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    Theories of International Relations Fifth Edition Scott Bur Jack Donnelly Terry Nardin Matthew Paterson Christian Reus-Smit Jacqui True palgrave macmillan a ANDREW LINKLATER The English School the 1970s to describe a group of predominantly British, or British-inspired, writers for whom ternational society” is the primary object of analysis (Jones 1981; inklater and Suganami 2006). Its most influential early members Martin Wight, John Vincent and Adam Watson publications appeared between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s (see Bull 1977; Wight 19775 1991; Watson 1982; Bull and Watson nt 1986). Robert Jackson, Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler have been among the most influential members of the English School in more recent years (Dunne 1998; Jackson 2000; Wheeler 2000). Since the late 1990s, the School has enjoyed a renaissance in large part hecause of the efforts of Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Andrew Hurrel and 2007). The remains one of the most important approaches to international politics although its influence is probabl than in most other societies where International School is that sovereign stares one since they do not submit to @ igher ly of power that can force them to comply with global rules. That states have succeeded in creating a society of sovereign ded as one of the most fascinating dimensions of world ere is, tis argued, a very high level of order, and surprisingly ence, in the absence of a higher coercive authority Readers are invited to reflect on the probable level of violence, fear, inse- ity and distrust in even the most stable of domestic societies should n authority collapse. A condition of fear and chaos would most feature of international rela~ ly ensue, but that is not the defi tions. That is not to suggest that the English School underestimates the mportance of force in relations between states. Its members regard lence as an endemic feature of the ‘anarchical society" (the title of The English School 89 main purpose of the School can result from the fai seem unreservedly realist at times. That is partic Wight’s essay, ‘Why is there no International TI politics is the realm of security and survival (Wight 1966: convictions are also evident in his observation tions are ‘i rh progressivist theory seems to place him squarely in the realist camp, Wight (1996: tained that the sixteenth-century thinker, Sir Thomas More, wi recognized the basic features of world politics in the 1960s since s had remained constant over the centuries. Some have contended English School is a British variant on state-centric rea mates how far appeals to defend international society interests of the dominant powers (for a critical discussion, see Wheel and Dunne 1996). English School analysts are attracted by elements of realism and i ered at the London School of Economies described what he called the ‘rationalist’ or ‘Grotian tradition’ i terms. The variety of terms c: that English School thinking is usually regarded as a mod older patterns of thought (see Jeffery 2006 for a critique of the Grotian tradition). Wight cited G: De Jure Belli ac Pacis first published in 1625, that those who bs anything goes in war are as deluded as those who think that force is never justified. On that argun tius envisaged an intern which violence between Catholic and Protestant states was rep of relatively amicable co-existence. Wight argued n to which Grotius belonged was the ‘via media’ or middle way between realism and ‘revolutionism’ which was a term used to describe the medley of utopian perspectives which hold that world peace is re inent (also Wight 1966a: 91). In the lectures, Wi lamented the way in which the tensions between realism and idealism or utopianism in the inter-war years had obscured the existence of a chi path that focused ional society. In short, the English School (which is best regarded as a diverse ng of scholars rather than a homogeneous commi international system is more orderly and civil than. ists suggest. But since violence is probably inerad are eri 90 Andrew Linklater There is no expectation, they maintain, that the interna- of cooperation that is har exists in stable national societies. If there is more realists suggest, there will always be less itan desires. be explored further by considering sm and ‘revolutionism’, and by developing «the English School offers a limited progressivist account of ‘world polities. As shown in Chapter 2, realism emphasizes the unending struggle for power and security in the world of states. Sovereignty, anar- chy and the security dilemma are crucial terms in its lexicon; the idea of ry. Moral principles and to be important for descriptions of domestic poli- ‘trust prevails and where security is provided by the state. But ight 10 where states must provide their own security, and where jon are pervasive. In that domain, moral principles ferests and to stigm: not the basis for a radical experiment in creating a world political orga- nization that supersedes the sovereign nation-state. re or less unbridgeable gulf between domestic and interna- tics is a central theme in realist and neo-realist thought. By ‘topian or cosmopolitan thinkers envisage a world order vernment = where ween dome: international politics is narrowed. The tensions between those approaches were central to the so- called ° between realists and idealists. The characteri that debate need not detain us, but it is useful to note that liber nalists believed that realism was ‘unrealistic’ about the fea ange while realists countered by maintaining that liberals were naive about the prospects for a new world order based on the rule of law, open diplomacy and collective security. Reflecting on the recent history , Hedley Bull, argued that both jghts, but neither recognized that the ate of war, despite the fact that states of the instruments of ¥ interests in ig force have led states to develop the art of diplomatic accom- modation and compromise that made international society