Professional Documents
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-versus-
In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the Philippines validly entered into,
the Rome Statute "has the same status as an enactment of Congress,"29 as "a law in the Philippines."30
They claim that the President "cannot repeal a law."
In G.R. No. 239483, pe,titioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its members
assert that their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the
Rome Statute.33 Citing a decision of the South African High Court, they also claim that the ratification of
and withdrawal from a multilateral treaty require the Senate's concurrence.
ISSUE : whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale
delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual
While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express
mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the
Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the
unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present
consolidated Petitions revolve. All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and
enters into international agreements. However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by
the Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive,
and is balanced by the legislative branch. The textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to
the basic separation of powers and to a system of checks and balances. Presidential discretion is
recognized, but it is not _absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists on how the Philippines
withdraws from, an international agreement, the president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis treaty
abrogation may run counter to the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic
operation of treaties,. The mirror principle and the Youngstown framework are suitable :starting points in
reviewing the president's acts in the exercise of a power shared with the legislature, However, their
concepts-and methods cannot be adopted mechanically and indiscriminately.'. A compelling wisdom
underlies them, but operationalizing them domestically requires careful consideration and adjustment in
view of circumstances unique to the Philippine context
Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts, and considering
our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as
the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements
1) The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes
2) the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur.
3) the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred
and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence
In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw
from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that
they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis;
any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover,
specific circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation,
or the Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the
president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal