisions57 till this question arose before the Supreme Court in M

dustries v. Union of India.58 In this case the central government
unspeaking order, rejected the appellants' revision application
order of the state government giving full reasons for rejecting th
lants' application for a mining lease. In a special leave appeal
article 136 the order was challenged, inter alia, on the ground th
central government did not give any reasons for rejecting the r
application. The appeal was dismissed by a majority of two to
Bachawat and Mudholkar, JJ., held that since the state had given
in its order and the central government agreed with them, no fres
by the latter were required. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, held th
neither of the two governments had given reasons the order of th
government was bad.69
Soon after, the question was reconsidered by a constitution be
thę Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India™ The appella
one of the applicants for a mining lease under the same law whic
applicable in M.P. Industries .81 The state government rejected th
cation of the appellant and granted the lease to another applicant
that the latter had general experience and technical knowledge a
an old lessee, without any arrears of mineral dues.62 A revision
tion against this order was rejected by the central government w
stating any reasons. In an appeal under article 136 before the
Court the appellant contended that "in rejecting the applicant's r
applications the Union of India was bound to give reasons for
sion".68 Without overruling or clearly distinguishing M.P . Indus
unanimous court allowed the appeal and observed :
Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives su

cient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejec
57. See Annamalai v. State of Madras, A.I. R. 1957 A.P. 739 wherein th
held that the reasons should be stated by the revisionai authority even if
reason to interfere" with the decision of the lower authority. In D. Balakrishnam
Municipal Commr ., supra note 23 at 493 the court held that "since the go
affirmed the order there was no necessity to give reasons." The court, howe
looked that, as even the lower authority had also not given any reasons. In
case court relied on Venkateswararao v. State of Madras, I.L.F. (1956) Andhra
58. A.I.R. 1966 S C. 671.
59. See Bachawat and Mudholker, JJ., at 676 and Subba Rao, J., at 674. The
observation of Subba Rao, J., at 675 and quoted in 28 infra is not very different fro
the majority view. Recently in Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipality , A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 567
at 575 the Supreme Court has treated this observation as the correct statement of law.
60. Supra note 49.
61. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 made thereunder. A minor change in Rule 55 had
been introduced in 1965 subsequent to M.P. Industries but prior to Bhagat Raja.
62. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49 at 1608.
63. Ibid.
ing that of the others, as it mus

adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may
proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the
purpose of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in
the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the
Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this
Court, in appeal, may have to examine the case de novo without
anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Govern-
ment.64
This observation did not make a very clear departure from the M.P.
Industries position but certain other remarks of the court left an impres-
sion that the majority View in M. P. Industries had been overruled.65
Bhagat Raja was followed in Som Datt v. Union of India** wherein the
petitioner approached the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitu-
tion for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the court-martial,
inter alia , on the ground that the order of the Chief of the Army Staff
confirming the proceedings of the court-martial and of the central govern-
ment dismissing an appeal from the first-mentioned order were unspeaking
orders. The court dismissed the petition without reference to Bhagat
Raja and with the remark that in the absence of express or implied statu-
tory obligation, natural justice did not require statement of reasons in
support of each and every decision.67
64. Id. at 1610.

65. For example, in continuation of the observation cited above the court
added :
If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good
and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the orders
of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according
to it are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government, this Court,
in appeal, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which
weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State
Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a 4 'speaking order"
is called for. (Ibid).
Further, at 1613-14 it said : /
[I]n a case where the Central Government merely affirms the order of the
State Government, it should make it clear in the order itself as to why it is
affirming the same. It is not suggested that the Central Government should
write out a judgment as Courts of láw are wont to do. But we find no merit
in the contention that an authority which is called upon to determine and
adjudicate upon the rights of parties subject only to a right of appeal to this
Court should not be expected to give an outline of the process of reasoning
by which they find themselves in agreement with the decision of the State
Government.
Cf. M.P. Jain, The Concept of Natural Justice : Comment on Travancore Rayons
Ltd . v. Union of India , 14 J.I.L.I. 602, 610-611 (1972).
66. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 414.
67. Id. at 422.
Although this case is said to have shaken the foundations o

