SPS PASCUAL V FIRST CONSLIDATED RURAL BANK

After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the preliminary
conference on October 4, 2011, and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. 2
Instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. 3 At the scheduled preliminary conference, the
petitioners and their counsel did not appear.4
On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for annulment of judgment
 
Although motions for summary judgment
can be filed before the pre-trial, their
non-resolution prior to the pre-trial should
not prevent the holding of the pre-trial
The petitioners contend that their Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in
Abeyance needed to be first resolved before the pre-trial could proceed; that the CA erred in
declaring that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court;"
and that the CA overlooked their submission in their Opposition with Explanation to the effect that
Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was superseded by Administrative Circular No. 3-99
dated January 15, 1999 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' contentions have no merit.
We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it is only at the pre-trial that the
rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as
provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court." The filing of the motion for
summary judgment may be done prior to the pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 3 5 of the Rules of Court
permits a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory
relief to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof in his favor (and its
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served;" while Section 2 of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion
for summary judgment (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or
any part thereof "at any time." As such, the petitioners properly filed their motion for
summary judgment prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the
requirement of supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).
We remind that the summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper under Section 3,
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 15 It is a method intended to
expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record. 16 The term genuine issue is
defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to
the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. 17 The party moving for the summary
judgment has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact.18
Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense
is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiffs burden has been discharged,
the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.19
The CA could have misconceived the text of Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
 Section 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:
x x xx
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
x x xx

To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier
been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier
filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to i nitiate the rendition of such
judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 3420
(Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 3521 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The
pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter
the motion.
Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first resolved their
Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pretrial. They could not use the inaction
1âwphi1

on their motion to justify their nonappearance with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as
their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their appearance at the pre-trial with
their counsel was mandatory.
The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing that Section 2(g), Rule
18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective on August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' argument was unwarranted.
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 still affirmed the mandatory character of the
pre-trial, to wit:

x x xx
V. The mandatory continuous trial system in civil cases contemplated in Administrative
Circular No. 4, dated 22 September 1988, and the guidelines provided for in Circular
No. 1-89, dated 19 January 1989, must be effectively implemented. For expediency,
these guidelines in civil cases are hereunder restated with modifications, taking into
account the relevant provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
A. Pre-Trial
x x xx
6. Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be a cause for dismissal of the
action. A similar failure of the defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the
Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) - adopted for the purpose of
abbreviating court proceedings, ensuring the prompt disposition of cases, decongesting court
dockets, and further implementing the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 - similarly underscored the mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated under its heading
Pre-Trial in civil cases that, among others, the trial court could then determine "the propriety of
rendering a summary judgment dismissing the case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial
or a judgment based on the pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial." 22
As such, they could have urged the trial court to resolve their pending Motion for Summary
Judgment during the pre-trial..
 
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V PCIB
The CA, in its challenged decision, stated and we are in full accord with it:
In the present recourse, the [petitioner] relied not only on the judicial admissions … in its pleadings,
more specifically its "Answer" to the complaint, the testimony of Maricel Salaveria as well as Exhibits
"A" to "T-3", adduced in evidence by the [respondent], during the hearing on its plea for the
issuance, by the Court a quo, of a writ of preliminary attachment. Significantly, the [petitioner] did not
bother filing a motion for the quashal of the "Writ" issued by the Court a quo.
It must be borne in mind, too, that the [petitioner] admitted, in its "Answer" … the due execution and
authenticity of the documents appended to the complaint … . The [petitioner] did not deny its
liability for the principal amount claimed by the [respondent] in its complaint. The [petitioner]
merely alleged, by way of defenses, that it failed to pay its account … because of the region-
wide economic crisis that engulfed Asia, in July, 1997, and the "Deeds of Assignment"
executed by it in favor of the [respondent] were contracts of adhesion:
xxx xxx xxx
The [petitioner] elaborated on and catalogued its defenses in its "Appellants Brief" what it believed,
as "genuine issues".
"(i) Whether or not [petitioner] received all or part of the proceeds/receivables due from the
construction contracts at the time the civil action was filed;
(ii) Granting that [petitioner] received the proceeds/receivables from the construction contracts,
whether or not [petitioner] fraudulently misappropriated the same;
(iii) Whether or not [petitioner] had become virtually insolvent as a result of the region-wide economic
crisis that hit Asia, causing the Philippine peso to depreciate dramatically; and
(iv) Whether or not [respondent] and [petitioner] dealt with each other on equal footing with respect
to the execution of the deeds of assignment of receivables as to give [petitioner] an honest
opportunity to reject the onerous terms imposed on it."
However, the [petitioner] failed to append, to its "Opposition" to the "Motion for Summary
Judgment", … "Affidavits" showing the factual basis for its defenses of "extraordinary
deflation," including facts, figures and data showing its financial condition before and after
the economic crisis and that the crisis was the proximate cause of its financial distress. It
bears stressing that the [petitioner] was burdened to demonstrate, by its "Affidavits" and
documentary evidence, that, indeed, the Philippines was engulfed in an extraordinary
deflation of the Philippine Peso and that the same was the proximate cause of the financial
distress, it claimed, it suffered.
xxx xxx xxx
Where, on the basis of the records, inclusive of the pleadings of the parties, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent], supportive of its plea for a writ of preliminary
attachment, the [respondent] had causes of action against the [petitioner], it behooved the
[petitioner] to controvert the same with affidavits/documentary evidence showing a prima facie
genuine defense. As the Appellate Court of Illinois so aptly declared:
The defendant must show that he has a bona fide defense to the action, one which he may be able
to establish. It must be a plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable and of a substantial
character. This he must show by affidavits or other proof.
The trial court, of course, must determine from the affidavits filed whether the defendant has
interposed a sufficiently good defense to entitle it to defend, but where defendant’s affidavits present
no substantial triable issues of fact, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The failure of the [petitioner] to append to its "Opposition" any "Affidavits" showing that its
defenses were not contrived or cosmetic to delay judgment … created a presumption that the
defenses of the [petitioner] were not offered in good faith and that the same could not be
sustained (Unites States versus Fiedler, et al., Federal Reported, 2nd, 578).
If, indeed, the [petitioner] believed it that was prevented from complying with its obligations to the
[respondent], under its contracts, it should have interposed a counterclaims for rescission of
contracts, conformably with the pronouncement of our Supreme Court, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The [petitioner] did not. This only exposed the barrenness of the pose of the [petitioner].
The [petitioner] may have experienced financial difficulties because of the "1997 economic
crisis" that ensued in Asia. However, the same does not constitute a valid justification for the
[petitioner] to renege on its obligations to the [respondent]. The [petitioner] cannot even find
solace in Articles 1266 and 1267 of the New Civil Code for, as declared by our Supreme Court:
It is a fundamental rule that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties, and obligations
arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good
faith. But the law recognizes exceptions to the principle of the obligatory force of contracts. One
exception is laid down in Article 1266 of the Civil Code, which reads: ‘The debtor in obligations to do
shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the fault
of the obligor.’
Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable
only to obligations "to do," and not obligations "to give." An obligation "to do" includes all kinds
of work or service; while an obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery of a
movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for its
simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, petitioner wants this Court to believe that the abrupt change in the political
climate of the country after the EDSA Revolution and its poor financial condition "rendered
the performance of the lease contract impractical and inimical to the corporate survival of the
petitioner." (Philippine National Construction Corporation versus Court of Appeals, et al., 272 SCRA
183, at pages 191-192, supra)
The [petitioner] even failed to append any "Affidavit" to its "Opposition" showing how much it had
received from its construction contracts and how and to whom the said collections had been
appended. The [petitioner] had personal and sole knowledge of the aforesaid particulars while the
[respondent] did not.
In fine, we rule and so hold that the CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court as, at bottom, there existed no genuine issue as to any
material fact. We also sustain the CA’s reduction in the award of attorney’s fees to only
P1,000,000.00, given the fact that there was no full-blown trial.
 
PEPSI V ISABELA LEAF
Ca treated RTC decision judgment on the pleadings as summary judgement
Neither judgment on the pleadings because an affirmative defense was raised
Nor summary judgement because may genuine issue
ALJEMS CREDIT V SPS BAUTISTA
"A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The test of the propriety of
rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact, "as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived[,] or false claim." "[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as
sham when[,] by its nature[,] it is evident that it cairnot be proven[,] or it is such that the
pai·ty tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it.
This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue[,]
and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath
anyway. 
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a
summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents
of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the
affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is
held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is
proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such SEissues are not genuine." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Additionally, in
order for summary judgment to be granted in lieu of a fullblown trial, the party moving for
summary judgment must establish unequivocally the absence of genuine issues of fact or
that the issue posed is so patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.39 When a
paiiy moves for a summary judgment, the trial court is duty-bound to examine the motion and the
supporting documents, as well as the corresponding opposition thereto, to determine if there are
genuine issues of fact that should be resolved by the trial court.  
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment claims that: (a) the spouses Bautista admitted that the
TCT of the property is in petitioner's name; (b) the Bautistas did not specifically deny the material
allegations of the complaint; and ( c) the defenses of the spouses Bautista (pactum co,nmissorium,
equitable mo1igage ), are legal issues, not factual. 40 On the other hand, the spouses Bautista's
Opposition (to the Motion) insists that there are genuine issues of facts in the case, such as
the existence of equitable mortgage, imposition of interest, and whether the contract to sell is
pactum commissorium, and forgery. 41 These issues are likewise reflected in the spouses
Bautista's Answer. The Court finds that summary judgment will be improper. The RTC is
conect in holding that there are genuine issues of fact to be threshed out in the trial. On
petitioner's argument that the spouses Bautista admitted that the TCT is already in its name,
the Court finds that this is just one of the pieces of evidence for the trial court to assess in
making a ruling for this case.  
On the argument on the lack of specific denials in the Answer, the CoU1i is not convinced. Rule 8,
Section 10 provides: Section 10. Specific denial. - A defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance
of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a
part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall
have the effect of a denial. "A specific denial is made by specifying each material allegation of fact,
the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The purpose of requiring the
defendant to make a specific denial is to make him briefly disclose the matters alleged in the
complaint which he intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to
support the denial."42 An examination of the Answer reveals that the spouses Bautista made
specific denials of the allegations in the Complaint: 
ANSWER DEFENDANTS, through counsel, in answer to the Complaint, unto this Honorable Court,
respectfully state that: xxxx 3. They deny the allegations in pars. 4 to 7 the truth being that as stated
in the Special and Affirmative Defenses and in the Compulsory Counterclaims; 4. They deny the
allegations in par. 8 for being inapplicable to the case at bar as explained in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses and in the Compulsory Counterclaims; 5. They deny the allegations in pars. 9
and 10 the truth being that as stated in the Special and Affirmative Defenses and in the Compulsory
Counterclaims and they also deny the allegations in par. 10 with respect to entitlement for attorney's
fees and appearance fees for being inapplicable to the case at bar as explained in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses and in the Compulsory Counterclaims; 6. They deny the allegations in par. 11 ,
the property being located in a prime subdivision in Davao City, it is worth several millions of pesos;
7. They deny the allegations in par. 12 for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof
The foregoing statements in the Answer suffice as specific denials as required by the Rules of Court.
The spouses Bautista were able to point out the exact allegations in the Complaint that they intend
to deny, even without expressly using the word "specific," (or any of the word's derivatives), in the
wording of the Answer. It is not required for them to set out the substance of the matters on
which they rely to support their denial. The Rules state that the defendant can set out their
basis for denial whenever practicable-there is no stringent requirement. 
As regards petitioner's contention that the spouses Bautista's defenses of equitable mortgage and
pactum commissorium. are legal issues and not factual, We hold that the question of whether a
contract is an equitable mortgage is a question of fact. 44 There is a need for the trial court to
review evidence, including the assailed document itself, and the intent of the parties, to determine
ifthere is an equitable mortgage, considering that the law provides for instances when a contract can
be presumed to be an equitable mortgage.45 The same goes
with the existence of pactum comm.issorium: it is a question of fact as the trial court needs to
look into the contractual stipulations, and the intent of the parties to determine, if there is
such.46 Though these defenses pertain to the preceding mortgage contract, resolving these in the
trial will affect the resolution on the rescission of the contract to sell because, as alleged by the
Bautistas, the former document is the basis of the latter. 47 Lastly, the spouses Bautista raise the
defense that Porferio's signature in the contract to sell is forged. It is well-settled that the question
of whether forgery exists is a question of fact.48 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are
still genuine issues of fact that need to be resolved in the trial. Hence, this Court holds that the
denial of petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is proper (which, again, is the issue here in
this appeal). 
ALJEMS CREDIT V SPS BAUTISTA
Petitioner's recourse now is to participate in the trial proper. Also wmih mentioning is that
the Court's pronouncement here is in line with the provisions of the 2019 Amended Rules of
Civil Procedure on motions for summary judgment, which provides that "[a]ny action of the
[trial] court on a motion for summary judgment shall not be subject of an appeal or petition
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus." 
PHIL BUSINESS BANK V CHUA (psj)
HE RULING
We DENY the petition for being unmeritorious.
Nature of Partial Summary Judgment
PBB’s motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section 1, Rule
35 of the Rules, which provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served, move witAVAILh supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial.21 When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are
not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts.22
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all
the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. – If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted
facts accordingly.
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals
that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as
it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." 23 The Rules provide for a partial summary
judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only
on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.
After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment,
which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way,
the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, 24 an interlocutory order,
rather than a final judgment.
The differences between a "final judgment" and an "interlocutory order" are well-established. We
said in Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court 25 that:
[A] final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by
the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move . . . and ultimately, of
course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, "final and executory."
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an
order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x Unlike a ' final judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.26
Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that the partial summary judgment
envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated
separately from the main case. As we explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals:27
It will be noted that the judgment in question is a "partial summary judgment." It was rendered only
with respect to the private respondents’ first and second causes of action alleged in their complaint.
It was not intended to cover the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the supplementary
counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the private respondents, nor the third-party complaint
filed by the petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust Company. A partial summary judgment
"is not a final or appealable judgment." (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189, citing several
cases.) "It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed
established for the trial of the case." (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.)
xxxx
The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court being merely interlocutory and not ‘a final
judgment’, it is puerile to discuss whether the same became final and executory due to the alleged
failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed period of appeal
________________________________________________________________________________
. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be
taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is
conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. This is on the
assumption that the partial summary judgment was validly rendered, which, as shown above,
is not true in the case at bar.28
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

