Learning, Culture and Social Interaction 25 (2020) 100274

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Learning, Culture and Social Interaction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/lcsi

Full length article

The vision of Developmental Teaching and Learning and Bloom's

T
Taxonomy of educational objectives
Igor M. Arievitch
The City University of New York, United States of America

ABS TRA CT

Several well-known concepts in contemporary psychology and education are scrutinized from the standpoint of Developmental Teaching and
Learning (DTL) framework grounded in Piotr Galperin's research. In particular, DTL reveals the need to take a fresh look at and radically revise the
key suppositions that underlie the currently influential Bloom's Taxonomy of educational objectives. From the DTL perspective, the Taxonomy has
multiple conceptual problems – it reflects a number of deeply entrenched and widely spread misconceptions about how the human mind works, how
students learn, and therefore, how teachers need to teach. The major issue is that the Taxonomy is implicitly based on outdated mentalist as-
sumptions and on the mechanistic model of human cognition as “information processing.” By contrast, DTL argues that knowledge is not “in-
formation” but rather a set of activities; activities cannot be “stored and retrieved” but can only be developed, enacted, and re-enacted. Thinking
about the mind and students' cognitive abilities in terms of activities that are inseparable from the acting person, rather than in misleading terms of
stages and levels of “objective information processing,” changes the entire discourse about educational goals, learning, and teaching.

1. Introduction

In this article, I would like to take a fresh look at several well-known concepts in contemporary psychology and education and
examine them in the light of the orienting activity principles that are briefly outlined in Galperin's lectures published in this issue. In
particular, these principles allow for radical revision of key assumptions that underlie the influential Bloom's Taxonomy of educa-
tional objectives and levels (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2000). In my view, such a revision is a necessary and potentially productive
effort in both theoretical and practical terms since the Taxonomy is based on a number of deeply entrenched and widely spread
misconceptions about how the human mind works and how students learn (and, therefore, how teachers need to teach). Before I focus
on these misconceptions and possible ways to overcome them, I need to start from several more general comments that should help to
foreground my main points.

2. Difference from behaviorism

I begin with a short comment that seems to be only marginally related to the central topic of this article; however, it might turn
out to be surprisingly relevant since, in my view, it is at the implicit core of many basic issues with the discussed Bloom's taxonomy.
Galperin's name is sometimes placed next to the name of Skinner, one of the major figures of American behaviorism, implying the
philosophical and methodological similarity between the two. Galperin is therefore portrayed as a sort of the “Soviet Skinner” – on
the grounds that both favored “programmed learning” which splits new challenging tasks into smaller manageable steps (e.g.,
Horlacher, 2015). However, a closer look into Galperin's stepwise procedure reveals that this is a false equivalency. As evidenced by
the translated lectures in this issue, both Galperin's general psychological philosophy and research methods, as well as his specific
ideas about learning, are openly opposed to the conceptual underpinnings of Skinnerian (and any other type of) behaviorism which

E-mail address: Igor.Arievitch@csi.cuny.edu.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lcsi.2019.01.007

2210-6561/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

I.M. Arievitch Learning, Culture and Social Interaction 25 (2020) 100274

indeed reduces human learning to animal-like training that revolves around different kinds of reinforcements and conditioning.
Nothing can be further from this model than Galperin's views of human learning. Actually, his stepwise approach to the formation of
new mental actions, although constructed for narrow purposes of psychological experimentation, shows how profoundly different all
human learning is from animal training.
At the risk of sounding trite I will point out that the difference is simple but fundamental. You do not explain to your dog why the
dog has to sit, or bark, or be put on the leash. But in human learning those “whys”, that is, the reasons for doing and learning
something is the key component. In order for children to learn and to act appropriately, they need to understand the “whys” of things.
Accordingly, in Galperin's overall model of stepwise formation of mental actions, as well as in each step of it, the connections between
the procedural and the conceptual aspects, that is, between the “hows” and “whys” and the links of each aspect to the bigger picture
of the whole process is always at the center of learning.
Also essential is that it is not enough just to tell students about the reasons for learning something and for acting in a certain way
and ask students to remember them (and if they don't get it – it's their problem). Rather, the teacher needs to make sure that the
learners really understood those reasons and that the reasons make sense to them. If the learners do not understand the underlying
reasons, they are not going to learn. To be sure, they can follow the teacher's directives and instructions, and in some cases, they can
memorize those instructions and procedures and give the directives to themselves, but this is not real human learning, since they do
not make that new “knowledge” their own. Most importantly, the students also need to accept the reasons for performing the task and
problem solving in a certain way, and to make a commitment to act along those reasons (Stetsenko, 2017a). Certainly, to do this,
students need help and guidance from a caring teacher. If students sense that the teacher does not care about them and their learning,
they immediately block the communication channels and switch from participation to resistance (cf. Dweck, 2016). Contrary to what
is suggested in Skinnerian and other behaviorist-based versions of “programmed instruction”, computers cannot provide the ne-
cessary help and guidance for students because computers do not care and because, again, it is not enough just to “list” the reasons for
students. In this sense, too, Galperin's view of human learning is dramatically different from all behaviorist models (cf. Engeness &
Lund, this issue).