Raja*8 in fact, it is clearly distinguishable. Firstly, this wa
tion under article 32 for a writ of certiorari and not an appe
article 136. Obviously the Court can lay down different stand
issuing a writ of certiorari under article 32 from those laid down for
an appeal under article 136 and actually the above mentioned
about the principles of natural justice was made with referen
certiorari Secondly, and which is very important, the orders
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to th
Forces" are expressly excluded from the appellate jurisdictio
Supreme Court under article 136(2). The court may have thought
lay down those standards for armed forces tribunals under
which it was otherwise prohibited to do under article 136. An
the Army Act, 1950, under which the proceedings were held aga
petitioner, expressly mentioned the requirement of grounds or r
case the proceedings were annulled or sentence reduced by the C
the Army Staff, 70 implying thereby exclusion of statement of r
case the proceedings were simply confirmed.71 Thus, Bhagat Raj
unaffected by Som Datt.
The impression that Bhagat Raja made a departure fro
Industries was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Travancore R
Union of India™. In that case the appellant's revision applicat
an eighteen page judgment of the collector of customs was rejecte
central government in a single-sentence order that the governm
"carefully considered the points made by the applicants but see n
cation for interfering with the order" of the collector. Allo
appeal from this order under article 136 the Supreme Court held
our view, the majority judgment of this Court in Madhya
Industries Ltd's case ... has been overruled by this court in Bhag
case."78 The government's order was bad because it did not give
Travancore Rayons was taken to establish the proposition that
had to be given for quasi-judicial decisions even when they affir
68. Sec Seervai, supra note 3 at 951 and Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipali
note 59 at 575.
69. See Som Datt , supra note do at 4 zz.
70. See the Army Act, 1950, ss. 162 and 165.
71. This was a consideration which was clearly taken into account by the
court. See Som Datt, supra note 66 at 421.
72. A.I.R. S.C. 862. ťnor to i ravancore Kayons tne supreme <~oun naa
followed Bhagat Raja in State of M.P. v. Seth Narsinghdas Jankidas Meht
1969 S.C., N.S.C. 115 without reference to its impact on M.P. Industries. B
High Courts had taken the view that Bhagat Raja had overruled M.P. Indust
H.M. Ahmed v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1970 All. 467, 485; Tehel Singh v. Spud
Officer , Ferozepur9 A.I.R. 1969 Punj. & Har. 1, 2 and Sarju Prasad v. Chot
R.T.A.', , A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 288.
73. Travancore Rayons case, id. at 865.
decision of the lower authority.74 B

the court, without reference to eith
held that a non-speaking order is no
an appeal from the order of the Tehs
ment by an unspeaking order. A pet
also rejected by the High Court.
Supreme Court though reiterated th
subject to review under articles 226
be possible in all cases to say that a
on that account alone" and found that on the facts of that case the
government order could not be invalidated.76 As the court neither
referred to the earlier decisions on the requirement of réasons nor did it
go deep into that question, Daulatrao cannot be regarded as making any
material change in the approach taken in Bhagat Raja and Travancore
Rayons.
That the court had not deviated from Bhagat Raja and Travancore
Rayons is evident from its observation in Siemens Engg . & Mfg. Co. v.
Union of India.11 In Siemens the assistant collector of customs by an un-
speaking order imposed duty on certain imported items. A revision from
this order was rejected by the appellate collector by a brief order and on
further revision the central government by an unspeaking order also refus-
ed to interfere. On an appeal under article 136 the court observed :
It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in

exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in
support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be
supported by reasons.™
It added :
The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the
principle of audi alteram partem , a basic principle of natural justice
which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must
be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance
with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.70
74. See M.P. Jain, supra note 65 at 611.

75. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2146.
76. Id. at 2149. The court observed : "No determination or adjudication of
facts was involved. The decision of the case rested on the points of law". Ibid.
11. Supra note 40 at 1785. The decisions of the court rested on the interpreta-
tion of item 72(3) of the first schedule to the Indian Customs Tariff and therefore
whatever is said on the requirement of reasons was basically an observation only.
78. Id. at 1789 (emphasis added).
79. Ibid, (emphasis added).
Since the reasons given by the appellate collector were n

factory, the court observed that "it would ... have been bett
Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons deal
the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while reject
revision application".80
While the law seemed sailing smoothly towards settling d
requirement of reasons even in case of affirmance, a set-back h
from the court in a recent case of Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipa
The court distinguished the facts before it in Tara Chand from
Raja , Travancore Rayons and other cases by pointing out that t
cases did not, unlike Tara Chand , relate to disciplinary proceeding
the court went on to point out that the observation in Travancor
that Bhagat Raja had overruled M.P. Industries was based on "som
sight" and that the minority view contained in the following obs
of Subba Rao, J., as he then was, in M.P. Industries laid down th
law :
Ordinarily, the appellate or revisionai tribunal shall give its o

reasons succinctly ; but in case of affirmance where the orig
Tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may di
the; appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with t
reasons.83
Do these observations in Tara Chand put the clock back to the

Industries stage or are they confined to disciplinary proceedings
of the cases upholding unspeaking affirming decisions84 of quas
bodies decided after Bhagat Raja and Travancore Rayons it is har
that these two decisions lay down a universal rule. But it is
correct that these two decisions have not carried the law beyond
Industries stage. In Tara Chand the court has distinguished Bhag
from M.P. Industries on the ground that the latter was decided
basis of the relevant rule85 as it existed before its amendment, wh
former was after the amendment and that after the amendment the
government was required to collect further information from th
before disposing of the revision application which weighed in fa
80. Id. at 1790.