possible. Success on that front undermined what he described as the ‘domestic analogy’ ~ the belief that order between states could only be established distrust nd the gulf ‘The English School 91 Adam Watson (1987: 151) argued thata ‘strong case can be mad ‘on the evidence of past systems as well as the present one, that the re latory rules and institutions of a system usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where the members become conscious of common values and the system becomes an international society’. That observa tion suggests that an international to develop wherever sis for argu- ‘community. However, English School thinkers argued that it is impossi ble to make sense of relations between states without understanding the recurrent appeal of utopian visions of international politics. While recog- hizing the merits of realist observations about the dangers inherent-in international anarchy, those scholars are far more prepared to analyse arguments for global reform that led to the universal culture of hum: rights and, more recently, to support for humanitarian inter to radical innovations in international criminal law. English Scl analysts maintain that debates about the merits of humanitarian inter- vention reveal much about their object of analysis (international society) and about its internal divisions. The realist contention that states are locked in struggles for power and security only partly explains the tensions that arise over intervention. States also have different conce tions of fundamental human rights and conflicting beliefs about how such ideals should be realized. Since the end of the bipolar era, several societies including China have not shared the enthusiasm of many Western powers for military intervention to protect human tights, Kosovo and, more recently, in Libya. China, Russia and others hay opposed what they regard as dangerous Western interference in Syria, Such fears were intensified by the neo-conservative experiment du the recent Bush Administration and specifically by the flawed tion to secure regime change in Iraq, If post-colonial states are troul decisions to undermine sovereignty it is because memories of stru free themselves from the Western imperial powers remain strong, and because they believe that a ‘new imperialism’ will further entrench global inequalities of power and status (Mayall 2000}. En regard such di ideology, as central features of international society in its ‘post-European Phase. Significantly, members of the School disagree amongst themselves about whether the time is ripe to build new principles of humanita intervention into international society or whether such noble aspirat will create unnecessary rivalries that damage what they regard as the only arrangement that has the capacity to preserve order between states with different levels of military power and diverse cultures (see the references to the differences between Jackson and Wheeler on pages 100-2). 92. ew Linklater ‘Members of the English School insist that the survival of that fragile idermined by realist objectives by using force. Bu ined by breaches of international law, and by failures to bal agecements that respect diverse outlooks and orientations. English Scho jntain that there is no guarantee that the moder cof states will survive indefinitely; it is therefore essential to understand its foundations and to ask how it can be strength- ened. That does not rule out support for ‘utopian’ aspirations. Observing tice have always influenced international ight ( xed that ‘the fundamental political task at 10 provide order, or security, from which lav, justice and pros- 1p’. Bur that comment rested on the assump- not benefit from a polities that underestimated the sof pre ‘international order ~ that had to be in place before irations could be promoted. In the age of superpower rivalries Union, English School writers by emphasizing the priority of order and stability. 1980s, t argued that ort for the right to be ee from starvation could at one and the me time promote justice and strengthen international society (see Cox and Rengger 2011). In the post-bipolar era, Dunne and Wheeler argued for normative English School stance on human rights and gervention. They defende ed ways in which states could act as ‘good interna alcitizens’ to promote cosmopol (Dunne 1998; Wheeler and 199), But as already noted, others within the English School have that international society had reached the point secure justice for individuals could be added to the 1g and preserving order between states. Such can also be under how far the great powers are ned in the pursuit of self-interest and ¢ to promote global values of the kind that Vince ler have defended. Underlying that standpoint is the be jowers that usually pose the most serious threat to interna- : 130). How far they accept ‘special responsi- wenance of that society, and the key to the and Reus-Smit 2007). The recent phase of American hegemony ~and the conduct of the ‘war against terror’ in particular ~ led English School analysts to return to the question of whether the survival of international society ultimately rests on the balance of power. Dunne (2003) fore {grounded that question in his discussion of the Bush doctrine of ‘preven- tive war’ against hostile regimes that were believed to be willing to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Such discussi reveal how great powers rewrite the rules of international society 10 their perceived interests (see Holmes 2007) ~ of, as in the case of the US position on the International Criminal Court, refuse to be restrained by what they see as unnecessary obligations and entanglements (Ralph 2007). Other English School writers have explored new lines of investi gation into the extent to which great power hegemony can be a basic ‘institution’ of international society —as was the case in the ancient Greek y-states system (Wight 1977: chapter 1) ~ contrary to those wl believe that the balance of power is central (Clark 2011). The issue has arisen in conjunction with the