We reiterated this ruling in the cases of Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals 29 and
Government Service Insurance System v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. 30
Applicability of Guevarra
PBB asserts that our pronouncement in the cases of Guevarra, Province of Pangasinan, and
Government Service Insurance System cannot be applied to the present case because these cases
involve factual circumstances that are completely different from the facts before us. While the partial
summary judgments in the cited cases decided only some of the causes of action presented, leaving
other issues unresolved, PBB insists that as far as its cross-claim against respondent Chua is
concerned, the court a quo’s partial summary judgment is a full and complete adjudication
because the award is for the whole claim. 31 According to PBB, whatever the court decides as
regards the main case, this will not affect the liability of respondent Chua as a solidary debtor in the
promissory notes, since the creditor can proceed against any of the solidary debtors. In other words,
no substantial controversy exists between PBB and respondent Chua, and there is nothing more to
be done on this particular issue.
We do not agree with PBB’s submission.
In the Guevarra case, the Court held that the summary judgment rendered by the lower court was in
truth a partial summary judgment because it failed to resolve the other causes of action in the
complaint, as well as the counterclaim and the third party complaint raised by the
defendants.
Contrary to PBB’s assertions, the same could be said for the case presently before us. The partial
summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-
defendant, respondent Chua, based on the latter’s admission that he signed promissory
notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB. This is obvious from the dispositive portion of the
partial summary judgment, quoted below for convenient reference:
WHEREFORE, a partial summary judgment is hereby rendered on the cross-claim of cross-
defendant Philippine Business Bank against cross-defendant Felipe Chua, ordering the latter to pay
the former as follows:
1. The amount of Ten Million (₱10,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory
Note dated April 17, 2001, plus interest thereof at the rate of 16% from April 12, 2002, until fully paid;
2. The amount of Twelve Million (₱12,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory
Note dated April 5, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from April 1, 2002, until fully paid;
3. The amount of Twenty Three Million (₱23,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the
Promissory Note dated April 25, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 16% from April 19, 2002,
until fully paid;
4. The amount of Eight Million (₱8,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory
Note dated June 20, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 20, 2001, until fully
paid;
5. The amount of Seven Million (₱7,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory
Note dated June 22, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 17, 2002, until fully
paid;
6. The amount of Fifteen Million (₱15,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory
Note dated June 28, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 24, 2002, until fully
paid;
7. Plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 32
Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised
in plaintiff Tomas Tan’s complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretary’s certificate which
authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and
mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes
and mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.
Chua shares common interest with co-defendant- debtors
Still, PBB insists that the partial summary judgment is a final judgment as regards PBB’s cross-claim
against respondent Chua since respondent Chua’s liability will not be affected by the
resolution of the issues of the main case.
On its face, the promissory notes were executed by John Dennis Chua in two capacities – as the
alleged representative of CST, and in his personal capacity. Thus, while there can be no
question as to respondent Chua’s liability to PBB (since he already admitted to executing these
promissory notes as a co-maker), still, the court a quo’s findings on: (a) whether John Dennis
Chua was properly authorized to sign these promissory notes on behalf of CST, and (b) whether
John Dennis Chua actually signed these promissory notes in his personal capacity, would certainly
have the effect of determining whether respondent Chua has the right to go after CST and/or John
Dennis Chua for reimbursement on any payment he makes on these promissory notes, pursuant to
Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due,
no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each.
In other words, PBB has a common cause of action against respondent Chua with his alleged
co-debtors, John Dennis Chua and CST, it would simply not be proper to treat respondent
Chua separately from his co-debtors.
Moreover, we cannot turn a blind eye to the clear intention of the trial court in rendering a
partial summary judgment. Had the trial court truly intended to treat PBB’s cross-claim
against respondent Chua separately, it could easily have ordered a separate trial via Section
2, Rule 31 of the Rules, which states:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues.
That the trial court did not do so belies PBB’s contention.
It has also not escaped our attention that PBB, in its Motion to Disallow Appeal and to Issue
Execution Against Cross-Defendant Felipe Chua, 33 already admitted that the partial summary
judgment is not a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. In its own words:
xxxx
3. However, the remedy availed of by [respondent Chua] is patently erroneous because under Rule
41 Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes the case;
4. The judgment rendered by [the RTC] dated July 27, 2005 is only a partial summary
judgment against [respondent Chua], on the crossclaim of cross-claimant Philippine
Business Bank. The main case which involves the claim of plaintiffs against the principal
defendants is still pending and has not yet been adjudged by [the RTC].34
Thus, PBB cannot now be allowed to deny the interlocutory nature of the partial summary judgment.
Certiorari not the proper remedy
PBB also maintains that the partial summary judgment attained finality when respondent Chua failed
to file a certiorari petition, citing the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules as basis. We
quote:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal maybe taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment, or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Contrary to PBB’s contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent
Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other
direct review, not a petition for certiorari, 35 since it imputes error on the lower court’s
judgment. It is well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions of law and fact. 36 As we explained in Apostol
v. Court of Appeals:37
As a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The jurisdiction of
this Court is narrow in scope; it is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the
exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a
petition for review.38
In light of these findings, we affirm the CA’s ruling that the partial summary judgment is an
interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory judgment, notwithstanding
respondent Chua’s failure to file a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the RTC
grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua.
In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by respondent Chua on
the validity of the RTC’s appointment of a special sheriff for the implementation of the execution writ.
Propriety of Summary Judgment Reserved for Appeal
As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the issue of the propriety of
the partial summary judgment issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never raised this issue
in his petition for certiorari before the CA. It is well settled that no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. 39 Basic considerations of due process
impel the adoption of this rule.40
Furthermore, this issue would be better resolved in the proper appeal, to be taken by the parties
once the court a quo has completely resolved all the issues involved in the present case in a final
judgment. If we were to resolve this issue now, we would be preempting the CA, which has
1avvphi1

primary jurisdiction over this issue.

Lastly, taking jurisdiction over this issue now would only result in multiple appeals from a single case
which concerns the same, or integrated, causes of action. As we said in Santos v. People: 41
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and
not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of
the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be
delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be
raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
 
 
BACABAC V SPS TIU
SABI SA FACTS PHOTOCOPY LANG DAW NUNG DEED OF SALE YUNG INOFFER NI
RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE. SO DAPAT PWEDE NILA IAPPEAL KASI ONE OF THE
LIMITATIONS KAPAG IN DEFAULT KA AND PWEDE KA MAG APPEAL DAHIL DI NA PROVE
YUNG MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS.

 
NATL POWER CORP V BAYSIC
Petitioners argue that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling, a petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy where a party imputes grave abuse of discretion on the trial judge who improvidently
declared them in default and consequently rendered a default judgment against them. 14
They further assert that the trial court erred in considering their Answer as an unsigned
pleading in view of its alleged lack of proper verification. 15
We grant the petition.
True, in cases of default judgments, the remedy of the party declared in default is appeal. But
when that party charges the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in declaring this party in default and eventually rendering judgment against it, the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of. ℒαwρhi ৷
In David v. Judge Gutierrez-Fruelda, et al., 16 the Court enumerated the remedies of a party declared
in default, viz:
x x x One declared in default has the following remedies:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious
defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec.
2, Rule 41).
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if
the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. ℒαwρhi ৷

Also, in Martinez v. Republic of the Philippines citing Matute v. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court
pronounced that a party who was improvidently declared in default has the option to either perfect an
appeal or interpose a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of default even before the
promulgation of a default judgment, or in the event that the latter has been rendered, to have both
court decrees – the order of default and the defaul judgment – declared void.
In fine, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy.
Under Rule 65, while the remedy of appeal is indeed available to petitioners, the same is
clearly not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in light of petitioners' vigorous assertion
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioners in default
and rendered an adverse judgment against them. Petitioners' availment of a Petition for Certiorari
therefore, is proper and should have been taken cognizance by the Court of Appeals.
Notably, petitioners are interposing a prima facie meritorious defense involving the issue of
disbursement of public funds. It is, thus, in the higher interest of substantial justice that petitioners
should be given their day in court.
So must it be.
 