81. Supra note 59.
_ -
82. Id. at 57b. ťor tne tacts oí ana discussion on i ara ariana see mjra p. oj.
83. Quoted in id. at 575.
84. See Som Dati, supra note 66, Daulatrao , supra note 75, and Ram Ch
infra note 103.
85. Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
giving fresh reasons.88 Certainly

reaching the Bhagat Raja decision,
tion in the absence of any express
that rule.87 There were other c
court also pointed out that when a
affects important rights of the p
affording hearing to the affected
decision has gone against him.88 M
court's refusal to interfere in M.P . Industries was due to the fact that the
state government had given "full reasons".88
Viewed in this light, the ratio of Tara Chanci, it is submitted, be treat-
ed to be confined to disciplinary proceedings and the particular facts of
86. Rule 55 before its amendment read :

Where a petition for revision is made to the Central Government under
rule 54, it may call for the record of the case from the State Government
and after considering any comments made on the petition by the State
Government or other authority, as the case may be, may confirm, modify or
set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as the Central
Government may deem just and proper.
Provided that no order shall be passed against an applicant unless he has
been given an opportunity to make his representations against the com-
ments, if any, received from the State Government or other authority.
After amendment in 1965, the rule read :
(1) On receipt of an application for revision under rule 54, copies thereof
shall be sent to the State Government and to all the impleaded parties
calling upon them to make such comments as they may like to make within
three months of the date of issue of the communication, and if no comments
are received by the Central Government within that period, it shall be pre-
sumed that the party which has omitted to make such comments or the
State Government as the case may be, has no comments to make and the
case may be decided by the Central Government ex-parte.
(2) On receipt of the comments from any party under sub-rule (1), copies
thereof shall be sent to the other parties calling upon such parties to make
such further comments, as they may like to make within one month from
the date of issue of the communication.
(3) The revision application, the communications containing comments and
counter-comments referred to in sub-rules (1) and (2) shall constitute the
record of the case.
(4) After considering the records referred to in sub-rule (3), the Central
Government may confirm, modify or set aside the order or pass such other
order in relation thereto as the Central Government may deem just and
proper.
87. See Seervai, supra lote 3 at 949. About Bhagat Raja he says : "It would
appear from the judgment that the Act and the Rules did not impose any obligation to
give reasons."
88. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49 at 1613. All these aspects were taken into
account in determining the ratio of Bhagat Raja in Maharashtra S.R.T. Corpn.v.
B.R.M. Service y supra note 47 at 338.
89. Bhagat Raja's case, id. at 1613.
that case. Even Justice Subba Rao's observation quoted above

the court found the correct statement of law is part of a longer
tion with which, as the court itself pointed out in Bhagat Raja,90
two judges in M .P. Industries did not agree. Reliance on this obs
implies that Tara Chanda court was not taking a view very d
from Travancore Rayons court. In any case it has not overru
v ancor e Rayons.91
To sum up the position on the requirement of reasons for affir
decisions of the appellate or revisionai authorities, the court has
laid down any inflexible general rule that reasons must be giv
cases. Inflexibility in this regard is neither desirable nor expedien
analysis of the decisions shows that the court will not insist on
where :
(0 reasons have been fully given by the lower authority and in

or revision no complicated issues are involved;*8 or
(//) reasons are too obvious to be stated;94 or
(iii) personal hearing has been afforded to the parties;96 or
(iv) the decision does not involve application of law to the fact
otherwise sound in all other respects;98 or
(v) the law expressly requires reasons in case of reversal and is
about it in case of affirmance.97 The court, will, however,
on reasons if
(i) the reasons given by the lower authority are nebulous or
scrappy;98 or
(iï) complicated questions of fact are involved and there is no
provision for hearing;99 or
90. Ibid.
91. It may, however, be noted that Travancore Rayons is a two jud
decision while Tara Chand is a three judge Bench decision.
92. Since, as is noted below, the requirement of reasoned decisions is based on
the principles of natural justice the courts have time and again stated that these
principles are not inflexible and as they are a means to the end of justice, they should
not be treated as an end in themselves and be supplied without regard to ultimate
just decision. See In Re K. (Infants), [1965] A.C. 201; Pearlberg v. Varty, ( 1972)
I W.L.R. 534, 540; R. v. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim, (1970)2 Q.B. 417; A.K..
Kraipak v. Union of India, supra note 28 at 156 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ,
supra note 28 at 629.
93. M.P. Industries v. Union of India, supra note 58.
x 94. Nandram Hunatram, Calcutta w.Union of India , supra note 50 and C.I.T. v.
Pilliah, 63 l.T.R. 411 (1967).
95. Pilliah' s case, ibid .
96. Rangunath v. Daulatrao, supra note 75.
97. Som Datťs case, supra note 66 and Tara Chanďs case, supra note 59.
98. Bhagat Raja's case, supra note 49 and Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. v. Union of
India, supra note 40.
99. Travancore Rayons 9 case, supra note 72.
(iii) the law requires new materia

ate or revisionai authority.100
(iii) Decisions in disciplinary procee

In disciplinary proceedings acti
Charges are framed and supplied to
reply on them. On receiving his
dependent enquiry officer, is held i
nity to appear in person, produce or
port and to examine the evidence p
examination of witnesses. The enqu
report giving his findings and sub
The authority may agree or disa
agree with the report and the find
it must, like an appellate or revision
ment and for taking any disciplina
does not lay down an obligation
dure in disciplinary proceedings tha
is supplied to the employee; that h
sentation against the proposed acti
and communicated to him after co
well be argued that requiring the
even when it fully agrees with the
sary and fruitless ritual. This arg
cases of disciplinary proceedings up
Tara Chand was a teacher in a p
Corporation of Delhi. On a complain
of Tara Chand that the latter had
enquiry was conducted in which th
established. Agreeing with the enqu
Education, passed an order proposi
considering Tara Chand's represent
100. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49.