3. Research method and educational practices

My other comment is that one of the most significant conclusions that can be made from research on mental actions formation and
different types of learning (just mentioned in the lectures; for details, see Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000; Podolskij, 1978) is that many
traditional educational practices that are usually thought to be based on some “internal limitations” of children's minds, in reality
themselves generate such limitations of students' thinking. This often creates a self-perpetuating cycle of “inadequate theories of
development – contingent educational practices – poor developmental outcomes – inadequate theories of development” which can be
quite misleading for both education and developmental theories (Stetsenko & Arievitch, 1997). Research on different types of
learning, particularly on systemic-theoretical learning, helps to break this vicious cycle – by re-conceptualizing the role of learning in
cognitive development in the context of new types of learning with significantly higher developmental potential.
It is also important to keep in mind that, as already mentioned by Andrei Podolskij (Podolskij, this issue), Galperin's experimental
model was originally conceived as a method of psychological investigation of the basic regularities of activity transformations and for
theorizing the role of learning in cognitive development, rather than as a blueprint for actual classroom teaching. Unfortunately,
partly because within that project pedagogical terms were often used and also because the experiments were framed as teaching
procedures, it led many scholars to view this model as a ready-made method of teaching and learning. The misleading similarity of
implemented experimental procedures with teaching methods has been the source of many misunderstandings and misplaced cri-
ticism that treated those procedures as suggested educational models (Eriksson & Lindberg, 2016). Therefore, in discussions of this
method the focus shifted to its educational merits, rather than its significance for psychological theory and research. Many of the
basic terms used in this model, such as the “stage of material actions,” the “stage of verbal and mental actions” and, even more
apparently, the “types of learning,” contributed to such unintended pedagogical slant.
One of the most unfortunate connotations ascribed by many critics to Galperin's research was that it seemed to promote highly
controlled, top-down pedagogical procedures which restricted learners' active participation and creativity (for details, see Arievitch &
Haenen, 2005). Again, such interpretations were largely the result of an inaccurate perception of the guided formation model as an
educational strategy for classroom teaching, rather than what it was originally meant to be – a psychological research strategy. In
reality, what was originally meant by “types of learning” in these studies could probably be more accurately characterized as different
types of children's mastery of new problem-solving strategies – something that could reveal how children's minds work and develop,
rather than provide ready-made models for classroom teaching and learning (Arievitch, 2003). As further research demonstrated,
progressing from psychological regularities and experiments to educational practice requires a number of important steps of gradual
contextualization. These steps entail designing several transitional models that address much broader realities and contexts than the
context of psychological experimentation, even when such experiments involve teaching and learning procedures (Lerman, 2000;
Podolskij, 1987, 2008).
Later on, Elkonin (1999), Davydov (2008), and their colleagues indeed began expanding the same activity-based framework into
the area of schooling and pedagogy by designing experimental programs for developmental education. However, the fine line be-
tween the methods of psychological investigation on the one hand, and the principles for classroom teaching and learning on the
other, has never been drawn clearly enough. This created a risk of and indeed led to a periodically renewed (and mostly unwarranted)
criticism of this theoretical and experimental psychological framework as a top-down educational model (e.g., Eriksson & Lindberg,
2016).