SPS GARCIA V SPS SORIANO
FACTS
Arnel died before 2009 hearing, impossible to make consent
Unjustified refusal… Petitioners recourse should have been consignation with the trial court
but he did not do so.
Parties reached compromised agreement
That should [petitioners] failed (sic) to produce such amount or sell the above-mentioned
properties within (the) period granted, then [petitioners] shall immediately turnover and
deliver possession and ownership of Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-23868 with an area of
513 square meters located at Poblacion, Tanuan, Leyte, and that, a Deed of Absolute Sale
shall be executed by [petitioners] in favor of [respondents];
the RTC issued an Order (subject judgment based on compromise agreement) approving the
aforesaid compromise agreement. Subsequently, petitioners failed to pay respondents the
sum of f 300,000.00 within the one-year period under the subject judgment based on
compromise agreement.
Issues
The Court deems the proper issues for resolution to be as follows:
I.
Whether petitioners availed themselves of the proper remedies.
 II.
Whether the proper party litigants validly entered into a new or modified compromise
agreement which superseded the judgment based on compromise agreement.
III.
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the subject writ of
execution to enforce the subject judgment based on compromise agreement.
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the ruling of the, CA but for different reasons.
At the outset, the Court notes that the execution proceedings subject of this case was
unnecessarily drawn-out, because the RTC erroneously permitted petitioners to resort to
improper remedies.
As narrated earlier, on June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a motion to quash writ of execution on
the ground that execution is premature, unjust, and violates their right to due process
principally because of the extension of time to pay the stipulated sum granted to petitioners
by the RTC in its Order dated January 30, 2009.
On June 4, 2009, however, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to quash.
Thereafter, or on July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a second motion to quash writ of execution.
Amplifying the previous grounds that they raised in their first motion to quash, petitioners
argued that respondents agreed to the aforesaid extension of time for petitioners to pay their
obligation, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 2009; that there is no law or
jurisprudence prohibiting the parties from amending or modifying a compromise agreement;
and that the RTC's Order dated January 30, 2009 supersedes or cancels all its previous
orders.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC should have dismissed outright the
second motion to quash for violating the Omnibus Motion Rule and for being the improper
remedy.
Under Section 9,17 Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 the Omnibus Motion
Rule states:
Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit or rationale of the foregoing rule is to require the movant to raise all available
grounds for relief in a single opportunity in order to avoid multiple and piece-meal
objections.19 In the present case, the second motion to quash raised additional arguments to
support or amplify those contained in the first motion to quash, but which arguments were
already available prior to and at the time of filing of the first motion to quash. Thus, such
additional arguments are deemed waived and can no longer be raised in the second motion
to quash by virtue of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
Furthermore, from the denial of petitioners' first motion to quash, the proper remedy was not
to file a second motion to quash, but to seek recourse to a higher court either by appeal (writ
of error or certiorari) or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, 20 if
warranted under exceptional circumstances established by jurisprudence and upon
compliance with any prerequisite (e.g., filing of a motion for reconsideration) required by the
Rules. As the Court explained in Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 although, as a
general rule, no appeal lies from an order denying a motion to quash writ of execution, 22
there are exceptions to this rule:
Certain it is x x x that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be contested
and prevented, and no appeal should He therefrom: otherwise, cases would be interminable,
and there would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations.
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they
may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where -
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or,
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari) or by a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.23
Resultantly, flowing from the patent infirmities of the second motion to quash, the Order
dated June 4, 2009 denying petitioners' first motion to quash attained finality; hence, the
execution of the subject judgment based on compromise agreement should have proceeded
as a matter of course.
At any rate, even if the Court was to disregard for the nonce the foregoing procedural
infirmities that attended the subject execution proceedings and adjudicate this case on the
merits, the instant petition still fails.
The CA principally relied on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments in concluding that
the subject judgment based on compromise agreement can no longer be altered or modified;
hence, the trial court's Order dated January 30, 2009 could not and did not extend the period
of payment stipulated therein.
Petitioners, however, concede that the subject judgment based on compromise agreement is
already final and executory, and instead, they argue that said final judgment was superseded
by a new or modified compromise agreement, during the January 30, 2009 hearing on the
motion for execution, where respondents allegedly agreed to give petitioners until April 30,
2009 within which to pay the sum of P300,000.00 as redemption or repurchase price of the
subject property. In essence, petitioners argue that there is no law or jurisprudence which
prohibits the parties from entering into a new or modified compromise agreement even after
a judgment based on compromise agreement has attained finality.
Within the context of the present case, the Court finds that the applicable principle is the rule
on compromise agreements after final judgment, and not the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments. A final judgment based on compromise agreement has the
same force and effect of a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction,
and is, thus, subject to the same prevailing principles on compromise agreements after final
judgment.
The rule of long standing is that rights may be waived or modified through a compromise
agreement even after a final judgment has already settled the rights of the contracting
parties.24 The compromise, to be binding, must be shown to have been voluntarily, freely and
intelligently executed by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment. 25 In
consonance with the law on contracts, the compromise must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs and public policy.26
In Magbanua v. Uy,27 the Court explained thus:
The issue involving the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a final judgment
is not novel. Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise agreement that covered cases pending
trial, on appeal, and with final judgment. The Court noted that Article 2040 28 (of the Civil
Code) impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should
be entered into. Palanca v. Court of Industrial Relations sustained a compromise agreement,
notwithstanding a final judgment in which only the amount of back wages was left to be
determined. The Court found no evidence of fraud or of any showing that the agreement was
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Gatchalian v. Arlegui upheld the right to compromise prior to the execution of a final
judgment. The Court ruled that the final judgment had been novated and superseded by a
compromise agreement. Also, Northern Lines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals recognized the
right to compromise final and executory judgments, as long as such right was exercised by
the proper party litigants.
xxxx
There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered
into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the
law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent of
the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the
compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established. 29 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there was nothing to prevent the parties from entering into a new or
modified compromise agreement even after the subject judgment based on compromise
agreement attained finality. Nonetheless, the Court holds that petitioners failed to
convincingly show that respondents consented or agreed to this new or modified
compromise agreement, which purported to supersede the subject judgment based on
compromise agreement.
Respondent Cricela Soriano argue that she and her now deceased husband, respondent
Arnel Soriano, did not agree to the aforesaid extension of time to pay, because: (1) during the
January 30, 2009 hearing on their motion for execution, respondents' counsel objected 30 to
the granting of the extended period (which petitioners do not dispute before the Court),
however, the trial court insisted on giving petitioners more time to pay the obligation, despite
the lapse of the period under the judgment based on compromise agreement, and (2)
respondent Arnel Soriano had previously died on August 2, 2007, as evidenced by the
original copy31 of his death certificate, thus, making it impossible for him to have given his
consent to the alleged modification of the original compromise agreement during the January
30, 2009 hearing.
Petitioners rely heavily on the wording of the trial court's Order dated January 30, 2009,
which stated, in part, that the extension of time to pay was "with the permission of
[respondents]." However, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court cannot
take such wording at face value precisely because of: (1) respondents1 uncontroverted
evidence that respondent Arnel Soriano had previously died on August 2, 2007; and (2) the
lack of sufficient proof that respondent Cricela Soriano as well as respondent Arnel Soriano's
heirs32 were actually present during the January 30, 2009 hearing and gave their consent to
the new or modified compromise agreement.
The Court finds that a greater degree of circumspection is warranted in this particular case,
because the purported modification to the subject compromise agreement is in the nature of
a unilateral concession in favor of petitioners (a form of pure gratuity) vigorously
contradicted with proof by respondents, so that it was incumbent upon petitioners, who had
the burden of proof, to convincingly show that the new or modified compromise agreement,
which would have the effect of superseding the subject judgment based on compromise
agreement, was voluntarily, freely and intelligently entered into by the proper party litigants.
This, petitioners failed to do.
Thus, the Court is constrained to rule that the requisite consent to enter into a new or
modified compromise agreement was lacking. Hence, no new or modified compromise
agreement was validly entered into by the proper party litigants which would have
superseded the subject judgment based on compromise agreement. Since it is undisputed
that petitioners were in default of payment under the terms of the subject judgment based on
compromise agreement, then the issuance by the trial court of the subject writ of execution
to enforce said final judgment was, therefore, proper.
Be that as it may, even if we were to assume arguendo that the proper party litigants in this
case validly entered into a new or modified compromise agreement, which superseded the
subject judgment based on compromise agreement by extending the period of payment
stipulated therein, the result would still be the same.
It will be recalled that the alleged extension as per the Order dated January 30, 2009 allowed
petitioners to pay the stipulated sum on or before April 30, 2009. On April 28, 2009,
petitioners manifested before the trial court their willingness and ability to pay the said sum,
but, according to petitioners, respondents allegedly rejected their offer of payment. 33 Instead,
on April 29, 2009, respondents filed a counter-manifestation maintaining that the subject
judgment based on compromise agreement is already final and executory;
(SO KAYA SINABI MAY UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL IN WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD
HAVE CONSIGNED PAYMENT SA RTC)
 that the period to pay has already lapsed warranting the execution of the same; and that the
Order dated January 30, 2009 is defective for lack of consent, because respondent Arnel
Soriano had previously died on August 2, 2007.
Based on the alleged unjustified refusal of respondents to accept the said payment, the
proper remedy of petitioners should have been the consignation of payment with the trial
court in order to comply with their obligation under the new or modified compromise
agreement. In Allandale Sportsline, Inc., et al. v. The Good Dev't. Corp.,34 we held:
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect; rather, tender of payment must be
followed by a valid consignation in order to produce the effect of payment and extinguish an
obligation.
Tender of payment is but a preparatory act to consignation. It is the manifestation by the
debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid
consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court.35
In the present case, petitioners failed to perform such valid consignation of payment. Before
the Court, and up to this point in these proceedings, they merely reiterate that they are willing
and able in earnest to pay the sum of P300,000.00 to respondents, if so ordered. 36 The net
effect of their lack of valid consignation of payment is that petitioners would have been,
likewise, in default under the terms of the new or modified compromise agreement; thus,
giving rise to the right of respondents to move for execution of the subject judgment based
on compromise agreement. In short, the issuance of the subject writ of execution would still
be proper.
Finally, petitioners invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Court to allow them to make a belated
payment under the subject compromise agreement. However, as we have often ruled, equity,
which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is only applied in the absence
of, and never against statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.37
This legal controversy stemmed from petitioners' failure to pay their obligation to
respondents in order to redeem or repurchase the subject property. Petitioners neither deny
the existence of this obligation (and their corresponding breach thereof) nor contest its
validity. During the mediation proceedings on October 29, 2005, the parties entered into the
subject compromise agreement that gave petitioners another opportunity to pay the sum
owed, but again they failed to do so. Their plea for equity cannot, therefore, prevail over the
clear legal consequences of the breach of their obligation to respondents who, after giving
valuable consideration to petitioners, have long awaited and are entitled to the satisfaction of
their just claims.
 
 
 
 
NEA V MAGUINDANAO
Joc is final and immediately executory, but binds only the parties who signed it.
4th exception applies because of supervening event.
“To stop execution of a final and executory judgement, the supervening event must transpire
after the finality of judgment.”
2 SUPERVENING EVENTS WHICH STOP THE EXECUTION OF THE JOC