101. Apart from the statutory require
for holding such enquiry, art. 311 of the
enquiry in all cases of dismissal, removal
union or of a state.
102. This is generally provided m the relevant statutes or rules. But even in the
absence of statutory provision the courts have held that reasons must be given in case
of disagreement. See G. Papaiah v. Asstt. Director , Medical Services , A.I.R. 1976 A.P.
75. This is also implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion in Tara Chand v. Delhi
Municipality , supra note 59 at 572, 574.
103. Supra note 59. Other notable cases are State of Orissa v. Govinddas Panda ,
Civil App : No. 412 of 1958 decided on 10 December 1962 (S.C.); State of Assam v! ,
Bimal Kumar Pandit , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1612 ; State of Madras v. A.R. Srinivasan , A.I.R.
19Ó6 S.C. 1827 and State of Haryana v. Ram Chander , A.I.R. 1976 P. & H. 381.
penalty of dismissal from service. On an appeal by Tara Chand t

missioner of Education "heard the appellant at considerable leng
rejected the appeal "by an elaborate order". A petition challen
orders of the deputy commissioner and commissioner was also dis
the Delhi High Court. Finally in a special leave appeal before the
Court the appellant, among others, contended that the dismissal
wrong because the deputy commissioner gave no reasons for his
Rejecting this contention the court held :
[W]e would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary

disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial
ctions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs
the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by
enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactme
the rules made thereunder it would be laying down the propos
a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence
be supported by reasons.104
As has already been noted, in view of the elaborate safeguard

enquiry and personal touch of the delinquent employee at every
the proceedings, this approach of the court does not appear a
unjustified in regard to disciplinary proceedings. And there
justification for its application in Tara Chand type fact situation
Chand there was express statutory requirement if the disciplinary aut
disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer.105 The court
aware that an order is not unspeaking "simply because it is brief
elaborate.106 The deputy commissioner's order clearly mentioned
agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and that the ch
serious and had been proved. This could be regarded a speakin
The commissioner, as already mentioned, "heard the appeallant a
derable length" and passed "an elaborate order.107 Above all, the
against Tara Chand was not an ordinary charge of indiscipline or
ordination. Judged from any angle, charge against him was too
to be defeated on mere technical grounds if otherwise clearly pr
established.
In spite of sound justifications in favour of court's approach in
nary proceedings in general and in Tara Chand in particular, there
a major lacuna towards which perhaps court's attention was not
If the disciplinary authority, while agreeing with the findings of the
officer, passes an order proposing a penalty against which the d
104. Trara Chand , id. at 574.

105. See Regulations 10 (a) and 12 of the Delhi Municipal Service (Control and
Appeal) Regulations, 1959, cited in Tara Chand , id. at 570-71.
106. Tara Chand , id. at 574.
107. Id. at 569.
employee is asked to make a represen

sary with respect to his represent
rejecting the representation, there is n
has applied its mind to the points r
vision for personal hearing at this stag
just like any other quasi-judicial auth
ing the/ representation. On this sma
nary proceedings cannot be distingu
Policy considerations of efficiency i
proceedings do not conflict with the
the area of disciplinary proceedings
valuable rights or interests of the i
context where unemployment is ram
are scarce, the right to continue in e
the right to carry on a business or p
should be subject to no lesser safe
rights or interests.108
III. Basis of the duty to give

In the absence of statutory guidan
find a definite basis for the duty t
they have read it in the "element
process",109 sometimes in the speci
under article 136, 110 sometimes in
of the High Courts in articles 226 a
the rule of law,112 and more rec
108. See H.W.R. Wade, supra note 27 at 200. īn the context of observance
of principles of natural justice (hearing) in disciplinary proceedings, he says : "A dis-
ciplinary power is a power to inflict punishment for an offence, and if there is one case
more than another which demands fair procedure and the right of self-defence, that is
it". C/. S A. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 171 and 198-200
(3rd ed. 1973). The Supreme Court in its recent decisions in Nand Kishore v. State of
Bihar, A I.R. 1978 S.C. 1277 at 1281 and Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa , supra
note 37° has in no uncertain terms emphasised the need of supplying reasons for deci-
sions in disciplinary proceedings. In the latter case it was done inspite of the fact that
the respondent was holding a purely temporary job- See also M.P. Jain, Administra-
tive Law, 13 A.S.LL. 451 at 466-67.
109. See, for example, Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras , supra note 56 at
280; Govindrao v. State of M.P., supra note 45 at 1226 and Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bombay v. Walchand & Co ., supra note 56 at 1437.
110. See, for example, Hari Nagar Sugar Mills' case, supra note '49; Bhagat Raja
v. Union of India , supra note 49; Travancore Rayons , supra note 72 and Mahabir
Prasad v. State of UP., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302.
111. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49 and Mahabir Prasad , supra note 1 1 0 and Ranga-
nath v. Daulatrao , supra note 75.
112. Id ., Mahabir Prasad at 1304.
justice.113 According to Seervai none of them is sound114 but i