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I would also argue that with regard to educational programs designed with the activity-based ideas in mind, such as the Elkonin-
Davydov curriculum of developmental education for teaching mathematics and other disciplines (Cole & Engeström, 2007;
Dougherty, 2008; Karpov & Haywood, 1998; Schmittau, 2004; Zuckerman, 2014), the criticism of these programs as somehow
restricting students' freedom and as promoting a “teacher-compliant child” view of learning is actually misguided (for a typical
example, see Matusov, 2001). These programs echo in large part the principles of systemic-theoretical learning first articulated in
Galperin's studies (Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000; Engeness & Lund, this issue; Galperin, 1998). Teaching and learning in such programs
are based on students' active and cooperative exploration and lead to students' much deeper grasp of issues at hand. Students in these
programs master powerful conceptual tools for independent thinking and problem solving. This approach dramatically enhances
students' ability to construct their own informed perspectives, to think critically about issues within a given discipline, and to find
their own solutions to various problems. The student-empowering outcomes of these experimental programs stand in sharp contrast
to more traditional educational practices, in which many students fail to acquire necessary cognitive tools. The lack of adequate
cognitive tools for independent and critical thinking and problem solving makes many young people who come out of traditional
educational practices de facto “less free,” rather than “more free” – that is, much easier to manipulate and control, even when this is
ostensibly done in the name of freedom and individual choice (cf. Giroux, 2010).
At the same time, one has to note that a fundamental task of promoting the development of students' general critical worldview
and their active agency has been insufficiently explored within the activity-based educational models by Elkonin and Davydov. This
important dimension of developmental education has been addressed in later scholarship based on elaborations of the concept of
agency within Vygotsky's project and affiliated frameworks (Stetsenko, 2017a).

4. Developmental Teaching and Learning

As one more clarifying comment leading to my central points, I would argue that DTL consistent with Galperin's research can be
framed in two major ways – in a narrow sense, as an educational strategy, and in a broader sense, as a vision for education.
Developmental teaching as an educational strategy (based on systemic-theoretical principles, see Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000) has
been designed and explored in detail by Elkonin, Davydov, and also by their followers who adapted this strategy in various countries
and educational contexts (e.g., Hedegaard, 2002; Schmittau, 2004). The less highlighted understanding of DTL as a vision for
education could be briefly characterized as follows.
The basic assumption of DTL as a vision is that educators' main goal is not to have their students accumulate information (which
inevitably soon gets outdated anyway) but to help students develop their minds (thinking and problem solving) in specific areas –
their “mathematical minds”, their “historical minds”, their “linguistic minds”, their “social minds”, and so on – so that students
continue to enhance their abilities to make sense of various scientific phenomena and social events and, most importantly, of their
own lives.
Simply thinking about numbers, historical events and figures, or about language, does not necessarily mean that one is thinking
mathematically, linguistically, or historically. Historians, mathematicians, linguists use specialized advanced ways of thinking about
issues and topics in each of their subject areas. Accordingly, in order to promote DTL, teachers need to help their students to get a
glimpse into that kind of advanced thinking and therefore, to expand and develop students' minds. As another side of the same coin,
DTL also implies that teachers need to develop their own educational minds, that is, their professional educational thinking in specific
subject areas by mastering the advanced ways of approaching, analyzing, and solving complex educational problems and situations
based on the understanding of how students learn in different subject areas.
Therefore, DTL as a vision is twofold. It focuses on (a) developing students' thinking in different areas (mathematics, science,
social sciences, languages, art, human and cultural relationships, and others) and (b) developing teachers' professional educational
thinking – also in various areas, so that they continuously advance their knowledge of what needs to be done to develop their
students' minds, thinking and problem solving. In essence, at the core of DTL is mutual or synergistic development of both students'
and teachers' ability to explore and expose connections and regularities in particular subject areas, to gain insights into how phe-
nomena and events are interconnected, and thus deepen conceptual understanding instead of merely memorizing and accumulating
information (Arievitch, 2017).
The core message of DTL is that students' potential for learning and development is not pre-determined in advance (for a detailed
articulation of this point, see Stetsenko, 2017b), and that the goal of the teacher is to develop students' minds – by using philoso-
phical, psychological, and subject domain-specific materials and contexts. In turn, this implies an understanding of the interplay
between teaching, learning and development, as well as knowing children's individual and cultural backgrounds and needs. In
addition, this also implies the need to challenge possible teachers' misconceptions about learning and schooling and to critically
analyze the social, historical, philosophical, and psychological causes for such misconceptions. And finally, it implies the develop-
ment of teachers' professional educational thinking through empowering teachers with approaches and methodologies that can
advance their students' potential for learning and development in various realms and subject areas. In particular, professional
educational thinking needs to focus on exploring and constructing advanced cognitive tools in different subject areas and helping
students to master such tools (understood as advanced strategies of thinking and problem solving).
With DTL as a vision, teaching and learning in all subject areas would not strive to highlight memorization of new information
and its retrieval as a criterion of learning and mastery. Instead, the emphasis would need to be on “understanding performances” (cf.
Perkins, 1995) – various forms of learning activities based on using new content knowledge as a tool for thinking about issues in a
particular area – that lead to students' enhanced conceptual understanding and competent problem solving. Accordingly, curriculum
design would need to be guided by the following key questions: How does a particular education course help teachers to promote the