ST FRANCIS PLAZA V SOLCO

he Court's Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." 94 The
parties, thus, "adjust their difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon, disregarding the
possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the danger of
losing."95 Relatively, for the compromise agreement to be binding upon the parties therein, it
must have been executed by them. 96 In addition, it cannot be overemphasized that the
presence of an indispensable party is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.97 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of
the court null and void.98
SFPC as an indispensable party to the Compromise Agreement.
Here, there is no dispute that SFPC is an indispensable party in Civil Case No. Q-12-283. However,
while SFPC was not specifically included as a party to the Compromise Agreement, both the
RTC and the CA correctly upheld its validity because its right to due process was never
violated.
In David v. Paragas, Jr.,99 the Court upheld the CA decision annulling a judicially approved
compromise agreement because one of the parties therein failed to satisfactorily prove his authority
to bind the corporation:
x x x A review of the Joint Omnibus Motion would also show that the compromise agreement
dealt more with David and Olympia. Given this, Olympia did not have any standing in court to
enter into a compromise agreement unless impleaded as a party. The RTC did not have the
authority either to determine Olympia's rights and obligations. Furthermore, to allow the
compromise agreement to stand is to deprive Olympia of its properties and interest for it was
never shown that the person who signed the agreement on its behalf had any authority to do
so.
IMPORTANT DISCUSSION IN THIS CASE. NO
AUTHORITY DAW TO BIND OLYMPIA. WAS PREPARED
BY SECRETARY OF THE MEETING NOT CORPO SEC
OF OLYMPIA
More importantly, Lobrin, who signed the compromise agreement, failed to satisfactorily prove
his authority to bind Olympia. The CA observed, and this Court agrees, that the "board
resolution" allegedly granting authority to Lobrin to enter into a compromise agreement on
behalf of Olympia was more of a part of the "minutes" of a board meeting containing a
proposal to settle the case with David or to negotiate a settlement . It should be noted that the
said document was not prepared or issued by the Corporate Secretary of Olympia but by a
"Secretary to the Meeting." Moreover, the said resolution was neither acknowledged before a
notarial officer in Hong Kong nor authenticated before the Philippine Consul in Hong Kong .
Considering these facts, the RTC should have denied the Joint Omnibus Motion and
disapproved the compromise agreement. In fine, Olympia was not shown to have properly
consented to the agreement, for the rule is, a corporation can only act through its. Board of
Directors or anyone with the authority of the latter. To allow the compromise agreement to stand
is to deprive Olympia of its properties and interest for it was never shown that Lobrin had the
necessary authority to sign the agreement on Olympia's behalf. 100 (Italics supplied.)
In contrast, the records show that SFPC, an indispensable party in the case, issued a Board
Resolution101 dated December 18, 2012, through its Corporate Secretary, appointing its President,
Francis, to represent it in Civil Case No. Q-12-283 and authorizing him to execute and sign
documents or pleadings in connection with the case, including compromise. Indubitably,
SFPC was duly represented in the Compromise Agreement and was never denied due
process of law.
Besides, the RTC aptly held that SFPC is deemed to have participated in the Compromise
Agreement considering that the parties therein are the sole and only stockholders and officers of
SFPC.102 To rule otherwise would allow SFPC, who invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.103
The Compromise Agreement is not void for being contrary to law and public policy.
Likewise, the Court does not agree with SFPC's contention that the Compromise Agreement is void
for being contrary to law and public policy. As aptly held by the CA, the dismissal of the criminal
cases was never anchored on the Compromise Agreement. The parties merely assumed the
obligation to withdraw as complainant or witness, or to desist from prosecuting the criminal
cases pending in courts or in the pro0ecutor's office. 104
Moreover, the Compromise Agreement provides a separability clause which states that the
declaration of nullity of any part thereof should not avoid the other parts of the agreement. 105
The consent of the parties in the Compromise Agreement is not vitiated by fraud and mistake.
Clutching at straws, the Francis Group contends that its consent to the Compromise Agreement was
vitiated by fraud and mistake.
To recall, Emilio accused the Francis Group of acquiring his 50% GLAC shares without his consent
which prompted him to file several criminal cases for forgery as a consequence. Pursuant to the
Compromise Agreement, Emilio demanded for the transfer of the entirety of the shares of the
Francis Group in GLAC in his favor. However, in the DOJ Resolution 106 dated February 10, 2014, it
was held that Emilio already transferred for valuable consideration (in the amount of
P30,000,583.00) his shares in GLAC to the Francis Group. Thus, the Francis Group contends that to
require it to transfer the Grace Park property, the 50% GLAC shares which they bought from Emilio,
and even the remaining shares that they had in GLAC through the Compromise Agreement, without
any consideration and contrary to the findings of the DOJ, would result in unjust enrichment and
extreme inequity to the prejudice of the Francis Group.
The Court is not swayed.
It is well settled that in order to annul or avoid a contract, the fraud must be so material that
had it not been present, the defrauded party would not have entered into it.107 Further, it must
be established by clear and convincing evidence.108
Unfortunately, the Francis Group failed to establish that it was deceived by Emilio in signing
the Compromise Agreement. On the contrary, records show that the Compromise Agreement
was made and executed by the Francis Group in the presence of and with the assistance of
its respective counsel, who also affixed their signatures. Otherwise stated, its consent was
given intelligently, freely, and spontaneously. 109 The findings of facts of both the trial and
appellate courts that the Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties freely, voluntarily
and with full understanding of the consequences thereof is conclusive and binding on the Court. 110
While the court encourages litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise, 111 the
courts "have no power to relieve parties from an obligation voluntarily assailed, simply because their
contracts turned out to be disastrous deals." 112 That the Compromise Agreement is heavily tilted in
favor of Emilio does not automatically mean that the consent of the Francis Group was vitiated. After
all, the Compromise Agreement was a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the Francis Group validly exercised the option of
rescinding the Compromise Agreement as to the unimplemented portions 113 thereof pursuant to
Article 2041 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses, to abide by the compromise, the other party may
either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded, and insist upon his original demand. (Italics
supplied.)
In the case of Inutan, et al. v. Napar Contracting & Allied Services, et al., 114 the Court held:
A judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata. It is
final, binding on the parties, and enforceable through a writ of execution. Article 2041 of the
Civil Code, however, allows the aggrieved party to rescind the compromise agreement and
insist upon his original demand upon failure and refusal of the other party to abide by the
compromise agreement.115 (Italics in the original and supplied.)
Thus, despite the finality of a judicially approved compromise agreement, where one of the
parties to the agreement fails or refuses to comply with his part of the bargain, as in this
case, 

REMEDY
the law recognizes the right of the aggrieved party to either:
 (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution;  
or (2) regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, upon the other party's
failure or refusal to abide by the compromise.
Verily, the aggrieved party need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for it is settled
that the aggrieved party may regard the compromise agreement already rescinded. 116
In this case, it is undisputed that Emilio never executed any affidavit of desistance in the
criminal cases117 which he filed against the Francis Group or filed any Withdrawal of Petition
for Review with the DOJ in I.S. No. XV-03-INV-12A-0577. Moreover, Emilio refused to pay the
amounts of P1,745,708.07 and P1,351,756.50 (relative to the Grace Park property) to the
Francis Group despite the presentation of official receipts evidencing such payments 118 and
to execute an Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim for the Samson Road property. 119
Lamentably, it was Emilio who moved for the execution of the Compromise Agreement arguing that
the Francis Group, Francis in particular, manifested their intent to renege on the Compromise
Agreement by filing several motions in the criminal cases. However, it must be emphasized that
there was no indication that Francis intended to renege on the Compromise Agreement. Quite the
opposite, records show that the Francis Group faithfully performed the obligations expected
of it under the Compromise Agreement. However, Emilio deliberately failed to execute the
ℒαwρhi ৷

necessary Affidavits of Desistance and. Withdrawal of Petition for Review which constituted
a material breach of the Compromise Agreement despite the compliance made by the Francis
Group, particularly the sale in favor of Emilio of the Sum-ag Bacolod properties at a very low
price and by Benz's desistance on the criminal cases he filed against Emilio pursuant to the
Compromise Agreement.
Needless to say, no one in the right frame of mind would agree to give up: (1) 50% GLAC shares
worth P30,000,583.00 which the Francis Group bought from Emilio; (2) another 50% GLAC shares
which the Francis Group respectively owns; and (3) the GLAC property without absolutely any
consideration.
Notably, the primary consideration of the Francis Group in signing the Compromise Agreement
despite ending up at the losing end of the financial equation is to secure the safety of their family
from the threat of criminal prosecution.
Thus, after Benz filed the affidavits of desistance in the cases against Emilio in Bacolod City on May
10, 2013, logic dictates that the latter should likewise execute the affidavits of desistance that
the Francis Group earnestly sought.120 However, Emilio never executed any affidavits of
desistance until the matter was overtaken by the DOJ Resolution dated February 10, 2014,
directing the dismissal of the five criminal complaints against the Francis Group based on
the merits.121
To the Court's mind, Emilio's failure to execute the needed affidavits of desistance despite
the lapse of a long period of time constituted a substantial breach of contract rendering
nugatory the very object of the parties in making the agreement. 122 His deliberate failure is
further bolstered by the fact that he filed several Oppositions 123 in the criminal cases instead
of desisting from them. Taken collectively, Emilio's failure to comply with the terms of the
Compromise Agreement, coupled with his opposition to the quashal of the criminal Informations,
constitute a clear repudiation of the remaining unimplemented terms of the Compromise
Agreement.124
The CA, however, appears to be of the view that the only recourse of the Francis Group is to insist
on the execution of the Compromise Agreement with specific reference to the unfulfilled obligations
of Emilio, thus:125
On this point, We cannot give due course to petitioners' prayer to rescind x x x the subject
compromise agreement x x x on account of the alleged non performance by [Emilio] of his covenant
therein. If, indeed, [Emilio] deliberately reneged on his undertaking x x x the aggrieved parties can
enforce the compromise agreement x x x by way of a Writ of Execution. 126
The Court disagrees.
Undoubtedly, Emilio's obligations under the Compromise Agreement, which he never performed, has
lost its importance the moment the DOJ Resolution 127 was issued. Given that his obligation can
no longer be performed, it would be absurd to compel the Francis Group to deliver its
correlative obligation. The DOJ findings and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal cases
were supervening events that rendered the execution of the Compromise Agreement as
unjust and inequitable.128 Emilio only has himself to blame for failing to adhere to his prestations to
execute his Affidavits of Desistance in the five (5) criminal cases despite the lapse of an ample
amount of time. To rule otherwise would be to allow Emilio to profit from his own wrongdoings. 129
Besides, the Francis Group is released from its reciprocal obligation the moment Emilio's
prior prestations (execution of the Affidavits of Desistance) were rendered legally impossible
by the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the DOJ Resolution. 130
For emphasis, Article 1266 of the Civil Code states:
Article 1266. The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes
legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligor
Viewed in this light, the CA's insistence that the Francis Group can enforce the Compromise
Agreement with the assistance of the RTC by way of a Writ of Execution does not find any practical
application to the facts established in the case.13
SO DITO, HINDI DAW WRIT OF EXECUTION KASI IMPOSIBLE NA BECAUSE OF THE DOJ RESOLUTIONS. UNIMPLEMENTED PORTIONS OF
THE COM AG IS CONSIDERED AS RESCINDED. ( insist daw on original demand… but impossible na ata because of the DOJ reso?)
1
Thus, the Court finds that the Francis Group validly regarded the unimplemented portions
of the Compromise Agreement as rescinded in view of Emilio's material breach and
noncompliance with his part of the bargain. To be sure, the straight jacket execution of a
Compromise Agreement is not the only remedy for the Francis Group in the face of Emilio's
deliberate refusal to abide by the material terms thereof.132
Resultantly, the following obligations are rescinded, to wit: (1) Francis' obligations to turn
over to Emilio the original owner's duplicate of the title over the Grace Park Property, as well
as Emilio's obligation to reimburse Francis under Title III.1 of the Compromise Agreement; (2)
Emilio's obligation to execute and file with the Registrar of Deeds an Affidavit of Cancellation
of Adverse Claim pertaining to TCT No. 163755 under Title III.2 of the Compromise
Agreement; (3) the Francis Group's obligation to transfer the entirety of their respective
shareholdings in GLAC in favor of Emilio and Dexter, as well as the latter's correlative
obligations pursuant to Title IV.1, IV.1.a, IV.1.b, IV.1.c, IV.1.d, and IV.1.e of the Compromise
Agreement; (4) the parties respective obligations under Title IV.2, IV.2.a, IV.2.b, and IV.2.c of
the compromise agreement relative to GLREDC shares; and (5) the parties respective
obligations under Title IV.3, IV.3.1, and IV.3.b of the Compromise Agreement relative to
SFPC's shareholding.133 On the other hand, the sale of the Sum-ag, Bacolod Properties by
Francis to Emilio is valid notwithstanding the rescission of the unimplemented portions of
the Compromise Agreement in view of the separability clause.
 
 
 
RULE 36
GARRIDO V TORTOGO (ejectment action)
NAGRANT NG RTC YUNG WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NI RESPONDENT
NAG PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SI PETITIONER
BAWAL APPEAL KASI GRANT OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
SO REMEDY NI PETITIONER DAPAT IS TO FILE A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION UNDER RULE 65
 
On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, or any
person acting for and in behalf, are hereby ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further
implementing the April 25, 2000 Writ of Execution and/or any of its aliases, or any demolition order, if
one might have been issued already, in Civil Case No. 23671 before MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City,
pending the hearing and final determination of the merits in this instant case, or until further orders
from this Court.
petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called "petition for review on
certiorari," seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
issued by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November 12, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002 order of
the RTC 
November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an
interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal
With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of appeal, we have
first to determine whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an interlocutory or a final
order. The distinction is relevant in deciding whether the order is the proper subject of an
appeal, or of a special civil action for certiorari.
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon.20 An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet
to be held and the judgment rendered. 21 The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is : does the order or judgment leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an
appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the
merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel
the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. 22 An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal,
but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65,23 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
 
PLANTERS DEV BANK V SPS LOPEZ 
FACTS:
pouses Lopez filed against Planters Bank complaint for rescission of the loan agreements
and for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
RTC ruled in Planters Bank’s favor.
spouses Lopez died during the pendency of the case. 
the CA reversed the RTC ruling.
The dispositive ruling of the CA decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED
the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
The CA re-examined the case and treated the comment as a motion for reconsideration. It
affirmed its previous decision but modified the dispositive portion, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, defendant-appellee’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED while plaintiffs-
appellants’ motion for reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The dispositive part of Our
Decision dated November 27, 2006 is hereby clarified and corrected to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The loan agreement
between the parties, including all its accessory contracts, is declared RESCINDED.
 