to agree that none of the basis found by the courts can be goo
support the requirement of reasons. We agree with the British
on Ministers' Powers115 that the observance of the principle
justice is implicit in the rule of law and the rule of law expr
principles of natural justice requires reasoned decisions.
Apart from anything else the minimum that the rule of law
that no one should be deprived of his rights without the auth
In view of the wide discretion conferred on the administrativ
to affect important rights of the individual, an implied obliga
reasons for the decisions is one of the most effective guaran
non-compliance with the law116 and arbitrariness. It is on th
tion that in their famous 1959 Delhi Congress the Internatio
sion of Jurists made the following specific recommendation :
It will further the Rule of Law if the Executive is required

mulate its reasons when reaching.its decisions of a judicial o
nistrative character and affecting the rights of individual
the request of a party concerned to communicate them to h
India being a party to this recommendation and in view of

that it is already the law in many countries,118 our courts s
submitted, read it in our law unless there is an express exclus
strict compliance with the rule of law by the administrative
the courts have evolved a number of grounds to review their
legitimately they can include among them the requirement
decisions.
It is indeed true to say that the principles of natural justice only
1 13. See, for example, Jagannath v. Union of India , supra note 43 at 124; Bhagat
Ram v. State of Punjab, supra note 46 at 1578; Ibrahim Kunju v. State of Kerala , A.I.R.
1970 Ker. 65 and Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India} supra note 40 at 1789.
1 14. Seervai, supra note 3 at 956-^59.
115. Report of the Committee on Ministers rowers lb Lmna. 4ut>u u y¿¿). ror a
recent plea to include requirement of reasoned decisions among the principles of na-
tural justice see H.W.R. Wade, Statutory Tribunal's Duty to Give Reasons, 79 L.Q.R.
344 and 346 (1963); H.W.R. Wade, supra note 27 at 214; and B. Schwartz and H.W.R.
Wade, Legal Control af Government 156 (1972).
1 16. See K C. Davis, Administrative Law : Text 332 (3rd ed. 1972).
117. The Rule of Law in a Free Society : A Report on the International Congress
af Jurists 8 (New Delhi, 1959).
118. See, for example, in France, M. Waline, Droit Administratif 478-479
(9th ed., 1963); in West Germany, R.W. Ruam, French and German Administrative
Law with some English Comparisons, 14 I.C.L.Q. 1104, 1118 (1965), in Cyprus, the
Constitution of Cyprus, arts. 29(1) and 30(2) and (3), in European Communities,
ECSC Treaty, arts. 5 and 15, EEC Treaty, art. 190 and Euratom Treaty, art. 162; and in
Israel, J. Pelly-Karp, The Israeli Statement of Reasons Act, 1958, 12 Am. Jt.C.L. 72
(1963).
concretise the rule of law. Two of th

propria causa and audi alteram partem
A third one - duty to act fairly - th
emerging.119 It is well accepted that
by the legislature ; they were evolv
Supreme Court itself has admitted o
new principles of natural justice.121
mittee on Ministers' Powers has sp
third principle of natural justice, na
the reasons for the decision."122
Seervai argues that "it would be su
justice (that reasons be given for
strictu sensu but was nevertheless b
ties.123 We do not, with respect, sh
of natural justice are part of our la
abrogated by statutes. "[T]hey do
supplement it".124 No court or any
quired to observe even the well recog
if a statute expressly excludes its o
the courts are free not to give reas
made by legislation and similar exce
administrative adjudication. But so
ment of reasoned decisions shoul
accepting for the sake of argument t
from the requirement of reasoned de
sly exclude it, there is a material dif
and of the administrative authorities. Even in those cases where the
courts arc not required to give reasons, they always give personal and
open hearing. Observance of this requirement meets the demands of
natural justice126 in so far as it gives full satisfaction to the aggrieved
party that he could bring his case to the knowledge of the judge and the
latter applied his mind before deciding against him. Barring a few excep-
tions, this satisfaction is not available to him in cases of administrative
119. See A.K . Kraipak , supra note 28 at 156 and M/s. E.E.C. Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal, supra note 28 at 269. Also see S.A. De Smith , supra note 108 at 208.
120. Wade, supra note 27 at 173.
121. A 'K. Kraipak , supra note 28.
122. Supra note 115 at 80. Also see at 99-100.
123. Seervai, supra note 3 at 945.
124. Kraipak* s case, supra note 28 at 156.
125. The principles of natural justice are not absolute. The court observed:
Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural
justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the obser-
vance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
Id. at 157. Also see the cases cited under supra note 92.
adjudication. Critics and courts have equally failed to notice th