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development of their students' thinking in a given area? How does this course enhance teachers' professional educational thinking in
this area? What kind of cognitive tools (thinking strategies) does this course offer for such development and for critical problem
solving in this subject domain?

5. DTL and Bloom's Taxonomy

Moving to the central point of this article, from the perspective of DTL as a vision for education, the well-known Bloom's
Taxonomy of educational objectives, even in its reworked and updated version (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2000), needs to be radically
revised. This taxonomy is based on the hierarchy of learning objectives, which include “memorizing” as the initial task, then “un-
derstanding,” “applying,” “analyzing,” “evaluating,” and finally “creating” as the highest level of such objectives. The Taxonomy is
very popular and influential in current educational research and practices, although sometimes it is criticized from a more tradi-
tionally didactic and conservative perspective which claims that higher order thinking cannot start until student master “fundamental
facts” and conventional wisdom (e.g., Booker, 2008). However, DTL can offer a very different and, in my view, more far reaching and
productive critique of Bloom's taxonomy. DTL would argue that the Taxonomy has multiple conceptual problems. The major problem
is that the Taxonomy, with its hierarchy of levels and educational objectives, is implicitly based on the outdated mentalist as-
sumptions combined with the mechanistic model of human cognition as “information processing,” in line with the flawed computer
metaphor. That is, it is based on the assumption that individuals first perceive “information,” then memorize and “store” this in-
formation, then make sense of the information, understand it and apply for typical problem solving, and only later come to be able to
properly analyze and evaluate it and to use it more “creatively.”
From the DTL perspective, such a traditional mentalist and mechanistic model does not accurately reflect how the human mind
actually works and how humans deal with the problems that they encounter. Understanding knowledge in terms of cognitive tools
rather than in terms of “stored information,” as well as understanding psychological (mental) processes in terms of object-directed
activities, reveals how many underlying assumptions in the taxonomy are flawed.
Specifically, human perception is as non-sensory as it is sensory. Human perception is saturated with cultural standards and ideas
about things; it is highly conceptual from the very first stage of what is erroneously viewed as pure “perceiving.” Similarly, human
memorization is also highly conceptual, since is it based on making sense and identifying connections and patterns rather than on
“storage” of information. From this standpoint, therefore, the characterization of perceiving and remembering (“storing”) knowledge
as initial and most “simple” learning objectives at the foundation of Bloom's taxonomy of objectives does not reflect the actual
dynamics and complexity of human cognition and learning. For example, according to the model of cognition in Bloom's taxonomy,
observation is placed at the lowest level of the hierarchy of learning objectives and tasks (first observe, then memorize, understand,
etc.). It is therefore not surprising that this mischaracterization of observation as elementary has incurred objections from a number
of scientists (e.g., Flannery, 2007), who pointed out that in reality observation is not at all a “lightweight” or low-level activity. On
the contrary, observation – especially, scientific observation – is a complex skill that implies understanding, conceptualization,
theoretical underpinnings, and many other components from what in Bloom's taxonomy is described as the higher levels of learning.
Most importantly, studies within Galperin's research school (e.g., Galperin, 1998) demonstrated that all levels and stages of
human learning and mastery (internalization) are based on and merged within the broader process of problem-solving activity. From
this standpoint, it is fundamentally inaccurate to consider problem solving (“application” in Bloom's taxonomy) to be a separate and
intermediate learning objective (one that follows “understanding” but precedes “analyzing”). Equally misleading is to conceptualize
“understanding” as something that precedes the stage and learning objective of knowledge “application.” From the DTL perspective,
genuine understanding can only be the outcome of problem solving or application. Everything before application is only an initial
“pre-understanding.” The misconception that understanding could somehow precede problem solving is based on another mis-
conception already mentioned above: about knowledge as “information” and knowing as “storage of information.” DTL argues that
this misconception should be replaced with the re-conceptualization of knowledge in terms of activities that can only be enacted and
re-enacted by learners rather than “stored” and “retrieved.”
In other words, from the DTL standpoint, knowledge and understanding are invariably the outcomes of problem solving activities,
rather than pre-conditions for “application.” Similarly, the presumably higher levels of learning objectives in the taxonomy –
“analyzing” and “creating” – in reality are parts of application/problem solving rather than separate learning objectives. Hence, one
could argue that to portray more accurately how the human mind and learning work, the pyramid of learning objectives in Bloom's
taxonomy has, in a certain sense, to be turned upside down, with “analyzing” and “applying” placed at its foundation.
To summarize the DTL arguments about Bloom's Taxonomy, all learning objectives need to be grounded in – that is, need to start
from and end with – problem-solving activity, rather than starting from the objective of “memorizing,” as is misleadingly the case in
Bloom's Taxonomy and its many implementations. From this perspective, problem solving (application) is the actual integrator of all
levels of learning, rather than a separate learning objective. In fact, all levels and objectives are merged in problem solving in the
course of learning, with knowledge itself conceptualized as a cognitive tool of activity. Hence, it would be more productive to
consider all the “levels” of learning objectives in the taxonomy not as separate objectives, but rather as different aspects of problem-
solving activity.
With regard to intentional “memorizing,” it cannot be treated as a valid learning objective at all: Memorizing must be and is really
a “byproduct” of problem solving and making sense of learning materials and tasks. Moreover, a DTL-minded approach would entail
what could appear to be a paradoxical conclusion in terms of classroom practices: If your students are required to intentionally
memorize some materials before implementing them, you are doing something wrong in your classroom. To be sure, students do need
to remember what they are learning. However, remembering needs to be an outcome of meaningful activities and problem solving,