RULING:
The CA’s amended decision dated July 30, 2007 is not yet final and executory
We believe Planters Bank’s assertion that its motion for reconsideration dated August 22,
2007 was filed on time. The Manila Central Post Office’s certification states that the amended
decision was only dispatched from the Manila Central Post Office to the Makati Central Post
Office on August 2, 2007.28 On the other hand, the Makati Central Post Office’s certification
provides that Planters Bank’s actual receipt of the decision was on August 7, 2007. 29 These
certifications conclusively show that Planters Bank’s counsel received the amended decision
on August 7, 2007 and not on August 2, 2007.
There is also no merit to the respondents’ argument that Planters Bank’s motion for reconsideration
is disallowed under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. 30 We point out in this respect that
there is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an
amended judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and
renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal
issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes or
takes the place of the original decision. On the other hand, a supplemental decision does not
take the place of the original; it only serves to add to the original decision.
In the present case, the CA promulgated an amended decision because it re-examined its
factual and legal findings in its original decision. Thus, Planters Bank may file a motion for
reconsideration. The amended decision is an entirely new decision which replaced the CA’s
decision dated November 27, 2006.
In sum, the amended decision is not yet final and executory because Planters Bank filed a
motion for reconsideration on time; its filing is allowed by the Rules of Court.
 
BATERINA V MUSNGI (hindi nag file ng joint omnibus motions si petitioner)
 
On December 18, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 20 on the Joint Omnibus
Motion of accused Relampagos and other accused, which inadvertently included the name of
petitioner which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Joint Omnibus Motion filed by

accused SALACNIB F. BATERINA is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
Consequently,, on January 15, 2018, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 22 nunc pro tunc
in order to clarify the Resolution dated December 18, 2017. The following correction to the
dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated December 18, 2017, reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Joint Omnibus Motion filed by

accused Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario Nunez, Lalaine Paule, and Marilou Bare is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 
To stress, petitioner's allegation that respondents acted with bias when the dispositive, portion of the
Resolution dated December 18, 2017 included his name is merely based on speculations and
conjectures unsupported by proof.
The Resolution dated December 18, 2017 pertained to the Joint Omnibus Motion of accused
Relampagos and the other accused. It erroneously contained a dispositive portion implicating
the name of petitioner. However, the subsequent issuance of Resolution dated January 15,
2018, in the nature of nunc pro tunc, cured the error in the dispositive portion.
In fact, a careful reading of the Resolution dated December 18, 2017 shows that the Sandiganbayan
meticulously discussed the issues raised by accused Relampagos and the other accused in their
Joint Omnibus Motion. It is likewise clear that what the Sandiganbayan ordered was the denial for
lack of merit of the issues raised therein. Therefore, the dispositive portion of the Resolution
dated December 18, 2017 which pertained to petitioner was a mere act of inadvertence on the
part of respondents and does not in any way qualify as proof of respondents' bias or
partiality against petitioner.
 
Notably, nowhere in the petition did petitioner ever mention the existence of the Resolution dated
January 15, 2018. Hence, with the legal concept and nature of nunc pro tunc judgments or
orders, it follows that petitioner's allegations that he was already prejudged and his case was
already predisposed by respondents would be rendered nugatory.
The Court in Mercury Drug Corp., et al. v. Sps. Huang, et al.,33 is instructive in this wise:

"Nunc pro tunc" is a Latin phrase that means "now for then." A judgment nunc
pro tunc is made to enter into the record an act previously done by the court,
which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. It neither
operates to correct judicial errors nor to "supply omitted action by the court." Its
sole purpose is to make a present record of a "judicial action which has been
actually taken."
The concept of nunc pro tunc judgments was sufficiently explained in Lichauco v. Tan
Pho, thus:

[A judgment nunc pro tunc] may be used to make the record speak the
truth, but not to make it speak what it did. not speak but ought to have
spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should
have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it.
has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry
nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment
nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but
only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but
which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases the
exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the
actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not
furnish the basis for such an entry.
If the court has omitted to make an order, which it might or ought to haye
made, it cannot, at a subsequent term, be made nunc pro tunc. According
 to some authorities, in all cases in which an entry nunc pro tunc is made,
the record should show the facts which authorize the entry, but other
courts hold that in entering an order nunc pro tunc the court is not confined
to an examination of the judge's minutes, or written evidence, but may
proceed on any satisfactory evidence, including parol testimony. In the
absence of a statute or rule of court requiring it, the failure of the judge to
sign the journal entries or the record does not affect the force of tihe order
grante[d].
xxxx
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is
one placing in proper form, on the record, the judgment that had been
previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what
the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the
one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court,
however erroneous the judgment may have been.

The exercise of issuing nunc pro tunc orders or judgments is narrowly confined to
cases where there is a need to correct mistakes or omissions arising from inadvertence
so that the record reflects judicial action, which had previously been taken.
Furthermore, nunc pro tunc judgments or orders can only be rendered if none, of
the parties will be prejudiced.

 
PHIL VET BANK V BANK OF COMMERCE
PADILLO V CA
Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and
the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. When the three (3) identities are present, the judgment on the merits
rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the
claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But
where between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein
such judgment is invoked, there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive
in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
conclusiveness of judgment.40
Under ordinary circumstances, this Court would have subscribed to the appellate court's conclusion
that M.C. No. 37442 barred petitioner's claim for damages in Civil Case No. 9114 since all four (4)
essential requisites in order for res judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" to attach are present in
the instant case, to wit:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of cause of action.41
M.C. No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, is a final judgment. 42
Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, in the new trial it conducted in M.C. No. 374-
82, following clarification by the Supreme Court of its expanded jurisdiction, 43 had obtained
jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties thereto. The judgment of Branch 57 of
Lucena City in M.C. No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or
dilatory objections.44 Finally, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
M.C. No. 374-82 and Civil Case No. 9114 both involved the petitioner and respondent Averia.
The subject matter of both actions is the parcel of land and building erected thereon covered
by TCT No. T-9863. The causes of action are also identical since the same evidence would
support and establish M.C. No. 374-82 and Civil Case No. 9114.45
However, a different conclusion is warranted under the principle of law of the case. Law of the case
has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. 46 As a general rule, a decision on a prior
appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or
wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. 47
The concept of Law of the Case was further elucidated in the 1919 case of Zarate v. Director of
Lands,48 thus:
A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case,
such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule
made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from
in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former
decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to
reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is 'necessary to enable an appellate court to
perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once
considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every
subsequent appeal.' Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. 'There
would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a
court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its
members.' x x x
The phrase "Law of the Case" is described in a decision coming from the Supreme Court of Missouri
in the following graphical language:
The general rule, nakedly and badly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal,
whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribed the duty
and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and
remain the law of the case in all after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is
grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there would be no end to
criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It
would be intolerable if parties litigant were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a
court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and
handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal,
would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew .
Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of
justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use. x x
x49
The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of this principle called the law of the case
which is totally different from the concept of res judicata. Law of the case does not have the
finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereas res judicata
forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. 50 In the 1975
case of Comilang v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division.),51 a further distinction was made in this
manner:
The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its
application. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to
the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although
it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally
concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.
Significantly in the instant case, the law of the case on the matter of the pendency of M.C. No. 374-
82 to bar Civil Case No. 9114 has been settled in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356.
It is worthwhile to consider that at the time this Court in G.R. No. 65129 ordered the new trial of M.C.
No. 374-82, after clarifying the expanded jurisdiction of the trial court with authority to decide non-
contentious and contentious issues, Civil Case No. 9114 was already existent. When the issue of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of pendency of M.C. No. 374-82 was raised before
the trial court wherein the said Civil Case No. 9114 was docketed, the trial court chose to merely
defer resolution thereof. And when the said issue of litis pendentia was raised before the Court of
Appeals via a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, the Court of Appeals, while
agreeing with respondent Averia's arguments on the existence of litis pendentia, which would
ultimately result in res judicata, incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No. 9114 to
await the final termination of M.C. No. 374-82, instead of dismissing the case and/or ordering that
the claim for damages be filed in M.C. No. 374-82.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on December 21, 1989 and by then, M.C. No.
374 82 had long been resolved by the trial court and pending appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Since no appeal was filed from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, the
resolution therein of the appellate court which ordered the suspension instead of dismissal of Civil
Case No. 9114, became final. Thus, even if erroneous, the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 15356 has become the law of the case as between herein petitioner Padillo and respondent
Averia, and may no longer be disturbed or modified. 52 It is not subject to review or reversal in any
court.
Petitioner, therefore, should not be faulted for yielding in good faith to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, Fourteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 and continuing to pursue her claim for
damages in Civil Case No. 9114. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 on
the matter of the issue of existence of M.C. No. 37442 as a bar to Civil Case No. 9114 should dictate
all further proceedings.
Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, this Court is not inclined to sustain the monetary award for
damages granted by the trial court.
Concerning the alleged forgone income of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) per
year since 1982 as testified on by petitioner as the income she could have realized had possession
of the property not been withheld from her by respondent Averia, 53 we consider such amount of
expected profit highly conjectural and speculative. With an allegation that respondent made millions
for the improper use and exploitation of the property, petitioner's testimony regarding the matter of
unrealized income is sadly lacking of the requisite details on how such huge amount of income could
be made possible. Petitioner did not detail out how such huge amount of income could have been
derived from the use of the disputed lot and building. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual,
compensatory and consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be presumed. If the proof
adduced thereon is flimsy and insufficient, as in this case, no damages will be allowed. 54 Verily, the
testimonial evidence on alleged unrealized income earlier referred to is not enough to warrant the
award of damages. It is too vague and unspecified to induce faith and reliance.
The only amount of unrealized income petitioner should be entitled to is the unrealized monthly
rentals which respondent Averia admits to be in the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) a
month or Nine Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P9,600.00) a year during the sixth (6th) to tenth (10th)
year of the Contract of Lease between Marina de Vera Quicho, as Lessor, and respondent Averia,
as Lessee, which fell on 1982 to 1986. 55 Inasmuch as respondent Averia had been in possession of
the property from January 1982 to February 1992 when he vacated the property, 56 it is but just for
him to pay petitioner the unrealized rentals of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P97,600.00) for that period of time. Furthermore, said amount of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Pesos (P97,600.00) shall earn interest 57 at the legal rate58 computed from the finality of this
decision.59
On the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), respectively, we find that there is no sound
basis for the award. It cannot be logically inferred that just because respondent Averia instituted Civil
Case No. 1690-G while M.C. No. 374-82 was pending, malice or bad faith is immediately ascribable
against the said respondent to warrant such an award.
The issue of whether the trial court in M.C. No. 374-82 could adjudicate contentious issues was only
resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 65129 on December 29, 1986 60 long after the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1690-G which was instituted by respondent Averia. 61 That respondent Averia instituted a
separate suit which was subsequently dismissed and all actions or appeals taken by respondent
Averia relative to M.C. No. 374-82 does not per se make such actions or appeals wrongful and
subject respondent Averia to payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. Such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on
those who may exercise it erroneously. One may have erred, but error alone is not a ground for
moral damages.62
In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a person for having been
made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award of moral
damages.63 The emotional distress, worries and anxieties suffered by her and her husband 64 are only
such as are usually caused to a party hauled into Court as a party in a litigation. Therefore, there is
no sufficient justification for the award of moral damages, more so, exemplary damages, and must
therefore be deleted.
With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the exception rather than the general rule;
counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 65 Attorney's fees as part of damages are not the
same as attorney's fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense,
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter, while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. 66
Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code.67 As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring
the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
reasonable. Thereunder, the trial court may award attorney's fees where it deems just and equitable
that it be so granted. While we respect the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this case, we find
the award of the trial court of attorney's fees in the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos
(P107,000.00) plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per appearance in the hearing of the case
and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive.
Attorney's fees as part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the
losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably reduced to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
Because of the conclusions we have thus reached, there is no need to delve any further on the other
assigned errors.
 