difference between the judicial and administrative decision-
processes126 which has an immediate bearing on the requirem
reasons.127
Thus, the argument that because the courts are not always requ
give reasoned decisions and, therefore, the requirement of reason
sions cannot be a principle of natural justice applicable to admini
adjudication, is too weak to deny the courts their legitimate role o
ing the rule of law and compelling the observance of certain bas
of adjudicatory conduct. We are in full agreement with Justice Bh
statement, quoted earlier,128 that the requirement of reasons for
be treated as a principle of natural justice and be applied with all
lity inherent in those principles. That this requirement of reasons
yet been recognised as a principle of natural justice even in the U
Kingdom should be no ground to minimise its importance and ne
in India where the legislature has failed to take steps similar
taken by the British Parliament.129
Finally, the constitutional provisions for judicial review by th
Courts under articles 226 and 227 and for special leave appeal
Supreme Court under article 136, constitute a solid basis for the
ment of reasons for decisions of administrative authorities. It is no
argument, as the Supreme Court seems to have done in Tara Chand91Z0
that since the courts in the United Kingdom do not compel administrative
or quasi-judicial authorities to give reasons for their decisions, the courts
in India also cannot do. No doubt, in conferring review jurisdiction on the
High Courts the Constitution-makers had in mind the common law
principles of such review developed by the courts in England but that is no
reason for tagging our law for ever with the law of the United Kingdom.
Courts in India should be free to develop their own principles of review in
accordance with the requirements of administration of justice in this
country. They can also look to other systems where similar principles of
review operate. For example, much before the enactment of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act in 1946, the courts in the United States had required
the administrative agencies to state reasons for their decisions because
that was necessary "for the orderly functioning of the process of
126. Neither Seervai, supra note 3 nor Subba Rao, J., in M.P. Industries, supra
note 58 at 675 took this difference into account. Some indirect reference to it is, how-
ever, made in Bhagat Raja , supra note 49 at 1613.
127. See supra note 125.
128. See supra.
129- For similar views see A. Chatterji, Natural Justice and Reasoned Decisions,
10 J.I.L.I. 241, 258 (1968); M.P.R. Nair, Speaking Order- An Attribute of Natural
Justice ? (1969) K.L.T. {Jour.) 47, 50; and V.S. Deshpande, "Speaking" Orders, A.I.R.
1969 {Jour.) 147, 150.
130. Supra note 59 at 575-76.
review".131 In view of the express

review, the legislative inaction, and
applicable to all administrative bodie
states,132 there is every reason in
which the British jurists themselves w
Moreover, under article 136, whic
Supreme Court has no alternative but
ing appeals from the decisions of th
under that article the Supreme Cou
give reasons, it cannot so require th
the fundamental distinction betwe
tion and court's distinctive role wit
proceeds on the basis of application
tive adjudication proceeds on the b
policy or discretion an administrati
trator to say and not for the cour
Court can sustain a right decision o
possible reasons that would have w
do so with respect to an administr
administrator to know the reasons for his decision and unless he states
them, the court cannot make its own guess about them.135 Since the
administrator knows that his decision is subject to an appeal to the
Supreme Court, he must disclose the reasons in support of his decision
because otherwise, if the validity of the decision is challenged, the court has
no option but to remand the case back to him for disclosing the reasons.
What has been said above with respect to article 136 is equally
applicable to articles 226 and, 227 and, therefore, it may be concluded that
131. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. , 318 U.S. 80, 94
(1943); Phelps Dodge Corp., v. National Labour Relations Board , 313 U.S. 177 ( 1 94 1 ).
See also Greater Boston Television Corpn . v. F.C.C. , 444 F. 2d. 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
cert, denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971) cited in Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolu-
tion of Administrative Procedure : A Somewhat Different View, 91 Harv. L. Rev . 1823,
1824(1978).
132. Till the passing of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976,
by which the "Administration of justice" has been included in the concurrent list as
item IIA, it was doubtful whether Parliament alone could lay down common standards
for different administrative authorities established by the union and the states within the
area of their respective legislative competence.
133. See, for example, Michael Akehurst, supra note 14 at 169 and Schwartz and
H.W.R. Wade, supra note 115 at 157.
134. See Seervai, supra note 3 at 344 and 956-57 and M.P. Industries' case, supra
note 58 at 671-676.
135. See Securities and Exchange Commission v . C henery Corp., supra note m,
196-197 (1946) . Commenting on it Davis says :
The justification for the difference is that a reviewing court may formulate
the ground upon which a lower court should have acted but may not initially
decide a question which is committed to an agency for initial determination.
Supra note 116 at 327.
the duty to give reasons for administrative decisions is implied

provisions.
IV. Adequacy of reasons

Accepting that the administrative authorities must give reasons for
their decisions, the question is : how much and what reasons would suffice?
Not much attention has been paid to this question so far and the courts'
occasional statements in this regard are representative only of their flexi-
ble attitude but do not lay down any clear guideline. The courts "do not
prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons".186 They say that
the "nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon
the facts of each case";137 that the administrative authorities are not re-
quired to "write out a judgment as courts of law are wont to do"188 and
that an order is not "a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and
not elaborate".139
However, that does not mean that the administrative authorities need
no guidance in this regard and that any formality of reasons will satisfy
the requirement. To dispel such notion, the Supreme Court in Union of
India v. M.L. Capoor 140 said that the reasons "should reveal a rational
nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached" and held
that mechanical, rubber-stamp, uniform reasons given in every case did
not satisfy that condition. Similarly, in Bhagat Raja the only reasons
given for preferring one applicant in the matter of grant of mine-lease over
another was that he "had adequate general experience and technical
knowledge and was an old lessee without any arrears of mineral dues".
The court held that the reason given was inadequate.141
Earlier, quashing a decision of the Central Road Traffic Board which
had reversed the decision of the regional transport authority on the ground
that it was "not proper", the Madras High Court said that the reasons
must "show that the tribunal has applied its mind".142
It further observed :143