recent ‘unipolar moment’; it may assume even greater importance if China's rise to power continues. Efforts 1 support for introducing, a principle of reduce the ‘moral backwardness of international society” (see Keal 2003) Indeed, one would expect proponents of an approach that is positioned between the poles of realism and utopianism to continue to develop distinctive debates about the prospects for ety and about the main obstacles that stand in the way: ‘The remainder of this chapter is in four sections. The first focuses on the idea of order and society in the foundational English School texts. ‘The second considers English School analyses of the relative importance of order and justice in the traditional European society of stares. That is followed by a discussion of the ‘revolt against the West” gence of the first universal society of states in which de: have been more frequently heard. The fourth section returns to the ques- tion of English School reflections on the limited progress that has occurred in international relations, and it offers some final observations about the idea that its position as the via media gives it an advantage over other positions in the From power to order: international society We have seen that the English School analyses begin with the surprisingly high level of order that exists between independent political communities n the condition of anarchy. Some such as Wight (1977: 43) were ntrigued by the small number of international societies that have existed n human history and by their short life-spans, all previous examples having been destroyed by empire after four o five centuries. Wight (1977: 35-9) also noted the propensity for internal schism in the form of international revolutions that brought transnational forces and ideolo- rather than sovereign states into conflict. He posed the interesting n of whether commerce first brought different societies into and creared the context in which a society of states later devel- ks about the three international societies ich most is known (the Ancient Chinese, the Graeco-Roman ind the modern society of states) he maintained (1977: 33-5) that each Jn evel of linguistic and cultural lent political communities felt they lization. A sense of their ‘cultural differentiation’ from allegedly semi- fed and barbaric peoples facilitated communication between them, ile it easier to define the rights and duties that bound them sive international society. They ieve that to colonize those who were regarded as 50 wn the evolution of modern international society, Hedley Bull “the form of the doctrine of natural preceded the development of ideas of iter tellec- tion was different because he argued that a soci the absence of linguistic, cultural or religious solidarities. To clarify the he distinguished between an international system and an interna- nal society, A ‘system of states (or international system)’, he main- tained, “is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact hetween them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave ~ at least in some measure ~ as parts of a whole’ (1977; 9-10). A society of states can be said to exist ‘when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form 1 society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’ (1977: 13). That important distinction underpinned Bulls efforts to provide a more detailed account of how international societies develop. pol The iglish School 95 As we have seen, Bull maintained that order can exist between states that do not regard themselves as members of the same ci pragmatic need to co-exist was all that was needed to give rise to wi Bull (1977: 316) called a ‘diplomatic culture’ ~a web of convention institutions that preserves order between states that are divide culture and ideology. He added that a diplomatic culture is stronger if is anchored in an ‘international political culture’ —i is more the European society of states rested on ai ie, but with the expansion of that society to embrace the non-European regions of the world, the sense of being part o! ‘common civilization has declined. Even so, the basic rules of the interna tional order that Europe have been accepted by overwhelming majority of its former colonies, now equal so members of the first universal society of states. No international pol culture currently underpins the diplomatic cultures however Bull (1977: 316-17) thought that condition cif different elites across the world come to identify with an emergent ‘cosmopolitan culture’ of modernity. Bull (1977: 53-5) provided the most detailed analysis of the founda- tions of international order. He stated that all societies ~ domestic and international ~ have arrangements for protecting three ‘p They are placing restraints on violence, upholding property ensuring that contracts and ageeem are common to domestic and rejection of ‘the domestic analo; recalled, is the idea that a peaceful international order will only co nto being when states surrender their powers to centralized insti similar to those at the national level. As we have seen, English Sc writers break with realism because they believe that states can enjoy the benefits of society without transferring sovereign prerogatives to a higher authority. Bulls approach was that states are usually committed t ing the use of force, to ensuring respect for property, and to preservis trust in their relations with one another. Those shared interests ~ rath than any common culture or shared way of life ~ are the dation of international society. ‘As members of that society, sovereign nation-states have si commitments to protecting primary goals, but the interstate order is distinctive because of its ‘anarchical nature. The citizens of each state are governed by ‘primary rules’ that specify how they should behave, and by ‘secondary rules’ that determine how such primary ru interpreted and enforced (Bull 1977: 133). Central institutions have the nate f 96 Andrew Linklater get Pee See eae er conn en eae (en Or On Cm men uve.

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