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rather than of intentional (and typically rote) memorization before and outside of application.
As pointed out earlier, DTL implies that knowledge is not something that a person accumulates, possesses, and stores; it is
something that one enacts while learning and re-enacts when being engaged in real-life problem solving. Theoretically speaking, if we
think this position through to its logical consequences and conclusions, we begin to realize that knowledge cannot be “stored” at all.
From the DTL perspective, knowledge is a set of activities, and activities can only be developed, enacted and re-enacted; it is not
something that can be “stored and retrieved.” Therefore, thinking about the human mind, students' cognitive abilities, and learning in
terms of activities that are inseparable from the acting individual (rather than in terms of “objective information processing” and its
putative stages) changes the entire discourse about learning objectives and tasks.
In addition, what is totally missing in Bloom's Taxonomy is, of course, the critical stage of motivation and making sure that
students accept the reasons for performing a certain task – the issue I mentioned at the beginning of the article. The absence of the
motivational stage is hardly surprising given the mechanistic model of human cognition underlying Bloom's Taxonomy – the model
that treats motivational-emotional processes as separate from cognitive processes and in which the teacher's main goal is simply to
convey “information” to students. However, from the DTL perspective, if psychological processes are viewed as the individual's
activities, it becomes clear that the cognitive aspects of activity cannot be separated from its motivational aspects and, therefore, the
motivational stage needs to be an integral and central part of any theoretical model of learning.
On the final note, one more important implication of Galperin's research that is also highly relevant today: It stands in sharp
contrast to the recent rising wave of biological reductionism and brainism in contemporary philosophy, psychology and education
(for some of the most mind-boggling recent instances of confident brain-based reductionism, particularly misleading given that the
authors themselves are no experts in neuroscience, see Prinz, 2012; Sanchez, 2017). Although Bloom's Taxonomy does not explicitly
refer to brain processes, its overall assumptions consistent with the computer metaphor in fact link it to the currently popular claims
that all the stages and levels of knowledge development take place in the most complex “biological computer” – the human brain.
Thus, the Taxonomy implicitly re-affirms the reductionist claims which are especially detrimental in the area of education. By
contrast, the orienting activity framework outlined in Galperin's lectures, and well as the DTL vision described in this article, reject
the brain-based models of human cognition and instead opens up possibilities to develop a consistently non-reductionist account of
mind and learning. It reverses the psychological and educational focus from the “internal” realm – be it “phenomena of con-
sciousness” or brain processes – to this-worldly meaningful human actions and their transformations (Arievitch, 2017). Consequently,
yet another conclusion from this framework is that the misguided claims about “learning brains” and “brain-based education” are
fundamental misconceptions reflecting the same discredited paradigm that is also evident in Bloom's Taxonomy.

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