[T]he order of a tribunal exercising judicial functions should ťex
facie' show reasons in a succinct form for setting aside the orders
of the subordinate tribunals. To say that an order is illegal or im-
proper or irregular is a mechapical repetition of the words of S. 64- A
136. M.P. Industries , supra note 58 at 675.

137. Ibid.
138. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49 at 1613.
139. Tara C handy supra note 59 at 574. Also see M/s V . Rice & Oil Mill v.
Collector . Central Excise , A.I.R. 1961 A. P. 350, 353.
140. Supra note 6 at 98. For the facts of this case, see supra p. 46.
142. Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras, supra note 109 at 280.
143. Ibid.
1979] DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 71
[of the Motor Vehicles Act] and is not a judicial disposal of

revision petition.
In several other cases the courts have held that mere repetition of the
words of the statute does not satisfy the requirement of reasons.144
A better guidance comes from another Madras High Court decision.
In M.U.M. Service Ltd. v. R.T.A., Malabar 145 the regional transport
authority acting under section 57(7) of the Motor Vehicles Act granted a
permit to an applicant in preference to others for the only reason:
"Granted to M/s C.C. Automobiles Ltd. as the most suitable." Holding
this reason inadequate, the court .-said that the reasons should be given
"in such a manner that an Appellate Court may be in a position to canvass
the correctness of the reasons given by if".146 Since, as we have already
noted, administrative decisions are subject to judicial review and their
validity has to be tested with reference to the basis upon which they pur-
port to rest "that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be under-
standable".147 It may not be easy to state in advance as to when the
basis will be treated to have been set forth with "such clarity as to be
understandable",148 but certainly it would require a statement of reasons
sufficient to uphold a decision without any addition.149 It is not necessary
that every possible reason in support of a decision must be stated150 or
that every reason must be sound.151 But whatever reasons are given must
in themselves be intelligible and sufficient to sustain a decision152 and if
it is not so, the reviewing court would have no option but to quash the
decision and remand it for adequate statement of reasons.
Conclusion
Hardly anyone would disagree today that the administration needs

wide discretionary powers for bringing about a just social order. Abuse
144. See, for example, Narayan Das v. State of M.P., supra note 16; State of
U.P. v. Lalai Singh , supra note 18 and Kishori Lai v. Dy. Commissioner , Kamrup, supra
note 5.
145. Supra note 5.
146. Id. at 60 (emphasis supplied).
147. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., supra note 131 at
196. The court further said: "It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at
the theory underlying the agency's action". Id. at 196-97.
148. For the difficulties in the application of the rule, see Penn-Central Merger
and N.ĪV. Inclusion Cases , 389 U.S. 486 (1968) and National Labour Relations Board v.
Wyman Gordon Co ., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
149. K.C. Davis, supra note 116 at 329.
150. Shri Rama Vilas Service v. Chandr asek aran , A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 107, 110.
151. M. Ramayyav. State of Madras , A.I.R. 1956 A. P. 217, 222. Also see
Pautons Squere Properties Ltd. v. L.C.C. 63 L.G.R. 158 (1965).
152. Cf., In re Poyser & Mills' Arbitration , (1963)2 W.L.R. 1309, 1316 where the
Queen's Bench in England held that "the reasons that are set out must be reasons which
will not only be intelligible, but which will deal with the substantial points that have
been raised".
of these powers can, however, defeat the cause of justice. There

absolutely necessary that along with the grant of discretion, po
of its abuse must be eliminated to the maximum possible extent.
ment of reasons is one of the most effective measures for elimina
possibility. It prevents the abuse of discretion by requiring the a
trator to formulate his reasons for a decision more carefully and
chance of getting a decision based on wrong reasons corrected afte
it quashed in review by a court. It also helps in structuring discr
Absence of such requirement not only leaves a wide scope for abu
cretion, but also generates a feeling of injustice in the mind of th
person and a general suspicion towards administrative adjudicati
is too high a price to pay by any society interested in good admin
Simultaneously we should remember that administrative adjud
stands for expedition and inexpensiveness which are values n
sacrificed too easily. Certainly duty to give reasons will cost
money and insistance on it cannot be justified unless the consequ
fits outweigh the cost. Juristic thinking has always assessed, and
seems to disagree with that, that the benefits resulting from the
give reasons outweigh the costs.154 It will, however, be counterpr
if without regard to the large amount and types of formal and
administrative adjudication, uniformly long decisions are insiste
It is, therefore, necessary that in addition to the present flexible
of the courts in this regard, the administrative authorities should
new methods to satisfy the need of reasons consistent with exp
and inexpensiveness. For example, in many areas such as imm
passport, parole, etc ., where the application or claim of the ind
disposed of without even a formal hearing, the concerned departm
work out on a form all the possible reasons or grounds on w
application may be rejected and the deciding officer instead of w
may just check the relevant ground or grounds while rejecting an
tion.155 This will ensure application of the mind by the administr
153. On structuring of discretion, see K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justi

(1969) and K.C. Davis, supra note 116 at 94-95.
154. This is implied in the recommendations of the Committee on M
Powers, supra note 115 at 7 6 and 100; the Franks Committee [see Report of
mittee on Tribunals and Enquiries 10 and 24 Cmnd. 218 (1957)] and the Law
sion, supra note 2. For some other views, see Michael Akehurst, supra note
R.S.W. Pollard, Reasons for Tribunal Decisions 1 British J. of Admin. L
(1954), K.C. Davis, supra note 116 and supra note 153. V.S. Desh pande,
129 at 149-50.
Even Seervai, who has criticised the court's attempt to impose the requirement of
reasons for administrative decisions, does not say that the requirement of reasons is
undesirable. See Seervai, supra note 3 at 959.
155. In the United States some administrative sigencies have adopted this
method. See K.C. Davis, supra note 116 at 344.
a satisfaction to the individual th

arbitrary.
This method may possibly be not employed in all areas nor may it be
desirable or permissible under the law because it may amount to fettering
of discretion, yet the possibility of employing it should be explored by all
the departments engaged in informal adjudication. Efficient and good
administration should be as much the concern of the administration as of
the judiciary and while judicial control of administrative action may be
just peripheral, the administrative measures may have deeper and more
widespread effects.
Finally, a general legislation as recommended by the Law Commission
and already effective in some other systems, would be an ideal solution to
the problem of statement of reasons by the administrative authorities for
their decisions. It will provide an apportunity for threadbare national
level discussion of the problem and clearly mark out the areas to be
excluded from the requirement of reasons for any policy considerations.
It will also be a much better guide for the administrative authorities than
the occasional and sometimes complex judicial pronouncements. As long
as the legislature does not act, the judiciary must, however, continue to
press for statement of reasons for all administrative decisions affecting the
individual's rights.

Duty To Give Reasons - MP Singh

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Duty To Give Reasons - MP Singh

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DUTY TO GIVE REASONS FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

IN INDIA there is no general rule, statutory or otherwise, that reasons

*LL.M. (Luck.), LL.M. (Columbia), LL.D. (Luck.), Reader in Law, Faculty of

I. Express statutory requirement

Central Board of Direct Taxes had tran

When law requires reasons to be re

Some statutes require, instead of rea

II. Statutory silence

(a) Constitutional requirement

19. Lalai Singh's case, id. at 204.

Similarly in Narasimha v. Distt. Magi

21 . A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 476, 478.

in a number of cases.28 Side by side the requirement of reason

Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions

Re-enforcing this approach, in M

35. Supra note 28 at 624.

Special Courts Bill, 1978 offended article 21 because of absence o

(b) Implied statutory requirement

(i) Decisions of the first instance :

order is subject to appeal to a highe

Supreme Court refused to interfere although no reason for the can

51. Supra note 49 at 1614.

trend, the requirement of reason

(//) Decision of the appellate or rev

decisions57 till this question arose before the Supreme Court in M

Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives su

ing that of the others, as it mus

64. Id. at 1610.

Although this case is said to have shaken the foundations o

decision of the lower authority.74 B

It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in

74. See M.P. Jain, supra note 65 at 611.

Since the reasons given by the appellate collector were n

Ordinarily, the appellate or revisionai tribunal shall give its o

Do these observations in Tara Chand put the clock back to the

80. Id. at 1790.

giving fresh reasons.88 Certainly

86. Rule 55 before its amendment read :

that case. Even Justice Subba Rao's observation quoted above

(0 reasons have been fully given by the lower authority and in

(iii) the law requires new materia

(iii) Decisions in disciplinary procee

100. Bhagat Raja , supra note 49.

penalty of dismissal from service. On an appeal by Tara Chand t

[W]e would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary

As has already been noted, in view of the elaborate safeguard

104. Trara Chand , id. at 574.

employee is asked to make a represen

III. Basis of the duty to give

justice.113 According to Seervai none of them is sound114 but i

It will further the Rule of Law if the Executive is required

India being a party to this recommendation and in view of

concretise the rule of law. Two of th

adjudication. Critics and courts have equally failed to notice th

review".131 In view of the express

the duty to give reasons for administrative decisions is implied

IV. Adequacy of reasons

It further observed :143

136. M.P. Industries , supra note 58 at 675.

[of the Motor Vehicles Act] and is not a judicial disposal of

Hardly anyone would disagree today that the administration needs

of these powers can, however, defeat the cause of justice. There

153. On structuring of discretion, see K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justi