PEOPLE V ESCOBAR
The Regional Trial Court denied 99 Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The
Court of Appeals overtumed 100 this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred
by res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." 101 This doctrine bars the re-litigation
of the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. 102
It likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also
known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement. 103 It "exists as an obvious rule of reason,
justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity." 104
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan 105held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of
Rule 39"106 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
 ....
(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Escobar' s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not
recognized in criminal proceedings.107
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the
parties or their successors-in-interest.108 Trinidad v. Marcelo109declares that res judicata, as
found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
criminal proceedings."110 Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied
to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Rule.

Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, 111
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad:112

Petitioner's arguments - that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman
twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and
that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a
reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances - do not lie.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.
But even if petitioner's argument[s] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in
prison grey" or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it
inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. 113
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature,
does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the
prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same
will still not apply.114 Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or
that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 115
Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been
convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar’s Second Bail
Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
 2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter;
3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. 116

In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A
1âwphi1

final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the
highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. 117 In contrast, an order is considered
interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a
point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy. 118
An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in
an action";119 in other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case-the
rendition of the final judgment.120 Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on
the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not
appealed.121 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:122

Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17,
1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing
questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said Order has become final
and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule
39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no
longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been
affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is
an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory. The phrase refers to aflnal determination as opposed to a judgment or an
order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing
intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply
only to those falling under the second category.
....
For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res
adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely
interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment. 123
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter 124-whether accused is
entitled to provisional liberty-and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence.
Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s]
unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.125 Thus:

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The
course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.126 (Emphasis in the original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory
order."127 The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's
First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not
attained finality. Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision,
the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and
weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.
 
PADUA V HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN
HOMEOWNERS FILED QUEITING OF TITLE
have already filed an action against the Estate of Spouses De Guzman before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for Specific Performance praying to compel
Spouses De Guzman to issue titles in favor of the homeowners.
Eventually, the HLURB found that Antonio acted without authority and misrepresented
himself as the registered owner-seller of the lots. Thus, the sales to the homeowners,
including petitioners herein, were declared null and void . The HLURB Decision in HLURB
Case No. REM-0292-C-96-LSG-Xl-REM-021298-0133 dated 10 May 1999 became final.
SO MAY DECISION NA SI HLURB NUNG NAG FILE SI HOMEOWNERS NG QUEITING OF
TITLE.
The HLURB ruling adverted to by petitioners had long been declared as final and executory; the
same having been decided more than 20 years ago in 1999, and the homeowners involved therein,
including herein petitioners, having failed to appeal the same. Under the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tune entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. 21 None of the recognized
exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments was raised in the instant case.
Moreover, petitioners never questioned the jurisdiction of the HLURB in the specific performance
case, and even allowed the same judgment to lapse into finality by failing to file an appeal. It was
only when the heirs of Spouses De Guzman raised the issue of res judicata that petitioners
conveniently proffered the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the HLURB to nullify the deeds of sale.
Verily, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.22 After all, it is
already well settled in our jurisdiction that  the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.23 In any event, the
HLURB has jurisdiction over annulment of titles, mortgage, and sale if the same were necessarily
entwined and/or intimately related to the issues within its jurisdiction.24 Stated differently, the
HLURB may decide on the perfection of contracts of sale when it relates to actions for specific
performance to deliver certificates of title necessarily hinged on the enforcement of contractual and
statutory obligations by the parties
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law which precludes
parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It
means that "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit. 1130 Notably, this doctrine applies to both judicial and quasijudicial
proceedings of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction.31 The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their
privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before
the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again
be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same.
 The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section 4 7 of the Rules of Court, is referred to
as "bar by former judgment"; while the second rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c), is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment. "32 To recall, petitioners instituted the complaint for specific
performance to enforce respondents' obligation allegedly arising from the Deeds of Sale and
Contracts to Sell. The same was filed upon respondents' failure to deliver the certificates of
title and hinged on respondents' breach of contract. On the other hand, petitioners filed the
complaint for quieting of title upon respondents' assertion of ownership in 2010. The same is
brought to remove a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, or to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon such title or any interest therein. 33 From the foregoing, there is no identity of
causes of action between the two cases. One is an ordinary civil action and the other a
special civil action. Moreover, they were instituted due to different, separate acts and/or
omission of respondents in violation of petitioners' supposed rights. The first is to enforce the
contract and the second is to remove a cloud on and enjoy ownership of the property. Hence, the
first kind of res judicata, or bar by former judgment is inapplicable in this case. 
There is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment when all the following elements are
present:
 (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and ( 4) there must be as between
the first and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes of action.34
Therefore, the parties and issues in the two (2) cases must be the same for res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment to apply
The parties in the two cases are considered the same even when they are not identical if they
share substantially the same interest. It is  enough that there is privity between the party in
the first case and in the second case, as when a successor-in-interest or an heir participates
in the second case.36 On the other hand, there is identity of issues when a competent court
has adjudicated the fact, matter, or right, or when the fact, matter, or right was "necessarily
involved in the determination of the action[. ]" To determine whether an issue has been
resolved in the first case, it must be ascertained that the evidence needed to resolve the
second case "would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first action ." Thus,
if the fact or matter litigated in the first case is re-litigated in the second case, it is barred by
res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
The above-mentioned elements are all present in the instant case. First, the HLURB Decision
dated 10 May 1999 had long attained finality. Second, the HLURB has jurisdiction to
determine the contractual obligations of petitioners and respondents, as buyers and owners
of subdivision lots, respectively, under the terms and conditions of the Deeds of Absolute
Sale and Contracts to Sell in relation to the provisions of PD 957. Third, said Decision
adjudged with finality petitioners' claim as regards their rights over the property in issue.
Fourth, the parties in the HLURB case and here are the same, namely, petitioners and
respondents. Certainly, there is privity between petitioners and the Dofia Caridad & De
Guzman Subd. Home Lot Owners, Inc. in that they substantially share the same interest and
petitioners herein are members of the association. To be sure, the issues passed upon by the
HLURB in determining the contractual obligations of the parties, specifically whether or not:
(I) petitioners have rights over the property; (2) the Deeds of Sale and Contracts to Sell
executed by Antonio in favor of petitioners are valid; and (3) petitioners are buyers in good
faith, shall also be adjudged in a complaint for quieting of title. The two cases, although
involving different causes of action, have the same undedying issue, that is, whether or not
petitioners have rights over the property in issue. Indeed, quieting of title is a common law
remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the complainant and other claimants, not only to put things in their proper place, to make
the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for
the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he
may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best.38 Prescinding from the
above, the conclusion in HLURB Case No. REM-0292-C-96-LSG-Xl-REM-021298-0133 that the
Deeds of Absolute Sale and Contracts to Sell by and between petitioners and Antonio are null
and void, is conclusive upon this case. Verily, in determining the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants in an action for quieting of title, the validity of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale and Contracts to Sell is a material, if not a decisive, factor. The determination
of petitioners' right over the property hinges on the validity of the Deeds of Sale and
Contracts to Sell. Since the issue of said validity had been resolved in the case for Specific
Performance before the HLURB, it cannot again be litigated in the instant case without
virtually impeaching the correctness of the decision of the former case.39 As an aside, the
Court agrees with the CA that the application of the doctrine of res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment in resolving the instant case would not result to an inequitable
administration of justice since petitioners will be duly refunded of their payments, including
their costs for the improvements, as explicitly ordered in the HLURB Decision. 
PHIL PORTS AUTHORITY V NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING
Issue
The sole issue for resolution of this Court is whether the CA erred when it issued the
Amended Decision affirming the September 2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC
Order, and directing PPA to execute a cargo-handling contract in favor of NIASSI for a full 10-
year term without deducting the period covered by the HOA.
The Court's Ruling
In the instant Petition, PPA contends that the Amended Petition before the RTC had been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214. 56 On
this basis, PPA concludes that it can no longer be compelled to formally execute a contract
with NIASSI upon finality of the Amended Decision, since the term of the perfected contract
already expired on January 3, 2011, 10 years after PPA received notice of NIASSI's conformity
to the Notice of Award.57
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The CA 's findings in CA-G.R. SP No.
00214 constitute the law of the case
between the parties, and are thus
binding herein.
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA held that (i) the 10- year cargo-handling
contract had already been perfected, and (ii) the HOA and its subsequent extensions
constituted partial fulfillment thereof. For emphasis, the relevant portions are reproduced:

Verily, the Holdover Authority (HOA) granted by the private respondent and the
series of extensions allowing the petitioner to operate provisionally the arrastre
service confirm the perfection of their contract despite the delay in its
consummation due to acts attributable to the private respondents. But it cannot
be gainsaid that the series of extensions constitute partial fulfillment and
execution of the contract of cargo handling services.
xxxx
It is therefore Our submission that a perfected contract of cargo handling
services existed when the petitioner won the bidding, given the Notice of Award
and conformed to the conditions set forth in the Notice of Award because the
requirements prescribed in the Notice of Award have no bearing on the
perfection of the contract. On the contrary, it amounted to a qualified acceptance
of petitioner's offer, a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port. Since
the respondent is bound by the contract, the act of taking over the cargo
handling service from the petitioner is violative of its right.58
This decision was affirmed by the Court in toto in G.R. No. 174136, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals isAFFIRMED.59

In tum, the Court's decision became final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from notice
thereof to the parties. From such time, the Court's decision became immutable and
unalterable.60
The Court notes that CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 and the instant Petition both stem from the
Amended Petition, and seek the same relief - the execution of a written contract in
accordance with the Notice of Award. Moreover, both cases involve the same facts, parties
and arguments. For these reasons, the Court believes that the doctrine of the law of the case
is applicable.
The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously made by an
appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same case. 61 Pursuant
to this doctrine, the Court, in De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees
Association (DLSUEANAFTEU),62 (DLSU) denied therein petitioner's prayer for review, since
the petition involved a single issue which had been resolved with finality by the CA in a
previous case involving the same facts, arguments and relief.

We note that both G.R. No. 168477 and this petition are offshoots of petitioner's
purported temporary measures to preserve its neutrality with regard to the
perceived void in the union leadership. While these two cases arose out of
different notices to strike filed on April 3, 2003 and August 27, 2003, it is
undeniable that the facts cited and the arguments raised by petitioner are almost
identical. Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only one relief, that is,
to absolve petitioner from respondent's charge of committing an unfair labor
practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g) in relation to Article 252 of
the Labor Code.
For this reason, we are constrained to apply the law of the case doctrine in light
of the finality of our July 20, 2005 and September 21, 2005 resolutions in G.R. No.
168477. In other words, our previous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' finding -
that petitioner erred in suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the
union and in placing the union funds in escrow considering that the intra-union
dispute between the Aliazas and Bafiez factions was not a justification therefor -
is binding herein. Moreover, we note that entry of judgment in G.R. No. 168477
was made on November 3, 2005, and that put to an end to the litigation of said
issues once and for all.
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.63 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In Heirs of Felino M Timbol, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank64 (Heirs of Timbol), the Court was
confronted with procedural antecedents similar to those attendant in this case. Therein, the
Court affirmed the CA's decision declaring as valid the extrajudicial foreclosure assailed by
petitioners on the basis of factual findings which were affirmed by the Court in a previous
decision that dealt with the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction issued in the same
case. Thus, in Heirs of Timbol, the Court ruled that the CA correctly applied the doctrine of
the law of the case.
 The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law of the case doctrine.
In PNB v. Timbol, PNB brought a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of
Judge Zeus L. Abrogar that issued a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 00-946. The Court struck down this order, holding that the order "was
attended with grave abuse of discretion."
The Court found that the Spouses Timbol "never denied that they defaulted in the
payment of the obligation." In fact, they even acknowledged that they had an
outstanding obligation with PNB, and simply requested for more time to pay.
The Court also held that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage was proper,
since it was done in accordance with the terms of the Real Estate Mortgage,
which was also the Court's basis in finding that Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3 does not apply in that case.
The Court also found that the Spouses Timbol's claim that PNB bloated the
amount of their obligation was "grossly misleading and a gross
misinterpretation" by the Spouses Timbol. The Court noted the Spouses Timbol's
letter to PNB that acknowledged they had an outstanding obligation to PNB, as
well as affirmed that they received the demand letter directing them to pay,
contrary to their claim. Thus, the Court in PNB v. Timbol concluded that the R TC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
No doubt, this Court is bound by its earlier pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol.
The term law of the case has been held to mean that "whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general
rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the
case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing."
xxxx
The Court is bound by its earlier ruling in PNB v. Timbol finding the extrajudicial
foreclosure to be proper. The Court therein thoroughly and thoughtfully
examined the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure in order to determine
whether the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. To allow a reexamination
of this conclusion will disturb what has already been settled and only create
confusion if the Court now makes a contrary finding.
Thus, "[q]uestions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be
regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions
are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all
the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion." 65 (Italics
in the original; emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The Court's discussions in DLSU and Heirs of Timbol are in point here where the allegations
and reliefs prayed for in NIASSI' s Amended Petition show that their disposition required the
RTC to resolve a single issue - whether PP A is bound to formally execute the 10-year cargo-
handling contract pursuant to the Notice of Award. The relevant portions of the Amended
Petition state:

14. Petitioner won the bidding to operate cargo-handling services in the port of
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, for ten (10) years. Notwithstanding due compliance by
petitioner of (sic) all the requirements as indicated in the Notice of Award x x x
petitioner was surprised to receive a communication from respondent CECILIO
 for public respondent to takeover instead the management and operations of
cargo-handling services in the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte.
xxxx
19. The act of public respondent in taking-over the management and operations
of cargo-handling services of petitioner utilizing the existing facilities and
manpower constitutes not only a blatant disregard to the existing permit to
operate, it likewise demonstrates a notorious abuse of power reminiscent of the
dark days of martial rule. The same act is oppressive, capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary and despotic as it denied petitioner of (sic) its right to be heard and
dispute the malicious allegations against it. Essentially, the act is a calculated
move to snatch away the award of the ten-year contract of petitioner to operate
the Cargo Handling Services. x x x
24. WHEREFORE, FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed of
(sic) this Honorable Court that upon filing of this Petition, a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be
issued commanding or enjoining the respondents and all persons acting in their
behalf or direction, to refrain, cease and desist from further implementing the
take-over of the management and operations of the cargo-handling services in
Nasipit Port, Agusan del Norte, as contained in the letter dated 6 December 2004
x x x, and to refrain from issuing similar orders pending resolution of the instant
case and to restore to the herein petitioner the management and operation of the
cargo handling services at the Port of Nasipit and until after the Honorable Court
shall have heard and resolved the application for the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
25. Petitioner further prays that after due notice and hearing, the Writ of
Mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to execute or cause the final
execution of a Cargo-Handling contract between petitioner and the Philippine
Ports Authority as represented by herein respondents. 66 (Underscoring omitted;
emphasis supplied)

In CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA determined the existence of a perfected contract between
PP A and NIASSI in order to ascertain whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in favor of NIASSI was proper. Thus, the sole issue for the RTC's determination had been
resolved in CAG. R. SP No. 00214, when the CA made the following findings:

1. The 10-year cargo-handling contract had been perfected on January 3, 2001,

the date when PP A received notice of NIASSI's conformity to the Notice of
Award;
2. The parties are bound to formally execute the perfected cargo-handling
contract in accordance with the Notice of Award; and
3. NIASSI's operations during the period covered by the HOA constitute partial
fulfillment of the perfected cargo-handling contract.

A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo
during the pendency of the main case. As a necessary consequence, matters resolved in
injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule, conclusively determine the merits of the
main case or decide controverted facts therein.67 Generally, findings made in injunction
proceedings are subject to the outcome of the main case which is usually tried subsequent
to the injunction proceedings.
In this case, however, no further proceedings were conducted after the Decision of the
Supreme Court relative to the injunction proceedings had become final. To be sure, the RTC
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the
main case had become moot and academic because of the finality of said Decision and, on
the basis of the memoranda, the R TC resolved to dismiss the Amended Petition, as it had
nothing left to determine.68 As such, no evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00214 were presented in the main case. This being the case, the factual findings
of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo-handling contract in the injunction proceedings
became conclusive upon finality of this Court's decision affirming the same. These
circumstances thus render the application of the law of the case doctrine proper.
In any case, it is worth noting that NIASSI recognized the perfection of the cargo-handling
contract in its Comment to the instant Petition, thus:

x x x When NIASSI received and signed the "conforme" portion [of the Notice of
Award], there [was] already [a] meeting of minds between the parties as to the
object and cause of the cargo handling contract, including the terms and
duration thereof.69

To NIASSI, the cargo-handling contract was a valid and binding agreement, and it was thus
bound by the concomitant rights and obligations arising therefrom.
 
RULE 37
Dinglasan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145420, September 19, 2006
FACTS:
Violation of bp 22
Dinglasan, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 which was denied by the same
court for lack of merit in an Order6 issued on 4 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, Dinglasan appealed to the Court of Appeals the adverse RTC
Decision dated 16 December 1991, finding him guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
the RTC Order dated 4 September 1992, denying his Motion for Reconsideration. 7
On 26 October 1998, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, People of the Philippines v.
A. Rafael. C. Dinglasan, handed down a Decision, 8 dismissing the appeal, thereby, affirming
in toto the Decision of the RTC finding Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads:
A Motion for Reconsideration 11 was then filed by Dinglasan on 26 August 1999, but the same
was again denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 13 September 1999 for failure to raise
substantial arguments that would warrant reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 June
1999 with an ad cautelam that such denial is final.12
Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was merely
noted without action by this Court in view of the En Banc Resolution dated 7 April 1987 that
no motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. In a Resolution dated 16 December 1999,
this Court directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
RULING:
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final,
the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his
defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of
the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.
While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition should be filed before
the finality of the judgment convicting the appellant, he, however argues that judgment attains finality
only upon the receipt of the order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.
Dinglasan's argument is without merit.
Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by this Court as the subject matter thereof is a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for
Reconsideration was merely noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc
Resolution dated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and was further emphasized by the provision of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that:
Rule 52. – Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or a final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must become final at some definitive date fixed by law.23
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order
denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby
courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in
the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby,
prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall
the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading;
such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the winning party.
It bears stressing further that on 14 October 1999, the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 137800
dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according
to the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:;
Rule 51. - Judgment.
"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. – If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or
final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain
the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be
laid to rest. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.24
Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case on 30
October 2000 was made way beyond the prescriptive period for doing so. The claim of
Dinglasan that he honestly believed that this Court will appreciate his defense of payment as
reiterated in his Second Motion for Reconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-mature to file
the instant petition before receiving the Court's ruling on the said motion, could not be given
credence.
The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the
convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the rule on
completeness of service, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes
beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.25
Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly made because the evidence sought to
be admitted were not available at the time the instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly,
he claims that this evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence as contemplated
by law.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment.
The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.26
These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry v.
State of Georgia27 where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x
x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it
is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to
satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was
not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it
would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only -
viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of
the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be
granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.
These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. 28
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is
newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered,
and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.29
Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and
Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was
discovered recently or just before the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. The
records, however, show otherwise.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court already considered that transmittal
letter dated 8 October 1985 in rendering its Decision dated 26 October 1998. The pertinent portion of
the Decision reads:
It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10, 1986, (Exhibit "B") no
mention was made of the two (2) manager's checks, considering that at least one of the two
(2), both dated October 8, 1988 (pp. 2-3, Records) was allegedly given to private complainant
on the said date (pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment in kind or dacion en
pago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial court correctly noted that, "x x x
accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of more than one million pesos, in
the form of manager's checks, as replacement of a check that bounced, without any
supporting document." (p. 8, Decision, Criminal Case No. 21238).
We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is no evidence establishing
that accused-appellant asked for the return of the Combank Check in the same way that the
PTB Check had been returned, other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said
check had been considered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check had
already bounced. (p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd that accused-appellant
would replace the Combank Check with an amount more than the P515,000.00, if the whole
indebtedness was still subject to final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit "5")
accused-appellant issued Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check. Hence, it is quite
quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask for the return of the Combank check after having
issued two (2) manager's check.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be presented in this case was
recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperate attempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a
cause that has long been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this Court but never did so
in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked an evidence which was
decisively claimed to have such significance that might probably change the judgment.
The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as
evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed
before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not
newly discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was already weighed by the
appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless review of decisions, where
losing litigants, in delaying the disposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether
through a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discovered evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 
 • Marikina Valley Development Corp. v. Flojo, G.R. No. 110801, December 8, 1995
The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by a decision of a trial court may move to set
aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be granted when (a) the judgment had awarded
"excessive damages;" (b) there was "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision;" or (c) "the
decision was against the law."2
A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) or (c) above must
point out specifically the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions. 3
A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance — that is, when it
satisfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court — interrupts the cunning of the
period to perfect an appeal. 4 A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with those
requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated as pro forma intended merely to delay the
proceedings and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the reglementary period. 5 The
net result will be dismissal of the appeal for having been unseasonably filed.
The question in every case is, therefore, whether a motion for reconsideration is properly
regarded as having satisfied the requirements, noted above, of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
As already pointed out, the Court of Appeals took the position that where a motion for
reconsideration merely "reiterates" or "repleads" the same arguments which had been
previously considered and resolved in the decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion is
a pro forma one. In taking this position, the appellate court quoted at some length from a prior
decision of this Court:
. . . Said the Supreme Court in "Dacanay v. Alvendia, et al.," 30 SCRA 31, to wit:
In Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, recently decided by this Court, we once again called the attention of the
bar and litigants to the "principle already forged by this Court . . . that a motion for reconsideration
which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro forma and does not stop the period of appeal
from slipping away." Mr. Justice Dizon pointed out in his concurring opinion that "The motion
aforesaid is pro forma on yet another ground, in substance it was but a reiteration of reasons and
arguments previously set forth in respondent Sto. Domingo's memorandum submitted to the trial
court and which the latter had already considered, weighed and resolved adversely to him when it
rendered its decision on the merits." And earlier in Lonaria v. De Guzman, we held that "[T]he filing
of the second motion on January 22, 1963 did not suspend the running of the period, first, because it
was " pro forma based on grounds already existing at the time of the first motion." 6 (Emphasis partly
in the original and partly supplied)
It should, however, be noted that the circumstance that a motion for reconsideration deals with the
same issues and arguments posed and resolved by the trial court in its decision does not
necessarily mean that the motion must be characterized as merely pro forma. More than two (2)
decades ago, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion, in Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,7 to point out that a pleader preparing a motion for reconsideration
must of necessity address the arguments made or accepted by the trial court in its decision:
. . . . Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence (Rule
37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues
passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing
only motions for reopening and new trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that
effect, a ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule 37. 8 (Emphases
supplied)
The movant is very often confined to the amplification or further discussion of the same issues
already passed upon by the trial court. Otherwise, his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision, but a new trial or some other remedy. 9
The kinds of motions for reconsideration which have been regarded as merely pro forma are
illustrated by Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals,10 where a one sentence motion for reconsideration,
which read thus:
COMES NOW the petitioners-appellants in the above-entitled case and to this Honorable Court
respectfully move for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on November 8, 1966, copy of
which was received by the undersigned on November 9, 1966, on the ground that the same is
contrary to law and evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
was considered a pro forma motion for total failure to specify the findings or conclusions in
the trial court's decision which were supposedly not supported by evidence or were contrary
to law. Similarly, in Villarica v. Court of
Appeals, 11 a motion for reconsideration which no more than alleged the following:
1. that the order is contrary to law; and
2. that the order is contrary to the facts of the case,
did not suspend the running of the period for appeal, being a pro forma motion merely. These
kinds of motion present no difficulty at all.
A motion for reconsideration which is not as starkly bare as in Crisostomo and in Villarica, but which,
as it were, has some flesh on its bones, may nevertheless be rendered pro forma where the
movant fails to make reference to the testimonial and documentary evidence on record or the
provisions of law said to be contrary to the trial court's conclusions. In other words, the
movant is also required to point out succinctly why reconsideration is warranted. In Luzon
Stevedoring Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 12 the Supreme Court declared that:
it is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should state what part of the decision is
contrary to law or the evidence; it should also point out why it is so. Failure to explain why
will render the motion for reconsideration pro forma. (Emphasis supplied)
Where a substantial bonafide effort is made to explain where and why the trial court should be
regarded as having erred in its main decision, the fact that the trial court thereafter found such
argument unmeritorious or as inadequate to warrant modification or reversal of the main decision,
does not, of course, mean that the motion for reconsideration should have been regarded, or was
properly regarded, as merely pro forma.
It is important to note that the above case law rests upon the principle that a motion for
reconsideration which fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 1 (c) and 2 of Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court, and is therefore pro forma merely, has no other purpose than to gain time. It is
intended to delay or impede the progress of proceedings and the rule that such motion for
reconsideration does not stop the period of appeal from "slipping away" reflects both poetic and
substantial justice. In Estrada, et al. v. Sto. Domingo, et al., 13 the Court underlined.
[T]he principle [previously] forged by this Court — that a motion for reconsideration which has no
other purpose than to gain time is pro forma and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping
away. It is in recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a motion for reconsideration in an
election case is taken advantage of for purposes of delay to the prejudice of the adverse party or
where such motion forms part of a matrix delay, that motion does not stop running of the five-day
period for appeal. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the movant merely to delay
the proceedings, our Court has refused to characterize the motion as simply pro forma. Thus, in the
Guerra Enterprises case, the Court took note of the fact that the motion for reconsideration had been
filed within barely twelve (12) days (the reglementary period was then thirty [30] days) after receipt
by the counsel for the movant party, which fact negated the suggestion that the motion had been
used as "a mere delaying tactic." 15 Dacanay v. Alvendia, 16 on which the Court of Appeals had
relied, is not in fact in conflict with the cases we have above referred to. In Dacanay, the motion for
reconsideration was in effect a fourth motion for reconsideration: the "reasons and arguments" set
out in the motion for reconsideration had on three previous occasions been presented to the trial
court and each time considered and rejected by the trial court. In Lonario v. De Guzman, 17 the
motion for reconsideration which the Court characterized as pro forma was in fact a second motion
for reconsideration based on grounds already existing at the time the first motion for reconsideration
was filed. Further, at the time of the filing of the second motion, the period to appeal had already
lapsed. This Court dismissed the case for having been appealed beyond the reglementary period. In
Samudio v. Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur, 18 the Court had before it a "so-called motion for
new trial based exactly on the very ground alleged in [defendant's] first motion for reconsideration
dated October 17, 1952" and accordingly, held that the motion for new trial did not suspend the
period for perfecting an appeal "because it [was] mere repetition of the [first] motion for
reconsideration of October 17, 1952." 19 (Emphasis supplied)
We turn then to the application of the above standards to the motion for reconsideration in the case
at bar. The text of petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated 7 November 1991 is quoted below:
(a) There [was] no sufficient evidence introduced to prove the alleged fact that the down-
payment for the property in question came from Jose Sytangco. Private transactions are
presumed to be fair and regular (citations omitted). The regularity of defendant Liamzon's
transaction with the Prietos for the sale of the property implies that the consideration came
from her and not from plaintiff. This presumption cannot be rebutted by the bare testimony of
abiased witness;
(b) The money used to pay for the property not belonging to the plaintiff, there could never be a trust
between him and defendant Liamzon. Even then, plaintiff merely claimed that what belong to him
was only the down-payment, not the total amount used to purchase the property, that the defendant
Liamzon was the one paying the installments can be gleaned from the fact that while plaintiff
allegedly authorized defendant Liamzon to purchase the property sometime in 1968, it was only in
1981 that he came to know that the property was titled in the name of defendant corporation.
Plaintiff's (Jose Reyes Sytangco) total lack of knowledge about the transactions regarding the
property for 13 long years, meant that he had no contract with the Prietos, the seller during this
period. Assuming without admitting that the down-payment belonged to plaintiff, he is only entitled to
reimbursement but not title to the property;
(c) Piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only to cases where the corporation was created for
purposes of fraud, usually in tax cases; fraud, however, being the exception rather than the rule
should be proven by convincing evidences. That defendant Liamzon is a director of defendant
Corporation is not indicative of fraud. The money used to buy the property being advances from
defendant corporation, there is nothing wrong to have said property be titled in the name of the
corporation to offset said advances;
(d) It may be mentioned that the ejectment counterpart of this case had already been decided with
finality in favor of defendant corporation. 20
In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners claimed that the evidence submitted was insufficient to
show that the downpayment for the purchase of the España Street property had in fact come from
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest Jose Reyes Sytangco. In effect, petitioners here aver
that the presumption of regularity of private transactions carried out in the ordinary course of
business had not been overturned by the testimony of Jose Reyes Sytangco himself. This reflected
petitioners' appraisal of the trial court's conclusion that Jose and Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had
handed over to Milagros Liamzon the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the downpayment of the
Reyes Sytangco spouses on the España lot. The trial court had not discussed the presumption of
regularity of private transactions invoked by petitioners.
In paragraph (b) of their motion, petitioners, building upon their paragraph (a), argued that since the
money used to pay the property did not belong to the plaintiff, no constructive trust arose between
Jose Reyes Sytangco and Milagros Liamzon. Petitioners further argue that assuming that the money
for the downpayment had really come from the Reyes Sytangco spouses, the rest of the payments
on the España property had been made by Milagros Liamzon. Accordingly, they argue that the
Reyes Sytangco spouses would be entitled only to reimbursement of the downpayment and not to
reconveyance of the property itself. The trial court had not addressed this argument in its decision;
the trial judge had found Milagros Liamzon's testimony concerning whose money had been used in
the purchase of the lot as "filled with contradictions" which seriously impaired her credibility. 21
The third argument of petitioners in their motion assailed the reliance of the trial court upon
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil by asserting that that doctrine was available only in
cases where the corporation itself had been created for purposes of fraud. Implicitly,
petitioners argue that no evidence had been submitted to show that Marikina Valley had been
created precisely "for purposes of fraud." The trial court had not touched on this argument. In
paragraph (d) of their motion, petitioners aver that the ejectment suit instituted by them had been
decided in their favor. The trial court's decision had not mentioned such an ejectment suit.
We are, therefore, unable to characterize the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners as simply
pro forma. That motion for reconsideration, it may be noted, had been filed no more than ten
(10) days after receipt of the trial court's decision by petitioner Marikina Valley.
It is scarcely necessary to add that our conclusion that petitioners' motion was not pro
forma, should not be regarded as implying however indirectly that that motion was
meritorious.
We note finally that because the doctrine relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration impacts
upon the reality and substance of the statutory right of appeal, that doctrine should be applied
reasonably, rather than literally. The right to appeal, where it exists, is an important and valuable
right. Public policy would be better served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity
to review the decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a
literal application of the procedural rule relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration.
 
 • Carreon v. Aguillon, G.R. No. 240108 , June 29, 2020 
July 28, 2017 which dismissed the Annulment Petition based purely on procedural grounds.
in the same February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA proceeded to tackle the merits of the Annulment
Petition itself.
Clearly, the CA's February 19, 2018 Resolution is a new ruling based on legal grounds that are
totally different from its original July 28, 2017 Resolution; hence, when Carreon filed the
March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration, he was technically filing a first motion for
reconsideration of the February 19, 2018 Resolution wherein the CA, for the first time,
traversed the merits of his Annulment Petition. 
= hindi 2 MRs
+
 
Carreon's March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration can hardly be considered as a second motion
for reconsideration as contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the aforesaid motion should have actually
been treated as a first motion for reconsideration because it assailed the CA's reconsidered ruling
(i.e., the Resolution dated February 19, 2018), and not its original Resolution dated July 28, 2017.
As will be discussed below, these Resolutions were premised on completely different legal grounds
from one another.
To recount, Carreon's earlier Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation was in response
to the CA's original Resolution dated July 28, 2017 which dismissed the Annulment Petition
based purely on procedural grounds. As such, this motion was intended to address the
alleged procedural infirmities pointed out by the CA. In its February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA
reconsidered its original resolution, holding that there was a "rectification of the infirmities" in the
Annulment Petition.22 Moreover, in the same February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA proceeded to
tackle the merits of the Annulment Petition itself. In particular, the CA held that the issue of extrinsic
fraud raised in the Annulment Petition was "too unsubstantial to warrant consideration." Moreover,
anent the claim of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the CA, citing the
presumption of regularity in official duties, found that the service of summons upon the defendants
was proper; therefore, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over them. 23
Clearly, the CA's February 19, 2018 Resolution is a new ruling based on legal grounds that are
totally different from its original July 28, 2017 Resolution; hence, when Carreon filed the
March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration, he was technically filing a first motion for
reconsideration of the February 19, 2018 Resolution wherein the CA, for the first time,
traversed the merits of his Annulment Petition. As such, the prohibition on the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration found in Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules did not come into play.
Evidently, what the Rules seek to proscribe is a second motion for reconsideration, which
essentially repeats or reiterates the same arguments already passed upon by the tribunal,
when it resolved the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same party. If the issues had
already been passed upon and there is no substantial argument raised, then the finality and
immutability of a judgment should not be obviated.
Thus, since Carreon's March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration was erroneously treated by the CA
as a second motion for reconsideration, the period within which to file an appeal did not lapse and
consequently, the CA's ruling did not attain finality.
In this regard, while the remand of this case back to the CA appears to be in order so that it may
now pass upon Carreon's arguments in his March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration, the Court
finds it fit to determine whether or not the Annulment Petition has prima facie merit.
In proceeding with the case, the CA ought to be guided by the provisions of Rule 47 of the Rules,
including Sections 7 and 9 thereof which state:
Section 7. Effect of judgment. - A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or
final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action
being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as
if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
Section 9. Relief available. - The judgment of annulment may include the award of damages,
attorney's fees and other relief.
If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed the court may
issue such orders of restitution or other relief as justice and equity may warrant under the
circumstances.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA erred in noting without action Carreon's March 8, 2018 Motion for
Reconsideration of its February 19, 2018 Resolution, as well as in dismissing outright his Annulment
Petition. The present petition seeking the grant of the Annulment Petition and other related reliefs
should, however, only be partly granted, considering that the CA must still conduct a trial on its
merits and issue the corresponding judgment in accordance with the parameters of Rule 47 of the
Rules.

Isang abogado ang sinampahan ng kasong administratibo DI UMANO dahil sa

pangangaliwa ng asawa ng complainant, at malala pa, abogado pa nila mismo ito
Ayon kay Mr Elpidio Tiong, asawa ni MISIS Elena Tiong, na dati niya pang
napagsuspetyahan na nangangaliwa ito at ito ay napatunayan niya nang mahuli niyang
na ka I LOVE YOUHAN ng abogado ang kanyang asawa sa telepono.

Inamin naman ni Atty. Florendo ang kanyang pangangaliwa subalit depensa niya, na
hindi siya pwedeng madisbar dahil pinatawad umano siya ng kanyang asawa dahil sa
affidavit na pinirmahan nila nagsasabing di umano, na pinapatawad niya na ang
naturang abogado.

At dito na rin Nagsampa ng kaso si Mr Tiong laban kay Atty. Florendo sa ground ng 
gross immorality at grave misconduct dahil sa kanyang pangangaliwa.

Pinatawan naman ng IBP si Atty. Florendo ng  isang taong suspension from the practice
of law.

Ayon naman sa Korte Suprema, tama lang, na patawan ng parusa si Atty. Florendo
dahil sa paglabag nito ng Canon 7, Rule 7.03, ng Code of Professional Responsibility
na sinasabi na 

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

Sinabi din ng Korte na hindi mapapawalang bisa ang kaso dahil sa affidavit na
nagsasabing pinatawad na si Atty. Florendo. Ayon sa Korte Suprema, ang mga kaso
na tungkol sa disbarment o suspension ay sui generis at hindi ito maiihantulad
ordinaryong kaso tulad ng mga civil case.

At ang kasabihan ika nga, kapag nahuli na, wag kang aamin, back to you